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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files

OA/ID Number: 91122
Folder ID Number: 91122-003

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (October 1989 - April 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	William Tobey to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. Defense & Space Review (2 pp.)	10/6/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Report	Re: DST 03 (8 pp.)	10/10/89	(b)(1)	S
01c. Background Report	Re: Issue (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02b. Cable	Re: Gorbachev Letter to the President (2 pp.)	10/28/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Letter	Prime Minister Wilfried Martens to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/27/89	(b)(1)	
02d. Letter	Prime Minister Lubbers to President Bush (1 pp.)	10/5/89	(b)(1)	
02e. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Correspondence (1 pp.)	11/1/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Report	Guess Who's Coming to the Med: What Gorbachev Might Have Up His Sleeve in December [FOIA restrictions redacted] (21 pp.)	11/8/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
04. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Brent Scowcroft Re: Soviet Summitt Objectives (3 pp.)	11/8/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: USSR Chronological Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (October 1989 - April 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1038
OA/ID Number: 91122-003
Date Closed: 3/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Memo	Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Possible U.S. Initiatives at the Malta Meeting (2 pp.)	11/20/89	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Arnold Kanter/Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Possible Initiatives in the Context of Malta (2 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Report	Re: Changes in the Defense Program and Possible Initiatives in the Context of Malta (12 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Arms Control -- Savings and Costs (4 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Memo	Don Pilling to Brent Scowcroft Re: Arms Control -- Savings and Costs (1 pp.)	10/24/89	(b)(1)	S
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Memorandum of Agreement for the INF Treaty (1 pp.)	10/28/89	(b)(1)	C
08b. Memo	Judyt Mandel to Brent Scowcroft Re: MOA for INF Treaty (2 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
09a. Memo	William Tobey to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item: Defense & Space Talks (1 pp.)	1/30/90	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memo	Secretary Cheney to Secretary of State Re: Defense and Space Issues at the Moscow Ministerial (2 pp.)	1/27/90	(b)(1)	S
09c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points Defense and Space (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10a. Memo	John Gordon/Rich Davis to G. Philip Hughes Re: General Scowcroft, Talking Points for Oval Office Meeting, Thursday, February 1, 1990, 2:30 PM (1 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	S
10b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points Pre-Ministerial Arms Control Meeting (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11. Outline	Re: Meeting with Senators Warner and Nunn (4 pp.)	2/21/90	(b)(1)	S
12a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: START Issues to be Addressed Before the May Foreign Ministers' Meeting (1 pp.)	4/11/90	(b)(1)	S
12b. List	Re: START Issues for Principals (1 pp.)	4/9/90	(b)(1)	S
12c. List	Re: START Interagency Issues (1 pp.)	4/9/90	(b)(1)	S
12d. List	Re: START Issues for Geneva (1 pp.)	4/9/90	(b)(1)	S
12e. Memo	Rich Davis to Brent Scowcroft Re: START Issues for the May Ministerial (1 pp.)	4/9/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Talking Points	Re: Building on START (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908097
RECEIVED: 10 OCT 89 20

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: TOBEY
KANTER

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
ARMS CONTROL
USSR
SPACE POLICY
START
LIMITED ACCESS

5

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: US DEFENSE & SPACE REVIEW

ACTION: OBE PER SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 14 OCT 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: TOBEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KANTER
		TOBEY

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 3/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 6, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: WILLIAM TOBEY

SUBJECT: U.S. Defense & Space Review

The time has come for a serious review of our Defense & Space position for three reasons: (1) during the broader review of national strategy last Spring, agencies were not prepared to step up to the issues; (2) the Soviet position on linkage presented at the Wyoming Ministerial has brought Defense & Space issues to center stage, and, (3) Ambassadors Cooper and Burt have sent backchannel messages to Secretaries Cheney and Baker respectively suggesting ways to modify our position.

Our policy options are sufficiently detailed that they require staffing before they can usefully be engaged by senior policy makers. The paper at Tab I is an example of what such an options paper might look like. But to conduct a successful review, we need to have top-down guidance from your colleagues to their staffs to take the review seriously.

The top-down guidance can be obtained in two ways. You might have an informal discussion with Secretaries Baker and Cheney, Judge Webster and General Powell that simply concentrates on the importance of the review and the need to make it a thorough and candid discussion of options. Or, you might use the paper at Tab II, to focus such a discussion and provide more specific guidance to the bureaucracy as to what is and is not under consideration. This latter approach might be particularly useful should the President wish to see options for big proposals (e.g. dropping heretofore U.S. insistence on a right to deploy SDI, perhaps in exchange for a ban on MIRV'ed ICBMs or some other large objective.)

The advantage of the paper at Tab II is that it could serve as the basis for more concrete guidance and therefore a more productive review. The disadvantage is that it may not be possible to provide such guidance.

Regardless of your decision on the paper at Tab II, we also need commitments for your colleagues that the review will be handled

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quietly. Leaks will hurt us badly, in Geneva and on the Hill. In order to minimize the possibility of leaks we recommend that you ask your colleagues to designate one official per agency to participate in a compartmented, NSC-staff chaired review, at the deputy assistant secretary level. Papers may be shared up, but not down.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve our conducting a review of the U.S. Defense & Space position as outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____

That you discuss with your colleagues the importance of the review.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Or, discuss with your colleagues the paper at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I DST 003
Tab II Sensitive Arms Control document

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October 10, 1989

DST 03 (U)

Purpose. To review U.S. Defense & Space positions in light of developments at the Wyoming ministerial meeting. (~~S~~)

U.S. Position. In returning to the Defense & Space talks in June, the U.S. negotiating group was instructed to pursue the following objectives:

- o to preserve the right to pursue the SDI program within the obligations of the ABM Treaty in order to determine the technical feasibility of advanced strategic defenses;
- o to discuss with the Soviet Union a cooperative transition to a strategic regime based on effective defenses; and,
- o to make explicit the right to deploy effective strategic ballistic missile defenses after a non-withdrawal period. (~~S~~)

The means by which the negotiating group was to pursue these objectives were several fold:

- o to preserve U.S. rights to conduct SDI testing, while countering Soviet arguments that permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty must be agreed, the U.S. offered a unilateral assurance that we would only conduct ABM tests from designated test satellites, and that the number of these platforms would be no greater than fifteen. Furthermore, the U.S. proposed that each side undertake to notify the other of launches of ABM test satellites and ABM tests in orbit. (~~S~~)
- o to promote stability during a transition, the U.S. offered a protocol to a Defense & Space Treaty, including reciprocal briefings and visits to strategic defense sites. We also proposed on-going discussions on strategic stability to further a stable transition. (~~S~~)
- o to make explicit a right to deploy strategic defenses after a non-withdrawal period, the U.S. draft Defense & Space Treaty built on the Washington Summit Joint Statement, in which Gorbachev agreed that after a non-withdrawal period, each side would be free to pursue its own course of action. (~~S~~)

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The U.S. Defense & Space negotiating group returned to Geneva for Round XII instructed to: probe the Soviets for details of their new approach on Defense & Space issues; continue discussions on predictability measures; and, seek to determine if the Soviets have new proposals on activities under the ABM Treaty. If asked about whether the U.S. Treaty remains on the table, the negotiating group was instructed to say that it is. Moreover, the U.S. team was instructed to express the continued U.S. commitment to evaluate the feasibility of effective strategic defenses, and to deploy them when ready and to oppose linkage or preconditions to START in any form. Finally, the U.S. negotiating group was authorized to draw on Secretary Baker's talking points from the ministerial meeting, and did so, making the points that the U.S. seeks a separate Defense & Space Treaty, embodying a commitment to discussions of strategic stability lasting not more than three years, at the end of which both sides would be free to decide their course of action on strategic defenses. (S)

Soviet Position. In June, the Soviets returned to the Defense & Space talks with little changed. They continued to link completion of a START Treaty to a U.S. commitment to adhere to a narrow definition of the ABM Treaty. They sought to use the U.S.-proposed predictability measures as a means of verifying compliance with this standard. And, they continued to refuse to work a joint draft Defense & Space Treaty although such work had been agreed to at the Washington Summit and subsequent ministerial meetings. One new development was their hint that they would seek to discuss ASAT limitations in Round XII. (S)

At the Wyoming ministerial, the Soviets announced that they were dropping their requirement for a U.S. commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty as a pre-condition for START. Both sides characterized this as delinkage. The Soviets made clear however, that they claim a right to withdraw from a START Treaty if they determine that the U.S. has gone beyond the ABM Treaty as they define it. Thus, the Soviets have moved from linking their D&S position to the paper of a START Treaty to the reductions following a START Treaty. (S)

The Soviets also said that they would have proposals for resolving permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty in a protocol to the ABM Treaty, which would also include predictability measures. They have hinted that the U.S. would find these proposals more acceptable than the 1987 "list" proposal. Most recently they proposed that the sides sign up to the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, citing the "Brown Statement" on the distinction between research and development. (S)

Thus, in dropping their demand for a non-withdrawal commitment, the Soviets have attempted to drop the Washington Summit Joint Statement framework for a Defense & Space agreement, and in particular the Gorbachev-agreed notion of a right to deploy defenses after a specified period of time. Below are options for dealing with this new Soviet approach. (S)

Activities Under the ABM Treaty.

Option 1. Current U.S. Position.

To clarify testing permitted during the non-withdrawal period and to address stated Soviet concerns, the U.S. provided to the Soviets on October 28, 1988 an authoritative unilateral assurance that:

"In order to demonstrate that the testing of space-based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, does not represent the deployment of such components, the United States is prepared to carry out such permitted testing only from designated ABM test satellites. Any space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile or its elements in flight trajectory shall be designated an ABM test satellite. Further, it is the view of the United States that the number of U.S. designated ABM test satellites in orbit simultaneously shall not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. The United States believes the number 15 falls well below that threshold." (S)

To help clarify ABM testing permitted during the non-withdrawal period and to provide for greater predictability, the U.S. also proposed in the draft Predictability Protocol that the Parties shall provide each other with the following data:

1. Identification, no more than 12 hours after launch of each space object in earth orbit from which a component of an ABM system capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile is to be tested to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory;

2. Notification within 12 hours after a re-entry of an ABM Test Satellite from its orbit or after a change in orbit; and,

3. Notification of a test using such a space object in earth orbit to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory no less than

two hour prior to the conduct of any test. (S)

Thus should the Soviets accept the current U.S. draft predictability protocol, they would necessarily accept certain ABM testing in space, thereby implicitly accepting some aspects of the broad interpretation. (S)

Those who support maintaining the current U.S. position believe that:

(1) The current package of U.S. proposals clarifies sufficiently permitted activities under the ABM Treaty. If accepted by the Soviets, the U.S. initiatives would give us a clear right to test in space, which is our primary objective.

(2) The Soviets have dropped their list proposal as unnecessarily cumbersome and inherently unverifiable. Restrictions on laser power or interceptor velocity cannot be verified because they are easily scaled. On-site inspection would raise very difficult problems related to protecting our NTM assets. Even if inspections were allowed the problems faced are inherently different from other forms of on-site inspection. E.g. RV counting inspections may be achieved with relative certainty and protection of U.S. technology. But, satellites cannot be inspected externally for their potential power output. Moreover, the list proposal could limit SDI technology in unforeseen ways.

(3) It is still too early to determine whether or not the Soviets are willing to accept the U.S. proposals. The testing in space assurance was crafted to respond to a February 1987 speech by Gorbachev speaking as Chairman of the Defense Council. That speech and subsequent statements by senior Soviets emphasized that the primary Soviet concern with SDI testing was that it could over night become deployment. Limiting the number of test satellites and requiring notifications addresses this concern directly.

(4) Congress may be a source of leverage. Some believe that the Soviet message at Jackson Hole was that they very much want to conclude a START agreement. Sen. Nunn and others have made clear that a START Treaty will face ratification trouble if permitted ABM activities are not clarified. At the same time verification problems associated with the "list" proposal or even enforcing the narrow interpretation as the Soviets now seem to propose, may also give the Senate pause. Thus, the Congress may present a position that the terms of the ABM Treaty must be clarified, but not with the Soviet proposal. This can be a source of leverage for the United States. (S)

This option is supported by: (S)

Option 2. Agree to Negotiate Permitted and Prohibited Activities Under the ABM Treaty. (S)

Under this approach, the United States would indicate a willingness to negotiate with the Soviets a list of permitted and prohibited activities with respect to testing in space. The list of activities would be based on a framework of technical characteristics of the devices to be tested. For example, lasers tested in space might be limited below a certain threshold of brightness, or kinetic interceptors tested in space might be limited below a certain acceleration or velocity. Tests below the thresholds would be permitted in any mode, including ABM and ASAT. Tests above the thresholds would be prohibited. (S)

Those who support this option believe:

1. Congress will demand clarification of the ABM Treaty as a precondition to START ratification. Senator Nunn has already laid this marker down. Moreover, he can expect support from conservatives on the Hill who will seek to ensure that SDI testing rights are well understood.

2. The Soviets will not accept the current U.S. proposal in any form. The Soviets have refused for over a year to negotiate on the basis of the January 1988 U.S. proposals. There is no reason to believe they will alter their position.

3. Congress will never permit the U.S. to test under the broad interpretation. Congress has restricted SDI funds to testing under the narrow interpretation for three years in a row and by substantial margins in the House. There is no reason to believe Congress will alter its position.

4. Negotiating permitted and prohibited activities with the Soviet Union may enable us to test under some sort of "narrow plus" formulation. For example, space-based kinetic interceptors might be tested against a strategic missile in ballistic trajectory so long as the interceptor's acceleration capability fell below a given threshold. Such a test would not be permitted under the U.S. understanding of the narrow interpretation. (S)

Option 3. Propose Clarifying Permitted ABM Treaty Activities in Some Other Fashion. (S)

To be provided by agencies with different ideas, if any. (S)

Right to Deploy.

The U.S. draft Defense & Space Treaty calls for an explicit right to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period. The rationale for this position was two-fold: first, it was a quid pro quo for the Soviet demand of a non-withdrawal period; second, it furthered the U.S. objective of facilitating deployment of strategic defenses should they prove feasible. The position was crafted to diminish political difficulties that would be inherent in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. (S)

The Soviet move at Wyoming probably reflects their judgment that they overestimated our ability to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They were willing to drop their demand for a non-withdrawal commitment confident that they still explicitly held hostage START reductions to U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty as they define it. They were particularly willing to make this move inasmuch as it enabled them to evade Gorbachev's agreement at the Washington Summit that after a non-withdrawal period "both sides would be free to pursue their own course of action" with respect to strategic defenses. At the time, Secretary Carlucci confirmed with Shevardnadze that this meant deployment. The U.S. can respond to the Soviet move at Wyoming in several ways.

Option 1. Modify the Current Position. (S)

The present U.S. draft treaty provides that after the non-withdrawal period, either side would have the right to deploy defenses upon six months notice of intent to deploy. The Soviet move at Wyoming removed the hook to hang the right to deploy on. But the U.S. draft could be recrafted to maintain that right in several ways. (S)

Sub-option A. A right to deploy tied to stability talks. (S)

Under this option, the U.S. would propose that should either side decide in the future to move to deployment beyond the ABM Treaty, that side must provide a plan to the other on how such deployment could proceed in a stable way. This plan would form the basis for the future discussions on strategic stability that were suggested in Gorbachev's recent letter. The discussions would take place for a period of no longer than two years, after which, unless the sides had agreed otherwise, either side would be free to deploy defenses after giving six months notice. (S)

Those who support this sub-option believe that:

1. It would facilitate SDI deployments, should effective strategic defenses prove feasible.

2. It would provide a framework for a stable transition, should one occur.

3. It would avoid giving the Soviets a date certain, by which the sides would be free of ABM Treaty restrictions. While the sides would be free to deploy after the two year period of discussions and notice, the period would not begin until a side notified the other of its intent to deploy. Moreover, such an agreement would have the effect of increasing the lead time notice from the present six month notice of withdrawal contained in the ABM Treaty.

4. The proposal counters continued Soviet linkage of their START reductions (as opposed to a START Treaty) to their Defense & Space position. A START Treaty that goes to the Hill with conflicting U.S. and Soviet statements on the status of linkage could well run into trouble. As with permitted and prohibited activities the Senate may not permit ambiguity. The sub-option allows the issue to be deferred on terms favorable for facilitating SDI deployments. (S)

This sub-option is supported by: (S)

Sub-option B. A right to deploy as of a given date. (S)

Under this sub-option the U.S. would press for a right to deploy defenses after a particular date. (S)

Those who favor this sub-option, agree with most of the above reasoning, but argue that the period of negotiations would only serve to undermine support for deployments. They believe that a fixed date removes ambiguity. (S)

This sub-option is supported by: (S)

Sub-option C. Different option if any to be provided. (S)

Option 2. Rely on ABM Treaty Withdrawal Rights and Counter Soviet Linkage Statements. (S)

Under this option, the U.S. would no longer propose an explicit right to deploy defenses after a given event. However, in concluding a START Treaty we would continue to reject any Soviet attempts (including unilateral statements) that going beyond the ABM Treaty would be grounds for reversing START reductions. If necessary, we would make this position clear in Senate ratification

hearings. (S)

Those who support this option believe that:

1. The Soviets will never concede a U.S. right to deploy defenses under any circumstances and the U.S. right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is sufficient to protect our interests.

2. It would be very difficult politically for the Soviets to reverse START reductions and at least the onus would be on the Soviets. In this regard, the future discussions on strategic stability could further support for the U.S. position.

3. There are not enough votes in the Senate to block a START Treaty simply because the Soviets link reductions to abandonment of SDI deployments in a unilateral statement. Those who might do so can simply support a stated U.S. view disavowing the Soviet unilateral statement. (S)

This option is supported by: (S)

Option 3. Rely on ABM Treaty Withdrawal Rights and Do Not Counter Soviet Unilateral Statements on Linkage. (S)

Under this option, the U.S. would rely on its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty if it wished to deploy strategic defenses. We would state that we recognize the interrelationship between offensive and defensive forces. We would agree to discuss this interrelationship in the future discussions on strategic stability. (S)

Those who support this option believe that:

1. The Soviets would not concede a right to deploy defenses under any circumstances.

2. We cannot take a START Treaty to the Senate with conflicting U.S. and Soviet views on linkage to START reductions.

3. As a practical matter, reductions should be linked to the future of strategic defense deployments. The U.S. would certainly wish to review whether or not to pursue START reductions in the face of additional Soviet strategic defenses and we should, therefore, understand the Soviet concerns. (S)

This option is supported by: (S)

Issue

Should the U.S. modify its current positions on (a) its rights to develop and test SDI under the ABM Treaty, and/or (b) its right to deploy SDI?

Background

The Soviets say they have delinked START and Defense and Space in order to facilitate early agreement on START. At the same time, they have made clear that they reserve the right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the U.S. goes outside the boundaries of the ABM Treaty as the Soviets define those boundaries. These moves have occurred against a backdrop of continuing erosion of Congressional budgetary support for SDI. They also have spawned public reactions from Sen. Nunn and Congressman Aspin (privately echoed by Sen. Lugar) that a START agreement which is based on a U.S.-Soviet "agreement to disagree" about the terms of the ABM Treaty would get a cold reception on the Hill.

The key U.S. objectives in the Defense and Space Talks have been:

1. Broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. To secure Soviet acknowledgement of (or acquiescence in) our right to conduct SDI research, development, and testing under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty; and

2. Right to deploy. To be able to deploy SDI without the need to abrogate the ABM Treaty and to secure Soviet agreement to (or acquiescence in) that course of action.

In the view of some, the shift in the Soviet position provides either the occasion or requirement for the U.S. to review one or both of these objectives and/or our strategies for achieving them. Such a review will require top-down direction to be effective. The decision on how to proceed with be affected in part by judgments about the prospects for realizing our two objectives, and by the likely impact of the alternatives on SDI, on the resolution of outstanding issues in START, and on Congressional support for SDI and strategic force modernization.

Discussion

Visible and concrete progress on START could help sustain Congressional support for both offensive force modernization and SDI (the latter by demonstrating that SDI is not an "obstacle" to a START agreement). Depending on whatever is agreed with the Soviets about terms of the ABM Treaty, the result could provide more latitude for SDI testing than Congress might permit in the absence of such an agreement. Conversely, progress on SDI could

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be hampered, either by the imposition of new limits on SDI-related activities, or by the erosion of political and budgetary support for the program. Moreover, if progress on START is seen to have come at the expense of SDI, SDI supporters may be unwilling to work for START ratification.

We can respond either tactically or strategically to the Soviet moves. Tactical questions include whether to engage the Soviets on their proposal to discuss "clarifications" of the ABM Treaty that would define what SDI testing would be allowed and forbidden, whether to continue to press the Soviets to acknowledge a U.S. right to deploy SDI after an agreed period, and how to engage the Soviet proposal for a mutual understanding about ABM developments that would allow a side to withdraw from the START Treaty. In principle, we could engage the Soviets on issues such as these for some time whether or not we modify our two core objectives, provided U.S.-Soviet agreement on them was not deemed essential to our goals for START or SDI.

The strategic questions turn on whether and, if so, when we should modify either or both of our D&S objectives. Specifically, should we:

1. Be prepared to seek agreement with the Soviets on "clarifications" of the ABM Treaty that would permit some SDI activities that go beyond the "narrow" interpretation, but would prohibit some SDI activities that would be accommodated under the "broad" interpretation; or should we continue to press for Soviet acceptance of our rights under the "broad" interpretation?

2. Be prepared to defer resolution of our right to deploy SDI after an agreed period; or should we continue to press for Soviet acceptance of our right to deploy without either requiring us to abrogate the ABM Treaty or agreeing to Soviet abrogation of the START Treaty; or should we be willing to put the possibility of delaying SDI deployment "on the table" as a trade for a major Soviet concession in START (e.g., agreement to a deMIRVing initiative).

Decisions on whether to address either or both strategic questions now rest essentially on political judgments that must be made at senior levels. Following these decisions, the interagency process can develop the appropriate options and analysis for senior level review.

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CHRON FILE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

8700

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

I pulled this out for 11-3 trip

Chairman Gorbachev of the USSR - October 18, 1989

Chairman Gorbachev apprises you of the positive impression he has of your meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. He discusses matters on arms control, chemical weapons, verification and bilateral relations. The cable merits your personal review.

5

Prime Minister Martens of Belgium - October 14, 1989

Prime Minister Martens acknowledges your letter of August 22nd on Panama. He states that Belgium, in coordination with the EEC, supports both the Opposition's efforts towards achieving democracy and the actions taken by the OAS against the Noriega regime.

Prime Minister Lubbers of The Netherlands - October 5, 1989

Prime Minister Lubbers, in cooperation with the EPC, offers his full support to the government of Colombia in its campaign against drug traffickers.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 02

RBT VANERON
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TAGS OR US PARM PREL
SUBJECT GORBACHEV LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
-
1 ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2 PARA 3 CONTAINS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF AN OCTOBER 18 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. IT WAS DELIVERED BY CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV DURING AN OCTOBER 26 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.
3 BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:
HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY A SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, MAY I CONVEY TO YOU MY GOOD WISHES AND ALSO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY THOUGHTS. MR. EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE INFORMED ME ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH YOU AND THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS HE HAD WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER. WE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE QUITE SATISFIED THAT IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO ENTER A NEW PHASE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND ALSO THAT A LARGER MEASURE OF CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED. IT IS MY HOPE THAT FOLLOWING DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND VIENNA AS WELL AS FURTHER MINISTERIALS YOU AND I SHALL BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OUR NEW ABM-RELATED PROPOSAL OFFERS A CHANCE FOR COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. WE FEEL THAT SOME SOLUTIONS MAY ALSO BE POSSIBLE ON THE ISSUE OF SLCMS AND ALCMS. IN SHORT, WE SEEM TO HAVE COME WITHIN REACH OF THE SECOND TREATY IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS BOUND TO BE HIGHLY ACCLAIMED BY THE ENTIRE HUMAN RACE.
SIMILARLY, PROSPECTS NOW LOOK GOOD FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ALSO ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE -- THE TWO AREAS WHERE WE HAVE NOW A BROAD-BASED COINCIDENCE OF APPROACHES. I WISH TO TELL YOU PERSONALLY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE STEPS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE IN THOSE AREAS WHICH HAVE PROVED QUITE HELPFUL.
IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WORK ON THE PROTOCOLS TO THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING COMPLETED BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IN THE COURSE OF MY MEETING WITH YOU WE COULD SIGN AND

SUBMIT THEM FOR RATIFICATION. THIS WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO ENHANCE UNIVERSAL SECURITY.
WHAT I WISH TO REITERATE MOST FIRMLY IS THAT WE STAND FOR AGREEMENT ON TOTAL CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, ESPECIALLY SINCE VERIFICATION ISSUES NOW APPEAR TO BE MANAGEABLE.
THE STAGE WE HAVE JOINTLY REACHED IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL PROBLEMS IS AN INDICATION OF THE MATURITY AND

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2806-MR
12/2/2016 MM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRODUCTIVENESS OF THE SOVIET-U S DIALOGUE IN THIS AREA IN ADDITION TO BROADER UNDERSTANDING IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MEASURE OF COOPERATION ON A COMPROMISE BASIS
IT IS A GOOD SIGN THAT SOVIET-U S TIES BETWEEN GENERAL PUBLIC AND IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE ARE ON THE RISE AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE INAUGURATION IN MOSCOW A FEW DAYS AGO OF AN IMPRESSIVE EXHIBITION "UNITED STATES-89" WHICH I TOURED LAST WEEK
I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR THE KIND GREETINGS YOU CONVEYED THROUGH MR EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE FOR YOUR WISHES OF SUCCESS TO SOVIET PERESTROYKA OF COURSE WE ARE KEENLY FOLLOWING THE REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE ONGOING TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION IT IS MY HOPE THAT THERE IS EFFECTIVE RECOGNITION IN WASHINGTON THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF OUR REFORMS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. IF THAT IS THE CASE OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAY EXPECT BROAD PROSPECTS TO OPEN BEFORE THEM, WHICH IT WILL BE YOUR AND MY TASK TO MAKE A REALITY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.
CARRYING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU WILL BE MR. YEVGENI PRIMAKOV, HEAD OF THE VISITING SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, WHICH PLANS TO FAMILIARIZE ITSELF WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, SHARE INFORMATION ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN OUR COUNTRY, AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATORS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.
IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE DELEGATION WILL BE ACCORDED A WARM WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES.
WITH PROFOUND RESPECT AND LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR EARLY MEETING.
KREMLIN MOSCOW
OCTOBER 18, 1989
SIGNED MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
END TEXT OF LETTER.
KIMMITT
BT
#5904

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PRES NOTED SUMMARY

LE PREMIER MINISTRE

A4/CS/1045/89

Bruxelles, le 14 septembre 1989

8925128
'89 OCT-27 10:12 PM

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à votre lettre du 22 août 1989 relative à la situation au Panama.

Les arguments que vous y avez développés ont retenu toute mon attention. Dans cette optique, les Autorités de mon pays ont participé activement aux consultations des douze Etats membres de la C.E.E. au titre de la coopération politique européenne.

Les instances européennes sont, dans ce cadre, convenues de ce qui suit :

- suspension de la représentation des Douze à Panama aux cérémonies officielles et aux invitations par des membres du Gouvernement ou des Forces de défense;

- intensification des relations avec l'opposition;

- refus à l'avenir de tout engagement de soutenir le Panama dans les organisations internationales;

- ralentissement des programmes bilatéraux de coopération technique à l'exception de l'aide à caractère humanitaire ou social;

Son Excellence
Monsieur George BUSH
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

WASHINGTON

- maintien de la consultation sur la situation au Panama avec l'OEA et les pays du mécanisme permanent (Groupe des Huit);

- examen par la Commission Européenne de la suspension de la participation du Panama à la coopération économique dans le cadre du dialogue permanent CEE-Amérique Centrale. La Présidence de la CEE, au nom des douze Etats membres, va entreprendre une démarche auprès de l'O.E.A. pour informer cette organisation de la portée des sanctions et mesures prises à l'égard du régime que le Général NORIEGA impose au Panama.

La Belgique ne manquera certes pas, à l'avenir, d'adopter toujours dans le cadre de la coopération politique des Douze, toute autre initiative susceptible de traduire la solidarité des Nations démocratiques avec le peuple panaméen dans son aspiration à la démocratie et dans sa volonté d'assurer le respect des Droits de l'Homme.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération

et de ma fidèle amitié,

Wilfried Martens

Wilfried MARTENS,
Premier Ministre

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

MINISTER-PRESIDENT

8925137
'89 OCT-28 9:08 AM

The Hague, 5 October 1989

Mr. President, dear George,

The Netherlands too is concerned about the situation in Colombia, which demonstrates that resolute action against the drug traffickers is urgently needed. The government of Colombia can count on the support of the Netherlands and that of its partners in European Political Cooperation in its campaign against the drug traffickers. This point was made most recently in the EPC-statement of 26 September 1989.

Minister Hans van den Broek is devoting a great deal of attention to this issue and, in consultation with his EPC partners, is considering specific ways in which assistance may be provided. He will continue to keep in close touch with Jim Baker on this matter.

T.a.t.

R.F.M. Lubbers

The President of the United States of America
The White House
WASHINGTON DC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
W/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8700

November 1, 1989

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON GVM for

SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence materials received by the Secretariat since Tuesday, October 24th.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary (Tab I) to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Summary for the President
Tab A Gorbachev - USSR
Tab B Martens - Belgium
Tab C Lubbers - Netherlands

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
W/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By GVL NARA, Date 5/4/11

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909853
RECEIVED: 06 DEC 89 16

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: UNKNOWN

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: ESSAY BY DIRECTORATE OF INTEL RE WHAT GORBACHEV MIGHT HAVE UP HIS SLEEVE IN DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 09 DEC 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKWILL
		RICE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Report	Guess Who's Coming to the Med: What Gorbachev Might Have Up His Sleeve in December [FOIA restrictions redacted] (21 pp.)	11/8/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (October 1989 - April 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/9/2023

Date Closed:	3/17/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91122-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0984-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/2/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

9853

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12/5/89

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502

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

8 November 1989

Guess Who's Coming to the Med:

What Gorbachev Might Have Up His Sleeve in December

Gorbachev has so regularly done the unexpected that some sort of surprise has almost come to seem the norm. Many of Gorbachev's unexpected moves have stemmed from the urgency with which he is pursuing domestic change and his drive to manage rather than respond to events. He has demonstrated that he sees his foreign policy and domestic goals to be inextricably intertwined, and has set an ambitious foreign policy agenda for next year. At the same time he faces a deteriorating situation at home and unprecedented turmoil next door in Eastern Europe, while paradoxically enjoying his strongest position ever within the Soviet leadership. These circumstances suggest he will take more bold initiatives sooner rather than later. (b)(3)

The most likely areas for bold, unexpected initiatives are strategic and naval arms control:

- o On START, a variety of specific initiatives to accelerate progress, or a package of far-reaching strategic cuts to replace the current START framework.

- o On naval issues, proposals for unilateral or mutual reductions--in forces or

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This paper was prepared by the Office of Soviet Analysis' (b)(3)

Praise and compliments can be directed to any or all of the above.

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0984-MR
MM 12/2/2016

naval presence--designed to break down US resistance to holding talks on naval arms control.

The dynamics of a relatively unstructured meeting, however, give Gorbachev the opportunity to offer initiatives affecting any aspect of US-Soviet relations. (b)(3)

Scope Note

WARNING--The following essay is the result of a deliberate attempt to flesh out less likely or unlikely actions and statements, especially those that would require a US response. The principal criterion for inclusion was the ability to make a plausible case in favor of some event. We did not systematically attempt to contrast these less likely excursions with what we judge to be most likely, nor did we generally present the reasons specific initiatives would not be taken. (b)(3)

Setting the Stage: Changes in Style and Tactics

In his December meeting with the President, Gorbachev might deliberately abandon his normally confident and persuasive demeanor in favor of a less confident or a more confrontational stance. The main cause would be the deteriorating Soviet internal situation and his urgent need for rapid progress on foreign policy issues that he sees as directly affecting his domestic agenda. Gorbachev hopes to frame next fall's Party Congress with concrete successes, especially in arms control. (b)(3)

Any new tack could surface before rather than during the meeting with the President. In the runup to the meeting, particularly while Gorbachev is in Italy, he could make a series of public statements that would be intended to raise expectations and to set the agenda for the talks. He might portray the meeting as a full "summit," hoping that the United States would feel greater pressure to conclude some significant agreement at the meeting, or at least to agree to joint language in a communique that laid out the goals for future negotiations and put some time limits on reaching some of the most significant agreements. (b)(3)

Gorbachev as Supplicant. The Soviet leader could come to the December meeting with his hat in his hand. He would stress his own beleagured political position and urge the President to take more concrete economic and political steps to support perestroyka. Increased US support, he would argue, would support the position of reformers within the USSR and lessen the possibility that internal dissent would reach the point of requiring sustained repressive measures. Gorbachev would also ask for the President's understanding in the event of a crackdown on ethnic or labor unrest, and if possible an agreement to temper US criticism. (b)(3)

Gorbachev as "Tough Guy". In this scenario, Gorbachev would inform the President that in the coming months the government might have to use force to contain disorder and that it was necessary for the United States to understand the need for this. He would warn that it would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to dictate Soviet "good behavior" by holding up progress on arms control and other issues. He would justify this stance by informing the President that some groups in the Soviet Union were threatening violence and attempting to break up the state, and remind him that the United States had fought a civil war in order to preserve its Union. (b)(3)

Gorbachev might also adopt a confrontational "put up or shut up" approach, trying to put the President on the defensive by bringing up Soviet arms control and compliance concerns. He would highlight specific examples of Soviet willingness to address US concerns, and argue that the United States had not demonstrated good faith in responding appropriately. For example, he might argue forcefully that the current high levels of emigration permitted by the Soviet Union justified not only a waiver of the Jackson-Vanick amendment and the granting of most favored nation trading status to the Soviet Union, but also that some more significant trade or economic agreements should be concluded that would help the Soviet Union out of its economic morass. Other examples could include the decision to take down the Krasnoyarsk radar and the unilateral decision to reduce Soviet tank advantages in Europe. He might argue that the lack of proportionate US response was making his domestic position more precarious and undercutting the consensus in the leadership for further progress on arms control. (b)(3)

We have not ruled out "negative" surprises, but we judge any surprises are more likely to take the form of concessions or proposals to further arms control and positive bilateral relations. In most of the following sections, therefore, have begun with 'positive' surprises. (b)(3)

Arms Control

Surprises are most likely in the areas of strategic arms, where several remaining "big issues" can only be resolved at a high level; and, given the meeting's at-sea setting and recent Soviet emphasis, in naval arms control. Gorbachev could introduce a variety of specific initiatives either to accelerate progress on START and CFE or in the context of a challenge to the United States to begin moving to the 'next stage' of arms control. Moscow envisions this 'next stage' as including START II, CFE II, SNF, naval arms control, and negotiations on a complete ban of nuclear tests. (b)(3)

Strategic Arms. Gorbachev is trying to set up next year's spring Washington summit as the venue for signing a START agreement or at least resolving all major issues. If Moscow believes the United States would be receptive to further concessions and proposals to meet this timetable, Gorbachev might make proposals to solve the remaining major stumblingblocks:

o Dropping the Wyoming ministerial call for an agreed US-Soviet statement on the right to withdraw from START if the ABM Treaty is violated, relying on the US Congress to prevent US violations of the ABM Treaty;

o Accepting US proposals for non-binding limits on SLCMs, perhaps in return for a commitment to continue discussions on SLCMs in START II or naval arms control talks;

o Agree to US proposed counting rules for nuclear ALCMs, perhaps in exchange for US concessions on the lesser issue of ALCM range. (b)(3)

If Gorbachev judges the US will not move on START without a dramatic push, he could go further and put forward one or more of the following unilateral initiatives or proposals for mutual reductions. Any such initiatives would have the added aim of undermining public and Congressional support for US strategic programs. In rough order

of increasing impact, Soviet initiatives could include:

o Unilaterally accelerating cuts in older ballistic missiles (SS-11s, SS-17s, SS-N-6, etc.) This would be relatively easy to do given cuts already underway and would provide some propaganda benefits, though its military impact would be minimized by ongoing ICBM modernization programs.

o Offer to cap Blackjack deployments--which we think have slowed in any case--either unilaterally or in return for limits on the B-2.

o Announce a unilateral 50 percent or more reduction in SS-18s without waiting for START (probably by dismantling the SS-18 mod 4s that would have to be eliminated anyway under START and modernizing the remaining 154 heavy ICBMs allowed). Moscow would expect this to have a major impact on public opinion, and would be consistent with Soviet plans for the heavy ICBM force under START. The Soviets have already altered the SS-18 mod-5 conversion program to accomodate future START limits. Moreover, the mod-5's greater accuracy will enable the Soviets to meet their targeting requirements with fewer heavy missiles. Other strategic programs--the silo-based version of the SS-24, and the Blackjack heavy bomber--have also been unilaterally curtailed and Gorbachev could include them in such a declaration. This would be designed to underline the Soviet commitment to START and put pressure on the United States to cut back programs such as the B-2, Trident, SDI, and Peacekeeper

o Offer to mutually eliminate all MIRVed mobile missiles, i.e. the railmobile versions of the SS-24 and Peacekeeper. By trading an existing program for one the US has not yet implemented the Soviets would gain credit for going the extra mile for arms control. They would still have one survivable mobile ICBM, the single-RV SS-25.

o Offer to phase-out all heavy ICBMs as part of START, perhaps in return for US concessions on Peacekeeper, cruise missiles, Stealth aircraft, or other systems of high concern. (b)(3)

Alternatively, Gorbachev might package a number of the more far-reaching proposals and present them as an alternative to the present START framework. For example, he could propose an immediate cut to 3000 nuclear warheads to include a ban on heavy ICBMs and SLCMs--all ideas that have been publicly discussed by Soviet arms control experts. This might be done if Gorbachev judges START as presently constituted does not go far enough and threatens to drag out beyond the time when Soviet decisions have to be made on proceeding with key strategic programs. (b)(3)

If Gorbachev prefers not to disrupt the present START framework he may choose to present some or all of the above proposals as part of the Soviet approach to the next phase of strategic arms control, START II. Soviet negotiators have already suggested that the two sides begin talks on strategic stability immediately after the conclusion of START. By outlining the Soviet vision of deeper cuts in the future, perhaps in the context of the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, Gorbachev would increase pressure for US flexibility now to finish START I. He could propose that the two sides agree to continue negotiations on key issues such as SLCM verification and limits on SDI testing, hoping this would allow the two sides to quickly conclude START while keeping key issues on the bilateral agenda. (b)(3)

Gorbachev could suggest ending the Defense and Space talks in light of Moscow's decision to drop linkage between START and a DST treaty. He could claim that remaining issues should be dealt with in the context of Soviet proposals for a protocol to the ABM Treaty regarding permitted and prohibited activities and call for a special ABM Treaty Review session. (b)(3)

An even more radical step would be to call for a mutual ban on Soviet BMD and US SDI activities, including dismantlement of the Moscow ABM system, as a way of increasing strategic stability and predictability. This could be coupled with an on-site inspection regime for laboratories engaged in research on strategic defenses. There is a chance Gorbachev could announce a unilateral decision to dismantle the Moscow ABM system, which has been criticized for its high cost and limited utility against modern ballistic missiles. This would be designed to put pressure on US funding for SDI. (b)(3)

Although Gorbachev is likely to emphasize Soviet concessions and further mutual cuts in arms, he may seek to balance his presentation by criticizing specific US positions. For instance, in the wake of the decision to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar and admit it was a violation of the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev could press for greater US action to "address Soviet concerns" on US radars in Greenland and the UK. Such a move might be designed to help build European pressure on the United States to eliminate these two radars or at least to prevent construction at Fylingdales in the United Kingdom. He could privately complain that he needs some positive US response to his controversial decisions to allay pressure from domestic critics and hint that the lack of such signals could complicate working out the dismantlement procedures for Krasnoyarsk. (b)(3)

Gorbachev could press the President on US plans to sell Trident missiles to Great Britain and insist that this would leave a loophole for circumventing a START treaty. He might suggest that this issue be addressed in START II, perhaps by including Great Britain in the negotiations. (b)(3)

Naval. The Soviets have been mounting a full court press on naval arms control in the wake of Gorbachev's Finland visit, and the December meeting's Mediterranean venue provides an occasion for a range of regional and bilateral initiatives. The major Soviet aim at this point is to break down US resistance to holding discussions and to make sure

naval forces are on the agenda for future talks. Gorbachev might also calculate that Soviet initiatives could complicate US negotiations for naval basing rights with Greece, the Philippines and other countries. Specific initiatives could include:

- o Proposing mutual withdrawals of fleet components from the Mediterranean, e.g. nuclear-powered or armed warships, aircraft carriers, submarines or SLCM platforms. Alternatively, he could make a unilateral announcement the USSR would cease deployment to the Mediterranean of some or all of the above.

- o Proposing mutual reductions in naval presence--measured in ship days--in areas such as the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean or South China Sea. Alternatively, he could unilaterally announce a Soviet cutback in out-of-area naval activity.

- o Suspending one or more major naval shipbuilding programs, such as the Tbilisi-class carrier or the Oscar-class cruise missile submarine. The Soviet carrier program is expensive, and an initiative in this area would put pressure on the United States to justify its unilateral superiority in large aircraft carriers.

- o Unilaterally give up, or offer to trade, Soviet naval bases and basing rights in the Third World, including: Soviet naval units at the resupply and repair facility at Tartus, Syria; naval reconnaissance missions occasionally flown out of Libya; the major Soviet air and naval base at Cam Ranh in Vietnam; and the Soviet repair facility on Dahlak Island off Ethiopia. (b)(3)

CFE. Gorbachev could make proposals on CFE to promote his plans for a European summit in the latter half of 1990, set the stage for follow-on talks, or take advantage of the meeting's European setting to make regional proposals. He might point to the ongoing instability in East Germany as underlining the need for urgency and compromise to quickly reduce tensions in the region. Some possible candidates:

- An offer to withdraw more Soviet forces from Hungary, particularly aircraft, in return for abandonment of NATO plans to rebase F-16s from Spain to Italy.

- A joint compromise on two outstanding problems, aircraft and personnel, whereby the West would agree to accept Pact proposals on personnel reductions in return for Soviet acceptance of NATO's position on non-exclusion of combat/combat-capable aircraft.

- Alternatively, Gorbachev could offer an aircraft deal in which the Soviets accept inclusion of air defense interceptors and combat-capable trainers in return for Western agreement to exclude intercontinental bombers, land-based naval air, and unarmed trainers. (b)(3)

On SNF, Gorbachev could well reiterate Soviet appeals for immediate talks on a "mandate" for negotiations on SNF reductions. He could buttress this appeal with one or more of the following:

- Unilateral reductions in Soviet/Pact SRBMs;

- A proposal for deep reductions in Soviet/Pact SRBMs in return for much smaller US/NATO cuts:

- Removal of all Soviet SRBMs from Eastern Europe and/or the European USSR in return for US removal of Lance and abandonment of follow-on to Lance.

- As a grandstand move, propose a nuclear-free zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. He would assume this would be rejected out of hand by the United States as well as France. (b)(3)

Gorbachev could wrap some or all of his proposals around a suggestion to create a Soviet-American task force to settle CFE issues bilaterally. Moscow believes US-Soviet

discussions are the quickest way to achieve a CFE agreement and may think the United States is willing to go around its allies to get a quick accord. (b)(3)

Nuclear Testing. The nuclear testing treaties are all but finished, and both sides have said they would be ready to sign them at the spring Washington summit. Gorbachev is eager to move on to discussions of a comprehensive test ban and could push to sign the treaties now, hoping to ensure a visible success in December and use the occasion to urge further talks on a comprehensive test ban. He might bolster this by announcing another halt to Soviet testing, especially in light of growing public protest in the USSR over the environmental impact of underground tests. (b)(3)

Chemical Weapons. Gorbachev might announce the USSR was proceeding with immediate unilateral destruction of its chemical weapons. In light of the recent closing of the Soviet chemical destruction facility at Chapayevsk he could ask for US technical assistance in destroying Soviet chemical stocks. Gorbachev will express disappointment over US proposals made at the UN in September, especially the decision to continue binary production, calling this incompatible with a global ban. He will urge that the two sides accelerate their discussions for deep bilateral reductions in stockpiles even before a multilateral treaty is signed. (b)(3)

Missile Proliferation. Missile proliferation in the Middle East is of particular concern to the Soviet Union given the area's instability, the proliferation of chemical and nuclear warheads, and the proximity of many Middle Eastern countries to the USSR. Gorbachev could propose mutual constraints on supplying missiles and missile technology. He will be especially concerned about US assistance to Israel and may raise the Israeli Arrow ATBM program that has been partially funded by SDIO. He might propose a new multilateral grouping to supercede the Missile Technology Control Regime, which the Soviets see as Western-dominated. (b)(3)

Eastern Europe and the German Question

Gorbachev may use the December meeting to publicize this approach and to press both publicly and privately for the US position on the German question. Gorbachev may try to finesse the tricky question of the Soviet position on German reunification by subsuming it in a discussion of the long-term future for Europe. For instance, he might argue that resolving the issue now is premature, and suggest that it be postponed until the basic framework for a new European security order is in place. The surprise could be that Gorbachev might spring a vision of such an order including the pullout of all foreign troops--a goal frequently set for the year 2000--and the conclusion of follow-on talks to CFE. He might say that the Warsaw Pact is prepared to dissolve by a certain date, and challenge NATO to step up to this timetable. German reunification could be put on the table as a natural byproduct of such a solution to East-West tensions. He might suggest that one step on the way to realizing this package would be removal of the Berlin Wall and talks to end the partition of Berlin, and hint that this could occur sooner rather than later. (b)(3)

Given the present uncertainty and disorder affecting the East German government, Gorbachev almost certainly would not make a major announcement to the President regarding Germany without first consulting the East Germans. It is remotely possible, however, that Gorbachev could work out a program with the East German leadership prior to his meeting with the President. Such a program would be intended primarily to bolster the legitimacy of the East German regime, and might include a decision to demolish the Berlin Wall in the near term. Although Gorbachev would almost certainly not take the lead in publicly announcing such a move, he might preview it privately with the President as a way of reinforcing the Soviet commitment to liberalization in Eastern Europe. (b)(3)

Brezhnev Doctrine. Gorbachev could chose the Mediterranean meeting as a venue

toemphasize the non-existence of the Brezhnev doctrine by renouncing the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. This would go far to reassure both Eastern and Western audiences that the Brezhnev Doctrine was finally dead. Soviet assertions that intervention has no role in politics continue to be viewed suspiciously as long as the 1968 invasion gets official Soviet support, and there have already been reports that a renunciation was in the offing. This would be a body blow to the current Czech regime's "go-slow" approach, something Moscow might prefer given its positive attitude towards East European reforms. (b)(3)

Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev could announce that Hungary was free to leave the Warsaw Pact after a CFE treaty. He might couple this with an invitation for some of NATO's smaller members to do likewise. This move could capitalize on what may be in the cards anyway, and could be used to put pressure on NATO to speed up CFE or its follow-on. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

Regional Issues

Gorbachev could propose ambitious US-Soviet political cooperation to solve Third World problems, going beyond the resolution of remaining confrontations. He might justify continuing Soviet support for Nicaragua and Afghanistan as unavoidable obligations incurred as a result of "Brezhnev-era" policies, but stress that they will not be repeated and should not stand in the way of expanded cooperation to reduce instability and prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Third World. (b)(3)

Central America/Cuba. In an effort to remove Nicaragua as an irritant to US-Soviet bilateral relations, Gorbachev may announce that the USSR will make its "temporary moratorium" on arms deliveries to Managua permanent, dropping the Soviet insistence that this could only occur if Washington discontinued military aid to its Central American

allies. Such an offer could be linked to a guarantee from the US that it drop economic sanctions against Managua and agree to full normalization of relations. The Soviets probably also would hope that this would strengthen their efforts to improve relations with Nicaragua's neighbors and would increase regional discontent with US military aid to Central America. (b)(3)

Gorbachev could also announce that the USSR will withdraw its brigade from Cuba in the hope that this would reduce Cuba as a contentious issue in US-Soviet relations and remove an obstacle to improved US-Cuban relations. Such a move would be in keeping with Soviet efforts to reduce its military presence outside of the USSR for economic reasons, and Gorbachev may also hope that it will send a message to Fidel Castro that the USSR no longer considers the US to be a military threat to Cuba. A more remote possibility would be an announcement that the USSR will eliminate or drastically reduce future military aid to Cuba. Again, the Soviets would have very good economic reasons for doing this--Soviet military aid to Cuba totaled over $1.6 billion in 1988--but they would not want to jeopardize their important intelligence gathering operations, port, and landing rights in Cuba. (b)(3)

On the other hand, Gorbachev may come into his meeting with President Bush frustrated that the US has not responded more positively to previous Soviet moves in the region, such as the "temporary moratorium" on arms shipments and Shevardnadze's visit to Managua and Havana in which he played up Soviet support for a regional security agreement and free and fair elections in Nicaragua. He may blame Washington for renewed fighting in Nicaragua and argue that Moscow cannot continue its arms moratorium while US-backed Contras threaten the Sandinistas. The Soviets may believe that since Washington continues to blame Moscow for shipments of arms to Nicaragua that arrive from Cuba they have little to lose by renewing their own direct shipments. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

Afghanistan. This is one issue where, given the unexpectedly strong showing of the Najubullah regime over the past year, Gorbachev is more likely to take a tough than a conciliatory approach. If he chooses to go beyond tough talk, Gorbachev may notify the President that Moscow is "raising the ante" on aid to Kabul, to include provision of MiG-29 aircraft, T-72 tanks or SS-21 missiles. The Soviet leader would want to emphasize that the USSR will not back away from commitments to continue its ally's hold on power, particularly in a country literally in its backyard. By raising the possibility of an arms race in the area, Moscow would hope to bring home to the US and Pakistan that the conflict is unwinnable and too costly over the long run. Gorbachev could raise the possibility of expanded aid to Kabul to reinforce a proposal to link Afghanistan and Central America: continuation of the claimed cutoff of arms deliveries to Nicaragua in return for US agreement to stop supplying arms to the Afghan resistance. (b)(3)

Alternatively, Gorbachev could take steps to galvanize a peace process in Afghanistan by announcing Moscow's willingness to conduct talks, without any preconditions, with the resistance. Although this would be a significant departure from the Soviets' demand that Kabul participate in negotiations for a follow-on government, Gorbachev might find the prospect of a long-term, resource-draining stalemate in Afghanistan too costly for domestic reasons. He might calculate, too, that some PDPA members are likely to be chosen as "good Muslims" to participate in a government, thus providing Moscow with an ongoing channel in Kabul for its views. To underline Soviet good faith, Gorbachev could announce he is withdrawing Scud missiles from Afghanistan or pledge a moratorium on supplying additional missiles. Though less likely, he might informally confirm comments made occasionally by lower-level Soviet officials to the effect that Najibullah might be removed as a token of Soviet sincerity in seeking a political solution. (b)(3)

Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Given the tentative progress in establishing a dialogue

between Israel and the Palestinians, Gorbachev might state his intention to issue a formal invitation for Israeli Labor Party leader and Finance Minister Peres--or even other Israeli leaders--to visit Moscow. As the concept for Israeli-Palestinian talks has been brokered primarily by Egypt and the United States, the Soviet goal for this move would be to reinsert themselves as a major player in the peace process and prove faithful to previous statements that Moscow is seeking a "balance of interests" in the region. Gorbachev may also provide more explicit terms under which the USSR would reestablish relations with Israel, perhaps linking the diplomatic opening to the beginning of an Israeli-Palestinian--rather than an Israeli-PLO--dialogue. (b)(3)

Economic Issues

Putting economic and trade matters at the center of summit discussions would itself be a major surprise. Gorbachev may judge the time is right, however, for a push in an area that has received little top-level attention and where relatively small moves could have large symbolic importance. (b)(3)

Moscow's top priorities would be to entice the United States to expand its purchases of Soviet products and engage the United States in making the Soviet economic system more compatible with participation in the world economy. Although the Soviets have little new to offer unilaterally, there are a few tantalizing concessions they might hold out, such as:

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- o Propose some type of large-scale deal for purchases of US agroindustrial equipment and products, consumer goods, medical or energy-related machinery and technology--items in which Moscow is looking to step up imports from the West--to expand American business participation and encouraging it to support ending barriers to US-Soviet trade.

- o Abolish current restrictions on repatriation of profits by Western firms involved in joint ventures to encourage further Western investment;

- o Offer some type of tax concessions or special privilege to US businessmen engaged in trade with the USSR;

- o Settle the Kerensky and Lend Lease debts that prevent Soviet access to US stock and financial markets:

- o Promise to accelerate the process of domestic monetary and price reform to strengthen the Soviet economic base and make foreign investment more attractive.

On the negative side, the Soviets may warn that:

- o US failure to remove quickly existing trade and credit restrictions and conclude a long term bilateral trade agreement such as the one currently being negotiated by Moscow with the EC may prevent American firms from getting in on the ground floor of the burgeoning Soviet market;

- o Continued refusal to grant MFN treatment to Soviet exports also will force American firms to face discriminatory tariff rates when Moscow institutes its coming two tier tariff schedule in 1990. (b)(3)

Gorbachev could release detailed data on Soviet strategic resources, debt, and trade

that have been a sticking point regarding Soviet entry into Western organizations such as GATT. The release of this data would be part of a campaign to facilitate Soviet economic integration with the West. (b)(3)

Especially surprising would be a request for US government assistance--disguised as special loan credits, trade subsidies or barter arrangments--to help the USSR's deteriorating economy and ease worsening shortages of consumer goods. Most extreme would be a plea for a Marshall Plan type of emergency aid package. (b)(3)

Other

A number of plausible proposals are grouped here that did not fit neatly into any other category.

More Defense Data. Gorbachev could present some dramatic package of Soviet military and economic data to the West in order to influence Western decisions and shape the image of the USSR. For instance, in the aftermath of the Supreme Soviet's budget deliberations, Gorbachev could present details of defense spending and procurement, perhaps for the next five years. The intent would be convince Western audiences of the Soviet willingness to moderate the military threat that they pose, and their desire to inject predictability into the East-West arms relationship. The Soviets might give early indications about their release of military spending data in order to heighten Western expectations. (b)(3)

Closer Cooperation. Two other proposals would push US-Soviet cooperation into new areas:

- o Gorbachev could propose joint intelligence-counterintelligence cooperation in areas such as terrorism, drug trafficking, missile technology proliferation, or nuclear proliferation.

- The Soviets may propose a major joint manned space mission, involving the US and Soviet space shuttles or the Mir space station. Gorbachev could appeal to the enormous cost of space exploration when borne by one country and stress the symbolic benefits of such a high-visibility project. (b)(3)

Blank Spots. In line with Shevardnadze's recent admissions on the Krasnoyarsk radar and Afghanistan, Gorbachev might offer explanations or apologies for past Soviet actions. He could bring up the KAL 007 shootdown as an example of how past mistrust and unnecessary military tensions can lead to disaster. Although it would be directed more at Eastern Europe than the United States, he could formally acknowledge a Soviet role in the Katyn Forest massacre of Polish officers and issue guarantees that Soviet politics will never allow a repetition. (b)(3)

Implications for the United States

Though it is too soon to characterize Gorbachev as desperate--and one of his major goals during his December meeting is likely to be to convey a sense that he remains in command--the tremendous pressure of events at home and in Eastern Europe is reinforcing his natural penchant for the dramatic. To the extent that Gorbachev sees his position threatened by Western unwillingness to meet him halfway in arms control negotiations or otherwise support perestroyka and East European reforms, he could be tempted to swing either towards threats ("Apres moi...) or pleas for help. His underlying goal could be to make Western governments look increasingly churlish in the eyes of public opinion for refusing to cooperate, especially if Gorbachev is ousted or is compelled himself to backtrack on reforms. It is this strategy of entangling the United States in the fate of Gorbachev and perestroyka that poses the main challenge to US interests. (b)(3)

In addition, initiatives on arms control could pose some specific problems for US

policy:

- o Dramatic proposals for deep reductions in strategic forces are designed to back the United States into a corner on SDI, cruise missiles, and other strategic modernization programs.

- o Proposals on naval arms control could appeal so strongly to US European allies that they cause friction in the alliance and lead to calls for US participation. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

November 8, 1989

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: Soviet Summit Objectives

Gorbachev most likely will play his December 2-3 meeting with the President as a full-fledged summit with primary emphasis on START with a possible surprise offer and with some linkage to U.S. naval reductions. He probably will not want to dwell much on Eastern Europe or on regional problems.

On October 23, Shevardnadze told the Supreme Soviet: "Ahead lies a new Soviet-American summit meeting" at which "an agreement on strategic offensive arms" would, in effect, be "first and foremost" on the agenda. He was clearly referring to the December 2-3 meeting, of which he was already privy. Later in a TASS interview, Shevardnadze stated: "I am confident that despite its unofficial character, the Mediterranean meeting will be of milestone importance. It will largely determine the importance and substance of the official summit talks to be held late in spring-early in summer next year." (Pravda, November 6, 1989). On November 2, TANJUG quoted from an (Italian) ADNCRONOS-NEWS interview with Shevardnadze in which he reportedly said that the upcoming Mediterranean summit could "serve to lay the foundations for an agreement on a 50 percent reduction of strategic arsenals of the two big powers."

In raising START, Gorbachev obviously will further insist that Soviet adherence to START reductions will depend on strict U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. (Continued Soviet concern about SDI is well reflected in Lt. General V. Starodubov's article in Krasnaya Zvezda of October 24, 1989). In addition, Gorbachev may well come up with a dramatic (at least in a PR sense) proposal on START. (I trust our arms control people are conjuring up all possible scenarios for such a Soviet surprise.)

It also seems likely that Gorbachev will exploit the naval setting of the summit to press again for naval reductions and attendant confidence building measures. A substantial reduction in the U.S. Navy is a principal Soviet arms reduction goal. This promotes the broad Soviet objectives of decoupling the U.S. from Europe, of reducing the U.S. SLBM and SLCM threat to the USSR and

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of weakening U.S. force projection potential. In his October 26 Helsinki speech, Gorbachev noted START progress, but warned:

> "... the more progress made on this path, the more pressing the need to resolve questions concerning naval forces, including confidence-building measures and corresponding verification [kontrol]. In the conditions of reducing other types of armaments, the destabilizing role of these forces will be increasing... the process of strengthening trust, reducing and then subsequently completely eliminating military confrontation, and making the transition to nonoffensive defense will simply not take place unless this problem is resolved."

In the October 30 Pravda, Marshal Akhromeyev, elaborating on Gorbachev's Helsinki remarks, stated: "... naval forces constitute one of the most important problems and today even the most important problem, of the Soviet Union's security." He then goes on to say that with accords reached on 50 percent START reductions and on a radical force reduction in Europe "and if we actually reduce these forces on a reciprocal basis, while U.S. naval forces and U.S. naval bases surrounding the USSR remain intact, the military threat for the USSR will increase and the position of the Soviet Union in the world will deteriorate. How could we agree to this?" Two days later, a Radio Moscow commentator lamented that "the Western press is unjustifiably ignoring the Soviet leader's remarks in Helsinki" and that "the problem of naval forces is being passed over in silence by Western politicians as well." Gorbachev at the summit can certainly counter this indifference. Gorbachev may also raise other aspects of conventional arms reductions as well as an agreement on chemical weapons and a ban on nuclear weapons tests.

In discussing internal developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe, Gorbachev will resist any attempt by the President to establish any kind of political droit de regard in Eastern Europe, but will welcome U.S. and other external economic assistance to Eastern Europe, specifically to Poland and Hungary. He will most likely push for lowering barriers to Western technology transfer to the USSR and for improved trade ties on more favorable (to the USSR) terms.

The general line Gorbachev will take on developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe will probably resemble the following remarks by commentator Stanislav Kondrashov in the November 6 Izvestiya:

> "If the progress of perestroyka has determined favorable changes in the international arena, its failure is quite possibly fraught with the return and

> intensification of the state of military confrontation, with the concomitant danger of the renewal of a ruinous arms race of increased savagery. As far as the East European countries are concerned, particularly Poland and Hungary, which are now being paid such close, interested attention by those across the ocean and by Western capitals in general, their development along the path of democratic pluralism is also linked to the development of democratic processes in the Soviet Union and the evolution of the Warsaw Pact from a military-political grouping into a political-military alliance, in which the free voice of every participant will grow."

Gorbachev will have little interest in discussing regional affairs save for a possible pitch for regional zones of reduced armaments (or nuclear-free). On Nicaragua, he will probably again call for joint U.S.-Soviet oversight of external military involvement in the area.

At the risk of stating the obvious, I would note for the record that summitry for the Soviets remains, first and foremost, an exercise in public relations to generate pressure on the U.S. to accept Soviet negotiating positions and to promote a spirit of detente aimed at enticing the West to lower its guard.

Soviet media commentators portray the President as being under considerable pressure from the Democrats and our allies to come to terms with the Soviets and indicate that is why he has now agreed to a summit with Gorbachev -- especially since the latter has already met with Thatcher, Kohl and Mitterrand. Gorbachev no doubt calculates he can exploit this pressure at the summit.

The first postwar summit, in 1955, produced the "Spirit of Geneva." The Soviets, including Shevardnadze, are now touting the "Spirit of Wyoming." The detente spirit now being promoted was well characterized by Shevardnadze (in the above quoted TASS interview) when he cited the November 3 U.S.-Soviet joint UN resolution and the upcoming summit as showing "again the possibility and feasibility of cooperation of the USSR and the US in international affairs during the development of constructive parallelism of Soviet-American and multilateral interaction..."

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8910481
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 20 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

5/3

KEYWORDS: EC
MALTA
USSR
ARMS CONTROL
SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE US INITIATIVES AT MALTA SUMMIT

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 08 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLACKWILL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/17/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD CLOSED BY: NSBTM DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 8910481

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	90010417	NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
001		X	90010417	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/17/09

AFNSA Has Seen

CHRON FILE 10487

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Non-log item

[redacted]

November 20, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: Possible U.S. Initiatives at the Malta Meeting

I want to be sure that you know that I am now doing no interagency work to prepare possible U.S. initiatives to be used by the President at Malta. Here is, nevertheless, my short list on the subject.

1. Economic

-- Announce that the two sides will immediately begin negotiations on a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement after which the President will seek a waiver of Jackson-Vanik.

-- Announce details of further U.S. Technical "Assistance" to the Soviet Union (or "Technical Cooperation" as the Soviets would prefer to call it.)

-- Agree to support Soviet observer status at the GATT.

2. Arms Control

-- Present a deMIRVing initiative.

-- Seek Soviet agreement to the President's UN CW initiative in return for the U.S. foregoing CW modernization.

-- Propose further U.S./Soviet reductions in CFE in the context of the changed situation in Europe and U.S. defense budget decisions.

-- Agree that the two leaders will attend a CFE Summit to sign an agreement.

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3. Procedural

-- Set dates for the 1990 Summit.

-- Elaborate an intense Ministerial work program in the next months to prepare for the Summit.

4. Human Rights

-- Propose that the Soviet Union open its borders.

5. Regional Issues

6. The Environment

7. Space

Please let me know if your wish me to do anything to push any of these possible initiatives along.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8910474
RECEIVED: 29 DEC 89 20

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: KANTER
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 24 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MALI
ARMS CONTROL
USSR
SUMMIT
CFE

5/3/11

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE INITIATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF MALTA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 02 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KANTER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/17/09

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 24, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Possible Initiatives in the Context of Malta

Following on your Wednesday breakfast discussion with Secretaries Baker and Cheney, we met this morning with Reg Bartholomew, Paul Wolfowitz, and Howard Graves in a principals-only "little five" meeting. We described our task as identifying and assessing various ways to get something from the Soviets for the defense budget cuts we probably will be making in any event. We stressed the obvious sensitivity of the enterprise, that there would be zero tolerance for leaks, and that the information had to be strickly limited to the people in room and their bosses. In that spirit, no papers were circulated in advance or carried away from the meeting.

The session was confined to talking through various possibilities, with the two of us undertaking to write an issues paper based on the discussion. That paper is attached. It has not been shared with anyone. We plan to reconvene the group tomorrow (Saturday) afternoon to go over it--after Wolfowitz and Graves return from Camp David--making whatever changes are necessary or desirable. After that, we will give you the revised version to work with your counterparts and the President in the run up to Malta.

One complication is that Cheney and Powell are scheduled to leave for Europe Saturday evening, returning next Thursday. Wolfowitz and Graves may be designated as their stand-ins, but you should confirm this on the margins of your Camp David meeting tomorrow morning.

Reading between the lines in today's meeting, it appears as though Cheney and Powell may resist all efforts to advance any concrete ideas or initiatives at Malta. They are inately suspicious of any such approach, worry about the appearance or reality of "Reykjavik II," and argue that we are running serious risks of allowing Malta to force decisions about the defense program and budget that have yet to be made. Based on a report to him about out meeting this morning, Cheney is said to believe that our effort to assess possible initiatives is a "bad idea."

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Their preferred approach is suggested by the Wolfowitz memo distributed at the Wednesday breakfast: take a broad, philosophical approach that tells the Soviets what we expect of them, and drops hints about what we would be prepared to do if and as they actually meet our expectations. The problems with this approach are that the Soviets might well not understand what we are talking about, and might well not take us seriously if they did. Given our defense budget realities, however, we will have to start reshaping our forces immediately, whether or not the Soviets live up to the standards we set for them.

Reg seems much more willing to contemplate various ways in which to accelerate a CFE agreement in order to get some benefit from our looming defense cuts. He is very concerned (and we think appropriately) about the impact on our Allies of anything that smacks of a superpower deal on CFE.

None of the agency principals appeared to have considered possible initiatives other than those related to CFE. We briefly discussed ideas related to START, CW, defense spending, naval arms control, and ASAT, and these are included in the paper.

We would appreciate getting any reactions to the paper or other guidance you may have before you leave for Camp David Saturday morning. As noted above, we are scheduled to meet with the three others at 2:30 on Saturday to go over the paper again.

Attachment
Issues Paper

CHANGES IN THE DEFENSE PROGRAM AND POSSIBLE INITIATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF MALTA

The U.S. defense program probably will undergo a significant restructuring and substantial reductions over the next few years. This paper assesses alternative ways in which to portray certain of these prospective defense program changes in the context of the President's meeting with Gorbachev at Malta.

Whatever we do in this regard will bear directly on Allied interests and their concerns that Malta might be a "Reykjavik II." We face three broad choices about how to accommodate these allied sensitivities.

(a) Consult with the Allies prior to Malta and shape an approach to Gorbachev in light of those consultations.

(b) Sound out Gorbachev at Malta about various initiatives and report to Allies on results at the December 4 NAC in Brussels.

(c) Take a broad, philosophical approach at Malta that does not result in any specific commitments or undertakings.

Each of these alternatives has significant disadvantages:

(a) Consulting with the Allies prior to Malta would risk leaks, constrain the President's flexibility, and aggravate fears that the meeting had become recast into a Summit-like negotiation.

(b) Trying out ideas on Gorbachev without prior Allied consultations could seem to the Allies as though they had been misled about the purpose of Malta, that the superpowers had cut deals over their heads, and that they were being informed of a fait accompli.

(c) Taking a broad, philosophical approach could leave Gorbachev uncertain about what we expected of him and what we would be prepared to do in return. It could seem as though we were setting high standards for Soviet conduct, but subsequently be seen to take actions unilaterally (because of budget pressures) before those standards had been met.

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CFE

Overview

The purpose here is to examine whether we can use CFE to try to get something from the Soviets for cuts in U.S. force structure that we will be forced to make anyway because of the budget situation, and at the same time to accelerate the conclusion of a CFE agreement. (DOD budget plans could require the withdrawal of 30,000 troops from Europe in FY 91 even if there is no CFE agreement, and a cut of U.S. ground and air forces in Europe by perhaps 150,000 by FY 94.) The options examined below would:

(1) drop aircraft and helicopters from CFE I and seek to persuade Moscow to agree quickly, perhaps by April 1990, to a Treaty that covers only tanks, armored troop carriers and artillery. This would allow us to make major savings in the period ahead by both rapidly implementing the 30,000 man European cut, and more importantly, by reducing CONUS forces in anticipation of the very large Soviet equipment reductions embodied in such a CFE I Treaty. We would assure the Soviets that we would begin CFE II expeditiously in order to respond to their expressed concerns about Western aircraft and helicopters; and/or

(2) offer to lower the ceiling on U.S. and Soviet troops from 275,000 to 200,000 in CFE I, or alternatively and more to Moscow's liking, promise now to do so as a subceiling in CFE II, while at the same time meeting Soviet concerns by NATO agreeing now to broaden the manpower ceiling in CFE II to cover all indigenous and stationed troops in the Central Region.

The Soviets will find it hard to drop aircraft and helicopters from CFE I without any concessions from our side, although their budget problems might induce a change in their position. Winning Allied support for any new CFE initiative would require extraordinary efforts at the political level to duplicate the exceptional consensus achieved at the NATO Summit in May. Finally, getting a CFE agreement signed quickly will trigger soon thereafter the beginning of SNF negotiations well before the West German elections at the end of 1990, a fact that at a minimum will deeply concern Mrs. Thatcher. (Imagine Helmut Kohl's reaction if Gorbachev proposed a Third SNF Zero at the height of the West German election campaign.)

Current Situation in Vienna

Although East and West are still struggling over counting rules for tanks and armored troop carriers, there are no fundamental reasons why these categories cannot soon join artillery in the list of agreed definitions. Aircraft and helicopters present a

different picture. Unless the East bends soon to the Western position or the West makes concessions, the two sides must defer these categories beyond CFE I if they are to gain quick agreement.

Defer the Aircraft Category Until CFE II

Paradoxically, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union expect to benefit militarily from inclusion of combat aircraft in CFE reductions. From the U.S. perspective, two factors are paramount.

-- First, the Warsaw Pact has many more combat aircraft that does NATO (over 14,000 to about 6700) and stands to take much greater cuts under the current Western proposal (common ceiling of 5,700). These cuts would tip the air balance decidedly toward the West, given our qualitative edge.

-- Second, NATO air forces are planning to reduce their aircraft inventories by about 15% unilaterally in any event, for budgetary reasons. So if we drop aircraft out of our CFE I proposal, the West would make these cuts without necessarily getting anything from the East in exchange.

Nevertheless, the Soviet attitude toward deferring this category could well be negative, though perhaps somewhat ambivalent. Like us, they would favor moves that would simplify the CFE I negotiation and improve chances for an early agreement, not least because an SNF negotiation would follow close behind. But inclusion of aircraft was an Eastern proposal that the West had long opposed, until we changed our position in May.

To some extent, the Soviets are now the prisoners of their own rhetoric. For more than three years, in a determined effort to portray the conventional military situation in Europe as balanced, they have argued that Western advantages in aircraft and helicopters offset admitted Eastern superiority in ground combat items like tanks. This argument was based, in part, on a genuine Soviet concern about the capacity of superior Western aircraft to influence results on the battlefield. But the Eastern fear never had a firm basis in actual aircraft numbers. Moscow this spring distorted counting rules in tabling their proposal in Vienna on aircraft so that the West would appear to have more of the "tactical strike" aircraft that the East wanted to cut. Soviet CFE representations are now putting forward compromise ideas that would entail much larger Pact aircraft cuts. Nevertheless, for both military and public diplomacy reasons, the Soviets -- even at the top levels -- could find it difficult to accept a CFE I agreement that left Western air capabilities wholly unconstrained. With our continuing rejection

of naval arms control, making NATO air forces immune from immediate cuts as well could seem, from the Soviet perspective, to mean that conventional arms control only emasculated Soviet strength while ignoring Western advantages.

Our allies' views would be more mixed. The British and the French never liked the idea of including aircraft in CFE I, at least in part because of their dual use of conventional combat aircraft as nuclear delivery systems. The Germans, on the other hand, will accept any idea, whether to include aircraft or exclude them, that will accelerate conclusion of a CFE I agreement and the beginning of SNF negotiations. Since the NATO Summit, however, all of our allies have become more aware, and more interested, in the apparent prospect of asymmetrical Eastern reductions in combat aircraft.

Defer the Helicopter Cagetory Until CFE II

The best, and fastest, way to overcome current disagreements on helicopters would be to drop the category from CFE I. Both sides now agree, in principle, on an overall ceiling of 1900 combat helicopters. They disagree on how to count combat helicopters. The problem here is most difficult for NATO because it now seems that sticking to the 1900 figure could force NATO to accept deep (30% or more) cuts, causing bitter intra-alliance disputes over the allocation of these reductions. Few in NATO would object to dropping this category.

The most important military disadvantage is that it would leave an important Warsaw Pact capability unconstrained in CFE I, with the possibility, in the absence of a CFE II treaty, of competition in helicopters supplanting competition in ground attack fixed-wing aircraft. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact would not start such a competition from a position of great advantage. There are about 1,200 Pact attack helicopters and about 900+ on the NATO side, and a number of NATO countries have active procurement programs underway to modernize and expand their helicopter strength.

The Soviets can be expected to object to dropping helicopters out of CFE I. As in the case of aircraft, Moscow originally proposed inclusion of this category, arguing that it was an area of NATO strength which counterbalanced Pact ground force advantages. Asking the Soviets to drop both aircraft and helicopters from CFE I with nothing in return from the West would be a very big pill for them to swallow, undoing what they thought they had gained from the President's May initiative.

Propose Deeper U.S.-Soviet Manpower Cuts

We currently propose U.S.-Soviet reductions so that each country would have no more than 275,000 ground and air personnel stationed on foreign soil in Europe. This implies a reduction of 30,000 U.S. troops and about 320,000 Soviets.

To move beyond these reductions to a U.S.-Soviet stationed ceiling of, say, 200,000 would mean that the U.S. would probably have to rethink its strategy for defending the inter-German frontier in two ways: (1) reconsider how many U.S. units need to be forward deployed in peacetime, given the declining threat of a short warning attack, and the effect of this change on our reinforcement requirements; and (2) redistribute the remaining U.S. forces in the FRG, perhaps radically thinning out the corps now deployed on the Bavarian-Czech border.

Ceilings lower than 200,000 would force the U.S. to alter the fundamental nature of its commitment to NATO, and would almost certainly invalidate the strategy of forward defense as it is currently understood. Merely to have a trained U.S. infrastructure in place on the Continent for rapid reinforcement requires a substantial number of personnel. If these are maintained, ceilings on U.S. forces in Europe of 150,000 or 100,000 would leave less and less room for forward deployed active units.

The problem we would have with Moscow on this score in CFE I might not only be with the effect of this 200,000 U.S.-Soviet ceiling on Soviet interests in Eastern and Central Europe. The ceiling would not include other stationed forces, or other indigenous forces. The Bundeswehr would therefore be unconstrained and well over 400,0000 in strength, a dark and forboding shadow from the Soviet Union's past.

Other implications of a 200,000 U.S. ceiling in CFE I could be:

-- The allies may worry that we are leaving Europe. Many of them, especially Mrs. Thatcher, believe our troops are there in current circumstances in large part to help manage the Germans.

-- U.S. cuts could therefore seriously unsettle the center of Europe at a particularly delicate time.

-- Larger U.S. and Soviet reductions in the near term could trigger unilateral cuts across NATO which, along with the increasingly difficulty of modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons on the Continent, could badly weaken the credibility of Flexible Response.

-- Such an initiative in CFE I could altogether ruin the President's May NATO Summit triumph, breaking apart the Allied

solidarity he cemented together.

In order to make this idea more palatable to the Allies, and more interesting to the Soviets, one could propose now that these additional U.S. troop reductions be made in a rapidly negotiated CFE II as part of a broader manpower ceiling on all forces in Central Europe.

Include all Manpower in the Central Region

Another way to implement steeper U.S. troop cuts might be in connection with a general manpower ceiling in CFE II for the Central Region, including both indigenous and stationed forces. The ceiling could include a subceiling for a U.S. and Soviet manpower. This approach would resemble the old NATO position in MBFR. Grinevsky floated just such an idea with regard to CFE I in his recent meeting with Woolsey, suggesting a 275,000 U.S.-Soviet subceiling and a 570,000 total for the Central Region (which would include the FRG, the Benelux countries, and possibly Denmark on the Western side and the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary in the East).

We could structure a proposal in CFE II for a ceiling on U.S. and Soviet forces of 200,000, and a common manpower ceiling for each side in the Central Region -- including Denmark and Hungary. This would both allow our allies to participate in reductions during CFE II, and meet Soviet concerns about the size of the Bundeswehr.

The Soviets would consider inclusion of the Bundeswehr in NATO's troop ceilings to be a major Western concession, and attach a particular premium to this move given recent events in the GDR. It is unclear whether this would be enough to convince Moscow to go ahead with CFE I without aircraft and helicopters and to accept a U.S.-Soviet manpower ceiling of 275,000.

Since the main impact of the additional ceiling would be the inclusion of the Bundeswehr, it is noteworthy that the FRG negotiators in Vienna praised Grinevsky's idea for an overall Central European manpower ceiling last week in a private meeting with Woolsey, saying this option would be best from the standpoint of German internal politics and in light of planned unilateral cuts in the Bundeswehr.

The West could explain that it had singled out the Central Region for a manpower ceiling in CFE II in order to find a solution to the disagreement with the East on how to limit Soviet manpower in Eastern Europe, stressing the fact that the Soviet ceiling would be even lower under this scheme. There are also the usual arguments about the special salience of the Central Region in the

East-West military balance. The West could also assert, with some accuracy, that while troop levels are inherently difficult to verify, bounding the problem in this way and in this region offered the best prospects for effective verification of a manpower ceiling.

Among the disadvantages of this option are that, because of the inclusion of French troops and because of the resemblance to MBFR, France might veto. (The FRG, however, has noted that the French may have already anticipated a move to broaden the manpower ceiling in deciding not to deploy their portion of the joint Franco-German brigade in Germany.) Flank states could question the emphasis in CFE II on the center, although Turkey, for one, would not be anxious to be included in manpower ceilings.

Other Impediments to a CFE I Agreement

If we were able to resolve East-West differences on aircraft, helicopters, and manpower in CFE I, the most difficult obstacles blocking an agreement would have been overcome. The related issues of stored equipment and delineation of the subzones are already moving closer to resolution. There would, however, be an inevitable process of nailing down an agreed treaty text, agreeing on lists of covered systems, drawing up needed annexes, and working out an agreed regime for verification and stabilizing measures (the two sides are close here in principle but the details are numerous and complex).

The toughest challenges would probably be within the Alliance. On verification, for example, we may find it easier to agree on a regime for production monitoring with the Soviets than with Italy. Even if there is broad agreement on substance, we have seen how, for the last two weeks, the Greeks have stood alone in blocking tabling of a Western treaty text for domestic political reasons. And in any event, a CFE I Treaty negotiated at this pace would inevitably contain much less stringent verification than has earlier been the case.

Chemical Weapons

Background

Approximately $800 million is included in the defense program between now and FY 1994 for binary modernization. The cost to the year 2000 is projected to be approximately $3 billion. The need to reduce defense spending could lead to cuts--perhaps substantial--in the binary modernization program. Separately,

Congress could impose sharp spending limitations on binary CW, either in the context of overall cuts in the defense budget or due to opposition to the modernization program itself. In either event, the feasibility of modernizing the CW stockpile with binary agents, and especially the feasibility of deploying the Bigeye air-delivered munition, could be in doubt.

The Soviets say they stopped producing CW in 1987, and challenged us to cease CW production immediately. They have not, however, responded to the President's proposal for bilaterial reductions down to 20 percent of the current U.S. stockpile, and have avoided engaging us in discussions about it. There is, of course, great uncertainty about the size of the current Soviet CW stockpile.

Possible Initiative

The U.S. could offer to end CW binary production before the modernizaton program is scheduled to be completed in exchange for Soviet endorsement of the President's CW initiative, viz., reductions to 2 percent of the current U.S. stockpile within eight years after the chemical weapons convention enters into force, preceded by bilateral reductions to 20 percent of current U.S. levels. The U.S. offer to cease CW production could be cast either in a multilateral or bilateral context:

(a) multilateral: In exchange for Soviet agreement to the 20 percent/2 percent approach, agree to cease CW production as soon as the chemical weapons convention enters into force (an act that would require Soviet participation).

(b) bilateral: In exchange for Soviet agreement to reduce to 20 percent of the U.S. stockpile, agree to cease CW production as soon as a Memorandum of Understanding is signed, preferably at the 1990 Summit.

A variant of the bilateral alternative would be to combine this offer with a challenge to the Soviets to reduce our respective CW stockpiles down to 10 percent of current U.S. levels, i..e, well below the impact of the Congressionally-mandated unilateral reductions but within the range of a near-term binary production program.

Such an initiative could take advantage of possible unilateral curtailment in our CW modernization program to help lock in Soviet agreement to the President's CW initiative. It also might help strengthen Congressional support for the program in the interim. On the other hand, it could sacrifice CW modernization that the budget and the Congress might otherwise allow. By

reversing course on CW modernization so soon after the President's UN speech, it also might be seen as vacillation or indecisiveness.

The Chairman, JCS strongly opposes any CW initiative that would have the effect of limiting CW production.

START and Strategic Force Modernization

Background

Although specific decisions have not been made about the post-START strategic force structure, several options are under consideration as part of the review of the defense program. These include downloading Minuteman III missiles to a 1-RV configuration and retiring Minuteman II. In combination with plans to redeploy Peacekeeper in the rail-garrison basing mode, this option would result in the phase out of silo-based MIRVed ICBMs.

Congress made relatively minor reductions in the budget requests for rail-garrison Peacekeeper and SICBM in the FY 1990 budget that was just passed. Future Congressional support for both mobile ICBM programs remains uncertain.

The defense program currently includes plans to build one Trident SSBN per year. Longer-term projections of this building rate would yield a fleet of about 30 Trident submarines by the year 2000 (well above any plausible START-constrained force structure). The long-lead items for the eighteenth Trident and the core for the nineteenth Trident are included in the just-passed FY 1990 defense budget. Budget pressures could lead to a reduced Trident building rate and/or a curtailed Trident fleet. Another consideration as the defense program is restructured is that START constraints will force tradeoffs between ICBM RVs and SLBM RVs.

In the past, the Soviets have argued for the elimination of nuclear weapons. More recently, they have suggested that the two superpowers move to a "minimum deterrence" force, perhaps as an interim step to eliminating nuclear weapons entirely. Gorbachev could make a proposal along these lines at Malta.

Possible Initiative

The U.S. could propose to:

(a) lower START limits from the current 6000 warheads by an

additional 20 percent to 4800 warheads, coupled with

(b) a ban on all MIRVed ICBMs, both silo-based and mobile.

In essence, we would offer to reduce START limits by trading our MIRVed Minuteman III and Peacekeeper missiles for the Soviet SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs. These MIRVed ICBMs could be phased out over the seven year timetable currently proposed for START reductions, or over a somewhat longer period.

Under such a proposal, the U.S. ICBM force would consist of a combination of 800 SICBM and 1-RV Minuteman missiles, and 15 START-accountable Tridents (assuming that we continue to deploy 1100 START-accountable bombers and ALCMs). It would eliminate some of the most destabilizing systems in the nuclear arsenal, including the most threatening Soviet systems. It would also reduce our ability to cover the Soviet target base, and drive us in the direction of strategic nuclear systems that are relatively more expensive.

SICBM would be critical to the continued viability of the ICBM leg of the Triad under this approach. It probably would be desirable to accelerate its IOC, but it is doubtful that the timetable could be appreciably shortened. If SICBM were not deployed for whatever reason, this proposal would be seen by many as tantamount to a U.S. decision to move to an "augmented dyad" for nuclear deterrence. Phase-out of Peacekeeper missiles might produce some near-term budget savings as a result of cancellation of the rail-garrison rebasing program, but would result in the elimination of our most modern and capable ICBM RVs. The implications of such a cancellation for continued Congressional support for SICBM are unclear.

Under this approach, we would not fund any new starts for Trident submarines and probably would not spend some of the money in the FY 1990 and FY 1991 budgets for long-lead items.

This proposal would have a much larger impact on the Soviets. They could reject it amid angry charges of American "grandstanding" at what was supposed to be an informal, no agenda meeting at Malta. They could well counter with proposals to ban SLCMs, or sharply limit or ban MIRVed SLBMs.

Variants of the proposal could limit the MIRV ban either to all silo-based MIRVed missiles, or all mobile MIRVed missiles. A ban on mobile MIRVs would permit the U.S. to retain Peacekeeper missiles in silos (and allow the Soviet Union to retain its SS-18s and SS-24s). It would reduce the costs of strategic force modernization to the U.S., and provide a hedge against the uncertain prospects for SICBM. It would require us to explain

how we reconcile our START emphasis on strategic stability with an approach that sanctioned vulnerable MIRVs and banned survivable MIRVs. It probably would be marginally more acceptable to the Soviets than would a total ban on MIRVed ICBMs.

Assuming a force of 800 ICBM RVs, a ban on silo-based MIRVed ICBMs would permit the U.S. to proceed with rebasing Peacekeeper, and to deploy either 300 SICBMs or 300 1-RV Minuteman IIIs. The Soviets would have to eliminate all of their SS-18s and silo-based SS-24s. It would not mitigate, and could aggravate, the verification and breakout risks posed by mobile MIRVs. The Soviets probably would find a ban on silo-based MIRVs more difficult to accept than a mobile MIRV ban unless they could be persuaded that the phase-out of their silo-based force was in their long term interest, or that U.S. concessions on other START issues, combined with a rapid conclusion of a START agreement, made it worthwhile.

Naval Force Reductions and Naval Arms Control

Background

Although we have made clear that we categorically reject the idea, there is a widespread expectation that Gorbachev will propose naval arms control in some form or other at Malta. Budget pressures are likely to lead to some reductions in naval forces. Options under consideration include early retirement of two carriers, mothballing some or all of the battleships. Escorts would be reduced proportionally.

Possible Initiative

The U.S. would continue to reject all efforts to engage us in discussions or negotiations about naval arms control. We could respond to such proposals, however, by observing that:

(a) U.S. requirements for naval forces depend upon threats to our interests around the world.

(b) As those threats diminish, our requirements will be adjusted accordingly.

(c) Reductions in Soviet military capabilities, particularly those that are well-suited for offensive missions, are one of the things that would lead to lessened threats and lowered requirements for naval forces.

(d) Reductions in regional tensions and regional instabilities likewise would permit smaller U.S.naval forces. The Soviet Union could help us address such regional problems.

Defense Spending

Background

The U.S. defense budget has declined in real terms every year since FY 1985. Even deeper reductions are in prospect. There are some signs that trends in Soviet defense spending also may be turning down. Because of the vast disparities in the relative sizes of our two economies, a given level of Soviet defense spending consumes a much larger percentage of their GNP than an equivalent expenditure requires of ours.

Possible Initiative

The U.S. could challenge the Soviet Union to reduce our respective "defense burdens," measured as a percentage of GNP, by 15-20 percent. For the U.S., this would reduce the amount of the GNP devoted to defense by about 1 percent. For the Soviets, the reduction in GNP spent on defense probably would be in excess of 3 percent.

ASAT

The implications of defense budget cuts, if any, for our ASAT program are sufficiently uncertain that it does not seem worthwhile to raise the subject in any way at Malta.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Arms Control -- Savings and Costs (4 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (October 1989 - April 1990)

Date Closed:	3/17/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91122-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: DON PILLING

SUBJECT: Arms Control -- Savings and Costs

In following up on the President's questions about when arms control will yield defense budget reductions, the memorandum at Tab I shows there is no "peace dividend" resulting from arms control. Indeed, verification costs could exceed what we hope to gain from all of our current arms control agenda. It concludes by showing just how dramatic a change is needed in policy and/or force structure to gain significant savings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for Signature

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2806-MR
12/2/2016 MR

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10253

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 28, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Agreement for the INF Treaty

On Thursday, December 21, 1989, the U.S. Representative to the Special Verification Commission (SVC) signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with his Soviet counterpart, which spells out detailed procedures for implementing certain provisions of the INF Treaty. The document is over 130 pages long, and covers the technical characteristics and methods of use of inspection equipment, logistical arrangements for inspections, and a host of other implementation questions. The length and level of detail indicate and the complexity of carrying out an arms control agreement, which has unprecedented on-site inspection provisions, will thus be a case study for other arms control agreements we are negotiating. In fact, our proposal in START to negotiate and begin early implementation of certain verification measures is based on our INF experience.

Although the MOA covers most of the outstanding implementation issues, there will be a number of additional details that will still have to be worked out. We have decided to go ahead and sign the MOA at this time because we want to codify those procedures that have been agreed upon, and which are being implemented on the ground. The remaining issues, and any new questions that arise, will be on the agenda for future SVC meetings as part of a process that will probably continue throughout the life of the Treaty.

Senate approval of the MOA is not required, but as we agreed during the INF ratification proceedings, we will promptly brief the Congress and send the text of the MOA, along with two Agreed Statements relating to the portal monitoring provisions signed earlier this year.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Patty--
Same problem as
Panama memo, though
no one's sure if
President saw this.

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jc

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2806-MR
12/2/2016 MM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL

SUBJECT: MOA for INF Treaty

On Thursday, the U.S. Representative to the Special Verification Commission (SVC) will sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with his Soviet counterpart, which spells out detailed procedures for implementing certain provisions of the INF Treaty. The document is over 130 pages long, and covers the technical characteristics and methods of use of inspection equipment, logistical arrangements for inspections, and a host of other implementation questions. The length and level of detail indicate the complexity of carrying out an arms control agreement that has unprecedented on-site inspection provisions, and will thus be a case study for other arms control agreements we are negotiating. In fact, our proposal in START to negotiate and begin early implementation of certain verification measures is based on our INF experience.

Although the MOA covers most of the outstanding implementation issues, there will be a number of additional details that will still have to be worked out. We have decided to go ahead and sign the MOA at this time because we want to codify those procedures that have been agreed upon, and which are currently being implemented on the ground. The remaining issues, and any new questions that arise, will be on the agenda for future SVC meetings as part of a process that will probably continue throughout the life of the Treaty.

Senate approval of the MOA is not required, but as we agreed during the INF ratification proceedings, we will promptly brief the Congress and send the text of the MOA, along with two Agreed Statements relating to the portal monitoring provisions signed earlier this year. ACDA Congressional Affairs will make brief phone calls to the appropriate Committee chairmen and staffers to alert them to this. (The delegations in Geneva will handle the signing in a low-key manner, with a brief press statement.)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2806-MR
12/2/2016 MM

We believe that the President should be informed of the completion of the MOA.

Concurrence: Condi Rice, Dan Levin, Bret Coulson

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: 12.00 mc LOG # 10253

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG mc A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes	1	APH	Review
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	mc 1/6	N
NSC Secretariat	3		N

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 10253

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	1	W	A
Philip Hughes	2	APH	
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft	4	for Rick	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room		APNSA Has Seen	
West Wing Desk	5	12/28AC	D
NSC Secretariat	6		

RECEIVED 89 DEC 21 P1:00

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

ne)

COMMENTS

Gen —

Redone w/ your changes.

treaty

APNSA Has Seen

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9000740
RECEIVED: 30 JAN 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: TOBEY

DOC DATE: 30 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

5

KEYWORDS: USSR
SDI

START

PERSONS: CHENEY, R

SUBJECT: BREAKFAST ITEM FOR 31 JAN / DEFENSE & SPACE TALKS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 02 FEB 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: TOBEY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		TOBEY

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 0740

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	9/7	
NSC Secretariat	R		OBE/ONR

90 SEP 7 P4:44

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~ 0740

January 30, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

OBE-NFAR

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: WILLIAM TOBEY

SUBJECT: **Breakfast Item:** Defense & Space Talks

Secretary Cheney may raise at your breakfast tomorrow, or during subsequent meetings, the issue of Soviet linkage between START and restrictions on SDI testing.

At the Wyoming Ministerial meeting last year, the Soviets formally dropped linkage between START and Defense & Space. Nonetheless, they continue to assert that U.S. ABM testing beyond the ABM Treaty as they define it would constitute grounds for withdrawing from the START Treaty.

Secretary Cheney will likely argue that if we remain silent on this issue, our silence will be taken as assent to a regime of de facto restrictions on SDI. It could also complicate START ratification.

SecDef has made these arguments and suggested talking points for Moscow in a memorandum for Secretary Baker (at Tab A). SecDef is seeking to rebut Soviet statements, not impose further conditions on signing a START Treaty.

As a practical matter, the U.S. cannot circumscribe the Soviet Union's right to judge whether its supreme interests are threatened. Nonetheless, we can lay a clear record that there has been no meeting of minds between the parties to a START Treaty that ABM testing under the broad interpretation would give grounds for avoiding START Treaty obligations. Moreover, if we are not clear on this point, it will complicate START ratification.

Nicholas Rostow concurs.

Attachment

Tab A Incoming from SecDef

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2806-MR
12/2/2016 MM

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2806-HQ
OSD 1/15/13

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 JAN 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Defense and Space Issues at the Moscow Ministerial

(S) The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the problem which confronts us in the Defense and Space Talks between now and the June Summit and to suggest some points you may wish to raise during your meetings in Moscow.

(S) During the Wyoming Ministerial, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that a START agreement could be signed and implemented in the absence of agreement in the Defense and Space Talks (DST). Despite this apparent relaxation of explicit linkage between START and DST, the Soviet Union subsequently tabled agreed statements in Geneva making it clear that the Soviet Union was "relinking" implementation of a START agreement to U.S. acquiescence in restrictions on SDI testing. In effect, the Soviet Union is offering us a START Treaty based on compliance with a more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty than we agreed to in 1972. The impact of this limitation on the SDI program would be serious.

(S) Clearly, to the extent that the Soviet Union is willing to conclude a START agreement on its own merits, we are correct in accepting Shevardnadze's initiative. However, since we are being asked to pay for progress on START with significant limitations on SDI testing, we should clarify our understanding of our existing rights to conduct SDI testing in space. Moreover, we must firmly correct the mistaken impression, which the Soviet negotiators are attempting to foster, that U.S. silence between the Wyoming Ministerial and a June Summit on our interpretation of the ABM Treaty would constitute assent to de facto restrictions on SDI. In short, to maintain the de-linkage which you accomplished in Wyoming, we need to counter this Soviet strategy.

(S) The alternative to challenging Soviet "relinkage" is a strategy of sidestepping the differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union on what constitutes legitimate testing under the ABM Treaty and deferring these contentious issues to future discussions in DST. In my view, this strategy complicates START ratification by failing to clear up the discrepancy between U.S. and Soviet views of the ABM Treaty. The result would be ambiguity on what U.S. activity affords the Soviet Union legitimate grounds to withdraw from its START obligations. Worse still, our failure to

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gain Soviet acknowledgment of our existing rights will place the resolution of the divergence between U.S. and Soviet views of the ABM Treaty on the U.S. Senate during the ratification of START. It is a strategy most likely to result in funding and legislative constraints on SDI, that could prevent or at least impede the accomplishment of the program's objectives. Moreover, it is a strategy which is least likely to afford the President a politically viable defense of his constitutional prerogative to interpret treaties.

(S) Consequently, we should place the onus of "relinkage" where it belongs: on the Soviet side. We have begun to make this point in the recent instructions for Round XIII of the Defense and Space Talks, in which we state that SDI development and testing would not constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. I am enclosing talking points for your consideration which make the larger point that compliance with the START Treaty will not be conditioned on the waiver or forfeit of U.S. rights under the ABM Treaty (TAB A).

(S) In my view, there is at least a reasonable chance that the Soviet side will give us an explicit acknowledgement in the START endgame of our testing rights. Even if one were not confident of eventual Soviet acknowledgement, it would be damaging in the START ratification debate if the negotiating record were to show that, between the Wyoming Ministerial and the June Summit, we did not press our view of the right to conduct development and testing under the ABM Treaty.

attachment
a/s

cc: Ambassador Burt
Ambassador Smith

~~SECRET~~

Moscow Ministerial

Talking Points
Defense and Space

-- At the 1987 Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to the phrase "research, development and testing as required which are permitted by the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972."

-- It is well known to the Soviet Union that the U.S. understanding of this phrase is that the Parties agreed that the ABM Treaty permits the testing of certain ABM systems in space.

-- Recent statements by the Soviet side suggest that the exercise of these existing rights under the ABM Treaty would constitute a violation of this Treaty and grounds for withdrawal from a future START Treaty.

-- This is simply not the case. The exercise of existing rights to test ABM systems based on other physical principles in space is not a violation of the ABM Treaty and, as such, does not constitute grounds for the Soviet Union to avoid its current or future Treaty obligations.

-- Since our meeting in Wyoming, Soviet attempts to "relink" START with constraints on the SDI program have become an obstacle to progress in negotiations and, if not dropped, will obstruct ratification of a START agreement.

-- The United States proceeds towards a START agreement with the understanding that Soviet compliance with a START agreement will not be conditioned on the requirement that the United States waive or forfeit rights under the ABM Treaty.

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0756
Add on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 31, 1990

[redacted]

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

5/3

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: JOHN GORDON/RICH DAVIS

SUBJECT: General Scowcroft Talking Points for Oval Office Meeting, Thursday, February 1, 1990, 2:30 PM

Attached are the talking points we have prepared for General Scowcroft's use in tomorrow's Oval Office meeting on arms control.

These were not available when we forwarded the original package. They are Tab II to package # 0756. Please ensure that they are included in the package as quickly as possible.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached Tab II.

Attachment
Tab II

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 691 NARA, Date 5/4/11

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(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points Pre-Ministerial Arms Control Meeting (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (October 1989 - April 1990)

Date Closed:	3/17/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91122-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1990 THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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MEETING WITH SENATORS WARNER AND NUNN

DATE: February 22, 1990
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:30 pm - 2:00 pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Congressional support for the defense budget, especially the strategic modernization program and its relationship to START.

II. BACKGROUND

This is an informal meeting held at the request of Senators Nunn and Warner to express their concerns about the prospects on the Hill for the strategic modernization program. They will tell you that the "two-missile program" will not survive without a major arms control initiative and that B-2 and SDI are "in trouble." You will want to draw them out on these subjects as well as on Congressional support for troop levels in Europe and on the defense budget as a whole.

Support for strategic modernization last year was very thin and required the investment of considerable political capital and time by you, Dick Cheney and our arms control negotiators. The political climate this year is far less supportive. We face a major attack on the defense budget, the belief by some that the strategic threat is now appreciably lessened, a growing clamor for payment of the "peace dividend," and election year politics. Yet with START in the balance, strategic modernization may be even more important.

ICBM Modernization. Your FY 1991 defense budget calls for $2.8 billion for the Peacekeeper ICBM, most of which is for the redeployment of the missile from its silos to rail garrison. It also includes $202 million for continued development of the small mobile ICBM, the Midgetman. The first trains with Peacekeeper would be deployed in 1992 and the first Midgetman in 1997.

The two missiles have survived in Congress as a package. The coalition that has supported both missiles was built largely around political compromises to support one missile in return for support for the other, and was never very

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

strong. That coalition is vanishing and there has not been a majority who support either missile for a year or more.

Now Warner has said that we cannot afford both systems; Nunn has called for a revision to START to ban mobile MIRVs and said that we should delay the treaty if necessary to achieve this; Aspin has said the US can no longer justify systems as needed for bargaining leverage. These are the members who led the fight to support the two missile program last year.

If both programs are cancelled there is a real possibility that the START treaty would not be ratified since the Soviets already have two deployed mobile systems and we will have none. This problem will be compounded if the B-2 program is sharply curtailed and we are not able to take full advantage of the bomber counting rule in START.

Nunn will push for a change to our START position to explicitly ban mobile MIRVs. While I am attracted to this idea, I am concerned that anything we do now will delay the conclusion of START and potentially give the Soviets an opening to charge that we are intentionally delaying the treaty. I will have some specific ideas to discuss with you soon. At this point, however, I note that there are no quick or simple ways to change START to rebuild support on the Hill for our ICBM modernization program.

B-2. Your budget proposal calls for $5.5 billion and the authorization to produce five additional aircraft. Last fall Congress reduced the plan from five aircraft to two and added a number of testing and reporting requirements. This year support for the aircraft is weakening further, and the aircraft cost makes this an easy target (although about half of the total program cost already has been spent).

The full program is for a buy of 132 aircraft and that is what is presented in your budget. Dick Cheney has ordered a full review of the program by March, after which he will make his recommendations. Best guess now is that he will call for a total buy of 75-85 aircraft instead of the 132 now planned.

Nunn and Warner should be generally supportive of the program but will be concerned about the costs -- both monetary and political. Both have supported the technology but will not support the full 132 aircraft buy. Nunn argues, I think correctly, that we have not done a good job defining the mission for this aircraft. We do need the B-2 if we are to enter the next century with a penetrating bomber. Numbers much below 75 do not make much sense to me from either a financial or operational point of view.

Congressional support of the B-2 will be important, however, for ratification of START. As you recall, bombers that do

not carry ALCMs only count as one warhead against the 6000 weapon limit of the treaty. Without being able to take advantage of this treaty feature, the JCS will have real difficulty supporting the treaty.

Trident/D-5. The Trident submarine program is in good shape on the Hill. This next year's budget funds the production of the 18th boat along with long-lead items for the 19th and 20th. We anticipate that START will permit this many boats. Next year, however, we will need to decide if we want to begin funding the 21st submarine.

SDI. The FY 1991 budget calls for $4.8 billion for SDI. This level of funding is required to support large-scale space-based experiments necessary to making the decision on SDI deployment during your first term. Budget support has been eroding -- last year's initial request was for $5.6 billion, later revised in your budget to $4.9 billion and eventually funded at $3.9 billion. As with other programs, the changes in the political environment are increasing calls to cut back or cancel this program.

In the past both Nunn and Warner supported the program and Nunn feels he carried the Administration's water during last fall's Congressional budget action. Some on the Hill question the Administration's support of SDI because we acquiesced to last year's cut in the program. We anticipate a substantial cut again this year unless you go to the mat for it. Nunn and Warner will want to know whether you are prepared to make an all out push including a veto threat if necessary.

Nunn would likely be content with a program that focused on long-term R&D, bypassing the near-term deployment option. Warner may believe we are spending too much on near-term technologies. Nevertheless, as you were told at Livermore, Brilliant Pebbles accounts for only about three percent of the SDI budget, despite its high profile. The overall balance is about 50-50 near term and long term.

Troop levels in Europe. Soviet agreement to your 195,000 manpower initiative in Central Europe should have strengthened Congressional support for maintaining this level, but there will be calls to reduce further as the Soviets inevitably pull out and German unification proceeds. While you will want to hear Nunn and Warner's views on how Congress will treat our military presence in Europe, you should emphasize that their support is essential and that we cannot now go lower without severe damage to the Alliance, the future of Germany, and our relations with our strongest allies.

Other Defense Budget issues. You may want to discuss briefly the overall level of the defense budget of $295

billion. The interest in the "peace dividend" seems limited at present to the press and those in Congress who want to shift even more funds into social programs, but there is widespread consensus that the budget will be cut, perhaps substantially. You can point out that the real peace dividends are in both peace itself and the potential for democratically elected governments in Eastern Europe. Nunn knows that there has been a reduction in defense spending every year since 1985 -- to take a bigger cut now may force hard-to-reverse steps before we fully understand the new strategic environment. Nunn and Warner can give insight on how to handle Congressional calls for substantial additional cuts.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Informal discussions.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List

Memo to President only

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1990

5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DICK CHENEY
The Secretary of Defense

GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL, USA
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: START Issues to be Addressed Before the May Foreign Ministers' Meeting (U)

During the meeting last week with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the two sides agreed on a list of issues to be addressed in the negotiations in preparation for the May 16-19 Ministerial meeting. These issues range from major policy issues on which the U.S. does not have a fully fleshed-out position to technical issues for which the Negotiator has primary responsibility. (S)

The attached lists sort these issues into three groups, based on the level of attention they require in Washington. First are the major policy questions that reflect either internal USG or U.S.-Soviet differences. I have asked Arnie Kanter's "Ungroup" to press ahead on these and have suggested tentative dates for us to meet on those that may require our personal attention. (S)

Second is a list of the issues that the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee should resolve. This list may grow as the Delegation requests additional guidance in the weeks ahead. Issues that cannot be resolved at the PCC will be quickly advanced for more senior-level consideration. This schedule is being circulated separately to PCC members. (S)

Third is a list of those issues for which the Negotiator has instructions or is best positioned to recommend next steps. (S)

Certainly the progress we will be able to make toward an agreement depends critically on the Soviets. For our part, however, we must be ready to take full advantage of any opportunities that present themselves. (S)

Brent Scowcroft

Attachments:
As stated

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TAB A

START Issues for Principals

	Issue	Tentative Meeting Dates: Ungroup	Tentative Meeting Dates: Principals
1.	**Central Limits** - SLCMs - ALCMs - Mobile ICBM Sublimits - Heavy ICBM Limits	4/16&19	4/23
2.	**New Kinds** - ASBMs - ICCMs	4/19	4/23
3.	**Inspections** - PPCM - SSI	4/24	4/27
4.	**RV Counting** - New Types Definition for Ballistic Missiles - RV Attribution for New Types	4/26	4/27
5.	**Third Country Basing/Inspections**	4/30	5/4

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12c. List	Re: START Interagency Issues (1 pp.)	4/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (October 1989 - April 1990)

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FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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START Issues for Geneva

1. Basing Terminology

2. Rapid Reload Details

3. Restrictions on Test and Training Launchers

4. Telemetry Issues
   - data exchange
   - exemptions from encapsulation ban
   - signal strength

5. Mobile ICBMs
   - basing areas
   - movements
   - verification

6. Launchers on Submarines
   - undergoing overhaul and conversion
   - prior to sea trials

7. Use of Terms "Produce" and "Develop"

8. Duration

9. Support Equipment

10. Unique Identifiers

11. Definition of Inspection Site

12. Precision of Coordinates in the MOU

13. Restructuring the Inspection Protocol

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON, ACTING JG

SIGNED

FROM: RICH DAVIS RD

SUBJECT: START Issues For The May Ministerial

The Baker-Shevardnadze meeting last week produced a list of U.S.-Soviet issues in START to be worked before the next Ministerial, May 16-19. The length of the list (Tab A) shows how much needs to be done between now and then, both here and in Geneva if we are to meet the President's goal for the June Summit.

The attached memorandum (Tab I) from you to your counterparts is designed to organize the START issues in the weeks ahead by allocating each issue to the group best able to reach informed decisions rapidly. If we are to be prepared to take full advantage of any openings the Soviets might offer, we need to complete our homework in a number of areas. The major issues are included in the first list and we recommend that you schedule tentative meetings now among your counterparts to address these issues. Suggested dates are included on the list.

The second and third lists allocate "secondary" issues to the PCC and the Negotiator. It would be useful to include these lists in the package to demonstrate the importance you place on all of this work. We have informally coordinated the work schedule with Reg Bartholomew.

JB fm

Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to your counterparts.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum on START Issues For The May Ministerial
Tab A Lists of START Issues

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008410
RECEIVED: 22 OCT 90 19

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: UNRECORDED

DOC DATE: 07 MAR 90
SOURCE REF:

5

KEYWORDS: START ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BUILDING ON START / PROPOSALS TO BE CONSIDERED BY PRES

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 25 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 1 OF 1

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ~~SECRET~~

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APNSA Has Seen 1st week in March

Patty save in personal file

major Dramatic Proposal — I told em go ahead CB 3-15

BUILDING ON START

-- There is now great momentum in every area of arms control, especially START. If we continue at the current pace, we will be able to initial the START Treaty at the June Summit.

-- President Bush wants to use the momentum we have generated and move boldly to build on our achievements.

-- This means focusing not just on numbers but on measures that can truly enhance strategic stability. There are two specific ways to do this:

-- The first is to eliminate mobile MIRVed ICBMs -- now, before both sides have so much invested in these systems that their elimination will be very difficult.

-- The second is to eliminate, over a longer period of time, the remaining land-based MIRVs -- namely those in silos.

-- I will outline these concepts briefly and would like to discuss them in more detail at the Ministerial, including whether we can begin to make these stabilizing improvements in the current negotiations. But let me emphasize that we do not want to do anything to delay initialing START at the Washington Summit.

-- We think a ban on mobile MIRVs could be incorporated into START without delay. The US is prepared to cancel the rail-garrison system in exchange for the elimination of your mobile SS-24. I know you have several SS-24 trains deployed, but the US also has a developed system, a budget to deploy it rapidly, and the political ability to proceed if necessary.

-- We are also prepared to eliminate silo-based MIRVs over a longer period of time, although we recognize that this proposal would require extensive negotiations. But if the two sides are able to go down this deMIRVing path, it would be possible to side-step remaining differences about constraints on heavy ICBMs in the current START negotiations.

-- If you see merit in an approach along these lines, we should work the details at the Washington Ministerial at the end of which President Bush and President Gorbachev could announce an agreement to ban mobile MIRVs in START, to initial the

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START agreement at the Washington Summit, and to immediately turn to the longer-term goal of eliminating land-based MIRVs.

-- On the other hand, if you cannot agree to a ban on mobile MIRVs in the current START agreement, perhaps the two sides could announce at the April Ministerial that we would begin talks, immediately after the current START agreement is initialed in June, to eliminate first mobile MIRVs and then all land-based MIRVs.

-- I wanted to present these ideas to you now so that you will have time to consider them. I know you have ideas of your own for follow-on negotiations which we can discuss at our April meeting.

-- In sum, we are prepared to agree to ban mobile MIRVed ICBMs in the current START agreement provided that can be done without delaying the Treaty, and to address other stabilizing measures in follow-on negotiations that could begin as soon as the Treaty is initialed.

-- If you cannot agree to dealing with MIRV mobiles in the current negotiations, we could agree to turn immediately to these issues once the current START agreement is initialed at the Summit.

-- I hope that you agree that conditions will never be better for both sides to capture and build upon the momentum we have generated in the negotiations.