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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files

OA/ID Number: 91122
Folder ID Number: 91122-002

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (July - September 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with Republican Members of Congress (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with Bipartisan Senators (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with Bipartisan Senators (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with GOP Congressional Leadership (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with GOP Congressional Leadership (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Luncheon with Jacques Attali, Wednesday, September 27, 12:30 p.m. (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
05a. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (4 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	
05b. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (3 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	
05c. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	✓

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (July - September 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1037
OA/ID Number: 91122-002
Date Closed: 3/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05d. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S
05e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Presidential Letters to Thatcher, Mitterrand and Kohl Concerning the Gorbachev Letter (2 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
05f. Message	Re: Message to Francois Mitterrand from the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05g. Message	Re: Message to Helmut Kohl from the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05h. Memo	Robert Blackwill/John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letters to Thatcher on the CW Initiative and the Gorbachev Letter and Messages to Mitterrand and Kohl Concerning the Gorbachev Letter (1 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5721

EXEC SEC CHRON

July 20, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES *lkh*
SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Members of Congress
(Part II)

Attached are talking points for the President's meeting with Republican Members of the House of Representatives scheduled for 10:30 a.m. on July 21.

Attachment
Talking Points

1

TAB A

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH
REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

- I need your support for the strategic modernization package.
- I've made hard and often unpopular decisions to cancel programs to build an affordable defense budget. Yet we simply must maintain a strong strategic modernization program -- for national security and for momentum in arms control. I have proposed an integrated, cohesive package that capitalizes on the revolutionary technology in B-2 and SDI and brings survivability and stability to ICBMs.
- This modernization package is absolutely essential to further progress in arms control. Without U.S. mobile missiles, the START negotiations will stalemate. Don't put me in the position of trying to negotiate on mobiles when the Soviets have two deployed mobile systems and we have none. Without B-2, we will have to revise the entire structure of START, including much of what we have reached tentative agreement on with the Soviets. A modern, penetrating bomber is the very philosophy around which our negotiating position is built. SDI helped bring the Soviets to the negotiations -- don't take the pressure off now.
- This is a critical year. If we walk away from these programs, the Soviets will simply sit back and wait to see what we give up next.
- I'm tired of hearing that I don't fully support strategic modernization. I want you to carry the word back to every

one of your colleagues that I need the B-2. I want every one on the Hill to understand that I am determined to deploy both Rail-garrison MX and the Small ICBM. I want both sides of the aisle to understand that unless we adequately fund SDI now, we will never be able to answer our children why we have denied their living in a safer world.

-- We either step up to the mark and support this essential and cohesive strategic package, or we walk away from our responsibilities and destroy the hope for real arms control.

-- We can make history -- in our relationship with the Soviet Union, in remarkable technological innovations, and in arms control. Don't squander the moment. Join with me and seize this opportunity.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

5721

July 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Points to be Made for the President's Meeting
with GOP Members

The President will meet tomorrow with a number of GOP members to discuss the strategic modernization program and arms control. Attached are a set of revised "Points to be Made" for the President. They are considerably shorter than those prepared for today's meeting and very direct.

BL
Virginia Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you provide the attached Points to be Made to the President.

Approve *AG*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Cicconi
Tab A Points to be Made

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 5721

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG GAP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Dep Exec	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>5721</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>NR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres mtg w/ Rep. Member of Congress
on July 21 at 10:30a.m.

July 20

Jackie:

Scowcroft approved this & Bill should sign this out ASAP. (Philip won't be in until after noon). It's for a 10:30a.m. mtg w/ the Pres. Bill saw this last night, but a couple of changes have been made.

Thanks,
Siare

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD 1D: 8905752
RECEIVED: 21 JUL 89 15

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: GORDON
KANTER

DOC DATE: 21 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS: NUNN, SAM

WARNER, JOHN W

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MTG ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 25 JUL 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GORDON
KANTER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8905752

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
002

Z 89072120 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 89072212 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WJN

LOG # 5752

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG GA2 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>WJN</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>APB</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

89 JUL 21 P 5: 03

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS Pres Mtg -
Bipartisan mtg w/ Senators on
Strategic Modernization
7/24

7/22

Maria -
once you have
processed this, the
TPO can be taken
directly to Ciconeri's
office. Thanks,
WJN

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH
BIPARTISAN SENATORS

- I need your continued support for the strategic modernization package.
- I would like to commend members of the SASC. There were some cuts that, quite honestly, I wish had not been made. But the results are very close to what we need. The problems are not even in the same league as those we have with the House version of the bill.
- My special thanks to Sam (Nunn) and to John (Warner) for the hard work that put this together.
- Now I need the support of all members to give us a good bill, a solid defense program, and a strong strategic modernization package.
- I've made hard and often unpopular decisions to cancel programs to build an affordable defense budget. Yet we simply must maintain a strong strategic modernization program -- for national security and for momentum in arms control. I have proposed an integrated, cohesive package that capitalizes on the revolutionary technology in B-2 and SDI and brings survivability and stability to ICBMs.
- This modernization package is absolutely essential to further progress in arms control. Without U.S. mobile missiles, the START negotiations will stalemate. Don't put me in the position of trying to negotiate on mobiles when the Soviets have two deployed mobile systems and we have

none. Without B-2, we will have to revise the entire structure of START, including much of what we have reached tentative agreement on with the Soviets. A modern, penetrating bomber is the very philosophy around which our negotiating position is built. SDI helped bring the Soviets to the negotiations -- don't take the pressure off now.

-- This is a critical year. If we walk away from these programs, the Soviets will simply sit back and wait to see what we give up next.

-- I'm tired of hearing that I don't fully support strategic modernization. I want you to carry the word back to every one of your colleagues that I need the B-2. I want every one on the Hill to understand that I am determined to deploy both Rail-garrison MX and the Small ICBM. I want both sides of the aisle to understand that unless we adequately fund SDI now, we will never be able to answer our children why we have denied their living in a safer world.

-- We either step up to the mark and support this essential and cohesive strategic package, or we walk away from our responsibilities and destroy the hope for real arms control.

-- We can make history -- in our relationship with the Soviet Union, in remarkable technological innovations, and in arms control. Don't squander the moment. Join with me and seize this opportunity.

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH
BIPARTISAN SENATORS

- I NEED YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PACKAGE.
- I WOULD LIKE TO COMMEND MEMBERS OF THE SASC. THERE WERE SOME CUTS THAT, QUITE HONESTLY, I WISH HAD NOT BEEN MADE. BUT THE RESULTS ARE VERY CLOSE TO WHAT WE NEED. THE PROBLEMS ARE NOT EVEN IN THE SAME LEAGUE AS THOSE WE HAVE WITH THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE BILL.
- MY SPECIAL THANKS TO SAM (NUNN) AND TO JOHN (WARNER) FOR THE HARD WORK THAT PUT THIS TOGETHER.
- NOW I NEED THE SUPPORT OF ALL MEMBERS TO GIVE US A GOOD BILL, A SOLID DEFENSE PROGRAM, AND A STRONG STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PACKAGE.
- I'VE MADE HARD AND OFTEN UNPOPULAR DECISIONS TO CANCEL PROGRAMS TO BUILD AN AFFORDABLE DEFENSE BUDGET. YET WE SIMPLY MUST MAINTAIN A

CARD 2 of 4

- STRONG STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM -- FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOR MOMENTUM IN ARMS CONTROL. I HAVE PROPOSED AN INTEGRATED, COHESIVE PACKAGE THAT CAPITALIZES ON THE REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGY IN B-2 AND SDI AND BRINGS SURVIVABILITY AND STABILITY TO ICBMS.
- THIS MODERNIZATION PACKAGE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. WITHOUT U.S. MOBILE MISSILES, THE START NEGOTIATIONS WILL STALEMATE. DON'T PUT ME IN THE POSITION OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE ON MOBILES WHEN THE SOVIETS HAVE TWO DEPLOYED MOBILE SYSTEMS AND WE HAVE NONE. WITHOUT B-2, WE WILL HAVE TO REVISE THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF START, INCLUDING MUCH OF WHAT WE HAVE REACHED TENTATIVE AGREEMENT ON WITH THE SOVIETS. A MODERN, PENETRATING BOMBER IS THE VERY PHILOSOPHY AROUND WHICH OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IS BUILT. SDI HELPED BRING THE SOVIETS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS -- DON'T TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF NOW.

-- THIS IS A CRITICAL YEAR. IF WE WALK AWAY FROM
THESE PROGRAMS, THE SOVIETS WILL SIMPLY SIT
BACK AND WAIT TO SEE WHAT WE GIVE UP NEXT.
-- I'M TIRED OF HEARING THAT I DON'T FULLY
SUPPORT STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. I WANT YOU
TO CARRY THE WORD BACK TO EVERY ONE OF YOUR
COLLEAGUES THAT I NEED THE B-2. I WANT EVERY
ONE ON THE HILL TO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM
DETERMINED TO DEPLOY BOTH RAIL-GARRISON MX AND
THE SMALL ICBM. I WANT BOTH SIDES OF THE
AISLE TO UNDERSTAND THAT UNLESS WE ADEQUATELY
FUND SDI NOW, WE WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO ANSWER
OUR CHILDREN WHY WE HAVE DENIED THEIR LIVING
IN A SAFER WORLD.
-- WE EITHER STEP UP TO THE MARK AND SUPPORT THIS
ESSENTIAL AND COHESIVE STRATEGIC PACKAGE, OR
WE WALK AWAY FROM OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND
DESTROY THE HOPE FOR REAL ARMS CONTROL.
-- WE CAN MAKE HISTORY -- IN OUR RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IN REMARKABLE
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS, AND IN ARMS

CARD 4 of 4

CONTROL. DON'T SQUANDER THE MOMENT. JOIN
WITH ME AND SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*
SUBJECT: Bipartisan Meeting with Senators on Strategic
Modernization

The President has agreed to meet with a number of Senators on Monday, July 24 to discuss strategic modernization. Attached are proposed "Points to be Made" by the President. They are identical to those provided for the July 21 GOP meeting with House members except for the introductory paragraphs which praise the work of the SASC and Senators Nunn and Warner in particular.

JG
Virginia Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you provide the attached Points to be Made to the President.

Approve

8

Disapprove

Attachment


Tab A

Points to be Made

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

July 24, 1989



MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Philip', written over the name 'G. PHILIP HUGHES'.

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with GOP Leadership Meeting

Attached are talking points on the strategic modernization program for the President's meeting with the GOP Leadership scheduled for 10:00 tomorrow.

Attachment
Talking Points

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH
GOP CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

- I need your rock-solid support and leadership to give us a good defense bill, a solid defense program, and a strong strategic modernization package.
- I've made hard and often unpopular decisions to cancel programs to build an affordable defense budget. Yet we simply must maintain a strong strategic modernization program -- for national security and for momentum in arms control. I have proposed an integrated, cohesive package that capitalizes on the revolutionary technology in B-2 and SDI and brings survivability and stability to ICBMs.
- This modernization package is absolutely essential to further progress in arms control. Without U.S. mobile missiles, the START negotiations will stalemate. Don't put me in the position of trying to negotiate on mobiles when the Soviets have two deployed mobile systems and we have none. Without B-2, we will have to revise the entire structure of START, including much of what we have reached tentative agreement on with the Soviets. A modern, penetrating bomber is the very philosophy around which our negotiating position is built. SDI helped bring the Soviets to the negotiations -- don't take the pressure off now.
- This is a critical year. If we walk away from these programs, the Soviets will simply sit back and wait to see what we give up next.

- I'm tired of hearing that I don't fully support strategic modernization. I want you to carry the word back to every one of your colleagues that I need the B-2. I want every one on the Hill to understand that I am determined to deploy both Rail-garrison MX and the Small ICBM. I want both sides of the aisle to understand that unless we adequately fund SDI now, we will never be able to answer our children why we have denied their living in a safer world.
- We either step up to the mark and support this essential and cohesive strategic package, or we walk away from our responsibilities and destroy the hope for real arms control.
- We can make history -- in our relationship with the Soviet Union, in remarkable technological innovations, and in arms control. Don't squander the moment. Join with me and seize this opportunity.

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH
GOP CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

- I NEED YOUR ROCK-SOLID SUPPORT AND LEADERSHIP TO GIVE US A GOOD DEFENSE BILL, A SOLID DEFENSE PROGRAM, AND A STRONG STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PACKAGE.
- I'VE MADE HARD AND OFTEN UNPOPULAR DECISIONS TO CANCEL PROGRAMS TO BUILD AN AFFORDABLE DEFENSE BUDGET. YET WE SIMPLY MUST MAINTAIN A STRONG STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM -- FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOR MOMENTUM IN ARMS CONTROL. I HAVE PROPOSED AN INTEGRATED, COHESIVE PACKAGE THAT CAPITALIZES ON THE REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGY IN B-2 AND SDI AND BRINGS SURVIVABILITY AND STABILITY TO ICBMS.
- THIS MODERNIZATION PACKAGE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. WITHOUT U.S. MOBILE MISSILES, THE START NEGOTIATIONS WILL STALEMATE. DON'T PUT ME IN

CARD 2 of 3

- THE POSITION OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE ON MOBILES WHEN THE SOVIETS HAVE TWO DEPLOYED MOBILE SYSTEMS AND WE HAVE NONE. WITHOUT B-2, WE WILL HAVE TO REVISE THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF START, INCLUDING MUCH OF WHAT WE HAVE REACHED TENTATIVE AGREEMENT ON WITH THE SOVIETS. A MODERN, PENETRATING BOMBER IS THE VERY PHILOSOPHY AROUND WHICH OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IS BUILT. SDI HELPED BRING THE SOVIETS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS -- DON'T TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF NOW.
- THIS IS A CRITICAL YEAR. IF WE WALK AWAY FROM THESE PROGRAMS, THE SOVIETS WILL SIMPLY SIT BACK AND WAIT TO SEE WHAT WE GIVE UP NEXT.
 - I'M TIRED OF HEARING THAT I DON'T FULLY SUPPORT STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. I WANT YOU TO CARRY THE WORD BACK TO EVERY ONE OF YOUR COLLEAGUES THAT I NEED THE B-2. I WANT EVERY ONE ON THE HILL TO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM DETERMINED TO DEPLOY BOTH RAIL-GARRISON MX AND THE SMALL ICBM. I WANT BOTH SIDES OF THE

CARD 3 of 3

AISLE TO UNDERSTAND THAT UNLESS WE ADEQUATELY
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Strategic Modernization Points for GOP Leadership Meeting, July 25, 10:00 am

The President will meet with the GOP Congressional leadership on Tuesday at 10:00 am. We understand he will spend a few minutes discussing the Defense Authorization Bill.

At Tab I are proposed talking points for use by the President. With the exception of the opening, they are identical to those prepared for today's meeting with bipartisan senators.

GP
Virginia Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you provide the attached Points to be Made to the President.

Approve *GP*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I

Proposed Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7625

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Your Luncheon With Jacques Attali, Wednesday,
September 27, 12:30 p.m.

Attali requested a meeting with you to review key bilateral and international issues. Below is a checklist of issues that could come up in your discussions with Attali.

1990 Economic Summit. Attali has written Dick McCormack proposing that he, Attali, host a Sherpa meeting in Paris November 10-11 to discuss North-South issues, the environment and drugs with representatives from Egypt, Senegal, Venezuela, India and Yugoslavia. He claims Mitterrand promised to do this during the Bicentennial. (You should be aware that Attali arranged for Liberation, a leftist French newspaper, to publish a detailed account of the Paris Summit Sherpa meetings. Other Sherpas have protested this extraordinary breach of confidentiality.)

It is up to us, not France, to organize the next Sherpa meeting. (Attali also tried to extend his mandate as chief Sherpa after the 1982 Versailles Summit.) Moreover, the UN, which has scheduled a conference for next year to discuss North-South issues, is the appropriate forum, not the Summit Seven.

U.S.-Soviet Ministerial. Attali will likely ask for a read-out of the Ministerial. On arms control, we recommend that you highlight the apparent Soviet willingness to de-link START from Defense and Space, their decision to dismantle Krasnoyarsk, the agreement on the protocols on verification of nuclear tests, and the chemical weapons data exchange. You could also tell Attali that the Soviets provided few details on their proposal for a CFE Ministerial Conference, but they did hint that they were ready to include more Soviet aircraft in CFE ceilings.

On regional issues, you may want to stress the candid nature of the talks, especially the issue of superpower arms flow to various regions. You should mention Shevardnadze's unequivocal statement that the Soviets were making no deliveries to Nicaragua, and his hint that Moscow might even consider pressuring Cuba to curtail its arms assistance. Given French interest in Lebanon, you might call to Attali's attention the U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement on Lebanon which focuses support on the Arab Summit plan for a cease-fire and negotiations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2805-MR
11/8/2014 MM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CFE. You may want to thank Attali for France's help in winning agreement in NATO to table the remainder of our proposal in Vienna. Given the difficult issue of verification, you may want to stress the need for a strong verification regime, recognizing that it will place most of the burden of intrusiveness on our European allies. You should note that, given our experience on strategic nuclear arms control issues, stringent verification measures will be needed to have confidence that the Warsaw Pact is not violating the treaty, and to command public confidence and Congressional support.

Chemical Weapons. You may want to tell Attali how much we appreciated President Mitterrand's letter, taking it into account as we worked with the President on his statement before the UN. You should stress the President's desire to accelerate work on a global ban, even as we recognize the daunting challenge of verification. You might also ask Attali for French reaction to the President's proposals.

Poland. You might want to give Attali a read-out on your meeting with Balcerowicz and Trzeciakowski and their desire to obtain \$490 million this year (to finance imports) and \$1 billion next year (for economic stabilization) in the context of their economic reform program. As the Brussels Concerted Action Group begins discussion on the EC \$200 million action plan for Poland, it would be useful to stress the importance of G-7 countries in maintaining the leadership role within the G-24. You might ask Attali for clearer indication of what additional steps France might take in support of Polish reforms.

Lebanon. Mitterrand and Dumas both pushed General Aoun to accept the Arab League Tripartite's Committee's latest proposals. With a tenuous cease-fire in effect, a meeting of Lebanon's Parliamentarians to debate the Arab League's draft National Reconciliation Charter is set for September 30 in Saudi Arabia. Our aim is to urge the Christians to be flexible on political reforms while dissuading the Arabs from giving Syria a free hand.

Middle East Peace Process. Attali may ask you about the upcoming visit of President Mubarak. The President's meetings with Peres and Arens in New York and with Mubarak next week in Washington, as well as Secretary Baker's bilateral with Abd al-Meguid are geared toward getting a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue going on the Israeli government's elections initiative. You may want to stress that we view Mubarak's ten points as a useful bridge to finding a Palestinian partner for this dialogue, although we are not promoting an alternative Egyptian plan. Moreover, outstanding differences (e.g., role for Palestinians "outside" the West Bank and Gaza) still remain to be addressed. We are trying to encourage all sides to refrain from playing to their internal constituencies.

Africa. Our differences with the French on African affairs are minimal, revolving around the issue of whether we can commit more economic assistance to the subcontinent, in particular to West

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Africa. Three weeks ago French officials made an earnest pitch for greater "burden sharing" in the Ivory Coast (similar to the British pitch on Nigeria), which State is reviewing. Assistant Secretary Cohen will have bilateral talks in Paris next month, in which he is expected to sound out the French on the possibility of stepping up our presence in Djibouti (to diversify our present position from Somalia).

Drugs. Bilateral cooperation on drug enforcement has been excellent. For their part, the French are focusing on money laundering. As EC President, France is encouraging fellow members to support the Vienna Convention on Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The French are also chairing a working group on money laundering as a follow-up to the Paris Summit. On Columbia, French officials have signalled their intention to send a survey team to assess President Barco's requirements. As yet, however, no specific actions have occurred.

qu *fu* [Condi Rice, Philip Zelikow, Robert Hutchings, Eric Melby, John Gordon, Donald Mahley, Heather Wilson, David Welch, David Passage, and Richard LaMagna concur.]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

CHRON FILE

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 7FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES Ltrs to PM Thatcher
LOG # 7485

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>STATE</u>	<u>Stapleton Roy</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/17/09REMARKS FOR IMMEDIATE CABLEING S&D ORIGINALS TO FOLLOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1989

Dear Margaret:

I wanted to wish you well in your discussions with President Gorbachev this weekend and to share with you some of the highlights of a letter that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivered to me earlier today from Gorbachev. As you know, I have been awaiting a response to my letters to Gorbachev on strategic arms control, CFE and other issues. Gorbachev's reply shows, in my judgment, that he wants to move forward on arms control.

The letter concentrates comprehensively and exclusively on arms control and contains a number of interesting suggestions, although some may have strings or conditions attached to them. The most forthcoming proposals are in the area of strategic arms control: Gorbachev says he will dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar; drop Soviet insistence on a fixed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty; and agrees to work with us on a package of START verification and stability measures, but with the idea of expanding those discussions to include all systems that would be limited in START.

I am especially encouraged by the Soviet decision to dismantle the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar -- long a visible symbol of Soviet disregard for their international obligations. Gorbachev adds that he expects the U.S. to reciprocate by meeting Soviet concerns regarding the U.S. radars in Greenland and Great Britain -- radars that we, of course, believe to be fully within the confines of the ABM treaty. We cannot allow those U.S. radars to become an issue and we will make that clear to the Soviets. Still, I think that the Krasnoyarsk decision represents a step forward.

On conventional arms control, Gorbachev proposes Ministerial meetings in Vienna to push the negotiations along and a CFE Summit in the second half of 1990 to sign an agreement. We will have to think carefully about whether such Ministerials would serve our interests. Gorbachev also hints that the Soviets might be flexible about subjecting more of their aircraft to CFE limitations -- something that we will definitely want to follow-up. Not surprisingly, Gorbachev reiterates his desire to hold immediate negotiations on SNF and, as he mentioned in Strasbourg, notes that he is considering major unilateral reductions in Soviet SNF.

The letter also refers to the possibility for breakthrough on agreements on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. I agree with Gorbachev that we are close to solving the verification problems of the 1974 and 1976 nuclear testing treaties. We also hope to make major progress on chemical weapons during Shevardnadze's visit. I am writing to you separately on the details of our CW effort.

I was particularly pleased to learn in the letter of Soviet agreement to attend an international conference to work out the details of the Open Skies proposal. I am now hopeful that we can move ahead rapidly on planning the conference.

Finally, Mr. Shevardnadze and I had a very private discussion of the timing of a U.S.-Soviet Summit. I hope that this issue will be resolved in the next few days and, in that event, I will be immediately in touch with you.

My meeting with Shevardnadze and the Gorbachev letter confirm my view that U.S.-Soviet relations are in good shape. I know that some are impatient with my approach, but new relationships are not born overnight and we and

the Soviets cannot just declare a new era. Perestroika gives us a chance to address the root causes of our conflict with the Soviet Union -- the character and size of Soviet military forces; Moscow's activities in the Third World; and Soviet abuses of human rights. But too many times in the past we have tried to build cooperation on a rocky foundation that masks or ignores the West's most vital concerns. No one is more anxious to fulfill the promise of this period than I am but we can only get there through the patient pursuit of our goals.

Our ability to affect perestroika's success is limited. It is not possible to "help" Gorbachev in some general sense. To the extent that Soviet flexibility in arms control or regional issues derives from the demands of perestroika, we are "helping" when we respond to that flexibility as we did on CFE.

But we would do no one a service by proposing GATT membership for the Soviet Union in advance of fundamental Soviet economic reform. The Soviets need to meet certain conditions for integration into the international economic system so that their participation benefits both the Soviet Union and the international community.

I must say too that the record of Soviet new thinking is mixed, particularly in regional affairs. There is mounting evidence that Soviet arms transfers have not abated and arms flows have increased in some regions. We cannot allow the rhetoric of the "new thinking" to hide old-fashioned power politics. That point needs to be made forcefully to the Soviet Union.

Yet on the whole, I believe that our relationship with the Soviet Union is in better shape now than it has ever been and that the patient pursuit of our goals is paying off. I hope that you will convey to Gorbachev my general satisfaction with the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and the sincerity of my support for perestroika.

I am concerned that the Western media's concentration on Gorbachev's problems could give him reason to think that I have reservations about proceeding energetically to improve East-West relations. That, of course, is not the case and I would like you to stress that with Gorbachev on my behalf.

Finally, I would be grateful if you would reiterate to Gorbachev that Western support for reform in Eastern Europe is not intended to threaten Soviet security interests. We are aiding the development of free and prosperous societies which should threaten no one.

You are obviously seeing Gorbachev at a critical time. I look forward to hearing about your discussions in Moscow.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G' followed by a long diagonal stroke, likely representing Margaret Thatcher.

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1989

Dear Margaret:

In light of the mutual concerns our two countries share about the threat of chemical weapons, I wanted to share with you directly my latest thinking on this subject. We agree that the problem is not only the threat posed by Soviet capabilities, but -- in some ways even more dangerous -- by the erosion of restraints on Third World engagement in chemical warfare, as well as continued CW proliferation. These dangers make it all the more important that we do all we can to accelerate achievement of a global ban on the production and use of these weapons.

I have decided to place an even higher priority on reaching this objective, building on the progress already achieved at the Conference on Disarmament, and our bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union.

To that end, I want you to know of the following steps that I am prepared to take:

- Destruction of 98 percent of our current chemical weapons stockpile within eight years after entry into force of a chemical weapons convention, provided the Soviet Union is one of the parties.
- Total elimination of our stockpile within ten years after entry into force of the convention, provided all chemical weapons-capable states become parties to the convention by the eighth year, or within two years of the time when all chemical weapons-capable states do become parties, whichever is later.

- As the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention continue, reduction of our stockpile to less than 20 percent of its current level, provided the Soviet Union agrees to reduce its stockpile to the same level under mutually agreed terms, including suitable provisions for the inspection of the chemical weapons destruction process.


Verification of a chemical weapons convention is and will remain a daunting challenge, making it vital that we explore all avenues to improve our capabilities. I have directed my people to make a redoubled effort to tackle the remaining verification uncertainties. We both recognize that the Soviets have been less than candid in their pronouncements about their existing stockpile levels. I want to assure you that my proposals in no way imply my acceptance of Soviet figures. Rather, I believe that the approach I have suggested can help reduce the uncertainty about the size and location of these stocks and bring about the verified destruction of a large quantity of Soviet chemical weapons. Moreover, I believe that the dangers caused by spiraling chemical weapons proliferation make it imperative that we proceed along the steps I have outlined above.

In my meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze I informed him of these steps to accelerate achievement of an agreement. Secretary Baker will discuss the approach in detail with the Soviet Foreign Minister in Wyoming. I intend to announce these steps in my address before the United Nations General Assembly.

I have no doubt that the road ahead to a final agreement on a multilateral convention will not be easy. The vigorous efforts your government and you personally have exerted on the Soviets

on this issue have been instrumental in getting us to the point where I feel confident we can break the logjam in our efforts to reach a global ban. Should we succeed in our endeavors, I want you to know that this could not have been possible without your unwavering conviction that only by addressing this problem fully and openly can we move to rid the world of the scourge of these weapons and enhance the security and well-being of our friends and allies.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letter "G" being large and prominent.

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

~~2005-0818-NR 2008-0642-NR~~
① 51105 3130109

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF A LETTER
THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE DELIVERED TO ME YESTERDAY
FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN AWAITING A
RESPONSE TO MY LETTERS TO GORBACHEV ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL,
CFE AND OTHER ISSUES. GORBACHEV'S REPLY SHOWS, IN MY JUDGMENT,
THAT HE WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL.

THE LETTER CONCENTRATES COMPREHENSIVELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON ARMS
CONTROL AND CONTAINS A NUMBER OF INTERESTING SUGGESTIONS,
ALTHOUGH SOME MAY HAVE STRINGS OR CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THEM.
THE MOST FORTHCOMING PROPOSALS ARE IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS
CONTROL: GORBACHEV SAYS HE WILL DISMANTLE THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR;
DROP SOVIET INSISTENCE ON A FIXED PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM
THE ABM TREATY; AND AGREES TO WORK WITH US ON A PACKAGE OF START
VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES, BUT WITH THE IDEA OF
EXPANDING THOSE DISCUSSIONS TO INCLUDE ALL SYSTEMS THAT WOULD BE
LIMITED IN START.

I AM ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIET DECISION TO DISMANTLE
THE ILLEGAL KRASNOYARSK RADAR -- LONG A VISIBLE SYMBOL OF SOVIET
DISREGARD FOR THEIR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. GORBACHEV ADDS
THAT HE EXPECTS THE U.S. TO RECIPROCATATE BY MEETING SOVIET
CONCERNS REGARDING THE U.S. RADARS IN GREENLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN
-- RADARS THAT WE, OF COURSE, BELIEVE TO BE FULLY WITHIN THE
CONFINES OF THE ABM TREATY. WE CANNOT ALLOW THOSE U.S. RADARS TO
BECOME AN ISSUE AND WE WILL MAKE THAT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS.
STILL, I THINK THAT THE KRASNOYARSK DECISION REPRESENTS A STEP
FORWARD.

ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, GORBACHEV PROPOSES MINISTERIAL
MEETINGS IN VIENNA TO PUSH THE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG AND A CFE
SUMMIT IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1990 TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT. WE WILL
HAVE TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT WHETHER SUCH MINISTERIALS WOULD
SERVE OUR INTERESTS. GORBACHEV ALSO HINTS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT
BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT SUBJECTING MORE OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO CFE
LIMITATIONS -- SOMETHING THAT WE WILL DEFINITELY WANT TO
FOLLOW-UP. NOT SURPRISINGLY, GORBACHEV REITERATES HIS DESIRE TO
HOLD IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF AND, AS HE MENTIONED IN
STRASBOURG, NOTES THAT HE IS CONSIDERING MAJOR UNILATERAL

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SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
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#7485

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

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~~SECRET~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0642-MR
EU 313010A

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO CHANCELLOR KOHL.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR HELMUT:

I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF A LETTER
TKAT FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE DELIVERED TO ME YESTERDAY
FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN AWAITING A
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CFE AND OTHER ISSUES. GORBACHEV'S REPLY SHOWS, IN MY JUDGMENT,
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LIMITATIONS -- SOMETHING THAT WE WILL DEFINITELY WANT TO FOLLOW-
UP. NOT SURPRISINGLY, GORBACHEV REITERATES HIS DESIRE TO HOLD
IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF AND, AS HE MENTIONED IN STRASBOURG,
NOTES THAT HE IS CONSIDERING MAJOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN
SOVIET SNF.

-
THE LETTER ALSO REFERS TO THE POSSIBILITY FOR BREAKTHROUGH ON AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. I AGREE WITH GORBACHEV THAT WE ARE CLOSE TO SOLVING THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS OF THE 1974 AND 1976 NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES. WE ALSO HOPE TO MAKE MAJOR PROGRESS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT. I AM WRITING TO YOU SEPARATELY ON THE DETAILS OF OUR CW EFFORT.

-
I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO LEARN IN THE LETTER OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL. I AM NOW HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY ON PLANNING THE CONFERENCE.

-
FINALLY, MR. SHEVARDNADZE AND I HAD A VERY PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF THE TIMING OF A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT. I HOPE THAT THIS ISSUE WILL BE RESOLVED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND, IN THAT EVENT, I WILL BE IMMEDIATELY IN TOUCH WITH YOU.

-
I BELIEVE THAT THE GORBACHEV LETTER IS INDICATIVE OF THE GENERALLY GOOD STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE PROGRESS IS, OF COURSE, BASED ON THE STRENGTH OF OUR ALLIANCE AND, IN THAT REGARD, I WANT YOU TO KNOW AGAIN HOW MUCH I DEPEND ON OUR PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP AND CONTINUING PARTNERSHIP.

-
SINCERELY,

-
GEORGE BUSH

-
P.S. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THERE WILL BE AGREEMENT THAT THE SUMMIT WILL BE HELD BY MID-YEAR 1990.

-
END TEXT

-
#0048

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7485

September 21, 1989

NOTE TO JIM CICCONI

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES



SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to
Thatcher

Note that the texts of the attached letters to Margaret Thatcher have already been cabled to her in Japan. The Presidential "greens" here are for the President's signature to follow-up the cables.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT H.Q.
9/22/89
7485
PIO: 27
PIO: 27

September 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Thatcher, Mitterrand and Kohl Concerning the Gorbachev Letter

Purpose

To inform Prime Minister Thatcher of our plans to announce a new CW initiative, report on the highlights of the Gorbachev letter which Shevardnadze delivered to you today on arms control issues, and ask her to pass along a message to Gorbachev on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, and, separately, to inform President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl of the highlights of the Gorbachev letter to you on arms control.

Background

Your meeting with Shevardnadze, the Wyoming Ministerial, and the delivery of the Gorbachev letter make this a particularly intensive week for U.S.-Soviet diplomacy. This is an ideal opportunity to apprise key U.S. allies of the potential for positive movement on the arms control front. The draft letters to your counterparts inform them of the major suggestions and proposals in the Gorbachev letter on arms control.

Mrs. Thatcher is scheduled to meet with Gorbachev on September 23. We feel it is important to inform her of your impending initiative on chemical weapons before she meets with Gorbachev. In a separate letter you discuss with her the Gorbachev arms control proposals contained in the letter delivered by Shevardnadze and describe the Administration's conception of U.S.-Soviet relations, asking her to relay a reassuring message to Gorbachev on your behalf: that you support perestroika sincerely and are ready to proceed energetically to improve East-West relations. Given the concentration of the Western media on Gorbachev's problems, he may appreciate again hearing of your own positive view of his efforts.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED 12958
PER E.O. 13526 AS
2010-0442-ML AMENDED
201 417110 3130129

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tabs A and B to Prime Minister Thatcher (for hand delivery to the British Embassy here and retransmission to the Prime Minister in Tokyo) and authorize transmission of the messages to President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl at Tabs C and D through White House Privacy Channels.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Thatcher on CW Initiative
Tab B	Letter to Thatcher on Gorbachev Letter
Tab C	Letter to Mitterrand on Gorbachev Letter
Tab D	Letter to Kohl on Gorbachev Letter

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

]

T
A
B
C

• MESSAGE TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND FROM THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Francois:

I wanted to share with you some of the highlights of a letter that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivered to me earlier today from President Gorbachev. As you know, I have been awaiting a response to my letters to Gorbachev on strategic arms control, CFE and other issues. Gorbachev's reply shows, in my judgment, that he wants to move forward on arms control.

The letter concentrates comprehensively and exclusively on arms control and contains a number of interesting suggestions, although some may have strings or conditions attached to them. The most forthcoming proposals are in the area of strategic arms control: Gorbachev says he will dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar; drop Soviet insistence on a fixed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty; and agrees to work with us on a package of START verification and stability measures, but with the idea of expanding those discussions to include all systems that would be limited in START.

I am especially encouraged by the Soviet decision to dismantle the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar -- long a visible symbol of Soviet disregard for their international obligations. Gorbachev adds that he expects the U.S. to reciprocate by meeting Soviet concerns regarding the U.S. radars in Greenland and Great Britain -- radars that we, of course, believe to be fully within the confines of the ABM treaty. We cannot allow those U.S. radars to become an issue and we will make that clear to the Soviets. Still, I think that the Krasnoyarsk decision represents a step forward.

On conventional arms control, Gorbachev proposes Ministerial meetings in Vienna to push the negotiations along and a CFE Summit in the second half of 1990 to sign an agreement. We will have to think carefully about whether such Ministerials would serve our interests. Gorbachev also hints that the Soviets might be flexible about subjecting more of their aircraft to CFE limitations -- something that we will definitely want to follow-up. Not surprisingly, Gorbachev reiterates his desire to hold immediate negotiations on SNF and, as he mentioned in Strasbourg, notes that he is considering major unilateral reductions in Soviet SNF.


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Finally, Mr. Shevardnadze and I had a very private discussion of the timing of a U.S.-Soviet Summit. I hope that this issue will be resolved in the next few days and, in that event, I will be immediately in touch with you.

I believe that the Gorbachev letter is indicative of the generally good state of East-West relations. The progress is, of course, based on the strength of our Alliance and, in that regard, I want you to know again how much I depend on our personal collaboration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

P.S. We anticipate that there will be agreement that the Summit will be held by mid-year 1990.

T
A
B
D

MESSAGE TO HELMUT KOHL FROM THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Helmut:

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P.S. We anticipate that there will be agreement that the Summit will be held by mid-year 1990.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7485

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 21, 1989

9/21/89
1920

Brent --
Philip Zelickow is
standing by to get
the Thatcher
messages to the
UK Embassy.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL/JOHN GORDON (Acting) *JB*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Thatcher on the CW Initiative and the Gorbachev Letter and Messages to Mitterrand and Kohl concerning the Gorbachev Letter *RD*

The draft letters at Tabs A and B are to Prime Minister Thatcher, one informing her of the President's planned CW initiative and the other reporting on Gorbachev's letter which Shevardnadze delivered today. The Thatcher letter on Gorbachev's letter also lays out our concept of U.S.-Soviet relations and asks Thatcher to deliver a reassuring message to Gorbachev on behalf of the President.

The Thatcher letters must go out **tonight**, in order to reach the Prime Minister before she departs for Moscow for her meetings with Gorbachev on Saturday morning. Ambassador Acland has told us that, if we give him the texts of the letters, the British Embassy here can transmit them directly to the Prime Minister's party in Tokyo more quickly and reliably than if we transmitted them through the Cabinet Channel to London for retransmission in the middle of the night from Number Ten to Tokyo.

The Mitterrand and Kohl messages, which would be sent through White House privacy channels, track that portion of the second Thatcher letter which reports on the highlights of Gorbachev's letter to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I, asking him to sign the Thatcher letters and authorize transmission of the messages to Mitterrand and Kohl.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to President
Tab A Letter to Thatcher on CW Initiative
Tab B Letter to Thatcher on Gorbachev Letter
Tab C Letter to Mitterrand on Gorbachev Letter
Tab D Letter to Kohl on Gorbachev Letter

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0412-MR
E01 3130109

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7485
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 27 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Review</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room	<u>4</u>		<u>Privacy Channels</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>CH 1962</u>	<u>LDX</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>Delivered -> UK Emb. 9/25/89 by C.G.</u>	<u>D</u>

89 SEP 22 11:06

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Date 9/22/89

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7485
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: / SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOS CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>9/21</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action

cc: V

Anita/Louise.

COMMEN

I sent this forward to the President, but not to VP & C of S offices. ✓

Done 9/22
 Diane