

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files

OA/ID Number: 91122
Folder ID Number: 91122-001

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (June - July 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: S-C-B Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, June 14, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) (2 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Withdrawal of CW from the FRG (1 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memo	Donald Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: OSD Report on Accelerated Withdrawal of US CW Stocks from the FRG (2 pp.)	6/8/89	(b)(1)	S
01e. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - ICBM Modernization and Congress (1 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S
01f. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: S-C-B Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, June 14, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Arnold Kanter to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item -- START Initiatives (2 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (June - July 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1036

OA/ID Number: 91122-001

Date Closed: 3/17/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership on Strategic Modernization and START (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03b. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Bipartisan Leadership Meeting Tuesday, June 20, 10:00 a.m. (1 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	
04. Report	Re: The current U.S. position... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05a. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to Senator Warner (1 pp.)	6/27/89	(b)(1)	
05b. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter from Senator Warner (1 pp.)	6/19/89	(b)(1)	
05c. Letter	Senator Warner to General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	6/14/89	(b)(1)	
05d. Attachment	Re: Thoughts on ICBM Modernization and Other Strategic Issues Senator John Warner (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06a. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to Senator Gore (1 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	
06b. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter from Senator Gore (2 pp.)	6/22/89	(b)(1)	☐
06c. Letter	Senator Gore to General Scowcroft (4 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	☐

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



ACTION

February 2, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: *LB* LINTON BROOKS *Nal* VIRGINIA LAMPLEY

SUBJECT: Public and Congressional Posture on the Future of Arms Control

Ginny Lampley's discussions with her Congressional liaison colleagues have convinced us that there is benefit in putting out a brief "party line" on the future of arms control and the nature of the review. The purpose is to ensure we are all singing from the same sheet of music during this time of transition. We have drafted the attached which we think fills the bill. If you agree, Ginny will provide it to her colleagues for use in preparing witnesses for various hearings now beginning to take place. We will also provide it to Roman Popadiuk for press office use.

Recommendation

That you approve the statement at Tab A for use as indicated above.

Approve *J* Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A

Statement

As Amended.

Arms Control Statement

The President has directed a review to ensure that our arms control positions are consistent with our broad strategic interests. It would be inappropriate for me to pre-empt the results of that review by speculating on possible changes which may or may not result. In general terms, ~~however, I do not expect major changes in U.S. positions.~~ The U.S. will remain committed to a strategic arms reduction process aimed at enhancing stability and to the global, verifiable elimination of chemical weapons. As the President has made clear both publicly and privately, it would be wrong to mistake a delay in conducting such a review for a decision to step back from the arms control process.

*Premature
to say
this.*

~~SECRET~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

4584

CHRON FILE

June 13, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES 

SUBJECT: S-C-B Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, June 14, 7:15 a.m.

The following items have been submitted for tomorrow's breakfast with Secretaries Baker and Cheney:

Maritime Pre-positioning Ships	DOD
Withdrawal of CW Stocks from the FRG	State
ICBM Modernization and the Congress	State

Although the State Department has formally withdrawn the second item -- removal of CW stocks from the FRG -- from the agenda, Don Mahley recommended its inclusion in case it comes up.

Attachments

Tab A	Maritime Pre-positioning Ships
Tab B	Withdrawal of CW Stocks from the FRG
Tab C	ICBM Modernization and the Congress

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2804-MR

SCS 12/12/11

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) (2 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (June - July 1989)

Date Closed:	3/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91122-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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01c. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Withdrawal of CW from the FRG (1 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S

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Series: USSR Chronological Files
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WHORM Cat.:
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Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed: 3/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91122-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM:

JOHN GORDON *G*

SUBJECT:

Breakfast Item - ICBM Modernization and Congress

State has placed this item on the breakfast agenda for Secretary Baker to raise with you and Secretary Cheney.

State Department staff believes we need an Administration effort to push the Hill towards decisions on the President's ICBM modernization program and, at the same time, to open a dialogue with members on our developing START positions. They expect Secretary Baker to offer State's help on such an effort.

An aggressive, visible lobbying program on our ICBM program, absent a START decision on mobiles, offers only downside potential. Similarly, an aggressive program to engage the Congress in a discussion of our START as we move through the NSC process opens us to all sorts of problems. That said, we should have a good idea of/where we are going in START by the end of this week and the time will be upon us to move out on an aggressive program.

Your and Secretary Cheney's work with members and small groups should give a good sense of what is possible on the Hill to help build that program. OSD is forming a legislative strategy group for strategic modernization that can help. Virginia Lampley and I will participate in that group.

In short, we need a good program that explains the inter-relationships between our ICBM modernization program and START and we should soon be in a position to move out. Agencies and Administration spokesmen need to be in step on this one.

Virginia *Scott* Lampley and Gene *G* Ebner concur.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2804-MR
SCS 12/12/11

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

4584

June 13, 1989

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8910489
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: KANTER

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START

ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:



SUBJECT: BREAKFAST ITEM RE START INITIATIVES

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 08 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KANTER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM CLOSED BY: NSBTM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001
001

X 90030613 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
X 90030613 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/14/09

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4583



June 14, 1989

OBE?
①

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL *JM*

SUBJECT: Press Briefings on NST

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Issue:

Whether you will do a press backgrounder/briefing on our START and Defense and Space Talks.

Background:

The Nuclear and Space Talks resume in Geneva on Monday, June 19. It has been our practice in the past to have a number of press briefings/backgrounders for the opening of the negotiating sessions, particularly when we have had changes in our position or responses to developments in the negotiations. There is substantial press interest in the resumption of the talks, particularly after a hiatus of over six months. We think it would be useful to do so again this time, although we see a number of potential pitfalls.

Discussion:

It is important to articulate our goals and objectives for the negotiations, and to underline the President's commitment to, and leadership of, the nuclear arms control negotiations. If we have new initiatives or new ideas, we will want to try to ensure that they are understood by the media, and presented in the most effective way.

Our negotiating position, however, is still under discussion, the President has not yet made his decisions, and we are not likely to have instructions for the delegation until shortly before -- or perhaps even after -- it arrives in Geneva to begin the talks. Thus, there is the danger that we will not be on very firm ground in doing the briefings. Press interest will be focused on what is new in the instructions, and to the extent that there is largely continuity in our positions, the likely press story will

be "After months of review, Bush Administration has no new initiatives".

On the other hand, if we do no press briefings, we are likely to get negative stories to this effect or to the effect that the Bush Administration still does not have its act together. Moreover, even if we have no new initiatives at this time, we can convey the change in nuance, i.e. from an emphasis on reducing strategic arsenals to one of reducing the risk of war and ensuring more survivable forces, and that we reserve the right to introduce new ideas and changes in the negotiations. This is particularly important as the Congressional debate on the Defense Authorization Bill and funding for our strategic modernization programs is likely to begin later this week.

On balance, we believe that there should be a White House press briefing early next week, possibly Monday, June 19. Given your tight schedule, we have explored the availability of other possible spokesmen to do this. Ron Lehman, who is a knowledgeable and articulate spokesman, has indicated that he would be available. If, however, you are willing to do the briefing, that would be helpful. We await your guidance.

We will be sending you separately a more detail gameplan for public diplomacy, Congressional and Allied consultation activities for the opening of the talks. At this time, we only ask that you decide on doing a White House press briefing/backgroundunder on the NST talks early next week, possibly Monday.

Cond^{CR} Rice, RichRD Davis, Will^{WJ} Tobey, John^{JG} Gordon, Roman^{RP} Popadiuk concur.

Recommendation:

That you agree to do a press briefing/backgroundunder on the nuclear arms control negotiations early next week.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Alternatively, that Ron Lehman do the briefing.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: TA 16:20

LOG # 4583

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG (AD) AIO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	APNSA Has Seen	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>27.420</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>NR</u>

89 JUN 14 5: 22

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS BS Do Press Briefings on NST - 19/20 June

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

4752

June 17, 1989



MEMORANDUM FOR FRED MCCLURE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Bipartisan Leadership Meeting

At Tab A are talking points for the President's use at Tuesday's bipartisan leadership meeting on strategic force modernization.

The points are separated into major topics. I recommend the President cover as much of this as he feels comfortable with and then turn to Secretary Cheney to for his remarks. I will follow up with any remaining points.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points for the President

cc: Jim Cicconi

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership on Strategic Modernization and START (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 17, 1989

*Changes made in
latest copy. P.S. is
holding.*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Bipartisan Leadership Meeting
Tuesday, June 20, 10:00 a.m.

The President has agreed to discuss the strategic modernization program at the next bipartisan leadership meeting. We have prepared talking points for his use which stress the integrity of the program, emphasize the thinking behind the two-missile program, and highlight where we are in START. The points on moving ahead rapidly with a new emphasis on verification are a new tack -- you should review them.

The talking points are broken down into separate sections on modernization and negotiations, making it easy for the President to turn to you after the introduction if that is his desire.

Virginia Lampley, ^{NOT AVAILABLE} Robert Blackwill ^{JG} and Condi Rice ^{JG} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum (Tab I) to Fred McClure, forwarding talking points for the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Fred McClure

Tab A Talking Points for the President

CHRON FILE

4858

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



11:30 a.m.
June ~~19~~, 1989
20

General:

Arnie Kanter left attached for you -- set of instructions he composed for Rick Burt on mobile ICBMs which you approved.

Arnie has read the instructions to Dick Cheney and to Reg Bartholomew for Secy Baker. *(to pass to Burt)*

Wilma

Good

cc: Bob Gates

*Passed to
Burt via
Stoll*

The current U.S. position to ban mobile ICBM missiles remains on the table for now. Negotiating Group should make clear that we reserve the right to make changes and introduce new ideas in the future, but should indicate that discussions at this time on the current U.S. proposal would not be productive. Negotiating Group may at its discretion draw attention to developments in the ICBM modernization program as one of the factors that will bear on possible U.S. reconsideration of its present position. Negotiating Group should seek to engage Soviet side in continued work on the mobile Joint Working Paper in accordance with previous guidance.

4711

CHRON FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1989

5

John
Dear Senator Warner:

Thank you for your June 14 letter sharing your thoughts on strategic modernization, arms control, and their relationship to the defense budget. Your comments and support at the bipartisan leadership meeting on June 20 were also appreciated -- and welcome.

The President is very pleased with your continuing support for the deployment of both the Peacekeeper in rail-garrison and the small ICBM. The two programs form a coherent, integrated approach to ICBM modernization. Improving the survivability of the Peacekeeper preserves the significant military capability of that very effective system, quickly and at relatively modest cost. Moving ahead with the small ICBM leads the way to where we want to be in the future with ICBMs -- very mobile, very survivable, single warhead missiles.

As you know, Dick Cheney recently outlined his plans for the out-year funding for the small ICBM, adding to the budget in FY 92 and beyond to reach an FY 97 IOC. That is a sensible approach, especially in this fiscally constrained environment, and I hope it meets with your approval. I do not believe it is in our interest to decide just now how many small ICBMs we want to deploy and on what schedule. Nor do we need to decide now the exact post-START mix of SLBMs and ICBMs. The draft START Treaty as it now stands permits a number of alternative force mixes, and we should preserve that flexibility for the time being.

Again, thank you for your solid support of the ICBM modernization program. I hope we have the opportunity to discuss this in more detail before the Senate begins the markup of the defense authorization bill.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable John W. Warner
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 19, 1989

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Warner

Senator Warner has written you (Tab A), indicating his strong support of both rail-garrison Peacekeeper and the small ICBM. He attaches a paper that expresses some concerns he has "if we are to plan prudently ...during this period of declining defense budgets." He seems concerned about the basing mode (carry hard or hard mobile launcher), the number of small ICBMs we plan, the cost profile, and the post-START ICBM/SLBM mix.

Warner's paper may reflect a desire to accelerate the IOC for the small ICBM to FY 95 -- it certainly sets that out as an option to consider. He points out that when "we discuss acceleration of the small ICBM ... that may mean trade-offs are required between the funding of other strategic and non-strategic programs."

We don't know where Warner plans to go with this, but we need his support for the President's modernization program. As fragile as is Congressional support for both missiles, pressure from Warner to accelerate the Small ICBM will not help.

In our proposed answer, we mention the recent letter from Secretary Cheney to the Hill that states Cheney's plans to fully fund the Small ICBM for an FY 97 IOC with a billion dollar increase in the budget beginning in FY 92. On the other issues, we simply tell him that our programs and the START treaty as it now stands permit flexibility in numbers and force mix and that we should preserve that flexibility for now.

Virginia Lamp *VL* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Senator Warner at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Senator Warner
Tab A Warner Letter to Scowcroft

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN

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4712

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

June 14, 1989

JUN 16 1989

Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500


Dear General Scowcroft:

Last week, I spoke before the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis on the issue of ICBM modernization. Previous speakers before that forum had focused on whether or not to limit modernization to a one or two missile program. Since my position is well known on this issue--I strongly support the deployment of both the Peacekeeper in rail-garrison and the small ICBM--I decided to review a number of important ICBM related issues that will surface in the not too distant future. I would like to share with you some of my thoughts on these issues since they will probably become topics for discussion during the Committee markup and floor debate on this year's defense bill.

There are essentially three questions that require our attention if we are to plan prudently for the ICBM program and other critical strategic force modernization programs during this period of declining defense budgets: (1) In what basing scheme and in what quantity should we deploy the small ICBM? (2) What are the costs associated with a five year funding profile for these two programs and other strategic programs? (3) What type of post-START force structure should we have if, or when, a Treaty is successfully negotiated?

I have attached a summary of my thoughts on these issues. The Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled to markup the defense authorization bill during the week of July 10-14. I welcome your comments and the opportunity to discuss these issues with you, at your convenience.

With warm regards,



John W. Warner

JW:bd
Enclosure

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Attachment	Re: Thoughts on ICBM Modernization and Other Strategic Issues Senator John Warner (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - Strategic Arms Control (June - July 1989)

Date Closed: 3/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91122-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

4781



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

July 29, 1989

cel
Dear Senator Gore:

I appreciate your follow-on thoughts on how to proceed with the President's two missile program. And our recent discussions have been most helpful. I think you will agree that the activities of the past few weeks have gone a long way toward making the case for the two-missile program and demonstrating the President's personal involvement and commitment to deploying both rail-garrison Peacekeeper and the small ICBM.

Our START position and the strategic modernization program are closely linked. I believe it is premature, however, to adjust our START position now to permit mobiles. You know my thinking on mobiles -- they are the future of the ICBM force. We need the survivability and the stability they provide -- especially the single-warhead Midgetman. But we should know whether we will actually be able to deploy them before we change our treaty position.

You have a fair point that if we ban mobile MIRVs we need a solid single-warhead mobile program. What we have designed is the sequential deployment of two systems in fiscally constrained times. We have put together an integrated and cohesive program that deals with the many competing defense programs. While it is possible to increase funding in one area at the expense of another, that will inevitably slow or increase the risk in the other program, and possibly reduce the coherence of the entire modernization effort.

There is no doubt in my mind or in the President's that we need to deploy both systems. Yet we have had to make the hard fiscal decisions in the current environment.

I hope we will be able to count on your continued support for the full strategic modernization program and for our efforts to bring to fruition a strategic arms control treaty that demonstrably improves strategic stability and reduces the risks we face.

Your thoughtful views and ideas are always welcome and have been a great help to me.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 22, 1989

Handwritten notes:
Gore
Ginsberg
see

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Gore

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Senator Gore has written with concerns about Administration support for the small ICBM. He quotes statements by Secretary Cheney, Admiral Crowe, and General Welch which do not, in his view, give full support to sequential deployment of two mobiles.

His main point is that we do not yet appear serious about deployment of the small ICBM. His specific concern is with the funding in FY90-91 (\$100 million and \$200 million), arguing that it does not support a 1997 IOC. He suggests you "challenge" the Air Force to demonstrate they can meet the schedule with current funding and promises to make the same challenge in committee.

He also points out that if we decide to ban MIRVed mobiles in START, we need the flexibility to shift from rail-garrison toward rapid deployment of Midgetman. He believes the small ICBM program as now funded does not have that flexibility. He seeks to add \$300 million in both FY 90 and 91 to guarantee the IOC and give us the flexibility to accelerate the program.

Senator Gore has a fair point. The funding for FY90-91 now in the budget barely keeps the program alive. Air Force acquisition personnel are not willing to say the IOC cannot be met, but they believe this level of funding imposes a greater degree of risk in that work does not progress rapidly enough on the long-lead items and that many the experienced personnel will be lost, requiring a rebuilding of the contractor team.

Programmatically it may make sense to invest some more money in FY 90 and 91. Politically and fiscally it probably does not. Your draft reply (Tab I) makes the points that we have a sequential program, the President is committed to it, but that we are walking a tight line with the budget.

Virginia *Bf* Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Reply

Tab A Incoming correspondence

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

B

May 5, 1989

~~Confidential~~

General Brent Scowcroft
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

First of all thanks not only for your generosity in terms of time, but in terms of spirit. There is a struggle in our country not only for a meeting of the minds, but for trust. You and I have enjoyed both now for quite a few years.

At the conclusion of our meeting, I volunteered to send you some ideas about how to proceed. Let me begin by doing a better job of documenting the gap between the President's decision and the manner in which it is publically supported by those representing him. It would be preferable to rely on transcripts of the testimony of the SecDEF, the Chairman of the JCS and the Air Force Chief of Staff, but these records won't be available from the stenographers until next week. So I will work from their prepared testimony, and from notes.

As you said, the President made a decision for "the sequential deployment of MX and Midgetman" with the budget worked out in light of that timing. Dick Cheney's testimony states:

"In the interim and in keeping with the longstanding goal to improve the capability and survivability of the ICBM leg of the TRIAD, the President decided to add mobility to a portion of our land based missiles. The decision includes redeployment of 50 Peacekeeper missiles from silos to trains, garrisoned at various Air Force installations. The amended budget also includes \$100 million in FY1990 and \$200million in FY1991 for the small ICBM program, primarily for missile certification."

Admiral Crowe said:

"With respect to the modernization of our land based ICBMs, the budget proposes to move forward with the Rail-Mobile Peacekeeper. In the event of a deepening East-West crisis, this system will be a great deal more survivable than our silo-based ICBMs. Concurrently, R&D investments in the small ICBM will continue."

In testimony before the HASC, Admiral Crowe added the further detail that his idea of a military requirement for Midgetman would be a development such as a Soviet depressed trajectory missile.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2804-MR
7/18/2014 MM

General Welch said:

"The proposed program in this budget provides the basis for a consensus on much needed further progress in ICBM modernization, focused heavily on crisis stability and escalation control. The most immediately available improvement and therefore the first priority remains the improved flexibility and added stability in crisis provided by rebasing Peacekeeper in the rail garrison mode. The program also calls for continued development of the small ICBM for deployment in the late 1990s, adding to this leg the added survivability and operational flexibility inherent in single-warhead missiles. To enhance deterrence, ensure stability and facilitate arms reductions, we need to move ahead with both programs."

Only General Welch comes close to the sense of the President's decision in favor of sequential deployment. And yet there's a fly even in that ointment. Cheney clearly signalled readiness to make programmatic adjustments to the package for the sake of consensus: Welch indicated under questioning that he would vehemently resist any change in priorities. In short, no listener could possibly derive from these statements that Midgetman is going to be sequentially deployed. The only message is that MX is certain, and we will see about Midgetman.

What's the corrective?

We need to bolster the theme of "sequential deployment" by making the case more firmly for it, by making that case with the authority only the President has, and by underscoring improved rhetoric by means of two concrete demonstrations of serious intent: (1) adjusting our arms control position to accommodate mobiles, hopefully to ban MIRVed mobiles; and (2) improving the flow of resources to Midgetman.

o Making the case: Congress and the public have to hear why Midgetman fits within a larger strategy for arms control. That has never been done by any Administration official since 1983. Of course, the word "stability" was taken over -- but it has never been concretely defined, and the role of Midgetman in delivering stability has not ever been described.

o Using the President's authority: We need, but don't have, a high intensity political effort operated from within the White House. We need some speeches by officials high in the Administration. We need some OpEds. We need word to be passed to Republican Members that the President is dead serious, and we need to have the reasons for that set out. We need the President himself to make that clear in discussions with the Congressional leadership of both parties in both houses.

o Arms Control: Adjusting our position to permit mobiles would at once underscore the need for the mixed package approach. It would also give the President a chance to clarify the connections between the package and his ability to negotiate.

However, the moment the President calls for a ban on MIRVed mobiles, (if he ever does), something else changes. The President would then need to shift emphasis in programming away from rapid full deployment of MX rail mobile and towards rapid deployment of Midgetman. As it stands now, I doubt very much that the package has that flexibility. And the presence or absence of such flexibility is my personal test for whether this whole idea is real or diversionary.

o Resources: How much money has to be in the program? First of all let me assert that the existing funding track for Midgetman is not workable. The Administration is claiming it can reach 1997 IOC by spending 1.2 billion dollars between FY 89 and FY 94. I think that if you challenge the Air Force to demonstrate how they will do this, you will discover they can't. Best to give them that chance in front of you, because I will make sure they get the chance in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

At any rate, how much additional money would be needed for Midgetman in order to give the President some real flexibility for arms control? Clearly, you would want to be able to move forward with Midgetman as a weapons system, including some work on basing and on command and control systems.

Let's assume, moreover, that we want this money to be on hand during the next two fiscal years: partly because that's the budgeting period we're legislating; partly because it's a not unreasonable amount of time for holding open options in arms control. I've been advised that the cost for this would be about \$300 million a year more in each of the next two fiscal years. I've also been advised that the extra money can be scrounged together. Some of it may have to come from the MX, but there are also some ideas around for doing this without affecting the MX IOC. If you want more detail on this, I can provide it.

And now we come back full circle to politics. Finding this money will not only require Administration tolerance, but active engagement. In the House, you cannot afford to lose any Republicans, because some liberal support for Midgetman will disappear no matter what, if it means buying MX up front. Only a full court press from the White House can keep those Republican votes in place. You need a political field marshal devoted full time to this task, who is counting noses, making calls and visits. Without such a figure, you can easily fail to recognize that the rocks are just ahead, and you will lack the means to steer around them.

If I can help in any way, please call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Al Gore'.

Al Gore
United State Senator