

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number: 91120
Folder ID Number: 91120-008

Folder Title:
SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - July 1990

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. List	Re: European Steering Group Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	7/16/90	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
01b. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Mike Fry/Heather Wilson to Robert Gates Re: The Meeting of Your European Strategy Steering Group (ESG) on Monday, July 16, at 9:30 a.m. (6 pp.)	7/14/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Cable	Re: Woerner Circulates Memo on Implementatio of the London Declaration; Purposes Full NAC Discussion of Possible Steps for July 18 [redacted] (4 pp.)	7/13/90	(b)(1)	C
01d. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Distribution List Re: Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on Monday, July 16, at 9:30 a.m. (1 pp.)	7/13/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - July 1990

Pinksheet Number: cap1018
OA/ID Number: 91120-008
Date Closed: 3/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005543
RECEIVED: 11 JUL 90 12

UNKNOWN FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: LAMPLEY

DOC DATE: 11 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT
CONGRESSIONAL

ECONOMIC SUMMIT
AP



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POINTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL MTG ON NATO & ECONOMIC SUMMITS / JUN 12

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 14 JUL 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAMPLEY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 5543
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JRP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>JRP 7/11</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other 1900

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Prints to be made for Congressional
 Leadership mtg on June 12 at 10:15am

(Exec Sec office has diskette)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5543

July 11, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK D. MCCLURE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Points to be made on NATO and Economic Summits at
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting, June
12, 1990

Attached are points to be made on the NATO and Economic Summits
for the President's meeting with the Bipartisan Congressional
Leadership Meeting on June 12, 1990, at 10:15 p.m.

Attachments

Tab A NATO Summit Points
Tab B Economic Summit Points

cc: James Cicconi

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

NATO SUMMIT

- I'd like to give you a brief overview on the results of the NATO Summit in London. In our view, the Summit was entirely successful. Judging from Allied and Soviet reaction, there seems to be broad recognition for what the London Summit accomplished.
- We agreed on a historic document, the London Declaration. This Declaration makes specific proposals and establishes directions for the future in four areas.
- First, the London Declaration transforms our relationship with old adversaries.
- We invited President Gorbachev to come to NATO, and asked all the member states of the Warsaw Pact to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.
- Second, the London Declaration transforms the character of NATO's conventional defenses.
- We decided that conventional arms control should continue, beyond the early conclusion of a CFE accord, in new negotiations to achieve further far-reaching measures to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent.
- We agreed to change our strategy for conventional defense,

moving away from forward defense to a reduced forward presence. That means smaller, more flexible, active forces and scaling back our exercises.

- We agreed, in addition, to make the principle of collective defense even more evident, by organizing NATO troops into multinational corps.
- Third, the London Declaration transforms NATO's nuclear strategy.
- As the danger of sudden overwhelming conventional attack recedes, we can modify our current strategy of flexible response to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. Allied leaders agreed to adopt a strategy making its nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.
- This new strategy will require different forces. We decided that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, we are prepared to eliminate all NATO nuclear artillery shells if the Soviet Union will do the same.
- Fourth, the London Declaration transforms the Alliance's vision for the CSCE.
- We agreed on six initiatives to give life to the CSCE's principles.
- As you can see, the London Declaration will bring fundamental change to every aspect of the Alliance's work. It will become a landmark for the renewal of the Atlantic Community.
- One final comment. Almost all of these initiatives were

based on proposals from the United States. I found, once again that, even if the European states do not admit it publicly, at critical moments they still look to us for leadership.

- To keep our influence and provide leadership in the new Europe, it is more essential than ever that we keep our strong military presence on the other side of the Atlantic. That is a message I have heard time and again from every one of my Allied counterparts -- and even from Gorbachev himself. We have had a bipartisan consensus on this issue for forty years, but I'll need your help to sustain it.
- We must continue to provide US leadership in Europe. The next few months will be crucial -- settlement of the German question, coming to closure in CFE, the CSCE Summit. But this NATO Summit has positioned the Alliance just where it needs to be for this period ahead, as an institution that will be part of these changes instead of being left behind by them.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

HOUSTON SUMMIT

- The Houston Summit was very successful and met our expectations. We had three difficult issues on the agenda -- the Soviet Union, the Uruguay Round and the environment.
- The discussions on these issues were intense. Clearly, we have some differences of view with some of our allies, especially on the question of aid for the USSR.
- On the Uruguay Round, we all recognize that agriculture was the key. I told the leaders that without agriculture, there would be no Uruguay Round agreement and the risk of trade wars would increase substantially.
- The other leaders agreed with me that we must all devote personal attention in the next few months to ensure a successful outcome. Each of us recognized that reaching this goal will require difficult steps in each of our countries.
- We discussed in detail President Gorbachev's efforts to reform the Soviet Union. In particular, we discussed his July 4 letter requesting Western assistance. Frankly, there are different views on what we should be doing to assist. The Europeans, with the Germans and French in the lead, were most forthcoming; the Japanese, the most reserved.
- We agreed that technical assistance was essential to the

Soviet economy move towards market-oriented reforms.

Moreover, we have asked the IMF to coordinate a study of the Soviet economy and make recommendations for its reform. We had a spirited debate about leadership of the study with the EC Commission and some of the EC states at Houston who were pushing hard for the EC to have extensive ownership of this enterprise. Ultimately, our view prevailed, with strong backing from Canada and Japan.

- The environment also received much attention. We launched two major forest initiatives: a free-standing global forest convention and a pilot project, to be headed by the World Bank, to devise ways to protect the Amazon region of Brazil. We also agreed to complete a framework convention on climate change by 1992.

China

- Summit leaders reviewed the situation in China at Houston.
- They agreed to maintain the measures put into place at the Paris 1989 Summit, as modified over the course of this year:
 - World Bank loans are authorized to meet basic human needs (BHN).
 - Other G-7 countries will also consider separate World Bank loans that contribute to a reform of the Chinese economy, especially loans that address environmental concerns.
 - As required by law, the U.S. will continue to vote

against all non-BHN loans for China in the World Bank.

-- Restrictions on military sales to China continue.

-- In short, we have taken steps with our major partners to offer incentives for better Chinese performance in the area of human rights and economic/political reform. But we will not lift all sanctions until we are convinced that China's commitment to reform is genuine as is their respect for human rights.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5543

July 11, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: VIRGINIA A. LAMPLEY, *al*

SUBJECT: Points to be made on NATO and Economic Summits at
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting, June
12, 1990

Attached is a memorandum to Fred McClure containing points to be made on the NATO and Economic Summits at the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting on June 12, 1990 at 10:15 a.m. The points have been provided by Philip Zelikow and Tim Deal.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Fred McClure
Tab A NATO Summit Points
Tab B Houston Summit Points

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005597
RECEIVED: 12 JUL 90 17

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: ZELIKOW
FRY
WILSON

DOC DATE: 14 JUL 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: NATO
USSR

ADNSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT FOLLOW UP RE MTG OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY STEERING GRP ON
16 JUL

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 16 JUL 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: NSD0001 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FRY
NSC CHRON
RICE
WILSON
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/9/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 5597

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	<u>24.124</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	<u>May 12/4</u>	<u>Add To File</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. List	Re: European Steering Group Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	7/16/90	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - July 1990

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

EUROPEAN STEERING GROUP MEETING
MONDAY, JULY 16, 1990
9:30AM - 10:30AM

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card
Robert Gates

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Carnes Lord

NSC

Robert Blackwill
Arnie Kanter
Condi Rice

STATE

Reginald Bartholomew
James Dobbins

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Stephen Hadley
I. Lewis Libby

JCS

David Jeremiah
John Sewall

CIA

Closed Under Donor Deed of Gift Restrictions

ACDA

Stephen Read Hanmer

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5597

July 14, 1990

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH:

CR CONDOLEEZZA RICE/*AK* ARNOLD KANTER

FROM:

ca fo PHILIP ZELIKOW/MIKE FRY/HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT:

The Meeting of Your European Strategy Steering Group (ESG) on Monday, July 16, at 9:30 a.m.

The London Declaration has created a crowded agenda for Alliance work. Washington will need to offer continued leadership within NATO to preserve the London initiatives and maintain momentum from the Summit. Manfred Woerner has circulated a list of major issues for NATO to consider (Tab I) and has scheduled a NAC meeting for discussion of these questions on Wednesday, July 18.

Your group should have a short meeting on Monday, July 16, to organize our efforts and indicate preliminary guidance on the most pressing issues for the July 18 NATO meeting. Your Monday meeting has substantially the same purpose and agenda as the meeting you had asked Arnie to convene and which also had been scheduled for Monday morning with most of the same attendees. Arnie accordingly will call around first thing Monday morning to cancel his session.

You face essentially two alternatives on how to proceed. The first is to operate within the NSD-1 structure with State leading an interagency group on the political issues, Defense leading an interagency group on strategy and force structure issues, and NSC leading an interagency group on nuclear and conventional arms control issues. All would report to a group that you would chair.

In essence, this first alternative would--in fact if not name--amount to the European, Defense and Arms Control PCCs overseeing the preparation of papers for discussion by the Deputies Committee under your chairmanship. The major advantage of this approach is that it uses the established NSC decision-making structure and distributes the work in a logical and equitable way. The major disadvantages are that it may make it harder to include two key players from State (Zoellick and Ross) and depends on PCCs (especially the Defense PCC) that have a problematic track record, though in some cases, the work could be assigned to ad hoc groups. When you and Arnie talked, you found these disadvantages, especially the second, to be decisive.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2800-MR
SCS 12/28/11

The second alternative would be to continue to rely on the European Strategy Steering Group which you chair, and to have it supported by NSC-chaired groups that are responsible for tasking and overseeing the preparation of the required discussion and decision papers. The advantages and disadvantages are largely mirror images of those associated with the first alternative. This second approach is the one you indicated to Arnie last week that you wanted to take.

On substance, we provide below a list of key topics, which is similar to Woerner's list. Under each topic we have briefly outlined the issues, and have suggested initial preferences that could become the USG's preliminary guidance for the July 18 NAC meeting. The process for subsequently establishing a more definitive and detailed US position depends on which of the alternative approaches you want to take.

State has prepared a draft guidance cable, which they have cleared with DoD, that will be crosshatched here over the weekend. At the Monday meeting itself, we suggest you introduce the subject, indicate how the work will be organized, and then ask for agreement in principle on the approach -- drawing on our "initial preferences" to guide the discussion on each topic. (We will have already worked with State on the substance of this message.) The discussion need not be exhaustive -- the guidance will be strictly preliminary, designed to keep NATO heading in the right direction in developing these initiatives.

1. Joint declaration on non-aggression.

Issues: We will need to decide what form this declaration should take and where that will be done.

Initial Preference: Although we are committed by the London declaration to a "joint" declaration we will want to avoid the pitfalls of a joint NATO-Warsaw Pact document. We could propose that the declaration be made part of a CSCE Summit document, open to all of the 35, and negotiated in the CSCE preparatory talks. Western ideas should first be discussed in NATO. To minimize controversy and avoid a lengthy drafting exercise, we should press in NATO to use language that is drawn verbatim from Helsinki and/or the UN Charter.

[Process: Ray Seitz would convene a small group to vet a paper outlining our strategy, for review by ESG.]

2. Invitation to Gorbachev.

Issues: Gorbachev has accepted Woerner's NATO invitation to come to NATO. We need to consider the timing of such a Gorbachev visit and the level of NATO representation to receive him (permreps, ministers, or heads of government?)

Initial Preference: Although our abstract preference would be to delay a Gorbachev visit to NATO until after the CSCE Summit and the German elections, we should let Gorbachev come to NATO anytime he wants to, rather than make an issue of timing. He

should be received at the political level, perhaps by foreign ministers, in order to heighten the prominence of the occasion for NATO and make a suitable impression on the Soviet domestic audience.

[Process: State would be asked to prepare a position paper to be screened in Seitz's group before being reviewed in ESG.]

3. Eastern diplomatic liaison with NATO

Issues: The nature and level of Eastern representation at NATO remains open, and we should be ready to answer Eastern questions about what these representatives can and cannot do in light of our political objectives, legal restrictions, and any counter-intelligence concerns. Some Allies are also likely to return to the question of whether the offer of diplomatic liaison should also be extended to European neutrals (or even non-European countries).

Initial Preference: The actual NATO invitation to the Eastern governments must not belie the original spirit of the initiative. We should push to accommodate East European desires, including full missions with accredited ambassadors and military attaches if that is their preference (although we know the French, and perhaps others, may resist). The Hungarians have already told us they will soon be seeking to accredit an ambassador to NATO. We could make clear that the invitation to Warsaw Pact member states is not exclusive, and that other interested countries would be considered on a case-by-case basis.

[Process: State would be asked to prepare a paper, to be discussed in Seitz's group, and then submit it for approval in your ESG.]

4. Military-to-military contacts and the doctrine seminar

Issues: The question of whether Galvin goes to Moscow was dodged at the Summit (with the compromise phrase "NATO military commanders"). Also unsettled is the venue, timing, and nature of another military doctrine seminar under the auspices of the CSCE.

Initial Preference: Galvin should go to Moscow. Our proposal that NATO host another doctrine seminar did not survive the drafting process in London. The resulting declaration could be read to imply that the seminar would meet in Vienna under CSCE auspices. Only if we decide it is worthwhile should we reopen the issue by proposing NATO offer to host the military doctrine seminar.

[Process: State would prepare a paper on political objectives that would establish the framework for a JCS-drafted plan, again for discussion in Seitz's group, and then passed to your ESG for final blessing.]

not in
military
to
military
contacts
channel

Com to
Press

Integrated
policy
ESG

5. Development of objectives for CFE follow-on negotiations.

Issues: The Summit Declaration makes three essential statements about follow-on negotiations that would begin with CFE's current membership and mandate:

- They will build on CFE I with "additional measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe." These limits would presumably encompass the size of Germany's forces. The nature of these limits on manpower in Europe is an open issue for the Alliance to consider.
- They will conclude "as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992." Although many others will read it otherwise, this language was carefully drafted to avoid making Helsinki a deadline for completion of the follow-on talks, while acknowledging the importance of Helsinki as a landmark of some kind in the negotiations. The issue of whether the follow-on talks would have to end by March 1992 is therefore still open, as are the questions of whether an entirely new mandate would be negotiated or when the European neutrals and nonaligned countries would join the talks.
- New conventional arms control negotiations would seek "further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe." It is unclear whether these new negotiations are the same as the CFE follow-on talks, or refer to yet another set of talks that would begin after the Helsinki meeting in 1992. The London declaration will be read by many to imply the latter interpretation. Nor is there agreement in Washington on what the "further far-reaching measures" should be, or if these measures should somehow be related to the "measures to limit manpower in Europe."

Initial Preference: We think the July 18 NAC meeting should not get into these issues. The US position should be elaborated and then worked in the HLTF.

We need to analyze whether we should continue to press for a "broad" scope for the immediate follow-on negotiations in the face of evident Allied reluctance and, if so, the appropriate content of such talks. Alternatively, we need to develop an approach for integrating a more limited agenda for immediate follow-on talks with a plan for new conventional arms control negotiations that would seek "further far-reaching measures." In any event, we will need to analyze how best to achieve the manpower limits called for in the London declaration. These and related issues should be developed by the arms control group before they are discussed in depth at your level.

[Process: Arnie would convene a small group to consider this issue and prepare a paper for review in your ESG.]

6. New conventional defense strategy and force structure (including multinational corps).

Issue: The basic principles of the new strategy need to be defined, the force structure and command relationships need elaboration, and the US needs to provide guidance to influence the NATO strategy review. The pace and procedures for that strategy review are also still undecided in NATO.

Initial Preference: None beyond the Summit Declaration language, pending further work in the US government. Woerner will soon be circulating a memorandum at NATO proposing procedures for the strategy review. We should get our views on timing and structure of the NATO review to Woerner privately ASAP.

[Process: DoD has already begun work to articulate key tenets of the new strategy. Paul Wolfowitz should chair a small group to work on a paper for submission to your ESG.]

7. New nuclear strategy and force structure

Same as #6, being careful to ensure that there is an integrated approach to these nuclear and conventional issues.

8. SNF arms control

Issues: NATO needs to establish a forum for consultations on SNF arms control positions; the US needs to develop its proposal for the mandate; and the US needs to consider a variety of substantive issues from area of application, to treatment of nuclear artillery, and accountability of Allied launchers. All of this needs to be done in a way that will serve our immediate objective: keeping SNF out of the German elections while preserving a viable theater nuclear deterrent in NATO.

Initial Preferences: US could support recreation of the Standing Consultative Group to handle Alliance management problems, as a parallel to the High Level Group which will continue to consider force planning issues. US should be in the chair. We should move out quickly with this position to preserve our leading role in this NATO body. We should put off discussion of the substantive issues, until further work has been done in the USG. However, we may need to take an early stand on nuclear artillery, including whether it is part of formal SNF negotiations.

[Process: Arnie's group would review a paper, or papers, on this topic for submission to your ESG.]

9. New Initiatives for the CSCE

Issues: We will need to define more specifically what we have in mind for these new CSCE institutions, such as the secretariat, the conflict prevention center, the elections monitoring body, and the parliament. Other issues related to the preparations for a CSCE Summit will arise as preparatory work proceeds in Vienna.

Initial Preference: There is already an interagency agreed paper, blessed in your group, on the conflict prevention center.

That paper, with slight revisions, can quickly be readied for circulation at NATO. Other issues will require more work within the US government.

[Process: Seitz's group would review papers on each of the new CSCE institutions for approval in the ESG.]

Attachment

Tab I Cable reporting Woerner Memo on Implementation of the
 London Declaration

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Cable	Re: Woerner Circulates Memo on Implementatio of the London Declaration; Purposes Full NAC Discussion of Possible Steps for July 18 [redacted] (4 pp.)	7/13/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - July 1990

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed: 3/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91120-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2800-MR (500.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/3/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>SIT: BENKO FRY VAX WILSONH

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUFHNA<DTG> 131243Z JUL 90
<ORIG>FM USMISSION USNATO
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4145
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1002

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: WOERNER CIRCULATES MEMO ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LONDON DECLARATION; PROPOSES FULL NAC DISCUSSION
OF POSSIBLE STEPS FOR JULY 18

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 03990
OPS CENTER ALERT EUR/RPM (CALDWELL - 71626) ON RECEIPT
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSBM
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO
SUBJECT: WOERNER CIRCULATES MEMO ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LONDON DECLARATION; PROPOSES FULL NAC DISCUSSION
OF POSSIBLE STEPS FOR JULY 18

REF: USNATO 3947

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY. AS REQUESTED BY PERMREPS (REFTEL), SYG
WOERNER HAS CIRCULATED A MEMORANDUM ON "IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE LONDON SUMMIT" (PO(90)67), TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE
COUNCIL MEETING ON JULY 18. AT THE JULY 18 MEETING, THE
U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS EACH OF THE VARIOUS
ACTION ITEMS, EVEN IF ONLY ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS. TWO
ISSUES WILL BE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE -- THE SUBSTANCE
AND MODALITIES OF A JOINT NATO-WTO DECLARATION AND A FORUM
FOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS ON SNF ARMS CONTROL. MISSION
REQUESTS GUIDANCE BY COB ON JULY 17. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON SUMMIT IMPLEMENTATION

3. IN RESPONSE TO PERMREP URGING AT TUESDAY'S LUNCHEON
(SEE REFTTEL), THE SYG'S PRIVATE OFFICE HAS PRODUCED A
MEMORANDUM LAYING OUT INITIAL VIEWS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE LONDON DECLARATION. THE MEMO (TEXT FOLLOWS IN PARA 4)
LISTS ELEVEN ISSUES HAVING OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS.
WOERNER PROPOSES THAT THE NAC TAKE UP THESE ISSUES AT ITS
JULY 18 MEETING. WHILE ALL OF THE ISSUES WILL NEED TO BE
ADDRESSED IN GREATER DETAIL OVER THE COMING WEEKS, IT WILL
BE IN U.S. INTEREST TO HAVE AT LEAST PRELIMINARY VIEWS TO
OFFER BY THE 18TH.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF PRIVATE OFFICE MEMORANDUM:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LONDON DECLARATION

(b)(1)



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2800-MR
SCS 7/3/12

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 03990
OPS CENTER ALERT EUR/RPM (CALDWELL - 71626) ON RECEIPT
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSBM
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO
SUBJECT: WOERNER CIRCULATES MEMO ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

**Entire
page
(b)(1)**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 03990
OPS CENTER ALERT EUR/RPM (CALDWELL - 71626) ON RECEIPT
VIENNA FOR USDEL CSBM
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO
SUBJECT: WOERNER CIRCULATES MEMO ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

(b)(1)

GUIDANCE REQUEST

10. ACTION REQUEST: MISSION WILL NEED GUIDANCE ON THE
PRIVATE OFFICE MEMO NO LATER THAN OOB, JULY 18. HOWEVER,
IF WE ARE TO WORK THE SNF/SCG LANGUAGE, WE WOULD WANT TO
APPROACH THE PRIVATE OFFICE AND POSSIBLY THE UK AND THE
FRG PRIOR TO THE 18TH. REQUEST WASHINGTON GUIDANCE
SOONEST. TAFT

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04<SSN> 3990<STOR> 900713103618 MSG000269174178
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04<SSN> 3990<STOR> 900713103652 MSG000269174211
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 04<SSN> 3990<STOR> 900713103746 MSG000269174265
<SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04<SSN> 3990<STOR> 900713103753 MSG000269174273

<ORIG> REUTER
<TOR> 900716095051

<TEXT>23

SS YDB

161351 MIS :BC-SOVIET-KOHL BULLETIN

MOSCOW, JULY 16, REUTER - PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV SAID
ON SOVIET TELEVISION ON MONDAY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCEPT
MEMBERSHIP OF A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO.

REUTER BLT DC

NNNN

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 13, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
PAUL WOLFOWITZ
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH
RICHARD KERR
RON LEHMAN
ROBERT ZOELLICK
DENNIS ROSS
RAYMOND SEITZ
STEPHEN HADLEY
LTG HOWARD GRAVES
JOHN McLAUGHLIN

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on
Monday, July 16, at 9:30 a.m.

This meeting will discuss how we should proceed to develop the initiatives adopted at the NATO Summit in London. We may also consider preliminary guidance for the NAC discussion of this subject on July 18. A copy of State's draft guidance cable will be circulated before the meeting.

POC is Philip Zelikow, Executive Secretary of this Group, at 395-5646.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0233-F/5
SCS 6/22/09

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR