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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number: 91120
Folder ID Number: 91120-007

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - February - May 1990

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Michael Fry/Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) Arms Control and Modernization (2 pp.)	2/16/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Michael Fry/Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) Arms Control and Modernization (2 pp.)	2/16/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Arnold Kanter/Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your April 4 Meeting on Arms Control (3 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Draft	Re: Philip Zelikow's draft Presidential Speech (14 pp.)	4/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short range Nuclear Forces] - February - May 1990

Pinksheet Number: cap1017
OA/ID Number: 91120-007
Date Closed: 3/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9001256
RECEIVED: 15 FEB 90 17

CHRON

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: FRY
ZELIKOW
KANTER

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR DEFENSE

ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES / SNF / ARMS CONTROL & MODERNIZATION

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 19 FEB 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
FRY
KANTER
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/4/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSAMM

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Just to say
APNSA Has Seen~~SECRET~~

1256

February 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL *MS*FROM: MICHAEL FRY/PHILIP ZELIKOW *MS*

SUBJECT: Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) Arms Control and Modernization

The changes underway in Europe are undermining the classic NATO rationale for Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) and our plans to maintain and modernize them. Of particular concern is NATO's deferral of the deployment decision on the Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL) until 1992.

When NATO made the decision mentioned above, the primary problem of the Alliance was maintaining a credible ground-based nuclear deterrent in Europe. The major problems now are even more fundamental: to ensure that the new, united Germany is a full member of NATO; and to retain the essential element of extended deterrence--substantial American forces equipped with nuclear weapons in Europe, especially in Germany. However, the problems of modernizing our SNF and avoiding arms control pressures to go to a "zero nuclear weapons" solution in Germany are closely linked to the future relationship of Germany to NATO and to keeping viable American forces there.

The most immediate problem will be SNF modernization, and the specific issue will be FOTL. The urgency comes from the Congress. There is currently about \$126 Million in the FY 91 budget for the program which we believe Congress will likely delete during the mark-up in April, effectively killing FOTL. Given this scenario, there are two basic options we should consider now as we begin our reassessment and as we prepare for the Kohl visit.

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
-2-

The first option would be to announce in the near future that we had decided, after talking to our allies, not to build FOTL. The goal would be to preempt the Congress and let the President, and especially Kohl, garner political credit for eliminating the program. The announcement would need to be made before Congress kills the program itself.

The primary drawbacks of preemptively eliminating FOTL are that the concession will have lost much of its force by the December elections in the FRG when Kohl will need help most, and we may immediately find ourselves pushed to the next SNF issues-- such as nuclear artillery and existing Lance missiles. This option also forfeits whatever possibility there may be of using FOTL as negotiating leverage in SNF negotiations with the Soviets, and of coordinating FOTL cancellation with the other NATO allies. Mrs. Thatcher would be incensed since she would believe we were moving precipitously to yet another ad hoc revision in our defense posture.

The second option is to attempt to keep the FOTL program alive, at least through this year. The best hope of doing this is to link it to future SNF negotiations and to existing and anticipated Soviet nuclear programs. While recognizing that this would be an uphill battle at best, the Administration could take the same course it is taking on strategic nuclear modernization, namely that we should react to current political changes carefully, and that the capabilities of the Soviets' modernizing nuclear forces and not their intentions should guide our force programs. This second alternative does not even sound plausible as we write it. The real question, therefore, is how to get the most out of the virtually certain demise of FOTL.

The focus of the Kohl visit should be firming up Germany's full membership in NATO, and any decision on FOTL should be designed so as to contribute to that goal.

Concurrence by: Virginia  Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That we meet with you to discuss FOTL and the larger SNF issues.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

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CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

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MODE

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ADMIN FAX #

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RELEASER

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FROM/LOCATION

1. G. Philip Hughes

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Brent Scowcroft / Kennebunkport

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Col NARA, Date 3/9/09

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

1256-Shoot Range Nuclear ForcesDeliver IMMEDIATE Upon Receipt!~~SECRET~~

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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DISPOSITION

Dep Exec

Philip Hughes

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Philip Hughes

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

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/APB

CM 2/17

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Jacom to Brent
Scowcroft at
Kenneth's part.
ay for Gates.

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

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Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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CIRCLE ONE BELOW

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PRIORITY

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SECURE FAX #

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PAGES

3

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RELEASER

FROM/LOCATION

1. G. Philip Hughes

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Beant Scowcroft / Kennebunkport

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2008

By Cap NARA, Date 3/9/09

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INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

1256-Short Range Nuclear Forces

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CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1256

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1990

ACTION

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FROM: MICHAEL FRY/PHILIP ZELIKOW

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Concurrence by: Virginia Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9002595
RECEIVED: 03 APR 90 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: KANTER
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 04 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

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2

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL
CBW
GERMAN UNIFICATION

SNF
START
ANSA

PERSONS: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL MTG ON 4 APR RE SNF / CHEMICAL WEAPONS / START

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 06 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KANTER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 4, 1990

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PER E.O. 13526

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SUBJECT: Your April 4 Meeting on Arms Control

You are meeting at 11:00 this morning to consider a possible SNF initiative with Baker, Cheney, and Jeremiah (for Powell). They have the executive summary and analytical paper we previously sent to you.

You also will want to discuss whether and how to use the CW production cutoff to advance the President's CW arms control agenda, and the position we should take on "new kinds" in START. Your counterparts have been advised about these additional two topics.

SNF

The paper you will be discussing has been through Bob Gates' Steering Group on European Security. There is a substantial consensus at that level that we should proceed to implement the plan described in the paper. Based on our discussion last night, you may want to challenge that consensus and present an alternative course of action.

The proposed approach would have the President announce the cancellation of FOTL by the end of April in the context of proposing an SNF initiative that would include calling for NATO reviews of our theater nuclear posture, and foreshadowing the elimination of nuclear artillery and short-range ballistic missiles in Europe.

The case for proceeding along these lines rests on the premises that cancellation of FOTL (an action Congress is likely to by the end of this month) will quickly put the broader SNF issue on the agenda whether we like it or not. Even if it does not, the German election campaign or the Two Plus Four talks soon will produce the same result. Although everyone would prefer to delay engaging the SNF issue until later in the year, the consensus is that we do not have that choice and that we need to exercise American leadership by taking the initiative now.

Bob Blackwill made several arguments last night challenging the

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conclusion that we need to act now on SNF. First, both Germanies are preoccupied with unification issues and the range of domestic questions unification raises. Nuclear weapons are not now a subject of consequence in Germany and we should not wish to make them so. Second, we do not want to make TASM a target for the SPD any sooner than required. Third, the Two Plus Four talks are moving more slowly than we expected or feared last month. Fourth, it would be incongruous for the President to launch a major SNF initiative against the backdrop of Lithuania.

Bob's arguments lead to the conclusion that the President should announce the cancellation FOTL now, but hold off on the broader SNF initiative until a June NATO Summit, a delay of six weeks or so. We should get the initiative ready, however, so that we can be in a position to respond quickly if and as the pressure builds to take a stand on SNF.

Chemical Weapons

Cheney told you last night that, for all practical purposes, we are out of the CW production business. You will want to talk about whether and how to make use of this fact during this week's ministerial.

Baker could privately try to get Shevardnadze's agreement both to the bilateral destruction agreement and to the multilateral chemical weapons convention in exchange for U.S. agreement to early termination of CW production (e.g., when the bilateral destruction agreement enters into force). As an alternative to making a specific offer, Baker could simply sound out Shevardnadze on the possibilities (e.g., "If we were able to agree to end CW production...."). If he were successful, there could be a joint announcement by the President and Gorbachev after the ministerial.

There is, however, a question of timing. Specifically, such a move on CW now could foster a perception that the U.S. was breathlessly pursuing arms control agreements with the Soviets by constantly changing its positions (i.e., making concessions). Lithuania would increase the damage that such perceptions could cause. Put simply, this may not be a good time to announce arms control "breakthroughs," even if they are in reach.

On the other side, the de facto decision to end CW production is a wasting asset. If it is not played with Shevardnadze this week to reach closure on CW arms control, it probably will not hold until the May ministerial. Even then, a Presidential announcement that he was ending CW production, effective immediately, would have a positive foreign policy impact whether or not it was tied to a CW deal with the Soviets.

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"New Kinds" in START

The Soviets want to ban "new kinds" of systems (i.e., systems other than ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and cruise missiles) in START. We have opposed any such ban. You may want to talk about whether the U.S. should show any flexibility on this issue.

We have no particular interest in deploying ICCMs or ASBMs, nor are we especially worried about any Soviet plans to do so. We do want to protect the right to deploy hypersonic glide vehicles (although most doubt there is even a chance we could field such systems during the 15 year life of the START treaty). The question is whether we should offer to ban ICCMs and ASBMs in exchange for the Soviets falling off of their ban on "new kinds."

If the Soviet motivation is to limit U.S. technological advantages, this deal probably would not have much appeal. However, they have hinted in Geneva that they might be willing to make such a trade. We could make the offer to see whether they pick it up. Alternatively, we could continue to reject their proposed ban on "new kinds" without making any counterproposal and see how much of an obstacle the issue is to reaching final agreement on START.

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RECORD ID: 9003158
RECEIVED: 23 APR 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ZELIKOW
BLACKWILL

CHIRON FILE

DOC DATE: 20 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
EUROPE

SNF
SPEECHES



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT SPEECH ON NATO / SNF

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 26 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cup NARA, Date 3/1/09

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DOC 1 OF 1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHIEF FILE

Brent -

4-21-90

Attached is the draft
speech on NATO/SNF for the
President. It's a pretty good
cut at the thing, in my
opinion.

J Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

APNSA Has Seen

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SECURE FAX # 51

ADMIN FAX #

PAGES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2001

By Cap NARA, Date 3/9/09

FROM - LOCATION:

1. Bob Gates, NSC

TO - LOCATION - TIME OF RECEIPT:

1. Brent Scowcroft - Islamabad FIA

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4/20/90
1840

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Brent/Bob --

As promised, Philip Zelilow's draft
Presidential speech, 4/20/90

BB Blackman

[intro para for particular audience/venue -- assume commencement]

You have all probably already heard that, as you graduate from college, you are turning a page in your lives and making important choices about your future. I suppose that is true. But I would like you to join me in reflecting on other choices we all must make. These are not decisions about careers. They are decisions we must make -- as Americans -- about our country's future, and our role in the world.

Revolutionary change is transforming Europe. The Old World is being renewed, as old divisions disappear and old fears fade. From the time of the French Revolution and the wars which followed it, to World War I and the flawed peace which ended it, to the Second World War and the creation of the postwar order, great upheavals in Europe have forced the American people to decide what part we will have in European affairs. I believe that, today, we are poised at another such moment -- a time of decision about our strategic relationship with our neighbors across the Atlantic.

The Age of Freedom: A Time of Uncertainty

Europe, and the world, has entered a new era -- the age of freedom. The revolutionaries of 1989 in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany cast aside

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the dictators. The people of these nations have taken back control of their societies from the Communist officials who ruled in their name but without their consent. The Berlin Wall, for decades a grotesque symbol of an effort to imprison an entire country, now lies broken and in ruins.

About a year ago, I spoke in Germany about the goal of my Administration: a Europe whole and free. Today that goal is within our reach. The heart of divided Europe has been a divided Germany. Now, the unification of Germany, which we and our Allies have supported for more than forty years, is finally coming to pass, in peace and freedom.

This new age of freedom is a time of uncertainty and hope in Eastern Europe. These new democracies have undergone a social, political, and economic convulsion, shaking loose institutions that have smothered initiative and free choice for generations. Many in these countries are fearful about the future. But these anxieties are mixed with a liberating sense of opportunity, of new possibilities for growth, prosperity, and personal freedom.

The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe have, thankfully, been accompanied by a diminishing threat of military aggression against the West from the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders are preoccupied with remaking their own society, the process of perestroika. They have shown real statesmanship in accepting, even encouraging, the free expression of popular desires for change in Eastern Europe.

Yet we are still living through a period of transition, moving from the postwar era, beyond containment, into the age of freedom. We do not know what choices the people of Eastern Europe will make for their future. The process of change in the Soviet Union is still unfinished -- and we do not know where it will lead. The Soviet armed forces are still over four million strong, with more than half-a-million troops stationed in Eastern Europe. It will be crucial to see, for example, whether Moscow chooses coercion or peaceful dialogue in responding to the aspirations of the Lithuanian people, and other nationalities within the Soviet Union.

President Gorbachev has made profound changes in his country. There is no doubt in my mind that these reforms are so fundamental that ~~they cannot be reversed. For Moscow,~~ the clock cannot be turned back. Yet, unfortunately for us, we cannot turn it ahead, cannot see what kind of country the Soviet Union will be in years to come. It will certainly be different -- this we know. Here is what we also know: the Soviet Union will remain, even after all planned reductions in its forces are complete, the strongest military power on the Eurasian landmass, armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, dwarfing all other European states in size, population, and armed strength.

I believe that our policies must be appropriate to a period of transition, displaying a constancy and reliability that will reassure our friends, both old and new. But as Europe evolves,

we will prepare for a new era in European history. If the promise of peaceful political change and Soviet military adjustment is fulfilled, we will be ready.

America In Europe

I believe that America's place in the new Europe should continue to be based on the North Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- NATO. We must be part of Europe's future. I believe, in short, that the United States should be a European power, in the broadest sense -- politically, militarily, and economically. The starting point for this American engagement in Europe is NATO.

NATO is not now, and has never been, just a military alliance. From the start, the North Atlantic Treaty was a basic political statement about America and Europe. Through this treaty we said, in effect, for the first time in our country's history that: 'The fate of the United States cannot be separated from the fate of Europe. We are going to recognize this fact and do something about it.'

Nations, like people, can learn from mistakes. We thought we could stay clear of Europe's quarrels in World War I. In 1916, President Wilson said "we are not concerned" with the causes of the war and "we are not interested" in "the obscure foundations from which its stupendous flood has burst forth." A year later America had been swept along by the torrent and our soldiers were on their way to the battlefields of France.

Yet after the war we again turned away from active involvement in European affairs. Instead, we sponsored a treaty to outlaw war. And then, as the outlaws gained strength, the United States declared its neutrality. As the Western democracies quailed in the face of the totalitarian powers, we passed new neutrality laws. When war finally came, the most devastating conflict in human history, America could not avoid its terrible consequences. We paid an awful price for our isolation. When that war ended, America's statesmen believed a new, and different, approach was needed to keep the peace.

We chose to join with the free nations of Europe and form an Atlantic Community, an enduring political compact, recognizing in peace what we had learned from war. Military arrangements to assist in the common defense flowed naturally from this underlying political covenant. When the NATO Treaty was being negotiated in 1948, the head of our team, Robert Lovett, put it this way: "After many heartbreaks," America had "reversed its policy and was seeking to deter aggression by proof of determination. The only question was how its determination should be implemented."

The result of our giving this "proof of determination," has been a generation of peace in Europe. There has not been a war anywhere in the continent of Europe in 45 years. This fact should be viewed with the perspective of history: the whole of Europe has now experienced the longest uninterrupted period of

international peace in the recorded history of the continent, stretching back over the centuries.

We should reflect carefully on the cause of this extraordinary 'long peace.' What has been different? There is abundant evidence around the world that we have not yet witnessed a transformation of human nature -- indeed, we are only now emerging from decades of sustained political hostility and global polarization between East and West. Our political compact with the free nations of Europe, backed by the tangible presence of our troops and the deterrent potential of nuclear weapons, has made a difference.

Our help is not a charitable donation. It is for our protection. It is in our interest. Our engagement in Europe has helped the democracies enjoy unprecedented stability and prosperity, but it has also meant that the Europeans accept America as part of their continent's future, taking our interests into account across the board, not just in defense. I have concluded, as we enter this age of freedom, we must retain this vital American contribution to the peace of Europe, and the peace of the United States of America.

NATO is the principal instrument for this American contribution. The exceptional solidarity the Alliance has fostered over the years among its members and the institutions it has built for collective defense provide a proven structure to help resist any relapse into narrow nationalism and the pursuit

of individual dominance. The Alliance today enjoys wide popular support. I am pleased that the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany have indicated their unequivocal wish to retain full membership for a united Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance, including its international military structures.

Article Two of the NATO Treaty pledges the members to build their free institutions, promote the ideals of democracy, and cooperate to promote conditions of stability and well-being. We have seen in the last year just how well these objectives have been accomplished. Politically, and militarily, the Alliance is now ready to take on new challenges, to build on the achievements of the past forty years, sustain the triumph of democratic values, and define the objectives and agenda that we, and our Allies, should pursue for the remainder of this century and beyond.

Four Goals for A NATO Summit

I have consulted with my NATO colleagues, and with Secretary General Woerner, about how to proceed. Based on these discussions, I am calling for a Summit meeting of all NATO leaders, to be held this June, to consider the Alliance's approach to the future.

I would like to suggest that the Summit launch a wide-ranging review of Alliance policy for the transformed Europe of the 1990s. This review should concentrate on: One, NATO's political role in the new Europe; Two, NATO's future goals in

conventional defense and arms control; Three, the Alliance's plans for nuclear forces and new nuclear arms control negotiations; and, Fourth, the Alliance's vision for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSCE. I would like to offer some comments on each of these subjects.

NATO's Future Political Role

First, the NATO Summit should consider the future political mission of the Alliance. As the military threat diminishes, the political dimension of NATO's work -- which has always been there -- becomes more prominent, more essential. The familiar features of the European landscape are gone forever, wrenched into radically new forms by a massive political earthquake. Since the 1940s, it has never been so important for the Atlantic nations to come together and consider the dangers and uncertainties that lie ahead, and -- most of all -- the magnificent opportunities.

At the NATO Summit, we must talk together about how to encourage democratic change in Eastern Europe. We should consult about the importance of keeping a united Germany fully committed to NATO. We need to consider how to interpret the developments in the Soviet Union which can be unsettling but, at times, so full of promise. The Alliance should find new ways to work with a more vital European Community, an EC that is properly and vigorously asserting distinct West European views in foreign affairs as well as economics. In other words, NATO should be a place for Western democracies to join in managing the

transformation of Europe. The NATO Summit should set the course for this new era.

Even as NATO gives more emphasis to its political mission, its place guaranteeing European stability must remain secure. These are turbulent times. No one predicted the events of the past year, and we will surely find surprises in the future. NATO deters aggression because the Alliance makes it obvious that its members are ready to unite in the common defense. NATO's readiness does not need to be aimed at a particular country -- the enemy is uncertainty, and instability. So, even as we seek to end the confrontation of armies from the center of Europe, the Alliance will need to maintain a sound collective military structure with forces in the field and backed by much larger forces that can be called upon in a crisis.

NATO and Conventional Defense

This brings me to the second task for the NATO Summit -- a review of the Alliance's conventional military requirements in the period ahead. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and proceed with further reductions in forces, the forces committed to the Alliance in years to come should differ substantially from those we deploy today.

NATO's forces are designed against the constant danger of an attack that could be launched with little warning, capable of overwhelming Western Europe, and spearheaded by powerful Soviet mechanized forces deployed forward in Central and Eastern Europe.

Political events and our arms control efforts are creating a new situation. Our plans for the future may be able to focus less on the danger of an immediate outbreak of war and more on how to safeguard stability over the long-term, preventing crises that could lead to war.

Conventional arms control can help. A CFE treaty, like the one we have proposed, would be the most ambitious arms control agreement ever concluded. It would require the destruction of tens of thousands of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and other systems.

We have already taken the first steps in the talks now underway in Vienna. President Gorbachev accepted the proposal I announced in my State of the Union message, and so the United States plans to eliminate more than one-fourth of its troop presence in Europe by the middle of this decade. Soviet stationed forces will also be reduced, and I expect that all the Soviet troops now in Eastern Europe will eventually return home, following the pattern already set in Moscow's agreements with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

In thinking about what kind of U.S. military presence we should maintain in Europe, Soviet actions will be critical. Yet even if all Soviet armed forces return to the USSR, and our conventional arms control efforts are successful, the Soviet military is likely to retain forces many times larger than those possessed by any other single European state.

I therefore believe that militarily significant U.S. conventional forces will need to remain on the other side of the Atlantic. They will be a continued counterweight both to inherent Soviet power and to potential sources of instability within Europe, and they will demonstrate -- as no words can -- the strength of the enduring political compact that binds our fate with that of the democracies of Europe.

The exact size of the American military presence in Europe will depend, in part, on continued progress in conventional arms control. We must finish the work on a CFE treaty soon. Last May, my NATO colleagues joined me in calling for the treaty to be finished within twelve months. We have made great progress. I believe, if all the participants in the talks make the effort, the major issues in CFE can and should be resolved by the time NATO leaders meet again at the Summit in June.

But we need to go further, at the NATO Summit, to prepare for follow-on negotiations, after conclusion of a CFE treaty, to continue our conventional arms control efforts. The Summit should describe what we hope to gain from these future talks.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe

The NATO Summit should also consider the future of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet Union is a nuclear superpower. Its nuclear weapons target the territory and population of all of our European Allies, most of whom have no nuclear weapons of their own and no current wish to acquire them.

We will keep our nuclear forces deployed in Europe, with the support of our friends, to assure our Allies that we stand together -- sharing the risk -- in deterring any form of war, ruling out any military intimidation.

Many countries have relied on conventional forces alone to prevent war. Even nations confident that they had the greater numbers of such forces have found that their supposed superiority did not always deter aggression, or even stave off defeat.

There are few lessons so apparent in history as that
✓ Reliance on conventional deterrence alone ^{often} has not ~~always~~ worked.
Reliance on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces has.

Yet as the threat of immediate and overwhelming aggression recedes, the nuclear forces needed to deter war will be different from the forces we needed in the past. Specifically, as the countries closest to NATO have substituted democratic government for dictatorship, and as Soviet troops return home, there is a reduced need for nuclear systems of the shortest range. The NATO Summit should initiate a fresh study, within the Alliance, to determine the minimum number of weapons that will be needed to deter war -- credibly, and effectively.

In light of these new political conditions, and the limited range and flexibility of short-range nuclear missile forces based in Europe, I have decided, after consulting with our Allies, to terminate our program to produce and deploy newer, more modern, short-range nuclear missiles to replace the Lance missiles we now have in place in Europe, and I will withdraw the funding request

for this program now before the Congress. I have also decided to cancel any further modernization of U.S. nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe.

As for the current short-range nuclear missile systems, both US and Soviet, we have said we are prepared to negotiate the reduction of these forces as well, in a new set of arms control talks. The NATO Summit should agree on our broad objectives for these future negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and start to develop a united Western approach to these talks.

An Expanding Role for the CSCE

The various aspects of American engagement in Europe -- military, political, and economic -- must complement each other. One place where they come together is in the CSCE, an organization which covers all of Europe, including the USSR, and spans the Atlantic to include the U.S. and Canada as well. The fourth task for a NATO Summit is to arrive at a common Allied vision for the future of the CSCE.

The creation of a Europe whole and free calls for a new Western strategy, one that will utilize the CSCE, along with our existing economic assistance programs, to strengthen the victorious forces of democracy in Eastern Europe, help them secure the fruits of their revolutions. We must reassure these new governments that, as they join the commonwealth of free nations, they will be partners in building a new, stable, Europe.

Therefore the NATO Summit should consider a much more

ambitious agenda for the CSCE, such as: providing guidelines for the conduct of truly free elections, strengthening the rule of law; offering direction for the painful transition from command economies to free markets; and serving as a forum for wider political consultation. My Allied colleagues and I should agree to promote these ideas at a subsequent CSCE Summit of all European leaders later this year, in association with the signing of a CFE treaty.

America as A European Power

My main message today is not only about the details of military strategy or the institutions of a new Europe. I am asking for your support in a historic choice for our country -- the decision for continued active American engagement in the future of Europe. I am convinced that our continued involvement and influence in Europe is the best way to secure our own peace and prosperity.

The United States has always been a leader within the Atlantic Community, from the day the NATO Treaty was signed on a spring day in Washington, forty-one years ago. It has been the most successful international alliance of modern times. We will go on, with our Allies, to show together how free peoples, sharing a common purpose, can shape the future of the world.

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Qs and As for President's Press Conference on
NATO Announcement

Q: Is it true, as Secretary Baker is reported to have said in Brussels, that the U.S. supports the removal of all land-based nuclear weapons from Europe, including the removal of all U.S. nuclear artillery? Aren't the steps you've announced just half-measures?

A: Our position, on which Secretary Baker briefed his colleagues, is that NATO needs to review and decide on its minimum nuclear requirements. The new political conditions mean there is a reduced need for systems of the shortest range. We recognize that. That is why, in this context, I have decided to cancel the Follow On to Lance, cancel our program to modernize nuclear artillery deployed in Europe, and ask the Alliance to begin -- at a NATO Summit -- to prepare for new SNF arms control talks with the Soviets. These talks would start shortly after a CFE treaty is signed.

I'll be calling on my NATO colleagues to reexamine our nuclear posture. These are matters that require proper consultation before final decisions are made. That's why I've called for the NATO Summit to give direction to the creation of NATO's new nuclear strategy.

Q: Why are you talking about a next phase in conventional arms control and all these new strategies when the current CFE talks seem to be stalled and the Soviets are cutting off food and energy to the people of Lithuania?

A: The changes that have already occurred in Eastern Europe are fundamental. The security environment in Europe is being transformed. I want the Alliance to be ready.

Q: Aren't you really saying that NATO is irrelevant now, that it doesn't have a mission and needs to find a new one?

A: Not at all. NATO has always been a place for the nations of the Atlantic Community to plan together to protect and promote the cause of freedom. Just because the Alliance has been fantastically successful doesn't mean there aren't new challenges to be faced. That's why I will be calling tomorrow for a NATO Summit, to address those challenges.

Short Range Nuclear Forces.

- FY 91 money request for Follow-on to Lance is \$112M for missile development and \$6M for warhead.
- There are plans to modernize both the 155mm and 8 inch artillery rounds for US and Allied forces. US forces have received the modernized 8 inch round, but not allies. No 155mm modernized rounds have been deployed to Europe.
- There are approximately 700 Lance missiles in Europe. The plan for FOTL was approximately 1000.
- There is more than 1000 artillery shells in Europe.
- NATO decided in May 1989 that SNF talks should begin when CFE implementation was underway. The proposal now is to begin shortly after CFE is signed

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Residence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2:00 PM



2 May 1990

Mr. President --

Attached are Qs and As drafted by the NSC staff for preparation for your press conference tomorrow. I also enclose a first cut at an opening statement that we will probably want to fine-tune tomorrow morning. (At least it will give you an idea of what might be said.)

Bm.

Bob Gates

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 2, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROMAN POPADIUK

SUBJECT: Press Conference Q's and A's

Attached is a package of questions and answers for the President's press conference that you requested this morning.

The answers were provided by the NSC senior directors.

May 2, 1990

1. Have you personally communicated with the Iranians on the hostage issue? Have you offered them anything beyond your thanks for Polhill and Reed?

A: We periodically communicate to Iran about a number of matters through the Swiss government, which as you know is our protecting power. I do not think it constructive at this point to get into the details of any diplomatic exchanges. What I will say here today is that the United States has neither said nor done anything privately in any channel that is at variance with our stated policy of seeking the unconditional release of the hostages.

2. Didn't your comment on Monday that you would have "no objection" to the release of Sheik Obeid and the 400 prisoners amount to subtle pressure on the Israelis?

A: No. As we have said and as everyone knows, Israel is a sovereign country fully capable of determining its own national interest and acting accordingly. We have not and will not pressure them.

3. Since the U.S. has influence over the Israelis, why don't we urge them to release their hostages?

A: Again, we will not engage in any dealings for our hostages. It is up to Israel to act as it sees fit.

4. Do you think the Israeli government has been dealing in bad faith regarding the settlements and the peace process?

A: Let me just say that Israel and the United States worked closely together in developing the Shamir plan of May 14. We continue to believe that the Israeli government plan is the best way to launch an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue leading to elections and a negotiating process. We hope that an Israeli government gets formed quickly and that we can make some real progress toward peace.

As for settlements, our opposition to them is well known. We continue to think that settlement activity constitutes an obstacle to peace and believe that Israel should stop such activity.

5. Why hasn't the U.S. taken some action against Iraq in light of their many transgressions (big gun, CW, nuke triggers etc) lately?

A: The United States has repeatedly registered its concerns over a range of Iraqi activities. As you know, I have spoken out more than once about our concerns regarding the proliferation of unconventional weapons and their use. We

will continue to work to frustrate efforts by Iraq and others to acquire or develop such capabilities. We are also calling upon all states to sign the NPT and to join with us in banning biological and chemical weapons. At the same time, we must recognize that Iraq is an important country in the region, and we want to work with them to reduce regional tensions. I am not convinced that the sort of sanctions some are proposing would help in this.

6. What kind of signal does it send for you to announce the retention of Syria and Iran on the terrorist list on the same day you thank them for their help on the hostages?

A: Both Syria and Iran have played a constructive role in the recent freeing of the two American hostages and have earned our thanks for doing so. At the same time, we continue to have significant disagreements with both governments in the field of terrorism, and are required by law to so report. Iran continues to support terrorist acts while Syria provides a haven for terrorists in both Syria and Lebanon.

7. Isn't the invitation to Prime Minister Prunskiene to visit as a private citizen an insult to the expressed will of the Lithuanian people?

A: Mrs. Prunskiene has said that she looks forward to meeting. She is, of course, a representative of the Lithuanian people who was freely elected and will be received as such even though this is a visit arranged through private channels. I expect to benefit from hearing her views.

8. Do you agree with Secretary Cheney that in light of all his problems, Gorbachev's future looks dim?

A: The Soviet Union is in the midst of a period of change and it is no secret that the leadership is encountering tremendous difficulties -- especially economic ones. I have said many times that I wish Gorbachev well in trying to reform the Soviet Union. It is tough job but we have to hope that he succeeds.

9. Did you have a hand in the Mitterrand/Kohl letter which pushed Lithuania to ease off on their independence drive? If not, what is the purpose of consultation when the allies do not inform you about their intended actions?

A: I am not going to get into a discussion of the nature of our consultations with our Allies concerning Lithuania -- consultations have been close and effective. As you know, I have recently met with President Mitterrand and talked with Chancellor Kohl as well as other Allies. We are all working toward the same end -- to stimulate a good-faith dialogue between Lithuania and Moscow.

10. Is it true that you have decided to cancel any thought of deploying the follow-on to Lance? Why not get rid of all battlefield nukes in Europe since they could only be used on what is now friendly territory?

A: We and our NATO allies have said that the significant changes in the political situation in East Europe and the declining threat we face from the Soviet Union will lead to reductions in our own forces, including our nuclear forces. Reductions decisions must still take into account our primary need to maintain a credible deterrent, which requires nuclear forces, but they should also consider the reduced need for nuclear systems of the shortest range such as FOTL. I have been consulting with our allies on these issues, and we will have more to say soon.

11. Isn't your recent decision to ease COCOM restrictions an example of the West's rush to sell the East the rope with which to hang us?

A: Our proposal is based on an analysis that showed the current list is too long and contains many goods and technologies that are of low strategic value. By eliminating unnecessary controls, we fully expect that the remaining controls will be more effective and enhance our national security.

12. Haven't you become fixated on Gorbachev's survival? It seems all your decisions (inaction on Lithuania, trade pacts, eased COCOM rules etc) are aimed at keeping him in power at all costs.

A: I have said time and time again that we are supporting the process led by President Gorbachev that has helped to bring about remarkable changes in the world.

Not one of you can tell me that the rise of democracy in Eastern Europe; the potential for a conventional arms control agreement that finally redresses the imbalances in Europe that NATO has faced for years; and democratic elections in Lithuania and the other Baltic states would have taken place in the absence of change in the Soviet Union.

I have to take account of these and other positive developments -- even at a difficult time like the present one -- and try to preserve the atmosphere that has allowed all of this to take place.

13. What is your reaction to the Senate resolution which said that there should be no U.S. - Soviet Trade agreement if the embargo on Lithuania is still in place?

A: I fully understand the wish of the Senate to express its support for the Lithuanian people -- I share their concern about what is going on there. But as I have said before, I do not think the resolutions of this kind are helpful.

14. Do you agree with German Defense Minister Stoltenberg who said that the U.S. will lose all its influence in Europe if its troops are cut back too drastically? What about reports that you may be considering further troops cuts in Europe?

A: We are working with our Allies to make changes in NATO and on the U.S. troop presence that are in line with the new strategic realities in Europe. I have said -- and I repeat -- the United States will remain a European power and as long as our Allies want us there, we will keep American forces in Europe sufficient to meet our Alliance commitments.

15. In light of the pressures to cut defense spending and the lessened threat, how can we afford both the Midgetman and rail mobile MX?

A: My position on this has been clear and has not changed. Bringing mobility to our ICBM force will be an important improvement in the stability of our nuclear forces. The rail-garrison MX system can be fielded quickly at relatively low cost -- it adds to the survivability of a missile we have already bought and paid for. The Midgetman development and production would be spread out over a longer period of time, but represents the most survivable ICBM we can deploy.

I must point out that there have been relatively few changes in the threat posed by the Soviet strategic forces. They will enter the START Treaty with a very modern, capable force. There remains a clear need for a survivable capable deterrent and the two missiles will be a major element of that deterrent.

16. Since the Chinese have failed to respond to your gestures of goodwill, will you revoke their Most Favored Nation status?

A: I am disappointed that after initial steps by the Chinese in December and January to respond to my efforts, the progress stalled. I hope that China's leaders will value relations with the United States and renew efforts to be responsive to the concerns of the U.S. and the international community. Lifting martial law in Tibet this week might be part of a new effort, although it is hard to tell the effect of that action when our embassy has no access to Tibet. Without further progress, management of the relationship will remain problematic. As for most favored nation status, I have to weigh both these considerations and China's eligibility under the law before I make my decision.

17. Why is the U.S. effectively providing assistance to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia?

A: That report is erroneous. We assist only the non-communist resistance and they do not receive lethal aid.

18. Are you willing to tie U.S. aid in El Salvador to progress made in the peace talks with the FMLN?

A: Our goal remains the same as it has been for a long time: to bring peace to El Salvador, and protect the gains made by democracy there over the last decade. We believe that President Cristiani is sincere in his determination to negotiate a solution that will bring peace to his country. Quite frankly, given the FMLN's track record of violence, we are not so certain about their intentions. My request to the Congress is that it not tie up needed aid to the people of El Salvador with conditions which will send the wrong signal to the FMLN guerrillas at this critical time.

Yes, we intend to keep pushing the Salvadoran government to improve its human rights accord and prosecute vigorously those responsible for the killings of the Jesuits last November. I understand congressional frustration at the problems of solving this case, but I hope it will be solved and justice will be done.

19. Isn't the use of paid DEA informants to kidnap Dr. Alvarez a clear violation of Mexican sovereignty?

A: I think you haven't got your facts right. It is no secret either here or in Mexico that the United States has wanted to bring to justice all those people who were alleged to have been involved in the brutal torture and murder of DEA agent Camarena. Mexico has expressed its support for this position, and as I mentioned last Friday, when President Salinas visits Washington next month. I will assure him that we are not going to do anything that breaks the law in Mexico. No DEA agents were involved in the capture of Dr. Alvarez.

20. Will you agree to the Mexican's request to assign Mexican DEA agents on this side of the border?

A: We will want to continue our very close cooperation with the Mexican government on drug matters. We have maintained excellent working relations with the Salinas administration on this issue, and want to continue them. We are working to consider all workable forms of cooperation to advance this policy, and would be willing to explore any ideas Mexico might have on this matter.

21. If you veto the Panama-Nicaragua aid package because of attached abortion language, won't the delay in getting aid put these fledgling democracies at risk?

A: My position on the abortion position is well-known to the Congress, I vetoed identical language that was inserted in a separate bill last year. If the Panama-Nicaragua aid bill comes to me with this same language, I will veto it again. Make no mistake about that. Unfortunately the insertion of this language in a bill that the Congress knows is vitally needed is a transparently partisan effort to embarrass the Executive. But the Congress must realize that it is holding up assistance to new democracies who need the aid desperately as they work to establish themselves. It would be a dreadful shame to put the democracy we have helped these countries achieve at risk, by letting this vital legislation languish. I again urge the Congress to pass this legislation, without drop extraneous items that make this assistance bill look some kind of Rube Goldberg creation.

22. Have you responded to Landsbergis's letter?

A: No. I read with interest President Landsbergis' views and I have taken them into account. My meeting with Mrs. Prunskiene will allow me to hear even more directly the assessment of the representatives of the Lithuanian people. I believe that this is the best approach to communicating with the Lithuanian leaders at the present time.

23. Are the 400 people Israel is holding hostages or prisoners? Is Obeid a hostage?

A: I do not think it is useful to get involved in word games or definitions. I will simply stick with what I said last July, namely that we call upon all parties who hold hostages to release them as a humanitarian act.

24. Is the ball in the US court on the hostages and Iran? Where is US goodwill as promised?

A: We have made clear that our goodwill will come only once all our hostages are released. We are not going to get into piecemeal responses.

25. Will the Administration support \$400 million in housing guarantees for Israel?

A: We welcome the exodus of Soviet Jews, and are prepared to support housing guarantees as soon as we have reached mutually acceptable assurances with the government of Israel. (Note: Suggest you avoid linking assurances to use of the \$400 M; also suggest avoiding getting into the content of the assurances themselves.)

26. I see you are meeting with Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek today. What is your position about the right of Jews to live anywhere in Jerusalem as Sec. Baker wrote to Cong. Levine?

A: Our position on Jerusalem is unchanged: we want to see a united city, but we believe its final status is one that should be determined by negotiations. In the meantime, we call on all parties to avoid unilateral actions that could upset order in the city and complicate the search for peace.

27. Do you have anything to say re the settlers in the Christian Quarter of E. Jerusalem?

A: We are naturally concerned about this unfortunate and provocative development. We call upon all parties to avoid any actions that threaten Jerusalem's peace or the prospects for peace.