

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number: 91120
Folder ID Number: 91120-006

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - August 1989

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft (4 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Paper	Re: Discussion Paper (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Cable	Re: SNF (1 pp.)	5/25	(b)(1)	S
02b. Cable	Re: Letter from the Secretary to Shevardnadze (2 pp.)	5/26	(b)(1)	S
02c. Cable	Re: SNF (3 pp.)	5/26	(b)(1)	S
02d. Coversheet	Re: Immediate (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - August 1989

Pinksheet Number: cap1016
OA/ID Number: 91120-006
Date Closed: 3/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft (4 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - August 1989

Date Closed: 3/9/2009

OA/ID Number: 91120-006

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Paper	Re: Discussion Paper (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - August 1989

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<TEXT>BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 168352 TOSEC 090006

QQQQ

NODIS

SEC BAKER ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE FROM KIMMITT
FOLLOWING LONDON 10913 DTD MAY 25 SENT ACTION SECTION
WASHDC BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR ACTION

QUOTE: ~~S E C R E T~~ LONDON 10913

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UK

SUBJECT: NO THIRD ZERO - THATCHER'S BOTTOM LINE ON SNF?

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IN A MEETING LATE MAY 25 WITH SENATOR ROTH, FCO
MINISTER OF STATE WALDEGRAVE REITERATED HMG'S STRONG
OBJECTIONS TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WOULD BY THEIR
VERY NATURE BE BAD FAITH TALKS, SINCE THE SOVIET
OBJECTIVE IS DENUCLEARIZATION VIA THE THIRD ZERO, AND
THE WEST'S MUST BE TO RETAIN SOME SNF -- EVEN IF THE
SOVIETS WERE TO GO TO ZERO THEMSELVES.

3. HOWEVER, WALDEGRAVE SAID THE GERMANS HAVE "BOUNCED"
US INTO A POSITION WHERE WE MUST AGREE TO SOMETHING; THE
OBJECTIVE NOW IS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE. MRS. THATCHER
WILL BE "VERY UNCOMFORTABLE AND UNHAPPY" WITH ANY
FORMULA COUNTENANCING NEGOTIATIONS, AND "WILL FIGHT IT
HARD ALL THE WAY," BUT COULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT ONE AT
THE SUMMIT. BUT NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE PUSHED AS FAR INTO
THE FUTURE AS POSSIBLE, AND COUCHED WITH AS MANY
CONDITIONS AS CAN BE.

4. ABOVE ALL, THE SUMMIT MUST CATEGORICALLY REJECT THE
THIRD ZERO. IMPLICIT REJECTION, OR REJECTION BY LOGICAL
INFERENCE, WILL NOT DO. WITHOUT AN EXPLICIT,
UNAMBIGUOUS REJECTION OF THE THIRD ZERO, WALDEGRAVE SAID
THATCHER MIGHT NOT GO ALONG WITH ANY COMMITMENT TO
NEGOTIATIONS, NO MATTER HOW CONDITIONAL AND FUTURISTIC.
CATTO UNQUOTE EAGLEBURGER

BT

#8352

CHRON FILE

2

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2408-MR
5/27/2014 MM

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 168353 TOSEC 090007

QQQQ

NODIS

SEC BAKER ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE FROM KIMMITT
FOLLOWING MOSCOW 13946 DTD MAY 26 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
WASHDC BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO

QUOTE: ~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 13946

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, XF, KPAL, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO SHEVARDNADZE

REF: STATE 166376

1. ~~SECRET~~--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER ALEKSANDR BESSMERTNYKH MAY 26 TO DELIVER
REFTEL LETTER FROM SECRETARY BAKER TO SHEVARDNADZE.
AFTER READING THE LETTER, BESSMERTNYKH THANKED THE
AMBASSADOR FOR DELIVERING IT AND SAID HE WOULD PASS
IT TODAY TO SHEVARDNADZE, WHO WAS ATTENDING THE
CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES.

3. BESSMERTNYKH COMMENTED THAT THE SECRETARY'S LETTER
CONTAINED A NUMBER OF INTERESTING THOUGHTS CONCERNING
THE NEW STEPS WHICH WASHINGTON PROPOSED FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST. THE LETTER ALSO DISCUSSED THE OUTCOME
OF DENNIS ROSS' TRIP TO THE REGION--A JOURNEY THE
SOVIETS HAD NATURALLY PAID CLOSE ATTENTION TO,
INCLUDING ROSS' MEETINGS WITH PALESTINIANS. THE
SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE IDEA OF JOINT
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. AIMED AT ACHIEVING A MIDDLE
EAST SETTLEMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING THE
MAY MINISTERIAL BETWEEN BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE.

4. THE SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, WERE ALSO ENGAGED IN
THE REGION, BESSMERTNYKH SAID. SPECIAL ADVISER FOR
ARAB/ISRAELI AFFAIRS GENNADIY TARASOV WAS IN
CASABLANCA AT THE ARAB SUMMIT, AND NEAR EASTERN AND
NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRI ADMINISTRATION CHIEF VLADIMIR
POLYAKOV WAS ALSO TRAVELLING IN THE REGION.

5. BOTH SIDES NOW NEEDED TO WORK ACTIVELY TOGETHER,
BESSMERTNYKH SAID. PERSONALLY, HE SAW POSSIBILITIES
FOR MORE INTENSIVE COOPERATION AD PROGRESS TOWARD A
SETTLEMENT. HE HOPED THE SECRETARY'S LETTER WOULD BE
A STEP FORWARD TOWARD RESOLVING THIS REGIONAL
CONFLICT. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S REFERENCE
TO SECRETARY BAKER'S MAY 22 SPEECH TO AIPAC,
BESSMERTNYKH INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INDEED
TAKEN NOTICE OF THAT SPEECH.

6. NOW WAS A KEY MOMENT IN THE PARALLEL U.S. AND
SOVIET EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION, BESSMERTNYKH
SAID. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO GET THE PROCESS
STARTED, AND HOW THOSE STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN BY
VARIOUS OUTSIDE PARTIES WOULD BE LINKED TO THE COMMON
GOAL OF A SETTLEMENT. THE SOVIETS WERE EAGER TO
AVOID DISRUPTIONS IN THIS PROCESS.

7. THE U.S. IDEAS WERE GOOD ONES, BESSMERTNYKH SAID.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2798-MR

SCS 12/22/11

THE SECRETARY'S LETTER WOULD BE CLOSELY STUDIED BY
THE SOVIET SIDE, HE ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR.
MATLOCK UNQUOTE EAGLEBURGER
BT
#8353

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Cable	Re: SNF (3 pp.)	5/26	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - August 1989

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/8/12

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2798-MR (500.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/22/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<TEXT>BT

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 168354 TOSEC 090008

QQQQ

NODIS

SEC BAKER ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE FROM KIMMITT
FOLLOWING BRUSSELS 06742 DTD MAY 26 SENT ACTION
SECTION WASHDC BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO
QUOTE: ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ BRUSSELS 06742

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO PRESIDENT'S PARTY AND USNATO
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, FARM, NATO, PREL, BE

SUBJECT: SNF: BELGIAN REACTION TO MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY

REF: STATE 166039

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

-BEGIN SUMMARY-

2. SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR REVIEWED THE STATE OF PLAY ON
SNF WITH THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, USING POINTS IN
REFTEL, STRESSING THE DISTANCE THE U.S. HAD COME TOWARDS
THE GERMAN POSITION AND EXPRESSING HOPE BELGIUM WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO SOLVING THE ISSUE BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

TINDEMANS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE MEDIA/OPINION IMPACT
OF FAILING TO AGREE AT THE SUMMIT AND SUGGESTED SOME WAY
BE FOUND TO SEND THE ISSUE TO A GROUP OF WISE MEN FOR
STUDY. HE ALSO NOTED THERE WERE STRONG PRESSURES ON THE
GOB TO STAND ON ITS STATED POSITION, EVEN IF THIS MEANT
ISOLATION. TINDEMANS SAID THAT BOTH HE AND THE PRIME
MINISTER WERE OPPOSED TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION AND THAT HE
WOULD DO HIS BEST KEEP BELGIUM A CONTRIBUTOR TO CONSENSUS.

3. SEE PARA 12 FOR AREAS WHERE THE U.S. AND THE GOB MAY
HAVE SOME DIFFERENCES, AND PARA 13 FOR GOB COMMENT ON THE
TERM "LAND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEMS" WHICH INDICATES THIS
COULD CAUSE CONFUSION. END SUMMARY

-END SUMMARY-

4. AMBASSADOR MET WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TINDEMANS
ON 26 MAY TO GO OVER POINTS AND POSITION PAPER ON SNF
CONTAINED IN REFTEL. IN DOING SO HE STRESSED THE DISTANCE
THE U.S. HAD ALREADY MOVED BY AGREEING TO DELAY DECISIONS
ON SNF MODERNIZATION AND EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT
TO FUTURE SNF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT NOTED THAT DIFFERENCES
REMAINED EVEN AFTER THE MOST RECENT COMMUNICATIONS WITH
THE FRG. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE
BEST COURSE NOW WAS FOR THE GERMANS TO RESPOND
SPECIFICALLY TO OUR APPROACH, AND SAID HE HOPED BELGIUM
COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFORT NEEDED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

5. TINDEMANS SAID HIS OWN IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE FRG
WILL STILL SEVERELY DIVIDED INTERNALLY ON THE ISSUE, AND
HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPRESSION THAT WOULD BE
MADE ON PUBLIC OPINION IF THERE WAS A CLASH OR NO OUTCOME
ON SNF AT THE SUMMIT. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WHILE WE
WERE WORKING HARD TO SOLVE THE SNF PROBLEM BEFORE THE
SUMMIT, WE DID NOT BELIEVE THE MEETING SHOULD BE DOMINATED
BY THIS ISSUE, SINCE IT HAD TO ADDRESS MORE IMPORTANT



DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2010-2798-MR

SCS 12/22/11

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

PRIME MINISTER MARTENS HAD TOLD HIM, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NEVER FOLLOW THIS COURSE.

7. TINDEMANS WAS ENCOURAGED THAT THE BELGIAN POSITION ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOW "AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE" RATHER THAN SOMETHING MORE DIFFICULT, AND THAT FLEMISH SOCIALIST INTERIOR MINISTER TOBBACK HAD SAID IN THE CABINET THAT HE DID NOT DEMAND A THIRD-ZERO. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESIDENT OF TOBBACK'S PARTY AND LEFT-WING FIGURES IN TINDEMANS' AND MARTENS' OWN PARTY DID OPENLY SUPPORT A THIRD-ZERO. THUS THE GOB WOULD BE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO TAKE A NON-COMPROMISING LINE.

8. THE AMBASSADOR, NOTING THE U.S. HAD ALREADY SHOWN CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY, UNDERScoreD THAT IN AN ALLIANCE OF 16 SOVEREIGN NATIONS GIVE-AND-TAKE WAS ESSENTIAL TO REACH AGREEMENT. HE AGAIN REVIEWED THE SNF POINTS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. REGARDING NO THIRD-ZERO AND THE TIMING OF THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND OF ANY AGREED REDUCTIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS POSITION WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS MAXIMUM INCENTIVE TO AGREE TO LARGE, EARLY REDUCTIONS IN CFE TO AND IMPLEMENT THEM MORE RAPIDLY THAN THE SOVIETS WERE CURRENTLY PROPOSING. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GOB WOULD NOT GET LOCKED INTO AN INFLEXIBLE ALL-OR-NOTHING POSITION ON TIMING AND COULD SUPPORT THE U.S. APPROACH.

BT

#8354

BT

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 168354 TOSEC 090008

QQQQQ

NODIS

SEC BAKER ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE FROM KIMMITT

9. TINDEMANS SUGGESTED ONE WAY TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF A NEGATIVE OUTCOME FROM THE SUMMIT, SHOULD THE SNF ISSUE NOT BE RESOLVED BEFORE OR AT THE MEETING, WOULD BE TO SHIFT THIS QUESTION TO AN INDEPENDENT "GROUP OF WISE MEN" OR SOMETHING SIMILAR. THEY COULD PREPARE A STUDY FOR 6 MONTHS OR A YEAR DOWN THE ROAD. SUCH ACTION, HE SAID, WOULD HELP TAKE THE SUMMIT FOCUS AWAY FROM SNF.

10. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BUILD A NATO CONSENSUS ON SNF, PREFERABLY BEFORE OR AT THE SUMMIT. SUCCESS, HOWEVER, DEPENDED ON COUNTRIES HAVING THE WILL TO WORK TOWARD A COMMON POSITION. HE NOTED AGAIN THAT THE U.S. HAD MADE MAJOR MOVEMENT ON THE SNF ISSUE.

11. TINDEMANS CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO KEEP BELGIUM IN ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE OF A CONTRIBUTOR TO CONSENSUS RATHER THAN IN ISOLATION.

12. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS DISCUSSION, TINDEMANS POL/MIL CABINET COUNSELOR NIEUWENHUYTS IDENTIFIED THREE AREAS IN THE U.S. POSITION WHICH COULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR BELGIUM: --OUR POSITION ON THE TIMING OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE HARD TO RECONCILE WITH THE GOB POSITION THAT THESE SHOULD BE SOMEHOW "PARALLEL" WITH CFE. (NOTE: TINDEMANS SUGGESTED SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT, SEE ABOVE.)

--THE REFERENCE TO "REQUIRED SPECTRUM OF RANGES" FOR SNF COULD RESUSCITATE DESIRES TO MAKE EXPLICIT THE BELGIAN

--THE "ALLIANCE AFFIRMS THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOTL" CLAUSE MAY BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOB POSITION THAT FOTL R & D IS "NOT A DECISION FOR NATO." AMBASSADOR NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS FOR U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT.

13. NIEUWENHUYTS ALSO ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM "LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILE FORCES," NOTING THAT "LAND-BASED" WAS A FAIRLY BROAD TERM AND ASKING WHETHER, FOR EXAMPLE, TASM WAS INCLUDED IN THIS. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT TASM WAS NOT RPT NOT INCLUDED IN THE U.S. WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT "LAND-BASED" IN THIS CONTEXT MEANT "GROUND-LAUNCHED."

14. COMMENT: WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT, AS IN INF, THE TERM "GROUND-LAUNCHED" BE USED RATHER THAN "LAND-BASED" TO AVOID POSSIBLE CONFUSION/AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT THE U.S. IS WILLING TO CONSIDER NEGOTIATING. GLITMAN UNQUOTE EAGLEBURGER
BT

#8354

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 31

ADMIN FAX #

PAGES 6

DTG 262035 Z

RELEASER H Doyle

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHSR

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. SEC BAKER

2. GEN SCOWCROFT / ROME

3. AMB BLACKWILL

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

STATE 168352

STATE 168353

STATE 168354

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By CD NARA, Date 5/3/11