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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number: 91120
Folder ID Number: 91120-005

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Meeting to Discuss NATO Summit/Mitterrand Visit (1 pp.)	5/15/89	(b)(1)	S
02a. Handwritten Note	Bill to Brent [Scowcroft] (1 pp.)	5/15	(b)(1)	S
02b. Transmittal Sheet	Re: Transmittal of Information Report (1 pp.)	5/10/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Cable	Re: Intelligence Information Cable (2 pp.)	5/10/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: President Mitterrand in Kennebunkport (3 pp.)	5/17/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: While initiatives could be useful... (10 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04a. Outline	Re: Official Working Visit of President Francois Mitterrand (3 pp.)	5/20/89	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Mitterrand of France (11 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04c. Report	Re: Francois Mitterrand [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

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File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1015
OA/ID Number: 91120-005
Date Closed: 3/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/15/89	(b)(1)	C
04e. Report	Re: Roland Dumas [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
04f. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1)	C
04g. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1)	S
04h. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1)	S
04i. Memo	Lawrence S. Eagleberger to POTUS Re: Official Working Visit of President Mitterrand (4 pp.)	5/13/89	(b)(1)	C
05a. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Next Steps on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	5/23/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05c. Paper	Re: Text of U.S. Position Paper (1 pp.)	5/23	(b)(1)	
05d. Cable	Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces]: Message from the Secretary to the Foreign Minister (3 pp.)	5/23/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper -- Your Trip to Europe and Participation in the NATO Summit (3 pp.)	5/25/89	(b)(1)	S

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07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper -- Your Visit to Italy (2 pp.)	5/25/89	(b)(1)	ϕ
07b. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Scope Papers for the NATO Summit (1 pp.)	5/23/89	(b)(1)	ϕ

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SE

5/15/89

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1989

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss NATO Summit/Mitterrand Visit

This meeting is designed to discuss and hopefully to come to closure on NATO Summit/Mitterrand Visit issues.

We have been discussing fruitlessly for over a month initiatives we might be able to table at the NATO Summit. To force the point that you want specific proposals for the summit and to discuss with Mitterrand, I propose that you table the following package or something similar:

1. A SNF position, in the event the issue is not resolved before the Summit, which acquiesces in negotiations but only after Soviet reduction of SNF forces to our level and a positive conclusion in CFE.

2. As a sidebar to CFE negotiations, a U.S. proposal for a 50% cut in U.S. and Soviet ground troops in Central Europe. The troops withdrawn to be demobilized, perhaps after some pause, and their equipment stockpiled in Europe for five years or completion of CFE implementation.

3. As an amplification of our START position, a U.S. proposal for a ban on ground-based MIRVed ICBMs, beginning with mobile MIRVed ICBMs.

Proposals such as these will at least focus the group's attention on the fact you want something done. If we are going to make any substantive proposals at the Summit, you almost have to make this a decision meeting.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2003-0368-F12
@ 8/12/09

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CHRON FILE

5/12

BRENT -

Done
on
AF
one
5/12

YOU MIGHT WANT TO SHOW

THIS TO THE PRESIDENT -

ILLUMINATING - IF TRUE - ON

THE "WHY NOW?" ASPECT OF

THE PROPOSAL.

I DIDN'T BANK IT UP AS

THE PRESIDENT SEEMED TO WANT TO

TALK TO YOU ON THE PLANS.

SAFE TRIP.

Bin

welcom

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Transmittal Sheet	Re: Transmittal of Information Report (1 pp.)	5/10/89	(b)(1)	S

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Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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2/1/4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 17, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA *AMB*

SUBJECT: President Mitterrand in Kennebunkport

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

The President's invitation to Mitterrand to drop in and relax with him at Kennebunkport after his official visit to Canada could not have come at a better time. Mitterrand is one year into his second seven-year term, in a solid position domestically, and well-placed to exercise leadership in Europe and beyond. The long-standing personal relationship between the two Presidents is a valuable asset as we approach the NATO Summit and the rest of our European and international agenda, up to and including the Paris Economic Summit.

Mitterrand will be a key player at the NATO Summit and it will be important to discuss this and the SNF issue. He has carefully cultivated his relationship with Kohl and is strongly concerned to keep the West Germans solidly anchored in the Alliance.

Other subjects meriting special attention include the Paris Economic Summit, East-West relations, the Middle East, Central America/Panama, the environment, narcotics and terrorism. Since both men are giving speeches at Boston University the next day, they may also wish to compare notes, or ask that you and Attali or Vedrine do so.

Mitterrand's Special Counselor (and Sherpa) Jacques Attali will see himself as your counterpart, but Foreign Minister Dumas and Elysee spokesman Hubert Vedrine probably have a greater role in shaping Mitterrand's foreign policy decisions.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2797-MR
SCS 12/16/11

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Your memo to the President and its attachments are at Tab I.

DM/Am *EM* *DW* *DP* *RB*
Arnie Kanter, Eric Melby, David Welch, David Pacelli and Randy
Beers concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Biographic Material
Tab C	Participants List
Tab D	Memo to the President From Acting Secretary Eagleburger
Tab II	Revised Schedule

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Mitterrand's

*As you know, the French
Mitterrand social the
Brady Plan paralleled
his own ideas*

Mitterrand may also raise the issues of LDC debt and of help to the poorest countries, long favorite French themes. It is important that the Economic Summit endorse our current debt strategy (the "Brady plan"), ~~rather than weaken it by adopting Mitterrand's suggestion~~ that some of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) be allocated to finance debt reduction. As to his proposal for a \$7 billion flood control project for Bangladesh, that project is neither ripe nor appropriate for the Summit. It should be handled by the World Bank.

The other issues on the agenda for the Economic Summit are East-West relations, drugs, terrorism, and chemical weapons proliferation. Mitterrand wrote you on a study of ways to control narcotics money-laundering, an idea we support. Given past French reluctance to use these Summits for strong statements against terrorism, it would be useful to emphasize your personal interest in this issue to Mitterrand.

Additional issues you could usefully raise with the French President are the Middle East peace process, Libya, Nicaragua, and Panama. France has taken considerable interest in Central America in recent years, and will assume the EC presidency on July 1. It is worth registering your concern that the Sandinistas should be held to their commitments as a condition for increased European aid. Furthermore, the EC's condemnation, under Spain's presidency, of Noriega's electoral fraud is a posture that we will want to see continue when France takes over, if the problem has not yet been resolved by then. For his part, Mitterrand may again raise Lebanon.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool for selected events.

V. SEQUENCE

See Advance Office scenario.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Biographic Material
Tab C	Participants Lists
Tab D	Memo to you from Acting Secretary Eagleburger

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In my view, there are important strategic issues involved in the SNF issue which go to the heart of current NATO strategy.

- While initiatives could be useful, depending on their content, we do not believe that either we or NATO should seek to match Gorbachev initiative-for-initiative.
- One initiative I have felt might have some promise is "Open Skies," which I proposed on May 12. What do you feel is the potential of this idea?
- We welcome the changes under way in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. *This is a historic opportunity and we should have a strategy to maintain the gains we have made and defense while taking advantage of potentially historic to discourage any tendencies at backsliding opportunities in East-West relations.* At the same time, we must maintain a strong defense while taking advantage of potentially historic opportunities in East-West relations.
- We recognize the need for a long-term effort to ensure the continuing relevance of NATO to a changing Europe.
- I know you have maintained a close dialogue with Chancellor Kohl on the SNF issue and have given much thought to the cohesiveness of the Alliance. *But I would be very interested in what are your views on the SNF issue and on managing the Summit?*

Economic Summit

a. Environment:

- *certainly* I share your concern on the environment. We have an opportunity -- and responsibility -- to make real progress at the Paris Summit. However, we must avoid competing proposals and initiatives. Steps must be scientifically and economically sound. *There is a particular danger in this area of high emotional content to launch*
- I believe the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) process is working well. *I think* It would be helpful to fold the Hague process into the IPCC. Our focus should be on

Lawrence

encouraging

Should include on our list 7 x the SNF issue. He should not be passing

interested in

science which exceed our scientific or economic grasp

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2010-2797-MR
SCS 12/16/11

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*I must tell you I have
some concerns about using*

enabling existing institutions to function better, not creating new ones. Within the IPCC, we should move towards a framework convention on global warming.

- I share your concern about Bangladesh. However, there is as yet no consensus on what should be done. I would prefer to discuss this issue within the World Bank. *I am not sure it does not seem what we could usefully do at to be an appropriate issue for the Summit.*

B. Debt and Other Economic Issues

- We must continue to work together to ensure that we have a sound and workable debt strategy. *The United States* Secretary Brady has put forward certain ideas for debt reduction which are under discussion internationally, *as have you.* However, *I do not believe using SDRs to finance debt reduction is the right approach because of the inflationary consequences.*
- At the Summit, we must maintain emphasis on reducing trade and current account imbalances. We all need to continue working on this. *While we need to watch inflation but more short term* priority should be on imbalances.
- I will ensure that the trade act is implemented fairly. Congress is watching closely. A successful end to the Uruguay round next year, along with progress on imbalances, is vital. Otherwise it will be impossible to contain protectionist pressures. We must have successful outcomes on agriculture, services, intellectual property. We should speed up negotiations.
- I strongly support EC efforts to establish a single market. Healthy growth in Europe is important for us all. But the

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EC must provide a competitive, open environment. Increasing barriers would be dangerous, politically and economically.

- As Europe moves towards closer economic integration and foreign policy coordination, there are increasing calls for a higher quality and broader U.S.-EC dialogue. Do you have any thoughts along these lines?

U.S.-Soviet Relations

- I believe that Gorbachev wants real reforms in the USSR, ^{primarily} ~~if~~ *to avoid economic catastrophe and to improve the Soviet economic and technological prospects for the future. I think he believes the Soviet international image.* This process will take years and faces ~~serious obstacles, but I genuinely hope it will succeed~~ *because success will change the require changing* ^{the} *place in the world of the future is at risk.*
- I want to move beyond containment to a policy that encourages, step-by-step, the integration of the Soviet Union into the international community of states; a system ^{the} *that has brought peace, prosperity and freedom to the Western world.*
- We should try to extend the benefits of our system to the East, and convert the Soviet Union into a partner in solving international problems, rather than contributing to them.
- This is an ambitious goal that must be pursued from strength, systematically and with patience and creativity. We must not be distracted by Gorbachev's propaganda ploys and tactical maneuvers.
- The Soviet Union's cooperation with the West has been cyclical -- cooperation followed by confrontation. This time we must insist, over time, on fundamental changes in

Soviet institutions, practices and military forces as a basis for enduring cooperation.

- I believe the U.S. and France share a common assessment: that the West should respond to real opportunities but be prudent about Soviet rhetoric and promises. The longer-term outcome is not at all certain and Soviet military forces remain formidable.
- We have set resumption dates for arms control discussions across the spectrum of issues: conventional forces in Europe (CFE), nuclear and space, chemical weapons, nuclear testing. We should give a boost to the CFE talks and also emphasize the need to limit the spread of dangerous weapons, chemical and nuclear.
- We are on the right track. Success will depend, in large part, on continued allied cooperation and cohesiveness, and on consistent pursuit of western objectives.

Eastern Europe

- I am encouraged by developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and Hungary.
- In my April 17 speech at Hamtramck, Michigan, I set out a vision and course for our policy toward Eastern Europe.
- As I said in my speech, the U.S. will not just be a sympathetic bystander. We will be engaged, as I know France will be.
- We saw in the "Roundtable" accords in Poland a commitment among all parties on plans for genuine reform. We are

actively encouraging the Poles in their efforts to achieve greater freedom and prosperity.

- We have not and should not offer the Poles a hand-out or a bail-out. Instead, we should encourage and help them to make the reforms needed to promote economic recovery. Our support is, of course, conditioned on a continuation of political liberalization.
- I understand that you will visit Poland in June and I know that you have visited a number of Eastern European countries over the past year. I would be interested in your views on developments in the region and on how you plan to proceed in your own policy.
- I ~~myself~~ will visit Poland and Hungary in July before the Paris Economic Summit. I will reiterate our desire to assist based on continued political and economic reform and human rights performance.
- I hope our message will be clear to other eastern European countries as well. The U.S. is willing to assist genuine economic reform in concert with their political liberalization .

Middle East Peace Process

- Advancing the Middle East Peace Process is a major goal of my Administration. We will remain active and committed.
- The Washington visits of Mubarak, Shamir, and Hussein were productive and gave us a basis for moving forward with the parties in the region.

- I would be interested in your own assessment, particularly in the light of Arafat's recent visit to you in Paris.
- Although we would have preferred that Arafat not be received at the highest levels, it is encouraging that you were able to get him to state publicly that the PLO covenant is obsolete. I wish to compliment you on this.
- But the PLO has far to go in reassuring Israel and the West of its intentions. We should continue to press them to do so in our dialogue and hope you will as well.
- We appreciate French support for our efforts to oppose membership of "Palestine" in UN agencies, which we agree would be detrimental to the UN system and to the peace process.
- Our objective is a process of dialogue and negotiations. We believe Shamir's proposal for elections in the occupied territories could be developed to contribute to this process. Mubarak and Hussein agreed that the idea could have merit and are looking forward to further details.
- We continue to press Israelis and Palestinians to take actions on the ground to shape an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations.
- We are pleased that you share many of our views and at the constructive approach France has adopted; your support and cooperation will be important to the prospects for progress.
- We hope you will continue to press Palestinian leaders to adopt constructive and workable positions.

- In particular, the PLO must understand the importance of allowing the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to speak directly to the Israelis.
- This is a necessary element in moving Israel in a constructive direction at this time, as is encouragement by the major western powers.

Lebanon

- Like you, we are deeply concerned about the senseless violence in Lebanon.
- We believe this concern is shared by the Soviet Union. As you know, the United States and the USSR recently issued a joint statement on Lebanon appealing to all sides to accept and observe a cease-fire.
- We are encouraging the Arab League to redouble its efforts to achieve a consolidated cease-fire.
- ~~As we discussed on the telephone, I share your view that~~
We believe Secretary General de Cuellar should, at this juncture, continue playing a supporting role to the Arab League's initiative to restore security and stability in Lebanon.
- The first step must be a stable cease-fire. Then the Arab League should renew its efforts to establish a political dialogue among Lebanese leaders.
- Before anyone can realistically expect foreign forces to withdraw, the Lebanese will need to make progress on reaching a political accommodation.

Libya

- I see no change in Libya's unacceptable policies, particularly its support for international terrorism. I am also concerned about Libyan chemical weapons efforts and about Soviet delivery of SU-24 long-range fighter bombers, which have long strike ranges.
- I urge you to remain steadfast in support of EC sanctions against Libya, including military embargo and restrictions on Libyan diplomatic presence.

Nicaragua

- I want to assure you that we are seeking a political solution in Nicaragua. We have put aside the military option in order to test the Sandinista commitment to democratize, as you and others had recommended.
- So far, however, the Sandinistas are not complying with their commitment to permit free, fair and honest elections in February 1990. They imposed the electoral and media laws by fiat; the electoral law gives all advantages to the Sandinistas.
- I met with Violetta Chamorro, publisher of *La Prensa*, on May 5, and I heard first-hand about continuing Sandinista restrictions on the media, including government control of newsprint.
- I am personally disappointed by the European trend toward being more generous in non-conditioned aid to the

Sandinistas. Diplomacy will not work if the Sandinistas believe that they can obtain assistance and implicit approval without fulfilling their democratization pledges.

- I hope that France, which has encouraged diplomatic and political solutions in Central America, will work with us to ensure that the Sandinistas receive a clear message that they must negotiate further reforms with the internal opposition.

Panama

- I was very pleased by the strong EC statement condemning Noriega's attempt to steal and later to annul the elections. Felipe Gonzalez also played a very helpful role personally. I hope you will encourage continuing European pressure for democracy in Panama.

Narcotics

- I appreciated your initiative in proposing a study on ways to increase control over illicit financial transactions, and I am looking forward to active discussions on money laundering and other narcotics related issues at the Summit.
- We would like to engage in more cooperation with the French on narcotics control, looking particularly at possible programs to move campesinos away from coca cultivation in the Andean sub-region.

Spelling?

Terrorism

- We hope France will support a security council resolution on hostages, emphasizing the plight of hostages in Lebanon.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-- We also hope that France will continue to work closely with the US and other Western countries to further tighten aviation security.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ParticipantsUnited States

The President
Secretary of State James Baker
Governor John Sununu
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft
Senior Director for Soviet and
[Eastern] European Affairs Robert Blackwill
Ambassador Walter J. P. Curley
Interpreter

France

President Francois Mitterrand
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs
Special Counselor to the President Jacques Attali
Press Spokesman Hubert Vedrine
Foreign Policy Adviser to the President Jean Musitelli
Interpreter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Revised 5/16/89 11:00 am

May 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF
DAVID BATES
RICHARD BREEDEN
ANDREW CARD
JAMES CICCONI
DAVID DEMAREST
MARLIN FITZWATER
BOYDEN GRAY
FRED MCCLURE
BONNIE NEWMAN
ROGER PORTER
BRENT SCOWCROFT
STEPHEN STUDDERT
CHASE UNTERMEYER
SUSAN PORTER ROSE
ED ROGERS
JOE HAGIN
JIM WRAY
CHRISS WINSTON

BOBBIE KILBERG
PATTY PRESOCK
LINDA CASEY
ROBERT GUTTMAN
TIMOTHY MCBRIDE
ROSE ZAMARIA
TONY LOPEZ
DAVID VALDEZ
BILLY DALE
JAY ALLISON
BRUCE ZANCA
LAURIE FIRESTONE
CASEY HEALEY
JEAN LAMB
DEB ANDERSON
USSS/PPD OPS
WHCA AUDIO/VISUAL
WHCA OPERATIONS
MEDICAL UNIT
PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS

THRU: STEPHEN M. STUDDERT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SPECIAL
ACTIVITIES AND INITIATIVES

FROM: JOHN G. KELLER, JR. *JK*
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVANCE

SUBJECT: TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT TO KENNEBUNKPORT,
MAINE AND BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, MAY 18-21,
1989.

For your use and planning purposes, the attached is the preliminary summary schedule for the Trip of the President to Kennebunkport, Maine and Boston, Massachusetts, on May 18-21, 1989.

Revised 5/16/89 11:00 am

THURSDAY, MAY 18, 1989

3:10 pm MARINE ONE arrives Walker's Point.
 RON Kennebunkport

FRIDAY, MAY 19, 1989

No events scheduled.

RON Kennebunkport

SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1989

10:30 am President Mitterrand arrives Pease AFB.

10:40 am President Mitterrand departs Pease AFB en route
Walker's Point.

(Flying Time: 20 Minutes)

11:00 am THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush greet President and
Mrs. Mitterrand upon arrival.

- * Bilateral Meeting
 - PRESS POOL
- * Working Luncheon
 - CLOSED PRESS
- * Expanded Bilateral Meeting
 - CLOSED PRESS
- * Walking Tour
 - PRESS POOL
- * Private Time
 - CLOSED PRESS
- * Private Dinner
 - CLOSED PRESS

RON Kennebunkport

Revised 5/16/89 11:00 am

SUNDAY, MAY 21, 1989

9:45 am MARINE ONE departs Walker's Point en route
Boston, Massachusetts.

(Flying Time: 45 Minutes)

10:30 am MARINE ONE arrives Boston Massachusetts Landing
Zone.

10:35 am MOTORCADE departs Landing Zone en route Case
Center.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

10:40 am MOTORCADE arrives Case Center.

- * Meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister
 - CLOSED PRESS
- * Boston University Commencement
 - OPEN PRESS
- * Joint Press Availability
 - OPEN PRESS

2:20 pm MOTORCADE departs Wilson Student Center en route
Landing Zone.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

2:25 pm MOTORCADE arrives Landing Zone.

2:30 pm MARINE ONE departs Landing Zone en route Boston
Logan International Airport.

(Flying Time: 15 Minutes)

2:45 pm MARINE ONE arrives Boston Logan International
Airport.

Revised 5/16/89 11:00 am

* Departure Ceremony
- OPEN PRESS

3:00 pm AIR FORCE ONE departs Boston, Massachusetts
en route Andrews Air Force Base.

(Flying Time: 1 Hour 10 Minutes)

4:10 pm AIR FORCE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.

4:15 pm MARINE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route White House.

(Flying Time: 10 Minutes)

4:25 pm MARINE ONE arrives White House.

Gary:

Please pass Original (for the President) plus one copy to General Scowcroft (for himself).

I need two copies for John Cochran (Sununu/Cochran)

I need two copies for Wilma (Blackwill & Wilma)

Please send copy back to Situation Room for following distribution:

The Vice President
Robert Gates (Diane Edwards)
Philip Hughes
West Wing Desk
Blackwill's Office

Please note on cover sheet that this package has been revised.
I will separately send note to Hughes et al.

Thanks.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3626

✓ file
CHRON FILE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

BACK from
the President

(as Revised)

OFFICIAL WORKING VISIT OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DATE: May 20-21, 1989
LOCATION: Kennebunkport and Boston
TIME: 11:00 a.m. May 20 --
1:55 p.m. May 21
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2797-MR
SCS 12/16/11

I. PURPOSE

To gain Mitterrand's full support for our goals at the NATO Summit, and for your broader international objectives over the next several months, including at the Economic Summit in Paris in July.

II. BACKGROUND

Mitterrand was very pleased by your invitation for an informal visit to Kennebunkport. Although he will not find it easy to adapt to American-style casualness, he is very much at ease with you personally. He no doubt remembers your mission to Paris shortly after the start of his Presidency on May 21, 1981. He had entered office at the head of a coalition in which the Communists at first seemed virtually equal to the Socialists and a dangerous partner. Mitterrand's prediction that by having them in his government he would severely weaken them has proven correct. As Vice President, you were always an especially-welcomed emissary, and Mitterrand sees his personal relationship with you now as a major plus.

Mme. Mitterrand surprised us by her last-minute decision to join her husband. They generally go their separate ways. At Kennebunkport, however, neither this nor her traditional reservations about the US are likely to pose any problem. She should prove an interesting and articulate guest.

The timing of Mitterrand's visit could not be better in terms of consolidating his support for your approach to the NATO Summit. The same holds for the broader goals which you will be pursuing in the rest of your European trip in late

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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May, in your speeches on Europe, and at the Paris Economic Summit in July. You will have over 24 hours together, including your appearances at Boston University and a joint press event just before his departure.

Mitterrand was comfortably re-elected to a second seven-year term last May, Prime Minister Michel Rocard is performing successfully despite the absence of a Socialist majority in the National Assembly, and the French economy is doing well. Mitterrand is thus ideally placed to exercise leadership in Europe and internationally.

As you know, Mitterrand has recently attempted to walk a very careful line on SNF. He has traditionally been a strong advocate of a US land-based nuclear deterrent in Western Europe, and he wishes to protect the pro-nuclear consensus of French opinion. However, the French have been concerned about the eastward drift in West German policy and have sought to protect the Bonn-Paris axis. Although Mitterrand is very sensitive to Kohl's political vulnerabilities, he also has substantial influence with Kohl. He could turn out to be a critical player in determining the NATO Summit outcome.

Mitterrand is also interested in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He has had periodic Summits with Gorbachev since his rise to power, and has followed the French tradition of special attention to Poland. Mitterrand is intrigued by the reform process in Eastern Europe and hopeful of increased economic opportunities for France, but he does not yet have a fully coherent approach to the region. He is also one of Europe's more prudent and clear-eyed leaders on questions of the military balance, and of fact versus rhetoric from the Soviets. His views on the USSR and on Eastern Europe will thus be of special interest. He may also wish to sound you out on possible new Western initiatives towards Poland and other countries of the region.

Your meeting should provide an excellent opportunity to learn more of what Mitterrand has in mind for the Paris Economic-Summit, and to lay out your own agenda. LDC debt and the environment will probably be high on his agenda. He has written you urging that the Summit focus on concrete measures to deal with global warming, and is organizing a "Planet Earth" meeting in Paris June 12-13 in a latecomer's attempt to project himself as a leader on the environment. Mitterrand should be encouraged to work with us to keep the emphasis on the ongoing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is making encouraging progress, and the process begun at the Hague as well as other initiatives should be folded into the IPCC in order to produce practical results rather than dispersion of effort.

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Mitterrand may also raise the issues of LDC debt and of help to the poorest countries, long favorite French themes. It is important that the Economic Summit endorse our current debt strategy (the "Brady plan"). As you know, the French said the Brady Plan paralleled Mitterrand's own ideas that some of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) be allocated to finance debt reduction. As to his proposal for a \$7 billion flood control project for Bangladesh, that project is neither ripe nor appropriate for the Summit. It should be handled by the World Bank.

The other issues on the agenda for the Economic Summit are East-West relations, drugs, terrorism, and chemical weapons proliferation. Mitterrand wrote you on a study of ways to control narcotics money-laundering, an idea we support. Given past French reluctance to use these Summits for strong statements against terrorism, it would be useful to emphasize your personal interest in this issue to Mitterrand.

Additional issues you could usefully raise with the French President are the Middle East peace process, Libya, Nicaragua, and Panama. France has taken considerable interest in Central America in recent years, and will assume the EC presidency on July 1. It is worth registering your concern that the Sandinistas should be held to their commitments as a condition for increased European aid. Furthermore, the EC's condemnation, under Spain's presidency, of Noriega's electoral fraud is a posture that we will want to see continue when France takes over, if the problem has not yet been resolved by then. For his part, Mitterrand may again raise Lebanon.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool for selected events.

V. SEQUENCE

See Advance Office scenario.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Biographic Material
Tab C	Participants Lists
Tab D	Memo to you from Acting Secretary Eagleburger

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

NATO Summit

- The U.S. goal at the Summit is to reaffirm our enduring transatlantic partnership and our continued strong ties to a changing Europe. We are working hard to ensure a successful Summit.
- The Summit should celebrate NATO's success in keeping the peace for forty years, as well as in putting forward an ambitious dialogue with the East, based on shared western values.
- The declaration must articulate a joint vision of the Alliance's approach to the East. The declaration should not be so long or detailed that the key points do not come readily to the attention of our publics.
- Press attention inevitably will focus on SNF. It is crucial that the Summit not be dominated by this issue.
- We need to emphasize that NATO is an alliance of democracies, based on shared values and common interests which bind us together indivisibly.
- The Alliance is fundamentally sound; this difference on SNF does not signal a crisis.
- Our democratic traditions can accommodate diversity of opinion.

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- While initiatives could be useful, depending on their content, we do not believe that either we or NATO should seek to match Gorbachev initiative-for-initiative.
- One initiative I have felt might have some promise is "Open Skies," which I proposed on May 12. What do you feel is the potential of this idea?
- We welcome the changes under way in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This is an historic opportunity and we should have a strategy of encouraging change. At the same time, we must maintain a strong defense to maintain the gains we have made and to discourage any tendencies at backsliding.
- We recognize the need for a long-term effort to ensure the continuing relevance of NATO to a changing Europe.
- I know you have maintained a close dialogue with Chancellor Kohl on the SNF issue and have given much thought to the cohesiveness of the Alliance. In my view, there are important strategic issues involved in the SNF issue which go to the heart of current NATO strategy. But I would be very interested in your views on the SNF issue and on managing the Summit?

Economic Summit

a. Environment:

- I certainly share your concern on the environment. We have an opportunity -- and responsibility -- to make real progress at the Paris Summit. However, we must avoid

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- competing proposals and initiatives. Steps must be scientifically and economically sound. There is a particular danger in this area of high emotional content to launch schemes which exceed our scientific or economic grasp
- I believe the IPCC (Intergovernment Panel on Climate Change) process is working well. I think it would be helpful to fold the Hague process into the IPCC. Our focus should be on enabling existing institutions to function better, not creating new ones. Within the IPCC, we should move towards a framework convention on global warming.
- I share your concern about Bangladesh. However, there is as yet no consensus on what should be done. I would prefer to discuss this issue within the World Bank. I am not sure what we could usefully do at the Summit.

B. Debt and Other Economic Issues

- We must continue to work together to ensure that we have a sound and workable debt strategy. The United States has put forward certain ideas for debt reduction which are under discussion internationally, as have you. I must tell you I have some concern about using SDRs to finance debt reduction because of the inflationary consequences.
- At the Summit, we must maintain emphasis on reducing trade and current account imbalances. We all need to continue working on this. We need to watch inflation carefully, but short-term priority should be on imbalances.

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- I will ensure that the trade act is implemented fairly. Congress is watching closely. A successful end to the Uruguay round next year, along with progress on imbalances, is vital. Otherwise it will be impossible to contain protectionist pressures. We must have successful outcomes on agriculture, services, intellectual property. We should speed up negotiations.
- I strongly support EC efforts to establish a single market. Healthy growth in Europe is important for us all. But the EC must provide a competitive, open environment. Increasing barriers would be dangerous, politically and economically.
- As Europe moves towards closer economic integration and foreign policy coordination, there are increasing calls for a higher quality and broader U.S.-EC dialogue. Do you have any thoughts along these lines?

U.S.-Soviet Relations

- I believe that Gorbachev wants real reforms in the USSR, primarily to avoid economic catastrophe and to improve Soviet economic and technological prospects for the future. I think he believes the Soviet place in the world of the future is at risk. This process will take years and faces serious obstacles, but I genuinely hope it will succeed because success will require changing the very nature of the system -- politically and economically.
- I want to move beyond containment to a policy that encourages, step-by-step, the integration of the Soviet

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Union into the international community of states; a system that has brought peace, prosperity and freedom to the Western world.

- We should try to extend the benefits of our system to the East, and convert the Soviet Union into a partner in solving international problems, rather than contributing to them.
- This is an ambitious goal that must be pursued from strength, systematically and with patience and creativity. We must not be distracted by Gorbachev's propaganda ploys and tactical maneuvers.
- The Soviet Union's cooperation with the West has been cyclical -- cooperation followed by confrontation. This time we must insist, over time, on fundamental changes in Soviet institutions, practices and military forces as a basis for enduring cooperation.
- I believe the U.S. and France share a common assessment: that the West should respond to real opportunities but be prudent about Soviet rhetoric and promises. The longer-term outcome is not at all certain and Soviet military forces remain formidable.
- We have set resumption dates for arms control discussions across the spectrum of issues: conventional forces in Europe (CFE), nuclear and space, chemical weapons, nuclear testing. We should give a boost to the CFE talks and also emphasize the need to limit the spread of dangerous weapons, chemical and nuclear.

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- We are on the right track. Success will depend, in large part, on continued allied cooperation and cohesiveness, and on consistent pursuit of western objectives.

Eastern Europe

- I am encouraged by developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and Hungary.
- In my April 17 speech at Hamtramck, Michigan, I set out a vision and course for our policy toward Eastern Europe.
- As I said in my speech, the U.S. will not just be a sympathetic bystander. We will be engaged, as I know France will be.
- We saw in the "Roundtable" accords in Poland a commitment among all parties on plans for genuine reform. We are actively encouraging the Poles in their efforts to achieve greater freedom and prosperity.
- We have not and should not offer the Poles a hand-out or a bail-out. Instead, we should encourage and help them to make the reforms needed to promote economic recovery. Our support is, of course, conditioned on a continuation of political liberalization.
- I understand that you will visit Poland in June and I know that you have visited a number of Eastern European countries over the past year. I would be interested in your views on developments in the region and on how you plan to proceed in your own policy.

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- I myself will visit Poland and Hungary in July before the Paris Economic Summit. I will reiterate our desire to assist based on continued political and economic reform and human rights performance.
- I hope our message will be clear to other eastern European countries as well. The U.S. is willing to assist genuine economic reform in concert with their political liberalization .

Middle East Peace Process

- Advancing the Middle East Peace Process is a major goal of my Administration. We will remain active and committed.
- The Washington visits of Mubarak, Shamir, and Hussein were productive and gave us a basis for moving forward with the parties in the region.
- I would be interested in your own assessment, particularly in the light of Arafat's recent visit to you in Paris.
- Although we would have preferred that Arafat not be received at the highest levels, it is encouraging that you were able to get him to state publicly that the PLO covenant is obsolete. I wish to compliment you on this.
- But the PLO has far to go in reassuring Israel and the West of its intentions. We should continue to press them to do so in our dialogue and hope you will as well.
- We appreciate French support for our efforts to oppose membership of "Palestine" in UN agencies, which we agree

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would be detrimental to the UN system and to the peace process.

- Our objective is a process of dialogue and negotiations. We believe Shamir's proposal for elections in the occupied territories could be developed to contribute to this process. Mubarak and Hussein agreed that the idea could have merit and are looking forward to further details.
- We continue to press Israelis and Palestinians to take actions on the ground to shape an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations.
- We are pleased that you share many of our views and at the constructive approach France has adopted; your support and cooperation will be important to the prospects for progress.
- We hope you will continue to press Palestinian leaders to adopt constructive and workable positions.
- In particular, the PLO must understand the importance of allowing the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to speak directly to the Israelis.
- This is a necessary element in moving Israel in a constructive direction at this time, as is encouragement by the major western powers.

Lebanon

- Like you, we are deeply concerned about the senseless violence in Lebanon.
- We believe this concern is shared by the Soviet Union. As you know, the United States and the USSR recently issued a

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joint statement on Lebanon appealing to all sides to accept and observe a cease-fire.

- We are encouraging the Arab League to redouble its efforts to achieve a consolidated cease-fire.
- As we discussed on the telephone, I share your view that Secretary General de Cuellar should, at this juncture, continue playing a supporting role to the Arab League's initiative to restore security and stability in Lebanon.
- The first step must be a stable cease-fire. Then the Arab League should renew its efforts to establish a political dialogue among Lebanese leaders.
- Before anyone can realistically expect foreign forces to withdraw, the Lebanese will need to make progress on reaching a political accommodation.

Libya

- I see no change in Libya's unacceptable policies, particularly its support for international terrorism. I am also concerned about Libyan chemical weapons efforts and about Soviet delivery of SU-24 long-range fighter bombers, which have long strike ranges.
- I urge you to remain steadfast in support of EC sanctions against Libya, including military embargo and restrictions on Libyan diplomatic presence.

Nicaragua

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- I want to assure you that we are seeking a political solution in Nicaragua. We have put aside the military option in order to test the Sandinista commitment to democratize, as you and others had recommended.
- So far, however, the Sandinistas are not complying with their commitment to permit free, fair and honest elections in February 1990. They imposed the electoral and media laws by fiat; the electoral law gives all advantages to the Sandinistas.
- I met with Violetta Chamorro, publisher of *La Prensa*, on May 5, and I heard first-hand about continuing Sandinista restrictions on the media, including government control of newsprint.
- I am personally disappointed by the European trend toward being more generous in non-conditioned aid to the Sandinistas. Diplomacy will not work if the Sandinistas believe that they can obtain assistance and implicit approval without fulfilling their democratization pledges.
- I hope that France, which has encouraged diplomatic and political solutions in Central America, will work with us to ensure that the Sandinistas receive a clear message that they must negotiate further reforms with the internal opposition.

Panama

- I was very pleased by the strong EC statement condemning Noriega's attempt to steal and later to annul the elections.

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Felipe Gonzalez also played a very helpful role personally. I hope you will encourage continuing European pressure for democracy in Panama.

Narcotics

- I appreciated your initiative in proposing a study on ways to increase control over illicit financial transactions, and I am looking forward to active discussions on money laundering and other narcotics related issues at the Summit.
- We would like to engage in more cooperation with the French on narcotics control, looking particularly at possible programs to move *campesinos* away from coca cultivation in the Andean sub-region.

Terrorism

- We hope France will support a security council resolution on hostages, emphasizing the plight of hostages in Lebanon.
- We also hope that France will continue to work closely with the US and other Western countries to further tighten aviation security.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Report	Re: Francois Mitterrand [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 10/16/14

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0925-MR (503.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	8/26/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

(b)(1), (b)(3)

François MITTERRAND

(Phonetic: meetairRAHN)

President (since May 1981)

Addressed as: Mr. President

FRANCE

The most popular politician in France, Socialist President François Mitterrand has been affectionately labeled Tonton (or Uncle) by his friends and some of the media. Nevertheless, he has a reputation for intrigue and long ago earned the sobriquet "the Florentine" for his ability to survive in politically murky waters.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)



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(b)(1), (b)(3)

the 72-year-old President remains vigorous and alert. An eloquent speaker, he recently told a crowd of students that, "like wine, the ability to govern improves with age."

(b)(1), (b)(3)

The "Grandfather of Europe"

(b)(1), (b)(3) Mitterrand sees his role as setting the broad lines of policy—especially on defense and foreign affairs—and intervening as necessary to correct the government's course.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

he wants to be viewed as an elder statesman, (b)(1), (b)(3) he would like to be remembered by history as one of the architects of a more united Europe. He has pushed Franco-German ties as a key to European integration, advocated close ties to the Atlantic Alliance, and promoted greater Western unity. Like most Frenchmen, he adamantly supports maintenance of France's independent nuclear deterrent. Regarding SNF modernization, Mitterrand has publicly agreed with the West Germans that there is no urgent need to move forward but will probably advise Bonn privately against pressing for early US-Soviet negotiations on the issue.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

Mitterrand has a deep aversion to Soviet totalitarianism and remains wary of Moscow. In recent months, however, he has adjusted the tone of his rhetoric from an outlook of skepticism about changes in the USSR to one that—publicly at least—emphasizes positive expectations about Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's policies. In November 1988 he visited Moscow and the Soviet space complex at Baykonur to watch the liftoff of a manned Franco-Soviet space mission. (b)(1), (b)(3) during the trip he told Gorbachev that the Soviet Union needed to make progress in the area of human rights and endorsed the idea of a START agreement in 1989. Mitterrand will host a visit by Gorbachev to Paris in July.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

In addition to resuming a regular dialogue with Moscow, Mitterrand has embarked on an ambitious travel schedule in East Europe that mixes business and "a little wreath laying." He has visited Czechoslovakia (December 1988) and Bulgaria (January 1989) and currently has visits scheduled or planned for Poland, East Germany, and Hungary.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

his travel reflects his publicly stated desire to go "beyond Yalta" and work toward an independent and reconciled Europe where France, standing head to head with Moscow and Washington, could play a dominant role.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

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(cont.)

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Mitterrand has frequently addressed the issue of chemical weapons. During a UN address in September 1988, he called for the prohibition of both their use and their manufacture. In a late November press interview he stated that France did not produce such weapons but sidestepped the issue of existing stockpiles in France. In January 1989 he hosted a chemical weapons conference in Paris; (b)(1), (b)(3) he plans to maintain a high profile in the chemical warfare control arena in the coming months. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Although Mitterrand has toned down his criticism of US policy in the Third World and Central America, some differences still linger. He received Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in early May and reportedly agreed to support increased EC economic aid for the Sandinista government. Like many other West Europeans, Mitterrand criticized the US decision to deny Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir 'Arafat an entry visa as "imprudent" and "regrettable." In January 1989 Mitterrand's government announced that it would upgrade the status of the PLO representation in Paris, and earlier this month Mitterrand met with 'Arafat in Paris (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

Early Life and Career

Mitterrand was born on 26 October 1916. A graduate of the School of Political Science, he holds degrees in sociology, literature, and law. During World War II he was a prisoner of war and a member of the Resistance. He was first elected to public office in 1946 and held 11 Cabinet posts during 1947-57, the most important being those of Minister of Interior and of Justice. He ran for the presidency three times between 1965 and 1981 before winning it. He was reelected in May 1988, the first president in the history of the Fifth Republic to win two consecutive terms by popular vote. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Mitterrand is the unofficial leader of the Socialist Party (PS), which he formed during the 1970s by persuading a variety of groups with slightly differing philosophies to join with him. An anti-Communist and a longtime champion of the non-Communist left, he nonetheless formed electoral alliances between the PS and other leftist parties, including the French Communist Party (PCF), to win the presidency and control of the National Assembly in 1981. According to the press, his long-term strategy was to convert PCF voters into Socialists: during the past 15 years he has reversed the balance on the left, with the PS becoming the dominant party and the PCF sliding toward oblivion. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Personal Data

Mitterrand is an avid reader and has himself written 13 books. Born in rural France, he enjoys walking in the woods and raising flowers (mostly roses and camellias) at his vacation home in southwestern France. He still resides at his home on the Left Bank in Paris and uses the Elysée Palace solely as an office. He understands English. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Mitterrand is married to the former Danielle Gouze, (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3) Her recent trips as head of the humanitarian France-Liberties Foundation have taken her to the Soviet Union, Turkey (where she visited Iraqi Kurds), and Latin America (including stops in Nicaragua and Cuba). The couple has two sons and several grandchildren. One son has been a deputy in the National Assembly, and the other is an adviser for African affairs on the presidential staff. (b)(1), (b)(3)

9 May 1989

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/15/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04e. Report	Re: Roland Dumas [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 10/16/14

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0925-MR (503.04)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	8/26/2013

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(b)(1), (b)(3)

Roland DUMAS

(Phonetic: dooMA)

FRANCE

*Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs (since May 1988)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Socialist Roland Dumas is one of President François Mitterrand's closest associates (the two own adjacent apartments in Paris) and has long advised him on his political image. He (b)(1), (b)(3) skillfully promotes the President's foreign policy interests. The press has reported that in negotiations he goes straight to the point and adds that he is able to suggest compromises, hiding sharp disagreements in elegant, nonconfrontational formulations. Often called a "born diplomat," Dumas maintains good relations with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who has described him as charming.



(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

Security Policy

Dumas generally adheres to Mitterrand's agenda in the security policy arena. Like most Frenchmen, he stresses the need for an independent strategic nuclear defense. He also maintains that bilateral arms control negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are more effective than bloc-to-bloc negotiating. (b)(1), (b)(3)

While Dumas advocates increasing ties to the East, he cautions that the Soviet threat should not be underestimated and agrees with Mitterrand on the necessity of presenting Moscow with a solid Western defense. He has said that the Vienna talks are the real test of Moscow's intentions and that while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposed unilateral conventional force reductions are a positive step, they do not require a reciprocal response. On SNF modernization, his position—like Mitterrand's—is ambiguous. (b)(1), (b)(3) Dumas appears convinced of the necessity of modernizing NATO SNF forces. At the same time, however, he reportedly supports Bonn's desire to postpone any Alliance decision on modernization for at least 18 months. When pressed, Dumas says France has no role in NATO's decision because it is not part of NATO's integrated military command structure. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Since assuming office, Dumas has worked closely with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—with whom he enjoys excellent rapport—to expand Franco-German cooperation. Dumas is a strong supporter of the Franco-German Defense Council, which will administer the entire range of bilateral security efforts, including the experimental joint brigade. In mid-1988 he and Genscher delivered a joint statement to the CSCE that helped bring the conference's drawn-out summer session to a successful conclusion. In April 1989 he traveled to West Germany for "private" consultations with Genscher; the trip was apparently intended to soothe Bonn's irritation with Dumas' proposal, made at the CFE-CSCE ministerial meeting in March, to establish a special CFE negotiating zone for West Germany and the Benelux countries. (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(cont.)

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0925-MR

SCS 8/26/13

Foreign Policy Agenda

Dumas is currently pressing a series of foreign policy initiatives. He has:

- Supported an international conference on Lebanon to increase confidence among the combatants and achieve a long-term solution to the crisis.
- Announced his intention to travel to Israel "soon" to discuss the Middle East peace process with Likud and Labor leaders. (The announcement came after PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat's recent visit to Paris.)
- Repeatedly offered to host a conference on Cambodia. As a result, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Kampuchea Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Sihanouk have agreed to meet in Paris in late July.
- Visited Poland in April to revitalize bilateral ties. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Other Interests

A well-known civil rights lawyer, Dumas has long been associated with the Socialist Party and with human rights issues. He has publicly stressed a foreign policy that includes an influential world role for his country and maintenance of France's human rights "mission." Deeply committed to European unity, he says that Europe must deal with the United States on economic and trade matters from a strong common position. He is also intensely interested in the Third World and favors European cooperation with developing countries to promote their political nonalignment and economic independence. In addition, (b)(1), (b)(3) Mitterrand has tasked Dumas to develop a comprehensive proposal to reduce Third World debt. (b)(1), (b)(3)

As Minister of European Affairs during 1983-84, Dumas was the driving force behind France's successful EC presidency (January-June 1984). During this stint and his subsequent one as Foreign Minister (1984-86), he made extensive international contacts. He is respected by government leaders in Africa and the Middle East, as well as in major European capitals. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Career and Personal Data

Dumas was born on 23 August 1922. He served in the Resistance during World War II. He holds a law degree from the University of Paris and has studied at the National School of Oriental Languages and the London School of Economics. He gained national prominence as a civil rights lawyer who represented many famous clients, including Pablo Picasso (who painted his portrait) and the satirical newspaper *Le Canard Enchaîné*. He has served as a National Assembly deputy four times, representing three different districts.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

He has a strong interest in modern art, and he likes movies. An accomplished tenor, he enjoys opera. He also plays tennis, rides, and sails. He speaks fluent English, German, and Spanish, as well as some Italian and Russian. Married for the second time, he has three children. (b)(1), (b)(3)

9 May 1989

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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04f. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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WHORM Cat.:
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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ParticipantsUnited States

The President
Secretary of State James Baker
Governor John Sununu
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft
Senior Director for Soviet and
European Affairs Robert Blackwill
Ambassador Walter J. P. Curley
Interpreter

France

President Francois Mitterrand
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs
Special Counselor to the President Jacques Attali
Press Spokesman Hubert Vedrine
Foreign Policy Adviser to the President Jean Musitelli
Interpreter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1989

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2797-MR
SCS 12/16/11~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lawrence S. Eagleburger  Acting

SUBJECT: Official Working Visit of President Mitterrand

I. SETTING

- o Relations with the French are generally excellent.
- o Despite some differences on NATO and arms control, security cooperation is generally good and military cooperation is excellent.
- o France maintains a strong military force and modern nuclear weapons but faces strong budget pressures to slow down or abandon programs.
- o Mitterrand is sympathetic to Chancellor Kohl's concerns, and has walked a "balanced" line on SNF, positing a need for NATO to match Soviet modernization, while noting that a decision on the Follow on to Lance (FOTL) can wait a few years. At the same time, he shares our reservations concerning SNF negotiations.
- o Our economic links are stronger than ever but present some problems. We differ greatly on eliminating agricultural subsidies and the French Government is making it more difficult for U.S. companies to buy into French firms.
- o The French economy experienced strong growth (3.3 percent) in 1988. We anticipate more growth (2.8-3.0 percent) in France in 1989 with only moderate inflation. Unemployment exceeding ten percent is a nagging problem. Isolated public sector strikes continue but have not spread to the private sector.
- o Mitterrand dominates the French political scene. He was re-elected in May 1988 by a comfortable margin, and the Socialist government of Prime Minister Rocard (appointed by Mitterrand) is firmly in place, albeit without a legislative majority.

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-2-

- o This visit comes only nine days before the NATO Summit and less than two months before you go to Paris for the Economic Summit and celebrations of the bicentennial of the French Revolution.

II. OBJECTIVES

- o Encourage Mitterrand to express to Chancellor Kohl his reservations about SNF negotiations and to play a role in forging consensus at the NATO Summit. He will, nevertheless, be reluctant to pressure Kohl.
- o Exchange views on how we can best jointly deal with changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
- o Highlight U.S. objectives for the Economic Summit. Mitterrand may seek U.S. support for a French plan for flood control in Bangladesh. He may also push French proposals on debt relief for the poorest countries and attempt to elicit your support for some broader international effort on environmental issues.
- o As France gets ready for the EC Presidency in July, stress our support for the 1992 European single market and our concern that it not be used to increase European limitations on trade or investment.
- o Tell Mitterrand that we still hope to drop the visa requirement for French visitors. We took the initiative in proposing reciprocal elimination of the visa, but when France agreed we found the Attorney General unwilling to approve it. We are continuing to review the matter.
- o Express concern for any increases in French aid to Nicaragua not conditioned on Nicaraguan steps to democratize and respect human rights. Mitterrand is likely to ask the United States to take a more conciliatory stand with the Sandinistas.
- o Encourage France to publicly call for Noriega to step aside and respect the outcome of the May 7 election; secure French support for OAS efforts to bolster Panamanian democracy.
- o Ask Mitterrand for details about his meeting with PLO leader Arafat, and encourage him to continue urging Arafat to moderate actions as well as words. Mitterrand will probably push strongly for an international conference to move the peace process along.

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-3-

- o Exchange views on how the United States and France can work together to maintain momentum toward an acceptable Cambodian settlement.
- o Having close personal involvement in shaping French policy in Lebanon, Mitterrand may ask the U.S. to take a stronger anti-Syrian and pro-Lebanese Christian stance, and to support having the Security Council take up the issue of Lebanon.
- o Mitterrand may seek details on a U.S. support package for Poland. He will go to Warsaw in June for the first French state visit there since martial law was declared.

III. STRATEGY

- o On SNF you should make the case that negotiations would create great pressure for a third zero elimination, which would place France in an uncomfortable position. Mitterrand will use the rationale that France is not a member of NATO's integrated military structure. You will probably not make much headway with Mitterrand, but he may have some ideas for smoothing over differences in the Alliance.
- o Mitterrand shares your cautious approach toward Gorbachev and will welcome an exchange of views on how to best deal with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
- o Mitterrand will appreciate hearing your views on the Economic Summit. He wants the Paris Summit to be a success, and is unlikely to push aggressively any controversial proposals.
- o On the EC single market, you should point out that while your administration favors free trade, there is protectionist pressure from Congress. Point out that to the extent the EC imposes limitations on trade or investment, it will become more difficult for the United States to avoid retaliatory actions which could ultimately hurt our trading system.

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- 4 -

- o On Nicaragua, you should emphasize the failure of the Sandinistas to live up to their promises concerning democratization and human rights. (Both are major French preoccupations in this bicentennial year.) Stress that aid should follow rather than precede progress in these areas. Emphasize that the United States is willing to take steps toward normalizing our relationship but only based on concrete steps by the Sandinistas. These arguments may persuade Mitterrand to back away from any premature increases in aid, other than humanitarian.
- o On Panama, you should ask Mitterrand to embrace the cause of human rights and democracy for Panamanians, to call publicly for Noriega's departure, and to lend his government's support to efforts by Latin American democracies to restore Panama's democratic process.
- o Regarding the Middle East peace process, you should emphasize to Mitterrand that the French could play an important role by encouraging their Arab friends to accept elections as a positive step forward. Mitterrand will tell you that he urged moderation on Arafat. You should emphasize that the time is not yet right for an international Middle East peace conference and that more opportunity should be allowed for Shamir's elections proposal to develop.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 23, 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON SNF

As discussed between Bob Gates and Bob Kimmitt, we believe the following steps on SNF are in order:

1. We believe the President should reply to Kohl through your channel along the lines of the draft text at Tab 1. We share your view that the May 22 German letter shows no real change in their position.
2. At the Secretary's direction we have shared with the British, Dutch, and French the language we provided to the Germans on May 19. The Secretary will communicate with his French and Dutch counterparts, as well as NATO Secretary General Woerner, to ask for any specific suggestions they might have on our language and their views on how to move things forward within the Alliance (draft cable attached at Tab 2). Our goal will be to engage them in an effort to develop an Alliance consensus that would eventually include the Germans. (As you know, we already have British views and made a change to our language at their request prior to sending it to the Germans.)

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2797-MR
SCS 12/16/11

Draft Letter to Chancellor Kohl

Dear Helmut,

Thank you for your note of May 22. We have studied your new language carefully with our previous conversations in mind. I believe that your response contains some useful points, but that our two governments remain apart in several important respects.

I found useful your inclusion of language from the March 1988 NATO Summit Declaration on the Alliance's objectives in the conventional force negotiations. Including this language would demonstrate the emphasis and priority that we, as an Alliance, attach to conventional arms reductions. Accordingly, we have added this language to the text that we gave to Minister Stoltenberg last week, and a revised copy of our text is attached to this letter.

In addition, I see some convergence on other points. The principal one, of course, is our acceptance of Germany's desire that the Alliance affirm now its willingness in principle to enter into future SNF negotiations. I continue to believe this represents a major move on our part, one designed to address your strong interest in securing a clear Alliance commitment to these negotiations. We also agree that negotiated reductions in these nuclear missile forces should not begin to be implemented until after full implementation of the results achieved in the negotiations on conventional forces.

We still appear to have an important difference, however, over the conditions that must be met prior to the beginning of SNF negotiations. I continue to believe that SNF negotiations should begin only after tangible implementation of an agreement on conventional force reductions has begun. In addition, it is our view that the Comprehensive Concept must clearly rule out a "third zero" for these missile forces.

On modernization, we have acceded to your desire to defer a firm Alliance decision on production and deployment of the follow-on to Lance until 1992. In my view, this also represents a major point of flexibility on our part since earlier this year. I continue to believe, however, that the Alliance should state explicitly its support for research and development.

Let me assure you, Helmut, that I recognize the obligation among friends to adjust where possible to help each other. I am trying to do so by both delaying a modernization decision and offering a commitment to negotiations. But in turn I ask you to understand three points of utmost importance to me. First, I cannot agree to a "third zero." Second, the initiation of any SNF negotiations must be linked to concrete results in the CFE negotiations. Third, the results of any SNF treaty should not be implemented before the full implementation of a CFE agreement that removes the dangerous conventional asymmetry that exists today.

I hope this statement of my concerns enables us to make real progress soon. I look forward to hearing from you.

George Bush

1. THE ALLIANCE REAFFIRMS ITS POSITION THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR, WHICH IS A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE BASED UPON AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEPT UP TO DATE WHERE NECESSARY. WHERE NUCLEAR FORCES ARE CONCERNED, LAND-, SEA-, AND AIR-BASED SYSTEMS ARE NECESSARY IN EUROPE.
2. IN VIEW OF THE HUGE SUPERIORITY OF THE WARSAW PACT IN TERMS OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES, THE ALLIANCE CALLS UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY ITS SHORT-RANGE MISSILE SYSTEM TO CURRENT NATO LEVELS.
3. THE ALLIANCE REAFFIRMS THAT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IT PURSUES THE OBJECTIVES OF
 - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS,
 - THE ELIMINATION OF DISPARITIES PREJUDICIAL TO STABILITY AND SECURITY, AND
 - THE ELIMINATION, AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY, OF THE CAPABILITY FOR LAUNCHING SURPRISE ATTACK AND FOR INITIATING LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTION.
4. IN KEEPING WITH ITS ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES FORMULATED IN REYKJAVIK IN 1987 AND REAFFIRMED IN BRUSSELS IN 1988, THE ALLIANCE STATES THAT ITS HIGHEST PRIORITY IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EAST IS REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES ABOVE. FOLLOWING TANGIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES, IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES, IS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE AMERICAN AND SOVIET LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILE FORCES OF SHORTER RANGE TO EQUAL AND VERIFIABLE LEVELS BELOW THE PRESENT LEVEL OF AMERICAN LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILE FORCES -- EXCLUDING A ZERO OPTION FOR THESE MISSILE FORCES. THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE PROCEED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN THESE NUCLEAR MISSILES FORCES WILL NOT BEGIN UNTIL AFTER THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES.
5. AS REGARDS THESE NUCLEAR MISSILE FORCES, THEIR LEVEL AND CHARACTERISTICS MUST BE SUCH THAT THEY CAN PERFORM THEIR DETERRENT ROLE IN A CREDIBLE WAY ACROSS THE REQUIRED SPECTRUM OF RANGES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THREAT -- BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR -- WITH WHICH THE ALLIANCE IS FACED. IN 1992, THE ALLIANCE WILL DECIDE IN THE LIGHT OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM FOR THE LANCE MISSILE INTO THE ALLIANCE AND HENCE ITS PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT. THE ALLIANCE AFFIRMS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM FOR THE LANCE SHORT-RANGE MISSILE.

ORIGINAL

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P: BBURTON//EUR/RPM: GTDAVIES
5/23/89 EXT.72057
P: RKIMMITT

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2010-2797-MR
SCS 12/16/11

EUR: RLRIDGWAY
S/S:

NSCS:

IMMEDIATE PARIS, THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE, USNATO IMMEDIATE

NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE ONLY FROM U/S KIMMITT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PREL, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: SNF: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN
MINISTER

AUTH
DRFT

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1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD PROVIDE THE MESSAGE FROM
SECRETARY BAKER IN PARA THREE {PLUS TEXT IN PARA FOUR}
BELOW TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR SYG WOERNER AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

3. BEGIN POINTS:

{FOR VAN DEN BROEK AND WOERNER ONLY: -- SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN
SO HELPFUL ON THE SNF ISSUE, AND HAVE GIVEN US MANY GOOD
IDEAS, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THE CURRENT SITUATION.}

{FOR DUMAS ONLY: -- BECAUSE OF FRANCE'S SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY, AND OUR DISCUSSIONS IN
KENNEBUNKPORT, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THE CURRENT SITUATION
REGARDING SNF.}

-- AS YOU KNOW, THE U.S. HAS SHOWN A GREAT DEAL OF
FLEXIBILITY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF GERMAN POLITICAL CONCERNS.

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WE HAVE AGREED TO PUT OFF TOUGH MODERNIZATION DECISIONS; WE ALSO ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS. WE NOW NEED TO SEE SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY FROM THE GERMANS.

-- WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED AN EXCHANGE OF POSITIONS ON SNF WITH THE FRG, WHICH BEGAN WITH DEFENSE MINISTER STOLTENBERG'S VISIT LAST WEEK.

-- WE HAVE GIVEN YOUR EMBASSY THE TEXTS OF THE INITIAL GERMAN PROPOSAL AND OUR COUNTERPROPOSAL. {FOR USNATO: YOU MAY SHARE TEXTS WITH WOERNER AT TIME OF PRESENTATION.}

-- ON MAY 22, WE RECEIVED THE FRG'S REPLY TO OUR COUNTERPROPOSAL. THE GERMAN REPLY LARGELY REITERATES THE POSITION REFLECTED IN THE PAPER WHICH STOLTENBERG GAVE US LAST WEEK. THEREFORE, IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN. REACHING AGREEMENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL REQUIRE A BROADER ALLIANCE EFFORT.

-- THE GERMANS ACCEPT ALMOST NONE OF OUR CONDITIONALITY FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS, DO NOT INCLUDE A "NO THIRD ZERO" PLEDGE IN THEIR POSITION, AND MAKE NO STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR U.S. SNF DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS.

-- NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS ONE USEFUL SUGGESTION IN THE GERMAN COUNTERPROPOSAL, WHICH WAS A PARAGRAPH REITERATING THE MARCH, 1988 SUMMIT DECLARATION LANGUAGE ON ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE NEGOTIATIONS {FYI: THIS IS TEXT IN PARA FOUR BELOW. END FYI}.

-- WE BELIEVE INCLUSION OF THIS LANGUAGE WOULD GIVE EMPHASIS TO NATO'S NEGOTIATING PRIORITY -- PROGRESS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE. THUS, WE ARE INFORMING THE GERMANS THAT WE AGREE TO INCLUDE THIS POINT IN OUR TEXT.

-- AT THIS STAGE, THE U.S. SEES SOME POINTS OF CONVERGENCE: THAT NATO'S PRIORITY IS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS; THAT NATO SHOULD MAKE A COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF MISSILES; AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN SNF MISSILES SHOULD AWAIT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF CFE AGREEMENT.

-- THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL DIFFERENCE SEEMS TO BE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SNF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COMMENCE. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT SNF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN ONLY AFTER TANGIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS HAS COMMENCED. ALSO, WE BELIEVE THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT MUST CLEARLY RULE

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OUT ANY "THIRD ZERO" FOR THESE MISSILE FORCES.

-- I WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE LANGUAGE WE PROVIDED THE GERMANS. I WOULD ESPECIALLY APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON WAYS TO GENERATE A BROADER ALLIANCE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IN THE COMING DAYS.

4. BEGIN TEXT {NOTE, THIS LANGUAGE WOULD BE INSERTED BETWEEN PARA. THREE AND FOUR OF U.S. LANGUAGE PROVIDED TO STOLTENBERG, BEING REPEATED TO YOU SEPTTEL.}:

THE ALLIANCE REAFFIRMS THAT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IT PURSUES THE OBJECTIVES OF:

- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS;
- THE ELIMINATION OF DISPARITIES PREJUDICIAL TO STABILITY AND SECURITY, AND;
- THE ELIMINATION AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY OF THE CAPABILITY FOR LAUNCHING SURPRISE ATTACK AND FOR INITIATING LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTION.44

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4004
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>pc 5/23</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>log FRP</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
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89 MAY 23 09:08

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

4354

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

WASHINGTON

Non-log item

May 25, 1989

CHRON FILEINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Scope Paper -- Your Trip to Europe and Participation in the NATO Summit

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Setting

You are traveling to Europe at one of those rare moments of historic transition from one era to another. The postwar strategy of containment has succeeded beyond our best expectations. Our political ideals are, as never before, becoming the political ideals of the world -- from students painstakingly sculpting a giant Statue of Liberty to carry in Tiananmen Square to hotly contested elections in the heart of Moscow. The Soviets proposed numbers on May 23 at the CFE talks in Vienna that, if implemented, would probably cut the size of the Soviet Army in Europe in half. The Western Europe we helped to rebuild has now emerged from the "Eurosclerosis" of the seventies and early eighties and is striding toward economic unity and resurgent global influence.

It is at this time, with all its promise and uncertainty, that West European leaders will be looking to you to set the tone and offer guidance for the Alliance, and the free world. In your meetings with these leaders, in your public statements, and -- most of all -- at the Summit and in your speech a day later in Mainz, you will be able to assert your leadership by providing your views on fundamental questions.

Tenor and Objectives

Many of your exchanges, public and private, will naturally focus on SNF and, especially as details emerge about your proposal, on conventional arms control. In both cases it is to your advantage to direct attention to the underlying principles at stake for the Alliance.

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Although the specifics are important, the SNF debate is -- at bottom -- not an internecine squabble about when to start new negotiations. It is about Western fidelity to nuclear deterrence and flexible response as a way of keeping the peace, and about the relationship of nuclear deterrence to the balance of conventional forces.

Your new conventional arms control ideas take advantage of Gorbachev's latest moves and then go beyond them. The result is the possibility for major progress. Your initiative nails down areas of agreement and extends arms control to all combat aircraft rather than just the narrower Soviet category of attack aircraft. It urges cuts in Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe below the level Gorbachev is currently willing to accept while offering, in return, an unprecedented ceiling on US troop strength in Europe. Most of all, your proposal dramatizes what should be evident: the United States does want a less militarized Europe; it is ready to move now to seize the extraordinary opportunities to realize this goal.

Beyond these high visibility issues, you will have, as I mentioned, a chance to address fundamental questions about the Alliance's future in this time of historic change.

- Is the Cold War over? As you said in your Hamtramck speech, not yet. The Cold War was the product of hostility and global competition between two utterly different social systems, one founded on individual liberty and the other founded on total state control of society. Vivid evidence is everywhere that this competition is entering a new, promising, phase. It may be, as Churchill said of the American entry into World War Two, not 'the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.'
- What is the future of divided Europe? The Cold War must end where it began, with an end to the division of Europe. Europe is divided, Chancellor Kohl once said, because half of Europe is not free. The only durable basis for a reconciliation between East and West will be a true sharing of common values, self-determination, individual rights, and pluralistic societies. You may, however, want to be careful not to get out in front of Bonn in calling for German reunification, since Germans inside and outside the government strongly feel that a high-profile position may compromise the careful, incremental movement that is already

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underway. Yet you need not shy away from saying that an end to the division of Europe, if based on self-determination and free popular choice, would logically imply an end to the division of Germany.

- Is NATO still relevant? You could emphasize the great uncertainties about the future, and the need to preserve the unity and protection that brought us to this point. You may also wish to explain that Western solidarity will be a crucial asset if the Allies are to capitalize on the changes underway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
- Do we still need nuclear deterrence in Europe? Without being strident, you can point out that nuclear forces have kept the peace. Conventional deterrence has often failed. If flexible response is to work, the US must visibly display a credible nuclear commitment on the ground in Europe. An emphasis on underlying principles will put the SNF dispute in perspective.
- Is the United States ready for a new era? You can point to many examples of your forward-looking approach. We are attempting to move beyond containment in our relations with Moscow and are actively engaged in promoting reform in Eastern Europe. Your Boston University remarks welcomed progress toward unity in Western Europe and your Mainz speech will reflect a broad vision for the future of the continent as a whole. You can cite specifics, such as your proposal on conventional arms, an idea for Western help to Eastern European efforts to protect their environment (to be announced in the Mainz speech), the Open Skies initiative, a renewal of President Reagan's effort to improve conditions in Berlin, and a push for putting a new subject -- free elections -- on the CSCE agenda.

It is difficult to recall when so much was at stake and, at the same time, there were so many opportunities in a Presidential trip to Europe.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3964
CHRON FILE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

May 25, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Scope Paper -- Your Visit to Italy

Setting: After a period of relative government stability in the mid-1980s, Italian politics have reverted to type. You will be arriving at a time when relations among key Italian leaders have been poisoned by the backbiting that brought about the fall of the De Mita government. (De Mita is expected to remain as caretaker Prime Minister through the NATO Summit but is almost certain to be succeeded soon thereafter by a reconstituted five-party coalition, perhaps headed by current Foreign Minister Andreotti.)

This atmosphere will complicate your bilateral discussions but need not diminish the favorable impact of your visit. Italians are used to the comings and goings of governments, and they appreciate the fact that your first visit to Europe as President begins in their country. For them, your visit reconfirms the exceptionally strong U.S. tie that underpins Italian foreign policy and responds to their need to be taken seriously.

Tenor and Objectives: Your visit in Italy will set the tone for the NATO Summit and indeed for U.S. policy toward Europe under your Administration. In reaffirming a strong U.S. commitment to Italy and outlining your aims for the NATO Summit, you will be sending messages to all of Europe. Your public remarks will therefore need to be aimed at this wider audience.

Your remarks at the Memorial Day ceremony at Nettuno will evoke the sacrifices Americans have made for peace and liberty in Europe. They will send a powerful and moving message, not only in Europe but here at home as well.

In your public statements on the NATO Summit, it will be important to transcend the SNF issue and project your broader view of the future of Europe and the Alliance's role in it. Italy's position on SNF reflects the usual Italian inclination to find a middle ground between competing views. Driven partly by Foreign Minister Andreotti's close ties to Genscher, the Italians have come out in support of SNF negotiations, though they want

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2003 2003-03408-F12
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first to see substantial progress in conventional force reductions. Your private meetings with Italian leaders will afford the chance to drive home our views on SNF and to call for Italian support. Publicly, however, you will need to focus on the ability of the Alliance to work out even the most difficult issues. You may also want to cite Italy's acceptance of the transfer of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing as an example of Allied solidarity.

Reiteration of key themes from your recent speeches -- active engagement in Eastern Europe, beyond containment in our relations with Moscow, a Commonwealth of Free Nations, support for closer European security cooperation -- will serve to drive home the messages for a European audience. They will also be the building blocks for the NATO Summit and your major speech in Mainz.

Italians are as enthusiastic as other Europeans about prospects for change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and they have strong commercial interests as well. A forward-looking but realistic attitude on your part will send a useful message in Italy and beyond. President Cossiga's visit to Poland in early May could be the touchstone for discussing Italian policies in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev is scheduled to visit Rome and the Vatican toward the end of 1989.

Italy considers itself a major player in the Middle East. Like other European allies, Italy favors an international conference and is sympathetic to the idea of a Palestinian state. The Italians have upgraded their relations with the PLO, but only slightly, and maintain a generally cautious approach. Arafat has cancelled a visit to Italy that was scheduled to take place just before your arrival. It will be useful to remind the Italians that when they talk with Arafat, they should seek something tangible in return.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 23, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Scope Papers for the NATO Summit

Attached are your memoranda to the President for his trips to Italy, the Vatican, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Your memorandum on the NATO Summit will be forwarded separately as a non-log item.

Concurrences by: *AK* Arnold Kanter

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memoranda to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum: Italy
Tab II Memorandum: The Vatican
Tab III Memorandum: Germany (FRG)
Tab IV Memorandum: The United Kingdom

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *201* NARA, Date *5/3/11*