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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	USSR Chronological Files
Subseries:	SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number:	91120
Folder ID Number:	91120-004

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (3 pp.)	5/2/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, Wednesday, May 3, 1989, 10:00-10:20 a.m. (1 pp.)	5/1/89	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter from Prime Minister Molroney (1 pp.)	5/3/89	(b)(1)	
02b. Letter	Prime Minister Mulroney to President Bush (2 pp.)	5/2/89	(b)(1)	
03a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney (3 pp.)	5/4/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03c. Report	Re: Brian Mulroney [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1014
OA/ID Number: 91120-004
Date Closed: 3/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03d. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, May 4 (2 pp.)	4/28/89	(b)(1)	C
03e. Letter	Prime Minister Mulroney to President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03f. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, May 4, 1989 (1 pp.)	5/2/89	(b)(1)	S
04a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac (2 pp.)	5/6/89	(b)(1)	C
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made Meeting with Paris Mayor Chirac (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Paris Mayor Chirac (1 pp.)	5/4/89	(b)(1)	C
05a. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Complete Text of Draft NATO Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament: Latest Version (1 pp.)	5/8/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Text	Re: Text for Comprehensive Concept (1 pp.)	5/18/89	(b)(1)	
05c. Cable	Re: Arms Control "Objectives" (16 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05d. Text	Re: Text for Comprehensive Concept Draft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (1 pp.)	5/8/89	(b)(1)	C
06b. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, Tuesday, May 9, 1989, 10:00-10:30a.m. (1 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	C
06c. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, Tuesday, May 9, 1989, 10:00-10:30a.m. (1 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	C
06d. Outline	Re: Meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (3 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1)	C
06e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made Meeting with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06f. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made Meeting with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Dealing with the Germans (3 pp.)	8/7/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Memo	Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Revised Memorandum for the President on Dealing with the Germans (1 pp.)	5/18/89	(b)(1)	S
07c. Memo	Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Revised Memorandum for the President on Dealing with the Germans (1 pp.)	5/11/89	(b)(1)	S

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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

5/3/89 - 10 a.m.
MEETING WITH NORWEGIAN
PRIME MINISTER - OVAL OFC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3162

May 2, 1989

MEETING WITH NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND

DATE: May 3, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

2

I. PURPOSE

To seek Norway's support on the SNF issue as we prepare for the NATO Summit, and to discuss international environmental issues.

II. BACKGROUND

Prime Minister Brundtland is in Washington on a private visit, during which she will make three speeches on the environment and will receive several awards from environmental and scientific groups.

Our objective is to engage Prime Minister Brundtland on SNF and enlist her support in resolving the issue before the NATO Summit. Although opposed to modernization and in favor of early negotiations, the Norwegians have been helpful by communicating their views privately -- until last week, when Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg responded to Genscher's request by taking a public stance in support of Bonn's position. Still, there may be give in the Norwegian position. Prime Minister Brundtland supports nuclear deterrence and flexible response, opposes a "third zero," and agrees that SNF reductions should be linked to redressing conventional imbalances. This position gives you an opportunity to drive home our opposition to early SNF negotiations and the urgent need for the Alliance to reach agreement before the NATO Summit.

On the broader themes concerning the NATO Summit, the Prime Minister will reflect Norway's public anti-nuclear sentiment and conviction that the West needs to respond to Gorbachev's "new" Soviet Union. She would welcome your assurance that we are developing new initiatives in U.S.-Soviet relations. You could also explain that your initiative toward Poland is part of a new and more active U.S. effort to engage Eastern Europe at a time of major change in the region.

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w/SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2003-0368-F12
EOA 8/12/09

~~SECRET~~

It would also be useful to engage the Prime Minister on Nicaragua. Her government opposes U.S. policy and recently added $4.5 million in unconditional aid for the Sandinistas. While we are not likely to change Norway's basic views, you could urge Brundtland to give our bipartisan initiative a chance by holding the line on additional funding for the Sandinistas.

The Prime Minister will want to raise environmental issues. She chaired the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), which issued its report on "Our Common Future" in April 1987. The report advocates some ideas we cannot accept, including compulsory arbitration of international economic disputes, but it has been an important catalyst in focusing world attention on the need for concerted action on the environment.

Brundtland is personally hosting a conference in May 1990 on environmentally sound and sustainable development. You wrote Brundtland April 11 welcoming her leadership and designating Secretary Baker to lead U.S. efforts for the conference.

You have just received a letter, dated May 2, from Prime Minister Brundtland, suggesting that you participate with a pre-taped video message for a June 3 global broadcast in connection with World Environment Day. We suggest that you give a noncommital response until we have reviewed the details of the broadcast.

Along with Prime Ministers Rocard of France and Lubbers of the Netherlands, Brundtland organized the March 1989 Hague conference that called for a new international authority to respond to the challenge of global warming. Our position is that such a new authority would conflict with the work of existing bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Prime Minister Brundtland is likely to raise these issues in the context of the July Economic Summit. This would be a good opportunity for you to assure her that the Summit will highlight environmental issues but that it should also give impetus to work underway in existing fora, particularly those dealing with global climate change. She may mention her proposal for a multilateral dialogue to help stabilize the oil market. We have told Norway we do not believe this would be helpful.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Photo opportunity and meeting in Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Brundtland Biography
Tab C	List of Participants

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH

NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND

-- As we prepare for the NATO Summit, it will be imperative for the Alliance to resolve its differences over SNF, particularly the issue of SNF negotiations with Moscow.

o I know that you share our commitment to extended nuclear deterrence and oppose a "third zero" on SNF.

o We have been exceedingly flexible on Lance modernization, but we believe that early SNF negotiations with Moscow would raise pressures for a third zero and ultimately for the denuclearization of Europe.

o There should be concrete results in the Vienna conventional force reduction talks and substantial unilateral reductions of Moscow's overwhelming advantage in SNF before NATO should consider further restructuring or reductions in its SNF forces.

o I ask your support as we try to reach an Alliance consensus that holds the line against early SNF negotiations.

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AS AMENDED
2003-0368-F/2
8/12/09

-- It is important that these differences be resolved, so that the NATO Summit can focus on the future. We propose not only to celebrate the Alliance's past achievements but also to project a broad vision of Europe's future and the Alliance's role in it.

o Beginning with our initiative on Poland, we seek to engage Eastern Europe creatively at a time of major change in the region -- and to do so in concert with our Allies.

o We are doing the same in building on the progress in relations with the Soviet Union.

-- On Central America, I know we have our differences. But I hope your Government can give our bipartisan initiative a chance.

o We believe that any Western aid to the Sandinistas should be linked to meaningful reforms.

o The Sandinistas have not met the first target under the El Salvador agreement. The new electoral law and media law are seriously defective and completely ignored opposition proposals.

- o Providing new unconditional aid at this point will erode prospects for democracy and peace.

-- You have worked tirelessly on behalf of efforts to protect the global environment. My Administration salutes your work and shares your commitment.

- o Thank you for your letter concerning the June 3 broadcast in connection with World Environment Day. I will certainly look into the idea and see whether I can join you.

- o I welcome the meeting you are organizing in Bergen next year. As I mentioned in my letter, Secretary Baker will be taking the lead in organizing U.S. participation.

- o As we consider new forms of international cooperation, we should avoid creating new bodies that may conflict with the work of those already in existence, like the International Panel on Climate Control (IPCC).

-- We hope the Paris Economic Summit can give new impetus to international cooperation on the environment, as well as on human rights, counterterrorism, and narcotics control.

-- (<u>if asked</u>) I do not think a producer-consumer dialogue on energy is desirable. Price and production issues are best left to the marketplace.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91120-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Governor Sununu
Secretary Baker
General Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates
Robert D. Blackwill (NSC)
M. James Wilkinson, State Department

NORWAY

Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland
Kjeld Vibe,
Ambassador to the U.S.
Arne Strand,
State Secretary
Morten Wetland,
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3162

May 1, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, Wednesday, May 3, 1989, 10:00-10:20 A.m.

At Tab 1 is the President's briefing package for his meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

As the Prime Minister's preoccupation will be with environmental issues, we have highlighted these in the President's package, along with specific markers we hope he can lay down. Our objective, however, is to turn the discussion toward the SNF issue, and to solicit Prime Minister Brundtland's support for a position that holds the line against early SNF negotiations with Moscow.

Donald Mahley, Eric Melby, and David Pacelli concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

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w/SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 12958,
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2003-0368-F12
8/12/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE 3125 a/o

May 3, 1989

NOTED

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5/5/89

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Mulroney

2

A letter from Mulroney just arrived this morning proposing that the NATO Summit should call upon the East to begin discussions on an Open Skies agreement. He argues primarily for its public relations value, but also feels it would contribute substantively to increasing confidence. He also argues that there is a very real possibility that Gorbachev might himself put forward such an initiative, that it would be politically difficult to say no, and that it would be seen as further evidence of the East taking the initiative.

The Open Skies issue is being intensively discussed right now within the Administration. My own view is that the idea has some attractions, although we will need to find ways around some potential pitfalls. But we will need more time, and I suggest that you be polite but non-committal.

Attachment

Tab A Letter from Prime Minister Mulroney

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CANADA

PRIME MINISTER · PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 2, 1989

Dear George,

In recent weeks we have been greatly concerned with ensuring that the forthcoming NATO Summit is successful in demonstrating convincingly to our publics our commitment to peace, arms control and cooperation with the East. When you were here in February we discussed the need to capture the initiative from Gorbachev to ensure our efforts are not lost in the glare of his public diplomacy. The recent problems the Alliance has encountered with SNF modernization, and the growing publicity being given to this dispute, which often is portrayed incorrectly as an argument between those who are for arms control and those who are against it, has only heightened the need for a broad, bold NATO initiative at the Summit. I believe that even if we succeed in resolving the SNF issue the need for such a NATO initiative remains.

Individually many of our nations have taken major steps to enhance cooperation with the Soviet Union. American leadership in this area has been particularly noticeable with such initiatives as regular summits and exchanges of visits by Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff. Collectively, as an alliance, we have not appeared to be so forthcoming. This is unfortunate as it undermines crucial public support for NATO.

We, in Canada, have been intrigued to learn through our regular process of consultation, that serious thought has been given within your Administration to putting forward a new "Open Skies" initiative. I believe a NATO Summit announcement calling on the East to begin discussions with NATO on an "Open Skies" agreement would be a most appropriate major gesture. "Open Skies" has always been seen as symbolizing both the West's values and our commitment to easing tensions. Properly presented, "Open Skies" would capture the public's imagination. I, therefore, would urge you to give serious consideration to pursuing such an initiative for the NATO Summit.

The President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

In addition to its public relations value, "Open Skies" would contribute substantively to increasing confidence. It would also provide a major part of the requirement for the verification of any future agreements on Conventional Forces and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. It could also be helpful in the verification of a START agreement. While the information gained from "Open Skies" would be more significant for the Allies who do not have the satellite-monitoring capability you have, I believe the implementation of "Open Skies" could also add to your ability to monitor activities in the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, the substantive significance of the initiative is what would give "Open Skies" its value as a means of publicly demonstrating our support for arms control.

Finally, I would note that there is a very real possibility that President Gorbachev might himself put forward such an initiative. If he were to do so it would be politically difficult to say no and the West would get no credit for agreeing. It would be seen as further evidence of the East taking the initiative.

Canada would be pleased to support you in whatever way you consider appropriate in promoting this idea or any other you may wish to put forward to our Allies in advance of the Summit and in elaborating a proposal. I look forward to discussing the idea with you on Thursday.

Yours sincerely,



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THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON 3125

May 3, 1989

MEETING WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2796-MR
gr 1/4/12

DATE: MAY 4, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 11:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT (~~THE~~ PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

I. PURPOSE

To further cement US-Canadian relations and to ensure Prime Minister Mulroney's positive contribution to the NATO Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Your meeting in Ottawa on February 10 started off the relationship on the right footing, and our bilateral agenda with Canada is as free of major problems as it has been in recent years.

According to Ambassador Derek Burney, who is very close to Mulroney, SNF and the NATO Summit should be the dominant theme of your meeting. As usual, however, economic issues and the environment will also be on Mulroney's mind and could distract from the strategic agenda unless you lead the conversation. Mulroney is here to accept an environmental award from the International Chamber of Commerce.

Mulroney wants to be helpful on the NATO Summit, and he is likely to respond well if you ask him for support on our approach to the SNF issue. It would be good to have public support from Canada recognizing the need for up to date short-range nuclear forces and, in particular, on the need to avoid negotiations with Moscow on these forces. Mulroney will probably urge you to give careful consideration to their suggestion, passed to us last week, that NATO members call at the Summit for East-West "open skies." This idea is now being reviewed intensively within the government for possible decision by you within the week.

Mulroney is probably feeling a bit defensive about the large military program cuts (-3.6% in real terms) which he has just approved as part of a difficult deficit reduction package. His April 26 letter (Tab E) to you explains the cuts, thanks you for previous US support on the nuclear-powered submarine program which he has just dropped, and projects future real defense spending increases. The letter implies that, rather than expecting a written response, Mulroney would plan to

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

discuss the letter informally with you. As you know, we had not been enthusiastic about the submarines in any case, but the cut in Canada's already-anemic defense spending is disappointing.

Regarding bilateral issues, Mulroney will have in mind primarily the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement and our pending legislation on acid rain. On the latter, our own legislative process on the Clean Air Act needs to be further along before we can reveal the details of our proposals or set a date for negotiations for a bilateral accord. As to the Free Trade Agreement, Mulroney may raise specific problems of implementation that are on his mind, such as softwood lumber, salmon, and ice cream/yogurt. This fits with his tendency to try to escalate to Presidential level problems which can be handled effectively by Ministers. I would suggest tactfully deflecting these issues toward Jim Baker or other members of the Cabinet.

On our own bilateral agenda, we have been asking the Canadians to begin negotiations on the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute. A word from you might help overcome their reluctance.

As to the environment, Mulroney is supportive of the idea of a conference of the type which you pledged during your campaign. He will be seeking your guidance as to whether you prefer a US-Canada-Mexico conference or one which extends further. He may also raise the Canadian proposal for a "Law of the Atmosphere" approach to deal with all atmospheric problems together. We favor a more limited framework convention on global warming.

On regional issues, the Canadians are actively engaged in Central America, and it would be worth enlisting Mulroney's support in pressing the Sandinistas for compliance. Canada is less of a player in the Middle East, but Mulroney may ask your views. The Canadians have been helpful in Geneva in our efforts to keep the World Health Organization from accepting the PLO as a member state. It would also be good to get Canadian endorsement (and public support) for elections on the West Bank and Gaza. Mulroney may also raise South Africa, an issue on which he feels substantial public opinion pressure in favor of tougher sanctions.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab C

IV. PRESS PLAN

Oval Office - Open Photo writing pool
Lunch - Official Photographers
Scrum - Open Press

V. SEQUENCE

The 11:30 meeting in the Oval Office will start with a brief photo opportunity. At 12:30, your private lunch with Prime Minister and Mrs. Mulroney will be on the Truman balcony, weather permitting. (Secretary Baker will host a separate lunch in the Roosevelt Room for other participants.) At approximately 1:30, you and Mulroney will have a press "scrum" at the Diplomatic Entrance before the Prime Minister's departure.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Mulroney Biography
Tab C Participants List
Tab D Memo to You from Secretary Baker
Tab E Letter from Mulroney

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2796-MR
JL 1/4/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

NATO SUMMIT & SNF

-- The Summit should not focus on SNF or the Comprehensive Concept. Instead, it should be a forward-looking event. We hope our intra-Alliance differences on SNF can be resolved beforehand.

-- However, we believe that SNF negotiations with Moscow under current circumstances would be a grave mistake.

-- We need to eliminate the Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces through the CFE negotiations. Only if there are concrete results in Vienna should we consider further reductions in our nuclear forces in Europe.

-- The Summit, however, is not just about SNF. It is about the future of Europe and of the Alliance.

-- We must convey the sense that NATO is not simply a security arrangement, but a dynamic community based on shared values.

-- The Summit declaration should be an appropriate vehicle to highlight the importance of these values as the means ultimately to overcome the division of Europe. Such a vision could also include references to:

- o The durability of the transatlantic partnership;
- o The opportunities and challenges of change in East-West relations;
- o Progress toward an emerging European political identity which offers a more creative basis for the sharing of risks, roles and responsibilities within the Alliance.

(IF RAISED)

-- I appreciate your sharing with us your idea for a NATO initiative on "open skies."

-- This idea is being analyzed right now on a priority basis.

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- I would like to express my appreciation for the public support you and Secretary Clark gave to our bipartisan initiative on Central America during the visit of President Arias to Canada.

-- The Sandinistas have pledged to make electoral reforms, but they have loaded the elections council to ensure Sandinista control and they approved a new media law which fails to enlarge press freedoms.

-- I hope you will continue to insist to the Sandinistas that electoral reform proposals should not be unilateral dictates and that the opposition should be given a fair chance to compete.

SOUTH AFRICA

-- The fluidity in South Africa's political situation offers reasons for hope and should be exploited.

-- We oppose economic sanctions because they mainly penalize black South Africans, and the main beneficiaries are white South African businessmen. Sanctions also weaken promising trends in South Africa, reducing chances of securing small but lasting gains now.

-- We should emphasize positive measures to strengthen the abilities of blacks to force the pace of change through their own economic and political empowerment.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- We have had good talks on the peace process with President Mubarak, Prime Minister Shamir and King Hussein. They have been pleased with our public statements and have offered support for our general approach.

-- PM Shamir's proposal to offer elections as a way to "launch a political negotiating process" could provide a basis upon which to move forward.

-- We have urged Israel to develop its elections concept further. We have made clear our view that elections must be part of a political process that leads to negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories.

-- We will continue working with Israel and the Palestinians to encourage steps that can reduce tension and create trust, and to develop ideas on elections. It is important that no one simply dismiss or reject the election concept out of hand.

ACID RAIN

-- Based on the commitment I made to you in February, my Administration is working on a legislative proposal for submission to the Congress by late May/early June.

-- We are not far enough along in our domestic process to give you details now, but we hope to be able to inform you confidentially before public presentation of our proposal.

-- We can begin talks on a possible bilateral acid rain agreement once the Congress has begun addressing this legislative proposal.

-- If everything proceeds on schedule, we believe that consultations on the accord issue could begin in the late summer.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA)

-- I'm delighted that so much progress has been made on FTA implementation.

-- We already have some dispute settlement cases before us, and we should make every effort to utilize the mechanisms provided by the Agreement to ensure their prompt resolution.

-- Let us strive to ensure that trade issues do not get blown out of proportion and let us use the FTA mechanisms to try to avoid unnecessary escalations to the political level.

-- (If the softwood lumber issue is raised:) I had understood that the softwood lumber issue was dealt with in the Free Trade Agreement, but if you think not, I'll ask Jim Baker to look into the issue.

-- (If the salmon or ice cream/yogurt cases are raised:) I will ask Jim Baker to talk it over with Carla Hills or Clayton Yeutter.

BEAUFORT SEA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

-- We understand from Secretary Clark that Canada is still studying our proposal to begin discussions toward a resolution of the Beaufort Sea dispute.

-- Both the U.S. and Canada would benefit economically from a resolution of this dispute.

-- We've both sold oil and gas leases there, but the ability of our companies to drill is hindered by the lack of a mutually agreed boundary.

-- (For use if Canada is not prepared for formal negotiations at this time:) Perhaps the Legal Advisers of the Departments of State and External Affairs could meet soon to

discuss the possible parameters of a settlement and a timeframe for negotiations.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

-- Congratulations on your award from the International Chamber of Commerce.

-- Ambassador Burney's comments to EPA Administrator Reilly have been helpful as we consider what shape to give my proposal for a major environmental conference.

-- As soon as we conclude a review of our options, we will be back in touch.

-- I would appreciate your help in making sure that the Hague Declaration and other initiatives do not create duplicative mechanisms or divert resources from work already underway under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in which the U.S. and Canada are both heavily involved.

-- (If asked:) I believe a "Law of the Atmosphere" approach is too broad; the more specific approach under the IPCC is already underway and is our best chance of getting results soon.

VALDEZ OIL SPILL (IF RAISED)

-- We will continue to keep your Coast Guard observer fully informed, including our plans for the repair of the S/S Valdez.

-- We will remain in touch as our expedited review of the spill proceeds, and be able to discuss the incident in detail on the basis of the report's findings.

-- The U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards, together with the U.S. merchant shipping organization, reached an understanding on West Coast tanker routes in January 1988. Those routes are a separate issue which are best first discussed among those three parties.

-- The Alaskan Natural Wildlife Refuge is a separate issue, since tanker transport from existing fields will continue regardless of future decisions on ANWR oil development. (As you know, I have said publicly that any new development would include proper environmental safeguards.)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	Re: Brian Mulroney [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 10/15/14

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91120-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-2796-MR (502.02)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/4/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(1), (b)(3)

GEORGE H.W. BUSH
502.02
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(Martin) Brian MULRONEY **CANADA**
(Phonetic: mullROOnee)

Prime Minister
(since September 1984)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

©

In November 1988 Brian Mulroney became the first Progressive Conservative (PC) prime minister in this century to win back-to-back parliamentary majorities. In a bitterly fought campaign that focused on the US-Canadian free trade agreement, he was able to convince enough Canadians that the agreement was in the best interests of the country and that it would not hurt social programs. Moreover, his key ministers appeared more credible than their opponents in the Liberal Party. Parliament met briefly in December to pass the enabling legislation for the free trade agreement, but Mulroney has waited until just this month to reconvene the body, in order to give himself and his new team of ministers time to plan a course for his new government. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Domestic Issues

(b)(1), (b)(3) Mulroney's limited mandate (the PC received only 43 percent of the popular vote) could restrict the government's maneuverability. We believe that he will nevertheless push major elements of the Conservative agenda, including tax reform and defense modernization. Mulroney is especially anxious to ensure that Canada's economic boom does not slow down. (Since the Tories came to power in 1984, foreign investment has increased, inflation and unemployment have dropped, and the decline of the Canadian dollar has been halted.) The Prime Minister hopes that interest rates will remain low enough to allow further progress on decreasing the federal budget deficit. He is working toward smooth implementation of the free trade agreement in the hope that it will result in a further boost for the economy, but the nationalism aroused by the election will encourage him to forcefully defend Canadian positions if disputes arise. He continues to press for US action to clean up acid rain and has made the environment a key issue (b)(1), (b)(3)
(b)(1), (b)(3)

Mulroney will continue to assert Canadian sovereignty over what Ottawa claims as its Arctic waters. He has repeatedly said that the Northwest Passage is under Canadian jurisdiction, and the government has begun the process of procuring a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines, in part to enforce Canadian prerogatives in the Arctic. Budgetary problems, however, make it unlikely that Ottawa will complete the submarine program. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Foreign Policy Views

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3) He has been an ally of this country on most international issues. Ottawa continues to

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(cont.)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0918-MR
SCS 9/4/13

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Secretary Baker
Governor Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates
Adrian Basora (NSC)
Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles
Assistant Secretary Rozanne L. Ridgeway

Canada

Prime Minister Mulroney
Joseph Clark
 Secretary of State for External Affairs
Stanley Hartt
 Chief of Staff
Ambassador Derek Burney
Don Campbell
 Associate Deputy Minister for U.S. Affairs

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 28, 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, May 4

I. SETTING

- Our relations with Canada are healthy and non-controversial. A good friend of the U.S., Prime Minister Mulroney has a new five-year mandate, a comfortable majority and a disoriented opposition.

- Your February 10 summit in Ottawa set a positive tone and pragmatic agenda for U.S.-Canada relations. This informal working meeting, during Mulroney's private visit, underscores the priority of the relationship.

- Our agenda is going forward. On the bilateral front, we are positioned to move the acid rain issue to resolution. Multilaterally, we are working to channel Canada's desire for a role in world affairs in directions supportive of U.S. policies.

- But, there may be some rough waters ahead. Mulroney's top priority at home is a tough deficit reduction program. It will be highly contentious in Canada and could spill over on U.S. interests.

  -- If the political pain becomes too intense, Mulroney could come under pressure to delay compliance with key FTA provisions.

  -- He might also be tempted to look for cost-free domestic points by differing publicly with the U.S. on international and regional issues.

- Environmental issues, dominated by acid rain but heightened by climate change and the Valdez oil spill, top most Canadians' list of concerns. Given the chance, Mulroney will try to influence your Clean Air Act proposal and U.S. policy on oil and gas development.

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2010-2796-MR
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II. OBJECTIVES

- The purpose of this meeting is to strengthen the positive dialogue you initiated in Ottawa, particularly on Alliance, regional and global issues.

  -- We want Canada on board as we start the run up to the NATO and Paris summits.

  -- And we want Mulroney's cooperation in Central America. In particular, at this vital time in our relations with Nicaragua, democratic nations must unite in linking aid to the Sandinistas to fulfillment of their pledges for democratization and electoral reform.

- On the bilateral agenda, we want to focus on a few important problems that can be moved forward. That means deflecting Mulroney's tactic of elevating minor issues to the highest levels.

- Acid rain again requires deft handling. We want to hold the initiative you seized in Ottawa, without giving Canada access to our politically sensitive deliberations on domestic legislation.

  -- We should buttress Mulroney's confidence in our commitment to an effective domestic acid rain program and to a bilateral agreement with Canada.

- We also want to move Canada toward talks on the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute. A resolution is necessary before oil and gas drilling can start.

III. STRATEGY

- Concentrate on the international agenda, filling Mulroney in on U.S. thinking and stressing areas where Canada's cooperation can be most useful.

- Pre-empt the acid rain issue, reassuring Mulroney we are moving ahead along lines Canada will like.

  -- We will brief Ottawa on our draft legislation before it goes to Congress.

  -- And we are prepared to begin preliminary talks on a bilateral accord once our legislative package is before Congress.

- Urge Mulroney to agree to talks on the Beaufort Sea boundary.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Letter	Prime Minister Mulroney to President Bush (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [1]

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~ 3125

May 2, 1989

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2796-MR
BR 1/4/12

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA AAB

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, May 4, 1989

Derek Burney's prebrief to you for the visit was useful in setting the stage. On the one hand, he said that SNF and the NATO Summit should be the dominant theme. On the other hand, he spent much of the time talking about acid rain, trade issues, and a conference on the environment.

The President's strategy ought to be to deflect Mulroney's tendency to dwell on lesser bilateral issues. The big ones have been resolved, with the exception of acid rain which is well on the way to solution but is not ripe just now for further discussion with the Canadians.

Your memo to the President and its attachments are at Tab I.
AK DM EM RH
Arnie Kanter, David Miller, Eric Melby, Richard Haass, Ginny
VL DP
Lampley and David Pacelli concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Mulroney Biography
Tab C Participants List
Tab D Memo to You from Secretary Baker
Tab E Letter from Mulroney

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3345

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

May 6, 1989

2/3

MEETING WITH MAYOR OF PARIS JACQUES CHIRAC

DATE: May 8, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:30-2:50 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To continue your long-standing relationship with Chirac and to encourage his continuing support on Alliance issues.

II. BACKGROUND

After his defeat in the French Presidential elections last May, Chirac kept a low political profile for several months. He has recently re-emerged, and this trip to the US is part of his attempt to restore an image that had suffered significant damage. He will also be seeing former President Reagan, Secretary Cheney, Mayor Koch, Henry Kissinger and Gregory Peck.

Chirac's total sweep of Paris' 20 electoral districts in the March mayoral elections boosted him, and his visit with you may help refurbish his international stature. However, a divided Right and Center-Right in France, and the emergence of younger challengers to the Giscard-Barre-Chirac generation make his prospects problematic. Nevertheless, Chirac and his neo-Gaullist party remain an important influence on French opinion and he retains ties with Kohl and other German leaders.

Chirac will have East-West and strategic issues -- and of course the German problem -- on his mind, having just given talks on this and on "Europe 1992" at the Mid-Atlantic Council and at the Council on Foreign Relations, respectively. I would suggest that you concentrate largely on these issues, and especially on SNF and the NATO Summit. You might also wish to congratulate him on his impressive re-election as Mayor of Paris and as his views about political prospects in France.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2010-2796-MR
BR 1/4/12

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Chirac wrote to you recently asking that you permit your name to be associated with an "American Day" in Paris on July 8 as part of the commemoration of the Bicentennial of the French Revolution. This would be ceremonial, and would not involve claims on your time or that of your family. I recommend that you accept.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab C

IV. PRESS PLAN

Oval Office - Open Photo writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

The meeting in the Oval Office will start with a brief photo opportunity.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C List of Participants
Tab D Letter from Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH PARIS MAYOR CHIRAC

FRENCH POLITICS

-- Congratulations on your resounding re-election as Mayor of Paris.

-- How do you see political trends and public opinion developing in France over the next several months?

NATO SUMMIT AND SNF

-- The Summit should not focus on SNF or the Comprehensive Concept. Instead, it should be a forward-looking event. We hope our intra-Alliance differences on SNF can be resolved beforehand.

-- However, we believe that SNF negotiations with Moscow under current circumstances would be a grave mistake.

-- We need to eliminate the Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces through the CFE negotiations. Only if there are concrete results in Vienna should we consider further reductions in our nuclear forces in Europe.

-- The Summit, however, is not just about SNF. It is about the future of Europe and of the Alliance.

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2010-2796-MR
BR 1/4/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- We must convey the sense that NATO is not simply a security arrangement, but a dynamic community based on shared values.

-- The Summit declaration should be an appropriate vehicle to highlight the importance of these values as the means ultimately to overcome the division of Europe. Such a vision could also include references to:

  - o The durability of the transatlantic partnership;
  - o The opportunities and challenges of change in East-West relations;
  - o Progress toward an emerging European political identity which offers a more creative basis for the sharing of risks, roles and responsibilities within the Alliance.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [1]

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Governor Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Robert Blackwill (NSC)
William Bodde, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

France

Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris
Pierre Lellouche, Foreign Affairs Adviser to Chirac
Didier Quentin, International Relations Director for the City of Paris

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 128672
RHC
French

No. 1974

The Mayor of Paris

Paris, February 16, 1989

Mr. President, [Handwritten] Dear Friend,

In the year of 1989, when France is celebrating the Bicentennial of the Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, as Mayor of Paris I considered it indispensable to give an American tone to the commemorative ceremonies that will be held in the capital.

Indeed, there are too many bonds between the Independence of the United States and the French Revolution for us not to hold a brilliant celebration of the friendship that unites the American and French people on the occasion of the Bicentennial.

That is why I wanted Saturday, July 8, 1989, in Paris to be dedicated to the United States and to pay it special homage.

In order to give the greatest possible luster and prestige to this "American Day" during the Bicentennial, I hope, Mr. President, that it might be placed under your illustrious patronage.

His Excellency
George Bush,
President of the United States of America.

Allow me to inform you of the main events that will take place during that day.

In the morning, the new garden in the Place des Etats-Unis will be inaugurated, where statues of Washington and Lafayette will be erected.

Next, throughout the entire day, there will be a long American parade, composed of brass bands from the 50 States of the Union and the District of Columbia, along the Seine from the Hôtel de Ville to the Palais de Chaillot.

In the evening, the American Waterways Wind Orchestra directed by Mr. Robert Boudreau will give a concert on the Seine, in front of the Hôtel de Ville, where afterward I will give a large dinner in honor of the American Community in Paris and the American personages present on this occasion.

I should be very grateful if you would give kindly consideration to this proposal of patronage, and the people of Paris and I would be deeply honored if your reply is favorable.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high consideration [Handwritten] and my very loyal and cordial friendship.

[Signature]

Jacques Chirac

1974

Le Maire de Paris

Paris, le 16 février 1989

8906262
'89 MAR-24 10:08 AM

Monsieur le Président, Chers Amis,

En cette année 1989, à l'heure où la France fête le Bicentenaire de la Révolution et de la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, il m'est apparu indispensable, en tant que Maire de Paris, de donner une tonalité américaine aux cérémonies de commémoration qui se dérouleront dans la capitale.

Il existe en effet trop de liens entre l'Indépendance américaine et la Révolution Française pour ne pas célébrer avec éclat, à l'occasion du Bicentenaire, l'amitié qui unit les peuples américain et français.

C'est pourquoi j'ai voulu que la journée du samedi 8 juillet 1989, à Paris, soit consacrée aux Etats-Unis et leur rende un hommage tout particulier.

Pour donner le plus grand éclat et le plus grand prestige à cette "journée américaine" du Bicentenaire, je souhaiterais, Monsieur le Président, qu'elle puisse être placée sous votre haut patronage.

Je me permets de vous indiquer les principales manifestations qui auront lieu au cours de cette journée.

Dès le matin sera inauguré le nouveau jardin de la place des Etats-Unis, où sont érigées les statues de WASHINGTON et de LA FAYETTE.

Ensuite, durant toute la journée, une grande parade américaine, composée de fanfares venant des cinquante Etats de l'Union et du District de Columbia, défilera le long de la Seine, de l'Hôtel de Ville au Palais de Chaillot.

.../...

Le soir, l'"American Waterways Wind Orchestra", que dirige Monsieur Robert BOUDREAU, donnera un concert sur la Seine, face à l'Hôtel de Ville, où j'offrirai ensuite un grand dîner en l'honneur de la Communauté américaine de Paris et des personnalités américaines présentes à cette occasion.

Je vous serais donc très reconnaissant de bien vouloir considérer avec bienveillance cette proposition de patronage, à laquelle le peuple de Paris et moi-même serions extrêmement honorés que vous apportiez une réponse favorable.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à l'expression de ma haute considération et de mon très fidèle et cordial amitié.

Jacques CHIRAC

Monsieur George BUSH
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3345

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION May 4, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RDB

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA AAB

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Paris Mayor Chirac

Chirac is here primarily to maintain contact and as part of his effort to refurbish his political image after losing the presidential elections last May. He will have seen Henry Kissinger, and addressed the Council on Foreign Relations and the Mid-Atlantic Council on strategic issues and on US-European relations. Chirac remains a major political figure on the French Right and retains connections with Kohl and other West German leaders. It would thus be useful to discuss the SNF problem and the NATO Summit with him and see if he is inclined to be helpful.

You and Bob Blackwill will be having supper with Chirac and Pierre Lelouche the evening before his meeting with the President. This should permit you to explore the SNF issue in advance and to see what else may be on Chirac's mind.

Chirac will probably also follow up on his letter to the President asking him to be the honorary patron of an "American Day" in Paris on July 8 (attached at Tab D). Our Embassy says that the President's association with the event would be ceremonial only and would not involve the presence of the President or any member of his family. On this basis, the State Department has recommended that he accept the honorary patronship.

In view of the short time allotted and the primary focus on strategic issues, other than courtesy points on French politics, we have provided talking points only on the SNF-NATO Summit issues.

Arnie Kanter AK concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C List of Participants
Tab D Letter from Chirac

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2010-2796-MR
BR 1/4/12

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Declassify on: OADR

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CHRON FILE 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

3401

Thanks much

May 8, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/LINTON BROOKS

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: Complete Text of Draft NATO Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament: Latest Version

As you requested, attached at Tab I is a copy of the latest version of the full Comprehensive Concept as reported (in fragments) from USNATO. The SNF paragraphs are 28-31 (29 and 30 are bracketed) and 46-49 (para 49 is currently just a placeholder, US and Netherlands have offered draft language for this paragraph; the FRG has not). As a convenience, we have attached, at Tab II, a copy of the language for paras 29, 30, and 49 that we passed to the FRG on April 18 and (in the case of para 49) tabled at NATO on April 26.

Don Mahley concurs.

Attachments

Tab I - Current draft of Comprehensive Concept
Tab II - US-proposed language for disputed paras on SNF

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Declassify on: OADR

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2010-2796-MR
1/4/12

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5/18/89

TEXT FOR COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

(Sub-strategic Forces') level and characteristics (diversity, survivability, penetration capability, accuracy, responsiveness and flexibility in use) must be such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges. Taking into account the threat -- both conventional and nuclear -- with which the Alliance is faces. Force levels also depend on the flexibility and capability of the systems involved and hence, as agreed by the Alliance in 1988. The latter will be kept up to date. In this context, particular attention is being given by the Allies to the longstanding requirement for sub-strategic systems of relatively longer range -- including air-launched and surface-to-surface missile systems.

"Modernization of NATO's surface-to-surface missiles could lead to a substantial reduction in nuclear artillery charges. Such a shift in emphasis toward longer range SNF would be wise both from a military and a political point of view. It is a clear example how greater security can be achieved at a lower level of arms.

Then the US would agree to the addition of the following language:

"--51. As a step toward implementing the Alliance's approach to further reducing the level of nuclear forces in Europe, we call upon the Soviet Union to eliminate unilaterally its current, massive advantage over NATO in ground-based nuclear missile systems deployed in Europe. NATO has engaged in a substantial program of unilateral reductions in its stockpile of nuclear weapons, reducing its stockpile by over one-third to its lowest level in more than 20 years. A further reduction of up to one-third of NATO's current stockpile -- including cutting in half the number of the shortest range systems -- could occur in the context of restructuring and updating NATO's nuclear forces with systems of longer range while maintaining our nuclear stockpile at the lowest level necessary for deterrence. We recognize that nuclear weapons kept up to date with characteristics to perform their deterrent role credibly across the required spectrum of ranges, and taking into account the conventional and nuclear threat, will continue for the foreseeable future to make a unique and essential contribution to that deterrence. The Alliance therefore cannot accept calls for a negotiated "third zero" elimination of such systems. Moreover, our priority remains to rectify the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. If concrete results toward eliminating offensive capabilities are achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further reductions in the level of nuclear forces."

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Cable	Re: Arms Control "Objectives" (16 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - May 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91120-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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Text for Comprehensive Concept Draft

IF THE FRG WOULD AGREE TO INCLUSION OF THE FOLLOWING IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT:

> "... [sub-strategic forces'] level and characteristics (diversity, survivability, penetration capability, accuracy, responsiveness and flexibility in use) must be such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat -- both conventional and nuclear -- with which the Alliance is faced. Force levels also depend on the flexibility and capability of the systems involved and hence, as agreed by the Alliance in 1988, the latter will be kept up to date. In this context, particular attention is being given by the Allies to the longstanding requirement for sub-strategic systems of relatively longer range -- including air-launched and surface-to-surface missile systems. (III/~~30~~ 29)
>
> "Modernization of NATO's surface-to-surface missiles could lead to a substantial reduction in nuclear artillery charges. Such a shift in emphasis toward longer-range SNF would be wise both from a military and a political point of view. It is a clear example how greater security can be achieved at a lower level of arms. (III/~~31~~ 30)

THEN THE US WOULD AGREE TO THE ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:

> "—~~52~~ 49. As a step toward implementing the Alliance's approach to further reducing the level of nuclear forces in Europe, we call upon the Soviet Union to eliminate unilaterally its current, massive advantage over NATO in ground-based nuclear missile systems deployed in Europe. NATO has engaged in a substantial program of unilateral reductions in its stockpile of nuclear weapons, reducing its stockpile by over one-third to its lowest level in more than twenty years. A further reduction of up to one-third of NATO's current stockpile -- including cutting in half the number of the shortest range systems -- could occur in the context of restructuring and updating NATO's nuclear forces with systems of longer range. While maintaining our nuclear stockpile at the lowest level necessary for deterrence, we recognize that nuclear weapons, kept up to date with characteristics to perform their deterrent role credibly across the required spectrum of ranges, and taking into account the conventional and nuclear threat, will continue for the foreseeable future to make a unique and essential contribution to that deterrence. The Alliance therefore cannot accept calls for a negotiated "third zero" elimination of such systems. Moreover, our priority remains to rectify the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. If concrete results toward eliminating offensive capabilities are achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further reductions in the level of nuclear forces."

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National Security Council
The White House

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Dep Exec	1	MD	A
Philip Hughes	2	APH	
Bob Gates	3	✓	
Brent Scowcroft	4		
Philip Hughes		APNSA Has Seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	GM	N
NSC Secretariat	6		R

89 MAY 8 P12:40

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS * If you requested current draft or requested SIPE [illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 3383

May 8, 1989

2.

MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER RUUD LUBBERS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2796-MR
BL 1/4/12

DATE: May 9, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

10 a.m. - 5/9/89 MEETING WITH
DUTCH PRIME MINISTER
RUUD LUBBERS (OVAL)

lations with the Netherlands and exchange views on NATO policies prior to the NATO Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers is in Washington despite the May 2 fall of his Christian Democratic Appeal-Liberal Party coalition over funding for environmental programs. Although a lame duck, Lubbers will remain as Prime Minister, at least through the September elections. His party has led all five coalition governments since 1977, and Lubbers may yet retain the Prime Ministership -- which he first won in 1982.

Although Lubbers views his meeting with you as an opportunity to discuss a broad range of foreign policy and environmental issues, he knows that SNF will dominate the agenda. The Dutch have tried to hammer out an SNF compromise that would pave the way for modernization, challenge the Soviets to make unilateral cuts in their SNF forces, and leave the door open for negotiations pending Soviet SNF reductions and progress in the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations. The Dutch were taken aback both by the Kohl Government's current public SNF position, and by the manner it was announced within the Alliance. Lubbers and Foreign Minister Van Den Broek -- who has Constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs -- visited London April 29 and Bonn May 3. In response to Kohl's backsliding and apparent refusal to rule out the complete elimination of SNF, Van Den Broek publicly insisted that even "speculation" about a third zero would undermine NATO's credibility. Lubbers will be interested in hearing your views on SNF, including whether you support the Dutch efforts to find a compromise.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3383

May 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON BL

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting With Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, Tuesday, May 9, 1989, 10:00 - 10:30 a.m.

Attached at Tab I is the briefing package for the President's meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers.

Don Mahley, Eric Melby, Richard Haass and Dave Pacelli concur. DAP

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I **Memorandum** to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Lubbers Biography

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By DJ NARA, Date 5/2/11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3383

May 5, 1989

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Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments:

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DECLASSIFY: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By [illegible] NARA, Date 5/2/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WASHINGTON 3383

MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER RUUD LUBBERS

DATE: May 9, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm our close relations with the Netherlands and exchange views on NATO policies prior to the NATO Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers is in Washington despite the May 2 fall of his Christian Democratic Appeal-Liberal Party coalition over funding for environmental programs. Although a lame duck, Lubbers will remain as Prime Minister, at least through the September elections. His party has led all five coalition governments since 1977, and Lubbers may yet retain the Prime Ministership -- which he first won in 1982.

Even though the Netherlands has been one of the best and most reliable of U.S. allies, no American President has ever visited The Hague. We now believe that a visit to this country would be an excellent idea following the Paris Economic Summit. With your approval, we hope to have informed the Dutch of these plans shortly before Lubbers' arrival. Your meeting with Lubbers could be a good opportunity for a public announcement of the Dutch invitation and your acceptance.

Although Lubbers views his meeting with you as an opportunity to discuss a broad range of foreign policy and environmental issues, he knows that SNF will dominate the agenda. The Dutch have tried to hammer out an SNF compromise that would pave the way for modernization, challenge the Soviets to make unilateral cuts in their SNF forces, and leave the door open for negotiations pending Soviet SNF reductions and progress in the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations. The Dutch were taken aback both by the Kohl Government's current public SNF position, and by the manner it was announced within the Alliance. Lubbers and Foreign Minister Van Den Broek -- who has

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2010-2796-MR
BJ 1/4/12

CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs -- visited London April 29 and Bonn May 3. In response to Kohl's backsliding and apparent refusal to rule out the complete elimination of SNF, Van Den Broek publicly insisted that even "speculation" about a third zero would undermine NATO's credibility. Lubbers will be interested in hearing your views on SNF, including whether you support the Dutch efforts to find a compromise.

On East-West relations, Lubbers has shared our approach of testing Gorbachev while maintaining our defense posture. While commending Gorbachev's unilateral cuts, Lubbers has publicly warned that the Warsaw Pact still poses a threat to NATO because of continued conventional disparities and past Soviet practices of military intervention. The Dutch government has been among the most vocal in highlighting human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and East Europe. On Soviet emigration, the Dutch -- who process Soviet applicants claiming a desire to emigrate to Israel -- are concerned about Israeli attempts to force Soviet Jews to go directly to Israel, rather than maintain their refugee status with freedom to enter the United States.

On the trans-Atlantic relationship, Lubbers is a staunch supporter of the Western European Union, but has reaffirmed that European efforts should be a complement to and not a substitute for NATO. In 1987 the Dutch played a key role in crafting the WEU's Security Platform that reaffirmed long-standing NATO policy -- including the need to maintain nuclear weapons in Europe. The Dutch view the 1992 Single European Act in a similar fashion as WEU: fostering European unity but not at the expense of the United States.

On regional issues, the Dutch may raise the Middle East, where they have cooled to the idea of an international conference, and now believe that our step by step approach is the only realistic option. Lubbers may ask for a read-out of your meetings with President Mubarak, Prime Minister Shamir and King Hussein, as well as for a sense of how we plan to follow up. On Central America, Lubbers has succeeded in ratcheting down Dutch public opposition to U.S. policies, has cut back aid programs to the Sandinistas, and has praised your emphasis on a diplomatic solution.

On environmental issues, the Dutch hosted an Environmental Summit March 11. Defensive about the last-minute invitation to the United States, Lubbers wrote to you March 6 and 20, forwarding the Hague Declaration on Global Warming. You responded, sharing Lubbers' concerns but expressing reservations about the creation of any new international

monitoring authorities.

In addition to his meeting with you, Prime Minister Lubbers will meet with EPA Administrator Reilly, accept an honorary degree from Georgetown University and meet with prominent members of the Dutch-American community.

III. Participants

U.S.

The President
Vice President
Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft
Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Robert Blackwill, NSC
Deputy Assistant Secretary Wilkinson

The Netherlands

Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
Foreign Minister Hans Van Den Broek
Henry Wijnaendts, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Richard Fein

IV. PRESS PLAN

Oval Office - Open Photo, Writing Pool

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Photo Op in Oval Office followed by meeting.

Attachments

Tab A Points to Be Made
Tab B Lubbers Biography

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POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RUUD LUBBERS

-- Welcome to Washington. It is always a pleasure to meet with the head of a country which helped finance our own revolution, and with which we have had the longest period of uninterrupted diplomatic relations.

-- (Pending your approval) I am delighted to accept the invitation to visit your country in July. I will be honored to be the first American President to visit the Hague.

NATO SUMMIT AND SNF

-- I know that you share our concerns about the SNF problem. We agree that the Summit should not focus on SNF or the Comprehensive Concept. It should be a forward looking event. We want to resolve intra-alliance differences over SNF beforehand.

-- I've followed your efforts to help resolve the SNF issue. I want to express my gratitude to your government. I also want to thank you for your statements reaffirming the need to maintain an up-to-date SNF force in Europe to maintain the credibility of our defenses.

3

-- We believe that SNF negotiations with Moscow under current circumstances would be a grave mistake.

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-- We need to eliminate the Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces through the CFE negotiations. Only if there are concrete results in Vienna should we consider further reductions in our nuclear forces in Europe.

-- As I said, the Summit is not just about SNF. It is about the future of Europe and of the Alliance. We must convey the sense that NATO is not simply a security arrangement, but a dynamic community based on shared values.

-- The Summit declaration should be an appropriate vehicle to highlight the importance of these values as the means ultimately to overcome the division of Europe.

Eastern Europe

-- We see hope in overcoming this division. The changes in Poland and Hungary are remarkable.

-- We are committed to an active policy in Eastern Europe. This July, I will be travelling to Poland and Hungary to demonstrate that the United States has a fundamental interest in encouraging the reform efforts underway in these two countries.

-- I know from your own concerns that there is much that needs to be done throughout the region -- particularly in Czechoslovakia and Romania.

-- I want to work with you and with the other members of the European Community in actively engaging in Eastern Europe. We have to make it clear to the other governments in Eastern Europe what the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Soviets are learning: economic reform can only succeed with political reform.

Environmental Issues

-- Thank you for your letters outlining your concerns on the state of the environment. I share them.

-- As I wrote to you, the environment and in particular the issue of climate change is a global concern. I expect it will be a key topic at the Paris Economic Summit.

-- The need for greater international cooperation will not be served by duplicative mechanisms that divert resources from work already underway under such organizations as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

-- I'm please to hear that you will find time during your brief stay in Washington to meet with our Environmental Protection Agency Head William Reilly. We're exploring ideas on how to advance environmental issues across a broad international front, and I know he will benefit immensely from his meeting with you.

Middle East Peace Process (If Raised)

-- We have had good talks with President Mubarak, Prime Minister Shamir and King Hussein. They have been pleased with our public statements

and have offered support for our overall approach.

-- I know that the European Community advocates an international conference. At some point, an international conference that promotes direct negotiations might be appropriate, but we are not yet there.

-- Prime Minister Shamir's proposal to offer elections as a way to "launch a political negotiating process" is a good idea that could provide a basis for forward movement. It should be explored.

-- We have made it clear to Israel that elections must be part of a political process leading to negotiations on interim arrangements and final status of the occupied territories.

Central America (If Raised)

-- We have taken a fresh look at our Central American policies and have decided to give diplomacy a chance.

-- The Sandinistas have pledged to make electoral reforms, but they have loaded the elections council to ensure their control and they have passed a new media law which fails to enlarge press freedoms.

-- We must not let the Sandinistas make a mockery of attempts by the other countries in the region to advance basic political reforms.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RUUD LUBBERS

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2010-2796-MR
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Biography to be provided

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[redacted]

National Security Council
The White House

[redacted]

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Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1		
NSC Secretariat			
Blackwell	2		

Pls change last para only - where we make reference to Europe trip "upcoming" — & send to Pres.

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N =

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

This memo had been deleted from our inventory, therefore I had to retype it from "scratch".

M. Blair

CHRON FILE

National Security Council
The White House

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NSC Secretariat	6		update
Blackwill	7		~~E~~ FFA

89 MAY 12 P 8:50

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

C

Good memo, but it needs at least a few words on how to preempt Gerasher.

CHRON FILE

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MC 9:50 LOG # 3095

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Philip Hughes			
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NSC Secretariat			

89 MAY 19 P12:02

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cc: VP ✓ Sununu ✓ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

CHRON FILE

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3095

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Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
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NSC Secretariat	3		OBE/OWR

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON 3095

August 7, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0701-MR
EO 5H110

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Dealing with the Germans

Managing our relations with Germany is likely to be the most serious geopolitical challenge our country faces over the next decade, unless we have to cope with a disintegrating Soviet Union. Following are some thoughts and recommendations on dealing with the Federal Republic through the 1990 elections and beyond. They offer ways of managing the relationship but hold out no guarantees of success.

Bonn's public repudiation of the Alliance position on SNF was unprecedented. It threatens the very basis of extended nuclear deterrence -- on which the security of NATO, and Europe, rests -- and may also signal stronger pressure from the FRG toward the denuclearization of Europe.

The Federal Republic is not alone in experiencing anti-nuclear sentiment and enthusiasm for Gorbachev. And in some ways Kohl's recent behavior suggests only that the FRG is beginning to assert itself like other European countries. But Germany is not just any other country. Germany's geopolitical situation as a divided nation in the middle of Europe, coupled with its growing economic and political power, means that any basic change in its security orientation would disrupt the post-war security order in Europe.

Germans are beginning to overcome the legacy of their history, but they cannot escape the facts of geography and national division. For most Germans, the reunification of Germany is seen as a heartfelt but currently unattainable goal; they want instead to overcome the consequences of national division by developing ever closer inter-German ties. Yet the "German Question" remains open: as FRG President von Weizsaecker has said, "A question does not cease to exist merely because no one has an answer for it." A recent intelligence report cites Genscher saying privately that the primary tenet of FRG policy toward the East must be German reunification.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

These basic elements of German national existence help explain the contradictions in West German attitudes: growing self-confidence but lingering insecurities, strong attachments to its Western allies but unfulfilled aims to play a stronger role in the East, (as it did for generations before 1945) and a strong nuclear aversion along with feelings of being "singularly" exposed to Soviet power. There is also wishful thinking in Bonn about the pace of change in the USSR.

As a result, the domestic security consensus in the FRG has become unsettled. The center in German politics is less stable, while the far left and far right are gaining strength. Genscher has seized the initiative to articulate a foreign policy orientation that captures popular sentiments in favor of nuclear disarmament, better relations with the East, and stronger defense of German interests in NATO, the EC, and the global economy. But the coalition as a whole is rudderless, unable to project coherent leadership before an uneasy electorate.

U.S. policy must come to grips with a changing Germany. Our approach over the past few years has been to help Chancellor Kohl find his way out of difficult domestic issues like Allied status rights and SNF modernization. While we would not want to do anything to undermine the Chancellor, particularly in light of the anti-NATO bent of the opposition Social Democrats, we should not pursue a strategy that allows him to threaten the security of the U.S., the Alliance, and the Federal Republic itself. We must remain firm on the essentials: above all the need for credible and effective nuclear deterrence.

Our objectives over the next few years should be:

-- to arrest the slide in Bonn's position on tough but vital NATO security issues like SNF;

-- to preempt Genscher by shifting the focus of debate to overcoming the division of Europe (and Germany), ceaselessly making our case for nuclear deterrence while pushing harder for progress in conventional arms control, and laying out a coherent U.S. vision for the future of the continent; and

-- to encourage trends that will further cement Bonn's Western ties -- including EC integration, intra-European security cooperation, and Franco-German defense cooperation.

U.S. policy must also reckon with the prospect of a Social Democratic (SPD) victory in 1990 or, before that, the possibility that Kohl might be dropped by his own Christian Democratic Union (CDU). ~~after the June local and European Parliament elections. This will be Kohl's New Hampshire primary, and heavy CDU losses could lead to his~~ replacement ~~as Chancellor~~ by Lothar Spaeth, currently Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg.

-- An SPD-led government, particularly one in coalition with the Greens, would pose even sharper challenges to Alliance cohesion, particularly on nuclear disarmament. You saw in your recent meeting with SPD Chairman Vogel how far to the left his party has moved.

-- Kohl's replacement by Spaeth -- which remains less than a 50/50 proposition at this point -- would mean that we would have to deal with a more forceful defender of German interests, but also a figure more likely to take decisive action within his own coalition and before his own people. And Spaeth would probably prove better able than Kohl to carry the CDU to victory in 1990.

The other key element of this approach toward Germany -- preempting Genscher -- serves broader purposes. The immediate challenge for U.S. leadership in Europe is not Gorbachev's "common European home" but the growing attraction of "Genscherism," a vision strong on disarmament and detente, but devoid of a security dimension. ~~Your upcoming trip to Europe, along with the speeches you will make before you go, offer an opportunity to project a~~ comprehensive and balanced vision around which Germany, and Europe, can rally. Even so, and despite our best efforts, we are likely in for a rough period in U.S.-German relations.

In your public statements here, [redacted] as well as throughout ~~the~~ your two recent trip to Europe, you outlined a

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

3095
RE-DO

May 18, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: Revised Memorandum for the President on Dealing with the Germans

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President laying out some thoughts and recommendations on dealing with the Federal Republic over the next year and beyond. The memorandum has been revised to incorporate some concrete ideas on how to preempt Genscher. Given our difficulties with Bonn over SNF and Kohl's domestic difficulties, we believe it important to give fresh thought to our objectives and strategies in the bilateral relationship.

Linton Brooks LB concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2796-MR
BI 1/4/12

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~ 3095

May 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on Dealing with the Germans

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President laying out some thoughts and recommendations on dealing with the Federal Republic over the next year and beyond. Given our difficulties with Bonn over SNF and Kohl's domestic difficulties, we believe it important to give fresh thought to our objectives and strategies in the bilateral relationship.

Linton Brooks concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0701-MR
EDL 514110

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

3095

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2006-0701-MR
EO1 514110

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Dealing with the Germans

Managing our relations with Germany is likely to be the most serious geopolitical challenge our country faces over the next decade, unless we have to cope with a disintegrating Soviet Union. Following are some thoughts and recommendations on dealing with the Federal Republic through the 1990 elections and beyond. They offer ways of managing the relationship but hold out no guarantees of success.

Bonn's public repudiation of the Alliance position on SNF was unprecedented. It threatens the very basis of extended nuclear deterrence -- on which the security of NATO, and Europe, rests -- and may also signal stronger pressure from the FRG toward the denuclearization of Europe.

The Federal Republic is not alone in experiencing anti-nuclear sentiment and enthusiasm for Gorbachev. And in some ways Kohl's recent behavior suggests only that the FRG is beginning to assert itself like other European countries. But Germany is not just any other country. Germany's geopolitical situation as a divided nation in the middle of Europe, coupled with its growing economic and political power, means that any basic change in its security orientation would disrupt the post-war security order in Europe.

Germans are beginning to overcome the legacy of their history, but they cannot escape the facts of geography and national division. For most Germans, the reunification of Germany is seen as a heartfelt but currently unattainable goal; they want instead to overcome the consequences of national division by developing ever closer inter-German ties. Yet the "German Question" remains open: as FRG President von Weizsaecker has said, "A question does not cease to exist merely because no one has an answer for it." A recent intelligence report cites Genscher saying privately that the primary tenet of FRG policy toward the East must be German reunification.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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Our objectives over the next few years should be:

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