

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number: 91120
Folder ID Number: 91120-003

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for the President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Talking Points	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Recommended Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher (1 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	S
01e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Recommended Telephone Call [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S
01f. Talking Points	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for Your Meetings with FRG Officials on SNF, Monday April 24 (1 pp.)	4/22/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Text	Re: Text for Comprehensive Concept Draft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Text	Re: Text of FRG Coalition Position on SNF (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1013

OA/ID Number: 91120-003

Date Closed: 3/9/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02d. Talking Points	Re: Opening Points for the Secretary to Make to FM Genscher on FRG SNF Position (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02e. Note	Re: Speaking Note SNF Modernisation/NATO Summit (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02f. Report	Re: References in Current Comprehensive Concept Draft Supportive of SNF Modernization (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02g. Report	Re: Key Excerpts from April 20 NPG Communique (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: SNF Developments: Chancellor Kohl's Statement to the Bundestag and Emerging Allied Reactions to the US-FRG Dispute (2 pp.)	4/27/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [2]

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Date Closed: 3/9/2009

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8902941
RECEIVED: 21 APR 89 16

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 21 APR 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: RECOMENDED PRES TELEPHONE CALL TO PM THATCHER 22 APR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 25 APR 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
KANTER
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cep NARA, Date 3/1/08

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSREB CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 8902941

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
001
002

Z 89042120 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
Z 89042409 OBE PER SCOWCROFT
X 89042810 NOTED BY PRES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 3/9/00

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2941

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

89 APR 28 16:18

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

NSC/S

Pres made call on
22 Apr 89

4/28
AC

This was
forwarded to
Pres.

PROOFED BY: _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

BY PASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG #

SYSTEM

DOCLOG

PRS

NSC INF

AO

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

~~Robertto~~ *Duffy*

5

Robertto

Philip Hughes

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Philip Hughes

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

1

N/R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain H = No Further Action

CC: VP Summary Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Pres made phone call

4/22/89

Close out.

NBP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

2941 add-on

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

April 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *RB*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President's Telephone Call
to Prime Minister Thatcher on SNF *He*

Secretary Baker has requested changes in the above-described talking points. A new set of talking points incorporating his suggestions is attached at Tab I. At Tab II we have attached a markup of the old talking points, indicating what has been changed. We do not think these changes pose a problem.

Recommendation

That you replace the talking points previously furnished to the President for this phone call with the new points, attached at Tab I, incorporating Secretary Baker's comments.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - New Talking Points for the President's Phone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher
- Tab II - Markup of Previous Talking Points Indicating Changes Made by Secretary Baker

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-1113-MR
SCS 4/18/11

~~SECRET~~

Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher

- You know that the German coalition has adopted proposed concepts on the subject of SNF and that Genscher and Stoltenberg will come here on Monday to discuss these German ideas.
- You have their language, and the substance of these ideas is, of course, very bad. (The German paper:
 - calls for early SNF negotiations on missiles and artillery shells;
 - leaves open the possibility of a third zero for all SNF systems;
 - treats development of the follow-on to Lance as a purely U.S. decision;
 - postpones any decision on Lance follow-on, including whether it is necessary at all, until 1992.)

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2010-1113-MR
SCS 4/18/11

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- Moreover, we are concerned about the unilateral way in which the Germans have been proceeding on this issue.
- In determining the essential elements in a commitment to modernize the land-based missile force, a pledge to keep systems up to date where necessary should suffice and realistically is the most we can probably expect to get -- as it was at Brussels last year.
- The situation has since deteriorated and, in any event, specific decisions on deployment can wait until 1991.
- That notion is consistent with the points your government has passed to us. We will try to achieve with the Germans the point that your government suggested, to the effect that the Alliance should express its support for the continuation of the necessary development work.
- I continue to believe that SNF negotiations at this time would be a grave mistake. Any such negotiations would depend, among other things, upon concrete results from the conventional negotiations in Vienna.

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- We will, of course, inform you of the tenor and results of our discussions with Genscher and Stoltenberg in order to prepare you for your own meeting with Kohl.

- You are an old hand at NATO Summits. This is the opening Summit of my Administration. I know you agree it must be a success. We cannot afford to have it dominated by discussions on SNF. We must have the SNF issue settled well before then.

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: REB

LOG # 2941

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CM A/O _____

Donley
~~Bob Perito~~

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

MD

A

Philip Hughes

2

APZ

Bob Gates

3

8

Brent Scowcroft

4

Philip Hughes

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

5

CM 4/20

D

NSC Secretariat

6

N

89 APR 21 P 6: 47

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

Thatcher Telephone Call (April 22) (Date/Time)

NSC/S

This one not
forwarded to
Pres - see revised
version

~~SECRET~~

Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher

-- You know that the German coalition has adopted proposed concepts on the subject of SNF and that Genscher and Stoltenberg will come here on Monday to discuss these German ideas. (They:

- call for early SNF negotiations on missiles and artillery shells;
- leave open the possibility of a third zero for all SNF systems;
- treat development of the follow-on to Lance as a purely U.S. decision;
- postpone any decision on Lance follow-on, including whether it is necessary at all, until 1992.)

you have their language, and
-- ^ The substance of these ideas is, of course, very bad. *←*

-- Moreover, we are concerned about the unilateral way in which the Germans have been proceeding on this issue.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-1113-MR
SCS 4/18/11

~~SECRET~~

- The situation has deteriorated since then and, in any event, specific decisions on deployment can wait until 1991.
- In determining the essential elements in a commitment to modernize the land-based missile force, a pledge to keep systems up to date ^{where necessary} should suffice. ~~Specific decisions on deployment can wait until 1991.~~ and realistically is the most we can probably expect to get -- as it was at Brussels last year.
- That notion is consistent with the points your government has passed to us. We will ^{try to achieve with the Germans} ~~also be making the point~~ ^{that your government} ~~to the Germans, as you suggested,~~ ^{to the effect} that the Alliance should express its support for the continuation of the necessary development work.
- I continue to believe that SNF negotiations at this time would be a grave mistake. Any such negotiations would depend, among other things, upon concrete results from the conventional negotiations in Vienna.
- We will, of course, inform you of the tenor and results of our discussions with Genscher and Stoltenberg in order to prepare you for your own meeting with Kohl.
- You are an old hand at NATO Summits. This is the opening Summit of my Administration. I know you agree it must be a

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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2941

April 21, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER ^{RB} ^{NB} ^{6/11/89}

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW ^{P2}

SUBJECT: Recommended Telephone Call to Prime Minister
Thatcher

We have attached talking points (at Tab A) for the President's call to Prime Minister Thatcher. They have been cleared by State, OSD, and JCS.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CD NARA, Date 7/13/10

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Recommended Telephone Call [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1) , (b)(6)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft; Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [2]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/1/12

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2795-MR (500.05)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/2/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2941

~~SECRET~~

April 21, 1989

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Recommended Telephone Call
TO: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
DATE: Saturday, April 22, 1989
PURPOSE: To exchange views on the SNF issue in light of the planned April 24 visit of the FRG Foreign and Defense Ministers to Washington.
SECURE OR OPEN: Open
INTERPRETER: None
PHONE NUMBER: (b)(6) (ask for Chequers)
CONTACT PERSON: Mr. Charles Powell (at Chequers)
TIME DIFFERENCE: + 5
SUGGESTED TIMES: 10:30 a.m. - 11:00 a.m. (Washington)
TOPIC OF DISCUSSION: SNF
Date of Submission:
Action:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SCS NARA, Date 5/2/2011

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Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher

- You know that the German coalition has adopted proposed concepts on the subject of SNF and that Genscher and Stoltenberg will come here on Monday to discuss these German ideas. They:
 - call for early SNF negotiations on missiles and artillery shells;
 - leave open the possibility of a third zero for all SNF systems;
 - treat development of the follow-on to Lance as a purely U.S. decision;
 - postpone any decision on Lance follow-on, including whether it is necessary at all, until 1992.
- The substance of these ideas is, of course, very bad.
- Moreover, we are concerned about the unilateral way in which the Germans have been proceeding on this issue.

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2018-1113-MR
SCS 4/18/11

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- In determining the essential elements in a commitment to modernize the land-based missile force, a pledge to keep systems up to date should suffice. Specific decisions on deployment can wait until 1991.
- That notion is consistent with the points your government has passed to us. We will also be making the point to the Germans, as you suggested, that the Alliance should express its support for the continuation of the necessary development work.
- I continue to believe that SNF negotiations at this time would be a grave mistake. Any such negotiations would depend, among other things, upon concrete results from the conventional negotiations in Vienna.
- We will, of course, inform you of the tenor and results of our discussions with Genscher and Stoltenberg in order to prepare you for your own meeting with Kohl.
- You are an old hand at NATO Summits. This is the opening Summit of my Administration. I know you agree it must be a

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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2962

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

April 22, 1989

Thanks

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Meetings with FRG
Officials on SNF, Monday, April 24

The interagency-agreed (State, OSD, JCS, and NSC) talking points for this meeting are attached at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I - Talking points for April 24 meetings on SNF

- Tab A - US Text for Comprehensive Concept Draft
- Tab B - Text of FRG Coalition Position on SNF
- Tab C - UK April 18 Speaking Note on SNF/NATO Summit
- Tab D - References in Current Comprehensive Concept
Draft Supportive of SNF Modernization
- Tab E - Excerpts from June 1987 Reykjavik NAC Statement
- Tab F - Excerpts from March 1988 NATO Summit Declaration
- Tab G - Excerpts from April 20 NPG Communique

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2795-MR
JL 6/6/12

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T
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B

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Text	Re: Text for Comprehensive Concept Draft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scheduling and Public Liaison Office
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [2]

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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~Text of FRG Coalition Position on SNF

1. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany endorses the Alliance's observation that there is at present no foreseeable alternative to the concept of preventing war through deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces.

In the case of nuclear forces, land-, sea- and air-based systems are under the existing circumstances needed in Europe too.

2. The development of a follow-on system to the Lance short-range missile is a national American decision.

3. Within the framework of the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, the Alliance will issue a mandate for the early commencement of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles aimed at establishing equal ceilings at lower levels, as defined by the Alliance at Reykjavik in 1987 and at Brussels in 1988.

4. For nuclear artillery warheads, too, a negotiating mandate will be included in the comprehensive concept with a view to attaining equal ceilings at radically lower levels.

5. In 1992 the Alliance will decide, in the light of political and security developments and especially the results of all disarmament negotiations, on whether or not it is necessary to introduce a follow-on system to Lance into the Alliance in 1996 and hence on the production and deployment of such a system.

The decisive and crucial factors in this respect will be whether it proves possible:

-- to achieve greater security at lower levels of nuclear and conventional forces in general;

-- to conclude binding agreements with the Warsaw Pact on the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action;

-- to attain, through suitable agreements, a higher degree of mutual trust on account of increased transparency and predictability of military conduct.

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DECL: OADR

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PER E.O. 135262010-2795-MR
3c 9/13/12

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Opening Points for the Secretary to Make to FM Genscher
on FRG SNF Position

Introduction

- I'm glad you're here. We have been anxious for some time to have this meeting.
- I am sorry we had no chance to consult in depth before your position was made public.
- It is important to solve SNF so we will not have a Summit characterized by discord, which will serve no one's interest.
- We would have preferred to consult quietly and privately, as you suggested, but we must deal with the situation as it is now.

Today's Objective

- Our task today is to develop specific language for the Comprehensive Concept that we can take to the rest of the Alliance.
- You had our language, of course, before you arrived at your position.
- Our language was meant to round out the Comprehensive Concept in a way that met your concerns and ours.
- Here is our language, which we still believe should satisfy your requirements and Alliance security needs.
- Your paper sets out a number of ideas with which we have difficulties. Our most serious difficulty is the call for negotiations, which would be a grave mistake under current circumstances.
- SNF is a distraction when we should be working on our first priority -- achieving a conventional balance.

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2010-2795-MR
JR 9/13/12

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~~Point 2 - SNF systems during the meeting~~

- The Alliance should be able to state that land-based SNF systems in Europe will remain a part of NATO's nuclear inventory during the 1990's and beyond.
- NATO should also confirm the requirement for the replacement of the Alliance's existing systems and express support for the necessary development work.
- There is much in the NPG Communiqué which we find useful, for instance:
 - o reaffirmation that deterrence will continue to require conventional and nuclear forces;
 - o determination to ensure NATO possesses diversified, survivable and operationally flexible nuclear forces across the entire spectrum;
 - o pledge to keep these forces up-to-date where necessary;
 - o notation of the fact that nuclear forces in Europe will continue to play an essential role in Alliance strategy;
 - o expression of continued support for the efforts of member countries to meet requirements stemming from Montebello to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent posture;
 - o promise of further reductions in NATO's stockpile if restructuring is carried out.

~~How to present the results of the meeting~~

- I suggest we take the following public line:
 - o We had a good day of discussions.
 - o Discussions will continue.
 - o We are sure a satisfactory resolution will be achieved.

Contingency Points to Respond to FRG Assertions (noted in quotation)

"There is Much On Which We Agree"

- We agree on fundamental principles. That deterrence is valid. That NATO needs a mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces. That there should be no third zero.
- However, "no third zero" is only implicit, not explicit, in the FRG position. We should make the point as often as possible that NATO will not accept a third zero.

"NATO Must Issue a Mandate For SNF Negotiations"

- We disagree strongly that the Alliance must issue a mandate for SNF negotiations.
- The Reykjavik NAC language says nothing about negotiations.
- It says only that NATO's Comprehensive Concept would include SNF reductions in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the elimination of chemical weapons.
- The CFE talks have only just begun, and we have a long way to go on the CW negotiations.
- You therefore have no basis for saying that NATO will create a mandate anytime soon for SNF negotiations.
- On the contrary, our first task should be to challenge the Soviets to come down to our levels.
- We cannot have lasting stability and security without such a balance.
- We should focus public attention on what the Soviets must do in this area and not play blindly to their repeated calls for SNF negotiations.
- Agreeing to such talks only serves the Soviet's long-term goal of denuclearizing Europe.

"Development of a Follow-on to Lance is a U.S. Matter"

- Development of a follow-on to Lance is not simply a "national American decision."
- It relates to the security of the Alliance, and the Alliance has been involved closely in the process of defining the need for a Lance follow-on.
- Specifically, the HLG has already clearly established a rationale for such a system, and has endorsed its development.
- While no production or deployment decisions are required for the time being, none of the factors you have listed in paragraph five change the rationale requiring a Lance follow-on.

"In 1992 the Alliance Will Decide...On Whether...To Introduce a Follow-on System to Lance"

- The conditions you list for an Alliance decision in 1992 on whether to introduce a Lance follow-on are totally at odds with longstanding Alliance positions.

"The Concept Will Include a Mandate for Talks on Artillery"

- We are baffled by your call for a negotiating mandate on artillery. We find it completely unacceptable.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Note	Re: Speaking Note SNF Modernisation/NATO Summit (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scheduling and Public Liaison Office
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

TAB E

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCERPTS FROM THE JUNE, 1987 STATEMENT
ON THE MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC)
AT REYKJAVIK

Paragraph Seven

[Opening section deals with INF Treaty]

"[The Allies] consider that an INF agreement on this basis would be an important element in a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which, while consistent with NATO's doctrine of flexible response, would include:

- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile system of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings.

Paragraph Eight

"We have directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, working in conjunction with the appropriate military authorities, to consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. The arms control problems faced by the Alliance raise complex and interrelated issues which must be evaluated together, bearing in mind overall progress in the arms control negotiations enumerated above as well as the requirements of Alliance security and of its strategy of deterrence.

TAB F

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCERPTS FROM THE DECLARATION
OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATING IN THE MARCH, 1988 NATO SUMMIT
IN BRUSSELS

On the Question of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

"4. ... The presence in Europe of the conventional and nuclear forces of the United States provides the essential linkage with the United States strategic deterrent, and, together with the forces of Canada, is a tangible expression of that commitment. This presence must and will be maintained.

On the Modernization of Nuclear Forces in Europe

"5. Our aim will continue to be to prevent any kind of war or intimidation. By maintaining credible deterrence the Alliance has secured peace in Europe for nearly forty years. Conventional defences alone cannot ensure this; therefore, for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02f. Report	Re: References in Current Comprehensive Concept Draft Supportive of SNF Modernization (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scheduling and Public Liaison Office
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	3/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-003
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

**National Security Council
The White House**

2962

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Donley Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>MD</u>	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	<u>cy</u>	_____
Bob Gates	_____	<u>cy</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>I</u>
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>JC 4/24</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

For Genscher Mtgs, Mon 4/24

88 V6855 b1: 33

Key Excerpts From April 20 NPG Communique

- o "For the foreseeable future, our strategy of deterrence will continue to require both conventional and nuclear forces."
- o "We again expressed our determination to ensure that NATO possesses diversified, survivable and operationally flexible nuclear forces across the entire spectrum. These forces must be kept up-to-date where necessary. We noted that nuclear forces in Europe will continue to play an essential role in Alliance strategy."
- o "We expressed continued support for the efforts of member countries to meet requirements stemming from Montebello to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent posture."
- o "...we welcomed the submission of the SACEUR's recent Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study."
- o "...as a consequence of measures to update and restructure NATO's nuclear forces...further significant reductions could be made in NATO's total requirement for nuclear weapons in Europe. [The NWRS] further concludes that such measures would allow a shift in emphasis toward relatively longer ranges across the entire spectrum including both ground-launched and air-delivered capabilities..."
- o "We agreed that [the NWRS] which is currently under consideration by government's, together with further advice from the NATO High Level Group and NATO military authorities, will be important contributions to future decisions relating to individual systems. These decisions will be taken in a wider political context, including the Alliance's Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 27, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: SNF Developments: Chancellor Kohl's Statement to the Bundestag and Emerging Allied Reactions to the US-FRG Dispute

Kohl's Statement and the SNF Issue

As expected, Chancellor Kohl's statement earlier today to the Bundestag on government policy repeated, word for word, the coalition position on SNF which was passed to us a week ago, which was leaked verbatim to the German press, and which Genscher and Stoltenberg defended in Washington. The portion of his statement dealing with security issues recognized the "friendship and close, trusting partnership" shared by the FRG with the US, France, and Britain, referred to the Genscher-Stoltenberg consultations in Washington, and said the US-FRG dialogue would continue. Kohl also said he would be meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher on April 30, Italian Prime Minister De Mita on May 2, and Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers on May 3. He said his government was determined to reach agreement "in all these questions of defense policy, disarmament and arms control" at the NATO Summit.

Kohl then turned to the subject of SNF negotiations. He said the FRG had already called for SNF negotiations "in the framework of the INF negotiations," citing letters to President Reagan since 1986, and said this view "had its effect" in the June 1987 Reykjavik ministerial communique and the March 1988 NATO Summit declaration. Concluding, he declared that the SNF position described earlier was the position "of the German government and, I believe I can say, of the German parliament" since the FRG was "more strongly affected" by these limited-range systems. Therefore, he said, it was "self evident that our friends will have the same understanding for our interests which we have had for them on many occasions."

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Emerging Allied Reactions to the US-FRG Disagreement

At NATO yesterday, April 26, Ambassador Keel explained our concerns about the German position and tabled our draft language for the portion of the Comprehensive Concept on the potential for further SNF reductions if there are concrete results in CFE. The Germans, unable to respond with concrete language of their own, were criticized (even by the Belgians) for prematurely publicizing their position.

Other allied governments have begun to weigh in with their view of the US-German dispute. Norway and Denmark (after getting phone calls from Genscher) have publicly stated their support for Bonn. The Dutch government, on the other hand, has publicly attacked the FRG position on SNF negotiations, immediately belying Genscher's claim to solid support within "continental Europe." The Italian government has also gone on record (Foreign Minister Andreotti today in the Senate) as opposing SNF negotiations until there has been "significant progress" in the talks on conventional forces. Paris understandably prefers a low and neutral public profile while, in private, French officials are critical of every aspect of the announced German SNF position.

An Important Misstatement on CW

In the course of reciting the Alliance's arms control accomplishments, Kohl's statement said that "President Bush has announced that by the end of 1990 all chemical weapons will have been removed from Germany in advance of schedule and unilaterally." Secretary Baker's announcement on this subject in Vienna: (a) did not mention the 1990 target date (which we asked the Germans not to make public); and (b) did not make an ironclad commitment to meet any target date. Our position, public and private, has been only to promise our best efforts in accelerating the removal of US CW stocks in the FRG. The State Department is now seeking an explanation for Kohl's statement on the CW point from the German Embassy in Washington.

Robert Hutchings ^{PH} concurs.

Attachment:

Tab I - Text of Security Policy Portion of Kohl's Statement

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271546Z APR 89

FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 13466

SHAPE FOR GEN. GALVIN

NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: TEXT OF SECURITY-POLICY PORTION OF KOHL'S APRIL 27
GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

REF: BONN 012773 (DTG 241130Z APR 89)

1. FOR ADDRESSEES' INFORMATION, WE ARE TRANSMITTING BELOW OUR TRANSLATION OF THAT PORTION OF CHANCELLOR KOHL'S APRIL 27 GOVERNMENT STATEMENT TO THE BUNDESTAG WHICH RELATES TO SECURITY POLICY. THE FIVE POINTS OF THE GOVERNMENT POSITION ON SNF WERE TRANSMITTED REFTTEL, BUT WE BELIEVE ADDRESSEES MAY FIND ADDITIONAL RATIONALE BY KOHL INTERESTING, AND WE TRANSMIT THE WHOLE FOR REFERENCE.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS HOW THINGS HAVE STARTED TO MOVE THERE. BUT IT IS ALSO UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE REFORM POLICY BEGUN BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL BE LASTING AND SUCCESSFUL. NOT ONE AT THIS TIME CAN GIVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. WHO CAN DENY THE OVERT PROBLEMS?

WHO AMONG US IS NOT STRUCK BY THE MOST RECENT IMAGES FROM GEORGIA, AND OTHERS FROM ARMENIA AND ADZERBAIDZHAN? THEY PROVE THAT EVEN THE PRESENT REGIME CONTINUES TO MAKE USE OF TANKS AND SOLDIERS IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH CONFLICTS. WHO, THEREFORE, CAN EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF REGRESSION?

AS LONG AS THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF THE WARSAW PACT AND SECURITY-POLITICAL RISKS CONTINUE TO EXIST, WE IN THE WEST AND ABOVE ALL IN EUROPE CANNOT UNILATERALLY REDUCE AND NEGLECT OUR CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

THEREFORE, DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH THE EAST ON THE BASIS OF ENSURED ABILITY FOR SELF DEFENSE MUST ALSO IN THE FUTURE REMAIN THE STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

WE DO NOT ADMIT THAT A CONTRADICTION BE SET UP BETWEEN ENSURED ABILITY FOR SELF DEFENSE AND PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN ORDER TO AMPUTATE IN ONE OR THE OTHER DIRECTION THIS DOUBLE STARTING POINT FOR OUR SECURITY POLICY.

IN THIS CONTEXT THE ALLIANCE WILL GIVE RENEWED STRENGTH TO ITS COMMON POLICY IN THE MAY 30 SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS. WE WILL ALSO ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE GUIDED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF FOUR DECADES OF POST-WAR HISTORY TO THE EFFECT THAT FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE AND TRUSTING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES, WITH THE USA, WITH FRANCE AND WITH GREAT BRITAIN IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

WE HAVE FORMULATED OUR POSITION FOR THE CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE:

FIRST, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC RECALLS THE ALLIANCE'S STATEMENT THAT -- AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN -- THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONCEPT OF WAR PREVENTION THROUGH DETERRENCE ON THE BASIS OF AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. AMONG NUCLEAR FORCES, LAND-, SEA-, AND AIR-BASED SYSTEMS ARE ALSO NECESSARY IN EUROPE UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES.

SECOND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM FOR THE SHORT-RANGE MISSILE LANCE IS A NATIONAL AMERICAN DECISION.

THIRD, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT THE ALLIANCE WILL ISSUE A MANDATE FOR THE EARLY INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES WITH THE GOAL, AS FORMULATED BY THE ALLIANCE IN 1987 IN REYKJAVIK AND 1988 IN BRUSSELS, OR (ACHIEVING) EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOWER LEVELS.

FOURTH, A NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY MUNITIONS, WITH THE GOAL OF EQUAL CEILINGS AT A DRASTICALLY REDUCED LEVEL, WILL ALSO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT.

FIFTH, IN 1992 THE ALLIANCE WILL DECIDE IN THE LIGHT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS, AND WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE RESULTS OF ALL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE A FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM TO LANCE INTO THE ALLIANCE IN 1996 AND HENCE TO DEPLOY (SUCH A SYSTEM). OF PRIMARY AND DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE WHETHER IT PROVES POSSIBLE:

- TO ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES;
- TO CONCLUDE BINDING AGREEMENTS WITH THE WARSAW PACT ON ELIMINATION OF THE CAPABILITY FOR SURPRISE ATTACK AND LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTION;

-- TO CREATE, THROUGH APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS, A GREATER DEGREE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BASED ON INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY OF MILITARY CONDUCT.

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DEFENSE MINISTER STOLTENBERG SET FORTH THIS POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WEEK IN THE CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON. WE HAVE AGREED WITH OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS TO CARRY ON THESE CONVERSATIONS.

WE ARE ALSO DOING THIS WITH ALL THE OTHER PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE. I MYSELF WILL BE SPEAKING ON THIS MATTER ON SUNDAY WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND TUESDAY WITH THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER DE MITA, AND ON WEDNESDAY WITH MY DUTCH COLLEAGUE. IT IS OUR FIRM INTENTION, IN ALL THESE QUESTIONS OF DEFENSE POLICY, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL, TO REACH AGREEMENT AT THE NATO SUMMIT. WE HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST ALSO IN THE FUTURE TO ENSURE THE UNITY AND NEGOTIATING ABILITY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR POLICY AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO. THIS COALITION HAS ALWAYS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS AN ABSOLUTELY SERIOUS PARTNER.

THE ALLIANCE HAS REPEATEDLY SHOWN ITS WILLINGNESS FOR DISARMAMENT. THEREFORE, IN RECENT YEARS, IT UNILATERALLY REDUCED NUCLEAR WARHEADS BY 2,400. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PART, DECIDED TO RELINQUISH ITS 72 PERSHING IAS. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS ANNOUNCED THAT BY THE END OF 1990 (HE WILL) IN ADVANCE OF SCHEDULE AND UNILATERALLY, WITHDRAW ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

WE WOULD HAVE WISHED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD FINALLY FOLLOWED THESE STEPS AND ABOVE ALL DRASTICALLY REDUCED ITS 14-FOLD SUPERIORITY IN THE AREA OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT HAS WELL OVER 10,000 WARHEADS IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AREA.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WITH THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING THE CURRENT IMBALANCE BY DRASTIC REDUCTIONS AND SETTING COMMON CEILINGS. I CALLED FOR THIS REPEATEDLY IN SEVERAL LETTERS TO THEN-PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE 1986, AND THE EFFECT OF THAT IS TO BE FOUND IN THE NATO COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 12 1987 IN REYKJAVIK AND MARCH 1988 IN BRUSSELS.

EVERYONE MUST SURELY UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND, I BELIEVE, THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT THAT TAKES THIS POSITION. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS MORE STRONGLY AFFECTED THAN ALL OTHER PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE BY SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS DUE TO THEIR RANGE. THEREFORE, IT IS SELF-EVIDENT TO ME THAT OUR FRIENDS WILL HAVE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR INTERESTS WHICH WE HAVE SHOWN FOR THEM ON MANY OCCASIONS. END TEXT.

WALTERS