

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number: 91120
Folder ID Number: 91120-002

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel (2 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with West German Social Democratic Party Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with West German SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, Wednesday, April 5, 1989, 11:00-11:20 a.m.; Your Meeting with Vogel at 10:30 a.m. (2 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S
02a. Outline	Re: Meeting with French Foreign Minister Dumas (2 pp.)	4/10/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made in Meeting with French Foreign Minister Dumas (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Report	Re: Roland Dumas [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/6/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
02d. Report	Re: Report (6 pp.)	4/7/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 7

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1012

OA/ID Number: 91120-002

Date Closed: 3/6/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02e. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Dinner with French Foreign Minister Dumas, Monday, April 10, 7:30 p.m.; the President's Meeting with Dumas, Tuesday, April 11, 4:30 p.m. (2 pp.)	4/10/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Recommendation	Re: Recommended Telephone Call (1 pp.)	4/12/89	(b)(1)	S
03c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made in Your Telephone Call to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Call to Kohl (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
04a. Outline	Re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1012

OA/ID Number: 91120-002

Date Closed: 3/6/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Wednesday, April 12, 1989, 3:45-4:05 p.m.; Your Meeting with Woerner from 4:05-4:30 p.m. (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: B-C-S Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, April 12, 7:30 a.m. (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item: NATO Summit Planning (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item: Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05d. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item: No-Exceptions Policy (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05e. Memo	Sandra Charles to G. Philip Hughes Re: April 12 Breakfast Item on Bahrain Stinger Buyback (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05f. Memo	David Miller to Brent Scowcroft Re: Pan Am 103 Incident and the PFLP-GC Connection (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05g. Memo	David Miller to Brent Scowcroft Re: Pan Am 103 Incident and the PFLP-GC Connection (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 3 of 7

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1012

OA/ID Number: 91120-002

Date Closed: 3/6/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. Position on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (7 pp.)	4/12/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Cable	Re: Comprehensive Concept - "Friends" Continue Review of Composite Text: New Chapters I-IV (17 pp.)	3/31/89	(b)(1)	C
07a. Outline	Re: Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (2 pp.)	4/15/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07c. Report	Re: Biography (3 pp.)	2/6/89	(b)(1)	S
07d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, Monday, April 17, 1989, 3:30-3:45 p.m.; Your Meeting with Howe at 3:00 p.m. (2 pp.)	4/14/89	(b)(1)	S
08a. Memo	Don Mahley/Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Language in NATO's Comprehensive Concept (2 pp.)	4/15/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Report	Re: Proposed Language on Implementation of Reykjavik NAC Communique's Approach to Reductions in Short-range Nuclear Forces for Inclusion in Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 4 of 7

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1012
OA/ID Number: 91120-002
Date Closed: 3/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08c. Report	Re: References in Current Comprehensive Concept Draft Supportive of SNF Modernization (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08d. Report	Re: Begin Text of Dutch Proposed Language (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
09a. Cable	Re: Message from General Brent Scowcroft to Mr. Peter Hartmann (3 pp.)	4/18/89	(b)(1)	C
09b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Teltschik on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
09c. Message	Brent Scowcroft to Horst Teltschik (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09d. Cable	Re: Compromise Language on the Comprehensive Concept (3 pp.)	4/18/89	(b)(1)	S
10a. Coversheet	Re: General Scowcroft to Tim McBride (1 pp.)	4/15/89	(b)(1)	S
10b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	4/15/89	(b)(1)	S
10c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Short-Range Nuclear Forces and NATO's "Comprehensive Concept" (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 5 of 7

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1012
OA/ID Number: 91120-002
Date Closed: 3/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10d. Report	Re: Proposed Language on Implementation of Reykjavik NAC Communique's Approach to Reductions in Short-range Nuclear Forces for Inclusion in Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
10e. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum to the President on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] and the Comprehensive Concept (1 pp.)	4/14/89	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	Brent Scowcroft for Memorandum for the Record Re: Items Discussed at Baker-Cheny-Scowcroft Breakfast - Tuesday, April 18, 1989 (1 pp.)	4/18/89	(b)(1)	S
12a. Recommendation	Re: Recommended Telephone Call (1 pp.)	4/20/89	(b)(1)	S
12b. Talking Points	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	S
12c. Talking Points	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12d. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Recommended Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	4/20/89	(b)(1)	S
12e. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's Telephone Call with Chancellor Kohl, April 21, 1989 (1 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 6 of 7

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1012
OA/ID Number: 91120-002
Date Closed: 3/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12f. Memcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 7 of 7

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1012
OA/ID Number: 91120-002
Date Closed: 3/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel (2 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with West German Social Democratic Party Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed: 3/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

ParticipantsU.S.

The President
General Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates
Ambassador Robert Blackwill
Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway

Federal Republic of Germany

SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel
Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with West German SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, Wednesday, April 5, 1989, 11:00-11:20 a.m.; Your Meeting with Vogel at 10:30 a.m. (2 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1989

~~SECRET~~

2456

MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS

DATE: April 11, 1989

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 4:30 - 4:50 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To discuss key Alliance issues with Dumas and to further strengthen U.S.-French cooperation on East-West and arms control issues.

II. BACKGROUND

Dumas is in Washington to get better acquainted personally and to gain a fuller sense of your Administration's thinking on key foreign policy issues.

In view of the short time available, I would suggest that you concentrate on the key East/West and strategic issues, most specifically on how to assure a successful NATO Summit and how to assure a creative but realistic Alliance response to Gorbachev's disarmament initiatives and to developments in Poland. He recently saw Shevardnadze in Moscow and Genscher in Bonn and will be focused especially on East/West relations, trends in the FRG, and preparations for the NATO Summit at the forefront of his concerns.

Dumas is very close personally to President Mitterrand and plays a major role in French foreign policy. He is also a leader among his EC peers and will have increased influence when France takes on the EC Presidency in July. It would be good to lay down a marker with Dumas against EC protectionism and in favor of more EC help on regional issues and in solving international economic problems. Dumas' role in preparing for the Paris G-7 Summit will also be important, as will be the French role as we prepare for the NATO Summit. The French will be working with the Germans to try to keep them within a consensus on SNF.

Regarding the USSR, Mitterrand will be seeing Gorbachev in July and the French, in any case, will be playing a major role in shaping the European response to perestroika. He will be interested in your comments on the U.S. policy review now underway.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

On Eastern Europe, the French are seeking to be more active in general. They will be particularly anxious to assure a positive Western response to the Polish "Roundtable" agreement, given their special interest in Poland.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open Photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Biography
Tab C	Participants List

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2456

POINTS TO BE MADE IN MEETING WITH
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS

- I am delighted at this opportunity to meet with you and look forward to President Mitterrand's visit to Kennebunkport next month.
- As you know, we have been conducting a very careful review of our policies toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We are fairly far along and while there are substantial elements of continuity with our policies of the past, we are looking for ways to respond creatively to real Soviet changes as they occur.
- I know you recently saw Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow and that President Mitterrand will see Gorbachev in July. What are your impressions and thoughts concerning events in the USSR?
- One of our main tasks in the weeks ahead is to assure a successful NATO Summit. I know you have been working closely with Foreign Minister Genscher toward this end and that President Mitterrand just recently saw Chancellor Kohl. What is your current analysis of German thinking concerning the Summit?
- On the SNF issue, we should be sensitive to the German political situation, but I know that you also agree on the essential need to maintain U.S. land-based nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

- On Eastern Europe, I am encouraged by the positive trends there, and especially by the positive outcome of the "Roundtable" negotiations in Poland. As you know, we feel it is important for the West to respond positively, but the success of the reforms is first and foremost dependent on actions by the Poles themselves.
- As to the overall U.S. relationship with Europe and, particularly with the EC countries, I welcome the rapid progress you are making toward fuller integration. I was pleased to hear Foreign Minister Ordonez's confident assurances that protectionist forces in Europe would be held at bay. I know that the French EC Presidency will continue in this vein.
- I would hope that a more united and prosperous Europe could also play an increasing role in other regions, such as you have begun to do in Central America. For example, the debt problems of Eastern Europe and Latin America are major areas of concern -- and perhaps of opportunity.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Report	Re: Roland Dumas [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/6/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 10/16/14

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2913-MR (501.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	8/26/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Roland DUMAS

(Phonetic: dooMA)

FRANCE

*Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs (since May 1988)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister



Roland Dumas previously served as Foreign Minister during 1984-86. One of President François Mitterrand's closest associates (the two own adjacent apartments in Paris), he has long advised him on his political image. (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3) he skillfully promotes the President's foreign policy interests. A well-known civil rights lawyer, Dumas has long been associated with the Socialist Party and with human rights issues and has frequently served as a Socialist deputy in the National Assembly. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Security Policy

Dumas has usually adhered to Mitterrand's agenda in the security policy arena. Like most Frenchmen, he stresses the need for an independent strategic nuclear defense. He also maintains that bilateral arms control negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are more effective than bloc-to-bloc negotiating. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Dumas, who stresses a global approach to easing tensions on East-West issues, agrees with Mitterrand on the necessity of presenting Moscow with a solid Western defense. After taking office, he urged a delay in SNF modernization until Soviet willingness to reduce conventional forces could be assessed. (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3) however, he has publicly urged his European partners to agree to modernize SNF, noting that otherwise they risk de facto denuclearization by 1995. (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3) Dumas has added that, although Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposed unilateral reductions are a positive step, they do not require a reciprocal response. Moreover, although he advocates increasing ties with the East, he cautions that the Soviet threat should not be underestimated. (b)(1), (b)(3)

Since assuming office in May 1988, Dumas has worked closely with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—with whom he enjoys excellent rapport—to expand Franco-German cooperation. Dumas is a strong supporter of the Franco-German defense council, which, when approved by the legislatures of both countries, will administer the entire range of bilateral security efforts, including the proposed joint brigade. In July he and Genscher delivered a joint statement to the CSCE that helped bring the conference's drawn-out summer session to a successful conclusion. (b)(1), (b)(3)

(cont.)

LDA M 89-10673

**DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526**

2009-0922-MR
SCS 8/26/13

Other Policy Views

In other areas, Dumas has publicly stressed a foreign policy that includes an influential world role for his country and maintenance of France's human rights "mission." Deeply committed to European unity, he believes that Europe must deal with the United States on economic and trade matters from a strong common position. He devoted most of his time to European and East-West issues in his previous incarnation as Foreign Minister and will probably do so again. He is, however, intensely interested in the Third World and favors European cooperation with Third World countries to promote their political nonalignment and economic independence. (b)(1), (b)(3)

A Born Diplomat

As Minister of European Affairs during 1983-84, Dumas was the driving force behind France's successful EC presidency (January-June 1984). During this stint and his subsequent one as Foreign Minister, he made extensive international contacts. He is respected by government leaders and Cabinet officials in Africa and the Middle East, as well as in major European capitals. (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

Dumas was born on 23 August 1922. He served in the Resistance during World War II. He holds a law degree from the University of Paris and has studied at the National School of Oriental Languages and the London School of Economics. A lawyer for the Paris Court of Appeals since 1950, he gained national prominence by taking difficult cases, as well as through his association with famous clients like Pablo Picasso (who painted his portrait). (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

He has a strong interest in modern art, and he likes movies. An accomplished tenor, he enjoys opera. He also likes tennis, riding, and sailing. He speaks fluent English, German, and Spanish and some Italian and Russian. Married for the second time, he has three children. (b)(1), (b)(3)

6 February 1989

Participants

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Baker
Governor Sununu
General Brent Scowcroft
Ambassador Robert Blackwill

France

Foreign Minister Roland Dumas
Ambassador Emmanuel de Margerie
Ambassador Jacques Andreani,
Cabinet Director for Dumas

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Report	Re: Report (6 pp.)	4/7/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Dinner with French Foreign Minister Dumas, Monday, April 10, 7:30 p.m.; the President's Meeting with Dumas, Tuesday, April 11, 4:30 p.m. (2 pp.)	4/10/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed: 3/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2568

~~SECRET~~

April 11, 1989

2

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Your Call to Chancellor Kohl

As you know, Chancellor Kohl's national security advisor, Horst Teltschik has postponed again his projected visit to discuss SNF.

Kohl first suggested bilateral consultations to you in a letter of late January. Jim Baker also stressed the need for consultations when he was in Bonn in mid-February. When Rick Burt visited Kohl three weeks ago, Kohl again promised early consultations.

It is not clear precisely what is going on in Bonn. There may be differences between Kohl and Genscher, who met April 11 shortly before we received word of the Teltschik postponement. Genscher said publicly the same day that there was an "emerging consensus" in the Bonn coalition to engage in SNF arms negotiations and that the problem of modernizing SNF was a national decision for the United States. Kohl's position is still unclear, but it is apparent that, because of his domestic political difficulties, he is coming under increasing pressure to delay a decision on Lance modernization and support early SNF negotiations with Moscow.

It is important that we straighten out this issue with the Germans lest it dominate the lead-in to the NATO summit. Your phone call will renew the pressure on Kohl to engage in consultations.

Attachments

Tab A Recommended Telephone Call
Tab B Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2568

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Chancellor Kohl of West Germany

DATE: April 12, 1989

RECOMMENDED BY: Brent Scowcroft

PURPOSE: To impress on Chancellor Kohl the need for bilateral consultations on SNF.

SECURE OR OPEN: Secure

INTERPRETER: Yes (Gisela Marcuse, State Department)

PHONE NUMBER: WHCA Head of State circuit - Bonn

CONTACT PERSON: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIMES: April 12, 8:00 a.m.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. To sound out Kohl on SNF
2. To ask him when we can expect consultations to resolve our differences.

Date of Submission:

Action:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0692-MR
05/19/2010 MM

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN YOUR TELEPHONE CALL TO
WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

-- I am calling you about the SNF issue and to express my disappointment that your national security advisor, Mr. Teltschik, will not be coming this week for consultations.

-- As you know, we have been awaiting these consultations since they were first proposed in your letter to me last January.

✓ -- I have noted Foreign Minister Genscher's remarks that there is an emerging consensus within your government in support of SNF arms control negotiations. As you know, we oppose proceeding with such negotiations now. It runs the risk of a "third zero" and a further step toward the denuclearization of Europe and we believe we should concentrate instead on the conventional force talks with the East.

-- It is very important that we sort our joint position on SNF as soon as possible. We do not want this issue to complicate U.S.-West German relations or damage the preparations for the NATO summit.

- o We have agreed that the way to work through this issue is through close, confidential consultations.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
mm 12/7/2016

*not same as you do
this week, next week
negotiating position
new meeting
2 weeks ago - 10/10/84
visited - 10/10/84
thought I had been
there*

~~SECRET~~

2

- o If we can develop a common approach, it will be easier to develop a NATO consensus. The Summit can then celebrate NATO's fortieth anniversary and concentrate on the future.

-- I would like to know how we can consult together in order to resolve the issues relating to SNF and NATO's Comprehensive Concept.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

2568

April 11, 1989

4/11/89
1950

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: The President's Call to Kohl

Brent -- As I mentioned,
Kohl will be going into
a coalition meeting at
0900, 4/12, our time.
Thus, an 0800 call from
the President would catch
Kohl at the right moment.

Bob Blackwill

As you asked, we attach points to be made (Tab B) for the
President's call to Chancellor Kohl about SNF.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding the
points.

in draft
Don Mahley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Recommended Telephone Call
Tab B Points to be Made

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *MM* NARA, Date *05/10/2011*

2568

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1989

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Scowcroft suggests
that you make this call at
~~7:45-8:00 this morning.~~

Thank you.

J. W. Cicconi
James W. Cicconi

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-2913-MR
mm 12/7/2016

April 11, 1989

CHRON FILE

MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

DATE: April 12, 1989

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 3:45 p.m.-4:05 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the NATO summit, nuclear modernization issues, and the Alliance's overall approach to East-West relations.

II. BACKGROUND

✓ Secretary General Woerner is in Washington April 11-13 for meetings with senior Administration officials to plan for the upcoming NATO summit. He will also meet with leaders on the Hill to assess Congressional attitudes on the burdensharing issue.

✓ Woerner has made the NATO summit his personal project, and it will be the overriding focus of his Washington visit. In his meeting with you, he will solicit the specifics of the approach you intend to take to the summit. He will be inquiring into possible new U.S. initiatives, the Comprehensive Concept of NATO defense and deterrence, and short-range nuclear force (SNF) modernization.

Woerner shares our strong desire for a successful NATO summit, which he believes depends on a solution to the SNF issue as embodied in NATO's Comprehensive Concept. Our aim is to avoid a divisive West German debate over SNF modernization, while also resisting pressure to enter into SNF negotiations with Moscow -- which would abet Soviet efforts to denuclearize NATO defenses.

Woerner will be sympathetic to our position and may also have advice worth hearing. However, his political influence with Kohl and Genscher is limited.

Woerner believes, as we do, that the Alliance ought to develop new initiatives for the NATO summit. You may wish to underscore your desire that the summit leaders agree on a forward-looking vision of Europe's future and the Alliance's role in it. The potential for other initiatives is being actively explored within the USG.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

The Secretary General may also inquire into possible new U.S. initiatives toward the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. You can apprise him of our comprehensive policy reviews and of our intention to come forward with a tangible set of economic assistance measures in response to the successful conclusion of the Polish Roundtable.

Secretary General Woerner will be accompanied during his meeting with you by Deputy Assistant Secretary General Robert Pearson and acting chief of staff James Cunningham, both U.S. Foreign Service Officers on detail to NATO's International Staff.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting in Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Woerner biography
Tab C	Participants List

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

-- I am delighted to have this opportunity to meet as we prepare for next month's NATO summit, and I want to commend you for your work toward its success.

-- The summit should highlight the resounding success of the Alliance in keeping the peace and promoting prosperity for 40 years. It should be more than a celebration of the past; we expect the declaration to project a broad vision of the future of Europe and the Alliance's role in it.

o We should note that the Alliance now faces a welcome challenge: how to deal with success. Our steadfastness has wrought positive changes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and above all Western Europe.

o These changes also call on us to adapt ourselves to new circumstances. The NATO summit should demonstrate that the Alliance looks to the future with confidence and imagination.

-- I would welcome your thoughts on the summit and on initiatives we might undertake to affirm Alliance unity and purpose.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

-- As to the Comprehensive Concept and SNF modernization, we agree with you that these issues must not become the focus of the NATO summit.

o Chancellor Kohl and I agree that the way to work through the SNF issue is by close, confidential consultations.

o If the U.S. and the FRG can develop a common approach, it will be much easier to develop a NATO consensus. The Summit can then focus on celebrating NATO's fortieth anniversary.

-- In the arms control arena, we need to consider new approaches, but we must continue pressing the Soviet Union to take practical steps to eliminate existing asymmetries and the Warsaw Pact's offensive strike capability.

-- We also need to respond collectively to positive change in Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland. As you know, we are consulting with our Allies on a set of economic measures that respond creatively but prudently to the successful conclusion of the Polish Roundtable.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Participants

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Baker
Governor Sununu
General Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates
Ambassador Robert Blackwill
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

NATO

Secretary General Manfred Woerner
W. Robert Pearson, Deputy Assistant Secretary General
James Cunningham, Acting Director, Private Office

~~SECRET~~

2548

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

April 11, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Wednesday, April 12, 1989, 3:45-4:05 p.m.; Your Meeting with Woerner from 4:05-4:30 p.m.

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.

Your meeting with Woerner will immediately follow the President's. In addition to the issues outlined in the package for the President, Woerner may press you for more specific indications of our intentions for the NATO summit and particularly about SNF and the Comprehensive Concept. We believe the starting point should be principles about SNF that the Alliance has agreed to and which should underlie any solution for the Comprehensive Concept:

- NATO's strategy of flexible response is based on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces and capabilities.
- There is a need for the foreseeable future for land-based SNF missiles, irrespective of the outcome of the CFE negotiations. There must be no "third zero."
- Our agreement at Montebello to maintain forces at the lowest level needed to deter Warsaw Pact threats is still valid and useful.
- We need to keep the systems that provide this deterrence up-to-date.

The U.S. believes that these principles can be realized, as the President has said, by modernizing NATO's nuclear forces, including introducing the follow-on to Lance. Negotiations on SNF would be a grave mistake in current circumstances. We should not undertake a new "dual track" decision.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Don Mahley, ^{am} Philip Zelikow, ^{pr} and Condoleezza Rice ^{cb} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2532

April 11, 1989

2

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*
SUBJECT: B-C-S Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday,
April 12, 7:30 a.m.

The following items have been submitted for tomorrow's breakfast meeting with Secretaries Baker and Cheney:

NATO Summit (Defense)
SNF (Defense)
Review of Technology Transfer Policy with Respect
to East-West (No Exceptions Policy) (Defense)
Bahrain - Stinger Missile Buy Back Update (Defense)
Pan AM 103 Incident and the PFLP-GC Connection (NSC)

Attachments

Tab I NATO Summit
Tab II SNF
Tab III Review of Technology Transfer Policy with Repsect
to East-West (No Exceptions Policy)
Tab IV Bahrain - Stinger Missile Buy Back Update
Tab V Pan AM 103 Incident and the PFLP-GC Connection

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2003-0368 LF/2
08/12/2009 MM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Non-log

April 11, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: NATO Summit Planning

Defense placed this item on the agenda to explore how the USG will be organizing the planning for the NATO Summit. As you know, the President asked the government to develop initiatives for use in connection with the Summit at the April 4 NSC meeting on Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Defense wants to insure that they will be involved in such planning.

The NSC agreed on April 4 that consideration of some sensitive issues in our policy toward Western Europe should be handled in a small group, such as the Deputies Committee, in order to avoid press leaks. Bob Gates has organized just such a group, which includes Robert Kimmitt from State and Paul Wolfowitz from Defense as well as Bob Blackwill, to consider NATO summit ideas. Defense will therefore be fully involved in the substance of our NATO summit plans.

The next meeting of this group will be tomorrow, April 12, at 1100 in Mr. Gates' office.

Arnold Kanter *AK* concurs.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
mm 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Non-Log

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL *AK*

FROM: DON MAHLEY *DM*

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)

Defense originally placed this on the agenda to discuss what the US would do in the Teltschik meeting originally scheduled for tomorrow (April 12). Since then, Teltschik has cancelled his arrival, and State now wants the agenda item to remain to discuss what to do since the FRG obviously is in disarray on SNF policy.

Kohl and Genscher had a meeting this morning (Bonn time), after which Kohl ordered Teltschik to delay his travel plans. We have no information about the outcome of the meeting, but it is possible that Genscher feared (correctly) that we would resist FRG demands for language in NATO's Comprehensive Concept offering SNF negotiations. He may have argued that waiting until closer to the Summit (and after the NPG) would increase pressure on the US to make concessions to ensure a "successful" Summit.

We need to find our real bottom line in SNF. Ron Lehman at Defense wants greater commitment to specific modernization plans now, possibly including the MLRS program. State believes we can get by with a simple commitment to the principle, perhaps no more than the generic language about "up-to-date where necessary" from the 1988 Summit. (General Galvin told you last week that he believes the US Congress will continue to support MLRS with little additional language.) State may argue that we can agree to soften modernization language in return for FRG agreement to omit language calling for negotiations in SNF.

State may propose a challenge to the Soviets to reduce their SNF advantage as a way to "be forthcoming" on arms control without accepting negotiations. This is a double-edged sword: if the Soviets take us up on the challenge (or if Gorbachev makes the offer on his own), it will make any kind of modernization much more difficult to sell, both to Europeans and to the US Congress, and could conceivably jeopardize the future of the entire MLRS program, including its conventional component.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MUM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

State also may raise concern about Teltschik's cancellation of his trip to Washington this week on the grounds of possible connection to Shevardnadze's trip to Bonn this weekend to prepare for the Gorbachev visit in June. Also, Mrs. Thatcher will talk to Kohl on April 20th. Robert Blackwill told the FRG Ambassador today that we hope not to see anything in the news that would foreclose options in our bilateral discussions.

A final point is that the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers are meeting this week, and may issue a statement calling for SNF arms control. We know Gorbachev has said that SNF modernization will set back the atmosphere in Europe and the hopes for further arms reductions. NSC Staff have energized the interagency process to prepare and transmit a message to the Allies noting the opportunity that the Warsaw Pact meeting will provide for such mischief and reminding the Allies of the agreed NATO position that further reductions could be considered only in conjunction with elimination of the conventional imbalance and an effective global ban on chemical weapons.

In Draft
Philip Zelikow concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the above as appropriate at breakfast tomorrow.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NON-LOG

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 11, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RBW*
DEANE E. HOFFMANN *DEH*

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TE*

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: No-Exceptions Policy

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

You will recall that this item was on the agenda for the breakfast meeting on March 22. At that time, Secretary Cheney asked for additional time to acquaint himself with the issue. Since then, Secretary Baker pointed out in the NSC meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations that the President would have to take a position on no-exceptions soon, given strong allied pressure for lifting the sanctions.

The no-exceptions policy, announced in January 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, meant that the USG would not approve any license request (i.e., "exceptions") for the export of COCOM-controlled goods or technology to the USSR. The allies never endorsed the policy formally, but gave it their tacit, informal support. Other COCOM members gave notice last fall that they expected the U.S. to drop no-exceptions following the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. There are now several cases pending in COCOM which would require a U.S. veto to block the export. These are cases that under normal COCOM criteria probably would be routinely approved since they are not strategically significant.

The earlier memorandum to you on this subject set forth five possible options. Realistically, there are only three:

1. Continue the present no-exceptions policy.
2. Adopt a "limited exceptions" policy (i.e., approval of COCOM cases where strategic considerations are insignificant and denial where they are important).
3. Drop the no-exceptions policy and revert to case-by-case review of all COCOM license applications for the USSR.

We understand that Secretary Baker will support a policy of limited exceptions. Secretary Cheney may be more flexible on this issue than Carlucci was, but if Cheney adopts DOD staff views, he will probably argue for keeping the present no-exceptions policy in place.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DOD protestations notwithstanding, the no-exceptions policy is essentially an alliance issue. Under either the second or third options, we would retain the right -- as would our allies -- to veto any export license applications on strategic grounds. Thus, we have the tools to prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology to the USSR. Refusal to modify the no-exceptions policy will risk undermining the always fragile consensus in COCOM and also undercut U.S.-led efforts to enhance allied enforcement of controls on dual-use goods and technologies with possible military applications. In fact, Mrs. Thatcher has just recently written to the President announcing that the UK is about to break ranks on an important case. We will soon see more of the same if we try to hold an unrealistic line on "no-exceptions."

We recommend that you join Secretary Baker in recommending to the President approval of a limited exceptions policy.

Adrian Basora concurs.



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05e. Memo	Sandra Charles to G. Philip Hughes Re: April 12 Breakfast Item on Bahrain Stinger Buyback (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID MILLER

SUBJECT: Pan AM 103 Incident and the PFLP-GC Connection

It is important that we do not add to or verify the speculation that the PFLP-GC and/or the Iranian government are behind the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. To do so might heighten media attention which could in turn raise expectations of victim's families. It might also jeopardize the ongoing investigations.

RECOMMENDATION

★ That you ask Secretaries Baker and Cheney at your Wednesday breakfast meeting to encourage discipline in this matter within their respective departments.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

→ FYI: Last minute addition.
This was not brought to
State or DOD attention
as a formal agenda item.
Donley

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR

mm 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2532

April 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID MILLER

SUBJECT: Pan AM 103 Incident and the PFLP-GC Connection

It is important that we do not add to or verify the speculation that the PFLP-GC and/or the Iranian government are behind the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. To do so might heighten media attention which could in turn raise expectations of victim's families. It might also jeopardize the ongoing investigations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you ask Secretaries Baker and Cheney at your Wednesday breakfast meeting to encourage discipline in this matter within their respective departments.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
mm 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

2

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 12, 1989

2608

*all's well that
ends well*INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW/DON MAHLEY

SUBJECT: U.S. Position on SNF

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

This memorandum responds to your request for specific language, to be used in NATO's Comprehensive Concept, that we believe the US should be prepared to accept, if necessary, on (1) needed modernization of SNF forces, (2) prospects for SNF arms control, and (3) the future level of our stocks of nuclear artillery shells. As a complement to this memorandum, we would appreciate an early opportunity to discuss with you our approach to the end game on this issue and the problem of arriving at specific language on these issues.

We understand that State is engaged in a similar exercise, based on your meeting yesterday with the President and Secretary Baker. Possibly in connection with this effort, we have heard that Bob Zoellick at State is holding up State's proposed briefing materials for the President's meeting with Geoffrey Howe on Monday, April 17, in order to rework the talking points on SNF.

We believe the issue is no longer a question of how to get a clear commitment to SNF modernization from the Germans this year: that simply is not "in the cards" and we do not absolutely require it. Kohl is in deep political trouble at home, and may be on his way out regardless of the outcome of these issues. The same domestic pressures are reinforcing German efforts to get a commitment to early and specific arms control negotiations on SNF that has the potential for crisis. At the same time, a successful Summit, without headlines about Alliance disarray over SNF, is imperative.

Secretary Baker may be leaning toward endorsement of an idea being promoted by Roz Ridgway for overcoming the current US-FRG negotiating impasse on SNF. She believes we should develop our bottom line, embodying minimal and vague commitments to both SNF modernization and SNF arms control negotiations. We would then promptly inform the UK, perhaps when Howe is here. The US would

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

then proceed to give our position to The Hague, telling the Dutch that we are also giving it to Bonn, and simultaneously give it to Bonn, telling the Germans that this is our bottom line and they should take it or leave it.

Although we probably can live with a bottom line that contains vague and measured commitments on both modernization and arms control, we think Roz's overall approach is a bad idea. In his telephone conversation on April 12 to Chancellor Kohl, the President indicated that he would wait a week for the Chancellor's promised reply to the President's call for renewed dialogue on SNF. Also, giving the Germans our "bottom line" would begin negotiations, not end them. We are kidding ourselves if we think we can make a 'take it or leave it' ultimatum stick in a game where the Germans, who in many respects are desperate, hold so many of the cards.

Here is an alternative approach. The UK is at least as tough (and probably tougher) on this issue than we are. So, while the President awaits the Chancellor's promised response, we let the UK work this issue to the best of their ability. The President is seeing Geoffrey Howe on Monday, April 17. The President, or you, can sketch out to Howe on Monday the essential elements of our position. We would then ask Howe what he believes can be done, outlining both our position and our view of the central issue (early negotiations). If possible, we would work out an agreed plan to influence the Germans. Whatever we agreed with Howe, we would point out that we will work this with the Germans as rapidly as we can, and the British should do likewise through their own channels.

We believe we should deliberate whether to show much flexibility if and when Teltschik comes to Washington. We do not believe he will be able to commit his government, but rather will simply take whatever we propose back to Bonn. As such, we must expect further negotiations -- and compromises -- after a Teltschik meeting. Today's cabinet shakeup in Bonn provides further evidence that domestic political considerations will be the dominant factor in all national security decisions which the FRG is likely to make between now and the 1990 election.

We have tried below to delineate both an opening position and a bottom line. In any case, we are entitled to insist with the Germans that language in the draft Comprehensive Concept (attached at Tab I) which has already been agreed should not be reopened and can be taken as agreed.

1. The Commitment to Modernization (This subject is covered in Para 30 of Part III of the Comprehensive Concept)
CURRENT US POSITION:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

The United States supports the agreed language in the current draft at NATO of the Comprehensive Concept:

"30. As regards the sub-strategic forces possessed by the members of the integrated military structure, their level and characteristics (diversity, survivability, penetration capability, accuracy, responsiveness and flexibility in use) must be such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat - both conventional and nuclear - with which the alliance is faced. Force levels also depend on the flexibility and capability of the systems involved and hence on the latter being kept up to date. In this context, particular attention is being given by the allies to the longstanding requirement for sub-strategic systems of relatively longer-range - including air-launched and surface-to-surface missile systems."

OPENING US BARGAINING POSITION WITH BONN:

The language above is "bracketed" by the FRG at NATO, meaning that all others can agree to it but the Germans object. We have already made several concessions to arrive at the modest language above.

We therefore believe our opening position should be to ask the Germans to remove their objection, and agree to the language in the current U.S. position.

MINIMUM US POSITION:

"30. As regards the sub-strategic forces possessed by the members of the integrated military structure, their level and characteristics must be such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way across the required spectrum of ranges, taking into account the threat - both conventional and nuclear - with which the Alliance is faced. Force levels also depend on the flexibility and capability of the systems involved and hence on the latter being kept up to date."

This version drops the parenthetical description of capabilities in the first sentence and drop the entire last sentence of current para 30. We are then left with little beyond a commitment to keep a capable nuclear deterrent that is "up to date." The "up to date" phrase was used by NATO leaders at the March 1988 summit. The Bonn government has stressed that it remains unified in opposing a third zero. It would be difficult to object to a simple desire to keep the deterrent from lapsing through obsolescence. There is no specific commitment on which systems would need to be kept up to date or the timing of any

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

decisions on new systems.

2. The Commitment to Move Forward on SNF arms control (This subject is covered in paras 49-51 in Chapter IV of NATO's Comprehensive Concept.)

CURRENT US POSITION:

The US supports the language agreed at the Reykjavik ministerial in June 1987 and ratified again at the March 1988 NATO summit that our comprehensive concept of arms control will include: "in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings."

We have refused to agree to the following language (indicated by bold and underlining) in paras 49 and 50 in the current Comprehensive Concept draft, holding agreement hostage to German agreement on other sections:

- "49. Following the implementation of the INF Treaty, the Allies, however, will continue to face the direct threat posed to Europe by the large numbers of shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact territory. Major reductions in Warsaw Pact systems would be of overall value to Alliance security. One of the ways to achieve this aim could be by tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range leading to equal ceilings at lower levels."
- "50. But the substrategic nuclear forces deployed by member countries of the Alliance are not principally a counter to similar systems operated by members of the WTO. As explained in Chapter III, sub-strategic nuclear forces fulfill an essential role in overall alliance deterrence strategy by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount nuclear retaliation in response to his military action. Any move towards equal ceilings in U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range must ensure, therefore, that, for the foreseeable future, the Alliance retains a credible deterrence capability which is kept up to date where necessary."
- "51. ((SECTION ON MODALITIES OF MOVE TOWARDS EQUAL CEILINGS.))"

Para 51 is a placeholder. No draft language at all has been

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

drafted at NATO.

OPENING US POSITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH BONN:

We would offer to accept the passage in para 50 highlighted above. We also would change the language agreed at Reykjavik to replace "nuclear systems" with "nuclear-armed missiles" in order to address another potential problem. Our currently planned reliance on dual-capable MLRS launchers for Lance follow-on places crucial conventional capabilities at risk if these launchers, as part of the nuclear weapon system, are subject to specified ceilings. In sum, we would propose to have the section read as follows:

- "49. Following the implementation of the INF Treaty, the Allies, however, will continue to face the direct threat posed to Europe by the large numbers of shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact territory. Major reductions in Warsaw Pact systems would be of overall value to Alliance security."
- "50. But the substrategic nuclear forces deployed by member countries of the Alliance are not principally a counter to similar systems operated by members of the WTO. As explained in Chapter III, sub-strategic nuclear forces fulfill an essential role in overall alliance deterrence strategy by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount nuclear retaliation in response to his military action. Any move towards equal ceilings in U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear-armed missiles of shorter range must ensure, therefore, that, for the foreseeable future, the Alliance retains a credible deterrence capability which is kept up to date where necessary."

We would then propose the following language for para 51:
"Tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear-armed missiles, leading to equal ceilings, can be achieved through the restructuring of the forces of the two countries."

MINIMUM US POSITION:

The most important point is to avoid use of the term "negotiations." We can agree to explore dialogue, to seek ways to reach verifiable lower limits (so long as it is not zero), and reduce overall theater inventory. What we should not agree is to enter into negotiations - not least because the pressure for a zero solution will become almost insurmountable the minute some of the Europeans see negotiations anywhere on the horizon.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6

What we could offer:

- Agree to remove the U.S. objection to the current proposed language for paragraph 49, so that it read as follows:

"49. Following the implementation of the INF Treaty, the Allies, however, will continue to face the direct threat posed to Europe by the large numbers of shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact territory. Major reductions in Warsaw Pact systems would be of overall value to Alliance security. One of the ways to achieve this aim could be by tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range leading to equal ceilings at lower levels."

- Add a second sentence to para 51 of the Comprehensive Concept to read: "To complement these efforts, the Alliance will explore the possibilities for achieving progress toward verifiable equal ceilings between the US and the Soviet Union and report on the results of this examination to the North Atlantic Council." Paragraph 51 would then read:

"51. Tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear-armed missiles, leading to equal ceilings, can be achieved through the restructuring of the forces of the two countries. To complement these efforts, the Alliance will explore the possibilities for achieving progress toward verifiable equal ceilings between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and report on the results of this examination to the North Atlantic Council."

- 3. Restructuring of Nuclear Artillery (This subject is covered in para 31 of Chapter III of NATO's Comprehensive Concept.)

CURRENT US POSITION: (Contained in the current draft of the Comprehensive Concept.)

"31. Restructuring of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF), through the introduction of a standoff capability for dual capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles of longer range than those currently deployed, would allow a substantial reduction in nuclear artillery charges. Such a shift in emphasis toward longer-range SNF would be wise both from a military and a political point of view. It is a clear example of how greater security can be reached at a lower level of arms."

This language reflects US amendment of a Dutch proposal.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7

OPENING US POSITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH BONN:

Stick to the current language. If explicit reductions in nuclear artillery are called for, explicit endorsements of new systems should be included as well in order to avoid reducing artillery while doing nothing to prevent obsolescence of land-based missiles and increasing vulnerability of penetrating aircraft at the same time.

MINIMUM US POSITION:

Drop the "through the introduction" phrase in the first sentence and change "would allow" to "could allow." Paragraph 31 would then read:

"31. Restructuring of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF), of a standoff capability for dual capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles of longer range than those currently deployed, could allow a substantial reduction in nuclear artillery charges. Such a shift in emphasis toward longer-range SNF would be wise both from a military and a political point of view. It is a clear example of how greater security can be reached at a lower level of arms."

Wholesale elimination of AFAPS is premature, especially in the absence of ironclad commitments to the FOTL and TASM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Cable	Re: Comprehensive Concept - "Friends" Continue Review of Composite Text: New Chapters I-IV (17 pp.)	3/31/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT H2

THE WHITE HOUSE

4/2/89
CHRON FILE

Add-on

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1989

MEETING WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY GEOFFREY HOWE

DATE: April 17, 1989

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 3:45 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

(Handwritten signature)

2

I. PURPOSE

To discuss preparations for the NATO summit and the SNF issue, as well as Gorbachev's recent visit in London.

II. BACKGROUND

Foreign Secretary Howe is making his first official visit to Washington under your Administration. He comes fresh from meetings with Chairman Gorbachev, who visited London April 5-7.

NATO summit preparations and your visit to the UK will be highest on Howe's agenda. He will be interested in possible new U.S. initiatives and the general priorities you intend to project at the summit. You could apprise Howe of the impetus you have given to "new thinking" here and ask his views on possible initiatives.

The SNF issue will be the most difficult. The British, as you know, continue to press hard for a decision on SNF modernization and, like us, strongly oppose SNF arms negotiations with Moscow. Howe personally has shown greater sympathy for Chancellor Kohl's domestic difficulties, but he probably will echo Mrs. Thatcher's less forgiving attitude in his talks with you.

We suggest that you inform Howe that you called the Chancellor on April 12 but are not optimistic about getting Lance modernization commitment from the German government, given Kohl's domestic situation. Of greater importance is to resist FRG pressure for SNF arms control negotiations, and we will be working with the Germans toward that end. We suggest that you ask Howe that the British do the same. Together we may be able to keep SNF from souring the lead-in to the NATO summit and, beyond that, forestall pressure for SNF arms negotiations.

Howe will also be prepared to review the Gorbachev visit to London, which is being played in the British press as a personal triumph for Mrs. Thatcher, though there were no breakthroughs.

Howe may also mention Mrs. Thatcher's recent trip to Southern Africa and her concern that rising SWAPO violence in Namibia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR

MM 12/7/2016

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

endangers the peace settlement. When Mrs. Thatcher met with Chairman Gorbachev during his visit, she raised the issue and told him that Moscow should use its influence toward a peaceful solution. Gorbachev said he would let the U.S. and the U.K. take the lead but would try to be helpful. You may wish to ask Howe more about Soviet attitudes.

Our Central American initiative may also arise in the context of the Gorbachev visit to London. Mrs. Thatcher, with our encouragement, challenged Gorbachev to apply Soviet "new thinking" to Central America.

On the Middle East, Howe may reiterate the British support for direct U.S. and Israeli talks with the PLO and encourage stronger U.S. pressure on Israel. The British have been helpful to us in dampening enthusiasm in the European Community for an EC initiative on the Middle East, but privately the British share the general EC view that Israel is blocking progress. You can use this meeting to bring Howe up to speed on where we stand on the eve of the Hussein visit, in the process pushing for British support for our approach.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting in Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Howe biography
Tab C	Participants List

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY GEOFFREY HOWE

-- I am delighted to see you as we prepare for the NATO summit and my visit to the United Kingdom at the end of next month. I will also be interested in your views on Gorbachev's visit to London.

-- You and the Prime Minister handled the Gorbachev visit with great effectiveness, particularly in your strong support for nuclear deterrence.

-- I would like to offer my personal appreciation for the Prime Minister's efforts to get Moscow to apply "new thinking" to Central America. This issue will remain high on the U.S.-Soviet agenda until the USSR ceases its military aid to Managua.

-- I also appreciate the Prime Minister's raising with Gorbachev the matter of the Soviet sale of SU 24 aircraft to Libya. These are good examples of a larger strategy of challenging Gorbachev to live up to his expressions of good intent.

-- In the Middle East we are making some progress. Shamir's elections proposal has the potential to produce Palestinians that Israel will talk with. I am familiar with the pitfalls, but all the same I would appreciate your support for this approach.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

-- On the NATO summit, as I said to Secretary General Woerner last week, we need not only to highlight the resounding success of the Alliance but also to project a broad vision of Europe and the Alliance's role in it.

- o We will continue to discuss with you and the rest of the Allies possible new initiatives for the summit.

- o I would certainly welcome any ideas you may have.

-- The issue of SNF modernization will be particularly difficult, and we must work together as an Alliance to ensure that this does not disrupt unity on the eve of the summit.

- o I spoke by phone with Chancellor Kohl last week but am doubtful that we can get his government to accept a firm commitment now to Lance modernization.

- o There is a danger that the German government may call for SNF arms negotiations with Moscow. I believe, as you do, that this would raise the risk of a "third zero."

- o We will be working with the Chancellor to impress on him the need to avoid such negotiations with Moscow. I hope your government will join us in that. Mrs. Thatcher's visit to West Germany at the end of the month would be an excellent opportunity.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07c. Report	Re: Biography (3 pp.)	2/6/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Baker
Governor Sununu
General Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates
Robert D. Blackwill
Rozanne Ridgway
Ambassador Henry Catto

U.K.

Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe
Sir Patrick Wright,
Permanent Undersecretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Steven Wall,
Private Secretary to Sir Geoffrey Howe
Ambassdor Sir Antony Acland

~~SECRET~~

1430 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 14, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with British Foreign
Secretary Geoffrey Howe, Monday, April 17, 1989,
3:30-3:45 p.m.; Your Meeting with Howe at 3:00
p.m.

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe.

In addition to the points made in the package for the President, we believe you should engage Howe directly on SNF. Mrs. Thatcher, as you know, is determined to push Kohl harder. Kohl, we believe, has little flexibility, given the domestic trouble he is in. Hence there is a danger of a major clash over SNF as we approach the NATO summit. We suggest that you impress on Howe the following:

- A major clash over SNF could divide NATO on the eve of the summit and detract from our efforts to present a clear and forward-looking Allied view of East-West relations. It would be even worse to have an open fight over SNF at the Summit.
- There is little chance of getting from the Kohl government a firm commitment on SNF modernization. Stronger pressure from us or the British could induce Kohl publicly to break ranks.
- The greater danger is a push, led by the Germans, for early SNF arms control negotiations with Moscow. This would raise risks of a "third zero" and of the further denuclearization of Europe.
- We now believe the U.S. Congress will continue to fund FOTL development through 1989 and 1990 on the basis of language we already have.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR

MM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

-- We propose to focus on persuading the Kohl government not to press for SNF negotiations or for language promising negotiations soon. We believe the "arms control component" is sufficiently robust in what we have promised already. We urge the Prime Minister to convey the same message when she sees the Chancellor April 30.

-- We will, of course, keep you informed about German reactions. We intend to pursue this issue as rapidly as we can, hoping to get it settled well before the summit.

On another matter, Prime Minister Thatcher has written the President to inform him that HMG is going ahead with an export of equipment (made by the Simon Carves firm) to the Soviet Union despite our objections. We are preparing a Presidential reply that would make one final appeal to downgrade the key technology, but we propose no further action on the matter.

John *not available* *DP*
Don Mahley, Robert Cabelly, Richard Haass, David Pacelli concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum for the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Biography
Tab C	Participants List

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2682

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 15, 1989

CHRON FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: DON MAHLEY/PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: SNF Language in NATO's Comprehensive Concept

We have just received the documents at TAB I from State. The most important element is the State-proposed language for paragraph 51 of the Comprehensive Concept (the top page at TAB I). This is language that has not yet been circulated to NATO Allies. NSC Staff believe that it has weaknesses which we should avoid.

The third sentence (about one-third of the way down the text) reads: "These reductions are occurring in the context of restructuring NATO's nuclear forces toward systems of longer range, a restructuring which will result in halving of systems of shortest range, and a one-third cut in the size of the total NATO nuclear stockpile." NSC Staff notes that the cut in shortest-range systems (artillery projectiles) of that magnitude, according to SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study, can be accomplished only if accompanied by full modernization of the surface-to-surface missiles -- i.e. with full deployment of FOTL at the level of some 1,000-plus missiles. We do not think the full deployment of FOTL is politically likely, and putting this language in the Comprehensive Concept will lead the Germans (and others) to "pocket" the reduction of artillery inventory and then refuse to accomplish the accompanying modernization.

Even more worrisome is the final sentence, which reads: "If substantial progress toward eliminating offensive capabilities is achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further unilateral steps -- as well as additional arms control possibilities -- for reducing the level of nuclear forces." As we noted in our memo on SNF last night, this virtually accepts the notion of SNF negotiations - the one thing we do not think the US should support. Further, Genscher would likely argue that, given the Warsaw Pact position in Vienna, "substantial progress" at CFE has already occurred.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR

MM 12/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

2682

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the above in discussions of this language.

Approve ✓

Disapprove



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed Language on Implementation of Reykjavik NAC
Communique's Approach to Reductions in Short-range
Nuclear Forces for Inclusion in Comprehensive
Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament

U.S. Objective: Agreement on inclusion of this language

--51. As a step toward implementing the Alliance's approach to further reducing the level of nuclear forces in Europe, we call upon the Soviet Union to eliminate its current, massive advantage over NATO in deployed ground-based nuclear missile systems in Europe. NATO is itself now engaged in an ongoing program of unilateral reductions in its stockpile of nuclear weapons. These reductions are occurring in the context of restructuring NATO's nuclear forces toward systems of longer range, a restructuring which will result in a halving of systems of shortest range, and a one-third cut in the size of the total NATO nuclear stockpile. While maintaining our nuclear stockpile at the lowest level necessary for deterrence, we recognize that nuclear weapons will continue for the foreseeable future to make a unique and essential contribution to that deterrence. The Alliance therefore cannot accept calls for a negotiated "third zero" elimination of such systems. Our negotiating priority remains to rectify the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe through asymmetric reductions. If substantial progress toward eliminating offensive capabilities is achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further unilateral steps -- as well as additional arms control possibilities -- for reducing the level of nuclear forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2913-MR
MM 12/7/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Report	Re: References in Current Comprehensive Concept Draft Supportive of SNF Modernization (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08d. Report	Re: Begin Text of Dutch Proposed Language (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2682

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	☒	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	☒	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	☒	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>GA 4/7</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

IMMEDIATE
CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2772

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0769-MR
SCS 1/9/12

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 181653Z APR 89

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS
0000

APRIL 18, 1989

-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY FROM
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, TO MR. PETER HARTMANN,
OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, BONN. GERMANY

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR PETER:

HERE IS THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE WHICH WE DISCUSSED OVER THE
TELEPHONE. AS I TOLD YOU, SECRETARY BAKER SPOKE TO FOREIGN
MINISTER GENSCHER AND IS PROVIDING HIM WITH A COPY OF THIS
PROPOSAL.

-
WARM REGARDS,

-
BRENT

-
ATTACHMENT

-
TEXT FOR COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT DRAFT

-
IF THE FRG WOULD AGREE TO INCLUSION OF THE FOLLOWING IN THE
COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

... (SUB-STRATEGIC FORCES) LEVEL AND CHARACTERISTICS (DIVERSITY, SURVIVABILITY, PENETRATION CAPABILITY, ACCURACY, RESPONSIVENESS AND FLEXIBILITY IN USE) MUST BE SUCH THAT THEY CAN PERFORM THEIR DETERRENT ROLE IN A CREDIBLE WAY ACROSS THE REQUIRED SPECTRUM OF RANGES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THREAT -- BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR -- WITH WHICH THE ALLIANCE IS FACED. FORCE LEVELS ALSO DEPEND ON THE FLEXIBILITY AND CAPABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS INVOLVED AND HENCE, AS AGREED BY THE ALLIANCE IN 1988, THE LATTER WILL BE KEPT UP TO DATE. IN THIS CONTEXT, PARTICULAR ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN BY THE ALLIES TO THE LONGSTANDING REQUIREMENT FOR SUB-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF RELATIVELY LONGER RANGE -- INCLUDING AIR-LAUNCHED AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS. (111/30)

"MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES COULD LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARTILLERY CHARGES. SUCH A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS TOWARD LONGER RANGE SNF WOULD BE WISE BOTH FROM A MILITARY AND A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. IT IS A CLEAR EXAMPLE HOW GREATER SECURITY CAN BE ACHIEVED AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMS. (111/31)

THEN THE US WOULD AGREE TO THE ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:

-- 51. AS A STEP TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH TO FURTHER REDUCING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE, WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO ELIMINATE UNILATERALLY ITS CURRENT, MASSIVE ADVANTAGE OVER NATO IN GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. NATO HAS ENGAGED IN A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAM OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN ITS STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REDUCING ITS STOCKPILE BY OVER ONE-THIRD TO ITS LOWEST LEVEL IN MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS. A FURTHER REDUCTION OF UP TO ONE-THIRD OF NATO'S CURRENT STOCKPILE -- INCLUDING CUTTING IN HALF THE NUMBER OF THE SHORTEST RANGE SYSTEMS -- COULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF RESTRUCTURING AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

UPDATING NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES WITH SYSTEMS OF LONGER RANGE. WHILE MAINTAINING OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AT THE LOWEST LEVEL NECESSARY FOR DETERRENCE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. KEPT UP TO DATE WITH CHARACTERISTICS TO PERFORM THEIR DETERRENT ROLE CREDIBLY ACROSS THE REQUIRED SPECTRUM OF RANGES. AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR THREAT. WILL CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO MAKE A UNIQUE AND ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THAT DETERRENCE. THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE CANNOT ACCEPT CALLS FOR A NEGOTIATED "THIRD ZERO" ELIMINATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS. MOREOVER, OUR PRIORITY REMAINS TO RECTIFY THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. IF CONCRETE RESULTS TOWARD ELIMINATING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES ARE ACHIEVED IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES TALKS, NATO WILL BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE AT THAT TIME FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES."

END TEXT

#0113

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2772



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH1

ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER ^{AK}

FROM:

PHILIP ZELIKOW ^{PZ}

SUBJECT:

Message to Teltschik on SNF

The message that State sent to Bonn earlier today (Tab II) indicates that you will separately be sending Teltschik the U.S. draft. Such a message from you to Teltschik is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve transmission of the message to Teltchik attached at Tab I.

Attachments:

Tab I	Message from Scowcroft to Teltschik
Tab II	State Message to Bonn

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2914-MK
Z 6/6/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: on OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09c. Message	Brent Scowcroft to Horst Teltschik (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09d. Cable	Re: Compromise Language on the Comprehensive Concept (3 pp.)	4/18/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed: 3/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

89 APR 18 12:30

SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO

036960

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ / ~~TOP SECRET~~

No. Pages 3

FROM: ERIC EDELMAN
(Officer name)

P
(Office symbol)

7-1574
(Extension)

7208

(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LANGUAGE OF GOSCHER

TO: (Agency)

NSC

DELIVER TO:

ROBERT BLACKWILL

Extension

5-5112

Room No.

368

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By Gp NARA, Date 3/1/09

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐

INFORMATION ☐

PER REQUEST ☐

COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer:

[Signature]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8910496
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 90 13

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 17 APR 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NATO

ARMS CONTROL
SNF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES & NATO COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

ACTION: TRANSFERRED FM NSC LOG 20321 DUE DATE: 17 APR 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MAHLEY

ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 3/6/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSBTM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 4

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 12

DTG 151559Z APR89

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # _____

RELEASER 87

ROUTINE

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM/GENERAL SCOWCROFT

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TIM McBRIDE FOR THE PRESIDENT/CAMP DAVID/TOR: 1217L

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOR 151608Z APR89

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By MM NARA, Date 05/10/2011

OPTIONAL FILE

LOX'd 3

Comp 10496

Handwritten signature

on

4/15

File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1989

Mr. President:

Apropos our discussion yesterday with Jim Baker, attached are a brief background paper on SNF which explains how we got where we are and some proposed language for use with the Germans next week.

There are three elements to an SNF statement 1) modernization, 2) reductions in artillery shells and 3) arms control negotiations on SNF.

We will want to discuss this issue Monday -- probably to include Foreign Minister Howe who will be here.



Brent Scowcroft

~~SECRET~~

10496

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

(20321)

NOTED

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2914-MR

32 9/13/12

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT:

Short-Range Nuclear Forces and NATO's
"Comprehensive Concept"

The current dispute over modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF), and particularly the land-based missile portion of those forces, stems from the US-Soviet INF treaty. By eliminating land-based missiles in Europe with ranges over 500 kilometers, the treaty had three principal effects: (1) underscored the need to make sure that the US nuclear forces left in Europe, as the most credible element in extended deterrence, remained viable and survivable; (2) intensified German worries that the remaining short-range nuclear forces could only hit targets on German soil, implying that arms control was helping everyone but the Germans; and (3) set a powerful precedent for relying on the elimination of "whole classes" of nuclear weapons as the way to protect the continent from the danger of nuclear war. The 'double zero' solution in the INF treaty eliminated all US and Soviet land-based missile systems with ranges of 1000-5500 km. (the first zero) and all land-based missile systems with ranges of 500-1000 km. (the second zero).

NATO's response to these effects of the INF treaty was twofold. First, the Alliance reaffirmed that it would, as Defense Ministers had agreed at Montebello in 1983, modernize and improve its short-range nuclear forces while substantially reducing the overall numbers of nuclear weapons stocked in Europe. This NATO agreement specifically included deployment of a follow-on to the aging Lance land-based missile. Second, in order to reassure the Germans that total numbers of SNF weapons could be reduced, the Allies agreed to address these FRG concerns in a document called the "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament." NATO will adopt this document at the May summit.

However, as Kohl's political situation has deteriorated, the FRG has increasingly advocated language at NATO for the "Comprehensive Concept" which both challenges the Montebello commitment to SNF modernization, specifically the need to commit

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

again to a follow-on to Lance (FOTL), and urges the immediate initiation of negotiations with Moscow on SNF systems. The SNF negotiations that Bonn seeks would, in the current political climate, create almost irresistible pressures for a 'third zero', eliminating missile systems from 0-500 km. range. This would in turn hasten the denuclearization of Europe. We prefer to await further progress in conventional arms control and rely on unilateral restructuring of SNF forces by the two sides, rather than negotiations with Moscow, to achieve equal SNF missile ceilings for the U.S. and Soviet Union at lower levels.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed Language on Implementation of Reykjavik NAC
Communique's Approach to Reductions in Short-range
Nuclear Forces for Inclusion in Comprehensive
Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament

U.S. Objective: Agreement on inclusion of this language

As a step toward implementing the Alliance's approach to further reducing the level of nuclear forces in Europe, we call upon the Soviet Union to eliminate unilaterally its current, massive advantage over NATO in deployed ground-based nuclear missile systems in Europe. NATO is itself now engaged in an ongoing program of restructuring NATO's nuclear forces toward systems of longer range. While maintaining our nuclear stockpile at the lowest level necessary for deterrence, we recognize that nuclear weapons -- kept up to date with characteristics to perform their deterrent role credibly across the required spectrum of ranges, and taking into account the conventional and nuclear threat -- will continue for the foreseeable future to make a unique and essential contribution to that deterrence. The Alliance therefore cannot accept calls for a negotiated "third zero" elimination of such systems. Moreover, our negotiating priority remains to rectify the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe through asymmetric reductions. If concrete results toward symmetry and eliminating offensive capabilities are achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further unilateral steps (including significant reductions in systems of the shortest range) -- as well as additional arms control possibilities -- for reducing the level of nuclear forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2914-MR

32 9/13/12

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506Natl Sec Advisor
has seen~~SECRET~~

April 14, 1989

*Handwritten signature and initials*ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER ^{RB} ^{AK}FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW/DON MAHLEY ^{PZ} ^{DM}SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on SNF and the
Comprehensive Concept

This memorandum responds to your request for a memorandum to the President, attached at Tab I, providing essential background for the current dispute over the modernization of our short-range nuclear forces (SNF), possible SNF arms control, and the role of NATO's current efforts to agree on a "Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament."

Recommendation

That you send the Memorandum to the President on "Short-Range Nuclear Forces and NATO's Comprehensive Concept" attached at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2914-MR

JL 6/6/12

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memo	Brent Scowcroft for Memorandum for the Record Re: Items Discussed at Baker-Cheny-Scowcroft Breakfast - Tuesday, April 18, 1989 (1 pp.)	4/18/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - April 1989 [1]

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
1/4/89
2888
2

~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1989

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Chancellor Helmut Kohl

DATE: Friday, April 21, 1989

RECOMMENDED BY: Brent Scowcroft *BS*

PURPOSE: To encourage the Germans to engage promptly in discussions with the United States to arrive at an SNF decision.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: Gisela Marcuse

PHONE NUMBER: 011 49 228 562 000

CONTACT PERSON: Mr. Teltschik, 011 49 228 562 000

TIME DIFFERENCE: + 5

SUGGESTED TIMES: 8:00 A.M.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: SNF

Date of Submission:

Action:

got him 8:20 AM 4-21

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-1569-MR
7/8/2013 MM

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By MM NARA, Date 05/10/2011

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4/21/89

~~SECRET~~

Thank Iowa

Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl

- You indicated you would call me back this week. I am leaving town today and I thought I should check with you.
- SNF is an important issue to resolve, but neither of us wants it to dominate the Summit or cause a major difference of opinion within the Alliance.
- * -- You had indicated to me that we will have an opportunity to discuss this issue with you before you make any final decisions, and certainly before you go public. *leahs*.
- We've been trying to engage you for some time on this issue, and have gone out of our way to keep this issue low-key, and avoid public visibility. We have sent some proposed language back to Teltschik and to Genscher.
- We want to work all this out with you, but that will be possible only if you do not present us with a fait accompli.
- We are ready to engage in immediate discussions, in which we are prepared to take your concerns fully into account. However, a public position by either side will make it exceptionally difficult to find common ground.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2914-MR
31 6/6/12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/20

Bob:

Brent drafted these TPs for the Kohl call, which will now occur at 8:00 AM tomorrow. Unless you have something important to add to them, he's going to have the President go with these ~~edit~~ points. If you have edits, I'll be happy to get them incorporated.

Phil

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl

- [-- Helmut, I understand your people are meeting again this evening to discuss SNF.]
- You indicated you would call me back this week. I am leaving town tomorrow and I thought I should check with you.
- SNF is an important issue to resolve, but neither of us wants it to dominate the Summit or cause a major difference of opinion within the Alliance.
- You had indicated to me that we will have an opportunity to discuss this issue with you before you make any final decisions, and certainly before you go public.
- We've been trying to engage you for some time on this issue, and have gone out of our way to keep this issue low-key, and avoid public visibility. We have sent some proposed language back to Teltschick and to Genscher.
- [-- We are under pressure from the British to adopt an even tougher position.] *It would be a mistake to say this; it would probably get back to Thatcher and further complicate our problems on this subject with*
- We want to work all this out with you, but that will be possible only if you do not present us with a fait accompli. HMG.
- We are ready to engage in immediate discussions, in which we are prepared to take your concerns fully into account. However, a public position by either side will make it exceptionally difficult to find common ground.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2914-MR
JL 6/6/12

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

2888

April 20, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Recommended Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl

The President will call Chancellor Kohl Friday morning, April 21, to encourage the Germans to engage promptly in discussions with the United States before making a final decision on SNF modernization and arms control.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *4/4/13*

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010~~
~~By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *05/10/2011*~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

2888 add-on

April 21, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM:

PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Telephone Call with Chancellor Kohl, April 21,
1989

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation for the
President's telephone conversation with FRG Chancellor Kohl on
April 21.

Robert *RB* Backwill concurs.

Recommendation

That you file the Memorandum of Conversation attached at Tab I
for the record.

Attachment:

Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation for President's Telephone
Conversation with Chancellor Kohl

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (c), September 11, 2006
By *MM* NARA, Date *05/10/2011*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, State (interpreter)

Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Mrs. Weber (interpreter)

DATE, TIME April 21, 1989, 8:24 a.m. - 8:39 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl opened the conversation by apologizing for his unavailability the previous day, noting that he had been in Paris settling questions involving the European Community. The coalition had worked on the SNF problem last night and had sent up an agreed paper on the issue. The Chancellor promised that a copy of the paper would be sent to Washington within the hour.

Continuing, the Chancellor proposed that Defense Minister Stoltenberg and Foreign Minister Genscher come to see the President on Monday. They would stay for a day, or even less than a day, and talk to the President's officials about the SNF issue. In this way both countries could consult before the Chancellor delivered his declaration on SNF next Thursday and allow him to say that the FRG was consulting with its friends on the subject. There was no need to cast a final vote on SNF next Thursday; the Chancellor could explain that he could not say anything final while he was still discussing the issue with his allied colleagues. In summary, he hoped that appropriate U.S. officials could meet with Genscher and Stoltenberg on Monday or Tuesday.

The President said he was glad the Ministers were coming. He had anxiously awaited such a dialogue from the beginning. Although the President understood the Chancellor's internal political situation and did not wish to meddle in it, he stressed that the FRG must discuss the SNF issue with the U.S. before decisions were made and made public. The President was most concerned with the need for appropriate consultations to maintain Alliance solidarity.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-MR-
08/21/2009 MM

The President added that, although he would be on the West Coast on Monday, his key officials would be available in Washington for talks. He urged the Chancellor not to present the U.S. with a 'fait accompli.' Real consultations are needed.

Chancellor Kohl asked what the President meant by a fait accompli.

The President said he meant a unilateral position that the U.S. had been unable to discuss with the F.R.G., with no opportunity for each side to persuade the other which way it should go.

The Chancellor said he should explain one problem he had, which was constant indiscretion, disclosures of government information.

The President said he had that problem too.

The Chancellor replied that his problem was different, since a three party coalition left much more room for such disclosures than work within one party. He added that he would, of course, also have to talk with other allies, such as the British and the French. The Ministers would be coming with a paper that would form a basis (Grundlage) for their discussions, but there was no way to prevent people from disclosing the contents of the paper here in Bonn. The Ministers would be coming in order to talk over these issues.

The President said that was exactly what he had in mind.

The Chancellor said that one cannot prevent any debate from becoming a public debate.

The President said that was a problem in Washington too, but that a firm F.R.G. position for the Alliance should not be taken in advance. Our hope was that, when the Ministers come, there would still be some openness to work on a mutually agreed position. The President wanted to get this problem out of the way immediately so that we could have a successful NATO Summit meeting without any wedges driven into what, now, is very good Allied solidarity.

The Chancellor said that was precisely his view. His aim was a strong NATO. There was no doubt that he, the Chancellor, had linked his political existence to this goal. The SNF paper had amalgamated "all the points" and was being sent to the President today. The President would agree with part of the paper and would disagree with part of the paper; that is what negotiations are about.

Good, the President said.

The Chancellor promised to tell his representatives to come as

friends, as partners. The problem would be that the paper they would bring could not be kept under cover in Bonn. Too many people were involved. But his government needed to have procedures underway that were fair to the President as well. The Chancellor wanted to extend their friendship, not hamper it.

The President said he understood, but noted that the problem is that leaks tend to lock people into a position. It was a problem for for the U.S. too. He was pleased the Ministers would be coming in a spirit for negotiation.

Concluding, the Chancellor said his two Ministers would be coming to Washington. Then, if necessary, the Chancellor could talk with the President again on the telephone.

The President said that was good. Another conversation might not be necessary, but he hoped that both he and the Chancellor would be able to talk to each other at any time.

Finally, the President expressed his gratitude for the Chancellor's note passing his condolences for the loss of life in the accident aboard the battleship Iowa. The President observed that this was the third largest loss of life that the military had suffered in a single peacetime incident and that the disaster had caused much grief. The Chancellor's letter meant a great deal to the President and to the American people.