

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

OA/ID Number: 91120
Folder ID Number: 91120-001

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - March 1989

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Next Steps on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (3 pp.)	1/30/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Draft Message	Re: Proposed Message from Brent Scowcroft to Horst Teltschik (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Next Steps on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	2/4/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Philip D. Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: The U.S. Message on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces]: Advice from USNATO (2 pp.)	2/10/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Cable	Re: Heads Up from Brussels: Germany, The United States and the Comprehensive Concept (2 pp.)	2/9/89	(b)(1)	S
03c. Cable	Re: Alliance Issues: Comprehensive Concept and Nuclear Modernization (4 pp.)	2/7/89	(b)(1)	C
04a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with SPD Parliamentarian Egon Bahr of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	2/21/89	(b)(1)	C

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Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - March 1989

Pinksheet Number: cap1011
OA/ID Number: 91120-001
Date Closed: 3/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Conversation: General Scowcroft's Meeting with SPD Parliamentarian Egon Bahr of the Federal Republic of Germany (1 pp.)	2/27/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Re: Philip Zelikow/Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Preparations for Meeting with Germans on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	3/11/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Report	Re: Strategy Paper for SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] for Meetings with FRG (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Report	Re: Strategy Paper for SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] for Meetings with FRG (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] and Lance Follow-on (1 pp.)	3/13/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Report	Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] and Lance Follow-on - How We Got Here (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06c. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces]/Lance Follow-on - How We Got Here (1 pp.)	3/6/89	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07a. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Next Steps with Germans on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	3/13/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Cable	Horst Teltschik to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/13/89	(b)(1)	S
07c. Cable	Re: CDU Suffers Setbacks in Hesse Elections (2 pp.)	3/13/89	(b)(1)	C
08a. Memo	Linton Brooks to Cathy Millison Re: Message to Teltschik re SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	3/24/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Horst Teltschik (2 pp.)	3/16/89	(b)(1)	S
08c. Message	Brent Scowcroft to Horst Teltschik (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08d. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Melvyn Levitsky Re: Message to Horst Teltschik (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08e. Cable	Re: Letter from General Scowcroft to Horst Teltschik (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Possible Issues for Breakfast, Wednesday, March 22, 7:30 a.m. (1 pp.)	3/21/89	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09b. Memo	Linton Brooks/Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	3/21/89	(b)(1)	S
09c. Draft Letter	To Helmut Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09d. Memo	Linton Brooks to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - CW Initiative (1 pp.)	3/21/89	(b)(1)	S
09e. Memo	Jerry W. Leach and Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item: The No-Exceptions Policy (4 pp.)	3/20/89	(b)(1)	S
09f. Report	Re: Short History of the No-exceptions Policy (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09g. Report	Re: Report (10 pp.)	3/2/89	(b)(1)	S
09h. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Agenda Item for Breakfast on Wednesday, March 22: Comprehensive NSC Discussion of European Issues (1 pp.)	3/21/89	(b)(1)	S
09i. Memo	Don M. Snider to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item, March 2nd: Conventional Forces in Europe (1 pp.)	3/21/89	(b)(1)	S
10a. Letter	President Bush to Helmut Kohl (2 pp.)	3/22/89	(b)(1)	S
10b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	3/22/89	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10c. Memo	Linton Brooks/Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Kohl (2 pp.)	3/21/89	(b)(1)	S
10d. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Presidential Letter to Kohl on SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] (1 pp.)	3/20/89	(b)(1)	S
10e. Draft Letter	To Helmut Kohl (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron and Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Dinner with Jacques Attali, Special Counsellor to French President Mitterrand, Friday, March 31, 1989 (4 pp.)	3/28/89	(b)(1)	C
12a. Outline	Re: Meeting for SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Briefing (1 pp.)	3/29/89	(b)(1)	S
12b. Background Report	Re: Background Information for Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) Briefing (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12c. List	Re: Participants (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12d. Memo	Donald Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Briefing for the President (1 pp.)	3/28/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Memo	Don Mahley to Robert M. Gates Re: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Background Information (2 pp.)	4/7/89	(b)(1)	S

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National Security Council
The White House

CM

CHRON FILE

89 JAN 30 6:28

LOG # 0162
SYSTEM GCF IDF INT
DOCLOG CM A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec Sec	2	DP	A
Exec Sec	2	8	
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft			
Exec Sec			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	27.3/21	✓
NSC Secretariat	5		W/R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

Gen. Scowcroft
Decided not to send
the message.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0162

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 30, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

2

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: *RB* LINTON BROOKS/ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: DON MAHLEY *gmm*

SUBJECT: Next Steps on SNF

The interagency meeting last Wednesday, chaired by Bob Blackwill, generated agreement on the text of the letter that President Bush sent to Chancellor Kohl regarding SNF arms control in the NATO comprehensive concept. The last paragraph of the President's letter acknowledged the FRG suggestion that the U.S. and FRG meet bilaterally very soon to work out a joint position on both SNF modernization and the SNF arms control component of the "comprehensive concept."

There are two issues facing you:

- Do we need a review of our position on SNF modernization before such an meeting?
- When should we meet with the Germans and what is the best mode of organizing the meeting when it occurs?

SNF Modernization. Your staff is divided. Linton Brooks and Don Mahley believe no formal review of our long-standing support for SNF modernization (and especially for development and deployment of a Follow-On To Lance (FOTL)) is needed. They note that the President's letter to Kohl (coordinated with all agencies) in essence reaffirmed our position, as did Senator Tower's remarks at Wehrkunde. They fear that such a review will exacerbate our problems with alliance management and will give an impression of confusion. This is especially true since we would need to postpone the February 15 NATO High Level Group meeting pending the outcome of a review.

Bob Blackwill, who favors Lance modernization, believes a formal and rapid interagency review is necessary. He notes the desire of the President to take a fresh look at policies and believes the President should think carefully before deciding to embark on the major political struggle in Europe that would be inherent in Lance modernization. If there is to be a review all agree it should start soon to avoid the impression in NATO of a rudderless United States.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2911-MR
SCS 6/22/12

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Dialogue With the FRG. The timing of a bilateral meeting depends on your decision on the need for a formal review. There are four possible models of U.S. organization for such a bilateral meeting, and two possible locations -- Bonn and Washington. Because we believe the meeting should contain relatively senior people from the United States' side, and should occur in the very near future, we prefer Washington as the site of the initial meeting.

The first model for the U.S. delegation composition would be an all-NSC body, to act in the name of the President. We do not recommend this model since we believe that it is useful in coopting Genscher to have representatives from the U.S. State Department and the German MFA at the meeting. We also believe it important to establish the role of U.S. Cabinet agencies in such operations at the outset.

A second model would be to designate a Cabinet agency to lead the U.S. team and have an interagency team with one Cabinet agency in the chair. We do not recommend this option either, because we do not wish to establish agency primacy in this area at this time. Also, we do not have confirmed officials at the concerned Cabinet agencies of the appropriate stature to lead such a team.

A third model, which we believe acceptable but not preferable, would be to have the National Security Council chair a panel including both State and Defense representatives. We do not believe that the formal establishment of NSC primacy is necessary, and would "ruffle" feathers among some of the professionals in the agencies.

That leaves us with the model we recommend: an NSC-State-Defense team which does not have a formal chairperson but simply has a collegial tripartite composition. We do not recommend that you be the NSC member; you have other things to do and would constitute, in our view, a premature commitment of our "heavy artillery." Therefore, we recommend the team be composed of Robert Blackwill from the NSC staff, Rozanne Ridgway from State, and Ron Lehman from Defense.

This team could meet initially in Washington and subsequently in Bonn if necessary with appropriate FRG counterparts, including the Chancellery office, the MFA and the MOD to draft a common U.S.-FRG position. We believe this suggestion will be acceptable to the Germans. We should have the meeting here at the White House (probably in the Situation Room) to emphasize Presidential involvement.

To initiate this exchange and demonstrate the seriousness with which we view the issue, we recommend that you send a message to Horst Teltschik, Chancellor Kohl's nearest equivalent to your position, via White House privacy channels. We have drafted two versions of such a message. One (Tab I) would call for a meeting soon and assumes there is to ~~be~~ no formal review of our SNF

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-3-

position. Ron Lehman and Rozanne Ridgway agree with the idea of an early meeting and with the suggested participants. We have not explicitly requested their views on the need for an SNF review.

An alternate approach is to send a message promising Teltschik we will arrange a bilateral meeting, but deferring discussions until the review is done. A draft is at Tab II. To avoid unwanted FRG pressure, the draft cites the impending Far East trip as a reason for not setting a date. Under this approach we recommend you sign the tasking memorandum at Tab III initiating the study, which would be chaired by OSD unless you prefer an alternative. We will act to delay the High Level Group meeting scheduled for February 15, using the personnel turbulence at Defense as a rationale.

RECOMMENDATION

(Brooks/Mahley) That you agree that no formal SNF modernization review is necessary, and that you approve and transmit via White House privacy channels the message at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove 

Alternatively,

(Blackwill) That you (a) task a formal review of SNF modernization by signing the memorandum at Tab III, (b) send the temporizing message to Teltschik at Tab II via White House privacy channels, and (c) allow us to direct that the impending High Level Group meeting be postponed.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

(All) That you approve a tripartite U.S. team, as described above to conduct negotiations with the FRG to establish a common position on SNF and "comprehensive concept" language.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I	Message to Horst Teltschik (No SNF Review Version)
Tab II	Message to Horst Teltschik (If SNF Review Required)
Tab III	Tasking for SNF Review

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

There will be a struggle in Europe (FRG) over same modernization. A short deadline review reaffirming the need for it, placing it in the context of this Administration's policies, and developing a strategy for its achievement would be useful and represent a orderly approach. I favor Blackwill's alternative. Pg.

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~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT TO
HORST TELTSCHIK TO BE TRANSMITTED VIA
WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNEL

(SNF REVIEW REQUIRED)

Dear Horst:

You will recall President Bush's message to the Chancellor on Thursday morning, in which he noted the Chancellor's suggestion for early bilateral meetings between our governments on SNF language. I hope you will understand that with the press of activities in the early days of the Administration, I would like to suggest that such a meeting occur in Washington. Because of the effort required to prepare for the President's trip to Japan and China, I believe it would be best to plan on late February for the meeting.

I would propose that you bring a small delegation to Washington at a mutually agreeable time to discuss a position on both SNF modernization and the arms control component of the NATO comprehensive concept. I will ask my Senior Director for European Affairs, Ambassador Blackwill, along with Ambassadors Ridgway and Lehman, to participate on the U.S. side. I would anticipate conducting the discussions here in the White House complex and I would certainly want to have a good long talk with you at that time.

I think we both agree that there is some urgency in coordinating the positions of our two governments on these issues. Once I have your reply on the acceptability of this suggestion, I will ask my staff to be in touch on specific dates.

With warm regards,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2911-MR
SCS 6/22/12

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0463

February 4, 1989

CHRON FILE

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *pz*

SUBJECT: Next Steps on SNF

Two things have come up which tie into the memorandum Lint Brooks and Blackwill sent you on Next Steps on SNF.

First, a top FRG Defense Ministry Official, General Naumann, met with Blackwill today. Unaccompanied by any Foreign Office diplomats, Naumann told us that the MoD wants to modernize Lance, but feels a delicate compromise must be carefully worked out to give Genscher a face-saving way to sign on and to make the deal politically saleable for Kohl. He pushed hard for early U.S.-German bilateral discussions to address this. He also stressed that Kohl wanted to keep running this issue out of his office in the Chancellery and that Horst Teltschik, in Kohl's office, would be a prime interlocutor.

Second, Ambassador Keel sent in a cable yesterday from NATO indicating the signs there were that the Germans, if left to themselves, could table a paper at Evere which would defer an SNF modernization decision indefinitely. To avoid this, Keel urged quiet bilateral talks with the Germans at a senior level on SNF but suggested trying to work this into Secretary Baker's whirlwind schedule through Bonn and NATO HQ (instead of an in-depth Washington meeting that would include OSD).

These developments strengthen Lint's and my conviction that we ought to get a State/OSD/NSC team set up to handle these talks as soon as possible.

Don Mahley concurs. *pzm*

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2911-MR
SCS 6/18/12

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

0706

February 10, 1989

2

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *PB*

FROM PHILIP D. ZELIKOW *P2*

SUBJECT: The U.S. Message on SNF: Advice from USNATO

Based on his work with Allied reps and NATO SYG Woerner, Ambassador Keel has sent two cables in the last few days which offer a sharper formulation of the needed U.S. message on SNF. He thinks it will brace the Germans, and other Allies, if we give what Woerner called "a good dose of straight talk." This means we urge forthright recognition, in a document adopted at the NATO Summit, of the need to modernize (or "update") the SNF land-based missile force as we move forward on conventional arms control and the rest of our defense and arms control agenda. Unilateral SNF stockpile reductions can also be pledged, but no SNF arms control track should be promised, or ruled out (current NATO position is that such talks can go forward when conventional stability and global CW elimination are achieved).

As you know, I think Keel's approach is on target. Operationally, Keel suggests, again based on consultations with Allies, that we start working the problem bilaterally with the Germans and consult with Congress to help ensure that the signal the Allies are willing to give is the one Congress is happy to hear. If the Allies do not in some way reaffirm, at the NATO Summit, their readiness to deploy FOTL, both that program and possibly TASM are not likely to get authorization for needed deployment money from Aspin, et al. You have the message to Teltschik on the invitation for bilateral talks; I will be working with Ginny Lampley on how we can help State and Defense deal with the Hill. Lint Brooks and Don Mahley are working with us in coordinating production of an interagency implementation paper.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2003-0308-FH
DL 8/12/09

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2

NOTE: Kohl gave an interview published in the Feb 10 **Financial Times** which the paper headlined as backing off of an early SNF decision. In fact, Kohl said only that a decision on "production" was not needed until 1991-92. Embassy Bonn reports that this was deliberate - Teltschik inserted the word himself when the interview transcript was edited during the clearance process.

 Linton Brooks concurs.

*I CONTINUE
TO THINK WE
OUGHT TO MOVE
ON THE SNF CABLE.*

Attachments

Tab A USNATO 761 (NODIS)
Tab B USNATO 703

cc: Virginia Lampley

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

<DIST>PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: BLACKWILL MENATH RODMAN VAX BRANSCUM ZELIKOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUFHNA<DTG> 091720Z FEB 89
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<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9789

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: HEADS UP FROM BRUSSELS: GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ USNATO 00761

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR KEEL
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO,

SUBJECT: HEADS UP FROM BRUSSELS: GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER BELIEVES YOUR DISCUSSION WITH GENSCHER NEXT WEEK WILL BE CRITICAL TO ULTIMATE SOLUTION OF ALLIANCE DEBATE ON FUTURE NUCLEAR STRATEGY. HE SEES THIS MEETING AS SETTING THE DIRECTION FOR US-GERMAN BILATERAL EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH IN HIS VIEW ARE ESSENTIAL FOR SUCCESS OF THIS SPRING'S NATO SUMMIT.

3. OTHER NATO REPS SAID THE SAME THING IN A SERIES OF BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS THAT I HELD DURING THE PAST WEEK. ~~THEIR GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE THAT A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT REQUIRES A DECISION ON MODERNIZATION/SNF WHICH MAINTAINS THE ESSENTIALS OF ALLIANCE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, WHILE NOT PUSHING THE GERMANS INTO A CORNER. TO THEM THIS MEANS CONCENTRATED AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN BILATERAL US-GERMAN DISCUSSIONS.~~ WHATEVER THEIR PUBLIC COMMENTS, THE MAJORITY OF ALLIES BELIEVE THAT THE MODERNIZATION DECISION TOUCHES ON THE ESSENTIALS OF NATO SECURITY POLICY -- CREDIBILITY OF DECISION MAKING, LONG TERM VIABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR DETERENT AND ULTIMATELY GERMAN TIES TO THE ALLIANCE. THEY BELIEVE THINGS HAVE COME TOO FAR FOR THE DECISION SIMPLY TO BE "POSTPONED."

4. WOERNER KNOWS GENSCHER WELL FROM YEARS OF INTERNAL COMBAT. THEY ARE OPPONENTS, BUT WOERNER WILL NEVER CAST DOUBT ON GENSCHER'S DESIRE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN FACT WOERNER SAYS GENSCHER IS WORRIED NOW BY IMPRESSIONS THAT HE IS LOSING AMERICAN CONFIDENCE, AND HE BELIEVES THAT GENSCHER IS NOT NOW AS UNMOVABLE AS HE MAY SOMETIMES SEEM -- ESPECIALLY IF HE BELIEVES LACK OF COOPERATION WILL FURTHER UNDERMINE HIS STATUS IN U.S.

5. ~~WOERNER THINKS A GOOD DOSE OF STRAIGHT TALK WOULD BE THE BEST WAY TO GET PROGRESS.~~ BY THIS HE DOES NOT MEAN GIVING GENSCHER A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT PROPOSITION. BUT WOERNER DOES URGE YOU NOT TO ALLOW GENSCHER TO DETOUR THE DISCUSSION INTO GRAND CONCEPTS OF FUTURE HARMONY IN EUROPE. INSTEAD, HE SUGGESTS DIRECT QUESTIONS ABOUT GOALS, MEANS AND CONSEQUENCES OF GENSCHER'S PROPOSALS, FOLLOWED BY SOME CLEAR STATEMENTS OF US REQUIREMENTS.

6. ~~WOERNER AND MOST OTHER PARTNERS HERE BELIEVE THE BEST MESSAGE FOR THE GERMANS IS OUR CURRENT REQUIREMENT FOR A "POLITICAL SIGNAL" ON MODERNIZATION COMBINED WITH OUR "NEVER SAY NEVER" POSTURE ON SNF TALKS BUT WITH REJECTION OF IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS.~~ THOSE WHO ARE CLOSEST TO OUR POINT OF VIEW ARE THE BRITISH, DUTCH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE. STICKING CLOSEST TO THE GERMAN LINE ARE THE SPANISH, ITALIANS, NORWEGIANS, BELGIANS AND DANES. HOWEVER, MOST OF THE LATTER HAVE MADE CLEAR TO US THAT THEY WILL BUY WHATEVER WE AND THE GERMANS CAN AGREE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2003-0308-F11
21 1124106

7. AS YOU KNOW, THE BELGIANS HAVE THEIR SPECIAL INTERNAL SITUATION TO DEAL WITH. THE NEW FLEMISH SOCIALIST COALITION PARTNER BASICALLY WANTS TO SAY NO TO MODERNIZATION-- PERIOD. THE LOCAL BELGIANS BELIEVE THEIR GOVERNMENT WILL IN THE END GO ALONG IF THE GERMANS DO. THEY WORRY, HOWEVER, THAT TINDEMANN IS STAYING A BIT TOO MUCH ON THE SIDELINES AND HOPE THAT YOU CAN ENCOURAGE HIM TO BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN THE INTERNAL DEBATE. KEEL

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 0761<STOR> 890209203811 MSG000224368691
<TOR>890209204731

<DIST>SIT: VAX

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RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ALLIANCE ISSUES: COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND
- NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 00703
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR ADDEE ONLY)

EXDIS - MIL ADDRESSES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, NAC, MARR, MNUC, PREL

SUBJECT: ALLIANCE ISSUES: COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND
- NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: THIS IS THE FIRST OF SEVERAL CABLES
LAYING OUT MAJOR ISSUES WHICH THE ALLIANCE FACES AS THE
SECRETARY BEGINS HIS TOUR OF NATO CAPITALS. WE BELIEVE
THAT THE MODERNIZATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND THE CURRENT DEBATE ON THE ALLIANCE'S COMPREHENSIVE
CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT WILL INEVITABLY
ARISE IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER AS A PRIORITY CONCERN IN
THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIED LEADERS.
SEPTELS WILL PROVIDE SIMILAR ANALYSIS OF OTHER ISSUES
INCLUDING BURDENSARING, CONVENTIONAL STABILITY AND
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AS WELL AS EAST-WEST
RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

THE ISSUE

3. POTENTIALLY THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUE NOW FACING THE
ALLIANCE IS TO REACH CONSENSUS ON A "COMPREHENSIVE
CONCEPT" OF ARMS CONTROL (AND SECURITY) THIS LATE
SPRING FOR APPROVAL PRESUMABLY AT A NATO SUMMIT. HOW
THE ALLIANCE HANDLES THIS ISSUE WILL DO MUCH TO SET THE

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2010-2911-MR
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TONE FOR ANY SUCH SUMMIT AND WILL SIGNIFICANTLY SHAPE WESTERN PERCEPTIONS IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S ALLIANCE POLICY. THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT SHOULD BE CRAFTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENABLE NATO ALLIES TO EXPRESS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DEVELOP AND ULTIMATELY FIELD MODERNIZED SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF), PARTICULARLY A LANCE FOLLOW-ON, WITHOUT COMMITTING TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS.

BACKGROUND

4. OVER THE PAST YEAR, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS THAT IT WILL SOON BE NECESSARY TO REPLACE AGING LANCE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. LANCE MODERNIZATION WAS IMPLICIT IN THE AGENDA LAID OUT AT THE 1983 MONTEBELLO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) MINISTERIAL. LATER, SHAPE, IN A NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS STUDY (NWRS-85), CALLED FOR A LONGER RANGE SUCCESSOR TO LANCE BY 1995. SACEUR'S NEWEST STUDY (NWRS-88) REITERATES THIS NEED. AT LAST MARCH'S NATO SUMMIT, HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF MODERNIZATION.

5. SEVERAL ALLIES REMAIN CLEARLY RELUCTANT TO TAKE A DECISION TO DEPLOY A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE (FOTL); BUT NOT DEPLOYING A FOTL WOULD AMOUNT TO UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT IN THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, THE ROLE OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES CANNOT BE ASSUMED BY OTHER SYSTEMS. CONGRESS, HOWEVER, MAY NOT APPROVE FOTL FUNDS ABSENT AN INDICATION FROM OUR ALLIES THAT THEY ACCEPT THE WEAPON'S REQUIREMENT. THE NATURE OF THE SIGNAL CONGRESS REQUIRES IS NOT YET CLEAR, WHICH PROVIDES THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHAPE IT.

6. MEANWHILE, SINCE THE JUNE 1987 REYKJAVIK MINISTERIAL, NATO HAS BEEN PREPARING A STATEMENT OF ALLIANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES IN ARMS CONTROL - "THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT." THE MANDATE TO DO SO CAME FROM A COMPROMISE WITH THE FRG, WHICH WAS UNDER DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO SEEK SNF NEGOTIATIONS. BONN ACCEPTED A FORMULA WHICH -- WITHOUT SAYING "NEVER" TO SNF TALKS -- PUT OFF ANY SNF NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN CONVENTIONAL BALANCE AND GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN TURN, THE U.S. AGREED TO CONSIDER FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 00703
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR ADDEE)

EXDIS - MIL ADDRESSES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, NAC, MARR, MNUC, PREL

SUBJECT: ALLIANCE ISSUES: COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT" SO THAT NATO WOULD BE SEEN AS CONSIDERING ALL ARMS CONTROL OPPORTUNITIES.

CURRENT STATUS

7. AT THE HAGUE NPG MINISTERIAL LAST OCTOBER, DEFENSE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE ALLIANCE'S "STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH" TO NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION "UNDER WHICH DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN WHEN NECESSARY," REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR U.S. EFFORTS TO MEET THE IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENT FOR FOTL, AND ENDORSED A PAPER

8. AT NATO, WE ARE ACTIVELY WORKING ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT, WITH A GOAL OF APPROVAL AT THE JUNE NAC MINISTERIAL OR AN EVEN EARLIER NATO SUMMIT. THE CURRENT DRAFT IS A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES SUPPORTING U.S. INTERESTS. BONN INSISTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO INCLUDE SNF TALKS AMONG THE PRIORITIES.

10. THE GERMANS (AND OTHERS) WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS. THE UNITED STATES, SECONDED VIGOROUSLY BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE, WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH TALKS WOULD LEAD VERY QUICKLY TO A SOVIET OFFER OF A "THIRD ZERO," I.E. ZERO SNF, POLITICALLY IRRESISTIBLE IN EUROPE. A "THIRD ZERO" WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR STEP TOWARD "DENUCLEARIZATION" OF EUROPE, AN ENDURING SOVIET AMBITION.

11. WE ARE COMMITTED TO A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT THAT REAFFIRM5 THAT ARMS CONTROL MUST BE BASED ON SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. IT SHOULD RESTATE NATO'S ARMS CONTROL PRIORITIES: 50 PERCENT START REDUCTIONS, A GLOBAL CW BAN, AND CONVENTIONAL STABILITY. GREAT CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED ON THE QUESTION OF SNF ARMS CONTROL: [REDACTED]

1.2. WE MUST REMIND THEM TO NOT FORGET THE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS THAT ARE THE RESULT OF THE ONGOING NEED FOR DIVERSIFIED AND MODERNIZED SYSTEMS INCLUDING A SURFACE FLEET, SUBMARINE AND A REPERCUSSION ON THE COMMITMENT TO MODERNIZATION ("UPDATING") THAT WILL BE THE PROGRESS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS MOVING FORWARD. CONCRETE MUST BE CONVINCED OF NATO'S WILLINGNESS TO KEEP THEIR FORCES UP-TO-DATE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 00703
EXDIS - MIL ADDRESSES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

TAGS: NATO, NAC, MARR, MNUC, PREL

BE COMPLETED THIS SPRING INCLUDING FOUR KEY ELEMENTS:
-- PRIMARY ARMS NEGOTIATIONS **EMPHASIS** (FOR EUROPE) ON
CONVENTIONAL STABILITY;

-- COMMITMENT TO THE REQUIREMENT TO MODERNIZE

~~UPDATE SNF SYSTEMS~~

-- SIGNIFICANT UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN SNF WARHEADS AS WE MODERNIZE (ESPECIALLY WITH FOTL), WITH LESS RELIANCE ON SHORT-RANGE AND MORE RELIANCE ON STAND-OFF SYSTEMS; AND

-- CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY THEIR SNF (AS THEY MODERNIZE), WHILE ARMS NEGOTIATION EFFORTS CONCENTRATE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

14. THE ~~ADDITION~~ OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT (AT A NATO SUMMIT) ~~WOULD THEN MAKE CLEAR THAT~~ IT REPRESENTS OUR "COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH" BASED ON A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY INTERESTS, AND THAT ~~FURTHER ELABORATION AND DEVELOPMENT,~~ WOULD CONTINUE AS THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT EVOLVES AND AS RESULTS DICTATE -- ~~THUS NOT SAYING "NEVER" TO SNF~~ NEGOTIATIONS.

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03<SSN> 0703<STOR> 890208014241 MSG000224214161
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03<SSN> 0703<STOR> 890208014211 MSG000224214131
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89 FEB 10 P 6: 30 National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec Sec	<u>2</u>	<u>RO</u>	<u>I</u>
Exec Sec	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Exec Sec			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)
US Mag on SNF: Address
from US NATO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2911-MR
SCS 9/13/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with SPD Parliamentarian Egon Bahr of
the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, NSC
Philip Zelikow, NSC (Notetaker)

FRG
Egon Bahr, Bundestag Representative
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador of the FRG to the
United States

DATE, TIME February 21, 1989, 4:40 p.m. - 5:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: General Scowcroft's Office

Mr. Bahr began with three points: First, in Berlin the CDU has broken off negotiations with the SPD on formation of a 'grand coalition' and, as a result, the SPD is obliged to seek a coalition with the Greens, which is "terrible." In these coalition talks the SPD will insist that the Greens agree upon respect for Berlin's special status, acceptance of the presence of the Allies, and the current connections of Berlin law with the laws of the Federal Republic. The Greens have accepted these conditions, which are essential to the formation of a coalition. If, after studying the agreement, the Greens back off from these conditions, no SPD-Green coalition will be possible and the SPD will renew its efforts to negotiate a 'grand coalition.'

Second, Mr. Bahr continued, Eastern Europe presented special policy challenges. Poland and Hungary were on the eve of real political pluralism. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, could not follow 'glasnost' because the government was based on Soviet bayonets and could not adopt policies comparable to those of Dubcek. Mr. Bahr recounted that a Czech Politburo member recently told him that Prague would assimilate some of Gorbachev's new ideas but Gorbachev's actions were very dangerous. When Bahr said they amounted to a revolution, the Politburo member replied, "Or a counterrevolution."

The case of the GDR, Mr. Bahr explained, was most complicated. It rejected 'glasnost' but got it anyway from the West German electronic media. Older people, mindful of the 1953 experience, were caught between fears of too much liberalization or of too much toughness. This pressure would increase. Mr. Bahr said the government in Bonn could "explode" the GDR, if it so chose,

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within months. General Scowcroft asked if the GDR was really so fragile and Mr. Bahr repeated that it could happen in months. He and his colleagues had followed the situation in East Germany and saw evidence, for the first time, of networks of opposition with ties around the country. (Chancellery Chief of Staff) Schaeuble had the same view, Mr. Bahr said. The government policy was exactly right, trying not to destabilize the situation. Bonn could certainly destabilize the GDR; it was uncertain whether it could guarantee stability. Further pressure on human rights was unnecessary in light of ongoing progress. No one knows where this will lead or if Gorbachev can control it. Mr. Bahr gave Gorbachev a 50/50 chance of success.

Third, Mr. Bahr addressed the Soviet situation and 'perestroika.' He described 'perestroika' as a question of one generation, maybe more, while arms control was a problem to be resolved in the next decade. Arms control could not wait upon the success of 'perestroika.' The West needed to seize the opportunity to keep Gorbachev, or his successors, from escaping a difficult situation through military pressure against Western Europe. Our key goal should be to take advantage of the first chance since the war to remove the Warsaw Pact's military threat against Western Europe.

General Scowcroft agreed. The report on the GDR's situation was very worrisome. The consequences of an explosion there were incalculable. On arms control, General Scowcroft agreed with Mr. Bahr's general message but urged initial attention to conventional forces rather than the nuclear weapons in Europe which would remain our best first deterrent against adventurism. Conventional force reductions could strengthen stability and help the Soviets with their resource problem.

Mr. Bahr pointed out that the "Comprehensive Concept" embraced all elements of European security. The nuclear element could not be excluded. He expected the government in Bonn to press for an early start to nuclear talks to parallel those underway in the conventional field. A complete zero now was not needed. Battlefield nuclear weapons should come out soon but SNF could be set at a common ceiling, below the current number of 88 Lance launchers, that would include existing Lance systems. These systems, Mr. Bahr added, would be usable until 1999. German agreement to deploy new SNF weapons, with added range to allow attacks on Polish territory, would be inappropriate, psychologically, in 1989, the 50th anniversary of the German attack on Poland which opened World War II.

General Scowcroft agreed on the need to consider a real comprehensive concept, the future of Europe in the year 2000. He did not rule out SNF arms control for all time but felt it should be sequential, not parallel, with success in the conventional talks. The bridge to the deterrent of American strategic nuclear forces could be provided only by land-based nuclear forces in Europe. Flexibility was possible on the details of modernization.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NOTED

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATCH

1100

February 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: General Scowcroft's
Meeting with SPD Parliamentarian Egon Bahr of the
Federal Republic of Germany

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation covering
General Scowcroft's meeting with Egon Bahr of the Federal
Republic of Germany on February 21, 1989.

Robert Blackwill concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes the memorandum of
conversation at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 01 NARA, Date 2/11/11

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1607

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 11, 1989

CHRON FILE

Thompson

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/LINTON BROOKS *RB*
FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW/DON MAHLEY *PM*
SUBJECT: Preparations for Meeting with Germans on SNF

We heard today from Teltschik that Kohl will make a decision Monday morning on whether to send the German team. If they come, they will arrive on Tuesday, March 14. We would plan on meeting throughout the day in the Situation Room on Wednesday, March 15. If you agree, you would open the session on Wednesday morning for 15-20 minutes.

Working-level experts from the different agencies met here on Saturday, March 11, and drafted a paper that discusses the setting and objectives for this meeting and includes points for you to make in your opening remarks. Our draft for you is attached at Tab A. An abbreviated version of the same paper has been circulated to agencies (a copy is attached at Tab B). Everyone agrees core elements should be tough, especially since the Germans will probably not be ready for end-game bargaining. Both papers include bracketed language reflecting unresolved differences about what, if any, flexibility we should show during this meeting.

The short paper will be refined on Monday after further interagency discussion (NSC is in the chair for these ad hoc sessions). You will have an opportunity to discuss the approach on Monday at 6:00 p.m. with Bob Kimmitt, Ron Lehman, Bob Blackwill, and Philip Zelikow. As of Saturday afternoon, no senior policymakers at State, Defense, JCS, or ACDA have reviewed the paper.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Background Paper on SNF for Meetings with FRG
- Tab B - Abbreviated Version of Background Paper

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Report	Re: Strategy Paper for SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] for Meetings with FRG (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By ES On 8/3/2022

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - March 1989

Date Closed: 3/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91120-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2911-MR (504.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/20/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

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STRATEGY PAPER FOR SNF FOR MEETINGS WITH FRG

State of Play in Modernization

-- NATO's modernization program for nuclear forces includes fully modernized artillery rounds (AFAP), and a new stand-off air-delivered missile (TASM) as well as a Follow On To Lance (FOTL) surface-to-surface missile.

-- SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS) postulates that, with modernization of all systems, NATO's overall theater nuclear inventory could decrease by one-third, including a fifty per cent reduction in nuclear artillery rounds.

-- To date, neither TASM nor AFAP modernization per se have turned into the kind of political issue that FOTL has become.

-- The existing LANCE missiles are due to be removed from Europe beginning in 1995. In order to field a FOTL by 1995, we must proceed with ongoing development and test programs for the FOTL missile.

-- To prepare a new missile for 1995 deployment, we have requested \$161 million in authorization for FY 1990 and FY 1991, and appropriation of the FY 1990 share, about \$33 million. (\$7.5 million was appropriated for FY 89). Congress, in turn, needs to know that Allies are likely ultimately to accept the missile. We are not sure what European assurances Congress will require this year. Some key members of Congress appear willing to provide this year's funding for FOTL with a minimal commitment from the Allies -- possibly no more than what has already been said in the March 1988 Summit statement and various NPG communiques.

State of Play in Europe

-- The situation is deteriorating rapidly, and the FRG attitude toward SNF modernization/arms control is moving unfavorably against US interests.

-- Kohl understands the need for modernization but may be unwilling to go beyond the formulation in the March 1988 NATO Summit declaration on the need to maintain "up to date" systems.

-- Genscher is working against any modernization decision. He is arguing that FOTL is a "new missile" which impedes improvement in East-West relations.

-- Genscher does not rule out a third zero (no SNF land-based missiles) in the future, depending on CFE results, and has recently publicly demanded immediate SNF arms control negotiations.

- There appears to be an FRG consensus in favor of SNF arms control negotiations leading to equal lower ceilings on SNF missile launchers and missiles (e.g. 72 missile launchers for both sides versus the current 88 for NATO and over 1400 for the Warsaw Pact).

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-- Work on the Comprehensive Concept document that will express NATO's commitment to modernization and its view of arms control is hung up at NATO pending German clarification of their positions. The FRG is holding back pending agreement on a common Kohl/Genscher position and the outcome of their discussions with us.

-- The Soviets have indicated their opposition to SNF modernization, their willingness to negotiate on all theater nuclear-capable systems and related armaments, and their readiness to eliminate all SNF and denuclearize Europe.

Current Issues

-- In essence, we want a firm NATO commitment to modernize SNF, including a specific endorsement of the FOTL, with no commitment to SNF arms control negotiations anytime soon. The Germans want either a vague commitment to modernization or no commitment at all this year (depending on who is speaking), coupled with the immediate initiation of East-West SNF arms control talks. We have told Kohl that any solution must protect NATO defenses and that, while we hope to explore opportunities for dialogue with the East, we are against the opening of SNF arms control negotiations under current circumstances.

-- In addition to the above-described modernization and arms control issues, we must also decide whether NATO should, in the context of an overall solution, offer further unilateral reductions in its nuclear stockpile beyond current plans and/or call on the USSR unilaterally to reduce its SNF-capable missile launchers to current NATO levels.

-- There are also disputes emerging, within the USG, about what tactical approach to take at this meeting. Everyone agrees core elements should be tough, especially since the Germans will probably not be ready for end-game bargaining. Bracketed language in the next section reflects unresolved differences about what, if any, flexibility we should show during this meeting.

Objectives and Tactics for this Meeting

- Our first goal is to stop the deterioration in the German position.
- We have to do that by taking control of the issue, developing a clear USG position, and putting in motion a process designed to lead to early US-FRG agreement.
- We need to:
 - Show firmness on the principles that must underlie a solution.
 - Demonstrate our determination to find a solution that meets our strategic needs (FOTL deployment) and Germany's domestic problem (get Kohl past the 1990 elections).
- To meet these objectives, we must know and be prepared to say at some stage, although not necessarily at this meeting:
 - The US position on the level, mix, and timing of needed improvements in NATO SNF forces.
 - What commitment we are willing to accept in the Comprehensive Concept document on SNF arms control.
- We, in turn, need to learn from the Germans more about their own government's thinking on these issues.
- Tactically, if the Germans are unable, at this meeting, to bargain on the final outcome, we should adopt a position that stays tough on the core elements while signaling that we are sensitive to their situation and serious about these talks.
 - On modernization, we should argue for a clear description of the mix of forces we envision after 'restructuring' (a term FRG Defense Minister Scholz prefers to "modernization"), including explicit endorsement of the FOTL. We should make clear that we do not expect an explicit deployment decision at this time that commits individual countries to accept specific numbers of systems. [[But we could state that, contrary to SHAPE's current recommendation, we could consider replacing Lance missiles with a smaller number of FOTL missiles in the overall SNF mix.]] (All agencies agree on the need to use this bargaining chip, but DOD wants to withhold using it at this meeting.)
 - On arms control, a restatement of the 'Reykjavik formula' (tangible and verifiable reductions of US and Soviet land-based missiles leading to equal ceilings in conjunction with establishment of a conventional

balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons), with: (1) reiteration that we see such movement to arms control as sequential, not parallel, to efforts in CFE and the CW talks; (2) explanation that we can move on arms control now, if arms control is understood as a process of unilateral restructuring to lower levels on both sides; [(3) willingness to consider removing the global elimination of CW as one of our preconditions;] (OSD and NSC favor, State opposes) and [(4) offer to let NATO study how we could ultimately verify any reductions (negotiated or not) in SNF forces] (State favors, OSD opposes).

- An exploration of the pros and cons of calling for unilateral reductions of Soviet SNF capabilities to NATO levels. On the pro side: such a call could force a dramatic reduction in the SSM threat NATO faces and could preempt a Gorbachev offer to make such cuts during his June trip to Germany. On the con side: the Soviets could promptly accept the offer, conditioned on NATO foregoing modernization of its SNF. This counteroffer would be almost impossible for the Germans to refuse. Also, if we call for a cut in Eastern missile launchers, the Pact would be cutting their dual-capable missile launchers and we could then effectively lose the entire conventional MLRS program by being constrained to only 88 nuclear-capable missile launchers. If, on the other hand, we call for a cut in Eastern warheads or missile numbers, we have no way of verifying whether such cuts have occurred (and grave concerns about any regime that pinpointed the warhead locations and numbers on the two sides).

Points to Be Made

After introductory comments, we recommend you make the following points to the FRG.

- The President and the Chancellor have agreed that the way to work through this issue is with close, confidential consultations.
- We see these consultations as the means to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution that can be recorded in the Comprehensive Concept.
- Once we are agreed on an approach, we can lead the rest of the Alliance to our acceptable outcome.
- These are the principles we think should underlie the solution:
 - Flexible response based on a mix of nuclear and conventional systems.
 - A need in the foreseeable future for land-based SNF missiles, irrespective of the outcome of the CFE negotiations. (i.e. no third missile zero)
 - Our agreement at Montebello to maintain forces at the lowest level capable of deterring Warsaw Pact threats.
 - Need to keep the systems up-to-date.
 - A restructuring of our forces, including introduction of the Follow On To Lance, which will permit us to shift the emphasis of our force posture from short to longer ranges and allow us to cut the stockpile dramatically. This cut would include those systems with the shortest range, namely artillery projectiles.
 - We should explore opportunities for dialogue with the East, but, as the President said in his letter to the Chancellor, negotiations now would be a grave mistake.
- The problems that would be presented by SNF arms control negotiations are extraordinary.
- [[We can and should challenge the East to remove its considerable advantages in SNF.]] (Bracketed due to potential cons listed at end of previous section.)
- Reductions in the overall Warsaw Pact nuclear and conventional threat, whether unilateral or negotiated, would allow NATO to reduce the number of its weapons in Europe still further.

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05c. Report	Re: Strategy Paper for SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] for Meetings with FRG (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - March 1989

Document Partially Declassified

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Date Closed: 3/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91120-001
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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2911-MR (504.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/20/2015

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- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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STRATEGY PAPER FOR SNF FOR MEETINGS WITH FRG

State of Play in Modernization

-- NATO's modernization program for nuclear forces includes fully modernized artillery rounds (AFAP), and a new stand-off air-delivered missile (TASM) as well as Follow On To Lance (FOTL).

-- SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study (NWRS) postulates that with modernization of all systems, the overall theater nuclear inventory could decrease by one-third, including a fifty per cent reduction in nuclear artillery rounds.

-- To date, neither TASM nor AFAP modernization per se has become the kind of political issue that FOTL has.

-- Existing LANCE is due to be removed from Europe beginning in 1995. In order to field a FOTL by 1995, we cannot afford to interrupt ongoing development and test programs for the FOTL missile.

-- Therefore, we require money in the FY 1990-91 budget, and have already requested \$161 million. We are not sure what European assurances Congress will require this year. Some key members of Congress sometimes appear willing to provide this year's funding for FOTL with a minimal commitment from the Allies -- possibly no more than already said in the March 1988 Summit statement and various NPG communiques.

State of Play in Europe

-- The situation is deteriorating rapidly, and the FRG attitude toward SNF modernization/arms control is moving unfavorably against US interests.

-- Kohl understands the need for modernization but seems unwilling to go beyond the March 1988 formulation (maintaining "up-to-date" systems).

-- Genscher is working against any modernization decision. He sees FOTL as a "new missile" which impedes improvement in East-West relations.

-- Genscher does not rule out a third zero at a later date depending on CFE results, and "demands" immediate SNF negotiations.

-- There appears to be an FRG consensus in favor of SNF negotiations leading to equal lower ceilings on SNF missile launchers and missiles (e.g. 72 launchers).

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2010-2911-112

28 4/20/15

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
Declassify on: OADR

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3.3(b)(5)



-- The comprehensive concept is hung up in Brussels pending German clarification of their positions on SNF modernization and arms control. The FRG is holding back, however, until they have talked to us.

-- The Soviets have indicated their opposition to modernization, their willingness to negotiate on all theater nuclear-capable systems and their armaments, and their readiness to eliminate all SNF.

Current Issues

-- In essence, we want a firm NATO commitment to modernize SNF, including a specific endorsement of the FOTL, with no commitment to SNF arms control negotiations anytime soon. The Germans want either a vague commitment to modernization or no commitment at all this year (depending on who is speaking), coupled with the immediate initiation of East-West SNF arms control talks. We have told Kohl that any solution must protect NATO defenses and that, while we hope to explore opportunities for dialogue with the East, we are against the opening of SNF arms control negotiations under current circumstances.

-- In addition to language on modernization and arms control, we must also decide whether NATO should, in the context of an overall solution, offer further unilateral reductions in the nuclear stockpile beyond current plans or call on the USSR unilaterally to reduce its SNF-capable missile launchers to current NATO levels.

-- There are also issues, within the USG, of what tactical approach to take at this meeting - whether, or how far, to show signs of US flexibility within a tough going-in position. These issues are indicated by the bracketed language in the next section.

Objectives and Tactics for this Meeting

-- Our first goal is to stop the deterioration in the German position.

-- We have to do that by taking control of the issue, developing a clear USG position and putting in motion a process designed to lead to early US-FRG agreement.

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- We need to:
 - Show firmness on the principles that must underlie a solution.
 - Demonstrate our determination to find a solution that meets our strategic needs (FOTL deployment) and Germany's domestic problem (get Kohl past the 1990 elections).
- To meet these objectives, we must know and be prepared to say at some stage, although not necessarily at this meeting:
 - The US position on the level, mix, and timing of needed improvements in NATO SNF forces.
 - What commitment we are willing to accept in the Comprehensive Concept document on SNF arms control.
- We, in turn, need to learn from the Germans more about their own government's thinking on these issues.
- Tactically, if the Germans are unable, at this meeting, to bargain on the final outcome, we should adopt a position that stays tough on the core elements while signaling that we are sensitive to their situation and serious about these talks.
 - On modernization, we should argue for a clear description of the mix of forces we envision after 'restructuring' (which Scholz prefers to "modernization"), including explicit endorsement of the FOTL. We should make clear that we do not expect an explicit deployment decision at this time that commits individual countries to accept specific numbers of systems. [[But we could state that, contrary to SHAPE's current recommendation, we could consider replacing Lance missiles with a smaller number of FOTL missiles in the overall SNF mix.]]
 - On arms control, a restatement of the 'Reykjavik formula' (tangible and verifiable reductions of US and Soviet land-based missiles leading to equal ceilings in conjunction with establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons), with: (1) reiteration that we see this as a sequential, not parallel, process; (2) explanation of our willingness to approach arms control now, with arms control understood as a process of unilateral restructuring to lower levels on both sides; [[(3) willingness to consider removing the global elimination of CW as one of our preconditions;]] and [[(4) offer to let NATO study how we could ultimately verify any reductions (negotiated or not) in SNF forces.

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- An exploration of the pros and cons of calling for unilateral reductions of Soviet SNF capabilities.

Points to Be Made

After introductory comments, we recommend you make the following points to the FRG.

- The President and the Chancellor have agreed that the way to work through this issue is by close, confidential consultations.
- We see these consultations as the means to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution that can be recorded in the Comprehensive Concept.
- Once we are agreed on an approach, we can lead the rest of the Alliance to our acceptable outcome.
- These are the principles we think should underlie the solution:
 - Flexible response based on a mix of nuclear and conventional systems.
 - A need for the foreseeable future for land-based SNF missiles, irrespective of the outcome of the CFE negotiations. (i.e. no third zero)
 - Our agreement at Montebello to maintain forces at the lowest level capable of deterring Warsaw Pact threats.
 - Need to keep the systems up-to-date.
 - A restructuring of our forces including introduction of the Follow On To Lance, which will permit us to shift the emphasis of our force posture from short to longer ranges and allow us to cut the stockpile dramatically. This cut would include those systems with the shortest range, namely artillery projectiles.
 - We should explore opportunities for dialogue with the East, but, as the President said, negotiations now would be a grave mistake.
- The problems of SNF arms control negotiations are extraordinary.
- We can and should challenge the East to remove its considerable advantages in SNF.
- Reductions in the overall Warsaw Pact threat, whether unilateral or negotiated, would allow NATO to reduce the number of its weapons in Europe still further.

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG #

1607

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>OAD 4/7</u>	<u>~</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN March 13, 1989

CHRON FILE

1432

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: SNF and Lance Follow-on

Our attempts to ensure that a robust nuclear deterrent remains in Europe after INF systems are removed have involved three specific acts: (a) an increase in the visibility of our assignment of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles to NATO; (b) plans for a nuclear-armed Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM) to be carried on theater aircraft; and (c) plans for a follow-on to the Army's Lance missile, a 110 kilometer missile widely deployed in Europe and possessing both nuclear and conventional capabilities. At the same time, we have resisted entering into negotiations on Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF) (i.e. those with ranges below the INF Treaty cut-off of 500 kilometers) because we fear we would be unable to avoid a so-called "third zero" that would push us toward the denuclearization of Europe.

Our goal of deploying a follow-on to Lance has proved highly contentious with the Germans and with the U.S. Congress. For domestic political reasons, Chancellor Kohl has recently become reluctant to make a deployment decision on Lance Follow-on before the next German election in mid-1990. In addition, there is growing sentiment in the Federal Republic of Germany that SNF arms control should begin soon. This is now the formally announced position of both Foreign Minister Genscher and the Soviet Union.

We will have to resolve this issue before the NATO summit. In preparing to do so, I thought it might be useful to review how we got here. I have had the attached paper prepared summarizing the history of the issue. I recommend you read it for background in preparation for the decisions which you will soon face.

Prepared by:
Don Mahley

Copy to: The Vice President
The Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2911-102
28 4/20/2013

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten notes:
Brent
Very helpful
I'd like a 30 minute - 45 minute
"show & tell" briefing
with pictures & numbers
a cover to allow me
to go out alone
at Res

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2911-MR
2/18/2014 MM

SNF AND LANCE FOLLOW-ON -- HOW WE GOT HERE

In 1983, with deployment of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II imminent, NATO Defense Ministers at Montebello: (a) unilaterally reduced the NATO theater nuclear inventory by 1400 weapons; (b) affirmed that the remaining inventory should be kept modern, survivable, and at the minimum level necessary for deterrence; and (c) approved a SACEUR Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study calling for a future inventory including, among other elements, a follow-on to the LANCE missile. The projected inventory also included a follow-on to the FRG's Pershing I missiles and the U.S. INF systems.

When the INF Treaty was signed and the Germans independently decided to eliminate their Pershing I force, SACEUR revised his study to increase the emphasis on the follow-on to LANCE, and to recommend that such a missile have a longer range than the existing LANCE (which has a range of 110 kilometers).

The FRG, led by Foreign Minister Genscher, argued that: (a) especially with increased range, the follow-on to LANCE was really a new missile, not simply a modernization of a current weapon; and (b) they could not agree to deploy new nuclear missiles without also considering parallel arms control approaches. Therefore, they argued, NATO must devise a "comprehensive concept" that would balance arms control considerations and defense improvements in NATO's security posture.

At Reykjavik in 1987 NATO foreign ministers agreed to develop such a "comprehensive concept," that would include "in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and a global ban on chemical weapons, consideration of tangible reductions in SNF leading to equal ceilings...." The US and FRG have disagreed on whether this language implies starting negotiations on shorter range nuclear systems once conventional balance and the elimination of chemical weapons have been achieved, or when negotiations on those elements have been started. At the NATO Summit in 1988, heads of state agreed that NATO would keep its forces "up-to-date where necessary," but did not attempt to resolve the different US and German interpretations.

The domestic problem for the U.S. is that some members of Congress threaten to delete the development funds for the follow-on to LANCE in the current budget if NATO does not provide some additional demonstration of its commitment to the weapon. If we suspend development, we will not be able to field a follow-on system before the end of the life cycle of the current LANCE missiles, even if we subsequently resume our efforts.

The U.S. is trying to overcome increasing FRG reluctance to insert additional language supporting LANCE follow-on in the NATO Summit documents this spring. We believe a specific commitment by NATO to having a land-based missile as part of theater nuclear forces should be sufficient for Congress.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1432

March 6, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: LINTON BROOKS *[Signature]*

FROM: DON MAHLEY *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SNF/Lance Follow-on -- How We Got Here

*Good memo.
R*

Attached is the "How We Got Here" memorandum for the President on SNF and Lance Follow-on which Bob Gates requested we prepare.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Bob *[Signature]* Blackwill concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to the President
Tab A "SNF and Lance -- How We Got Here"

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *6/19/11*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1618

March 13, 1989
CHRON FILE

2

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/LINTON BROOKS *RB*
FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*
SUBJECT: Next Steps with the Germans on SNF

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

As you know, Horst Teltschik will not be coming this week for talks on SNF. Our charge in Bonn talked to Teltschik. Teltschik said Bonn probably would not be ready for bilateral talks until April. Although Teltschik emphasized Genscher's hospitalization as the principal obstacle to development of a common coalition position, we believe other political factors are at work that are at least as important as Genscher's temporary absence.

In elections held yesterday, March 12, in the state of Hesse and the state capital, Frankfurt, the Christian Democrats (CDU) lost power, with substantial defections from the totals polled in the last election (1985). Again, as in Berlin, extremist parties on the left and the right were the main beneficiaries. Our Consulate reports that the SPD will probably form a coalition with the Greens to govern Frankfurt (Frankfurt 4042, Tab B). This latest electoral setback, combined with the previous defeat in Berlin, has deeply traumatized the CDU. Genscher's FDP failed to make the cutoff needed to get any seats in the Hesse parliament or on the Frankfurt city council. As the CDU struggles to regain its strength, the likely temptation will be to move to the right on social issues and emphasize attention to German national (as opposed to NATO or EC) concerns. The FDP will be under even greater pressure to distance itself from the CDU. The election results are thus bound to make both parties even more reluctant to spend their dwindling political capital on the issue of SNF modernization.

Our next step should be to pursue the bilateral dialogue in Bonn. We are preparing a message, to be cleared interagency, that our charge could give to Teltschik, summarizing some of the points he would have heard if he had come to Washington. We then hope, using him as our principal interlocutor, to try to get a better sense of how opinion in Bonn is shaping up on this issue.

Bob Hutchings *BH* and Don Mahley *Ham* concur.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Message from Teltschik to Scowcroft
- Tab B - Frankfurt 4042

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2010-2911-MR
SCS 6/18/12

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: HOTLINE GATES SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: HOTLINE IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 131342Z MAR 89

FM CHARLIE

TO CROWN

~~SECRET~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

0000

MSGNR0462

FROM HORST TELTSCHIK, FEDERAL CHANCELLERY BONN

BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

DEAR BRENT,

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION STARTING BILATERAL DISCUS-
SIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND SNF-
MODERNIZATION.

I FULLY AGREE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATING THE POSITION OF
OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THESE ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
UNFORTUNATELY OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FINISHED YET ITS OWN CONSIDER-
ATIONS. IT NEEDS MORE TIME. I WILL COME BACK TO YOU IMMEDIATELY WHEN
OUR GOVERNMENT POSITION HAS BEEN DECIDED.

WITH WARM REGARDS

HORST TELTSCHIK

*0462

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2911-MR

SCS 6/18/12

~~SECRET~~

<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: MENATH VAX BLACKWILL ZELIKOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUFHFT<DTG> 131508Z MAR 89
<ORIG>FM AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1502
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1221
RUDKHB/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 7745
RUFHSG/AMCONSUL STUTTGART 6211
RUFHJU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 9586
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 7819

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 FRANKFURT 04042

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, GE

SUBJECT: CDU SUFFERS SETBACKS IN HESSE ELECTIONS
~BEGIN SUMMARY~

1. SUMMARY. HESSEN WIDE THE CDU TOOK A BEATING IN THE MARCH 12 COMMUNAL ELECTIONS. THE SPD AND GREENS POSTED LOWER THAN EXPECTED GAINS BUT NONETHELESS IMPROVED THEIR POSITION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MANY AREAS. FRANKFURT WAS SHOCKED BY A 6.6 PERCENT SHOWING FOR THE NPD. CDU RAN POORLY IN FRANKFURT, AND A RED-GREEN COALITION IS THE MOST LIKELY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FRANKFURT CDU SUFFERED A MAJOR BLOW MARCH 12, COMING IN AT 36.6 PERCENT OF VOTES CAST, 13 PERCENT LESS THAN IN 1985. THE SPD WON A PLURALITY, WITH 40.1 PERCENT, A MODEST 1.5 PERCENT GAIN OVER 1985. THE GREENS POLLED 10.1 PERCENT, 2.1 PERCENT MORE THAN IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTION. THE FDP JUST FAILED TO MAKE IT INTO THE GOVERNMENT, WITH 4.9 PERCENT. THE OVERRIDING NEWS OF THE EVENING WAS THAT THE NPD POLLED 6.6 PERCENT AND WILL ENTER THE ROEMER FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1972.

3. VOTING TRENDS IN OTHER CITY AND DISTRICT ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT HESSE WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE IN FRANKFURT. THE CDU POSTED LOSSES; THE SPD SLIGHT TO SUBSTANTIAL GAINS; AND THE PROTEST PARTIES, GREENS, NPD, REPUBLIKANER, AND THE VOTERS ASSOCIATIONS (WAEHLERGEMEINSCHAFTEN) DID WELL. TAKEN TOGETHER, THE NON-MAINSTREAM PARTIES (TO THE LEFT AND RIGHT OF CDU, SPD, AND PDP) RECEIVED 16 PERCENT OF THE VOTE COMPARED WITH ABOUT TEN PERCENT IN 1985. THE CDU LOST ABSOLUTE MAJORITIES, DROPPING BELOW 50 PERCENT EVEN IN SUCH ARCH-CONSERVATIVE STRONGHOLDS AS FULDA.

4. HESSE-WIDE, THE CDU DROPPED 6.8 PERCENT TO 34.3, THE SPD ADDED 1.1 PERCENT FOR A TOTAL OF 44.8, THE FDP DROPPED 0.4 PERCENT TO 4.9, AND THE GREENS ADVANCED 2 PERCENT TO 9.1. VOTERS' ASSOCIATIONS POLLED 3.4 PERCENT HESSE-WIDE, UP 1.3 PERCENT FROM 1985. THE REPUBLIKANER AND THE NPD, POLLED 0.7 PERCENT (21,085 VOTES) AND 1.4 PERCENT (44,356 VOTES) RESPECTIVELY. NEITHER CONTESTED THE 1985 ELECTION. IN THOSE FEW RACES WITH BOTH REPUBLIKANER AND NPD REPRESENTED, THE

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2010-2911-MR
SCS 6/18/12

REPUBLICANER DID SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN THE
NPD. TOTAL VOTER TURN-OUT WAS GOOD, 78.1
PERCENT COMPARED WITH 75.8 PERCENT IN THE LAST
ELECTION.

5. LATE ON ELECTION EVENING, SPD LEADER VOLKER
HAUFF WAS PROMOTING STRONG CITY GOVERNMENT WITH
ALL THE "DEMOCRATIC" PARTIES (ALL EXCEPT THE
NPD). HOWEVER, CDU MAYOR WOLFRAM BRUECK HAS
SAID THAT THE CDU WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN SUCH
AN ARRANGEMENT, AND THE GREENS HAVE PUBLICALLY
SAID THEY WILL NOT JOIN IN A GOVERNMENT THAT
INCLUDES THE CDU. HAUFF WILL TRY TO BRING CDU
AROUND BUT, WE THINK, A RED-GREEN COALITION
REMAINS THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME.

6. THE NPD SUCCESS CAST A PALL OVER THE
ELECTION EVENING IN FRANKFURT. EVEN THE
WINNERS, SPD AND GREENS, WERE SUBDUED. AN HOUR
AFTER THE FIRST RESULTS WERE ANNOUNCED, A CROWD
OF 3000 TO 5000 PROTESTORS, CARRYING TORCHES AND
ANTI-NAZI BANNERS, GATHERED OUTSIDE CITY HALL
AND LATER MARCHED THROUGH THE CITY.

7, AS WE SEE IT, THE NPD VOTE, LIKE THE
IMPROVED SHOWING FOR THE GREENS, REFLECTS
DISCONTENT WITH THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES. AS IN
BERLIN, MOST FRANKFURT POLLS FAILED TO PICK UP
THE RIGHTIST TREND MOST LIKELY BECAUSE MANY
GERMANS ARE UNWILLING TO ADMIT THAT THEY PLAN TO
VOTE FOR A RADICAL RIGHT-WING PARTY. THE BOTTOM
LINE IS THAT CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS OF LOWER
MIDDLE VOTERS ARE DISTRESSED--THEY ARE ANGRY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 FRANKFURT 04042
ABOUT "BEING LEFT OUT" AND WHAT THEY SEE AS
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS AND
OTHER NON-GERMANS RESIDING IN FRG. GERMAN
SECURITY SERVICES CONSIDER THE NPD (UNLIKE THE
REPUBLICANER) AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE
CONSTITUTION. NPD CLEARLY SEEKS TO PLAY UPON
FEARS AND ANTIPATHIES OF LOWER INCOME VOTERS AND
IS EXPLICITLY NATIONALISTIC, BUT IT HAS THUS FAR
RESTRICTED ITSELF TO LOWKEY APPEALS FOR SUPPORT
OF FAMILY, AND LAW AND ORDER--THEY STRESS THAT
GERMANY IS FOR GERMANS! AT CITY HALL ON
ELECTION EVENING, POLITICIANS OF ALL STRIPES
FROM GREEN TO CDU SOUGHT TO MAKE THE POINT THAT
THE NPD VOTE HAS EVERYTHING TO DO WITH CURRENT
SOCIAL ISSUES, AND VERY LITTLE IN COMMON WITH A
NAZI REGIME THAT COLLAPSED BEFORE MOST OF
TODAY'S VOTERS WERE BORN. FURTHER ANALYSIS TO
FOLLOW. RATTRAY

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 4042<STOR> 890313101603 MSG000227096163
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<TOR>890313102640

1691
CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Mar-1989 17:13 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Cathy Millison

(MILLISON)

FROM:

Linton Brooks
(BROOKS)

SUBJECT:

RE: #1691 - Msg to Teltschik re SNF

You are correct; this is OBE per Scowcroft. File w/o action.

Lint

CC: Donald A. Mahley

(MAHLEY)

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By EDU NARA, Date 5/11/11

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1691

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: *for* LINTON BROOKS/ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: DON MAHLEY *DM*

SUBJECT: Message to Horst Teltschik

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2911-MR
SCS 6/18/12

Since Horst Teltschik declined our invitation to bilateral discussions in Washington this week, we believe it would be useful to provide him with some idea of what we would have said if he and a team from the FRG government had come. This will both focus discussion in the FRG government, and demonstrate that we are prepared to discuss SNF on a rational basis rather than simply to upbraid the FRG for not agreeing now to deploy a Follow On To Lance (FOTL) missile.

At the same time, we take Teltschik's point that the FRG is not yet ready to discuss this topic with us since they do not have a firm government position. Therefore, we are reluctant to provide movement on the US position, since this would amount to negotiating with ourselves. The FRG would be able to "pocket" our movement, concede nothing in return, and use our new position as the starting point for discussions/negotiations when they do come. The proposed message does not contain much in the way of US movement.

The text of the proposed message has been coordinated with interested agencies. NSC Staff recommend that you approve the message at TAB I and dispatch it via White House privacy channels as a personal message for Horst Teltschik. State ~~_____~~ (Bob Kimmitt's office) believes State channels should be used - to make the process "more orderly," although Dennis Ross believes you should use White House channels. If you wish to use State channels, at TAB II is a memo from Philip Hughes to State requesting that they transmit to Bonn the text of your message.

Philip Zelikow *PZ* Concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at TAB I for transmission via White House privacy channels.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

2

Alternatively, that you approve the text of the message and the memo at TAB II for G. Philip Hughes to forward to the Executive Secretary at State requesting State to transmit the message at TAB A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

TAB I	Proposed White House Message to Horst Teltschik
TAB II	Memorandum to State Executive Secretary
TAB A	Proposed State Cable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

MESSAGE FOR HORST TELTSCHIK IN BONN FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT
TO BE TRANSMITTED VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

~~SECRET~~ VIA WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS ~~SECRET~~

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

TO: HORST TELTSCHIK, CHANCELLERY OFFICE

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HORST,

I AM SORRY THAT YOU WERE UNABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSIONS ON SNF THIS WEEK, BUT I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU SOON. IN THE MEANTIME, I THOUGHT I WOULD FORWARD TO YOU SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT.

SNF ISSUES, ALTHOUGH ALLIANCE-WIDE CONCERNS, ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. IF WE CAN DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH TO THIS SUBJECT, IT WILL BE MUCH EASIER TO FORGE A NATO CONSENSUS AROUND OUR COMMON POSITION. THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHANCELLOR HAVE AGREED THAT THE WAY TO WORK THROUGH THIS ISSUE IS WITH CLOSE, CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATIONS, WHICH I BELIEVE WE SHOULD START AS SOON AS WE CAN.

WE NEED TO EXPLORE HOW BEST TO EXPRESS NATO'S COMMITMENT TO FULFILL THE PROMISE OF THE 1988 SUMMIT STATEMENT TO KEEP NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES UP TO DATE, AND TO FRAME THE NATO COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WITH REGARD TO SNF.

I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN FIND A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY WAY TO DESCRIBE THE MIX OF NUCLEAR FORCES WE ENVISION HAVING IN NATO IN THE FUTURE TO SUPPORT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, INCLUDING A LAND-BASED MISSILE SUCH AS THE FOLLOW ON TO LANCE. NATO'S POLICY, AS REAFFIRMED AT MONTEBELLO, IS THAT WE WILL DEPLOY THE LOWEST NUMBER THAT WILL PROVIDE THE DETERRENCE REQUIRED BY NATO STRATEGY. AS YOU KNOW, SACEUR'S RECENT REQUIREMENTS STUDY PROJECTS A MODERNIZED FORCE POSTURE WHICH IS SMALLER THAN THE CURRENT NATO INVENTORY.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS BASED ON A MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS. IN THAT CONTEXT, WE BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A NEED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE FOR LAND-BASED SNF MISSILES, ALONG WITH AIR-DELIVERED WEAPONS AND SOME ARTILLERY-FIRED PROJECTILES, REGARDLESS OF ANY OUTCOME OF THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE CAN NOW VISUALIZE. THAT DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT WE NEED AT THIS TIME AN EXPLICIT COMMITMENT FROM INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TO DEPLOY SPECIFIC SYSTEMS.

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2010-2911-MR
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MOREOVER, MODERNIZATION OF OUR FORCES TO INCLUDE INTRODUCTION OF A FOLLOW ON TO LANCE SHOULD PERMIT US, ACCORDING TO SACEUR'S ANALYSIS, TO SHIFT THE EMPHASIS OF OUR POSTURE FROM SHORT TO LONGER RANGES AND ALLOW SIGNIFICANT CUTS IN THE OVERALL STOCKPILE. AT THE SAME TIME, I KNOW GERMANY AGREES THAT WE MUST AVOID ANY PROSPECT OF A "THIRD ZERO" CONCERNING LAND-BASED MISSILES.

ALL OF THIS SHOULD INFORM OUR DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL. WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, EXPLORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST - BUT, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS JANUARY MESSAGE TO THE CHANCELLOR, NEGOTIATIONS UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE. BUT WE WANT TO EXPLORE WITH YOU WAYS TO EXPRESS NATO'S LONGSTANDING EFFORT, THROUGH DIALOGUE AND OUR OWN ACTIONS, TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET UNION TO MATCH NATO'S RESTRAINT.

THIS IS SOME OF THE THINKING I WANTED TO SHARE IN A WASHINGTON MEETING WITH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE MOD AND MFA. I HOPE IT WILL PROVIDE STIMULUS TO YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DELIBERATIONS, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT AN EARLY DATE.

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1691

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Message to Horst Teltschik (U)

Request you transmit the attached cable containing a message from
National Security Adviser General Scowcroft to Horst
Teltschik. (C)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Proposed Cable

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2001
By 61 NARA, Date 5/11/01

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IMMEDIATE BONN

NODIS

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM GEN. SCOWCROFT TO HORST TELTSCHIK

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE {PARA 4} FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GENERAL SCOWCROFT DIRECTLY TO HORST TELTSCHIK IN CHANCELLERY OFFICE. CHARGE SHOULD ALSO AT THE SAME TIME ELICIT A REACTION TO CONCEPT OUTLINED IN LETTER (ON COMMON SNF POSITION) AND ASCERTAIN FROM TELTSCHIK WHERE FRG THINKING IS ON SNF AT THE MOMENT. END ACTION REQUESTED.

3. BEGIN FYI ONLY: WE SUSPECT GENSCHER AT LEAST MAY TRY TO DRAG OUT THE ISSUE OF SNF MODERNIZATION UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT IN ORDER TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON US AND OTHER ALLIES. WHILE WE CANNOT FORCE THE GERMANS TO ENGAGE IF THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO SO, WE BELIEVE IT IS USEFUL TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE. END FYI ONLY.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

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I AM SORRY THAT YOU WERE UNABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSIONS ON SNF THIS WEEK, BUT I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU SOON. IN THE MEANTIME, I THOUGHT I WOULD FORWARD TO YOU SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT.

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WARM REGARDS,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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March 21, 1989

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES 
SUBJECT: Possible Issues for Breakfast, Wednesday,
March 22, 7:30 a.m.

Attached for your information are 5 items which may be raised at tomorrow's breakfast with Secretaries Baker and Cheney.

Attachments

Tab I	Status of SNF (DOD)
Tab A	Presidential letter to Kohl
Tab II	State Proposal on CW (DOD)
Tab III	COCOM (NSC)
Tab A	Short History of No-Exceptions Policy
Tab B	Recent CIA Assessment on Outlook for COCOM
Tab IV	Comprehensive NSC Review on European Issues (NSC)
Tab V	Conventional Forces in Europe (State)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 21, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: *N.A.*
JA LINTON BROOKS/ROBERT BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item -- SNF

On Monday Defense asked to have the status of SNF placed on Wednesday's breakfast agenda. Secretary Cheney wanted to get up to speed on where we stand. Subsequently he has seen and cleared the proposed Presidential letter and is aware of the plan to send Burt and Blackwill as Presidential emissaries.

While this sounds like the issue is OBE, we still think it should be discussed at the breakfast. We think it vital that you, Baker and Cheney be together on this issue. We suggest you use the breakfast to consider authorizing Burt and Blackwill to explore with the Germans the idea of having Kohl come to the United States in April to meet privately with the President to work this and other issues regarding the NATO summit.

You may also wish to debrief Cheney and Baker on your meeting with Robin Butler and his suggestion that the President do nothing until Mrs. Thatcher meets with Kohl. Our view is that this UK suggestion is a bad idea: (a) Mrs. Thatcher may not be the most effective force on Kohl and (b) this is fundamentally a German-American issue. Still, your counterparts should be aware of the British concern.

N
Phil Zelikow concurs. Don Mahley is on travel.

Attachment
Tab A Presidential Letter

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Helmut:

I regret that your team of experts was unable to schedule a visit here last week to consult on short-range nuclear forces and the Comprehensive Concept as you suggested earlier. I share your view that confidential talks now to work out a joint approach to these issues can help make the 40th anniversary of the Alliance and the May Summit a success. You were right to reiterate this to Jim Baker, and we should act soon. In the meantime, I thought I would forward to you some of the framework I believe can move us ahead.

SNF issues, although of Alliance-wide concern, are of particular importance to our respective governments. If we can develop a common approach on this subject, it will be much easier to develop a NATO consensus.

We need to explore how best to express NATO's commitment to fulfill the promise of the 1988 Summit statement to keep NATO's nuclear forces up to date, and to frame the NATO Comprehensive Concept with regard to SNF. We are aware of the political sensitivities in the Federal Republic that surround the question of nuclear deployments, and I assure you that we will be prepared, in our bilateral discussions, to take your needs into account. I know you will also be prepared to take our needs into account.

On the question of restructuring our nuclear forces, the solution must be consistent with the principle that flexible response requires a land-based SNF missile, regardless of the outcome of the CFE negotiations. I know Germany agrees that we must avoid any prospect of a "third zero." I think we can find a way to describe the mix of nuclear forces we require, including the Follow-on to Lance. In fact, the number of systems that will eventually be required is a matter for Alliance consultations -- and NATO is committed to seek the lowest number that will provide the deterrence required by Alliance strategy.

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A restructuring of our forces to include introduction of a Follow-on to Lance will allow significant cuts in the overall stockpile and shift the emphasis from shorter to longer range weapons.

All of this should inform our discussion of the question of arms control. I believe SNF negotiations would be a grave mistake in current circumstances. Indeed, the problems associated with such negotiations are extraordinary. I do not believe a commitment to formal SNF negotiations now is necessary to achieve progress toward the objective which NATO agreed at the Reykjavik ministerial meeting in 1987 -- tangible and verifiable reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter ranges leading to equal ceilings. We would like to explore with you ways to express NATO's longstanding effort, through dialogue and the Alliance's own actions, to encourage the Soviet Union to match NATO's restraint.

I recognize that this is a sparse outline of some of our thinking which we had wanted to share with Horst Teltschik. However, I hope it will provide stimulus to your government's deliberations. I look forward to hearing whatever reaction you may wish to give Ambassador Burt at this time and to continuing the dialogue among a small group of high-level representatives from our two countries as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Bonn

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 21, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: LINTON BROOKS *LB*
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item -- CW Initiative

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Defense has asked to have the Vienna CW initiative put on Wednesday's breakfast agenda. There are no specifics; Secretary Cheney simply wants to understand where we stand. State has not yet put this item into the interagency process. The status:

- NSC tasked DOD to prepare a plan by April 3 to implement early withdrawal, without increased funding for FY 1989 or 1990 although reprogramming is allowed. The answer will lay out the pros and cons of various options for acceleration. Implementation will be difficult because there is neither long-term storage space on Johnston Island nor room to construct such storage. DOD is working on the cost implications of accelerating the destruction facility.
- State assumes (1) the Australia conference will be the first half of September and will involve both government and industry, (2) the plan will be to restrict attendance to members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and "serious" non-CD countries (includes Eastern Bloc) but we probably can't keep states like Libya out, (3) a primary objective is to put the heat on the chemical industry, and (4) we want the conference to be an Australian show and are discouraging any U.S. bilaterals on the conference. We are unaware of any formal plan for consultations with Congress or U.S. industry, although State may be working one internally.
- Reaction from allies has been mixed. Japan and France have been negative, primarily because of lack of advance consultations. German reaction has been split, with the opposition not impressed. Most other allies have been silent.

There also remains the question of publicity. One motivation for the initiative was to seize the public relations highground. This means we have to sell it through some public diplomacy, but only after we have more details on the initiative itself (otherwise we risk a story that we don't have our act together).

We suggest you, Baker and Cheney discuss (a) what we hope to gain from the conference and (b) the current State approach. We think State should be urged to start working this through formal interagency channels as soon as possible so we can have a well coordinated effort prior to further consultations with other countries. Once we do, we can work on additional publicity.

Bob Blackwill, Phil Zelikow *PZ* and Judy Mandel *JM* concur. *PAV DAPM*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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March 20, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM:

JERRY W. LEACH *JW*
CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT:

Breakfast Item: The No-Exceptions Policy

At the recent Vienna CFE meetings, Sir Geoffrey Howe and others pressed Secretary Baker to drop this policy. The Secretary indicated that they could expect a U.S. decision soon.

We understand from Reg Bartholomew that the Secretary will recommend that the "no-exceptions" policy be replaced with a "limited-exceptions" policy. "Limited exceptions" would imply approval of export cases where strategic considerations are insignificant and denial for cases where they are important. We would need to explain the meaning of "limited exceptions" carefully so that the policy change was not misinterpreted as a major liberalization move.

Despite Baker's publicly expressed views in February that no-exceptions should only be rescinded in return for concessions from the Soviets, he seems to have dropped that idea. The change to "limited exceptions" in Baker's view is essential for alliance management and one which will not have a strategically significant impact on the flow of exports to the Soviets.

At this moment, OSD still prefers the "no change at all" option. However, we believe that their position may be softening.

To our knowledge, Secretary Cheney knows nothing of this as yet and Secretary Mosbacher and Commerce have not expressed their views.

Options

There are five options available to the USG.

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1. Leave the policy unchanged.

Pro's

- Runs no risk that Western governments or business communities will misinterpret our move as a significant liberalization.
- Attracts no big increase in new USSR export cases.
- Would please those who favor an unyielding approach to the USSR.

Con's

- Would be unpopular with our COCOM allies.
- Probably would undermine our efforts to strengthen COCOM.
- Would impede emergence of a consensus on East-West relations for the NATO Summit.
- Would incense Mrs. Thatcher who has publicly called for dropping the policy.

2. Replace the policy with a "limited exceptions" policy.

Pro's

- Is responsive, to a degree, to the allies.
- Would be taken as a positive, but insufficient, step by the Soviets.
- Would be seen as our quid-pro-quo for the Afghanistan withdrawal, though viewed as a small step by us in return.
- Would allow USG to be more flexible in COCOM on strategically insignificant cases.

Con's

- Would produce criticism from allies and the business community as too small a move.
- Might nevertheless be misinterpreted by Western companies and produce a large number of new cases.
- Would lead to criticism from those who favor Option 1 as the beginning of a slippery-slope return to the 1970s.

3. Drop the policy and go to case-by-case review in return for concessions from the Soviets.

Pro's

- If we agree to liberalize substantially, we might win a major concession (e.g. Nicaragua) from the Soviets.
- If the mutual concessions are substantial, we could win enthusiastic support in Europe.
- Could become a positive step in US-USSR relations.

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Con's

- Would force us into a larger liberalization step in actual exports than we are currently contemplating.
- Would increase strategic risks as the volume of the sales to the USSR goes up.
- As COCOM business has been traditionally conducted without out-of-context linkage such as this, the allies would be hostile to such an approach at the outset, even if they were consulted.
- The Europeans would be angered unless we consulted with them on concessions. Our failure to consult when the original policy was imposed in 1980 still rankles.
- Unlikely that Moscow would go for such a deal and then what?

4. Drop the policy and return to case-by-case review in return for agreement from our COCOM allies to strengthen national enforcement of export control laws or something similar.

Pro's

- Would make the Europeans "pay" something for wanting greater trade with the Soviets.
- Might lead to some strengthening of export control systems in Europe.

Con's

- Would be considered an unreasonable approach by the Europeans. Could turn into a nasty alliance issue.
- Might deliver to the Soviets an alliance squabble in which we lose whatever the outcome.
- Might set off a flood of new license applications for the USSR from Western companies.

5. Drop the policy and return unconditionally to case-by-case review.

Pro's

- Would give the allies and the Western business communities what they want.
- Could be a significant move in US-USSR relations, depending on how we defined "case-by-case".

Con's

- Would produce a large volume of new USSR cases.
- Would increase strategic risks as case volume grows.
- Would be bitterly criticized by proponents of an unyielding approach who would interpret "case-by-case review" as a code word for the policies of the 1970s.

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Recommendation

We believe that the USG must move soon and that the "limited exceptions" approach favored by State (option 2) is our best move in the circumstances. Such a step, however, will have to be presented carefully, both to other governments and to the general public. This is essential in order to avoid a flood of new export cases as well as to avoid charges of bad faith, i.e. that we announced a "liberalization" and then did not deliver. We will also need to avoid disarray among key USG agencies as well, something that occurred frequently on similar questions in the 1980s. State, Commerce, Defense, and NSC are traditionally the key players.

Attachment

Tab A	Short History of No-Exceptions Policy
Tab B	Recent CIA Assessment on Outlook for COCOM

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Short History of the No-exceptions Policy

The "no exceptions policy" was announced by the United States on January 12, 1980 with minimal prior consultation with the allies. The policy meant that the U.S. would veto any licenses (or "exceptions") in COCOM, where unanimity is required, for exports of controlled goods or technologies to the Soviet Union. Prior to the announcement, our policy was to consider case-by-case exceptions to the general embargo.

Shortly after the announcement, we asked our COCOM allies to adhere to the policy formally. They would not do so officially for three reasons:

- o it was painful for them domestically for commercial reasons and because they did not want to be seen to be kowtowing to US dictates;
- o they were upset because they had not been consulted prior to the announcement; and
- o they regarded the policy as a "foreign policy" abuse of the COCOM system by the United States.

At the time, we presented the no-exceptions policy to our COCOM allies and to the public as a sanction in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A subsidiary argument was that high technology exports inevitably helped the Soviet military and were not in the interests of the West. Nonetheless, all other governments saw Afghanistan as the primary reason for the imposition of the no-exceptions policy. They eventually gave unofficial, tacit support to the policy.

During the 1980s, three modifications weakened the policy somewhat. First, the policy was never used, except by us briefly, to stop the flow of equipment on the second tier of the control lists, i.e., less sophisticated equipment that requires a license from a national capital but not COCOM review. Second, we developed a list of stated exceptions to the no-exceptions policy. These included items for use in public health and safety, items in small quantities with low performance, and spare parts for previous exports. Third, in taking positions on COCOM cases, we have not used the explicit rationale of no-exceptions since 1986, although we have acted on the basis of the policy and been able to block most cases that have arisen.

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All of our 15 COCOM partners, but particularly the UK, the FRG, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium, served notice last fall that they expected us to drop the no-exceptions policy when the Soviets withdrew. This would reestablish the status quo ante, i.e. case-by-case COCOM review without prior assumption of denial.

Because he anticipated alliance pressure to revoke no-exceptions, Secretary Shultz discussed the matter repeatedly with Secretary Carlucci in December and January but could reach no agreement on how to proceed.

The UK, Belgium, and Japan placed six cases on the COCOM docket in December with the clear intention of testing our policy after February 15. These cases have now all been vetoed, without high-level protest thus far from any of the sponsoring governments.

Eight more cases are now in the pipeline: two from Italy, one from the UK, one from Japan, two from France, and two from the FRG. The UK case, for example, is a credit card system for pay telephones. The COCOM office indicates that, in its view, none of these eight cases are strategically significant. Under the no-exceptions policy, they will probably all be denied. It is possible that under "limited exceptions" they would all be approved.

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(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - SNF [Short-range Nuclear Forces] - March 1989

Date Closed:	3/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91120-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 21, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*
SUBJECT: Agenda Item for Breakfast on Wednesday, March 22:
Comprehensive NSC Discussion of European Issues

Our policies toward the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe are obviously interconnected. Before reviewing the particular issues which are associated with NSRs 3,4, and 5, the NSC may wish to hold a meeting to provide an overview of the political developments and trends that will affect our approach throughout the continent.

However, we have qualms about such a meeting. In any event, we think a separate NSC on Eastern Europe should go forward on Friday, March 24, in order to provide a policy framework for imminent decisions on Poland. But we wonder whether a general NSC on Europe would be focused enough to justify this use of the President's time.

If you do decide to hold an 'overview' NSC meeting on Europe, we recommend that it concentrate on the Soviet Union and Western Europe, emphasizing the following themes:

- What opportunities and risks does a more politically and economically integrated Western Europe represent for the United States?
- What are the principal obstacles we are likely to encounter in fashioning a consistent approach to an East-West policy that will command allied support?
- How do current political and military trends in the Soviet Union affect the continuing viability of NATO security policy and the US role in Europe?

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
March 21, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: LINTON F. BROOKS *LB*
FROM: DON M. SNIDER *DS*
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item, March 22nd: Conventional Forces
in Europe

This item was submitted by State for the purpose of facilitating discussion in two areas:

(1) Public diplomacy - State is concerned that the USG is well behind the powercurve in influencing the public debates on conventional force issues, particularly in Europe. We agree. They will cite two recently missed opportunities: No major publicity nor credit received for US cancellation of REFORGER 89 to ease domestic pressure on FRG, and no credit received by the Alliance for influencing strongly, through the mandate negotiations, the shape of the initial Eastern proposal in CFE. There are other ongoing tensions in NATO with conventional forces -- helicopter stationing and low-level training flights. The USG does need to get moving, articulating a coherent rationale for our forward stationed forces in support of common security interests, even in an era of conventional negotiations. However, this is more an issue of execution than one of policy or organization. [FYI - The NSC chairs a public diplomacy working group as a subcommittee of the NSC/PCC on arms control.]

(2) Analysis for CFE - State's concern is that there is little analysis ongoing in departments and agencies, particularly Defense, that will prepare the USG to address where we want CFE to go beyond the initial round, or in the case we cannot sustain the 90% level in that round. This is a valid issue -- there is a political need to go beyond the 90% level. However, Defense and JCS, while agreeing with the need, are reluctant to proceed quickly, noting that at some force level below 90% this is no longer a military issue -- the forward defense strategy itself will have to be reexamined. The need for further analysis is recognized in the Western Europe review (NSR-5), with a recommendation that Defense lead a study in the context of the Defense Strategy review (NSR-12). This recommendation was approved at a NSC/DC on Monday and will go to the NSC. Thus, guidance on further analysis will be forthcoming. The discussion tomorrow should focus on the degree of urgency and feasibility of doing the analysis with a view toward sharpening the guidance from the NSC.

RB in draft *PZ in draft* *J.M. in draft*
Bob Blackwill, Philip Zelikow and Judy Mandel concur.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 22, 1989

Dear Helmut:

I regret that your team of experts was unable to schedule a visit here last week to consult on short-range nuclear forces and the Comprehensive Concept as you suggested earlier. I share your view that confidential talks now to work out a joint approach to these issues can help make the 40th anniversary of the Alliance and the May Summit a success. You were right to reiterate this to Jim Baker, and we should act soon. In the meantime, I thought I would forward to you some of the framework I believe can move us ahead.

SNF issues, although of Alliance-wide concern, are of particular importance to our respective governments. If we can develop a common approach on this subject, it will be much easier to develop a NATO consensus.

We need to explore how best to express NATO's commitment to fulfill the promise of the 1988 Summit statement to keep NATO's nuclear forces up to date, and to frame the NATO Comprehensive Concept with regard to SNF. We are aware of the political sensitivities in the Federal Republic that surround the question of nuclear deployments, and I assure you that we will be prepared, in our bilateral discussions, to take your needs into account. I know you will also be prepared to take our needs into account.

On the question of restructuring our nuclear forces, the solution must be consistent with the principle that flexible response requires a land-based SNF missile, regardless of the outcome of the CFE negotiations. I know Germany agrees that we must avoid any prospect of a "third zero." I think we can find a way to describe the mix of nuclear forces we require, including the Follow-on to Lance. In fact, the number of systems that will eventually be required is a matter for Alliance consultations -- and NATO is committed to seek the lowest number that will provide the deterrence required by Alliance strategy.

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
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A restructuring of our forces to include introduction of a Follow-on to Lance will allow significant cuts in the overall stockpile and shift the emphasis from shorter to longer range weapons.

All of this should inform our discussion of the question of arms control. I believe SNF negotiations would be a grave mistake in current circumstances. Indeed, the problems associated with such negotiations are extraordinary. I do not believe a commitment to formal SNF negotiations now is necessary to achieve progress toward the objective which NATO agreed at the Reykjavik ministerial meeting in 1987 -- tangible and verifiable reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter ranges leading to equal ceilings. We would like to explore with you ways to express NATO's longstanding effort, through dialogue and the Alliance's own actions, to encourage the Soviet Union to match NATO's restraint.

I recognize that this is a sparse outline of some of our thinking which we had wanted to share with Horst Teltschik. However, I hope it will provide stimulus to your government's deliberations. I look forward to hearing whatever reaction you may wish to give Ambassador Burt at this time and to continuing the dialogue among a small group of high-level representatives from our two countries as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "George", followed by a long, diagonal slash mark extending from the bottom right of the signature area.

His Excellency
Dr. Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Bonn

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1866

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2911-MR
SCS 6/18/12

Purpose

To further the dialogue with Chancellor Kohl on modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SNF) in Europe.

Discussion

A major issue facing NATO is the modernization of U.S. short-range nuclear forces in Europe, especially the deployment of a replacement for the existing Lance missile. To avoid disarray at the May NATO summit we need to engage the Federal Republic of Germany as soon as possible. Although you and Chancellor Kohl have agreed to high-level consultations on the issue, the Germans have been unwilling to engage. We invited my counterpart, Horst Teltschik, to Washington for discussions; he declined, saying the German position was under review.

To move the process along, Secretary Baker suggests sending Ambassador Richard Burt as a Presidential envoy to Kohl. He would carry a letter from you to Kohl and would be accompanied by Ambassador Robert Blackwill of the NSC staff. I agree with this approach. I have discussed the issue with Secretary Cheney and Admiral Crowe who also agree.

Attached (Tab A) for your signature is a letter to Kohl. It is similar to your previous letters and sets forth our views. Having it hand-carried will serve to open the dialogue.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Chancellor Kohl at Tab A for delivery by Ambassador Richard Burt.

Attachment

Tab A	Letter to Chancellor Kohl
Tab B	Input from Secretary Baker

Copy to: The Vice President
The Chief of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JB ANTON BROOKS/ROBERT BLACKWILL ^{NA, RZ for RS}

SUBJECT:

Letter to Kohl

Attached (Tab B) is Secretary Baker's proposed letter to Helmut Kohl. Baker recommends it be carried by Rick Burt; subsequently State has agreed that Bob Blackwill should also be part of the team. We agree.

We have shown State's draft to Secretary Cheney and Admiral Crowe. They suggested several minor wording changes which we have incorporated. A highlighted copy is at Tab II showing the changes.

In addition to these minor, non-substantive changes, Cheney and Crowe wanted to delete the paragraph reading:

A restructuring of our forces to include introduction of a Follow-on to Lance will permit us to shift to longer range weapons. It will also allow significant cuts in the overall stockpile, including deep reductions in those systems with the shortest range. [--artillery.] [You previously agreed to delete the word "artillery" because of JCS concerns.]

The Defense concern is that "systems with the shortest range" means artillery and they don't want to sign up to such a reduction at this stage. We compromised by modifying the paragraph as follows:

A restructuring of our forces to include introduction of a Follow-on to Lance will allow significant cuts in the overall stockpile and shift the emphasis from shorter to longer range weapons.

We have run this modification by both Cheney and Larry Eagleburger; both agree with it. While less blunt, it still will make the point to the Germans that the path to lessened dependence on shorter-range systems lies through a Follow-on to Lance.

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Attached (Tab I) is a memorandum to the President forwarding the letter, revised as indicated above, for his signature.

Other preparations for the trip are moving forward. State has drafted talking points which look fine. We are clearing them with Defense. We will not know if the Germans are willing to receive Burt until sometime Wednesday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Phil Zelikow ^{PK}Concurs. Don Mahley is on travel.

Attachment

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Letter to Kohl
Tab B	State Input

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 20, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: James A. Baker, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Kohl on SNF

One of the most sensitive and pressing issues facing NATO as we prepare for the May Summit is the planned modernization of U.S. SNF missiles in Europe. It is essential that we engage the FRG soon in high-level discussions on this issue so that the question may be resolved well prior to the May 29-30 NATO Summit.

We have approached Bonn repeatedly to implement the FRG suggestion made by Chancellor Kohl and endorsed by you that we hold high-level talks on the issue. Nevertheless, Bonn has yet to take action on this idea. Horst Teltschik was invited to come for that purpose recently, but at the last minute the FRG deferred the visit.

We need to take forceful action to get this discourse off the ground. I recommend that you send the attached letter to Kohl laying out some of our views. Moreover, I believe it would be useful to have a high-level Presidential emissary deliver the letter personally, both to indicate the importance we attach to the discussion and also to open the dialogue directly. I believe that Ambassador Burt would be an ideal emissary since he is still officially our Ambassador to the FRG and his meeting with Kohl would not attract too much attention.

Attachment:

Text of proposed Presidential letter to Kohl

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Dear Helmut:

I am sorry that your team of experts was unable to schedule a visit here last week to consult on short-range nuclear forces and the Comprehensive Concept as you suggested earlier. I share your view that confidential talks now to work out a joint approach to these issues can help make the 40th anniversary of the Alliance and the May Summit a success. You were right to reiterate this to Jim Baker, and we should act soon. In the meantime, I thought I would forward to you some of the framework I believe can move us ahead.

SNF issues, although of Alliance-wide concern, are of particular importance to our respective governments. If we can develop a common approach on this subject, it will be much easier to develop a NATO consensus.

We need to explore how to express NATO's commitment to fulfill the promise of the 1988 Summit statement to keep NATO's nuclear forces up to date, and to frame the NATO Comprehensive Concept with regard to SNF. We are aware of the political

His Excellency

Dr. Helmut Kohl

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.

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sensitivities in the Federal Republic that surround the question of nuclear deployments, and I assure you that we will be prepared, in our bilateral discussions, to take your needs into account. I know you will also be prepared to take our needs into account.

On the question of restructuring our nuclear forces, the solution must be consistent with the principle that flexible response requires a land-based SNF missile, regardless of the outcome of the CFE negotiations. I know Germany agrees that we must avoid any prospect of a "third zero." I think we can find a way to describe the mix of nuclear forces we envision, including the Follow-on to Lance. In fact, the number of systems that will eventually be required is a matter for Alliance consultations -- and NATO is committed to seek the lowest number that will provide the deterrence required by Alliance strategy.

A restructuring of our forces to include introduction of a Follow-on to Lance will permit us to shift to longer range weapons. It will also allow significant cuts in the overall stockpile, including deep reductions in those systems with the shortest range -- artillery.

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- 3 -

All of this should inform our discussion of the question of arms control. I believe SNF negotiations would be a grave mistake in current circumstances. Indeed, the problems associated with such negotiations are extraordinary. However, I do not believe a commitment to formal SNF negotiations now is necessary to achieve progress toward the objective which NATO agreed at the Reykjavik ministerial meeting in 1987 -- tangible and verifiable reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter ranges leading to equal ceilings. We would like to explore with you ways to express NATO's longstanding effort, through dialogue and the Alliance's own actions, to encourage the Soviet Union to match NATO's restraint.

I recognize that this is a very sparse outline of some of our thinking which we had wanted to share with Horst Teltschik. However, I hope it will provide stimulus to your government's deliberations. I look forward to hearing whatever reaction you may wish to give my emissary at this time and to continuing the dialogue among a small group of high-level representatives from our two countries as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 28, 1989

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
ERIC MELBY *EM*

SUBJECT: Your Dinner With Jacques Attali, Special
Counsellor to French President Mitterrand, Friday,
March 31, 1989

Attali is in town principally to consult on preparations for the July Paris Economic Summit. He will want to conduct a tour d'horizon with you on global issues, as well as discuss the shape of the Summit. Outlined below are current French foreign policy concerns, followed by our thoughts on preparations for the July meeting.

France's Foreign Policy Agenda

Franco-Soviet Relations. Visits to Moscow this year by the French Ministers of Agriculture, Industry and Tourism all attest to a more active Franco-Soviet relationship. Foreign Minister Dumas will be in Moscow March 28 to discuss the agenda for Gorbachev's visit to Paris July 4-7. While the French remain among the most cautious in Europe in dealing with Gorbachev, their growing bilateral agenda with the Soviets reflects a discomfort at being perceived as odd man out in the new dynamics of East-West relations. They will want to consult closely with us to protect their security and arms control interests, while maintaining their freedom to pursue their economic dealings with the Soviets. Attali may raise with you Jim Baker's public statements on a U.S.-Soviet dialogue on the future of Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's Reforms. The French are belatedly endorsing the view that it is in the West's interest to help Gorbachev succeed, although they remain vague as to how we can or should bring this about. They also remain skeptical of Gorbachev's chances of reviving the Soviet State. Elysée advisor Herbert Vedrine flatly told one of our embassy officers, "We are witnessing the death of Leninism."

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SNF Modernization. Mitterrand is continuing his balancing act between helping Kohl and ensuring that the Alliance not appear weak vis a vis Gorbachev. Following his February 27 Summit with Prime Minister Thatcher, Mitterrand publicly suggested that, if the Soviets modernize their SNF forces, there is no reason why the West should not do the same. Yet, he also said that the Germans will have to make their own "sovereign" decision on deployment. Although he remains a skeptic of the military value of SNF and doctrine of Flexible Response, he nevertheless reiterated publicly France's decision to produce the Hades -- France's own version of SNF land based missiles. Mitterrand will be meeting with Kohl April 8 to discuss planning for the NATO and Paris Summits, and to take another reading of Kohl's political future and his views on SNF.

Franco-German Relations. More rhetorical than real, the French have infused this relationship with special importance, principally to influence German political-security policies toward the East and economic policies toward the West. Kohl has been responsive, in part, to avoid being isolated on key issues. Dumas' opening statement at the CFE/CSBMs talks in Vienna -- in which he singled out the Benelux Countries and the FRG for "special treatment" -- raised Bonn's neuralgia to the establishment of a separate security zone dividing France and Germany.

Eastern Europe. The French are interested in responding to the reform efforts in Eastern Europe, yet do not want to embark on any policy that would undermine Gorbachev's position in the Kremlin. The glaring exception to reform -- Romania -- has been the target of a three pronged French diplomatic initiative -- bilaterally, with the EC and via the UN -- aimed at putting pressure on Ceausescu. At the request of the French we have agreed to begin a working-level bilateral exchange of views on Eastern Europe, with the first such meeting set for April 3.

Middle East. France, along with Spain and Greece -- form the EC troika on the Middle East. Mitterrand is worried that U.S. diplomacy will eliminate any role for the EC in the Middle East Peace Process, a concern he shared with Egyptian President Mubarak during his March 17 visit to France. In an effort to demonstrate their activism in the region, the French announced March 28 that Mitterrand would meet with PLO Chairman Arafat in the near future. On Lebanon, the French remain concerned about the disintegrating situation. The cool reception accorded to Syrian Foreign Minister Shara in his March 20-23 Paris meetings reflect French frustration with Syria's role in Lebanon.

Preparations For the Economic Summit

The Summit will take place July 14-16 in Paris, at the conclusion of the official celebrations of the French Bicentennial. In addition to the Summit Heads, the French are expecting around 15

Heads of State or Government for the Bicentennial celebrations July 13-14 (including Gandhi, Aquino, Bhutto, Mubarak and Perez).

In response to concerns expressed by us and other Summit countries, Attali has stressed there will be no commingling of the Summit and the Bicentennial nor French encouragement of any effort to put pressure on the Summit Seven to do something "special" for the Third World as a result of the presence in Paris of prominent developing country leaders.

The Economic Summit traditionally discusses economic issues during the formal sessions and political issues over meals.

Economic Issues. Economic issues likely to be on the agenda are: macroeconomic policy, trade, debt, the environment, the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) and East-West economic relations.

Debt and the environment are likely to arouse the most interest among the Heads. The fate of the Brady initiative is unclear at this point, and we will see after the IMF Interim Committee and IBRD Development Committee meetings next week whether a consensus is likely to emerge. In any event, debt is an issue that will likely attract serious attention at the Summit. We must also be alert to a play by Mitterrand may wish to use the Summit to plead the debtors' cause and get credit for any resulting flexibility by creditors.

The environment issue is a wild card. The political bandwagon to do something about climate change gathers more speed daily. The French helped sponsor the March 11 Hague Summit which called for a new international body within the U.N. with effective powers to police the environment. Margaret Thatcher favors Summit action on global climate change. Everyone believes the Summit should do something but no one yet knows what it is.

One possibility which could have positive environmental effects would be international action to get nuclear power back on track. Industry will not step forward without government encouragement. The French and Japanese have impressive nuclear energy programs; only the Germans would shy away from this issue.

Mitterrand is pushing a \$6 billion Bangladesh flood control project for which the French would like Summit blessing. Attali will be discussing the project with Barber Conable. We are skeptical about discussing the project in the Economic Summit. It is more appropriately handled in the World Bank. We should avoid selecting a disaster case of the year for the Summit to sponsor.

Trade will doubtless come up in the context of giving political encouragement to the Uruguay Round, particularly on agriculture. How much needs be given will be determined by the April 4-5 meeting of the Trade Negotiation Committee.

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There is widespread interest in using the Economic Summit to advance cooperation on controlling the spread of chemical weapons. There seems to be a consensus on expanding the Australia Group, a 19-member group of Western nations which meets informally to seek ways to control the spread of precursor chemicals.

Political Issues. While the thinking on economic issues is proceeding apace, discussion of suitable political topics for the Paris meeting has been anemic. Attali prefers to downplay political issues -- even suggesting at one point in the February Paris meeting that there be no political document. Others are pushing their pet interests: Britain; the Middle East (a likely loser from our point of view); the FRG; chemical weapons.

At the Paris Sherpa meeting, agreement was reached on the need for a political document. We are worried that, having reached this agreement, the document would amount to no more than a stale rehash of past communiques (e.g., drugs, terrorism). We should not commit the President to a ritualized communique exercise whose sole result would be to foster the impression that the Summit Seven ^{are} ~~is~~ trapped in a time-warp.

As we envision it, a political document should state boldly our vision on key international issues, and should be seen as a companion to the NATO Summit. Two possible themes for inclusion in the political document would be: the West's views of Gorbachev, and endorsement by the Summit Seven of our policy of including transnational issues in our agenda with the Soviets. We could also incorporate a positive statement on developments in Eastern Europe as well.

Attali will spend one day in Washington enroute to Mexico. In addition to dinner with you, he will see Richard McCormack at State, Richard Darman (unconfirmed), Barber Conable and Michel Camdessus.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEETING FOR SNF BRIEFING

DATE: March 29, 1989
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To present a briefing on Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) in response to your request.

II. BACKGROUND

See Tab A.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Doug MacEachin of CIA will present five minutes on Soviet capabilities and political strategy.

Ron Lehman of OSD will then present fifteen minutes on U.S. plans for SNF Modernization.

Discussions among principals will follow.

Prepared by:
Donald Mahley

cc: The Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Background Information for Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)
Briefing

In response to your request, we have scheduled a briefing from OSD and CIA on Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) for 10:00 a.m. - 10:45 a.m. on March 29, 1989. The briefing is designed to provide you with information on what the U.S. is planning to deploy, and when it will be operational. The CIA portion of the briefing will provide information on the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat. Our forces are not designed simply to counter Soviet SNF but rather are an integral part of NATO's overall strategy of flexible response and deliberate escalation.

Although SNF is a "family" of weapons systems, which encompass land-based missiles, aircraft bombs, aircraft stand-off missiles, and nuclear artillery shells, debate has centered around the land-based missile component, the Follow-On To Lance (FOTL). The briefing will explain U.S. plans for this system in detail.

This system has become the central political symbol in Europe, of both nuclear modernization in the wake of the INF Treaty and of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee of Alliance security.

There are three inter-related issues: (a) the need to modernize Lance; (b) the U.S. Congressional requirement for allied commitment to deploy a new missile as a condition for funding the new missile, and (c) German domestic politics which lead Kohl both to be reluctant to make a clear commitment now and to want NATO to make some sort of positive statement on SNF arms control. The Burt mission is our latest effort to find a formula that satisfactorily addresses all three.

These issues are coming to a head now because of the lead time required to develop a new missile in time to make a 1995 Initial Operational Capability (IOC). There are alternatives that might allow the hard choices to be deferred until after the 1990 German elections, but all have serious disadvantages. Likewise, there are theoretical alternatives to using the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) as the launcher (overall MLRS numbers could foster a perception that we are planning a tenfold increase in SNF launchers over the Lance), but these too have serious military and economic disadvantages.

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PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence

John H. Sununu

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brent Scowcroft

Robert M. Gates

Arnold Kanter, NSC Staff

Ambassador Robert Blackwill, NSC Staff

Mr. Douglas MacEachin - Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Ron Lehman - Office of the Secretary of Defense

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 28, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: DONALD MAHLEY

SUBJECT: SNF Briefing for the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President. OSD and CIA will present the briefing. We have requested that the material be long on information concerning US and Soviet SNF systems and short on policy.

Our hope is that it will provide a stimulus for discussion among the President and the principal advisers on the policy issues. Modern, land-based SNF is a bedrock of flexible response. As such, Lance modernization is a test that we cannot afford to fail. If our present game plan is successful, we will pass handily. But we face serious obstacles. In the end, if it looks as though we may fail the test as currently defined, we will need to redefine the issues to ensure that we are successful.

Doug MacEachin of the CIA will lead off with five minutes of information on Soviet capabilities and Soviet political strategy. He will emphasize that NATO's SNF are not designed simply to counter Soviet SNF, but rather conventional and nuclear attack by Warsaw Pact forces. We have made the point in the proposed memo for the President.

Ron Lehman will then spend about fifteen minutes on the Lance modernization program underscoring the fact that SNF is an integral part of NATO's strategy. That will leave ample time for discussion among the principals at the meeting.

on Draft
Philip Zelikow concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and forward to the President the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Background Paper
Tab B List of Participants

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 7, 1989

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Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: *on hand* ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: DON MAHLEY *DM*

SUBJECT: SNF Background Information

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SCS 9/25/12

You asked, in the context of considering options for Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) modernization -- specifically the Follow-on to Lance (FOTL), how we reached our current position. Below we summarize where we stand now and what should be considered if we alter our course.

In 1988, Secretary of Defense Carlucci, after reviewing US Army recommendations and analyses, selected the MLRS launcher for the FOTL system. He also made the accompanying decision to develop a unique nuclear missile for use on the MLRS launcher. (A separate option would have been to develop a nuclear warhead for the standard MLRS missile, but this would not have provided the range required by SACEUR). Secretary Carlucci announced this US decision at the NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) (NATO Defense Ministers) in December. Earlier last year, NATO Defense Ministers had approved a NATO Force Goal for the US to develop and procure a FOTL missile with the range capability required by SACEUR. In October 1988 at the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Ministerial, NATO Defense Ministers noted (as opposed to endorsed) a HLG report which recommended development and eventual deployment of a FOTL. NATO "theology" language aside, all of this means that NATO has asked the US to develop an appropriate missile; listened to the US announce a national decision on the launcher; and recognized that some believe an appropriate missile will be needed and should be deployed in the future.

Were we to change our course (e.g., by selecting a different launcher or missile), we would be obligated to inform NATO of our decision on two grounds. First, if earliest availability of the different system were delayed, we should report change in accomplishing our agreed force goal. Second, we owe SACEUR information about the availability of systems to accomplish his nuclear strike plans. Even if the different system were available by 1995, we should notify NATO if its capabilities (e.g., range, yield) differ from MLRS. This would not, however, require NATO to reverse any decision it has made as a corporate body.

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If we change course, we may need to sell Congress on idea that we may need more R&D money before we are ready to proceed with development. However, there are several contractors who already did research on their own to compete for the FOTL program. (e.g., Martin-Marietta has a separate launcher, using PERSHING technology, in its corporate files). We may well be able to field an alternate system just as early as MLRS, and the cost differential may only occur in the later procurement years (e.g., 1994-95). Our present information (reinforced by General Galvin's conversation with General Scowcroft on April 6) is that Congress is prepared to provide the requested funds in FY 90 and FY 91 (\$162 million total, all test and development) even without additional NATO commitment to deployment. NSC staff believe we could retain authority this money for an alternate program if we explained thoroughly how the new approach showed better political promise for European acceptance.

RB *h* *P2* *VAL*
Philip Zelikow concurs. Lampley concurs.

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