

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-014

Folder Title:
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (February - March 1991)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Note	David Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Volker Ruehe -- CFE (1 pp.)	2/27/91	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: The Future of the CFE Treaty (3 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	
02c. Memo	David Gompert/Arnold Kanter to Brent Scowcroft Re: CFE (1 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Letter	Prime Minister Major to President Bush (2 pp.)	3/28/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (February - March 1991)

Pinksheet Number: cap1035

OA/ID Number: 91121-014

Date Closed: 3/16/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101531
RECEIVED: 01 MAR 91 15

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 27 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: GERMANY
CFE

USSR

PERSONS: RUEHE, VOLKER

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG W/ VOLKER RUEHE RE CFE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 05 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT

LOGREF: 9101301 9101422

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT

KANTER

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

February 27, 1991

ADNSA Has Seen

NOTE FOR BRENT:

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Volker Ruehe -- CFE

Woolsey just reported that German Disarmament Commissioner Holik has advised Jim that he has floated a compromise with the Soviets on Article III (Naval infantry, etc). The Germans appear to be motivated at least in part by recent Soviet statements linking ratification of CFE to ratification of the 2 plus 4 treaties.

This German move is very bad for several reasons:

- The substance of the Holik compromise -- indeed, of any substantive compromise on Article III -- is unacceptable and would not meet our standard for ratification.
- For the Germans to float such an idea at this time undermines our strategy of getting Gorbachev to overrule the military on Article III.
- It is not acceptable for the Germans to float with the Soviets an idea on an issue they know is so sensitive to us and other allies.
- The Germans are making a big mistake in succumbing to Soviet linkage.

With Volker Ruehe in town, we have an opportunity to express our concerns to a confidant of the Chancellor. David will have already raised CFE with Ruehe by the time you see him; but it is important that you also raise this with him. We will also want to raise it with Genscher.


David Gompert

Concurrence by: Arnie Kanter 

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101278
RECEIVED: 21 FEB 91 09

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 11 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CFE
USSR

ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF THE CFE TREATY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 25 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT

KANTER

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 4 OF 4

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**National Security Council
The White House**

CFE

PROOFED BY: *JEB*

LOG # 1278

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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DOCLOG *[initials]* A/O _____

WSD
Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

91 MAR 5 P 7: 16

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

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APNSA Has Seen

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

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Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

11 MAR 2

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2-26-91 1278

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1991

91 MAR 11 AM 10:08

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: The Future of the CFE Treaty

On February 17, the grace period for correcting CFE data errors expired. Despite your letter last month to Gorbachev (Tab A), and parallel pressure from NATO allies, the Soviets have not modified their positions which cast doubt on the Treaty's future. Unless and until the Soviets meet our most critical concerns, ratification of the CFE treaty will not be possible. These CFE problems also have serious implications for our broader arms control agenda with the Soviets and our relations with key NATO allies.

Problems with the CFE Treaty

The Soviets are attempting to evade their CFE destruction obligations in three ways:

- Moving vast quantities of military equipment east of the Urals, outside of the zone covered by the CFE treaty.
- Reducing their apparent destruction obligation by underreporting the amount of military equipment located in the zone when the CFE treaty was signed.
- Insisting that equipment held by certain units such as naval infantry and their strategic nuclear forces are not covered by treaty limits (the so-called "Article III" issue).

The vast buildup of equipment east of the Urals (amounting to perhaps 60,000 tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces) was technically legal insofar as it occurred before the treaty was signed. It is a serious political problem, however, because it clearly undercuts the spirit and objectives of CFE. Our ability to manage the problem will depend critically on Soviet willingness to provide assurances about the ultimate disposition of this buildup.

Recent analysis suggests that the Soviet underreporting of equipment in the zone is far less significant than originally feared.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2004-1953-MR
SCS 1/17/08

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The most serious problem is the Soviet insistence that certain ground force units are not covered by the treaty limits spelled out in Article III. This interpretation is without foundation. (Jim Baker told Shevardnadze that it was "fraudulent.") None of the other 21 signatories share it, and all of the other 21 signatories have included their analogous units under CFE treaty limits. Using this self-defined loophole, the Soviets are already seeking to exclude more than 3,000 pieces of military equipment (including 1,000 tanks) by steps such as redesignating three armored divisions as naval infantry. More fundamentally, this Soviet unilateral reinterpretation of their treaty obligations after the treaty was signed undermines our confidence that they can be reliable negotiating partners who can make--and keep--agreements.

We have told the Soviets, our allies, and the Hill that we will not submit the CFE treaty for ratification until the Soviets have resolved this "Article III" issue. Most of the other signatories also will not ratify the treaty under current circumstances, but are unlikely to say so in public as we have done. Meanwhile, the CFE treaty that was to define the new military balance in Europe remains in limbo. Over time, we may face growing pressure from some (though not all) of our allies to compromise on Article III so that we can proceed to implement the rest of the CFE treaty.

Our Current Response

Your February 9 letter to Gorbachev about these CFE problems made clear that the Article III problem is not an issue that lends itself to compromise, and emphasized the broader U.S.-Soviet interests that are being placed in jeopardy. You have not yet received a reply.

The CFE follow-on negotiations opened in Vienna on February 14. Because these negotiations are supposed to build on the success of the CFE Treaty, we and our NATO allies have refused to conduct business-as-usual in the talks until the CFE treaty problems have been resolved. The East Europeans are sympathetic.

A Near-Term Strategy

Gorbachev has an important personal and political stake in the success of CFE. To address our concerns, however, he will have to overrule his generals who want to evade the treaty's destruction requirements, and Party hardliners who resent the broader Shevardnadze foreign policy (including German unification and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact) of which CFE is a part. Indeed, important elements of both groups would accept--or even prefer--no CFE treaty at all. We do not know whether Gorbachev will be willing and able to overcome the views of these key constituencies.

Our ability to affect the internal Soviet debate is limited. Our major sources of leverage lie in persuading Gorbachev that his hardliners are wrong in arguing that we will eventually back down

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in CFE, and in taking actions to convince Gorbachev that his failure to intervene personally and remedy the CFE problems will have major costs in other areas.

In particular, we need to impress on Gorbachev that the broader arms control agenda will be stalled until our CFE concerns get resolved: we would not enter into a START treaty (e.g., by withholding final signature or not submitting the treaty to the Senate), or go forward with negotiations aimed at a follow-on CFE agreement or proceed to talks on short-range nuclear forces.

We will face a more difficult problem if the CFE dispute remains intractable. Whatever its flaws, the CFE treaty would improve the balance of military power in Europe and limit Soviet ability to reconstitute threatening forces in the Western USSR. We may therefore need to try to salvage whatever we can from CFE if and when we conclude that the Soviets will not rectify the problems they have created. We are quietly considering options whereby the parties would implement the verification and undisputed destruction requirements even as ratification must await solution of the remaining problems. Any such approach would require Congressional support or acquiescence.

We will not face decisions about possible salvage operations for at least the next few months. Until then, we should pursue our present course of keeping the pressure on Gorbachev, refusing to submit the CFE treaty for ratification, holding off on signing START, scheduling a U.S.-Soviet Summit, or pursuing any further negotiations on European arms control, and persuading our NATO allies and the East European signatories to adopt the same posture.

Attachment

Tab A

Your February 9 letter to Gorbachev on CFE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last week. I wanted to write you personally with my views.

I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that the Soviet side continues to insist that ground force equipment held by certain units such as naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces is not subject to the limits of the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to explore possible compromises that would allow the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union. Jim told him we simply cannot do that.

I do not understand how the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that equipment such as that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE limits. None of the twenty-one other signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in part because both the treaty text and the negotiating record are so clear about what is covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty applies to the kinds of units and equipment that the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And, accordingly, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment they hold so that it would be subject to CFE Treaty limits.

I must tell you that the United States cannot accept any approach that would amount to a redefinition of the obligations and commitments that all the parties assumed when they signed the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty signatories hold a similar position.

Let me emphasize that this is not a question of the United States or any other signatory seeking unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit Soviet difficulties. I hope that the constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet concerns about the Kiev military district, which required us to reopen an agreement reached by our foreign ministers in New York, would put any such suspicions to rest. We did that even though our allies were neither easy to convince nor particularly pleased with our asking them to go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless, in that case, we were able to work together to address a problem precisely because it was raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not state its position on the treatment of units such as naval infantry when it had every opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was signed, particularly when it successfully argued for other exclusions during the negotiations.

I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were agreed, and I do not underestimate the difficulties you may face in meeting these commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way that would change the obligations that the signatories undertook. This is a matter of principle that determines how much confidence we can place in negotiations and commitments that directly affect our security. Basically, Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and credibility. That is why I will not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification until the Soviet Union has rectified this situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still hope to achieve ratification.

You and I have often said that the CFE Treaty is one of the principal pillars of the new security structure in Europe that we are trying to build. It symbolizes the end of a generation of military confrontation and competition and the beginning of a new era of cooperation. All of that could be put in jeopardy, however, if we are unable to resolve the naval infantry issue or address satisfactorily data discrepancies and the less pressing issue of the large-scale movement of military equipment east of the Urals. The treaty-mandated period for correcting CFE data ends on February 17. I hope we can put these matters behind us by that time.

I am conveying my concerns in this direct and forthright manner because of what is at stake. We stand at a crossroads, not just for CFE but for the entire arms control process. We either can move forward with agreements that enhance our mutual security and international stability, or see our long and hard efforts stall. I know neither of us wants that. I urge you to help us move down the right path.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of Mikhail Gorbachev, written in dark ink. The signature is slanted and features a prominent, sweeping stroke that extends downwards and to the right, crossing over the recipient's name.

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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REDO

March 5, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID COMPERT/ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
SUBJECT: CFE

As discussed, attached is a memorandum to the President on the implications of the CFE problem. Its main policy points are:

- The Article III problem is not one on which we can compromise.
- Therefore, Gorbachev will have to overrule the military and other hardliners if we are to have a ratifiable treaty.
- We must reinforce our strong message by demonstrating that the Soviets' stance on CFE is stalling the entire arms control agenda.
- In addition to refusing to enter into CFE IA and SNF talks, we should tell the Soviets that we are prepared to complete but not consummate a START agreement.
- It will not be easy to maintain Alliance cohesion around such a tough stance. We will have to be prepared to deal with Allied pressures to: slide into new arms control talks, compromise on Article III, ratify a flawed CFE treaty if the Soviets do not meet our concerns.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Your February 9 Letter to Gorbachev on CFE

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2004-1953-MR
SCS 1/17/08

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Letter	Prime Minister Major to President Bush (2 pp.)	3/28/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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Subseries: CFE Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (February - March 1991)

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-014
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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