

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-013

Folder Title:
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (December 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (4 pp.)	12/5/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Heather Wilson/Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Marshal Akhromeyev on CFE, Soviet Data, and Soviet Equipment Transfer East of the Urals (2 pp.)	12/3/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Message	From White House Re: Message to Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Rethinking Rail Garrison Termination (2 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (December 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1034

OA/ID Number: 91121-013

Date Closed: 3/16/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009345
RECEIVED: 27 NOV 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: WILSON
ZELIKOW
KANTER

DOC DATE: 03 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
TREATIES

CFE

PERSONS: AKHROMEYEV, S

SUBJECT: MSG TO AKHROMEYEV RE CFE / SOVIET DATA & EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS EAST OF
URALS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 30 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
KANTER
NSC CHRON
WILSON
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

BS — AKhromayev — re — CFE

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MLT

LOG # 9345

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG LAF A/O _____

WGA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>traveling</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	<u>5</u>	<u>12/4</u>	<u>D</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>12/5</u>	<u>N</u>

REC'D DEC 3 P 8.02

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (4 pp.)	12/5/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (December 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SSS on 10/22/14

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0981-MR (500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: PRIVACY OUT

<PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 050729Z DEC 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

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SECTION 01 OF 02

(b)(1)

TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MARSHAL
SERGEI AKHROMEYEV FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE:

DEAR MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV:

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK FOR YOUR HELP IN SOLVING TWO POTENTIALLY
SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN IN CFE. BOTH PROBLEMS RELATE
TO THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS SAID IT HAS
IN THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE-URALS AREA AND WHICH ARE THUS SUBJECT TO
THE TREATY.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THAT EACH COUNTRY PROVIDE DATA
ON HOW MUCH EQUIPMENT IT HAD IN THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS ZONE AT
THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY. OUR INFORMATION SHOWS THAT,
IN MANY CASES, THE SOVIET DATA DOES NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT ACTUAL
EQUIPMENT LEVELS AS OF SIGNATURE -- NOVEMBER 19. IT APPEARS, AMONG
OTHER THINGS, TO EXCLUDE EQUIPMENT THAT PERHAPS YOUR GOVERNMENT WAS
OR IS PLANNING TO REMOVE FROM THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE-URALS AREA BUT
THAT WAS STILL THERE ON NOVEMBER 19.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0981-MR

SCS 9/24/13

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

THIS IS A SERIOUS ISSUE WHICH IS CERTAIN TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET INTENT TO COMPLY WITH THE TREATY. CFE DESTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS ARE BASED ON EQUIPMENT LEVELS PRESENT AT SIGNATURE OR ENTRY-INTO-FORCE -- WHICHEVER ARE LARGER. THE TREATY PROVIDES VARIOUS MEANS TO ADJUST THE DATA SUBMITTED AT SIGNATURE. ALL PARTIES RECOGNIZED THAT MISTAKES MIGHT NEED TO BE CORRECTED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE DATA AND MAKE THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT YOUR EXAMINATION WOULD RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE FIGURES REPORTING WHAT WAS ACTUALLY PRESENT IN THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE-URALS ZONE AT TREATY SIGNATURE, AND THUS AN INCREASE IN YOUR DESTRUCTION OBLIGATION UNDER THE TREATY.

THE SECOND PROBLEM WHICH HAS ARISEN STEMS LARGELY FROM THE TRANSFER OF VERY LARGE AMOUNTS OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT OUT OF EUROPE AND EAST OF THE URALS, EXEMPTING IT FROM FORMAL COVERAGE UNDER CFE. WE HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS EQUIPMENT WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE CFE TREATY.

SECRETARY BAKER HAS RAISED THIS PROBLEM WITH MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS. IN AN OCTOBER 13 LETTER, MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT 20,000 TANKS HAD BEEN

TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE CFE ZONE BUT HE ASSURED US THAT THE BULK OF THESE TANKS WOULD BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN USE. IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 18, SECRETARY BAKER WAS ASSURED THAT THE TREATMENT OF OTHER TYPES OF EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN WOULD BE COMPARABLE. THIS ASSURANCE IS IMPORTANT TO US. WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DATA YOUR GOVERNMENT PROVIDED IN CONNECTION WITH SIGNATURE OF THE CFE TREATY WHICH REVEALED THE RECENT TRANSFER OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT OUT OF THE ZONE -- ESPECIALLY ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT. THE RESULTING DESTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS IN THESE TWO CATEGORIES (653 ARTILLERY PIECES AND 1295 AIRCRAFT) ARE CLEARLY TOO LOW; WE HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY TOLD IN NEW YORK IN OCTOBER TO EXPECT DESTRUCTION OF 3000 AIRCRAFT UNDER CFE. A TEAM IS ENROUTE TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS OUR

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

CONCERNS ABOUT EQUIPMENT MOVED EAST OF THE URALS. I TRUST THEY WILL HAVE INFORMATION AND USEFUL EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT WITH YOUR EXPERTS.

WE DO NOT WANT CFE TO BE PERCEIVED AS A HOLLOW SHELL. LIKEWISE, WE DO NOT WANT SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO RATIFY THE CFE TREATY AND OTHER AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL SOON REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WE EXPECT A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE MEMBERS OF TWO KEY SENATE COMMITTEES WHICH WILL ASK HIM NOT TO SEND THE TREATY TO THE SENATE FOR APPROVAL BEFORE THESE ISSUES ABOUT SOVIET DATA ARE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED.

I HOPE YOU CAN LOOK INTO THIS QUESTION. THE TREATY ALLOWS NINETY DAYS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES ABOUT THE DATA EXCHANGED. WE SHOULD USE THAT TIME TO PUT THIS PROBLEM TO REST. THERE ARE TWO POINTS ON WHICH I WOULD ASK FOR YOUR HELP: (1) IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP ESTABLISHED BY THE CFE TREATY, WE WILL BE LOOKING FOR A SIGNIFICANT REVISION TO THE SOVIET DATA PROVIDED AT SIGNATURE OF THE CFE TREATY THAT WILL REPORT THE EQUIPMENT THAT WAS ACTUALLY IN THE ZONE ON NOVEMBER 19. (2) FOLLOWING ON THE VISIT OF OUR TEAM, WE HOPE TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WHICH OFFERS ASSURANCES ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT TRANSFERRED EAST OF THE URALS AND INDICATES THAT EQUIVALENT NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT IN ALL THE RELEVANT CATEGORIES WILL BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED.

WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. WE VALUE THIS ACHIEVEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN WE RECENTLY MOVED EQUIPMENT OUT OF EUROPE FOR DEPLOYMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE VOLUNTEERED CLEAR ASSURANCES THAT THESE MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT AFFECT OUR ALLIANCE'S DESTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS UNDER CFE. IN THIS SPIRIT, WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR EXPERIENCE WITH CFE CONTINUES TO REFLECT THE NEW NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

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(b)(1)

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0130

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memo	Heather Wilson/Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Marshal Akhromeyev on CFE, Soviet Data, and Soviet Equipment Transfer East of the Urals (2 pp.)	12/3/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (December 1990)

Date Closed: 3/16/2009	OA/ID Number: 91121-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (December 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 10/22/14

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0981-MR (500.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/24/2013

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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FROM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MARSHAL
SERGEI AKHROMEYEV FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE:

DEAR MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV:

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK FOR YOUR HELP IN SOLVING TWO POTENTIALLY
SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN IN CFE. BOTH PROBLEMS RELATE
TO THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS SAID IT HAS
IN THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE-URALS AREA AND WHICH ARE THUS SUBJECT TO
THE TREATY.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THAT EACH COUNTRY PROVIDE
DATA ON HOW MUCH EQUIPMENT IT HAD IN THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS
ZONE AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY. OUR INFORMATION
SHOWS THAT, IN MANY CASES, THE SOVIET DATA DOES NOT ACCURATELY
REFLECT ACTUAL EQUIPMENT LEVELS AS OF SIGNATURE -- NOVEMBER 19.
IT APPEARS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO EXCLUDE EQUIPMENT THAT PERHAPS
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TO-THE-URALS AREA BUT THAT WAS STILL THERE ON NOVEMBER 19.

THIS IS A SERIOUS ISSUE WHICH IS CERTAIN TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT
SOVIET INTENT TO COMPLY WITH THE TREATY. CFE DESTRUCTION
OBLIGATIONS ARE BASED ON EQUIPMENT LEVELS PRESENT AT SIGNATURE OR
ENTRY-INTO-FORCE -- WHICHEVER ARE LARGER. THE TREATY PROVIDES
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PARTIES RECOGNIZED THAT MISTAKES MIGHT NEED TO BE CORRECTED. IT
IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
EXAMINE THE DATA AND MAKE THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS. WE WOULD
EXPECT THAT YOUR EXAMINATION WOULD RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL
INCREASE IN THE FIGURES REPORTING WHAT WAS ACTUALLY PRESENT IN
THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE-URALS ZONE AT TREATY SIGNATURE, AND THUS AN
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THE SECOND PROBLEM WHICH HAS ARISEN STEMS LARGELY FROM THE
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EXCESS EQUIPMENT WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE CFE TREATY.

SECRETARY BAKER HAS RAISED THIS PROBLEM WITH MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS. IN

~~SECRET~~

~~C T~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0981-MR
SCS 9/24/13

~~SECRET~~

2

AN OCTOBER 13 LETTER, MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT 20,000 TANKS HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE CFE ZONE BUT HE ASSURED US THAT THE BULK OF THESE TANKS WOULD BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN USE. IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 18, SECRETARY BAKER WAS ASSURED THAT THE TREATMENT OF OTHER TYPES OF EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN WOULD BE COMPARABLE. THIS ASSURANCE IS IMPORTANT TO US. WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DATA YOUR GOVERNMENT PROVIDED IN CONNECTION WITH SIGNATURE OF THE CFE TREATY WHICH REVEALED THE RECENT TRANSFER OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT OUT OF THE ZONE -- ESPECIALLY ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT. THE RESULTING DESTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS IN THESE TWO CATEGORIES (653 ARTILLERY PIECES AND 1295 AIRCRAFT) ARE CLEARLY TOO LOW; WE HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY TOLD IN NEW YORK IN OCTOBER TO EXPECT DESTRUCTION OF 3000 AIRCRAFT UNDER CFE. A U.S. TEAM IS ENROUTE TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT EQUIPMENT MOVED EAST OF THE URALS. I TRUST THIS TEAM WILL HAVE INFORMATIVE AND USEFUL EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT WITH YOUR EXPERTS.

changes
from
3 Dec
various

WE DO NOT WANT CFE TO BE PERCEIVED AS A HOLLOW SHELL. LIKEWISE, WE DO NOT WANT SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO RATIFY THE CFE TREATY AND OTHER AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL SOON REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WE EXPECT A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE MEMBERS OF TWO KEY SENATE COMMITTEES WHICH WILL ASK HIM NOT TO SEND THE TREATY TO THE SENATE FOR APPROVAL BEFORE THESE ISSUES ABOUT SOVIET DATA ARE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED.

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changes
from
3 Dec

WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. WE VALUE THIS ACHIEVEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN WE RECENTLY MOVED EQUIPMENT OUT OF EUROPE FOR DEPLOYMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE VOLUNTEERED CLEAR ASSURANCES THAT THESE MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT AFFECT OUR ALLIANCE'S DESTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS UNDER CFE. IN THIS SPIRIT, WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR EXPERIENCE WITH CFE CONTINUES TO REFLECT THE NEW NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009877
RECEIVED: 18 DEC 90 17

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: GORDON
KANTER

DOC DATE: 21 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE BUDGET
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
USSR

ARMS CONTROL
START

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RETHINKING RAIL GARRISON TERMINATION

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 21 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GORDON
KANTER
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 9877

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	<u>2.47</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>ORE/ONK</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 FEB 7 AIO: 35

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

10/10/92
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9877

December 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*
SUBJECT: Rethinking Rail Garrison Termination

OSD has settled on the funding to keep the MX rail garrison program alive: \$25 million each year for FY 1992 to FY 1996. For a program nearly ready to flight test, this will do little more than keep an office open. The Air Force reports they will have to terminate existing contracts this year and pay termination liabilities of \$285-295 million, roughly the unexpended balance of this year's funding. They will then write a new contract for next year at the \$25 million level.

We believe you and Secretary Cheney should reconsider the "keep alive" approach in light of the termination liabilities and decide either to continue the program through flight test of one missile (requiring \$200 million in FY 92 and \$25 million in FY 93) or to kill the program outright.

We have already received calls from Senator Warner's staff warning us that if we terminate the existing contracts with so much work already done to prepare for a proof-of-principle flight test, thereby "wasting" the current appropriation, we will seriously damage Administration credibility across the board on strategic programs and will not get a FY 92 authorization for the \$25 million. Further, we do not believe DOD will actively support the \$25M, preferring instead to tag you with the responsibility for directing it.

Even if termination costs are not as large as now predicted, cancelling existing contracts and starting over at a much lower level will clearly announce, to the Soviets, that the program really is a sham and thus it will be of relatively little value in follow-on START negotiations.

Thus it seems to us that if the decision is to terminate the program, we should do so now and cleanly, without wasting either the money (\$25 million per year) or the political capital of the life-support option. The alternative is to complete R&D up

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through flight test for a total of \$225 M in "new money" (i.e. beyond that already appropriated through FY 1991) in FY 1992 and 1993.

If you agree, you should call Cheney and suggest that we: either cancel the program outright, or spend a relatively modest amount of new money to demonstrate the capability of MX in a rail-based system. Since given the choice, Cheney will opt for outright cancellation, you may want to press him to accept and budget for a single flight test.

Concurrence by: ^{Nal} Virginia Lampley, ^P Don Pilling and ^H Mike Hayden.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Secretary Cheney and agree with him on an "up or down" decision on continuation of MX rail garrison.

✓ I strongly concur, given especially Shevardnadze resignation and potential stiffening of Sov's arms control positions, we'd be unilaterally descending in an environment far less favorable & unstable than last year. We'd be reversing

the argument we used on the Hill last year with our only justification being duck

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