

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-012

Folder Title:
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (November 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Michael Hayden/Bob Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Military Contacts with Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	11/2/90	(b)(1)	✓
02. Memo	Michael Hayden to Brent Scowcroft Re: The Paris Summit -- Confidence and Security Building Measures (2 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
03a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Soviet Withdrawal East of the Urals (2 pp.)	11/16/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Map	Re: Movement... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03c. Letter	E. Shevardnadze to Mr. Secretary [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	10/13/90	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (November 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1033

OA/ID Number: 91121-012

Date Closed: 3/16/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008738
RECEIVED: 02 NOV 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAYDEN
HUTCHINGS
KANTER

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: MILITARY OPERATIONS
POLAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

EUROPE EAST
HUNGARY
FMS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MILITARY CONTACTS W/ EASTERN EUROPE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 06 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
HAYDEN
HUTCHINGS
KANTER
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MSN
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 8738
 SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 DOCLOG PC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>[Signature]</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>OK 11/5</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 NOV 5 AM 41

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8738

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 2, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/DAVID GOMPERT

FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN/BOB HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: Military Contacts with Eastern Europe

A program has been launched with broad interagency support to significantly expand military contacts with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Although similar to our efforts with the Soviets since 1988, this undertaking has fewer of the impediments inevitably associated with that program. It fits well with our overall approach to the region and is sufficiently circumspect so that it should not poison any ties with the Soviets.

A recommended two year calendar of contacts is about to be forwarded to each post. It includes visits by the Chairman or a Service Chief to the three northern states while other general officers will go to Bulgaria and Romania.

We will also extend our International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Our own budget constraints and limited classroom seats will bound our efforts for the next year or two but we will likely see some students in 1991. Early students will attend a course in defense management designed to strengthen civilian oversight of the armed forces.

Although FMS has been disapproved in principle for now, these efforts lay the groundwork for military sales if and when we decide to wean these states from their sole supplier of hardware.

Concurrences by: Condoleezza Rice and Nicholas Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0980-MR
SCS 1/22/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009002
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 90 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE



FROM: HAYDEN
KANter
GOMPert

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CFE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PARIS SUMMIT / CONFIDENCE & SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 16 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPert
HAYDEN
KANter
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSWWD DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FyI — Paris Summit — Confidence
& Security Building
Measures

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MSN

LOG # 9002

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>McK</u> McK Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>JHM 11/26</u>	<u>N</u>

90 NOV 14 AM 44

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

CSCC Background

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9002

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1990

Natl Sec Adv
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/DAVID GOMPERT
FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN
SUBJECT: The Paris Summit -- Confidence and Security Building Measures

Brent: This memo provides useful background, just in case the President asks. - Arnie

Even though the CFE Treaty will be the centerpiece at Paris, the Summit will also be the occasion for CSCE heads of state to endorse a new package of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). Although CSBMs are in many ways the relics of an earlier era, this new package will contain a few useful innovations and we have been successful in clearing most of the mischief -- well intentioned or otherwise -- from the remainder.

When first launched at Helsinki in 1975, CSBMs promised greater transparency and predictability -- and a reduced risk of war through miscalculation -- at a time when limits on force structure and capabilities were thought to be beyond reach. Helsinki called for advance notification and observation of large exercises. This was later expanded to include annual forecasts of exercises and prohibitions on the very largest exercises unless included in the annual calendar. Never a formal treaty, CSBMs were politically binding and the mandate negotiated at Madrid in 1983 made it clear that they applied primarily to ground forces and were extended to forces in the adjacent sea and air space only when these forces were part of a notifiable ground exercise.

In the current negotiations the West has been remarkably successful in setting the content and direction of the talks, reinforcing earlier agreements on transparency while also breaking some new ground. Warsaw Pact discipline, such as it was, disintegrated early and for most of the negotiations the Soviets have been trying single-handedly (and unsuccessfully) to break down barriers to include naval issues in the agreement.

Details are still being negotiated in Vienna, but the package to be delivered to Paris will likely include all of the following measures. The first three fit nicely within the Conflict Prevention Center called for by NATO in London.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0980-MR
SCS 11/22/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- An annual exchange of information on military organization, manpower, deployments and equipment, including land based naval air and amphibious troops, but not naval forces
- A measure that will allow participating states to request and receive explanations of what they view to be "unusual military activity" in any other state
- A dedicated communication network among the 34 to serve both CSBM and CFE needs
- Improvements to the annual calendar of exercises, including notifications, observations and media access
- An annual exchange of information on military budgets
- Visits to air bases to observe routine activity
- Annual meetings of the 34 to review implementation of all CSBMs

The information exchange will be useful, especially in allowing neutral and non-aligned states access to the kind of data that we will be getting in CFE. The comm network has practical value and most of the remaining measures will do no harm, even if they add little of substance. But all of these are really chasing after a political environment that has largely been eclipsed. More important, and more future oriented, is the measure on "unusual military activity" that we proposed -- and which the Soviets have accepted, after initially balking. This has potential beyond the East-West context and could help dampen the effects of inevitable instabilities in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the Balkans.

As the only game in town for the 34, the CSBM negotiations will continue under their current mandate until the Helsinki meeting in 1992. Getting the comm system up and running, organizing the Conflict Prevention Center, holding the doctrine seminar we called for in London and the first annual implementation meeting -- all of these will certainly occupy the delegates. Beyond this, our biggest challenge will be to spike new measures that would unduly constrain our remaining forces in Europe. The Soviets, for example, will continue their efforts to capture naval activity and -- having been forced to yield their position in this round -- they will probably come back with a vengeance and some measure of sympathy. And a recommendation that we create a CSBM to define international standards for armories suggests the degree to which we may have squeezed dry many of the alternative areas for investigation.

Concurrences by: Heather Wilson and Philip Zelikow 

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008953
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 90 08

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 14 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CFE

TREATIES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AUTHORIZE CABLE / FINISHING THE CFE TREATY

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE

DUE DATE: 16 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
KANTER
NSC CHRON
WILSON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	6	LMS 11/14	D
NSC Secretariat	7	11/14	NIR
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action
 RECEIVED NOV 14 90 14:09

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

90 NOV 14 PM 3:07

THE PRESIDENT
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

11-14-90

8953

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Finishing the CFE Treaty

The CFE Treaty will be initialled in Vienna as early as this Saturday, November 17, 1990, in order to close off negotiation on the text in advance of the Paris Summit.

The cable at Tab A authorizes Ambassador Woolsey to initial the text and commends the delegation for a job well done.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the cable at Tab A to be sent to Vienna on November 16, 1990.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Cable to U.S. Delegation

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

FROM: WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY

USMISSION USVIENNA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE

1. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CLOSE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND TO AUTHENTICATE THE TEXT BY INITIALING THE DOCUMENT IN VIENNA.
3. PLEASE COMMEND YOUR DELEGATION FOR ME FOR OUTSTANDING SERVICE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS LANDMARK AGREEMENT. YOU HAVE ALL HELPED TO REDRAW THE MILITARY MAP OF EUROPE AND TO OVERCOME THE UNNATURAL DIVISION OF A CONTINENT. WELL DONE.

GEORGE BUSH

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8953

November 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/DAVID GOMPERT

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: Finishing the CFE Treaty

The memo to the President at Tab I asks him to sign a cable that would close the CFE negotiation and would commend the U.S. Delegation for their hard work.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Cable to U.S. Delegation

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009122
RECEIVED: 16 NOV 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILSON
KANTER
RICE

DOC DATE: 16 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: CFE
ARMS CONTROL

USSR

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOVIET WITHDRAWAL EAST OF URALS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 20 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KANTER
NSC CHRON
RICE
WILSON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Soviet Withdrawal East of the Urals (2 pp.)	11/16/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (November 1990)

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Map	Re: Movement... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (November 1990)

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Unofficial translation

October 13, 1990

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Pursuant to our agreement I wish to inform you on the scope of reductions in the USSR military capabilities in Europe and the relocation of certain numbers of our combat materiel east of the Ural Mountains.

As of July 1, 1988, the USSR ground forces in Europe had 41,580 tanks, 57,800 armored fighting vehicles, and 42,400 artillery systems.

As of August 1, 1990, the USSR had 24,898 tanks, 32,320 armored fighting vehicles, and 18,300 artillery systems in Europe.

These changes occurred within the context of the measures, announced by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, that involved unilateral reductions in the USSR armed forces by 500,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 820 combat aircraft, as well as measures implementing the provisions of the new defensive doctrine. The said measures, in particular, called for disbanding several tank divisions and regiments and a reduction of the number of tanks in each motorized division by 105, and in tank divisions, by 70 tanks.

As a result, the total tank inventory in Europe has been reduced by about 10,000 tanks.

Overall, as of the end of last September over 20,000 tanks have been taken out of the active inventory in Europe:

- 4,000 tanks were taken out for use as scrap metal, or as prime movers, fire engines, trainers, or were exported;
- about 8,000 tanks, primarily of modern types, were moved to re-equip or augment those units that are located in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Tanks of obsolete types released in the process are gradually being destroyed;
- the rest of the tanks relocated beyond the Urals are slated in part, for destruction using the local facilities, and in part, for conversion to be used in civilian economy in accordance with the State Conversion Program.

Thus, before the end of 1990 the USSR ground forces in Europe shall have approximately 21,000 tanks.

As I told you in New York, roughly the same situation obtain with the other categories of armaments which are subject to reductions.

Sincerely,

E.SHEVARDNADZE

11/16/90

16:02

NO. 211

P002/006

CFE Full

PRESS GUIDANCE

CFE

PRE-TREATY SOVIET MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS

QUESTION: IT'S BEEN REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REMOVED MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR WHICH WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION UNDER CFE. ARE THESE REPORTS ACCURATE?

SUGGESTED RESPONSE:

SINCE THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN IN MARCH 1989, THE SOVIET UNION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS FORCES IN EUROPE. SOME OF THESE REDUCTIONS WERE UNDERTAKEN AS PART OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S UNILATERAL DECISIONS ANNOUNCED IN DECEMBER 1988; OTHERS HAVE COME AS A CONSEQUENCE OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS MOSCOW REACHED WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND GERMANY; OTHERS MAY HAVE COME IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THEIR DESTRUCTION OBLIGATIONS UNDER CFE.

THE RESULT IS THAT THE AMOUNT OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT REMAINING IN EUROPE AT THE TIME OF CFE TREATY SIGNATURE AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS TREATY OBLIGATIONS WILL BE CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN WE HAD EXPECTED AT THE OUTSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

IT'S IMPORTANT TO PUT THIS IN PERSPECTIVE. CFE WILL STILL REQUIRE THE SOVIETS TO DESTROY FAR MORE TANKS THAN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS THE U.S. NOW HAS IN EUROPE AND TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHER ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE THEY CHOSE.

MORE/

-2-

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOING ABOUT THIS?

WE HAVE BEEN MONITORING THESE MOVEMENTS CLOSELY OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE SCOPE OF THESE MOVEMENTS AND THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THIS EQUIPMENT.

WHILE WE WELCOME THE WITHDRAWALS OF SOVIET FORCES STATIONED OUTSIDE THE USSR, WE WANT TO SECURE THE DESTRUCTION OF MOST OF THE EQUIPMENT REMOVED FROM EUROPE.

FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS RESPONDED VERY CANDIDLY TO SECRETARY BAKER'S SEVERAL INQUIRIES OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS ABOUT THESE EQUIPMENT MOVEMENTS. HE HAS INDICATED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THIS EQUIPMENT MOVED EAST OF THE URALS WILL BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN USE IN A MANNER THAT WILL FACILITATE OUR CONFIRMATION OF ITS ULTIMATE DISPOSITION. SHEVARDNADZE HAS WRITTEN A LETTER TO SECRETARY BAKER INCLUDING SOME DATA ON THE OVERALL AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT REMOVED FROM EUROPE AND ON AMOUNTS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN DESTROYED OR CONVERTED. HE HAS ALSO NOTED THAT SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING USED TO RE-EQUIP AND AUGMENT UNITS IN THE ASIAN PART OF THE USSR, AND THAT OLDER EQUIPMENT SO REPLACED WILL BE DESTROYED.

IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM SECRETARY BAKER, THE SOVIETS HAVE INVITED A TEAM OF U.S. EXPERTS TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER, AND THIS TEAM MAY MEET WITH THE SOVIETS AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. WE FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THIS ISSUE CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSED IN OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS AND IN THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS TREATY IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE QUESTIONS.

MORE/

-3-

QUESTION

DOESN'T THIS REALLY DIMINISH THE VALUE OF THE CFE TREATY?

- CFE'S CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IS MUCH LARGER THAN THE DESTRUCTION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE TREATY CODIFIES THE BASIS FOR A STABLE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE WHICH IS THE FOUNDATION FOR A DURABLE POST-COLD WAR ORDER IN EUROPE.
- THE TREATY WILL ESTABLISH PERMANENT LEGAL LIMITS ON ARMED FORCES AND REQUIRE UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF OPENNESS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WILL HELP MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE AND ENSURE THAT ANY DEVIATION FROM TREATY LIMITS ARE READILY APPARENT.
- THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BOLSTERED THE HANDS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND GERMANY IN THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS OVER TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM THEIR COUNTRIES, WHICH RESULTED IN SOME OF THESE ACCELERATED WITHDRAWALS.
- THE LIMITS CODIFIED IN THE CFE TREATY WILL ALLOW THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE TO PURSUE THEIR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT FEAR OF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, THUS ACHIEVING CFE'S LARGER POLITICAL PURPOSE.

DRAFTED: S/P: SFLANAGAN, 11/14/90
X-73551, SPEUR 1795

CLEARED: S/P: JHOLMES
EUR/RPM: MPOLT
PM/STP: JSALMON
T-CDELL
C-MFOULON

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: 27 LOG # 9122

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 27 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>[initials]</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>WFA 12/15</u>	<u>[initials]</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 NOV 16 P 4: 01

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: