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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-011

Folder Title:
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (October 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Summary of Progress Made in New York (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01b. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: CFE -- Agreement on Key Issues (1 pp.)	10/4/90	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Shevardnadze Letter on CFE (2 pp.)	10/31/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Letter	Eduard A. Shevardnadze to James A. Baker, III [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02c. Map	Re: Subzones of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Area Proposed by NATO (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (October 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1032

OA/ID Number: 91121-011

Date Closed: 3/16/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007925
RECEIVED: 04 OCT 90 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 05 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CFE

ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS: BAKER, J

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF PROGRESS MADE IN NEW YORK

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 08 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
KANTER
NSC CHRON
WILSON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CFE — Agreement on Key Issues
P/Memo

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: RUG LOG # 7925
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>24. 10/11</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>HM 10/11</u>	<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Note: PRS ~~up~~ + Doclog updates
10/5 to show w/ Pres. Never

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~Rec'd~~ Rec'd ~~Org~~ Original
News back. This was
provided to Pres by ~~Scowcroft~~
Scowcroft Ofc. Connie

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10-1-80 7925

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Summary of Progress Made in New York

You know that Jim Baker reached agreement in principle with the Soviets in New York on the major elements of a CFE treaty. Here are some of the highlights.

We agreed that the total number of Soviet aircraft that will be allowed by the treaty itself will be slightly more than 5000. As we have long insisted, the agreement will limit all kinds of combat aircraft: fighters, medium bombers, air defense interceptors, and combat-capable trainers. We agreed that land-based naval aircraft will be treated slightly differently, with a political commitment outside the treaty itself that neither side would have more than 400. We deflected persistent Soviet efforts to open the door to naval arms control and there will be no limit on or reference to our carrier-based naval aircraft.

On another tough issue, we reached agreement that no one country should be allowed to have more than about one third of the total amount of equipment in Europe. This is important because it limits the size of Soviet forces more than any other provision in the treaty.

We also reached agreement on the limits for each side on all other equipment categories: tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, and helicopters. And we made progress on the limits in the various sub-regions of Europe.

In addition to resolving these major issues, during the course of the week in New York experts also reached agreement in principle on more technical issues, especially verification and destruction.

We need to confirm these agreements with our Allies and Shevardnadze needs to ensure that they do not unravel when he

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2009-0979-MR
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2

returns to Moscow. That said, the progress made in New York opens the way to complete a CFE treaty for the CSCE Summit in Paris on November 19-21.

Jim was not able to cover much ground on START, in part because Shevardnadze simply did not seem ready to engage. Based on their exchange, it does look as though we may be able to settle the Backfire bomber issue. Jim is going back to New York on Friday to meet with Shevardnadze further on START issues.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7925

October 4, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/DAVID GOMPERT
FROM: HEATHER WILSON
SUBJECT: CFE -- Agreement on Key Issues

Attached is a memo to the President summarizing the agreement in principle on CFE reached in New York.

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010
By CAF NARA, Date 11/17/2011

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008656
RECEIVED: 31 OCT 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: WILSON

DOC DATE: 31 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

CFE

PERSONS: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE LTR ON CFE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 03 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
KANTER
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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cof NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSRLG

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DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

LOG # 8556

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

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APNSA Has Seen

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6

AM 11/2

Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

CC: VP

Sununu

Other

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

8656

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

October 31, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/DAVID GOMPERT

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Letter on CFE

Yesterday afternoon the Soviets delivered the letter at Tab I from Shevardnadze to Baker on CFE. The Soviets want to revisit the subzonal arrangement Shevardnadze agreed to in New York (Tab II) by moving the Kiev Military District out of the flanks and into a more central zone with the three western military districts. Shevardnadze says that they must do this because they have no other place besides Kiev to put the troops being withdrawn from Eastern Europe.

This proposal will raise serious problems with our allies, most notably the Turks. Turkey fought hard to get the Kiev district kept in the flank zone and strictly limited because they feel that the troops there are directed against them. More generally, our flank allies have always been afraid that CFE would force a reduction in Central Europe that would flow in their direction. As the Norwegians often put it, they are afraid CFE might "just squeeze the bologna in the middle". To compound the problem, Turkey was unhappy with the New York agreement on paramilitary forces and is fighting Moscow to get some assurance on paramilitary forces in the area near them.

Shevardnadze reaffirms the Soviet desire to sign the treaty in Paris. His tone is apologetic, and his concerns may be valid. Our task is to try to be responsive to his problem, without losing allied -- especially Turkish -- support for the treaty.

Baker will be seeing Shevardnadze in Geneva next week. He will visit Ankara, Paris, and London on the way. We have set up a small group to try to find a creative solution to this problem, and to develop a plan for getting agreement on it. Because of the sensitivity of this issue with our allies, we are treating it as very close hold around town.

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

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2009-0979-MR
SCS 12/31/12

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Attachments

Tab I Shevardnadze letter
Tab II Map of the CFE area

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Dear James,

There is an urgent need to seek your advice on the matters involved in implementing the agreements you and I reached in New York that provided solutions for the Vienna talks. Let me tell you that the Soviet leadership, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, highly appreciated the realistic opportunity, created in New York, for concluding the conventional arms treaty which will dramatically change the political face of Europe. In fact, the nascent pan-European structures, and the statement by the leaders of our two countries that we are no longer enemies, will be placed on a solid material foundation.

However, in evaluating the New York agreement the Soviet leadership was confronted with an issue which I would like to discuss with you, as always in a straightforward and honest manner. I am referring to the problem of regional division relative to the flanks. By and large, the agreement we reached is a right one, and the agreed numerical parameters correctly take into account the situation, including in the unstable south. The problem we are facing has to do with the location of the Kiev Military District (KMD).

The fact of the matter is that both geographically and in terms of the climate, and from the standpoint of its possibilities, it is best suited for stationing there the armed forces and armaments that we are presently withdrawing from the Central and Eastern Europe. We simply have no other place - and you will see that easily if you take a look at the map. Of course, in the process we have to take into account both the political and moral psychological factors.

Unfortunately, those realities that emerged only recently do not, in any way, fit into the numerical parameters that you and I agreed upon in New York with the understanding that the final decision would be made after we have consulted our respective allies.

As you know, the situation in Europe is changing with lightning speed. We are withdrawing our troops from Hungary, Czecho-

Slovakia, East Germany. It was after our New York meeting that we have accommodated Poland on pulling out our troops from that country's territory.

However, the speedy withdrawal of our troops from Central Europe that our allies are asking us about can practically be carried out only to the area of the Kiev Military District. Yet at the same time the numerical parameters agreed upon in New York do not permit us to do that.

For example, based on the New York agreement and consultations with our friends, we can station at the flanks about 1,700 tanks in regular units plus 600 tanks in storage within the KMD, and 600 tanks in the Leningrad Military District. Yet in the Kiev Military District alone we have 1,900 tanks.

As you see, I am being very frank with you. We are not seeking unilateral advantages or trying to achieve a preponderance in forces. It is simply that we are confronted with a new serious problem, which is primarily of a humanitarian nature and one that, apparently, must be addressed in a humane way.

Now, I am not proposing to you that we alter the parameters agreed in New York. That would be a difficult and painful thing to do. But it seems to me that a way out of this situation could be found in moving the Kiev Military District from the flank area to the so-called "extended Central Europe", or, as your experts refer to it, the "4.3" area. This will not change the balance of forces in the south. Nor would there be any change in the balance of forces within the "extended Central Europe". The latter would still have the limit of 10,300 tanks in regular units.

We would simply get more adequate conditions for filling up this limit. In other words, the treaty provisions would be made to conform to the changed situation in Europe.


I understand, of course, that any changes in the New York agreements are painful and require extra efforts to secure agreement of the allies. Therefore, I would not have raised these considerations with you if I had not felt a very pressing need to do so, above all in the interest of concluding the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, which the leaders of our two countries together with the leaders of the respective allied nations intend to sign on November 19 in Paris.

I hope that if you agree with this we will be able to persuade other parties to the negotiations - our allies and yours - to accept it.

Sincerely,

Eduard A. SHEVARDNADZE

Subzones of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Area Proposed by NATO



Note: Hungary was added to the center with Poland and Czechoslovakia in N.Y.