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Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-010

Folder Title:
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (September 1990)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: CFE - New Aircraft Proposal (2 pp.)	9/4/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Report	Re: CFE Aircraft (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Robert Gates Re: European Strategy Steering Group Meeting, 4:00 pm Monday, 17 September 1990: CFE Follow-On (3 pp.)	9/14/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Report	Re: CFE II: Issues for Decision (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

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File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (September 1990)

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Date Closed: 3/16/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008938
RECEIVED: 31 AUG 90 13

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TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILSON
KANTER
BASORA

DOC DATE: 04 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CFE
ARMS CONTROL

USSR

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CFE - NEW AIRCRAFT PROPOSAL

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 04 SEP 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: WILSON LOGREF:
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 3/14/09

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 4, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

N.S. Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ADRIAN BASORA *AB's draft*

FROM: HEATHER WILSON *H*

SUBJECT: CFE - New Aircraft Proposal

At the 9-12 September Bartholomew-Karpov meeting in Moscow, the U.S. will informally explore possible compromises on aircraft limits in the CFE negotiations. Arnie's Ungroup has developed a series of proposals which Bartholomew will use as a guide to probe for common ground with the Soviets. (Tab I) In the end, it is likely that any compromise will include a political commitment outside the CFE Treaty to limit land-based naval aviation (LBNA).

Reg, however, does not intend to offer nor accept such an approach in Moscow, preferring instead to wait until a later meeting with the Soviets to play the LBNA card. We wonder about holding back on a key element of a possible aircraft compromise when we are trying to wrap up CFE, but yield to Reg's tactical judgment (which went unchallenged by other members of the Ungroup).

In his July 29 letter to Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed a compromise that would limit naval Backfires to 200 outside of the CFE Treaty and limit air force Backfires to 400 and include them in the CFE negotiations. Limiting SNA Backfire outside the CFE Treaty is acceptable to us, but may go too far for some of our Allies. In any event, limiting just Backfire is insufficient. In recent months the Soviets have transferred over 200 fighter aircraft from the Air Force to the Navy in what looks like an attempt to circumvent the CFE limits. We will counter-propose a limit on all LBNA, including naval Backfires, outside the CFE treaty.

Bartholomew also will explore adjusting other elements of the aircraft proposal to find common ground. At the June NAC in Turnberry, Foreign Ministers agreed on parameters for an acceptable solution on aircraft. These limits have not been tabled in Vienna because the Soviets have not seemed ready to move. Bartholomew will build on the structure of the Soviet proposal on the table and, for the most part, stay within the NAC guidelines. If Bartholomew uses all his flexibility on aircraft numbers, we will be going slightly outside the NATO agreed guidelines, but only in the number of aircraft allowed for the Eastern Europeans, not the Soviets.

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Because Reg plans to stay largely within the NAC guidelines, no special consultations with Allies are planned before the Moscow meetings.

Concurrence by: ^{PZ. draft} Philip Zelikow

Attachment

Tab I Outline of Aircraft Proposals

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
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CFE Aircraft

The choice of options at step 5 (choosing either 5a or 5b) is because we could not do both a 35 percent sufficiency rule and add 500 CCT without breaking the limit of 5000 Soviet aircraft maximum. It would be difficult to take one of the two ideas off the table to try the other -- hence the choice of two paths.



Add-On To Any Option Grandfather Oldest CCT
-350 MIG-21, Midgets, Mujuks

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CFE Aircraft -- Further Explanation

Option 1 Current NATO numbers

This option would stick with our current NATO proposal as tabled and reject the Shevardnadze offer. It is a point of departure. Land based naval air and combat capable trainers would continue to be counted in the 4700 aircraft ceiling and there would be a separate declaratory limit on air defense interceptors and a 30 percent sufficiency rule calculated on the 4700 ceiling. The result would be:

5200 Total for each side
3320 Max for USSR (30% plus up to 500 ADI)

Option 2 NATO + LBNA in CFE

This option would increase the combat aircraft ceiling by 700, but would still include LBNA under ceilings. A slight modification would be a separate ceiling of 700 for LBNA in CFE.

5900 Total for each side
3740 Max for USSR (30% plus up to 500 ADI)

(Modification)

5900 Total for each side
4020 Max for USSR (30% + 500 ADI + 700 LBNA)

Option 3 NATO + LBNA outside CFE

We would be prepared to build upon the Shevardnadze idea and talk about an ATTU-wide limit on LBNA of 700 for each group of parties -- a number proposed by Hungary -- outside CFE in a form to be determined. These 700 would not be counted under the CFE ceilings. But CCT would still have to be counted under the 4700 ceiling. The result would be:

5900 Total for each side
4020 Max for USSR (30% + 500 ADI + 700 LBNA)

Option 4 NATO + LBNA + 500 more ADI

In addition to being willing to make a separate commitment outside of CFE to limit LBNA to 700, we would be prepared to split the difference with you on ADI. USSR has proposed 1500, we have proposed 500. We could split the difference at 1000. (Of course, we could rise to 1000 gradually, if we wish to for tactical reasons.) We would still press the Soviets to absorb CCT in the overall combat aircraft limit. The result would be:

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6400 Total for each side
4520 Max for USSR (30% + 1000 ADI + 700 LBNA)

Option 5a NATO + LBNA + 500 more ADI + 35% Sufficiency

In addition to a separate commitment on LBNA and 500 more ADI, we could raise the sufficiency rule up to 35 percent. This would keep us within the Turnberry guidance for overall numbers (a level close to NATO's current 6300) and would be the maximum percentage we could allow for the Soviets to stay within the Turnberry guidelines. CCT would still be in the overall limit. The result would be:

6400 Total for each side
4990 Max for USSR (35% + 1000 ADI + 700 LBNA)

Option 5b NATO + LBNA + 500 more ADI + 500 CCT

In addition to a separate commitment on LBNA and 500 more ADI, we could agree to a separate allotment for CCT of 500, which goes a long way toward the current Soviet proposal of a 750 allotment. This would be a declaratory distinction, and there would be no right to recategorize CCT to primary trainers. This Option would exceed the Turnberry guidelines because the total aircraft allowed would be 600 in excess of current NATO holdings. The result would be:

6900 Total for each side
5020 Max for USSR (30% + 1000 ADI + 700 LBNA + 500 CCT)

Option 6a NATO + LBNA + 500 ADI + 400 more ADI if 35% for ADI too

In addition to the separate commitment on LBNA, we could agree to up to 1400 ADI if the sufficiency rule applies to both the 4700 general ceiling and the 1400 ADI ceiling. This Option would exceed the Turnberry guidelines because the total aircraft allowed would be 500 in excess of current NATO holdings. The result would be:

6800 Total for each side
5000 Max for USSR (35% + 980 ADI + 700 LBNA)

Add-On for Any Option Grandfathering old CCT

Rather than allow recategorization, we may be able to shift up to about 350 older aircraft that are current considered to be CCT in the NATO proposal into the category of primary trainers. These aircraft would then not be counted under the ceilings. This grandfathering would be in addition to the proposals in 4a and 4b. If we limited the grandfathering to CCT older than the Mig-

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21, this would exclude 210 Mig-21 trainers, 80 Midgets, and 60 Mujuks by moving them to the primary trainer category, which is unrestricted. The Soviets have offered to recategorize by disarming. We may wish to take advantage of this offer.

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RECEIVED: 14 SEP 90 17

TO: GATES

FROM: WILSON
KANTER
RICE

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CFE

ARMS CONTROL

6
CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN STRATEGY STEERING GRP MTG 17 SEP RE CFE FOLLOW ON

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 18 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 14, 1990

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLLEEZZA RICE

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: European Strategy Steering Group Meeting, 4:00pm
Monday, 17 September 1990: CFE Follow-On

Your objective for this meeting is to persuade your counterparts to keep open our options on the scope of CFE follow-on negotiations, rather than join an Allied consensus in favor of a "minimalist" approach. This may be difficult, and will require your active participation. State, at least up to the Bartholomew level, is critical and may now be supported by OSD and JCS. At the end of the meeting, you also may want to put down a marker that the issue is important enough to warrant discussion at Brent's level.

At the Assistant Secretary level there is a consensus that we should support our Allies preference for a minimalist approach to the follow-on, notwithstanding the ambitious aims set out in the London Declaration. This consensus is contrary to the previous position taken by Deputies to keep the scope of the follow-on negotiation open. All agencies agreed in the Arms Control PCC that the immediate follow-on negotiations should be a limited "transitional" negotiation which will only consider manpower limits and any issues left over from the first treaty. There is also consensus that this negotiation would need to finish by the 1992 Helsinki review conference, after which further arms control negotiations would take place at 34, not 23. This assumption that there would only be a little more than a year to complete a CFE follow-on negotiation reinforces -- and in some cases determines -- the view that our objectives for CFE follow-on should be very modest.

Since Deputies last discussed this question, OSD has attempted to evaluate what arms control measures after the conclusion of a CFE Treaty might be in our security interest. A summary of that analysis -- which, frankly, leaves much to be desired -- is

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included in the OSD paper for this meeting (Tab I). Their conclusion is that, other than manpower and clean-up from the first CFE agreement, there is little to be gained from a security point of view in immediate follow-on negotiations. With some merit, both JCS and OSD think that after we finish CFE, we should focus on implementing the treaty and revising NATO strategy and force structures to suit the new security environment in Europe. They argue that in this period of rapid change, it will be difficult to identify significant arms control measures that will complement our defense posture.

On the other hand, one could imagine a more ambitious agenda that could further strengthen security and stability in Europe with measures such as deeper reductions, regional measures to reduce the threat to the flanks, and enhanced verification arrangements. The bureaucracy, however, clearly is not motivated to press the analysis or diplomacy along these lines.

While OSD's inability to identify significant measures to pursue had weight in the PCC, the pressure to foreclose options has come from our Allies, particularly the French. They argue that continuing negotiations at 23 sustains the Warsaw Pact as an organization, and that negotiations should be at 35 as soon as possible, and certainly by the 1992 Helsinki review conference. State, and possibly others, now think that it is inevitable that the negotiations at 23 will end in 1992.

At the HLTF meeting in Rome last week, 14 Allies argued for a "transitional" follow-on negotiation focussed principally on manpower. Only the U.S. and Turkey did not sign on to this approach. You may want to call on Reg to give a fuller readout of the Rome meeting, if only because he is likely to expound at length in any event on the Allies' views as he presents his own position.

Finally, discussions with the Soviets in Moscow last week about CFE may indicate that using the follow-on negotiations to "tie up loose ends" would entail a very ambitious agenda and anything but a minimalist approach. The odds increasingly favor deferring aircraft constraints, and we may only be able to secure Soviet agreement to our zonal limits if we explicitly commit ourselves to revisit the issue in CFE follow-on. More generally, we may find that the Soviets will be willing to sign up to a CFE treaty this year only if it is treated as a "framework" that would be subject to extensive and potentially large-scale adjustments in follow-on talks. If that is right, it not only would mean that we would, de facto, have an ambitious agenda, but also one that would only be manageable if participation were limited to the 22.

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Your meeting might usefully discuss whether the question of a broad versus narrow agenda for CFE follow-on is rapidly becoming moot, and how best to broach with the Allies the prospect that CFE follow-on may need to concern itself with substantial revisions of limits, and perhaps the structure, of the treaty now under negotiation.

You also should know that Reg may use your meeting to raise a bureaucratic issue. He fully understands (and resents) the fact that the major purpose of using your "European Steering Group" rather than the Deputies Committee to address these issues is to include Bob Zoellick and Dennis Ross. You said in your last Steering Group meeting that you would want to return to the question of which body, the Steering Group or the Deputies Committee, is better suited to oversee the implementation of the London Summit agenda. Reg may remind you of that pending issue and press you to use the Deputies Committee.

In opening the discussion you might make the following points:

- After last week's meetings in Moscow, we find ourselves in a situation where the Soviets may be re-evaluating their stake in and minimal conditions for a CFE treaty. The next three weeks will tell us if we will have a CFE agreement for a November Summit.
- If we do get an agreement, through decisions made in the end game, it may be on the explicit condition that both its limits and its structure may be significantly different in the follow-on agreement than what is now on the table.
- Manpower will be part of the follow-on negotiations, and the HLTF has begun work on what that proposal might look like.
- The question for us is whether we should or need to foreclose the option of a more substantive follow-on negotiation at 22/23, and agree to transition to 34/35 in 1992 now -- before we see the results of CFE.
- What are the factors which force us to narrow our options now? And what are the costs -- including political costs - of being seen to chose a minimalist approach to further conventional arms negotiations? .

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow ^{N/A}

Attachment

Tab I OSD paper on CFE Follow-on

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CFE II: ISSUES FOR DECISION

Introduction. This paper is designed to assist US policy makers in deciding US goals for the CFE II (CFE 1a or CFE 1-bis) negotiations and choosing an appropriate set of measures to fulfill those goals. There are three basic issues for the Committee to decide:

- First, is CFE II a transitional negotiation between CFE I and the Helsinki Conference in 1992 or should the USG seek to extend CFE-II (and therefore the CFE mandate and structure) beyond the Helsinki Conference?
- Second, what additional arms control measures should the US support in CFE II, particularly if it seeks to extend CFE-II beyond the Helsinki Conference?
- Third, what should be the US position regarding manpower in CFE-II?

Issue One: Is CFE II a transitional negotiation between CFE I and the Helsinki Conference in 1992 or should the US seek to extend CFE II (and therefore the CFE mandate and structure) beyond the Helsinki Conference?

I. US Objectives. What are US objectives in post-CFE Europe and how can arms control serve them? US goals for CFE II should be to maintain NATO's political cohesion and coordination role, decrease Soviet military capabilities where possible, and continue to encourage the security policy independence of East European states.

(A) **New Context.** Between CFE I, bilateral Soviet-East European agreements and the 2+4 talks the West will have achieved almost all of its negotiating objectives for CFE I and more.

- Soviet equipment totals in the ATTU will be reduced dramatically to levels below current NATO holdings.
- Soviet forward-based forces in Eastern Europe will be completely withdrawn.
- Soviet equipment above ceilings will be destroyed, for the most part.
- The US will have avoided measures prejudicial to its security such as naval measures, or measures that apply more harshly to NATO than the Pact, such as exercise constraints.
- The Warsaw Pact, as a Soviet-dominated military threat to NATO, will have largely disbanded.
- NATO will remain a viable and strong military alliance.
- Germany will be unified and remain a full member of NATO.

II. The Threat. Beyond attempting to lower Soviet force levels further to address the residual short warning threat to the flanks, the future threat to NATO appears in some instances to extend beyond the issues which the CFE process is best suited to address.

(A) **Residual Soviet Threat.** The residual Soviet threat will come from 1) forces in-being in the ATTU and their capability to threaten flank areas with relatively short warning, and 2) the ability of the Soviet Union to reconstitute a theater-wide strategic offensive with a long warning for NATO.

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(B) Threat from Regional Conflicts. "Spill over" into NATO territory from regional conflicts and proposals for crisis management of such conflicts may be better addressed in a 35 negotiation. Regional issues may involve non-alliance members. Also, there is a dearth of good NATO ideas for 35 with which to prevent "bad" ideas, such as naval measures from being discussed.

(C) Out of Area Threats to NATO Territory. Ballistic missile attacks from North Africa and the Middle East will become a growing concern for NATO but clearly are outside the CFE framework.

III. Current Positions.

(A) US Position. The US currently has left the option open for a more sustained follow-on negotiation, hoping to retain the benefits of the current mandate and forum (e.g., the exclusion of naval matters) and to avoid a hasty establishment of a sweeping new arms control negotiation with a new mandate. A new Mandate for follow-on negotiations would open the discussion of more sweeping disarmament measures, including naval arms control, measures not limited only to the ATTU but covering also North America, measures without strong military significance or adequate verification.

(B) Allied and NNA Position. Most Allies see CFE-II as a short, transitional negotiation between CFE I and the 1992 Helsinki Conference. In general, they argue that the bloc-to-bloc format of CFE cannot and should not be sustained beyond a short follow-on negotiation that would deal with a limited agenda (manpower and other issues left over from CFE-I). Many NNA countries are eager to participate directly in follow-on arms control talks and regard the impending conclusion of CFE-I and the CSBMs Negotiations as the end of the "first phase" of the Conference on Disarmament (CDE) in Europe, as agreed at the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid.

(C) Soviet Position. The Soviets have proposed to the US in bilateral discussion in Vienna a CFE II negotiation at 22 to take place between CFE I and Helsinki (under the CFE I Mandate), and a new CFE III negotiation also at 22 to begin after Helsinki. The Mandate for CFE III would be negotiated in parallel with CFE II and would have to include some provision for naval measures.

IV. Near-Term Implications of a Long-Term CFE II. While a transitional CFE-II need not look very far beyond the manpower and other housekeeping issues, a CFE-II that would extend beyond Helsinki would have **two serious drawbacks for the United States.**

(A) **Extending CFE II beyond Helsinki will require the US to propose now to its allies a number of substantive arms control measures such as further reductions in current holdings or greater constraints on military operations.** The test for the view that CFE-II should be an extended negotiation is whether the US is willing to commit now to such an agenda for talks and whether the US can overcome the serious objections of some (especially France) and the basic inclinations of most of the rest of our Allies.

(B) A decision to extend CFE II beyond Helsinki would also have to deal with the issue that many of our Allies are trying to address through the creation of a new forum, namely,

the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. CFE-II will remain, despite important modifications, a bloc-to-bloc undertaking. **Extending the existing CFE structure would continue to lump East and Central European countries with the USSR;** it is unlikely we will be able to sustain the fiction of de jure parity in stationed equipment levels. And we will certainly not want to link future western levels to Soviet ones as an alternative. The kinds of new measures that could be pursued in CFE-II will be addressed separately, under Issue Two.

Recommendation: That the US pursue short term, transitional negotiations with a limited agenda.

Issue Two: What additional arms control measures should the US support in CFE II, particularly if it seeks to extend CFE-II beyond the Helsinki Conference with an ambitious arms control agenda?

I. Issues which may carry over from CFE-I.

(A) **Aircraft.** If aircraft falls out of CFE I, it will probably do so as part of an understanding that the issue will be addressed in CFE II.

(B) **Exercise constraints.** In CFE I, NATO proposed an absolute limit of one national exercise greater than 40,000 personnel or 800 tanks every two years. In response, the East tabled an extensive package of exercise constraints with multiple rules and thresholds at 40,000 and 25,000. If rejected from CFE I, the Soviet Union may well table the measures anew in CFE II. Germany also would likely support such additional constraints on exercises as it did during the preparation of the NATO CFE I proposal.

II. Lowering Existing CFE Ceilings. In addition, there is likely to be some interest in taking the existing CFE-I limitations as the basis for further reductions, whether by lowering existing collective ceilings, the sufficiency rule or the equipment entitlement for active units. Though there may appear to be great merit in starting from existing limitations, there exists a great danger that such tampering with CFE-I will lead to ambitious efforts to bring the entire treaty into line with perceived new realities. At bottom, CFE-I was designed to deal with the old realities and to provide a hedge against their return. Too much tampering with the existing limitations could overturn them. We do not want to bring the stationed equipment levels into line with the new reality as Soviet levels are proceeding to zero. It may be better to live with a false Soviet entitlement than to try to make the provision correspond with reality.

(A) **Lower the sufficiency rule.** As the controlling measure on the absolute level of Soviet equipment holdings in the ATTU, the sufficiency rule is one of the most important ceilings in the CFE I negotiations. While all countries, East and West, agree that the 40% rule proposed by the Soviets is too high, several countries, both NATO allies and some Pact participants such as Hungary, see a higher sufficiency rule as compensation to the Soviet Union for "territorial losses" in Eastern Europe. Others, such as the Poles, are concerned to hold the ceiling down.

(B) **Lower levels for equipment in active duty units.** Soviet negotiators in Vienna have proposed lowering the ceiling on equipment in active duty units in the Central Region, 4.4 to

4,000-4,500 tanks, 6,000 ACVs, 3,500 Artillery pieces. To maintain the balance in the Central Region after Soviet withdrawal, the Soviets argue that NATO should decrease its active duty holdings. If the Soviets continue to press on lowering the active-duty equipment ceiling in 4.4, one possible NATO response should be to seek a lower level for active equipment in the whole of the ATTU. For example, instead of 16,000 tanks in active duty units, we could counter propose [14,000]. As part of this proposal NATO would pledge to take these reductions in 4.4 (where NATO would do so in any case). Any counterproposal would have to be fully coordinated with the JCS and the other allies.

III. New measures These ideas might be considered for creating a more ambitious agenda for CFE-II negotiations.

(A) Limitations on Air Defense SAMs. An existing disparity in this category makes it an attractive item for limitations. However, there remains a real question whether this category of weapons comfortably fits within the mandate because they are not inherently offensive and do not take and hold territory. The Soviets have a tremendous advantage in SAM systems. These systems are of a size and signature to permit monitoring. NATO must also anticipate that attempts to include new TLE of this type could engender corresponding Soviet proposals, though the mandate would protect us against the most obvious (naval systems). NATO and US modernization and deployment plans will need to be carefully considered.

The effects of such a proposal on our other arms control negotiations and deployment plans needs to be considered. In general the US has supported the position in talks with the Soviets and the US Congress that purely defensive systems are stabilizing and should be encouraged not limited. The US is also interested in having an anti-tactical ballistic missile capability for Europe to protect against not only the Soviets but also against Syria, Iraq and Lybia. A US proposal in this area should be coordinated thoroughly.

(B) New Stabilizing Measures. Long-standing US policy on confidence and security buildings measures (CSBMs) was to seek transparency and reject all constraints on forces until the fundamental force level asymmetries were rectified. CFE's basic premise, reductions to parity, was designed to address the huge Pact and Soviet asymmetry and thus allowed NATO to propose real constraints on the use of equipment. New developments in Europe since the NATO CFE proposal was formulated have challenged NATO to review its defense policies and establish new dicta.

(1) Lower readiness levels. The London Summit stated that after Soviet forces leave Eastern Europe and CFE I is fully implemented, NATO would reduce the readiness of its forces through reducing training requirements and the number of exercises. CFE I established two approaches that taken together could limit the amount of training troops receive by controlling the time spent exercising through storage of TLE and exercise limits.

One possibility is to lower the ceiling on equipment in active duty units and thereby increase the requirement for holding equipment in storage. The effect for NATO would be similar to the ceiling on active equipment in the Central Region (4.4) mentioned above. The ability of the Pact to comply with such a measure, however, is open to question since it would require difficult consultations among (former) allies as to who would store the equipment.

Restrictions could be placed on military exercises above a certain threshold in close proximity to national borders. By limiting the size of these exercises and moving them away from national borders, the likelihood of misunderstanding or misperception arising from border incursions may diminish. Increasing confidence in border areas will become more important as Europe moves away from pact to pact conflicts and the likelihood of regional national and ethnic conflicts rises. The measure also reflects the movement in Europe towards pan-Europeanism with the removal of borders.

Further exploration of the location of existing training centers along with the "typical" size of these exercises needs to be done. The two primary US training facilities in Europe are 75 kms from the Czech border in Germany. Exercises typically involve no more than 20,000 troops. As under the previous discussion of exercises, this measure may be more usefully deployed in the CSCE context.

Recommendation: If a CFE II is to be a short, transitional negotiation, no additional measures, beyond those that carry-over from CFE I, should be considered at this time. If the US decides to extend CFE II beyond Helsinki, several of the measures discussed above should be considered.

Issue Three: What should be the US position regarding manpower in CFE-II?

I. Regardless of what decision is made regarding the timing and scope of CFE II, the NATO Heads of State and Government at the London Summit pledged themselves to address manpower limits in a follow-on CFE negotiation. On August 30, NATO tabled text embodying this pledge in Vienna.

II The US should continue to oppose manpower limits based upon national holdings. A trend toward national ceilings undermines NATO's consultative process and whittles slowly away at NATO's basic unity and cohesion. The compromise reached in CFE between collective ceilings and intra-alliance consultations on national holdings bolsters NATO's role as a forum for alliance consultation and decisions. Applying national ceilings to manpower in CFE II would give a strong push to the already strong momentum leading to national ceilings for all treaty-limited equipment.

The FRG and France are the strongest supporters of national ceilings on manpower. The FRG would like all other NATO states to have national ceilings to break their self-imposed singularization. The French argue that national ceilings better reflect the goal of encouraging the independence of Eastern Europeans from the Soviet Union.

III. NATO should continue to differentiate clearly between the quality of measures for manpower and those for TLE. So that the looser verification associated with manpower is not allowed to set a precedent for TLE.

IV. US force reductions from Europe will continue, with the aim of sustaining a corps and 4 TFWs. Such a US presence would seem to require something on the order of 140,000 ground and air force personnel, though Congressional and budgetary pressures may drive US force levels far below this figure. This aim of sustaining a US military presence of this size

ought to guide our thinking about the extent of further manpower reductions in a CFE follow-on.

V. Because both NATO and the Soviet Union will come to rely to a greater degree on their reserves, the US may want to leave open the option to address reserve forces as well as active duty manpower.

VI. What follows is a discussion of the various options for addressing manpower in CFE-II.

(A) **UK Approach.** The UK proposal circulated at the 9 August HLTF holds that only "active duty manpower" should be covered in CFE II manpower negotiations, with this phrase left largely unelaborated; verification should not seek the unattainable, but should include realistic and acceptable measures that would provide a degree of confidence that figures are accurate; and ceilings should be flexible from year to year allowing for a certain degree of increase.

- The UK proposes a national manpower ceiling pegged to a three-year moving average, the so-called "moving peg." The ceiling in any given year would be the average of the three preceding years with a limit on year to year increases of an additional 5% above the average. Nations may use the 5% provision to exceed the average only twice in any three years or three times in any five years. The result is that over 10 years a country could increase its manpower by about 18%. Other nations would monitor the levels through indirect means such as comparison of declared arms control levels with levels declared to national legislatures.

- The UK approach results in a cap for each country that is not militarily significant.

- The weakness of the UK approach is that the "moving peg" is meant to be an actual ceiling against which a certain degree of verification would be possible. The UK paper makes clear that tight monitoring of manpower ceilings is not feasible. In this case, a set of specific, precise rules as proposed by the UK are inappropriate. Moreover, the approach to verification presupposes an effective legislative body in each CFE country, which by no means may be the case for the Soviet Union.

(B) **German Proposal.** The Germans do not have a proposal but support specific national manpower ceilings with a certain degree of flexibility. Verification would be kept at a minimum but should allow for a reasonable degree of confidence that agreed limitations are being complied with. In addition, the Germans would apply the sufficiency rule to manpower. Although the Germans ideas seem to mesh with the UK proposal, the Germans reject the "moving peg" as too complicated. No alternative system for ensuring flexibility while also firmly limiting national holdings is proposed.

(C) **Declared National Ceilings with a NATO Collective Approach.** The State Department supports a regime whereby each participant in the negotiations would declare its own national ceilings. Others would be free to comment on these declarations and there might be some adjustments as a consequence.

- The NATO nations would make an additional declaration that the sum of their national ceilings constitutes a collective ceiling for the alliance. It is highly unlikely that the East European states would want to be part of a counterpart collective with the Soviet Union and we would not seek to force them into this mold.

- There would be some flexibility in the declared national ceilings through something akin to the Hungarian suggestion in CFE I for lending portions of national equipment allotments. Such "loans" would be limited in size. Within NATO, adjustments in national ceilings would be made on the customary basis of consultation and agreement within alliance mechanisms. For the countries of Eastern Europe, adjustments would be made on a bilateral basis.

- There would be no specific verification provisions for these manpower limitation, although a certain amount of information on manpower levels could be gleaned from inspections of equipment under CFE I.

(D) **National Ceilings in a Regional Context.** As a half step between collective ceilings and national ceilings, OSD has suggested that national manpower ceilings by region could be quite useful in CFE II.

- Each region would have its own manpower ceiling based upon the holdings of the state with the highest manpower levels (ground, air and air defense personnel) in the region. For simplicity the regions could follow the CFE I zones, but the regions would not be nested. Within the regional sufficiency ceilings, states would be able to declare their national holdings. Verification would follow the State proposal. The chart below shows one possible set of ceilings. In most cases, the intra-zonal balance is fairly good.

- All stationed manpower of a country would come under the regional ceiling applying to the zone containing the stationing country. For example, UK stationed forces would count with indigenous UK troops against the regional national ceiling in 4.3 of 450K. For the Soviet Union, the regional ceiling would be the addition of the three zones containing Soviet territory, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, or 1,310,000 troops. Any Soviet stationed forces would have to come under this cumulative national ceiling. Currently, Soviet manpower in the zone is approximately 1,845,000. For the record, US troops for the whole of Europe could be treated as if the US was a country in 4.4, where the US has the bulk of its forces.

	National Ceiling by	Largest NATO	Largest Pact
<u>Region</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Nation</u>
4.4	350K	345K GE#	288K Poland
4.3	450K	378K FR*	442K USSR (WMDs)
4.2	260K	250K SP	260K USSR (MO & V-U MD)
4.1	600K	499K TU@	598K USSR (LE,OD,KV,NC,TC)

German ground and air force troop totals depend upon final decision by Germany in 2+4.

* France has the highest manpower levels in 4.3, 378K, because the indigenous, 328K, and stationed troops, 50K, count under the ceiling for France's "home" zone, 4.3.

@ Turkey has an additional 74K troops outside the ATTU for a total of 573K.

Source: 1990 IIM, CIA. and 1989 US Government Data Base.

- National manpower ceilings by region may not require complicated provisions for increases above current declared levels given that in three of the four regions NATO states are below the regional sufficiency rule. In the fourth region, 4.4, German force levels will be capped making a provision for increases unnecessary. Because this approach would sub-divide Soviet territory, as in CFE I, there would be a limit on the number of Soviet troops that could be deployed opposite NATO's flanks and in the Western Military Districts.

- Several allies may oppose manpower ceilings by region. The French are already on record as opposing measures that would further divide Soviet territory. As noted above, the Germans have a strong position that national ceilings should result from CFE II. The French and UK also support national manpower ceilings. Breaking the nested addition of the CFE I zones could lead to proposals for regional sufficiency ceilings on TLE as well, a trend that leads to a further break-down of NATO coordination and cohesion.

Recommendation: That the US support a declaratory statement of politically binding manpower limits. State supports a regime with a collective ceiling for NATO only. OSD supports national limits within a regional context.

**National Security Council
The White House**

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Ken Hill
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SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

Ken Hill

A

Bill Sittmann

✓

Bob Gates

2

✓

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

3

LMS 9/17

✓

NSC Secretariat

4

N/B

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

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COMMENTS

Meeting 9/17 4:00 PM

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