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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-007

Folder Title:
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (June 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: German CFE Proposal on Limiting the Bundeswehr (3 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Report	Re: Paper provided by J. Holik following June 6 Lcg Group (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: CFE -- Greece and the Mersin Problem [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Cable	Re: Conventional Stability Mandate: W.S. - Trukish Exchange of Letters (1 pp.)	1/13/88	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (June 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1028
OA/ID Number: 91121-007
Date Closed: 3/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004608
RECEIVED: 08 JUN 90 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: WILSON
KANTER
RICE

DOC DATE: 08 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: CFE

GERMANY F R

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GERMAN CFE PROPOSAL ON LIMITING BUNDESWEHR

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 12 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KANTER
RICE
WILSON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND _____ W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4608

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June 8, 1990

COMMON FILE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: German CFE Proposal on Limiting the Bundeswehr

The Germans have circulated a proposal that would limit the size of the Bundeswehr. (Tab A) This memo provides our initial reactions in advance of the Kohl dinner tonight.

On the margins of the NAC at Turnberry, the UK asked for a meeting with the U.S., French, Germans, and Italians to discuss proposed Soviet limitations on the Bundeswehr and ideas floated by the German delegation in Vienna to respond to the Soviets. After initial discussions, German Arms Control Commissioner Holik circulated a proposal. The proposal was made on a "personal" basis, but we understand from the State Department that Holik discussed the proposal with Genscher before circulating it.

The proposed new article for the CFE I Treaty would include:

- Declaration of intent to pursue, in follow-on negotiations, agreement on national ceilings for ground and air force personnel of all 23 (22) participants in the whole of the Atlantic to the Urals area.
- In the context of this declaration of intent, clarification that, as far as the central region is concerned (FRG, Benelux, Denmark, GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) no single country will have more than X troops. (Emphasis supplied.)
- No-increase agreement for ground and air force personnel of all 23 participants in the whole Atlantic to the Urals area to be effective between entry in force of CFE I and CFE Ia.

According to State, it was clear from the discussion that the limit on forces in the central region would be effective in a CFE I treaty. However, the underlined language in the second tick above makes this ambiguous. It was also understood that the FRG hopes that "X" would probably be 400,000, and the personnel

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-1595-MR
SCS 1/18/13

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ceilings in the follow-on negotiations would supersede the ceilings set in CFE I.

If the State Department's understanding is correct, the Germans will be accepting a thinly veiled singularity now in exchange for a commitment to negotiate away that singularity in follow-on arms control negotiations and a commitment by all other parties not to increase their forces in the meantime. As such, this proposal seems to go beyond what Kohl has been saying he is ready to do. We presume the German objective is to remove a major obstacle to unification by satisfying Soviet concerns about the Bundeswehr.

Our most important question about this proposal is whether Kohl supports it. The President will have an opportunity to find that out at his dinner tonight.

If the Germans go through with this proposal, it would be a major move for both the CFE negotiations and German unification. We would have to consider the timing of such a proposal very carefully. It would be further evidence that the West is taking every reasonable step to reassure the Soviet Union as it withdraws from Eastern Europe leaving a unified Germany in NATO behind. By making the proposal in CFE, we will have given the Soviet Union a compelling reason to complete the treaty. This could, however, complicate the CFE talks and risk slowing them down. We would have to ensure that any slowdown this brings to CFE would not become an excuse for delaying a final settlement in the Two Plus Four.

The military effects, if any, of this proposal are unclear. The no-increase commitment might limit NATO's flexibility somewhat, but all projections are for NATO force reductions, so this should not be a major constraint. However, in the event of changed circumstances in Europe, Allies may wish to have the flexibility to reconsider their force plans. The proposal would also commit us to make personnel a unit of account in follow-on negotiations, and we believe such personnel ceilings are largely unverifiable. Nevertheless, there is a widespread view that manpower limits will be a centerpiece of the follow-on negotiations and we have already accepted personnel limits in CFE I. The U.S., of course, will already be under a national personnel ceiling in CFE I. Another possible problem is that we would be inviting the Soviets to negotiate the value of "X", pushing down the size of the Bundeswehr. While the Germans already have plans to decrease their forces, pushing them too low could pinch Alliance defense.

From a political perspective, there are some costs. The proposal would singularize the Germans, at least for a limited time. The approach also seems to lead toward individual national ceilings

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for each country within the Atlantic to the Urals region. This would involve all participating states in setting, with some precision, the size of the Greek ground and air forces, the Turkish ground and air forces, and so on for every country in Europe.

In addition, while the national ceilings are not likely to limit Alliance cooperation on a practical level, national ceilings may be too individualistic at a time when we are trying to shore up the collective and multinational aspects of NATO. Finally, we do not know whether this proposal will be a deal-closer with the Soviets. If the Soviets are looking for road blocks to acquiescing to a unified Germany in NATO, they could pocket this major concession and propose further limitations.

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow *PZ*

Attachment

Tab A German Proposal on CFE Limits on the Bundeswehr

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One article in a CFE I agreement would comprise three elements:

- Declaration of intent to pursue, in follow-on negotiations, agreement on national ceilings for ground and air force personnel of all 23 (22) participants in the whole ATU area.
- In the context of this declaration of intent, clarification that, as far as the central region is concerned (area 4.4 plus Denmark and Hungary) no single country will have more than X troops.
- No-increase agreement for ground and air force personnel of all 23 participants in the whole ATU area to be effective between entry in force of CFE I and CFE Ia.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004754
RECEIVED: 13 JUN 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILSON
KANTER
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREECE
ARMS CONTROL

CFE



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CFE / GREECE & MERSIN PROBLEM

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 16 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WILSON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KANTER
RICE
WILSON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Caf NARA, Date 3/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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FyI CFE -- Greece + the Korean Problem
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JRP LOG # 4754
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CH A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmannh			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>Jim 10/8</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>10/9</u>	<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: CFE -- Greece and the Mersin Problem [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (June 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By bal on 11/15/13

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0975-MR (501)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/19/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 12, 1990



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: CFE -- Greece and the Mersin Problem

At his visit last week, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis sought the President's help on including the port of Mersin, Turkey under the CFE agreement. The President agreed to discuss Greek concerns, but made no commitment to re-open the negotiations.

BACKGROUND

Because Turkey borders on Syria and Iran, not all of its territory will be covered by the CFE treaty. (Tab A) The Turkish exclusion area was the last issue to be resolved in the mandate negotiations. In the endgame, the West traded the inclusion of Incirlik Air Base in the zone for the inclusion of all of the Soviet Transcaucasus. This brought the western end of the line dividing Turkey to a town called Erdemli, very near the port of Mersin, which is one of the ports through which Turkey supports its forces on Cyprus. Mersin was outside the zone. At the last moment, having expressed no interest in the Turkish dividing line before, Greece refused to sign the mandate unless Mersin was included.

After several days of intense negotiation, Turkey accepted a formulation of the mandate which describes the line through Turkey ending with the town of "Gozne, and thence to the sea" only because the United States, France, the UK, Germany, and the Soviet Union exchanged letters with Turkey confirming that our interpretation was that Mersin is excluded from the zone. (Tab B) Greece knew about the letters, and had seen some of them in advance, but Greece did nothing at the time.

After the mandate was signed, the Mersin issue provoked a political firestorm in Greece. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

That government and the new government headed by Prime Minister Mitsotakis have tried to reopen the issue in the negotiations with no success.

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HANDLING MERSIN

Our principal objective is to keep the Mersin issue from slowing the conclusion of a CFE Treaty. On the substance, we have unambiguously endorsed the Turkish position in writing. Turkey will not sign the Treaty if we go back on this commitment.

Arnie's Arms Control PCC is searching for creative ways for (b)(1) consistent with keeping CFE on track and improving U.S.-Greek relations. Part of the solution might involve a letter from the President to Mitsotakis outlining what we might do to take Greek concerns about Mersin into account. Possibilities include:

- Having no maps for the Mersin area of Turkey in the treaty and relying on "and thence to the sea." Turkey has indicated that this might be acceptable. While (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- Our commitment to use U.S. influence and good offices to promote and facilitate the resolution of differences between Greece and Turkey. This would be a general political commitment, (b)(1)
- More active pursuit of certain confidence-building measures on Cyprus. The President has told all sides that we support the leading role of the UN Secretary General on the Cyprus problem. We would have to be careful not to get too far out in front of Perez de Cuellar.
- (b)(1)

The PCC will meet to consider these possibilities next Monday.

Concurrence by: Nick Burns^{NB}, Philip Zelikow^{PZ}

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 USVIEV 00090 00 OF 02 131146Z 0852 EUR4280
ACTION EUR-00

USVIEV 00090 00 OF 02 131146Z

0852 EUR4280

ACTION OFFICE PMP-03

INFO EUR-05 PMA-01 PMA-01 CE-01 PA-01 PMS-01 PM-01 AU-01
FILE-01 /016 AJ GF

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
N-01 IO-10 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 L-03 TRSE-00
PH-10 PA-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /063 W

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FM USMISSION USVIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 6366
AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACI IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USVIENNA 00090

S/S-O: PLEASE ALERT EUR PDAS THOMAS UPON RECEIPT

ANKARA: FOR DCM ROPE

FROM STEVE LEDOGAR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NATO, PREL
SUBJECT: CONVENTIONAL STABILITY MANDATE: U.S.-TURKISH
- EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

REF: (A) ANKARA 563 (B) ANKARA 536
- (C) STATE 1077 (D) STATE 11471

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT 10:45 AM LOCAL (0945 ZULU) THE U.S.-TURKISH
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS FORESEEN IN REFS A-C TOOK PLACE
BETWEEN AMBASSADORS ALP AND LEDOGAR.

3. TEXT OF TURKISH LETTER:

VIENNA, JANUARY 10, 1989

EXCELLENCY,

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE PHRASE
".....AND THENCE TO THE SEA" CONTAINED IN THE LAST
PARAGRAPH OF PART ENTITLED "SCOPE AND AREA OF
APPLICATION" IN THE MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY
TALKS MEANS THE LINE FROM GOZNE TO ERDEMLI.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

ALI HIKMET ALP
AMBASSADOR
HEAD OF DELEGATION

(TO) H.E. AMBASSADOR STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION TO THE MANDATE TALKS
VIENNA

END TEXT.

4. TEXT OF U.S. RESPONSE:

JANUARY 10, 1989

EXCELLENCY:

I SHOULD LIKE TO REFER TO YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 10

RELATING TO THE TURKISH INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT ON
THE AREA OF APPLICATION IN THE MANDATE FOR THE
NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE. I
CAN CONFIRM THAT WE REMAIN READY TO ACCEPT THAT THE
PHRASE "AND THENCE TO THE SEA" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED
AS MEANING THAT THE LINE IN TURKEY SHOULD RUN THROUGH
GOZNE TO ERDEMLI.

VERY TRULY YOURS,

STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
AMBASSADOR

(TO) HIS EXCELLENCY
ALI HIKMET ALP,
AMBASSADOR OF TURKEY
TO THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY MANDATE TALKS,
VIENNA, AUSTRIA

END TEXT.

5. CURRENT STATUS OF TURKISH LETTER EXCHANGE WITH THE
OTHER FOUR:

FRANCE: CONSIDERS IT COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE ORIGINAL TURKISH LETTER AND CURRENTLY REFUSES
TO RECONFIRM THE EXCHANGE.

USSR: LOCAL REP KASHLEY CONTINUES TO INSIST HE
ALREADY COMPLIED WITH TURKISH REQUIREMENTS AND REFUSES
TO RECONFIRM EXCHANGE. TURKISH AUTHORITIES IN ANKARA
ARE REPORTEDLY WORKING WITH THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR/CHARGE IN AN EFFORT TO GET THIS POSITION
REVERSED AND SECURE A SOVIET LETTER THAT CONFORMS.

FRG: IN THE PROCESS OF REPLICATING US-TURKISH
EXCHANGE -- ON CONDITION OF GREEK "NOO"

UK: SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS TO DO THE SAME AS THE FRG;
LATEST REPORT (PROTECTED) THAT FRETWELL HAS
RECOMMENDED TO MOVE THAT THE UK GO AHEAD, BUT ONLY ON
CONDITION THAT THE GDS ETC AND THE FRENCH CONFORM.
(COMMENT: IT'S EXTREMELY UNHELPFUL THAT THE U.K. IS
STANDING AROUND WAITING ON OTHERS TO MOVE FIRST.)

6. BONN: IS REPORTEDLY LEANING ON THE FRENCH IN PARIS
TO GET THEM TO RECONSIDER AND CONFORM TO U.S. LEAD
(PROBABLY AT THE GENSCHER LEVEL).

7. DANISH OPTION (REF D): BOTH TURKISH AND GREEK
REPS HERE SAY THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAVE REJECTED THE IDEA
OF DELETING FROM THE MANDATE SENTENCES ON AREA OF
APPLICATION IN TURKEY AND THE SOVIET UNION AND
ATTACHING INSTEAD TURKISH AND SOVIET NATIONAL
STATEMENTS TO THE MANDATE.

8. RECOMMENDATION: THAT WASHINGTON PURSUE ANY
HIGH-LEVEL SUPPORT IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE TO GET THE
LETTER EXCHANGE MOVING ASAP. LEDOGAR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0775-MR
bah 2/19/13