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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-006

Folder Title:
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (May 1990)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: CFE Initiative at the Moscow Ministerial (1 pp.)	5/10/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: CFE Initiative at the Moscow Ministerial (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Cable	Re: CFE: Letter to Allied Foreign Ministers (5 pp.)	5/11/90	(b)(1)	S
01d. Report	Re: Elements of Common Ground (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Moscow Ministerial: CFE Personnel Limits (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Cable	Re: Message to Robert Gates and Arnold Kanter from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S
02c. Message	From White House Re: Message to Bob Gates and Arnold Kanter in Secretary Baker's Party from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Arnold Kanter and Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your May 25 Meeting on Arms Control (4 pp.)	5/24/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (May 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1027
OA/ID Number: 91121-006
Date Closed: 3/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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03b. Cable	Re: CFE: Genscher Initiative on Personnel (4 pp.)	5/24/90	(b)(1)	S
03c. Memo	Arnold Kanter to Brent Scowcroft Re: Status of START Issues (3 pp.)	5/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~ CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3749

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May 10, 1990

*Per your
conversation
Baker will
revise*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: CFE Initiative at the Moscow Ministerial

During the last round of the CFE negotiations the Soviets slowed the pace considerably. To reach agreement on a CFE Treaty this year, we will have to use the momentum of the Moscow Ministerial and the Summit to reinvigorate the negotiations and reach closure on key issues.

Secretary Baker's letter to Allied counterparts at Tab A describes a package of proposals on key issues which he intends to discuss with Shevardnadze next week. You may want to discuss this issue with the President rather than sending the memo at Tab I. Draft elements of common ground which describe the proposals in more detail are at Tab II.

These proposals have been cleared by Arnie's Arms Control PCC, although the elements of common ground paper is still a working draft. Secretary Baker's letter will have to be delivered in NATO capitals no later than Monday morning.

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss this initiative with the President, or, alternatively, that you sign the memo at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter from Secretary Baker to NATO Counterparts

Tab II Draft Elements of Common Ground

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3749

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: CFE Initiative at the Moscow Ministerial

Purpose

To obtain your approval for Secretary Baker to present a package of CFE proposals to the Soviets at next week's Moscow Ministerial in order to reach closure on major CFE issues by your Summit with President Gorbachev. The proposals are described in a draft letter from Secretary Baker to his NATO counterparts at Tab A.

Background

During the last round of the CFE negotiations, the Soviets slowed the pace considerably. If we are to reach our goal of signing a CFE Treaty at a CSCE Summit this fall, we must use the momentum which will be generated by your Summit to reinvigorate the negotiations and reach agreement on key issues.

The proposals Secretary Baker would present are a balanced package. On some issues, we would accommodate Soviet concerns in exchange for their agreement to accommodate our concerns in other areas. On other issues, we would propose to split the difference between Eastern and Western positions. The key elements of the package are:

- Agreement to a ceiling on combat aircraft which would be higher than current NATO levels, thus giving the Warsaw Pact de facto, but not de jure, superiority in land-based combat aircraft. In exchange, land-based naval aircraft, including the Backfire, would be covered in CFE, and the Soviets would still have to destroy several thousand aircraft to get down to a ceiling of up to 7,000. This would be the most significant Western concession in the package. We believe, however, that this proposal is a better alternative than deferring the issue or having no limits on aircraft at all.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2

- Adjustment to a provision which would allow the Soviets to have a slightly higher fraction of the total number of forces in the area. We have proposed 30 percent; the Soviets want 35-40 percent. We will propose 35 percent.
- Agreement that equipment reduced must be destroyed so that it cannot be restored to its military use. Within this constraint, salvage will be allowed.
- Minor changes to lock in agreement on ground equipment definitions splitting the difference between Eastern and Western positions which are very close.
- Adjustments to our approach to verification which would reduce the frequency of U.S. inspections in exchange for increased U.S. representation on multilateral inspection teams and a complementary regime of aerial inspection.

The risk of this strategy is the possible reaction of our NATO Allies. While Secretary Baker will describe our approach in his letter to his NATO counterparts, these new proposals will not be agreed NATO positions. While some Allies might welcome U.S. leadership, other Allies might object to the United States negotiating on behalf of the Alliance. The State Department judges this risk to be acceptable under the circumstances.

This balanced package of proposals will be a litmus test of Soviet intentions on conventional arms control. If Gorbachev accepts it, or something close to it, we will have made substantial progress toward completing a CFE Treaty this year. If he does not, we will know that despite our major effort to accommodate Soviet concerns, the Soviets will have blocked closure.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the initiative along the lines described in the letter from Secretary Baker at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Letter from Secretary Baker to NATO Counterparts

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB A

CLEAR 2000-15
3 UAC 4 OC 5 W
6 7 8

~~SECRET~~

EUR/RPM/D:KDVOLKER:KDV
05/11/90 7-1135 SERPMCFE 490
THE SECRETARY

T:RBARTHOLOMEW
JCS:HGRAVES OSD:SHADLEY
ACDA:RLEHMAN
S/S-O:

EUR:ATBOHLEN PM:RCLARKE
IC:DMACEACHIN
S/S:
NSCS:

IMMEDIATE ANATO
IMMEDIATE VIENNA

NODIS
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE; VIENNA FOR USDEL CSBM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, KCFE

SUBJECT: CFE: LETTER TO ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS SHOULD PASS THE LETTER AT
PARA 7 FROM SECRETARY BAKER TO FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. USNATO SHOULD DIRECT IT TO SECRETARY GENERAL
WOERNER. LONDON, PARIS, BONN, AND USNATO SHOULD MODIFY
LETTER PER PARAS 3, 4, 5, AND 6, RESPECTIVELY. THERE WILL
BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. FOR LONDON: INSERT THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH AT THE
OPENING OF THE LETTER:

BEGIN TEXT:

AS PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AGREED AT
BERMUDA, WE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD SWIFTLY TO BRING THE CFE
NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE. I WILL MEET ON WEDNESDAY WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, AND THREE KEY SUMMIT
MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE
NEAR FUTURE -- MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2

PRESIDENT BUSH, AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER. WE SHOULD USE THE OPPORTUNITY ALL OF THESE MEETINGS PROVIDE TO LOCK IN AN AGREEMENT ON THE OUTSTANDING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN CFE.

END TEXT.

4. FOR PARIS: INSERT THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH AT THE OPENING OF THE LETTER:

BEGIN TEXT:

AS PRESIDENTS BUSH AND MITTERRAND AGREED AT KEY LARGO, WE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD SWIFTLY TO BRING THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE. I WILL MEET ON WEDNESDAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, AND THREE KEY SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE -- MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PRESIDENT BUSH, AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER. WE SHOULD USE THE OPPORTUNITY ALL OF THESE MEETINGS PROVIDE TO LOCK IN AN AGREEMENT ON THE OUTSTANDING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN CFE.

END TEXT.

INSERT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE AT THE END OF THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF THE LETTER:

BEGIN TEXT:

IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S MEETING ON MAY 25, I WILL BE IMMEDIATELY IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON THE RESULTS OF MY EFFORT IN MOSCOW.

END TEXT.

5. FOR BONN: REPLACE LAST SENTENCE OF LETTER WITH THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

BEGIN TEXT:

WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON HOW WE MIGHT BEST PROCEED IN MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE. THE VISIT OF CHANCELLOR KOHL AND MINISTERS GENSCHEF AND STOLTENBERG TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DISCUSS OUR IDEAS IN MORE DETAIL.

END TEXT.

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2

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3

6. FOR USNATO: INSERT THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH AT THE OPENING OF THE LETTER:

BEGIN TEXT:

AS YOU AND PRESIDENT BUSH AGREED WHEN YOU MET RECENTLY IN WASHINGTON, WE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD SWIFTLY TO BRING THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE. I WILL MEET ON WEDNESDAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, AND THREE KEY SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE -- MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PRESIDENT BUSH, AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER. WE SHOULD USE THE OPPORTUNITY ALL OF THESE MEETINGS PROVIDE TO LOCK IN AN AGREEMENT ON THE OUTSTANDING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN CFE.

END TEXT.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER FOR ALL NATO CAPITALS:

DEAR -----

AS WE DISCUSSED AT THE MAY 3 MEETING OF THE NAC, THE PACE OF THE CFE TALKS HAS SLOWED CONSIDERABLY IN RECENT WEEKS. I THINK WE WOULD ALL AGREE THAT WE ARE WITNESSING MORE THAN JUST NEGOTIATING TACTICS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE WARSAW PACT, GERMAN UNIFICATION, AND SOVIET INTERNAL PROBLEMS HAVE PUT A CFE AGREEMENT IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT FOR THE SOVIETS. SOME IN MOSCOW MAY EVEN BE QUESTIONING WHETHER A CFE AGREEMENT IS STILL IN THEIR INTEREST.

AS I SAID LAST WEEK, WE ALL NEED TO STRESS IN OUR MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS THE CONTINUING CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF CFE TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE. SIGNING A CFE AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO A CSCE SUMMIT. THERE CAN BE NO NEW SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE OF THE KIND A CSCE SUMMIT MIGHT BEGIN TO EXAMINE WITHOUT CFE.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SOVIET CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT. A SOLID CFE AGREEMENT, ALONG THE BASIC LINES AGREED TO AT LAST MAY'S NATO SUMMIT, IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES.

IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WILL NEED TO LOOK AT POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO SOME ASPECTS OF OUR POSITION, AS WE HAVE DONE PERIODICALLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4

MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO GAUGE SOVIET VIEWS ON CFE. I PROPOSE TO PROBE SOVIET POSITIONS BY DISCUSSING U.S. IDEAS IN KEY AREAS -- AREAS WHERE BRIDGING CURRENT DIFFERENCES IS CRUCIAL TO BRINGING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE. SOME OF THESE IDEAS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT I WILL PRESENT THESE SOLELY AS U.S. VIEWS THAT STILL REQUIRE ALLIED AGREEMENT.

MY PURPOSE IN DISCUSSING THESE IDEAS WILL BE TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE. IN ADDITION TO PROBING SOVIET BOTTOM LINES AND INDICATING OUR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SOVIET CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, I WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE ALLIED NEEDS AS WELL. WE WILL REPORT BACK TO THE ALLIANCE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. IF THE SOVIETS ARE FORTHCOMING, NATO COULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO TABLE A PACKAGE IN VIENNA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SEEKING TO RESOLVE MOST OF THE REMAINING MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THE TALKS AS EARLY AS THE JUNE NAC. AS I SEE IT, THE CRUCIAL OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

AIRCRAFT: I WOULD SEEK TO IDENTIFY A POSSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE CURRENT SOVIET AND NATO POSITIONS. IN PARTICULAR, I WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OUTCOME THAT MIGHT PERMIT AN OVERALL LIMIT -- ON COMBAT AIRCRAFT (INCLUDING LAND-BASED NAVAL AIR), AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS, AND COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS -- IN THE 6,000'S. I WOULD STRESS THAT LIMITATIONS ON LAND-BASED NAVAL AIR ARE ESSENTIAL.

SUFFICIENCY RULE: THIS IS ONE OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NATO POSITION. THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A SUFFICIENCY RULE, BUT HAVE ARGUED FOR A HIGHER LIMIT. I INTEND TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF LOCKING IN SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF A SUFFICIENCY RULE AT A LEVEL BETWEEN THE FIGURES UNDER DISCUSSION IN VIENNA.

VERIFICATION: EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS A CENTRAL PILLAR OF NATO'S PROPOSALS. THE SOVIETS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED IS TOO HIGH. I WOULD LIKE TO FIND A WAY TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS WHILE PROVIDING FOR STRINGENT INSPECTION DURING THE BASELINE, DESTRUCTION, AND RESIDUAL PHASES OF IMPLEMENTATION.

GROUND EQUIPMENT: RESOLUTION OF THE ARMOR DEFINITIONS IS IMPERATIVE FOR CFE TO MOVE AHEAD. I THEREFORE WILL URGE

~~SECRET~~

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THE SOVIETS TO COME TO CLOSURE RAPIDLY ON A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CURRENT NATO AND SOVIET POSITIONS.

(C) FOLLOW-ON: I WILL MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO FINALIZE LIMITATIONS ON U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED GROUND, AIR DEFENSE, AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN TREATY TEXT PROVIDED THEY AGREE TO DEFER ANY ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR PERSONNEL LIMITS TO A FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATION. WE WILL MAKE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS A RANGE OF ISSUES, AS I OUTLINED AT THE MAY 3 NAC, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN A CENTRAL REGION, AS PART OF A CFF FOLLOW-ON WITH THE SAME MEMBERSHIP AND MANDATE AS THE CURRENT TALKS.

DESTRUCTION: DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA HAVE SHOWN A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WAYS TO DESTROY MILITARY CAPACITY OF EQUIPMENT BEING REDUCED. WE WOULD LIKE TO NAIL THIS DOWN.

IF THE SOVIETS PROVE RECEPTIVE TO IDEAS SUCH AS THESE, WE WILL WANT TO WORK OUT DETAILED PROPOSALS WITHIN NATO AND PUT THEM ON THE TABLE IN VIENNA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH RAPID AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT FROM MAY 31 TO JUNE 3 WILL PROVIDE YET ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

I BELIEVE AN APPROACH SUCH AS I HAVE OUTLINED CAN HELP MOVE THIS TOP-PRIORITY NEGOTIATION TO THE OUTCOME WE ALL SEEK, AND THUS ADVANCE OUR COMMON EFFORT TO PUT INTO PLACE AN ENDURING STRUCTURE OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THESE IDEAS AND HOW WE MIGHT BEST PROCEED IN MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE.

SINCERELY,

//SIGNED//

JAMES A. BAKER, III

END TEXT.

YY

~~SECRET~~

Elements of Common Ground -- CFE AIRCRAFT

[FYI: We should explore with the Soviets the possibility of scheduled reductions over time in the various aircraft ceilings (e.g., agreeing to a total of 6900 aircraft, but with reductions of 100 per year for nine years, ending up at 6000). This approach, if accepted by the Soviets, might allow us to accept an initial aircraft total of 7000 or greater, as long as the scheduled reductions resulted in a total of less than 7000.
End FYI.]

[FYI: If the Soviets reject the possibility of scheduled reductions, and if necessary to reach agreement, we can increase the aircraft ceilings described below by a cumulative total of up to 700, distributed as tactically appropriate among any or all of the combat aircraft, interceptor, and CCT categories.
End FYI.]

Combat aircraft

1. There will be a ceiling of 4700 combat aircraft for each group of States Parties. This ceiling shall be subject to the sufficiency rule. Current types of combat aircraft shall be identified on an agreed list.
2. Land-based naval combat aircraft, except for maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), shall be counted in the 4700 combat aircraft ceiling.

Maritime patrol aircraft

1. Each group of States Parties undertakes not to increase its current level of MPA in the area of application.
2. Current types of MPA shall be identified on an agreed list; future types shall be subject to a definition to be negotiated by the parties in Vienna.

Air defense interceptors

1. There will be a separate limit of 750 air defense interceptors for each group of States Parties. This limit shall not be subject to the sufficiency rule.
2. The respective groups of States Parties shall designate which aircraft are subject to this limit--under the proviso that a State Party's entire holdings of a type, or sub-type, of aircraft shall have to be so designated.

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Combat-capable trainers

1. There will be a separate limit of 750 combat-capable trainers (CCTn) for each group of States Parties. This limit shall not be subject to the sufficiency rule.

2. CCTs shall be defined as two-seat training variants of single seat combat aircraft or of single-seat air defense interceptors. Types of two-seat trainers without variants that are combat aircraft or interceptors also may be designated as CCTs. [FYI: This formulation would permit placing all Alpha Jets, Hawks, and/or CASA-101s in this category. The Allies also have the option of declaring any of these types to be combat aircraft, interceptors, or primary trainers. End FYI.] Current types of CCTs shall be identified on an agreed list.

Primary trainers

1. Primary trainers shall not be subject to direct numerical limitation.

2. Primary trainers shall be subject to the same data exchange and inspection requirements as limited aircraft types.

3. Current types of primary trainers shall be identified on an agreed list. No new armaments shall be added to existing primary trainers. Future types of primary trainers shall not be armed for combat.

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Elements of Common Ground--OTHER CFE ISSUES

Sufficiency Rule

1. Each State Party shall hold no more than 32.5 percent of the total level permitted within the zone of application of:

- battle tanks;
- armored combat vehicles;
- artillery;
- combat aircraft; or
- attack helicopters.

[FYI: To reach agreement, we can accept a sufficiency rule of up to 35 percent. End FYI.]

Personnel Limits

1. Limits on stationed US and Soviet ground, air defense, and air forces personnel shall constitute the only reference to military personnel ceilings in the CFE Treaty.
2. The follow-on agreement to the CFE Treaty should address, inter alia, the question of further limitations on conventional forces in the Central Region.

Destruction of TLE (Except Helos)

1. Reduction of equipment in excess of ceilings shall be by destruction.
2. Destruction will remove the military capability of equipment so that it cannot be restored.
3. Salvage of components of destroyed equipment will be permitted.

Paramilitary Forces

1. Restrictions will be placed on paramilitary forces to curb their potential for circumvention of CFE limits on conventional armed forces.

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Verification

1. The level of baseline inspections will be 25% below that in NATO's current proposal; baseline inspections for a group of States Parties may be conducted by a mix of national and multinational teams.

2. The proposed level of residual inspections will be 25% less than in NATO's current proposal, but complemented by short-notice aerial inspection and cooperative measures. [FYI: If needed to get short-notice, we can accept somewhat simpler platforms and sensors than in Open Skies. End FYI.]

3. Each group of States Parties may conduct continuous observation at destruction sites with single, multinational teams rather than teams from each member of that group.

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Elements of Common Ground. - CFE GROUND EQUIPMENT

5

Battle Tanks

1. There shall be a ceiling of 20,000 battle tanks per group of States Parties.
2. Battle tanks shall be defined as tracked vehicles weighing at least 13 metric tons and wheeled vehicles weighing at least 17 metric tons.
3. This definition shall be based on the unladen weight of a vehicle.
4. The definition shall not include any reference to the number of seats. [FYI: See entry in ACV category. End FYI.]

Artillery

1. The ceiling shall be 17,500 per group of States Parties.
2. The definition shall be as put aside in Vienna on October 17, 1989.

Armored Combat Vehicles

1. The ceiling shall be 30,000 ACVs per group of States Parties. [FYI: If necessary to reach agreement, we can go as low as 28,000. End FYI.]
2. Within the 30,000 ACV ceiling, there shall be a subceiling of 17,000 on AIFVs and HACVs. Within the 17,000 AIFV/HACV subceiling, there shall be a subceiling of 1500 HACVs.
3. The definition for a HACV shall include a minimum weight of 6 metric tons, calculated on the basis of the unladen weight of a vehicle.
4. It shall be clear in the AIFV definition that AIFVs are designed and equipped to transport combat troops.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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CHRON FILE

May 16, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

5/16/90
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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON (Acking) / ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: Moscow Ministerial: CFE Personnel Limits

Brent --
If you want
to talk further
about this, we
are available.

Bob Gates and Arnie Kanter sent us a cable from Moscow last night (Tab II). Based on his conversation with you on Sunday, Jim Woolsey wants to tell the Soviets that we could agree to a provision in CFE I that, among other issues, forces in central Europe, including personnel, could be dealt with in CFE II.

BB
Blackwill

Including the provision in CFE I is not controversial. The phrase "including personnel" goes beyond the position we have taken with the Germans, and in the Two Plus Four negotiations. Bob, Arnie, and Jim Baker all think that this is premature and, if not worked out with the Germans in particular, could be damaging. We agree. The draft message from you at Tab I makes this clear.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the message at Tab I.

OK

Attachments

Tab I Draft Reply to Gates and Kanter

Tab II Incoming Message from Gates and Kanter

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Declassify on: OADR

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2008-0797-MR
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Cable	Re: Message to Robert Gates and Arnold Kanter from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (May 1990)

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By SLS on 10/2/14

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0974-MR (501.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT. COMM OLEARY SIGLER SDO
SIT. COO PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 161810Z MAY 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO (b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

(b)(1) PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
ROBERT GATES AND ARNOLD KANTER FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

BEGIN TEXT:

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT. WE SHOULD STICK TO THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN STEERING GROUP AND PRINCIPALS. WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH THE GERMANS AND WITH THE ALLIES. THE U.S. SUPPORTS FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO CFE TALKS WITH THE SAME MEMBERSHIP AND MANDATE AS THE CURRENT TALKS. THESE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ADDRESS A RANGE OF ISSUES. INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN A CENTRAL ZONE.
3. THERE IS NO NEED TO GO FURTHER AT THIS TIME WITH THE SOVIETS OR WITH KOHL.

END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#0201

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2008-0797-MR
SCS 10/24/13

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Message	From White House Re: Message to Bob Gates and Arnold Kanter in Secretary Baker's Party from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (May 1990)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SSS on 10/2/14

Date Closed:	3/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-006
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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0974-MR (501.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO (b)(1)

REF YOUR 161025Z MAY 90

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BOB GATES AND ARNOLD KANTER IN SECRETARY BAKER'S PARTY FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT. WE SHOULD STICK TO THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN STEERING GROUP AND PRINCIPALS, WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH THE GERMANS AND WITH THE ALLIES: THE U.S. SUPPORTS FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO CFE TALKS WITH THE SAME MEMBERSHIP AND MANDATE AS THE CURRENT TALKS; THESE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ADDRESS A RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN A CENTRAL ZONE.
3. THERE IS NO NEED TO GO FURTHER AT THIS TIME WITH THE SOVIETS OR WITH KOHL.

DECL: OADR



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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2009-0974-MR

SCS 10/24/13

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CHRON FILE

4165

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ARNOLD KANTER^{me}/ROBERT BLACKWILL^{RB}

SUBJECT:

Your May 25 Meeting on Arms Control

We understand that this meeting has been called at Secretary Cheney's request. His staff is not sure what his specific agenda is. He evidently wants to concentrate on issues related to CFE, including manpower limits, treatment of the Bundeswehr, and the Two Plus Four talks. He also may want to take stock of where we are on other arms control issues on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet Summit.

MANPOWER ISSUES

Limits on the Bundeswehr. In Moscow, the Soviets proposed what amounted to a three part approach. First was a separate U.S.-Soviet deal on stationed manpower based on the Ottawa agreement. They even proposed that it be signed at next week's U.S.-Soviet Summit. Second was a call for limitations on the armed forces of a united Germany that would be discussed and decided in the Two Plus Four talks (and perhaps "reflected" in CFE). Third, if the U.S. were prepared to agree to these two proposals, the Soviets said that all other manpower issues could be deferred to follow-on negotiations.

Baker said "no" both to a separate U.S.-Soviet agreement on stationed manpower that would precede CFE, and on dealing with the Bundeswehr in the Two Plus Four talks. Drawing on the language he used in his NAC intervention, Baker did indicate that he understood Soviet concerns, and that CFE follow-on negotiations could consider a range of issues, including the question of further limits on armed forces in a central zone. (He may have been both more sympathetic and direct in his one-on-one talks with Shevardnadze.)

Jim Woolsey has just reported from Vienna (cable at Tab 1) that Genscher is floating a new idea on CFE manpower limits that he might have raised with Shevardnadze. The FRG ambassador to the CFE has told Jim that Genscher is willing to propose a formal commitment in CFE I to negotiate personnel limits in CFE II.

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5/4/2010

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-2-

Such personnel limits (e.g., no more than 400,000 from any one country in a specified zone) would result in the cap on the Bundeswehr that the Soviets seek. The zone would be drawn in such a way as to capture Soviet manpower in the Western Military Districts, which among other things would avoid singularizing the Germans. Jim reports that Genscher is ready to make such a deal in CFE I if that is what it takes to close the deal, make progress on CFE, and remove a major roadblock in the Two Plus Four talks.

The Soviets now have about 1,000,000 men in this zone. The Genscher proposal would involve some intricate, if not dubious, arithmetic to describe how a nominal Soviet manpower limit of 400,000 might be achieved, including the exclusion of Soviet forces in the GDR because they will be "in transition," and the assumption that other Soviet forces will be withdrawn in any event from Eastern Europe. In brief, it is not obvious that the Soviet requirement for a cap on the Bundeswehr and the German requirement that they not be singularized can be readily reconciled by this Genscher proposal.

Despite Jim's positive response to the FRG CFE ambassador, we should not be too quick to endorse the Genscher initiative. Stoltenberg told you earlier this month: "We cannot accept a singularization, not just of Germany, but also of the Central region." We need to determine the status of this reported move with the German government, first in your (and Secretary Baker's) meetings with Genscher, and then with the Chancellery. Before we react, we also will need to consider carefully whether this move would open the door not to a deal but to negotiations on the size of the Bundeswehr in CFE I, starting with a Soviet counter-proposal that could--for example--ask for a lower cap (200,000?) and not include the Western MDs. We could then find ourselves bogged down into prolonged negotiations that could stall both CFE I and a Soviet decision to accept German membership in NATO.

Ottawa Agreement. As he had promised Colin, Baker did probe Soviet willingness to reopen the Ottawa agreement. After hinting broadly in the group meeting, Baker asked Shevardnadze directly in the one-on-one whether the Soviets would prefer the original Gorbachev proposal for 195,000 in the ATTU to the 195,000/30,000 that subsequently had been agreed in Ottawa. Shevardnadze in turn asked Baker which he would prefer. There the matter rests, with each hinting but waiting for the other to act.

In what by now is a familiar refrain, Jim Woolsey suggests in his cable that the Genscher proposal would effectively reopen Ottawa, and that we take advantage of the opportunity to seek relief from 195,000/30,000.

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-3-

OTHER CFE ISSUES

Following on the Baker letter to allies, we presented new U.S. "ideas" on aircraft, verification, destruction, and armor definitions to the Soviets in Moscow. They did not engage us on any of them. We plan to press them again when the Soviet team arrives in Washington over the weekend. State has suggested that we try to persuade the Soviets to agree to a joint statement for the Summit on CFE that at least would be exhortative, and hopefully would record some "principles" and areas of progress. We will be able to get a better idea of whether this is advisable after we get a look at the statement they are drafting.

START

Arnie's earlier memo (Tab II) reports on the current state of play. His Ungroup agreed Tuesday that we should "trade" our 3000/3300 ICBM sublimit for virtually any Soviet concession in order to get off the table a U.S. proposal that no one has taken seriously for some time. We also agreed that a Backfire package that capped production and prohibited giving the aircraft an intercontinental capability (but did not get an explicit Soviet commitment to limit Backfire in CFE) would be acceptable.

We do not believe that your meeting need return to any of the outstanding START issues you previously considered.

Your meeting, however, could usefully address an issue related to the proposed joint statement that records the sides' substantive agreement on major START issues. Each side has come up with its own version of a long (10-20 page) technical summary of all the things that have been agreed to date in START. We also will have a 1-2 page political statement that the presidents could sign and to which this technical summary could be attached.

Everyone agrees that the political statement is indispensable. The question is whether, on balance, having a technical summary that the presidents approve is a good idea. On the one hand, the technical summary would demonstrate to all just how much has been accomplished. In doing so, it would help resolve any doubts about claims that "substantive agreement has been reached on the major START issues" even though some issues remain to be settled. It also would help lock in the agreement in a way that will make it harder for the Soviets, especially the General Staff, to walk back.

On the other hand, the technical summary is an effort to create in about one day an authoritative encapsulation of the 400 page JDT. As such, there are bound to be errors of commission and omission. Arguably, these will be harder to remedy once the

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-4-

presidential blessing is given, especially if--as is likely--a given error tends to favor one side or the other. In brief, we could be buying ourselves a lot of aggravation down the road.

Unless the political arguments in favor of issuing a substantial START document at the Summit are persuasive, we would tend to question the wisdom of and necessity for the technical summary.

OTHER ISSUES

The bilateral agreement on CW is being finalized in New York. No problems are expected and everything seems on track to have it signed during the Friday signing ceremony.

The verification protocols to the nuclear testing treaties have been completed and conformed. They are now being printed. They will be ready for signing.

We will be working a joint statement on Open Skies with the Soviet team that is arriving over the weekend in an effort to impart some new momentum to those negotiations.

Concurrences by: Rich Davis, ^{sub} John Gordon, ^{sub} Heather Wilson, and Philip Zelikow

Attachments

Tab I	Cable on Genscher Initiative on Personnel
Tab II	May 23 Memo on Status of START Issues

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<DIST>PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SDO SITTMANN SUNUNU
SIT: BENKO FRY FILE KANTER SIT VAX WILSONH BLACKWILL ZELIKOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUFHMB<DTG> 241554Z MAY 90
<ORIG>FM USMISSION USVIENNA
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3077

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USVIENNA 01494

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

ALSO PASS TO SECDEF CHENEY, CJCS POWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR SCOWCROFT, ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN AND JUDGE WEBSTER
FROM AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY. FRG REP HARTMANN BRIEFED ME AND DEPREP
KAPLAN MAY 23 ON A CFE PERSONNEL INITIATIVE PLANNED BY
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER. IN A NUTSHELL, HARTMANN
SAID GENSCHER REMAINS OPPOSED TO DEALING WITH GERMAN
MILITARY FORCES IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS BUT SEEMS
PREPARED TO OFFER A FORMAL COMMITMENT IN CFE-I TO
NEGOTIATE A SUFFICIENCY RULE ON PERSONNEL IN CFE-II,
USING A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF PERSONNEL (RATHER THAN A
PERCENTAGE OF AN OVERALL TOTAL) WITHIN A SPECIFIC
ZONE; HARTMANN MENTIONED 400,000 TROOPS AND ZONE 4.3,
WHICH INCLUDES THE SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS
AS WELL AS BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY. HE SAID THE
GERMANS ALSO COULD CONSIDER ACCEPTING SUCH A
SUFFICIENCY RULE IN CFE-I, AS A FALLBACK, IF NECESSARY
TO CLOSE A DEAL. FRG REP SAID GENSCHER MIGHT RAISE
THESE IDEAS DURING HIS (NOW CONCLUDED) MAY 23 MEETING
WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN GENEVA AND HOPED THEY MIGHT
REMOVE SOVIET OBJECTIONS BOTH TO A CFE AGREEMENT AND
TO GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

3. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW THE FRG LEAD ON
ISSUES RELATED TO BUNDESWEHR LIMITS BUT ADDED, ON A
PERSONAL BASIS, THAT SUCH FORMAL COMMITMENTS,
SPECIFYING THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND SPECIFIC ZONE,
COULD LEAD WASHINGTON TO SEE SUCH A MOVE AS DEPARTING
FROM THE OTTAWA UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
OTHER PERSONNEL LIMITS IN CFE -- AN IMPORTANT PART OF
OTTAWA'S FRAMEWORK. THIS IN TURN COULD REQUIRE SOME
ADJUSTMENT OF THE OTTAWA PERSONNEL LIMITS IN ORDER TO
AFFORD MORE FLEXIBILITY FOR U-S- MANPOWER. HARTMANN
SAID THE FRG ALSO HAD BEEN THINKING ALONG THOSE
LINES. SEE COMMENT - PARA 16. SEPTTEL ADDRESSES FRG
VIEWS ON AIRCRAFT, THE SUFFICIENCY RULE AND OTHER
MATTERS. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

4. AMBASSADOR HARTMANN AND HIS DEPUTY MET WITH ME AND
DEPREP KAPLAN MAY 23 DIRECTLY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

CAP 2008.0753.mR
6/4/2010

FROM BONN WHERE HE HAD CONFERRED WITH GENSCHER ALONE FOR AN HOUR. HE FOUND GENSCHER CONCERNED THAT SOVIET STALLING IN VIENNA, AND INSISTENCE ON COVERING GERMAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS, MIGHT DELAY GERMAN UNIFICATION. GENSCHER WAS NOT PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE BUNDESWEHR IN TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS. BUT

HARTMANN SAID GENSCHER NOW WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A NEW INITIATIVE ON GERMAN PERSONNEL IN THE CFE CONTEXT.

5. ACCORDING TO HARTMANN, GENSCHER PLANNED TO EXPLORE WITH SHEVARDNADZE, IN GENEVA, A MUCH MORE CONCRETE FORMULATION IN CFE-I FOR DEALING WITH PERSONNEL IN CFE-II IN A WAY THAT WOULD LIMIT, INTER ALIA, BUNDESWEHR PERSONNEL. SPECIFICALLY, THE GERMANS WOULD OFFER A SUFFICIENCY RULE, CAST IN TERMS OF AN ABSOLUTE NUMBER (NOT AS A PERCENTAGE OF AN OVERALL TOTAL) AND A SPECIFIC ZONE, TO THE EFFECT THAT "NO COUNTRY MAY DEPLOY MORE THAN (SAY) 400,000 GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN ZONE 4-3-" THE GERMAN IDEA IS THAT THERE WOULD BE A FORMAL PROVISION IN A CFE-I TREATY OR PROTOCOL COMMITTING SIGNATORY STATES TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A SPECIFIC PROVISION IN CFE-II.

6. HARTMANN SAID THAT, SHOULD THIS PROPOSAL PROVE UNACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW, THE FRG MIGHT AGREE AS A FALLBACK TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE IN A CFE-I TREATY ITSELF. IN EXPLAINING THIS PROVISION, HARTMANN MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO DISGUISE GENSCHER'S READINESS TO MOVE TO SUCH A "FALLBACK" TO CLOSE A CFE DEAL AND REMOVE SOVIET OBSTACLES TO GERMAN UNIFICATION. HARTMANN ALSO SAID THAT GENSCHER HOPED SUCH A DEAL COULD REMOVE SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

7. HARTMANN POINTED OUT THAT A 400,000-MAN PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE, FOR ZONE 4.3, WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF CONCRETELY ACCOMMODATING THE SOVIET DESIRE TO PLACE AN UPPER LIMIT ON THE COMBINED MANPOWER OF A UNIFIED

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USVIENNA 01494

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

ALSO PASS TO SECDEF CHENEY, CJCS POWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT, ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN AND JUDGE WEBSTER FROM AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL GERMANY. IT ALSO WOULD LIMIT SOVIET PERSONNEL -- ABOUT 412,000, HE SAID -- IN THE SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS. FRENCH PERSONNEL -- NUMBERING ABOUT 384,000 -- WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE CUT. (UK REP LEVER TOLD ME AND KAPLAN EARLIER MAY 23 THAT BRITISH MANPOWER (150,000 GROUND AND 70,000 AIR) WOULD FALL WELL UNDER SUCH A NUMERICAL PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE; LEVER EXPECTED THE UK GROUND FORCE NUMBER TO FALL IN THE COMING YEARS TO ABOUT 100,000 AS THE SIZE OF THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE RHINE DECLINED.)

8. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO OUR CALCULATIONS, THE SOVIETS HAD SOME 1,000,000 PERSONNEL IN ZONE 4.3 BEFORE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BEGAN. THIS INCLUDES

TROOPS IN HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR AND POLAND, AS WELL AS IN THE WMDS. THIS TOTAL WILL FALL, OF COURSE, AS FORCES ARE QULLED OUT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY, AND AS NOTED IN PARA. 12 BELOW, THE FRG FORESEES EXCLUDING SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE GDR FROM THE SUFFICIENCY RULE, GIVEN THEIR TRANSITION-ONLY STATUS. SOVIET PERSONNEL IN POLAND, HOWEVER, WOULD PRESUMABLY STILL COUNT; ADDED TO FORCES IN THE WMDS, THAT WOULD MAKE A TOTAL OF SOME 500,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL SUBJECT TO A 4.3 SUFFICIENCY RULE. IF THE SOVIETS RELOCATED FORCES BEING WITHDRAWN FROM EASTERN EUROPE IN THE WMDS, THIS FIGURE WOULD BE EVEN HIGHER.

END COMMENT.

9. I TOLD HARTMANN THAT WE WOULD NOT BE OUT IN FRONT ON THIS ISSUE, LOOKING INSTEAD TO THE FRG. KAPLAN SAID THE INITIATIVE DESCRIBED BY HARTMANN APPEARED TO BE VERY IMPORTANT.

10. I ALSO TOLD HARTMANN THAT, WHETHER AGREED IN CFE-I OR CFE-II, A FORMAL COMMITMENT TO SUCH A SPECIFIC NUMERICAL LIMIT ON THE BUNDESWEHR IN A SPECIFIC REGION, COULD BE READ AS A DEPARTURE FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OTTAWA UNDERSTANDING, WHICH CLEARLY RESTRICTED PERSONNEL LIMITS IN CFE TO U.S./SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER. SINCE THE BUNDESWEHR HAD BEEN -- AND REMAINED -- THE PRINCIPAL WESTERN SURGE FORCE, LIMITING ITS SIZE AND THUS CAPABILITY WOULD SEEM TO ALTER THE PREMISES UNDERLYING THE OTTAWA NUMBERS AND STRUCTURE. IT SEEMED TO SUGGEST THE NEED FOR SOMEWHAT GREATER FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING U.S- STATIONED MANPOWER. HARTMANN SAID BONN WAS THINKING ALONG THESE LINES.

11. ONE POSSIBILITY, I CONTINUED, WAS THAT SUCH A DEPARTURE FROM THE OTTAWA FRAMEWORK COULD ENCOURAGE RECONSIDERATION OF THE EARLIER GORBACHEV PROPOSAL FOR EQUAL 195,000 OR 225,000 U.S./SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE. WE INITIALLY HAD PREFERRED TO OPT FOR THE 195,000/30,000 SPLIT BETWEEN AN ADJUSTED CENTRAL ZONE AND THE REST OF EUROPE IN ORDER TO COPE WITH THE NEED TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF U.S.-SOVIET ASYMMETRY. BUT THE SOVIETS SUBSEQUENTLY HAD INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH THE HUNGARIAN IDEA OF BANNING THE STATIONING OF FORCES WITHOUT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. IN THAT CASE, THE 30,000 PROVISION MIGHT NO LONGER BE REQUIRED, ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT THERE WAS GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE BASING OF THE 195,000 U.S. TROOPS. THIS WAS ONE IDEA; THERE MIGHT BE OTHERS.

12. HARTMANN SAID THE FRG ALSO WAS CONTEMPLATING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR CONCERNING SOVIET FORCES NOW STATIONED IN THE GDR IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE BASING OF PERSONNEL THERE WAS "LIMITED IN TIME"; SOVIET FORCES NOW STATIONED IN THE GDR, THEREFORE, WOULD NOT/NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE 4.3 SUFFICIENCY RULE. HARTMANN ADDED THAT BONN ALSO WAS INVESTIGATING THE LIKELY CONTENT OF THE PLANNED POLISH-SOVIET STATIONING AGREEMENT.

13. I COMMENTED THAT GENSCHER'S CONCEPT, AS REPORTED

BY HARTMANN, WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IF
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USVIENNA 01494
NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

ALSO PASS TO SECDEF CHENEY, CJCS POWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR SCOWCROFT, ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN AND JUDGE WEBSTER
FROM AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL

IT ALSO SUCCEEDED IN REMOVING SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO
GERMANY'S NATO MEMBERSHIP. KAPLAN ADDED THAT SUCH A
BOLD STROKE ALSO COULD ACCORD A MAJOR POLITICAL
IMPETUS TO THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE OVERALL
EAST-WEST ATMOSPHERE.

14. HARTMANN CLOSED BY SAYING IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT A
PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE APPLY TO ZONE 4.3 IN ORDER
TO COVER SOVIET TROOPS IN THE WMDS AND TO AVOID

SINGULARIZATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE WEST. A
PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE, EXPRESSED IN AN ABSOLUTE
NUMBER RATHER THAN A PERCENTAGE OF AN OVERALL TOTAL,
ALSO WOULD LESSEN THE PERCEPTION OF LIMITING ONLY
GERMAN MANPOWER. FOR THE NUMBERS TO WORK, THE KIEV MD
ALSO WOULD NEED TO BE PLACED OUTSIDE OF ZONE 4.3.

15. I CONCLUDED BY REITERATING THAT THE FRG HAD THE
BALL AND THAT WE LOOKED FORWARD TO LEARNING ABOUT
GENSCHER'S SOUNDINGS IN GENEVA. HARTMANN SAID HE HAD
TOUCHED EARLIER ON THIS CONCEPT WITH GRINEVSKIY, WHO
CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION OF SOMEONE WHO "DIDN'T KNOW
WHERE MOSCOW STANDS," AN OBSERVATION ABOUT GRINEVSKIY
ALSO MADE TO US EARLIER IN THE DAY BY THE NEW UK REP.

16. COMMENT. IT IS, OF COURSE, OF PARAMOUNT
POLITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT GENSCHER'S IDEA REMAIN A
GERMAN INITIATIVE. IF HE GOES FORWARD WITH A
PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE OF THIS SPECIFICITY, AS A
GERMAN PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS MAY SEE IT AS A WAY
FORMALLY TO PLACE AN UPPER CEILING ON THE MILITARY
MANPOWER OF A UNITED GERMANY, THEREBY REMOVING WHAT
APPEARS TO BE A -- IF NOT THE -- CENTRAL SOVIET
RESERVATION ABOUT A CFE AGREEMENT. SUCH AN
INITIATIVE, IF ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS, SEEMS TO ME,
AND APPEARS TO SEEM TO HARTMANN, TO REOPEN THE OTTAWA
UNDERSTANDING AND THUS TO PROVIDE US WITH A CLEAR
RATIONALE FOR REVIEWING THE OTTAWA PERSONNEL NUMBERS
AND STRUCTURE, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF GORBACHEV'S
EARLIER EUROPEAN-WIDE LIMITS FOR U.S./SOVIET STATIONED
MANPOWER. I WOULD NOTE THAT THE UK REP ALSO URGED US
EARLIER IN THE DAY TO TRY AND FIND A WAY TO DO THIS.
END COMMENT. WOOLSEY

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03<SSN> 1494<STOR> 900524143510 MSG000264868510
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03<SSN> 1494<STOR> 900524143553 MSG000264868552
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03<SSN> 1494<STOR> 900524143636 MSG000264868596
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4111

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 23, 1990

LIMITED ACCESSINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
SUBJECT: Status of START Issues

This memorandum reports on the status of the major START issues following the recent Moscow Ministerial, and describes the game plan for how we plan to proceed with the Soviets between now and the Summit.

Soviet Arms Control Team

One of the key unknowns concerns the team of Soviet arms control experts which is due in town later this week. This team (which is now scheduled to arrive on Saturday instead of today as previously planned) will be headed by Viktor Karpov. It evidently will not include General Omelichev or other senior level General Staff representation. The first meeting is now scheduled for Saturday afternoon, with plans to meet through the Memorial Day weekend.

We have told the Soviets that we envisage these meetings to be a continuation of the Bartholomew-Karpov arms control working group that met in Moscow. As such, we expect this group to continue to work the unresolved START issues (as well as try to make progress on CFE and Open Skies). We also expect it to work on two joint statements that might be issued at the Summit, one that records substantive agreement on the major START issues and one that describes the objectives of follow-on negotiations.

The Soviets have told us that they agree with this approach. Their late arrival date and lack of General Staff representation, however, leave unclear whether they will be in a position to implement it unless the extra time in Moscow has been used to get them the guidance and authority necessary to close deals. At a minimum, we will want to use the presence of the Soviet team to come as close to agreement as possible on the two joint statements.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDEDCAP 2008.0753.MR
5/4/2010

Resolved Issues

The ALCM and SLCM issues were settled in Moscow. Geneva is now working on final versions of the SLCM declaration and the ALCM "agreed elements." There undoubtedly will be hiccups (or worse) along the way as we translate these policy level agreements into detailed treaty text, but I do not expect anything further to arise in these two areas between now and the conclusion of the Summit. The issue of the START Treaty's duration was resolved in Geneva immediately before the Ministerial. All of the other outstanding START issues remain unresolved.

Unresolved Issues

Baker got nowhere with the Soviets in Moscow on additional heavy ICBM limits, mobile ICBM limits, road-mobile verification, Backfire, or non-circumvention. This list will constitute our initial agenda for the weekend meetings with Karpov. The recent NSD gives us flexibility on some of these issues that was not used in Moscow. I convened my Ungroup yesterday to review the state of play and to identify other potential areas of flexibility (e.g., a different package on Backfire, dropping our 3000/3300 ICBM RV sublimit). With the possible exception of mobile ICBM limits, however, none of the unresolved issues is a candidate for quick and easy agreement with the Soviets in Washington.

We have been careful to avoid identifying any specific remaining issues as ones that must be resolved by the time of the Summit. We likewise have worked to preserve the option of deciding that, with ALCMs and SLCMs, we already have reached "substantive agreement on the major START issues." With issues such as Backfire and SS-18 still open, however, this could be a hard sell.

More generally, we want something from the Soviets on most of what is left to resolve. Declaring victory on the basis of the current areas of agreement, therefore, will weaken our hand on the remaining issues. This tactical situation argues that we should not be too quick to signal during the weekend meetings with Karpov that we are more eager than the Soviets to announce substantive agreement on START at the Summit.

Joint Statements

As noted above, there are two possible joint statements that could be signed or otherwise issued during the Summit. The first would be a document that recorded the substantive agreements that

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have been reached to date in START. The Soviets reportedly have a 20 page draft they will be bringing to Washington to work during our weekend meetings. State has just circulated for comment its cut at a U.S. draft.

It is likely that these drafts will become the vehicle for addressing at least some of the unresolved issues (e.g., each side includes its version of the prospective agreement on the heavy ICBM issue). At some point, therefore, we will need decisions on what we can accept in the joint statement on each of the unresolved issues, including which ones can be omitted altogether and which, if any, need to be explicitly noted as still outstanding. After we see what has been agreed with the Soviets, we also will need a decision about whether the President will want to sign this document. It is possible that this can all be worked out in the Bartholomew-Karpov meetings, but we probably should plan on some of these questions going to the Baker-Shevardnadze, if not presidential, level after Gorbachev arrives in Washington.

The second document would be a joint statement on the follow-on negotiations. We brought our draft to Moscow. The Soviets also had theirs. There is somewhat more overlap in these drafts than I had expected, especially on topics related to "defense and space," but also the obvious areas of disagreement. A bracketed text is being worked in Geneva. Rick reports that the Soviets have the greatest difficulty with the implicit SDI reference to "a cooperative transition" and the explicit mention of "a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs." He will bring back the current version when he returns to Washington this weekend for the Bartholomew-Karpov meetings. I will get it to you as soon as it is available.

We also will need decisions to resolve disagreements about the substance of this document and regarding whether the two presidents should sign it.

RB
Robert Blackwill, Rich Davis, and John Gordon concur.

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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NSC Secretariat

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A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

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COMMENTS

*Mtg re: Arms Control on May 25
at 3:30pm*

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