**Originally Processed With FOIA(s):**
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# FOIA MARKER

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
**Series:** USSR Chronological Files
**Subseries:** CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

**OA/ID Number:** 91121
**Folder ID Number:** 91121-005

**Folder Title:**
CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (January 1990)

| Stack: | Row: | Section: | Shelf: | Position: |
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| G | 34 | 3 | 3 | 1 |

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
# (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title | Date | Restriction | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. Memo | Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Office Call with CFE Ambassador Jim Woolsey, January 2, 1990 (2 pp.) | 1/2/90 | (b)(1) | C |
| 02a. Memo | Robert D. Blackwill to G. Philip Hughes<br>Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (1 pp.) | 1/10/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 02b. Memcon | Re: Meeting with President Francois Mitterrand of France (10 pp.) | 12/16/89 | (b)(1) | S |
| 03a. Memo | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: CFE Reductions (1 pp.) | 1/16/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 03b. Memo | James A. Baker, III to POTUS<br>Re: US Troop Levels in Europe (2 pp.) | 1/16/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 03c. Talking Points | Re: What Might Be Said on CFE In The State Of The Union Message (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1) | S |
| 03d. Memo | Secretary Cheney to POTUS<br>Re: Memorandum for the President (3 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1) | S |
| 03e. Memo | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: CFE and U.S. Troop Levels in Europe (3 pp.) | 1/16/90 | (b)(1) | S |



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**File Location:** CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (January 1990)

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1026
**OA/ID Number:** 91121-005
**Date Closed:** 3/13/2009
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S
**Re-review Case #:**
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title | Date | Restriction | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03f. Memo | Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: CFE and U.S. Troop Levels in Europe (1 pp.) | 1/15/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 04a. Memo | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.) | 1/26/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 04b. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversations with Key Allied Leaders on New Move in CFE (4 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1) | S |
| 04c. Memo | Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Presidential Phone Calls to Key Allies on New Movement in CFE (1 pp.) | 1/23/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 05a. Outline | Re: Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (2 pp.) | 1/27/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 05b. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with IK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (5 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1) | S |
| 05c. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (5 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1) | S |
| 05d. Report | Re: Biography (2 pp.) | 1/17/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 05e. Memo | Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: The President's Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd on January 29 at 3:00 p.m. (1 pp.) | 1/27/90 | (b)(1) | S |



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| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title | Date | Restriction | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06a. Memo | Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item: The President's CFE Initiative (2 pp.) | 1/31/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06b. Cable | Re: Talking Points for President's CFE Initiative (7 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06c. Cable | Re: Letter from the President to Allied Heads of Government on New Proposals in CFE (4 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06d. Memo | G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: B-C-S Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, January 31, 1990, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06e. Memo | Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item: Base Closures (Upper Heyford & Bermuda) (1 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06f. Memo | Rich Davis to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Fireproofer -- Sublimits on Mobile ICBM Warheads in START (1 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06g. Memo | William Tobey to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item: Defense & Space Talks (1 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06h. Memo | Secretary Cheney to Secretary of State<br>Re: Defense and Space Issues at the Moscow Ministerial (2 pp.) | 1/27/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06i. Talking Points | Re: Talking Points Defense and Space (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1) | S |



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| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title | Date | Restriction | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06j. Memo | William Tobey to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Possible Breakfast Items: The Krasnoyarsk Radar and Thule and Fylingdales Visits (2 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06k. Memo | Secretary Cheney to Secretary of State<br>Re: Krasnoyarsk (1 pp.) | 1/26/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 06l. Memo | Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item: Secretary Cheney's Travel to Asia (1 pp.) | 1/29/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 07a. Memo | Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Your Meeting with Tom King, UK Defense Secretary, on January 31 at 11:00 a.m. (1 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 07b. Report | Re: Biography (2 pp.) | 1/12/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 08a. Memo | Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Telephone Calls from the President to Congressional Leadership on CFE Initiative (1 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 08b. Memo | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Telephone Calls to Congressional Leaders on CFE Initiative in the State of the Union Address (1 pp.) | 1/31/90 | (b)(1) | S |
| 08c. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Key Congressional Leadership (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1) | S |



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| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title | Date | Restriction | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09. Memo | Philip D. Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Impressions from the Ottawa Conference (1 pp.) | 2/14/90 | (b)(1) | S |



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 10166 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

January 2, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: Office Call with CFE Ambassador Jim Woolsey, January 2, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

You will be meeting with Ambassador Woolsey at **4:00 pm today.** Ambassador Woolsey has just returned from his first round at the CFE negotiations and will be returning when the negotiations reopen January 12 for Round V.

The last round of the negotiations was dominated by a Greek-Turk dispute over the area of application which held up tabling the NATO draft treaty text. That text has now been tabled; the East has also tabled a draft treaty text which is very similar to our own in many respects. The other significant event of the last round was the tabling of a revised NATO position on tanks and armored troop carriers which tried to narrow the gap between the eastern and western positions. We already have agreement on artillery definitions. The proposal has been welcomed by all Eastern delegations except the Soviet Union.

The major issues for Round V will be getting agreed definitions for other items of equipment, accelerating work on verification, and sorting out zones and subzones.

There is a Deputies Committee meeting on CFE verification on Thursday to resolve some key outstanding issues.

Jim is visibly frustrated by the unwieldy process of gaining Alliance consensus, and will probably mention this to you. Some Allied delegations in Vienna are reluctant to make any decisions without remanding issues back to the HLTF in Brussels. For our part, we are trying to shift as many issues as possible to the caucus in Vienna. The Allies would not agree to dissolve the HLTF or move it to Vienna. Trying to do so would take more time and energy than it is worth.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0972-MR
SCS 8/15/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**You may wish to say:**

-- You've been creating quite a whirlwind in Vienna. Well done, and you'll need to keep doing it. We're committed to signing this Treaty in 1990.

-- To accelerate the process here in Washington, we've just set up task forces on all the tough issues to better use our resources and get you timely guidance as the pace increases further. If that doesn't work, we'll try something else. We will do whatever is necessary to support you.

-- I know that you are frustrated by the way NATO makes decisions. As much as the Allies are willing to tolerate should be done in Vienna.

-- The HLTF will be meeting every two weeks, at a minimum, starting immediately. We won't let pre-set meeting dates slow down the pace of these negotiations.

-- Keep up the good work.

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow ~~AW to P2 w draft~~

**National Security Council**
**The White House**

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 10166

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AM A/O 61

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dep Exec | 1 | N | I |
| Philip Hughes | 2 | JPH | |
| Bob Gates | 3 | APNSA Has Seen | |
| Brent Scowcroft | 4 | | |
| Philip Hughes | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
| West Wing Desk | 5 | | N |
| NSC Secretariat | 6 | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

RECEIVED 90 JAN 2 P2:15

A = Action | I = Information | D = Dispatch | R = Retain | N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

Office Call w/ CFE Amb. Jim Woolsey on Jan. 2 at 4:00pm.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9000214
RECEIVED: 10 JAN 90 17

TO: HUGHES

SIGRON FILE

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 10 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE MEMCON

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND

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ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 13 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLACKWILL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

**DECLASSIFIED**
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CoP NARA, Date 3/13/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAMM CLOSED BY: NSJRP DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0214

January 10, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Mitterrand, on December 16, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 3/6/2012

SECRET

0214

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CAP 2000.0429.F
8/21/2009

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Francois Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Brent
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)

Francois Mitterrand, President of France
Roland Dumas, Prime Minister of France
Hubert Vedrine, Elysee Press Spokesman
Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Elysee Military Advisor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 16, 1989, 1:30 - 3:00 pm
St. Martin

The President: We need to move forward on CFE. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, and we still have a problem with aircraft. The Soviets want to exclude air defense aircraft. (S)

The President: We have to move the process and get it done. It's very important. (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't see too many obstacles. It was a mistake to generalize the definition of aircraft. What we need on aircraft we should exclude from regular forces. We must sacrifice one category to save another. (S)

The President: Given the changes in Eastern Europe, we have a real problem in the US with defense spending. (S)

President Mitterrand: In France, we do not see things clearly enough to reduce defense spending. Things could change internally in the USSR. (S)

The President: That's the way I look at it too, but there is a crazy mood in the US. Some people say we should cut $50 to 100 billion dollars in defense and give out a peace dividend in our social programs. There are almost euphoric expectations in the U.S. (S)



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President Mitterrand: During a TV program a few days ago, I said that the time had not yet arrived to cut defense spending. However, this is not a refusal to consider doing so in the future, because we are spending too much. (S)

The President: MacNamara said that we could cut the defense budget in half. (S)

Secretary Baker: Yesterday, the Soviets announced an 8 percent cut in defense spending and said that all foreign based troops would be home by the year 2000. (S)

The President: That will put great pressure on us to cut back our forces. (S)

President Mitterrand: Shall we talk more about CFE now? We must get this thing moving. We had a problem with the Greeks and the Turks and we solved that one. This is a good lesson regarding the Turkish application to join the EC. If we solve the aircraft problem, we should be able to sign an agreement in the second half of 1990. (S)

Secretary Baker: This will take continued high level direction. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: Yes, or our respective bureaucracies will bog down. (S)

The President: What about wrapping up a CW treaty next year? (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: We are somewhat optimistic, but the U.S. delegation in Geneva has the key. You made good proposals at Malta and I think the Soviets will accept. We got that impression in Kiev. I think they are interested in this one. Two treaties in one year would be a good signal. (S)

The President: I think they are interested across the board if we can find the right formulation. That will help more than anything. (S)

President Mitterrand: I have no objection to a CSCE summit. One will have to decide what is said. We will have to be prepared. It will not cost us anything, and it will boost Gorbachev at home. (S)

The President: We have been somewhat reserved about this. It did not come up with Gorbachev. We need to discuss what might come out of it. (S)

President Mitterrand: What does he expect of this? Gorbachev feels they need this to make the Summit solemn, to make it obvious he is a part of the international community. He needs it given his problems. (S)

The President: In Malta, he thought we had proposed a

Helsinki II rather than a CFE Summit. (S)

President Mitterrand: He needs results on arms control. We are in a good position to get concessions from him. (S)

The President: Tell us about the Eastern Europe Development Bank. We are interested, but how do you see it? Would the USSR be a sponsor or a recipient? If the latter, won't that break the bank? (S)

President Mitterrand: This morning in Paris, I signed a letter to you. On the basis of an EC decision, I would like a meeting on January 15 of all countries that will take part in the European Development Bank. There is no time to lose. The situation in the USSR is desperate. We need to help. I wrote to the other eleven EC members, to you and to the Japanese, Swiss, Austrian, Canadian, and Australian Prime Ministers. I also wrote to Gorbachev, and said this invitation is open to all who wish to give capital; they can be on the board of directors. We don't want it to be an EC bank. Recipient countries should also be involved at the decision making level. Hence, the participation of USSR. Each country will appoint representatives: bankers, Treasury Secretaries. These people will not make mistakes, or take financial risks. But this Bank is very important to the Eastern European countries. Gorbachev told me in Paris that he is very much interested; he is keen on this idea. Everything will depend on the quality and level of people we appoint. We can't throw money out of the window. (S)

The President: Exactly. (S)

Secretary Baker: Will there be a private sector component to this bank? (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Exactly; that's the point. (S)

President Mitterrand: The Strasbourg Declaration says we want them to move to a market economy. This bank should be open to both public and private funds. (S)

Secretary Baker: The President has proposed an Enterprise Fund to help develop the Polish and Hungarian private sectors. (S)

President Mitterrand: This will be a bank run by professionals. Bankers in France are not tenderhearted towards Frenchmen, and I doubt that they will be tenderhearted towards Moscow. You have bankers who are evangelists. Look at their loans to Mexico. (S)

The President: And look at Argentina also. (S)

Secretary Baker: Should the Soviets join the World Bank? (S)

President Mitterrand: They want to. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Soviets are not yet ready to come up with funding, but they want to join the International Financial Institutions. (S)

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President Mitterrand: In itself, this is a good thing, although they must meet conditions. We mustn't isolate them. (S)

The President: This is good. It helps them understand the market. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Ryzhkov plan moves them in the wrong direction. This reveals their political vulnerability. (S)

President Mitterrand: As long as we maintain control, we will be fine. In the EDB, they will have a share commensurate with their contribution. It will be very small. The IMF and World Bank are strong. Why should they fear the Soviets, especially when dealing with a country that needs everything. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: IMF is certainly independent ready. (S)

President Mitterrand: On Lebanon, as soon as Muawad was elected, we recognized him. Then he was killed. I wrote General Aoun telling him I recognized the legitimacy of the Muawad government. I told him that this was in the interest of Lebanese Christians. I think the Syrians killed Muawad, although I have no proof. After Harawi was elected, we acted in the same fashion. We don't send arms to General Aoun. It is difficult for us to do much more as I said on French TV. The only legitimate government is this government. I have stopped all arms shipments to General Aoun. He is hesitant. He has picked up stature in the last few days thanks to Iraq and Israel. They have given him oxygen. I was right to tell the Syrians they would not accept bombing of Beirut. We said the same thing. I told Harawi that France would not understand an attack on East Beirut Christians through the Syrian Army. How does Harawi want to use force? His legitimacy would be questioned if he did. The Arabs are saying to us that General Aoun is in a state of rebellion, and we are helping Aoun. If we let him go on, he will win the day. Aoun should feel isolated without external support. Our advice to Israel should be to remove Aoun's external support. He must understand that Lebanon cannot be partitioned. He does not have the support of France. This is the first time in history that this is so. If the U.S. could act as we are to appease passions, we perhaps can avoid additional civil war. (S)

The President: As you know, we have no contact or standing with General Aoun. I had not heard of Israeli support. Aoun ought to be offered refuge somewhere so that he can get out. (S)

President Mitterrand: I have offered him asylum. This remains absolutely secret, but I have given Aoun all assurances as to the safety of his family. (S)

The President: I had not heard about the allegation that Israel was providing support for General Aoun. I assume you mean diplomatic support, not military. (S)

President Mitterrand: Assad doesn't want a victorious army which can be dangerous to politicians when the army comes home. It is



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a tragedy for General Aoun that he does not have French government support. (S)

Secretary Baker: Would you have a problem with a statement that he should step down? (S)

The President: I have said on French TV that France does not recognize Aoun, and that we want the Taif agreements to succeed. But, we don't want to encourage the Syrians either and it is a Lebanese internal matter in any case. I am sad about this. (S)

General Scowcroft: We are more worried about Syria than you are. We feel that they are about to attack, only held back by a promise that Aoun will leave. (S)

The President: Aoun can beat the Syrians in the short term, for several weeks. The Syrians do not have a good army. (S)

The President: Many Lebanese Americans are sympathetic to General Aoun. It amazes me that they still are sympathetic. They see him as a strong Christian champion. (S)

President Mitterrand: We have the same problem. The only difference is they have friends in Parliament. (S)

The President: Are they of Lebanese heritage? (S)

President Mitterrand: Not especially, they are just Catholics. (S)

President Mitterrand: Today, the Pope is very silent on the subject. (S)

Secretary Baker: Very. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: If we push in the right direction, Aoun is more likely to step down. If he thinks he has outside support, such as Iraqi and Israeli backing, he will hang on. (S)

The President: Let us check the Israel connection. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Israel provided support for the Maronites for a long time. (S)

The President: The Secretary is working hard to move the peace process forward. (S)

President Mitterrand: We can reiterate the points of law: recognition of the government by you and by all of us. This is significant because France is considered the protector of the Christians. To add to this that Aoun should go would be counterproductive, too aggressive. We can express the hope that everyone will draw the consequences. (S)

The President: The Tripartite group did well. It looked like they were down and out, but they arose from the dead. (S)

SECRET

President Mitterrand: The Pope refused to meet the delegation. The Pope doesn't want to accelerate the process. (S)

The President: I thought the Pope had encouraged Muawad and Aoun to cooperate with the Tripartite group. (S)

President Mitterrand: What does Secretary Baker have in mind regarding your NAC proposals? (S)

Secretary Baker: We need to adapt our institutions for a new era. NATO/EC/CSCE need to be reviewed at a time when we are reducing the US presence in Europe. We want the EC to serve as an anchor for Germany. We should institutionalize some of what we now do informally. How to enhance cooperation? We have no blueprint in mind. We could talk about trade agreements, but not necessarily. The essential point is that when the US military presence is reduced, we should enhance our trans-Atlantic political ties. (S)

President Mitterrand: What does this mean in concrete terms? (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: I said to Jim Baker this morning that Europe does not speak with one voice. He said, "does that mean you have twelve positions?" We can't create artificially one EC voice. Europe needs to shape itself. We are driven to move forward because of the German issue. Our approach should be practical, not theoretical. We don't know how Eastern Europe will turn out. Regarding U.S. reductions in Europe, the Soviets say they will withdraw from Europe by the year 2000. But Gorbachev says he wants the U.S. to remain in Europe. (S)

President Mitterrand: How do you interpret the idea of having all Soviet troops out of Europe by the year 2000? (S)

The President: I can't figure it out. He must be addressing himself to internal problems. (S)

President Mitterrand: This may be linked to Jim Baker's speech. (S)

Secretary Baker: I sent it to Shevardnadze. (S)

Secretary Baker: Czechoslovakia says that it wants Soviet forces out. Then will come Hungary and Poland, and then the GDR. They will have to leave anyway, so why not propose it. (S)

President Mitterrand: We are open as to the form the Alliance will take, but we must be practical. (S)

Secretary Baker: In my speech I suggested a NATO verification unit. This will be more and more a part of NATO's business. Regarding political consultations, we could talk about regional issues within NATO. This would not be to take NATO action, but to talk over the issues. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Regarding NATO verification, our military believes it is the responsibility of each state. We are not against coordination and there could be an exchange of information. But to have NATO take over the responsibility entirely would seem inappropriate. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker: As the military component of NATO diminishes, as it will, NATO needs an increased political role, but verification would remain a national responsibility. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Dumas: As for regional discussions, we talk bilaterally. Why do it in NATO? ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker: We would like to enhance NATO consultations in addition to bilateral contacts. ~~(S)~~

President Mitterrand: It is a question of common sense. France is a loyal member of NATO. It is not in the integrated command, but we have good talks between our military and the NATO command. Each time the US has needed something, we were forthcoming. We have received assistance from the U.S. of all kinds, We have no complaints. France and the UK are the most reliable U.S. allies. National responsibility is fine, but I'm very open to this kind of thing especially since we are moving toward the time when there will not be an enemy to the East. But we must be careful and not put the cart before the horse. Things can change in the USSR and bring about a military reversal. However, if by the year 2000 we don't have a strategic enemy, .. I accept the framework but will reserve on the contents. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker: We favor continued EC integration. It's not for us to say how or even whether to deepen the EC. We have discussed this issue. The key is a strengthened EC. ~~(S)~~

President Mitterrand: Yes, we talked about that. Your last point is very right. I agree that it is important to understand the German urge to reunify, but this must be accomplished through a proper transfer. We can't ignore the others who will resist this: the Poles, the Soviets, the Czechs, the Belgians, the Danes, the Italians. And there are others. France is showing the most understanding for the Germans right now. As I said to Kohl, German reunification must not go forward any faster than the EC. Otherwise, the whole thing will end up in the ditch. ~~(S)~~

The President: Regarding China, it will be a long time before we achieve normalized US-China relations. But I thought the time had come to have contact with them. We have difficult problems with China on trade, human rights, and their man in the U.S. Embassy. I asked Brent Scowcroft and Larry Eagleburger to go there. They were well received, but it caused a firestorm in some quarters in the U.S. We are trying to move the human rights agenda forward not backward. I hope China will take certain positive actions as a result of this trip. We don't know that they will, but it is my gut instinct that they will. We have taken a gamble. Privately, we have heard from the U.S. Ambassador that things are moving. They will not sell missiles

to the Middle East, and they have permitted The Voice of America correspondent to come in, although they do continue their jamming. We are also having discussions regarding Fulbright scholars. In taking this first step, I have taken some heat, but we want to move them forward on the rights of dissidents. Time will tell. I hope that I am right. (S)

General Scowcroft: There is an internal struggle going on in China. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: How is Deng Xiaoping? (S)

President Mitterrand: Has the situation stabilized? (S)

General Scowcroft: No, Deng Xiaoping still has control when he wants it. He is trying to transfer power to Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Party. (S)

The President: Li Peng is tough and has something of an anti-US streak, but even he seemed a little more positive. Du Shi Meng was pleased that Scowcroft was meeting with Jiang Zemin. (S)

President Mitterrand: These eighty-year-olds give us some hope. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Did anything come up on Cambodia? (S)

General Scowcroft: We didn't discuss it. (S)

Secretary Baker: China has said no to the idea of a UN-supervised process. (S)

President Mitterrand: Hun Sen is the strong point of his government. Paradoxically, we didn't choose him but he is governing well. He is benefiting from fears of the return of the Khmer Rouge. For us, the Khmer Rouge are a nightmare. They would kill the negotiation. Hun Sen really needs to be taken into account by us. Sihanouk has lost lots of authority. He hopes to regain it in the field via the Khmer Rouge. (S)

Secretary Baker: There can be no settlement that does not involve the Khmer Rouge and China. That is an absolute fact of life. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: If you have China then you have the Khmer Rouge. China is pulling the strings. Without China, Hun Sen will be the strongest. The Khmer Rouge depends entirely on China. (S)

Secretary Baker: Without China, the Khmer Rouge would indeed be weak. (S)

General Scowcroft: But China won't cut its links to the Khmer Rouge; that is their influence in the game. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have differences as to the role of the Vietnamese. We believe they influence Hun Sen. The West has

leverage over Viet Nam through their aid requirements. You give because you seek leverage. We hold back because we seek leverage. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: So there is no difference! (S)

General Scowcroft: It's only a question of tactics. (Laughter) (S)

The President: Turning to Hong Kong, that is a very difficult repatriation problem. (S)

President Mitterrand: For us, it is ethically an almost unbearable situation. (S)

The President: Regarding Central America, Oscar Arias asked that I ask Gorbachev to persuade Castro to stop exporting revolution. We didn't get much progress, but our views are more clearly understood. (S)

President Mitterrand: On the question of what we tell the press on the German issue, developments in Germany must be linked to developments in NATO and the EC. We should show understanding over what the Germans wish. There is not much we can do because we are not going to go to war against Germany. It could cause a diplomatic crisis if it goes too fast. It would have the wrong effect and would complicate East-West relations at a time when the West is winning hands down. (S)

Secretary Baker: With regard to the Strasbourg communique and the NATO Ministerial, we are all together. (S)

President Mitterrand: I agree fully with President Bush. We are prepared to manage the contradictions in the situation. A speedy move towards reunification cannot be stopped by force, and perhaps not by diplomacy. At the same time, it could disrupt the European equilibrium based on existing treaties and frontiers. What you have said, I feel. I did not care for General Walters giving a date for reunification. (S)

The President: What he said about a five year time frame is not the official U.S. position. (S)

President Mitterrand: But he said it in Germany and the Germans heard it. I am not saying anything about the man, but I do not think it is wise to mention a date. We don't need to encourage more speed. (S)

The President: General Walters is no longer saying it. (S)

President Mitterrand: We must move on arms control, on EC integration, on European monetary union, and on US-EC cooperation all at the same time in order to create a new Europe. Otherwise, we will be back in 1913 and we could lose everything. We are friends of Germany. They can't take our advice amiss. (S)

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The President: Kohl understands this but he is playing political cards. (S)

President Mitterrand: He has turned down the rhetoric, but he has his election problems. I was mentioning earlier that we must respect the Helsinki agreements. When Germany says no to the elimination of border controls with France because of the East Germany issue, that upsets me. Holland and Belgium refused outright; we were more diplomatic. But Germany caused the problem. Four days ago, Kohl called me and raised no objection. When our representatives met and had East Germany foisted on us, we were shocked. (S)

Secretary Baker: Regarding my trip to the GDR, the opposition said that Modrow represented our only hope of getting to the May 6 elections. He is the last symbol of legitimacy in the GDR. We fear anarchy if Modrow falls. (S)

President Mitterrand: I am going there on Wednesday on a State visit. Honneker had invited me. (S)

Secretary Baker: Kohl will have the opportunity to make the same point. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Do you think he will? (S)

Brent Scowcroft: No. (S)



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SE

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

January 16, 1990

CHRON FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: CFE Reductions

Attached are position papers for the meeting at 4:30 p.m. today on CFE reductions. The Defense/JCS position is at Tab I and the NSC position at Tab II. Secretary Baker has apparently decided to make his arguments orally rather than to submit a formal paper.

Attachments:

Tab I - Defense/JCS Position Paper
Tab II - NSC Position Paper

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 10/18/2011

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**THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

**WASHINGTON**

January 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Troop Levels in Europe

Strategic trends in Eastern Europe and the USSR, our budget projections, and Congressional views all point to US troop levels in Europe by end FY94 substantially below the CFE I 275,000 ceiling. The question is how we respond.

NSC proposes we move now to amend the CFE US-Soviet 275,000 ceiling to 200,000. DOD proposes instead that we indicate publicly that we would expect US force levels to be reduced substantially below the 275,000 by 1994, and make the reductions contingent on future conditions and consultations.

There is merit in both approaches. But I am not certain that either fully advances and protects key objectives:

1. Your commitment to complete CFE I this year.

2. Your continued leadership with the Allies and Congress on European security issues.

3. Your strong commitment to a significant level of US forces in Europe over the long term, which is fundamental for stability and our influence on developments.

An approach combining elements of the DOD and NSC recommendations might better serve these objectives. We would cast it with the Allies and publicly as a "program for European security and stability for the long term" with these key features:

1. Completing CFE I in 1990 is the keystone of our program and we are working with our Allies to resolve the key outstanding issues and speed agreement. (We are working compromises that could be outlined if we can get them agreed here and with the Allies in time.)

2. We and our Allies propose that immediately after CFE I is completed, the CFE participants also agree in 1990 on an "outline of goals for further reductions" for follow-on CFE II negotiations.

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3. These goals would reflect US plans to reduce its forces in Europe to 200,000 at the earliest possible time and in any event by the end of 1994, in consultation with our Allies and assuming strategic trends continue. Our objective is a significant level of forces in Europe for the long term. (Note also that CFE I reductions agreed in 1990 would be completed by 1992-1993 in the Allies' proposal and 1994-1995 in the Soviets'.)

4. We expect the Soviet level of forces in Eastern Europe to go much lower in the same time frame. US and Soviet reductions below the CFE I levels should not be tied together, whether in CFE II or in independent decisions. There are important differences in roles and geography that must be respected, and the will of countries that host outside forces must be decisive.

This "program" sets out specific and concrete US reductions rather than the general and hedged objective in the DOD approach. In our view, the hedged approach will not fly in Congress and will leave the Allies unsure of your bottom line. The program also provides for CFE II which the DOD approach does not; this is important because major Allies want some follow-on negotiations and we can use it to brake Allied unilateral cuts.

The program breaks the linkage between US and Soviet force levels whereas amending that level in CFE I, as the NSC approach suggests, would help tighten it. This is important for our objective of maintaining a significant US level in Europe while getting the Soviets totally out of Eastern Europe. Even more importantly, there is a high risk that moving to amend CFE I, as the NSC approach calls for, will delay agreement in 1990. This approach would avoid that.

Whatever we think or hear about possible Allied and Soviet reactions, dropping the CFE I 275,000 to 200,000 is a major step that could bog us down in a flood of questions, reservations and conditions. If there were some way to assure this did not happen, then this approach could be attractive, though we would still have to find some way to handle the US-Soviet linkage effect. But it is not clear that there is such a way and the program outlined above seems a better way to advance and protect our key objectives.

Jim

James A. Baker , III

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

WHAT MIGHT BE SAID ON CFE IN THE
STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

-- We have a sound program for European security over the long term.

-- Our objectives are:

- a secure Europe, whole and free, of states living without fear of intimidation or intervention in their internal affairs;
- a substantially reduced but still significant U.S. military presence, providing a source of stability; and
- a cohesive NATO Alliance, continuing to provide the framework for Western security.

-- A key element of our program for European security is completion of a CFE agreement in 1990.

- This will make a major contribution to European security.
- It will result in the removal of over 300,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.
- It will result in destruction of a large amount of Warsaw Pact military equipment -- the tools of offensive warfare (tanks, artillery, and armored troop carriers).

-- We would expect, assuming current trends continue, that U.S. force levels in Europe would by 1994 be reduced substantially below the 275,000 level contained in a CFE agreement.

- We would complete these reductions only after close consultation with our Allies as to the substance of the reductions and the manner of making them.
- These consultations would give prudent consideration to the security situation at the time, political developments, and the impact on NATO defense strategy.



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-- Let no one doubt, however, the strength of our continuing commitment to NATO and our European Allies.

- The U.S. will continue to have a significant military presence in Europe.
- Our presence in Europe serves important U.S. security interests.
- We will remain in Europe as long as our Allies continue to require it.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

We face a key challenge in reconciling your CFE initiative with fiscal realities and defense budget levels. In broad terms, this is a leadership challenge: how to maintain your influence and leadership in two spheres -- with the Congress at home, and with the Allies abroad -- while attaining overall U.S. security objectives, particularly as they apply to Western Europe.

This broad challenge comes in the guise of a much simpler question. The current NATO CFE proposal calls for a 275,000 limit on both US manpower stationed in Western Europe and Soviet manpower stationed in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Five Year Defense Plan that you will submit in January will require us to reduce our troops in Europe considerably below that number by 1994.

To resolve this simpler question, we could change the NATO proposal by substituting for the 275,000 a number more in tune with our defense plans (like 200,000 or 225,000). Your bold leadership in proposing the 275,000 limit last May won wide praise in NATO capitals and at home. You would simply be revising your own initiative, and could point to developments in Eastern Europe as the reason for the change. While the revision would undoubtedly win short-term praise in some quarters, I believe it would have a number of highly adverse consequences which outweigh these limited gains. General Powell and I have discussed this issue extensively, and this memorandum reflects both our views.

While you are obviously the best judge of the matter, we are concerned that moving off the 275,000 figure would seriously undermine the existing, hard-fought consensus within the Alliance. Those who fervently support CFE (like the Germans) will see the change as delaying an agreement -- thereby foregoing expected gains in the near term. Those who are more skeptical (like the UK and, to some degree, France) will be critical of our inability to hold to already agreed NATO goals. By setting negotiating levels unilaterally -- strongly influenced by our own budget pressures rather than a shared NATO consensus -- we will also encourage other allies in further unilateral cuts in response to their own budget pressures. Under your leadership, we have built a solid Alliance consensus behind 275,000. We should not abandon it.

Some may argue that we should float the idea of reducing the 275,000 figure informally with our Allies (and perhaps even the Soviets) to see if these concerns are real. If our concerns are justified, however, much of the damage will have been done simply by floating the idea. If it leaks, the Congress is liable to force us to the lower levels regardless.

This leads, in our view, to perhaps the most telling point. The defense budget you will be submitting to the Congress in two weeks assumes the 275,000 number. By changing that number now, you would be walking away from your own budget even before it is submitted. This will make it virtually impossible to defend any



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subsequent figure for U.S. troop strength in Europe. This, in turn, will considerably diminish your ability to hold out against Congressional pressure to reduce our troop strength there to dangerously low levels. U.S. troop strength in Europe will go into "free fall". You will, in our view, have lost effective control over a key element of what will be the most critical defense budget debate in years.

We believe there is a way, however, to maintain your leadership within the Alliance, keep control of the defense budget debate, and still signal that we will be making further reductions in our forces in Europe.

(1) You would hold to the 275,000 figure and press for an early CFE agreement. We should not move off the 275,000 figure. This is a figure in which you have invested a considerable amount of your influence, beginning with the NATO Summit last spring, and which we have already tabled with the East. The Alliance should instead move ahead vigorously to wrap-up a CFE agreement along the lines of the current NATO proposal. This would nail down the significant gains the agreement offers for the West: (a) to reach the 275,000 level, the Soviets will have to reduce about 375,000 troops compared to 30,000 for the U.S.; (b) other provisions of the agreement will require the East to destroy military equipment far in excess of that destroyed by the West (for example, 30,000 Pact tanks compared to 2,000 for NATO); and (c) there would then be in place mechanisms and procedures for monitoring future destruction of equipment and verifying compliance with the agreement.

(2) You would indicate publicly that, assuming current trends continue, you would expect U.S. force levels to be reduced substantially below the 275,000 by 1994. This would establish the time frame within which an orderly build-down is expected to occur, while maintaining flexibility as to the precise force level to be achieved. We can emphasize now other reductions that we plan to take globally in FY 90 and 91 and thus demonstrate that arms control is not standing in the way of even initial reductions.

(3) You would indicate that reductions to force levels below 275,000 would occur only after close consultation with our Allies and after prudent consideration of the security situation, political developments, and the impact on NATO defense strategy. This would appropriately link future force levels to larger U.S. security objectives, and help avoid a free-fall in force levels induced mainly by domestic budgetary considerations.

(4) You would reaffirm the U.S. commitment to NATO and that the U.S. will continue to maintain a significant presence in Europe for the longer term. This would be an important reassurance for those Allies who might see these projected reductions as the first step in a U.S. withdrawal from Europe.

There is no inconsistency between holding to the 275,000 figure now while signalling clearly an expectation that our force levels will go lower in the future. Since 275,000 is an entitlement -- a ceiling, not a floor -- we are free to move below it. Moreover, it is useful to establish this principle publicly. A key US objective ought to be to encourage the removal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. As you well know, the East Europeans (particularly Hungary and Czechoslovakia) are pushing hard in this direction. Our approach makes clear that the 275,000 entitlement is no impediment to this result. It also helps to break the link between US and Soviet troop levels in Europe. This is important if we are going to maintain a significant US

presence in Western Europe at the same time that the Soviets are being pushed out of Eastern Europe.

Paradoxically, we believe this is also the best strategy for achieving reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe. Events in Europe are outstripping the ability of arms control to keep pace. It will simply take too long formally to negotiate with the East the reductions we may need to make ourselves and the reductions the East Europeans will -- hopefully -- be able to force upon the Soviets. We must not let formal arms control negotiations stand in the way of taking full advantage of the unique historical opportunity before us. Our approach would allow you to have both the benefits of arms control and the freedom to take full advantage of events.

In sum, we believe our approach best preserves your leadership of both NATO and the US budget debate while achieving overall U.S. objectives in Europe: the elimination of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the maintenance of US forces in Western Europe (but at lower levels and costs), and the preservation of the cohesion of the NATO alliance.

Mr. President

This memo reflects the views of Colin Powell, Gen. Jack Galvin and the Joint Chiefs —

Dick

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THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON 0313

January 16, 1990

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MM 8/21/2015

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: CFE and U.S. Troop Levels in Europe

If present international and budget trends continue, there will be no more than 200,000 U.S. troops in Europe by 1994 or 1995. But the Hill may want to cut our forces in Europe even faster and deeper. Such Congressional action could send U.S. troop levels in NATO into a tailspin that would undercut your commitment to our Allies to maintain substantial U.S. forces in Europe.

All your advisors agree that our major objectives are to complete a CFE Treaty this year; lower manpower levels in Europe; establish a floor under U.S. troop levels there that we can sustain at least through the mid-1990s; and maintain the confidence of our allies.

How best to implement these objectives will be largely determined by the answers to two questions. First, should we embed these planned U.S. manpower cuts (down to 200,000) in CFE I, should they be deferred to CFE II, or should they be unilateral U.S. reductions outside CFE? Second, should we announce a specific number for the U.S. presence we expect to have in Europe in the mid-1990s?

**I recommend that you try to cut a clean deal with the Allies and Gorbachev on 200,000 for U.S. and Soviet stationed troops as part of CFE I to be implemented by 1994. You would hold in reserve an alternative approach of unilaterally announcing in your State of the Union address that 200,000 is our goal for U.S. troop levels in Europe in the mid-90s.**

Why Embed Cuts in CFE I. The timetable for the U.S. troop cuts in Europe would be about the same, inside or outside of CFE, since it probably would take until some time in 1994 to implement the reductions required by CFE. But, making troop reductions part of CFE increases the chances that you rather than the Hill will determine the pace and size of our cuts. A CFE I agreement, including further U.S. manpower reductions, would constitute a kind of "contract" between you and the Congress. The Hill would see it as binding you to reduce manpower over the next four years in a way that vague plans for the budget "out-years" cannot. For the same reasons, the Allies would regard it as a relatively firm

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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floor that could be sustained over the longer term and better insulated from the vicissitudes of U.S. domestic politics and budgets.

In return, Congress would find it much harder to reduce U.S. forces outside the context of CFE. The Hill will not want to be seen as undercutting our negotiating position or forfeiting the opportunity to get something from the Soviets in return for our reductions. By contrast, if we announce unilateral cuts independent of CFE, the Hill might regard plans for reductions as merely the starting point for the further cuts it will make. Nunn will probably support us -- he is on record as calling for a new CFE manpower ceiling between 200,000 and 250,000. If the Soviets reject our deal, we will be able to say we tried, and the Soviets said no. If we do not try, our critics will ask why.

There is a risk that this approach could slow down the negotiations. We therefore would need to present a clean deal to key Allied leaders and Gorbachev: "Let's agree to a U.S.-Soviet limit of 200,000 rather than 275,000, in CFE I. If Gorbachev in turn wants to introduce other new elements that will slow down CFE, let's forget it." If we make such an approach quickly, it would preserve your option to announce in your State of the Union address our unilateral plans to reduce the U.S. troop presence down to 200,000 by the mid-1990s.

Such a deal might appeal to the Allies as the best way to build a floor under the U.S. presence in NATO, once they understand that the question is how, not whether, the U.S. will be cutting its forces in Europe. It also might appeal to the Soviets whose own forces are being pushed out of Eastern Europe irrespective of CFE. This deal would provide at least some political cover for their withdrawal. Indeed, if we stick with our current proposal for a 275,000 manpower limit, we could find ourselves trumped by a Soviet call for lower troop levels in CFE I.

Deferring deeper U.S. troop cuts to CFE II is not a realistic option. First, Congress won't wait for new negotiations, that will not begin for more than a year, to achieve lower U.S. troop levels in Europe. If we wait for CFE II, we will surrender the initiative and be perceived to have been dragged by the Hill to make further reductions. Second, our Allies are unlikely to accept further CFE manpower limits that benefit only us and the Soviets. Third, we want to break--not perpetuate--the linkage in any future negotiations between our military presence in NATO and the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.

Why a specific number. Whether or not our further troop cuts are embedded in CFE, we quickly need to establish a precise number for our military presence in Europe into the mid-90s. Otherwise, Congress will set--and probably constantly reduce--U.S. troop levels in NATO; the Allies will believe that our budget decisions will drive down our presence to no more than token levels; we

will undermine the CFE process to which you committed yourself as recently as December; and we will reduce our ability to help manage the German problem, since our influence is based largely on our continued military presence there. In my judgment, that number should be 200,000. Below 200,000, there is no good stopping point that would keep a substantial number of U.S. military units effectively deployed in Europe.

Whatever you decide, we must consult with our Allies about our plans to move to a level of 200,000 U.S. troops in Europe by the mid-90s before it is publicly announced.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 15, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: CFE and U.S. Troop Levels in Europe

At Tab I is a proposed memorandum for the President setting out your views on embedding planned U.S. troop reductions in Europe in CFE. You may want to share this memo with Baker, Cheney, and/or Powell before your meeting with the President. We understand that Cheney, at least, also plans to provide the President a memo that lays out his preferred approach.

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow PZ

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0972-MR
SCS 8/5/13

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# National Security Council
## The White House

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| Dep Exec | | | |
| Philip Hughes | | | |
| Bob Gates | | | |
| Brent Scowcroft | | | |
| Philip Hughes D | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
| West Wing Desk | | 4/1/93 | |
| NSC Secretariat | 1 | | N/R |
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| A = Action | I = Information | D = Dispatch | R = Retain | N = No further Action |
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 0649

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1990 JAN 26 PM 12:05

January 26, 1990

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Calls to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom, President Mitterrand of France, Chancellor Kohl of the FRG, and Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy (9am Sat 7am Sat 3:15 Friday)

DATE: January 25-26, 1990

PURPOSE: To inform key Allied leaders of your intention to propose a change in the Western position on U.S.-Soviet ceilings on stationed manpower in the CFE negotiations and ask them to receive Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and Bob Gates for further consultations

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: (Needed for Mitterrand, Kohl, and Andreotti)

TIME DIFFERENCE: +5 (London) and +6 (Paris, Bonn, and Rome)

SUGGESTED TIMES: To be determined

TOPIC OF DISCUSSION: CFE

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH KEY ALLIED LEADERS
ON NEW MOVE IN CFE

(Essential Points are in **Bold** Type)

**I want to talk to you today about the way the political situation is developing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and how these events relate to our position in the talks on conventional arms in Vienna.**

**Our proposal on the table is for both the United States and the Soviet Union to have no more than 275,000 troops stationed in Europe when the CFE reductions are complete, in the mid-1990s. The Soviet have been putting out hints the figure is completely unrealistic, and I think they are right.**

The Czech and Hungarian governments are negotiating now for Soviet troop pullouts by the end of this year or next. Lech Walesa called last week for Soviet withdrawal from Poland by the end of 1990.

Meanwhile, President Havel has indicated that he plans to ask in February, in his visits to Moscow and Washington, for greater U.S. and Soviet troops cuts than those now in our CFE proposal.

**We have heard from various people, including the Soviet negotiator in Vienna, that Moscow ~~is moving~~ may be toward our position on capping U.S. and Soviet stationed forces, but at**



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a number well below the current 275,000 figure. The Soviets seem to want to use CFE as a way to regulate what they hope will be a stable withdrawal of their troop presence from Eastern Europe. So the Soviets may propose a lower ceiling themselves.

-- We need to be out in front on this issue. We cannot be put in the position of insisting on a higher ceiling on stationed forces. It would seem to the East Europeans as if we were trying to keep Soviet troops where they are not wanted.

-- However, nothing we do should in any way complicate or delay achieving CFE in 1990 and we should redouble our efforts to accomplish this.

-- At the same time, I have concluded that a force of 195,000 U.S. troops in the Central Zone in Europe (225,000 overall) in the mid-1990s is a significant and sustainable level to maintain forward defense and implement the NATO strategy of flexible response. I am persuaded that the best way to make these manpower reductions and to sustain the new force levels is within an arms control negotiating process.

leaves out Turkey - UK.

-- After a careful review of our defense needs, I have therefore concluded that we should now propose that we seek to conclude in a manner which does not delay or otherwise interfere with the current CFE negotiations, an agreement that sets a negotiated ceiling on U.S. and Soviet stationed

forces in the Central Zone at 195,000. At the same time, I believe we should also say that we expect Soviet troop levels in Eastern Europe to move below that level as democratically elected governments there seek the complete removal of the Soviet military presence. All this is without prejudice to a CFE II negotiation which I would strongly urge follow CFE I.

-- As you know, I am under pressure to cut our defense spending. Putting force plans into a negotiated process will help preempt calls for even greater reductions coming from the Congress, and elsewhere. By preempting Congressional moves in this way, I am confident this is a floor that we can sustain.

-- I hope you will be able to support this approach. It is absolutely crucial, in trying to manage the changes now underway, the CFE not be overtaken by events, that our publics continue to perceive this process as relevant, and responsive, to the opportunities now before us.

-- We have an opportunity before us to redraw the postwar military map of Europe. The time is right. The East Europeans still consider CFE useful, and the Soviets still look to CFE to solve political and economic problems.

-- My main objective in considering the U.S. troop presence in Europe is the pledge I made last December in Brussels, that "the United States will maintain significant military forces

in Europe as long as our Allies desire our presence as part of a common security effort."

-- **I would like Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and my deputy National Security Advisor, Bob Gates, to visit you during the next few days to further explain our thinking. I hope you would be able to receive such a visit. They would also be stopping in (London) (Bonn) (Paris) (Rome).**

-- **Their trip will be entirely private, and hopefully will not leak.**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Non-log item

January 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Calls to Key Allies on New Movement in CFE

As you requested, we have prepared talking points for the President to use in outlining our intention to propose a reduction in the U.S.-Soviet manpower ceiling to 200,000, and asking his key allied counterparts to receive Eagleburger and Gates for a further discussion of our plans in CFE.

These points would be used for phone calls to Prime Minister Thatcher, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Andreotti.

In addition to pressing arguments for a 200,000 ceiling personally to the individual leaders, we are leaving open the possibility that Eagleburger and Gates could also bring along a proposed revision in the NATO position on aircraft, now in the final stages of work within the USG, as part of an effort to wrap up the major issues for the CFE Treaty within the next several weeks.

Heather Wilson concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum to the President and talking points at Tab I for use by the President in telephone calls to Prime Minister Thatcher, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Andreotti proposing an Eagleburger/Gates mission.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to President and Points to be Made (Eagleburger-Gates mission)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9000660
RECEIVED: 26 JAN 90 16

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 27 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN AP

PERSONS: HURD, DOUGLAS

SUBJECT: PRES MTG ON 29 JAN W/ BRITISH FORN SEC HURD

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ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 30 JAN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW LOGREF: 9000676

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

| FOR ACTION | FOR CONCURRENCE | FOR INFO |
|---|---|---|
| | | BLACKWILL |
| | | KANTER |
| | | ZELIKOW |

**DECLASSIFIED**
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 3/13/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG CLOSED BY: NSAMM DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
# (George Bush Library)

| Document No. and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05a. Outline | Re: Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (2 pp.) | 1/27/90 | (b)(1) | S |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
**Series:** USSR Chronological Files
**Subseries:** CFE Files
**WHORM Cat.:**
**File Location:** CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (January 1990)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Date Closed:** | 3/13/2009 | **OA/ID Number:** | 91121-005 |
| **FOIA/SYS Case #:** | 2009-0275-S | **Appeal Case #:** | |
| **Re-review Case #:** | | **Appeal Disposition:** | |
| **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:** | | **Disposition Date:** | |
| **AR Case #:** | | **MR Case #:** | |
| **AR Disposition:** | | **MR Disposition:** | |
| **AR Disposition Date:** | | **MR Disposition Date:** | |

## RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

**P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]**
**P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]**
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**P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]**
**P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

**PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.**

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
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**(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information**

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ CARD 1 OF 9

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

SECURITY ISSUES AND CFE

-- I SPOKE TO MARGARET ON SATURDAY ABOUT OUR INTENTION TO PROPOSE DEEPER CUTS IN US AND SOVIET TROOPS STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, GOING DOWN TO 195,000 IN THAT REGION.

-- WE ARE MAKING THIS MOVE BECAUSE WE WANT TO KEEP, AS I HAVE PLEDGED, A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY PRESENCE, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR, IN EUROPE IN ORDER TO PROTECT EUROPEAN STABILITY AT THIS TURBULENT TIME.

-- THE CUTS WE HAVE IN MIND WILL LEAVE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL AND EFFECTIVE US MILITARY COMMITMENT IN EUROPE AND HAVE BEEN SCRUBBED BY OUR TOP MILITARY LEADERS. TO PROTECT THAT LEVEL OF FORCES, WE MUST MOVE FAST TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE CONGRESS, THE SOVIETS, AND

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ CARD 2 OF 9

OTHERS WHO WILL SOON BE CALLING FOR MUCH DEEPER CUTS.

-- THAT IS WHY WE WANT TO PREEMPT THOSE DEMANDS WITH OUR OWN INITIATIVE, THAT WILL USE THE CFE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK TO PUT A FLOOR UNDER THE U.S. TROOP PRESENCE IN EUROPE IN THE MID-1990S.

-- AS I MENTIONED TO MARGARET, OUR FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD NOT BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY OUR PLAN, SINCE BRITAIN IS NOT IN THE CENTRAL ZONE. ONE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF OUR APPROACH IS THAT WE HOPE TO BREAK THE LINK BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF US FORCES STATIONED ANYWHERE IN EUROPE AND THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE.

**((IF US BASE AT UPPER HEYFORD IS RAISED))**

-- I AM GLAD DICK CHENEY DECIDED NOT TO ANNOUNCE THIS MOVE AND STUDY IT SOME MORE. HE PLANS TO

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TALK ABOUT THIS ISSUE TOMORROW WITH YOUR DEFENSE SECRETARY, TOM KING.

-- I CAN ASSURE YOU OF MY PERSONAL INTEREST IN HOW THIS ISSUE GETS RESOLVED.

FUTURE OF EUROPE

-- I KNOW YOUR GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PACE OF GERMAN MOVES TOWARD REUNIFICATION.

-- WE ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF REUNIFICATION, IF THAT IS THE CHOICE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, AND ARE READY TO LIVE WITH IT. WE ALSO, HOWEVER, WILL TRY TO WORK WITH THE GERMANS, AND OUR ALLIES, TO MANAGE THIS PROCESS IN A STABLE WAY.

-- OUR ONLY HOPE FOR A STABLE MANAGEMENT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS IS TO AVOID POISONING OUR RELATIONS WITH BONN, WHICH WILL HAPPEN IF THEY THINK WE ARE TRYING TO BLOCK THEIR NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS. A POSITIVE APPROACH WILL GIVE US THE HIGH GROUND WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO WORK



CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE GERMANS IN HANDLING THE CHALLENGE THAT IS COMING UPON US SO QUICKLY.

-- MEANWHILE, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS NEED TO WORK TOGETHER VERY CLOSELY IN THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.

-- WHAT WERE YOUR IMPRESSIONS FROM YOUR RECENT TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE?

US-EC RELATIONS

-- WE ARE COMMITTED TO A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP WITH A MORE INTEGRATED EC. THE PRESS ASSERTIONS THAT WE SOMEHOW DIFFER IN OUR SUPPORT FOR AN INTEGRATED COMMUNITY WERE TROUBLING TO ME, BECAUSE WE KNOW HOW COMMITTED YOUR GOVERNMENT IS TO THE 1992 SINGLE MARKET AND FREE TRADE.

-- I KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN BUILD ON THE NEED FOR CLOSER US-EC TIES, SUCH

AS MORE FREQUENT MEETINGS OF OUR MINISTERS. COULD YOU ELABORATE ON THESE IDEAS?

-- EXPANDED US CONTACTS WITH THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION (EPC) WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. HOW DO YOU THINK WE CAN BEST ACCOMPLISH THIS?

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO GET STARTED WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE IDEAS SOON, PERHAPS BY THE END OF MARCH.

VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE AND HONG KONG

-- I UNDERSTAND THE CHALLENGE YOU FACE IN REASSURING THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG ABOUT THEIR FUTURE AS YOU DEAL WITH THIS VERY TOUGH REFUGEE PROBLEM. I KNOW THERE ARE NO EASY ANSWERS.

-- AS I HAVE TOLD MARGARET, I THINK WE MUST DISAGREE, AS CLOSE FRIENDS SOMETIMES DO, ON THE ISSUE OF MANDATORY REPATRIATION. MY FEAR IS THAT WE MIGHT BE REPLACING ONE HUMAN



TRAGEDY WITH AN EVEN GREATER ONE, AND ENDANGER THE BASIC RIGHT OF FIRST ASYLUM.

-- IT IS TOO SOON TO GIVE UP. WE SHOULD TRY TO KEEP WORKING ON THIS TOGETHER, AND WITH OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO FIND SOME OTHER WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

SOUTH AFRICA

-- SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS SEEM TO BE EVOLVING IN A MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. DE KLERK IS CLEARLY ALLOWING MORE OPPOSITION ACTIVITY, AND WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA.

-- LIKE YOU, WE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO GIVE DE KLERK REASONABLE TIME TO IMPLEMENT HIS PROGRAM OF POSITIVE CHANGE AWAY FROM APARTHEID.

-- YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PLAYING A VERY HELPFUL ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND IN NAMIBIA

~~SECRET~~

TOO. WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS FOR THE MONTHS AHEAD, ESPECIALLY IF MANDELA IS RELEASED?

HONG KONG

-- I UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR RECENT VISIT TO HONG KONG HELPED GIVE A BOOST OF CONFIDENCE TO THE LOCAL POPULATION. HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE MOOD THERE NOW?

CAMBODIA

-- WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE PERM FIVE DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS EARLIER THIS MONTH. WE THINK AN ENHANCED UN ROLE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD LEADING TO ELECTIONS AND DIRECT UN RUNNING OF THOSE ELECTIONS ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT.

-- STILL, REACHING A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT THIS UN ROLE, AND GETTING AGREEMENT TO IT FROM THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES, WILL BE A FORMIDABLE TASK.



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-- DO YOU THINK OUR GOVERNMENTS DIFFER IN OUR APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE HUN SEN REGIME IN PHNOM PENH?

ARGENTINA/FALKLANDS

-- WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONTACTS BETWEEN YOUR GOVERNMENT AND ARGENTINA. WE HOPE FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS CAN BE RESTORED SOON.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT MENEM'S SITUATION, GIVEN THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THERE AND THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF SOCIAL UNREST. WHILE WE CANNOT SOLVE ALL OF THESE PROBLEMS, WE CAN PROVIDE SOME DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.

PANAMA

-- I JUST WANT TO REITERATE AGAIN MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE STAND MARGARET TOOK ON PANAMA. SHE DID NOT HESITATE FOR A MOMENT AND WAS AS FORTHRIGHT AS SHE COULD BE.

~~SECRET~~

-- NOW, OF COURSE, WE HAVE HIGH HOPES TO SEE A RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TO MR. NORIEGA. STILL, YOU WERE RIGHT THERE WITH US WHILE THINGS WERE STILL A BIT TOUCH AND GO, AND I WILL REMEMBER THAT.

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
UK FOREIGN SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD

Security Issues and CFE

-- I spoke to Margaret on Saturday about our intention to propose deeper cuts in US and Soviet troops stationed in Central Europe, going down to 195,000 in that region.

-- We are making this move because we want to keep, as I have pledged, a significant military presence, both conventional and nuclear, in Europe in order to protect European stability at this turbulent time.

-- The cuts we have in mind will leave a very substantial and effective US military commitment in Europe and have been scrubbed by our top military leaders. To protect that level of forces, we must move fast to get out in front of the Congress, the Soviets, and others who will soon be calling for much deeper cuts.

-- That is why we want to preempt those demands with our own initiative, that will use the CFE negotiating framework to put a floor under the U.S. troop presence in Europe in the mid-1990s.

-- As I mentioned to Margaret, our forces in the United Kingdom would not be directly affected by our plan, since Britain is not in the Central Zone. One of the advantages of our approach is that we hope to break the link between the level of US forces stationed anywhere in Europe and the size of the Soviet presence.

**((if US base at Upper Heyford is raised))**

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-- I am glad Dick Cheney decided not to announce this move and study it some more. He plans to talk about this issue tomorrow with your Defense Secretary, Tom King.

-- I can assure you of my personal interest in how this issue gets resolved.

Future of Europe

-- I know your government is concerned about the pace of German moves toward reunification.

-- We accept the inevitability of reunification, if that is the choice of the German people, and are ready to live with it. We also, however, will try to work with the Germans, and our allies, to manage this process in a stable way.

-- Our only hope for a stable management of these developments is to avoid poisoning our relations with Bonn, which will happen if they think we are trying to block their national aspirations. A positive approach will give us the high ground we need to be able to work constructively with the Germans in handling the challenge that is coming upon us so quickly.

-- Meanwhile, our two governments need to work together very closely in thinking about the future of Central and Eastern Europe.

-- What were your impressions from your recent trip to Eastern Europe?

US-EC Relations

-- We are committed to a stronger relationship with a more integrated EC. The press assertions that we somehow differ in our support for an integrated Community were troubling to me, because we know how committed your government is to the 1992 Single Market and free trade.

-- I know you have been thinking about how we can build on the need for closer US-EC ties, such as more frequent meetings of our ministers. Could you elaborate on these ideas?

-- Expanded US contacts with the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) would be particularly helpful. How do you think we can best accomplish this?

-- We would like to get started with negotiations on these ideas soon, perhaps by the end of March.

Vietnamese Boat People and Hong Kong

-- I understand the challenge you face in reassuring the people of Hong Kong about their future as you deal with this very tough refugee problem. I know there are no easy answers.

-- As I have told Margaret, I think we must disagree, as close friends sometimes do, on the issue of mandatory repatriation. My fear is that we might be replacing one human tragedy with an even greater one, and endanger the basic right of first asylum.

-- It is too soon to give up. We should try to keep working on this together, and with others in the international community, to find some other way to deal with this very difficult problem.

South Africa

-- South African politics seem to be evolving in a more positive direction. De Klerk is clearly allowing more opposition activity, and we are looking forward to the release of Nelson Mandela.

-- Like you, we believe it is necessary to give de Klerk reasonable time to implement his program of positive change away from apartheid.

-- Your government has been playing a very helpful role in South Africa, and in Namibia too. What are your plans for the months ahead, especially if Mandela is released?

Hong Kong

-- I understand that your recent visit to Hong Kong helped give a boost of confidence to the local population. How do you assess the mood there now?

Cambodia

-- We are pleased with the outcome of the Perm Five discussions in Paris earlier this month. We think an enhanced UN role during the transitional period leading to elections and direct UN running of those elections are especially important.

-- Still, reaching a consensus on how to implement this UN role, and getting agreement to it from the Cambodian parties, will be a formidable task.

-- Do you think our governments differ in our approach to dealing with the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh?

Argentina/Falklands

-- We are pleased to see continued improvement in the contacts between your government and Argentina. We hope full diplomatic relations can be restored soon.

-- We are concerned about Menem's situation, given the economic problems there and the real possibility of social unrest. While we cannot solve all of these problems, we can provide some diplomatic support.

Panama

-- I just want to reiterate again my deep appreciation for the stand Margaret took on Panama. She did not hesitate for a moment and was as forthright as she could be.

-- Now, of course, we have high hopes to see a restoration of democracy and the administration of justice to Mr. Noriega. Still, you were right there with us while things were still a bit touch and go, and I will remember that.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

U.K.

Douglas Hurd, Foreign Secretary
Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sir Patrick Wright, FCO Permanent Undersecretary
Stephen Wall, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
# (George Bush Library)

| Document No. and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05d. Report | Re: Biography (2 pp.) | 1/17/90 | (b)(1) | S |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
**Series:** USSR Chronological Files
**Subseries:** CFE Files
**WHORM Cat.:**
**File Location:** CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (January 1990)

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| **Date Closed:** | 3/13/2009 | **OA/ID Number:** | 91121-005 |
| **FOIA/SYS Case #:** | 2009-0275-S | **Appeal Case #:** | |
| **Re-review Case #:** | | **Appeal Disposition:** | |
| **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:** | | **Disposition Date:** | |
| **AR Case #:** | | **MR Case #:** | |
| **AR Disposition:** | | **MR Disposition:** | |
| **AR Disposition Date:** | | **MR Disposition Date:** | |

## RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

**P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]**
**P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]**
**P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]**
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**P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]**
**P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

**PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.**

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
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**(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0660

January 27, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd on January 29 at 3:00 p.m.

This will be the President's first meeting with Hurd. His main topics are likely to be East-West issues, focusing mainly on our plans in CFE and, perhaps, bases in Britain. He will be looking for signs of a general political strategy for stability in Europe, especially Central Europe, that animates our arms control and force planning decisions. He will also want to discuss U.S. relations with the EC, and, of course, the Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong.

From our perspective, we would like to see the President's meeting with Hurd, and yours, be dominated by a warm effort to smooth troubled waters. Our CFE intentions, the handling of the bases issue, and the President's refusal to join Britain in approving mandatory repatriation of boat people -- all in the past week -- come in the context of increasing concern in London about the special relationship.

You, and the President, can stress the continued commitment to European defense, praise Hurd's (and Thatcher's) less confrontational approach toward the EC (Hurd is a long-standing Europeanist), compliment the bracing effect of Hurd's mildly helpful visit to Hong Kong in reassuring the local population, and commend the wisdom of British policy toward South Africa (Thatcher intends to go there after Mandela is released). On refugees, the President's natural inclination will be to characterize our differences with deep regret, with no sermons, and that tone would be just right.

Concurrences by: Arnold Kanter

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I, briefing him for his January 29 meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Hurd.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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CHRON FILE

January 31, 1990 APNSA Has Seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: The President's CFE Initiative

Secretary Cheney would not clear the talking points to explain the President's initiative last night. We have prepositioned the guidance with NATO (Tab A) and instructed them to call a North Atlantic Council meeting for not earlier than 0900 Washington time (3 p.m. Brussels time). The President's letter has been sent (Tab B). This must be resolved at breakfast.

Secretary Cheney has two problems with the text.

1. He objects to the implication that we might pursue the idea in follow-on negotiations if the proposal threatens to slow down the talks. This point, highlighted on page 4 of Tab A, was put in to the cable at the request of the State Department. Secretary Cheney argues that this was not the President's decision, and that we should not commit ourselves to follow-on negotiations at this point.

2. He wants a ceiling of 225,000 throughout Europe as well as 195,000 for the Central Zone. On this point, you should say:

-- This was not the decision, and this was not the proposal the President, Eagleburger and Gates made to Kohl, Thatcher, Mitterrand and Andreotti.

-- The proposal does not make sense. Only the 195,000 ceiling would apply to the Soviets because they have no foreign stationed forces outside of Eastern and Central Europe. It would effectively be a unilateral ceiling only applying to the U.S.

-- We do not want to propose limits in a way that continues the linkage between U.S. and Soviet manpower levels.

These problems must be resolved at breakfast and we need to know the outcome immediately after the meeting. Arnie will not be

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2011-1594-MR
MR 9/28/2016

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available at 8 a.m. He has suggested that you tell me the decision and I will ensure that guidance gets to Brussels immediately.

RECOMMENDATION

That you resolve these issues at breakfast and let me know the result immediately after the meeting.

Attachments
Tab A Guidance to NATO
Tab B President's letter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH [illegible] DRAFT [illegible]
CLEAR 1 [illegible] 2 ___
3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___
6 ___ 7 ___ 8 ___

deliver the President's letter as instructed septel, but should

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2. Action addressees should take no action on this cable pending further authorization from Washington. USNATO should request a NAC for not earlier than 3 p.m. Brussels time. Washington approval will be forthcoming at approximately 08:00 Washington time.

NSCS:AKANTER
01/30/90 71627 SERPM 58
T:RBARTHOLOMEW

EUR:RSEITZ
JCS:MGRAVES
S/S-O:

OSD:SHADLEY
NSC:
S/S: by telephone

NIACT IMMEDIATE ANATO

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, CANBERRA IMMEDIATE, TOKYO IMMEDIATE •

NODIS
USNATO FOR AMB. TAFT; USVIENNA FOR CFE/AMB. WOOLSEY •

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, KCFE, NATO

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S CFE INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 29198 (DTG 2800172 JAN 90)

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

3, 2. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTED: THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO MAKE A NEW CFE PROPOSAL ON U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER IN EUROPE. OVER THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, THE UNITED STATES HAS HELD INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY ALLIES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON THIS PROPOSAL. ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (EXCEPT BONN, PARIS, LONDON, AND ROME, WHO WERE CONTACTED EARLIER) AND SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER WILL HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OUTLINING THIS PROPOSAL THIS MORNING, JANUARY 31 (SEPTEL). THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE THIS INITIATIVE IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS TONIGHT, 31 JANUARY, AT 9 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME. USNATO SHOULD REQUEST A MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN THE AFTERNOON OF 31 JANUARY TO FURTHER EXPLAIN U.S. THINKING, DRAWING ON THE POINTS IN PARA 6 BELOW, WHICH MAY BE CIRCULATED AT YOUR DISCRETION. USNATO SHOULD ATTEMPT TO SECURE A NAC ENDORSEMENT OF THE

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PRESIDENT'S MANPOWER INITIATIVE, IF POSSIBLE, IN A NATO PRESS RELEASE FROM BRUSSELS ASAP. OTHER ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT BONN, PARIS, LONDON, AND ROME) SHOULD FURTHER EXPLAIN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL, DRAWING ON THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 5.6 BONN, PARIS, LONDON, AND ROME SHOULD CONTACT HOST GOVERNMENTS AND INFORM THEM THAT OTHER NATO ALLIES HAVE NOW RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OUTLINING OUR MANPOWER PROPOSAL AND OFFER ANY FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSAL, DRAWING ON POINTS IN PARA 6 BELOW.

4. IN REF A, SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER OUTLINED A NEW U.S. PROPOSAL FOR COMING TO RAPID CLOSURE WITH THE EAST ON COMBAT AIRCRAFT. TALKING POINTS FURTHER EXPLAINING THE U.S. POSITION ON AIRCRAFT ARE BEING SENT SEPTEL. TOGETHER, THESE INITIATIVES ON MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT ARE INTENDED TO FACILITATE EARLY AGREEMENT ON KEY OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS IN LINE WITH WESTERN INTERESTS SO THAT WE CAN CONCLUDE A CFE AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN 1990. THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT/NOT REFER TO THESE AIRCRAFT IDEAS IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS. AS NOTED IN SECRETARY BAKER'S LETTER (REF), WE EXPECT THE AIRCRAFT ISSUE TO BE TAKEN UP AT THE 5 FEBRUARY MLTF WITH A VIEW TO REACHING ALLIANCE AGREEMENT ON A NEW AIRCRAFT PROPOSAL AT THAT TIME.

5. OUR OBJECTIVES IN PROPOSING THIS MANPOWER INITIATIVE, AND OUR INITIATIVE ON AIRCRAFT, ARE:

-- TO CONCLUDE A CFE TREATY IN LINE WITH WESTERN INTERESTS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IN 1990;

-- TO UNDERSCORE OUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES DESIRE OUR PRESENCE AS PART OF A COMMON SECURITY EFFORT;

-- TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE IN OUR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS;

-- TO BETTER INSULATE U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE FROM THE VICISSITUDES OF U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS.

END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTED.

6. BEGIN TALKING POITNS ON MANPOWER INITIATIVE.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH HAS SENT HIS NATO COUNTERPARTS AND SYG

WOERNER A LETTER THIS MORNING ON A NEW CFE PROPOSAL ON U.S. AND SOVIET MANPOWER STATIONED IN EUROPE. THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE THIS INITIATIVE IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS TONIGHT AT 9 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME. I WOULD LIKE TO FURTHER EXPLAIN OUR ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW WE THINK THESE DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS IN VIENNA. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEEK THE SUPPORT OF YOUR GOVERNMENTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE.

-- IN DECEMBER, IN ADDRESSING THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AFTER HIS MEETINGS IN MALTA, THE PRESIDENT PLEDGED THAT "THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES DESIRE OUR PRESENCE AS PART OF A COMMON SECURITY EFFORT."

-- THE UNITED STATES REITERATES THAT PLEDGE TODAY AND WISHES TO UNDERSCORE ITS CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO NATO AND OUR COMMON DEFENSE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT CFE CONTINUES TO BE THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATED, COORDINATED, VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN A CHANGING EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. AS THE PACE OF CHANGE IN EUROPE CONTINUES TO ACCELERATE, CFE PROVIDES A VEHICLE TO FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM EASTERN EUROPE, TO ENSURE THAT THOSE FORCES WITHDRAWN ARE DESTROYED, OR, IN THE CASE OF TROOPS, DEMOBILIZED, AND TO LOCK IN THOSE REDUCTIONS IN LIGHT OF A FLUID SITUATION IN THE USSR.

-- WE ALL KNOW THE SITUATION THE SOVIETS NOW FACE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, AND -- SOON -- POLAND. IN ADDITION, WE EXPECT PRESIDENT HAVEL TO ASK FOR GREATER U.S. AND SOVIET TROOP REDUCTIONS THAN THOSE NOW ENVISIONED IN OUR CFE PROPOSAL WHEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH. MOREOVER, WITH THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE GDR ELECTIONS, SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST GERMANY IS LIKELY TO BE QUESTIONED AS WELL.

-- ALL OF THESE EVENTS HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCLUDING A CFE AGREEMENT QUICKLY. WE SHOULD REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IN 1990. IN THAT SPIRIT, WE RECENTLY PRESENTED OUR NEW IDEAS ON HELICOPTERS AND ON VERIFICATION, AND WE HOPE TO REACH CLOSURE ON THESE ISSUES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BY NEXT WEEK. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT A NEW APPROACH TO U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER -- IN COMBINATION WITH THE

INITIATIVE ON AIRCRAFT DESCRIBED IN SECRETARY BAKER'S LETTER -- COULD SEIZE AN OPPORTUNITY AND HELP BRING THE CFE TALKS TO A RAPID, SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED NOT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD SLOW DOWN THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS. ACCORDINGLY, IF THIS NEW MANPOWER PROPOSAL THREATENS IN ANY WAY TO DELAY COMPLETION OF THE CFE AGREEMENT, THEN WE ARE PREPARED RAPIDLY TO CONCLUDE THE CFE AGREEMENT WITHOUT IT, AND PURSUE AGREEMENT ON THIS NEW MANPOWER PROPOSAL IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

-- WE HAVE HEARD FROM VARIOUS PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR IN VIENNA, THAT MOSCOW IS MOVING TOWARD OUR POSITION ON CAPPING U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES, BUT AT A NUMBER WELL BELOW THE CURRENT 275,000 FIGURE. THE SOVIETS SEEM TO WANT TO USE CFE AS A WAY TO REGULATE WHAT THEY HOPE WILL BE A STABLE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOP PRESENCE FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

-- WE NEED TO BE OUT IN FRONT ON THIS ISSUE. WE CANNOT BE SEEN BY THE EASTERN EUROPEANS TO BE TRYING TO KEEP SOVIET TROOPS WHERE THEY ARE NOT WANTED. EVEN WORSE, WE DO NOT WANT TO BE TRUMPED BY A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A LOWER CEILING IN CFE WHILE THE WEST CONTINUES TO SUPPORT 275,000.

-- THE UNITED STATES WILL REMAIN A EUROPEAN POWER WITH A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE THEREFORE ALSO NEED TO MOVE NOW TO BEGIN TO BREAK THE LINKAGE BETWEEN U.S. TROOPS IN NATO AND SOVIET TROOPS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

-- FOR OUR PART, ON MONDAY, THE PRESIDENT PRESENTED HIS 1991 DEFENSE BUDGET TO CONGRESS. THAT BUDGET REFLECTS HIS CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND, IN OUR FORCE PROJECTIONS FOR THE MID-1990S, OUR RESPONSIVENESS TO EVENTS UNFOLDING IN EASTERN EUROPE.

-- OUR FORCE PLANS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND FISCAL CONSTRAINTS. BASED ON THE ADVICE OF HIS SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS, HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT A FORCE OF ABOUT 225,000 U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE BY 1994 OR 1995 WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT AND SUSTAINABLE LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN READY, FORWARD-DEPLOYED U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE IN SUPPORT OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

-- WITH 225,000 TROOPS IN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE MORE THAN A CORPS FORWARD-DEPLOYED IN GERMANY. THE GROUND FORCES WHICH REMAIN WOULD BE SUSTAINABLE FOR TEN TO FIFTEEN DAYS, WOULD BE HIGHLY MOBILE, AND STRUCTURED SO THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF ABSORBING REINFORCEMENTS. OUR AIR-TO-AIR CAPABILITY WOULD REMAIN ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED AND WE WOULD PRESERVE A MIX OF LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT FOR DEEP INTERDICTION AND SHORT-RANGE AIRCRAFT FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. THE AIR FORCES WHICH REMAIN WILL BE PREDOMINANTLY DUAL-CAPABLE AND MULTI-ROLE AIRCRAFT, AND THE FULL RANGE OF NUCLEAR OPTIONS WILL BE MAINTAINED.

-- THIS IS A PLANNED, ORDERLY REDUCTION; THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO MAKE IT A FIRM BOTTOM LINE -- A FLOOR -- NOT A STARTING POINT FOR FURTHER WITHDRAWALS. HE IS PERSUADED THAT THE BEST WAY TO INSULATE THESE MANPOWER PLANS FROM U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND TO SUSTAIN THE NEW FORCE LEVELS IS TO EMBED THEM IN THE CFE PROCESS.

-- LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS NOT TIED TO CONTINUED SOVIET PRESENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE, ANY MORE THAN THE FUTURE OF NATO IS TIED TO THAT OF THE WARSAW PACT. EVEN IF ALL SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE WERE WITHDRAWN, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE 3.5 MILLION MEN UNDER ARMS.

-- IN LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, AND AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR DEFENSE NEEDS, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE, AND THE BUDGET, THE PRESIDENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD NOW PROPOSE A CFE CEILING ON U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES IN THE CENTRAL ZONE AT 195,000.

-- A TECHNICAL POINT HERE: AS YOU KNOW, THE WESTERN CENTRAL ZONE WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED IN VIENNA INCLUDES THE FRG, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG, THE GDR, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE EASTERN POSITION IN VIENNA IS THAT DENMARK AND HUNGARY SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE CENTRAL ZONE. UNDER THE CHANGED CONDITIONS IN EUROPE, WE THINK THE ADDITION OF HUNGARY AND DENMARK MAY MAKE SENSE. HOWEVER, WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE DIFFICULT PROCESS THAT PRODUCED THE WESTERN ZONAL ARRANGEMENT. WE WOULD SUPPORT REDEFINING THE CENTRAL ZONE TO INCLUDE DENMARK AND HUNGARY, AND NOT CHANGING THE REST OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE WHOLE PROPOSAL, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE DENMARK AND HUNGARY IN THE AREA COVERED BY THE U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER CEILING. THIS WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY ADDRESS WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE HUNGARY'S LEGITIMATE

CONCERNS.

-- A NEW U.S./SOVIET MANPOWER CEILING IN CFE THAT IS SET AT 195,000 BUT IS LIMITED TO THE CENTRAL ZONE WOULD NOT LIMIT THE OVERALL NUMBER OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE, WHICH WOULD NOT BE CAPPED IN CFE. WE THEREFORE WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY OUR PLANNED FORCE OF 225,000 OVERALL.

-- IN THIS WAY, WE CAN BEGIN TO BREAK THE LINK BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET TROOP PRESENCE.

-- THIS MANPOWER CEILING WOULD REQUIRE THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW ABOUT 400,000 TROOPS FROM EASTERN EUROPE. WE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT SOVIET TROOP LEVELS IN EASTERN EUROPE TO BE REDUCED EVEN FURTHER AS DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS THERE SEEK THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET MILITARY.

-- WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WILL BE APPEALING TO THE SOVIETS. IT GIVES THEM A POLITICAL COVER FOR WITHDRAWAL WHICH IS BEING FORCED UPON THEM IN ANY EVENT. MOREOVER, GORBACHEV HAS STRONG REASONS FOR CONCLUDING SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR SUPPORT FOR THIS PROPOSAL. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT CFE NOT BE OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THAT OUR PUBLICS CONTINUE TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS AS RELEVANT IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT.

END TALKING POINTS ON MANPOWER.

VV

OCT: PLS ADD ADDITIONAL MILADDEE
MIL ADDEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE; E.O. FOR GEN. GALVIN
USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH ___ DRAFT ___
CLEAR 1 ___ 2 ___
3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___
6 ___ 7 ___ 8 ___

~~SECRET~~

TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
01/30/90 71627 SERPM 59
T:RBARTHOLOMEW

EUR:RSEITZ
OSD:SHADLEY
S/S-O:

JCS:MGRAVES
NSC:
S/S:

NIACT IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE, THE HAGUE NIACT IMMEDIATE, LUXEMBOURG NIACT IMMEDIATE, REYKJAVIK NIACT IMMEDIATE • IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS IMMEDIATE, LONDON IMMEDIATE, ROME IMMEDIATE, MOSCOW IMMEDIATE, USVIENNA IMMEDIATE
NODIS
USVIENNA FOR CFE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, KCFE, NATO

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ALLIED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON NEW PROPOSALS IN CFE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ALL ADDRESSEES EXCEPT BONN, PARIS, LONDON, AND ROME SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AT 0OB ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31. USNATO SHOULD DELIVER LETTER TO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER.

3. TEXT OF LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

DEAR:

SECRETARY BAKER HAS ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO DESCRIBE A NEW PROPOSAL WE HOPE THE ALLIANCE WILL MAKE TO HELP SETTLE THE VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION OF HOW AIRCRAFT WILL BE TREATED IN A CFE AGREEMENT. I AM WRITING TO YOU TODAY IN THE SAME VEIN, BUT ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT: THE NATO POSITION ON U.S. AND SOVIET TROOPS



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SCS 8/5/13

STATIONED ON FOREIGN TERRITORY IN EUROPE.

THE CURRENT WESTERN APPROACH IN CFE IS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION TO HAVE NO MORE THAN 275,000 *TROOPS STATIONED IN EUROPE* WHEN THE CFE REDUCTIONS ARE COMPLETE. DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, AND POLAND DEMONSTRATE THAT, AT LEAST FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THIS FIGURE IS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC. RECOGNIZING THIS, THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN INCREASING SIGNS OF PREPARING TO *MOVE TOWARD OUR POSITION ON CAPPING U.S. AND SOVIET* STATIONED FORCES, BUT AT MUCH LOWER LEVELS, AS THEY SEEK A WAY TO REGULATE WHAT THEY HOPE WILL BE A STABLE DRAWDOWN OF THEIR FORCES FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

I AM CONVINCED THAT WE NEED TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE ON THIS ISSUE. WE CANNOT BE PUT IN THE POSITION OF APPEARING TO INSIST ON A HIGHER CEILING THAN THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES, *FOR STATIONED FORCES IN COUNTRIES WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE NO* LONGER WANTED.

AT THE SAME TIME, MY MAIN OBJECTIVE IN CONSIDERING THE U.S. TROOP PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS TO STAND BY THE PLEDGE I MADE LAST DECEMBER IN BRUSSELS, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES DESIRE OUR PRESENCE AS PART OF A COMMON SECURITY EFFORT. BASED ON THE ADVICE OF MY SENIOR MILITARY ADVISERS, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A FORCE OF 195,000 *U.S. TROOPS IN THE CENTRAL ZONE IN EUROPE IN THE* MID-1990S IS A SIGNIFICANT AND SUSTAINABLE LEVEL OF FORCES SUFFICIENT FOR MAINTAINING FORWARD DEFENSE AND IMPLEMENTING THE NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

I BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY TO COORDINATE THESE PLANNED REDUCTIONS IN U.S. STATIONED TROOP STRENGTH, AND PRESERVE THIS COMMITMENT OF OUR FORCES TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, IS TO PLACE THESE ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD REVISE ITS CURRENT CFE PROPOSAL AND SEEK TO CONCLUDE, IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT DELAY THE CFE *NEGOTIATIONS, AN AGREEMENT THAT SETS A NEGOTIATED CEILING* ON U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AT 195,000. I PLAN TO REFER TO THIS PROPOSED REVISION IN OUR CFE POSITION ON U.S. AND SOVIET MANPOWER IN MY ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TONIGHT ON THE STATE OF THE UNION.

I WILL ALSO STATE THAT, EVEN IF DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE ASK SOVIET FORCES IN THAT

REGION TO BE REDUCED BELOW 195,000 MY PROPPOSAL CANNOT BE THE STARTING POINT FOR EVEN DEEPER REDUCTIONS OF U.S. FORCES. WE EXPECT SOVIET TROOP LEVELS IN EASTERN EUROPE TO MOVE BELOW 195,000 AS GOVERNMENTS THERE SEEK THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE. BY CONCENTRATING ON THE CENTRAL ZONE, MY APPROACH EFFECTIVELY SEPARATES THE OVERALL NUMBER OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE, WHICH WE EXPECT TO BE 225,000, FROM BEING LINKED TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIET STATIONED FORCES ALLOWED IN EASTERN EUROPE.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THIS NEW STEP, AS WELL AS OUR IDEAS FOR RESOLVING THE AIRCRAFT ISSUE. TAKEN TOGETHER, I BELIEVE THEY WILL MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR GOAL OF COMPLETING CFE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN 1990. INDEED, I THINK THEY OFFER A REAL PROSPECT FOR CONCLUDING THE CFE TREATY BEFORE I MEET WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN JUNE. IN TRYING TO CONSOLIDATE AND PROTECT THE CHANGES NOW UNDERWAY, THE CFE PROCESS MUST NOT BE OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. OUR PUBLICS AND GOVERNMENTS IN THE NEWLY EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PERCEIVE IT AS RELEVANT AND RESPONSIVE TO THE ENORMOUS OPPORTUNITIES THAT LIE BEFORE US.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

Communications

Please add the following addressees for action:

Oslo Niact Immediate
Copenhagen Niact Immediate
Madrid Niact Immediate
Lisbon Niact Immediate
Athens Niact Immediate
Ankara Niact Immediate
Ottawa Niact Immediate

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~ 0754

January 30, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: B-C-S Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, January 31, 1990, 7:15 a.m.

The following items have been submitted for your breakfast meeting tomorrow with Secretaries Baker and Cheney:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Cheney Trip to Asia | Defense/State | Tab A |
| Base Closure (Upper Heyford & Bermuda) | Defense | Tab B |
| ICBM Status Following the DC Mtg | State | Tab C |

Also, at Tabs D and E are two additional items that are not formally on the agenda. There is a chance that they may be raised at the breakfast.

| | |
|---|---|
| Defense and Space Talks | Tab D |
| Krasnoyarsk Radar and Thule and Fylingdales Visits | Tab E |

Attachments:
As stated

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2009-0972-MR
1/27/2014 MM

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
# (George Bush Library)

| Document No. and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06e. Memo | Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Breakfast Item: Base Closures (Upper Heyford & Bermuda) (1 pp.) | 1/30/90 | (b)(1) | S |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
**Series:** USSR Chronological Files
**Subseries:** CFE Files
**WHORM Cat.:**
**File Location:** CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (January 1990)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Date Closed:** | 3/13/2009 | **OA/ID Number:** | 91121-005 |
| **FOIA/SYS Case #:** | 2009-0275-S | **Appeal Case #:** | |
| **Re-review Case #:** | | **Appeal Disposition:** | |
| **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:** | | **Disposition Date:** | |
| **AR Case #:** | | **MR Case #:** | |
| **AR Disposition:** | | **MR Disposition:** | |
| **AR Disposition Date:** | | **MR Disposition Date:** | |

## RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

**P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]**
**P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]**
**P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]**
**P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]**
**P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]**
**P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

**PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.**

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
**(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 30, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: RICH DAVIS

SUBJECT: Breakfast Fireproofer -- Sublimits on Mobile ICBM Warheads in START

State has proposed to discuss mobile ICBM sublimits, although we understand Baker's staff has suggested he not raise it. We agree that it is not ready to be discussed at the breakfast.

The principal issue is whether to adopt a simple sublimit on mobile warheads, as State proposes, or to "nest" the mobile sublimit under the 1540 heavy ICBM sublimit, as JCS and OSD propose. The nested approach would force the Soviets to dismantle a SS-18 for every SS-24 deployed. In the most unlikely event this approach were accepted by the Soviets, it would lead to further reductions in SS-18s. But it would also have the perverse effect of linking the SS-18, which have been seeking to eliminate, with mobile ICBMs, which we are attempting to deploy ourselves.

State is also proposing higher warhead numbers (900-1100 vice 700-800) for negotiability, and a MIRV sublimit of 500-600 to cap the SS-24 program at projected levels. DOD objects to the MIRV cap because it would foreclose the 2-RV Small ICBM. (One alternative to a MIRV sublimit is to seek a sublimit of 500 rail-mobile warheads. Rail-mobiles are larger, more difficult to monitor and pose greater breakout potential.)

The Deputies meeting last Friday made little headway on this issue and State requested a principals' meeting. Wednesday afternoon Arnie's informal group will discuss an approach to decouple mobiles from heavies, and to make separate proposals in each area. Such an approach would probably be supported by JCS and State, and might attract OSD if it is tough enough.

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MM 6/12/2015

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~ 0740

January 30, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: WILLIAM TOBEY

SUBJECT: **Breakfast Item:** Defense & Space Talks

Secretary Cheney may raise at your breakfast tomorrow, or during subsequent meetings, the issue of Soviet linkage between START and restrictions on SDI testing.

At the Wyoming Ministerial meeting last year, the Soviets formally dropped linkage between START and Defense & Space. Nonetheless, they continue to assert that U.S. ABM testing beyond the ABM Treaty as they define it would constitute grounds for withdrawing from the START Treaty.

Secretary Cheney will likely argue that if we remain silent on this issue, our silence will be taken as assent to a regime of de facto restrictions on SDI. It could also complicate START ratification.

SecDef has made these arguments and suggested talking points for Moscow in a memorandum for Secretary Baker (at Tab A). SecDef is seeking to rebut Soviet statements, not impose further conditions on signing a START Treaty.

As a practical matter, the U.S. cannot circumscribe the Soviet Union's right to judge whether its supreme interests are threatened. Nonetheless, we can lay a clear record that there has been no meeting of minds between the parties to a START Treaty that ABM testing under the broad interpretation would give grounds for avoiding START Treaty obligations. Moreover, if we are not clear on this point, it will complicate START ratification.

Nicholas Rostow concurs.

Attachment

Tab A Incoming from SecDef

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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2010-2806-MR
12/2/2016 MM

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-98006-MR
ES 11/15/13

27 JAN 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Defense and Space Issues at the Moscow Ministerial

(S) The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the problem which confronts us in the Defense and Space Talks between now and the June Summit and to suggest some points you may wish to raise during your meetings in Moscow.

(S) During the Wyoming Ministerial, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that a START agreement could be signed and implemented in the absence of agreement in the Defense and Space Talks (DST). Despite this apparent relaxation of explicit linkage between START and DST, the Soviet Union subsequently tabled agreed statements in Geneva making it clear that the Soviet Union was "relinking" implementation of a START agreement to U.S. acquiescence in restrictions on SDI testing. In effect, the Soviet Union is offering us a START Treaty based on compliance with a more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty than we agreed to in 1972. The impact of this limitation on the SDI program would be serious.

(S) Clearly, to the extent that the Soviet Union is willing to conclude a START agreement on its own merits, we are correct in accepting Shevardnadze's initiative. However, since we are being asked to pay for progress on START with significant limitations on SDI testing, we should clarify our understanding of our existing rights to conduct SDI testing in space. Moreover, we must firmly correct the mistaken impression, which the Soviet negotiators are attempting to foster, that U.S. silence between the Wyoming Ministerial and a June Summit on our interpretation of the ABM Treaty would constitute assent to de facto restrictions on SDI. In short, to maintain the de-linkage which you accomplished in Wyoming, we need to counter this Soviet strategy.

(S) The alternative to challenging Soviet "relinkage" is a strategy of sidestepping the differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union on what constitutes legitimate testing under the ABM Treaty and deferring these contentious issues to future discussions in DST. In my view, this strategy complicates START ratification by failing to clear up the discrepancy between U.S. and Soviet views of the ABM Treaty. The result would be ambiguity on what U.S. activity affords the Soviet Union legitimate grounds to withdraw from its START obligations. Worse still, our failure to

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gain Soviet acknowledgment of our existing rights will place the resolution of the divergence between U.S. and Soviet views of the ABM Treaty on the U.S. Senate during the ratification of START. It is a strategy most likely to result in funding and legislative constraints on SDI, that could prevent or at least impede the accomplishment of the program's objectives. Moreover, it is a strategy which is least likely to afford the President a politically viable defense of his constitutional prerogative to interpret treaties.

(S) Consequently, we should place the onus of "relinkage" where it belongs: on the Soviet side. We have begun to make this point in the recent instructions for Round XIII of the Defense and Space Talks, in which we state that SDI development and testing would not constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. I am enclosing talking points for your consideration which make the larger point that compliance with the START Treaty will not be conditioned on the waiver or forfeit of U.S. rights under the ABM Treaty (TAB A).

(S) In my view, there is at least a reasonable chance that the Soviet side will give us an explicit acknowledgement in the START endgame of our testing rights. Even if one were not confident of eventual Soviet acknowledgement, it would be damaging in the START ratification debate if the negotiating record were to show that, between the Wyoming Ministerial and the June Summit, we did not press our view of the right to conduct development and testing under the ABM Treaty.

attachment
a/s

cc: Ambassador Burt
Ambassador Smith

Moscow Ministerial

Talking Points
Defense and Space

-- At the 1987 Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to the phrase "research, development and testing as required which are permitted by the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972."

-- It is well known to the Soviet Union that the U.S. understanding of this phrase is that the Parties agreed that the ABM Treaty permits the testing of certain ABM systems in space.

-- Recent statements by the Soviet side suggest that the exercise of these existing rights under the ABM Treaty would constitute a violation of this Treaty and grounds for withdrawal from a future START Treaty.

-- This is simply not the case. The exercise of existing rights to test ABM systems based on other physical principles in space is not a violation of the ABM Treaty and, as such, does not constitute grounds for the Soviet Union to avoid its current or future Treaty obligations.

-- Since our meeting in Wyoming, Soviet attempts to "relink" START with constraints on the SDI program have become an obstacle to progress in negotiations and, if not dropped, will obstruct ratification of a START agreement.

-- The United States proceeds towards a START agreement with the understanding that Soviet compliance with a START agreement will not be conditioned on the requirement that the United States waive or forfeit rights under the ABM Treaty.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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January 30, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: WILLIAM TOBEY

SUBJECT: Possible Breakfast Items: The Krasnoyarsk Radar and Thule and Fylingdales Visits

Krasnoyarsk. At Tab A is a memo from SecDef following up on an earlier discussion on dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar. Contrary to the agreement summarized by Secretary Baker's memo of January 12, 1990, Secretary Cheney believes that we should not sign a START Treaty until the Soviets have completed dismantling the radar. He argues it would send the wrong signal to both Congress and the Soviets if we were to take the position that dismantlement need not be complete, so long as it has begun and proceeds at a reasonable pace by the time a START Treaty is signed.

The Soviets could dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar by a June Summit, but they would not be able to salvage much equipment. They have estimated that it will take more than a year to complete dismantlement under the procedures they have outlined in the SCC. (Under these procedures they would remove the radar equipment, dismantle the top half of the buildings, and restore the roofs to use the buildings for some other purpose.)

There may be a need to give definition to "reasonable progress", lest we find ourselves in June arguing about whether or not to sign a START Treaty. A standard such as completion of whatever salvage activity and beginning destruction of the buildings could work. SecDef is also concerned about the disconnect between Shevardnadze's statements about the radar being a violation and what the Soviets have told us in the SCC. Here we should press Shevardnadze to see that his pledge to eliminate the violation is fulfilled.

Thule and Fylingdales. On a related issue, General Powell is reportedly concerned about letting the Soviets visit Thule and Fylingdales. He believes that the visits cannot directly address the Soviet concerns (which hinge on a legal issue, not physical

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evidence) and that they may be a basis for undermining U.S. ability to sustain modernization of the radars.

It is hard to see how the visits would resolve Soviet concerns. The sides agree on the characteristics of the radars but differ over the terms of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets, including Shevardnadze, have charged that the modernization violates the ABM Treaty. So there is a good chance that the visits will simply end in criticism of U.S. activities, without resolving anything.

As these issues have been previously handled at breakfast meetings, they may again arise at your breakfast or at later meetings.

Attachment

Tab A SecDef Memo



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

25 JAN 1990

SUBJECT: Krasnoyarsk (U)

(S) Further to our conversation on how best to respond to the Krasnoyarsk radar, I believe that there are compelling reasons to continue the longstanding U.S. policy not to conclude any further strategic arms control agreements until the violation is corrected. The last Administration undertook this policy as the best means of applying pressure on the Soviets to dismantle the illegal facility, and strict adherence to this line may have been important in achieving a Soviet commitment to eliminate the radar. Given the ambiguity of Soviet statements since the Wyoming Ministerial, I see no reason to alter our policy. In fact, to change policy at this juncture could send the wrong signals to the Soviets and, perhaps, to those who would oppose START ratification on grounds of a weakened Administration position on verification and compliance.

(S) There is an apparent and growing disconnect between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (who has openly referred to Krasnoyarsk as a clear violation that will be "completely eliminated") and the Soviet delegation to the Standing Consultative Commission (which has been unwilling to concede a violation or to agree to complete elimination of the radar). My view is that, if you were to bring this fact to Shevardnadze's attention during the Moscow Ministerial, there is a very good chance that he would see it our way. Your personal interventions in the past have been most successful.

(S) On the proposed visits to Thule and Fylingdales, I believe that, if we are to go forward, we should consult fully with our Allies before we respond to the Soviets. Given the clear political sensitivities in both Denmark and the United Kingdom, it would only be appropriate to work closely with the two Governments to establish and implement an agreed policy.

c.c. General Scowcroft

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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January 29, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON KDJ

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: Secretary Cheney's Travel to Asia

Background

Secretary Cheney will be making the following stops in Asia:

-- 10-13 Hawaii,

-- 14-17 Korea,

-- 17-18 Hong Kong,

-- 18-20 Philippines,

-- 20-24 Japan (including Okinawa).

Assuming approval by the President in an NSC meeting, Secretary Cheney will be consulting with our Asian allies on the changes in U.S. force structure anticipated in Asia during the 1990s. These originally included a three phase option in which the U.S. would:

-- decrease primarily non-combat manpower by 10-12 percent (1991-93),

-- further reduce and reorganize ground forces (1993-95),

-- further reduce forces as circumstances permit (1995-2000).

At each stop, the Secretary will emphasize that it is better to cut non-combat manpower first than to be forced toward a meat axe approach by Congressionally mandated cuts that might otherwise be imposed. Likewise, the Secretary will use the trip to increase contributions to allied burden sharing as a means forestalling calls for further cuts from Congress.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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January 30, 1990

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Tom King, UK Defense Secretary, on January 31 at 11:00 a.m.

King took over the Defense portfolio last July after four years of responsibility for Northern Ireland, a thankless job which he performed solidly, despite some occasional gaffes with the press. Not one of the Conservative Party's stars, but one of its more notable team players, King does bring to his new position support for strong defense and he may repeat some of the Prime Minister's concerns about how our arms control policies fit into an overall political strategy for Europe's future.

We suggest that you promptly reiterate our undiminished commitment to a strong NATO and a substantial US commitment of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. Our move in CFE can then be portrayed as the product of our effort to find the best way to sustain our commitment over the long haul. The real fight will not be with those who think 195,000 in the Central Zone cuts too much, but with those - in Congress and in Europe - who believe we have not gone far enough. That is where we will need the help of our allies in supporting this figure, and in helping shelter it within the CFE framework. If asked about a CFE II, you can emphasize the need to first get this CFE agreement signed, while noting the value of CFE as a mechanism for coordinating Allied defense adjustments in this period of change.

If the future of SNF is raised, you may wish to restate our unaltered commitment to extended deterrence and needed modernization, including new F-15E dual-capable aircraft based in Britain in 1991-92. If, perhaps in this context, King inquires about our plans for the F-111 wing at Upper Heyford, you can note that Cheney has suspended plans for a public announcement and that no final decision has been made. In any event, the F-15E deployment should proceed on schedule.

Heather Wilson concurs.

Attachment
Tab I Biography of King

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
# (George Bush Library)

| Document No. and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07b. Report | Re: Biography (2 pp.) | 1/12/90 | (b)(1) | S |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
**Series:** USSR Chronological Files
**Subseries:** CFE Files
**WHORM Cat.:**
**File Location:** CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Post 1989 (January 1990)

| | | | |
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| **Date Closed:** | 3/13/2009 | **OA/ID Number:** | 91121-005 |
| **FOIA/SYS Case #:** | 2009-0275-S | **Appeal Case #:** | |
| **Re-review Case #:** | | **Appeal Disposition:** | |
| **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:** | | **Disposition Date:** | |
| **AR Case #:** | | **MR Case #:** | |
| **AR Disposition:** | | **MR Disposition:** | |
| **AR Disposition Date:** | | **MR Disposition Date:** | |

## RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

**P-1** National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
**P-2** Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
**P-3** Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
**P-4** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
**P-5** Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
**P-6** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

**C.** Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**PRM.** Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**(b)(1)** National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
**(b)(2)** Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
**(b)(3)** Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
**(b)(4)** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
**(b)(6)** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
**(b)(7)** Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
**(b)(8)** Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
**(b)(9)** Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# National Security Council
## The White House

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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January 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: HEATHER WILSON

SUBJECT: Telephone Calls from the President to Congressional Leadership on CFE Initiative

In support of his CFE initiative, the President should call key Congressional leaders, including Senators Mitchell and Dole, and Congressmen Foley, Michel, and Gephardt on Wednesday to inform them of the proposal before his State of the Union address Wednesday evening. Given Senator Nunn's influence and public support of a proposal like this, the President may wish to call him as well. Alternatively, Secretary Cheney could call Senator Nunn.

Secretary Cheney and Secretary Baker should call key Congressional leaders for foreign affairs and armed services. To ensure that the presentations are consistent, we suggest that you send a copy of the President's talking points at Tab A to them.

Concurrences by: Philip Zelikow, Bret Coulson

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

2. That, if the President does not want to call Senator Nunn, Secretary Cheney call Senator Nunn.

3. That you sign the memo at Tab II to Secretary Cheney and Secretary Baker.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab II Memo to Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Calls to Congressional Leaders on CFE Initiative in the State of the Union Address

DATE: January 31, 1990

PURPOSE: To inform Congressional leadership about your proposal in advance of your State of the Union Speech

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None Required

PHONE NUMBERS:

| | |
|---|---|
| Senator Dole | 224-6521 |
| Senator Mitchell | 224-5344 |
| Congressman Foley | 225-2006 |
| Congressman Michel | 225-6201 |
| Congressman Gephardt | 225-2671 |
| Senator Nunn | 224-3521 |

SUGGESTED TIMES: Wednesday, January 31, 1990 morning and afternoon

TOPIC OF DISCUSSION: Explain your CFE initiative on manpower in Europe

Date of Submission:

Action:

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 3/7/2012

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KEY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

-- I'm calling you to let you know that I will be announcing a new proposal for the CFE negotiations in my State of the Union speech tonight.

-- I feel strongly that we need to respond to the rapid changes going on in Eastern Europe and continue to use this negotiated, verifiable, arms control process to manage that change and facilitate Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.

-- Our NATO Allies and the Eastern Europeans still believe in the CFE process, and so do our publics. We need to keep ahead of this and we are redoubling our efforts to finish this treaty as early as possible in 1990.

-- At the same time, we need to keep significant military forces in Europe to protect our interests and maintain stability there for the foreseeable future. I am committed to that.

-- As you know, in May I proposed, and the Alliance agreed, to put a ceiling of 275,000 on U.S. and Soviet stationed manpower in Europe.

-- Tonight, I plan to announce a proposal to revise our current CFE proposal and lower substantially U.S. and Soviet ceilings on ground and air force manpower in Central and Eastern Europe -- where the concentration of forces is highest -- to 195,000 on each side. That will permit us to deploy our planned U.S. force of about 225,000 in all of Europe by the mid-1990s.



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-- Even if democratically elected governments in Eastern Europe ask Soviet forces in this region to be reduced even further, my proposal tonight cannot be the starting point for even deeper reductions of U.S. forces. This would be dangerous in this uncertain time.

-- I am committed to achieving a CFE agreement as soon as possible. If this new personnel proposal threatens to slow down the agreement, we will conclude the CFE treaty without it.

**((For Senator Nunn))**

-- I know you support this idea. It's a realistic response to events. But we must maintain our commitment to our Allies in a time of great uncertainty in Europe. I know that you share that view.

# National Security Council
## The White House

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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February 14, 1990

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: PHILIP D. ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: Impressions From the Ottawa Conference

While the ministerial conference in Ottawa certainly got the Open Skies negotiation off to a good start, its principal value was as a forum for intensive political discussion among a shifting array of involved ministers at a crucial moment in European history. We will be writing elsewhere about the substantive implications of the decisions taken at Ottawa. Here we would like to convey a brief sense of the atmosphere.

The dominant aspect of the meeting was the hectic pace of the diplomatic work, with snap judgments made on both Germany and the CFE issue. For example, yesterday, February 13, Baker met with Shevardnadze -- by my reckoning -- on at least five separate occasions, met with Genscher about as frequently, participated in two Quad sessions (US, UK, FR, FRG), had other private talks individually with Hurd and Dumas, participated in a ministerial plenary argument about Open Skies, led discussion in a NATO ministerial caucus, and proceeded with other previously scheduled bilaterals. Baker's support in these meetings came principally from Zoellick and Ross.

One anecdote may be of particular interest. Late in the day, NATO ministers met and discussed the statement which had already been issued by the 'Six' on their intent to discuss "external aspects of the establishment of German unity." Few of the smaller allies had been aware of what was happening on this issue, and some had not previously known that the statement was already released to the press. Several of the smaller Allies, led by Italy, attacked the lack of consultation and involvement, especially since the statement referred explicitly to the security concerns of neighboring states (such as the Netherlands and Italy). After the Italian Foreign Minister, De Michelis, had delivered an emotional statement on this point, Genscher entered the meeting. De Michelis repeated his concerns, probably for Genscher's benefit. (You may recall that the Italians have for years been cultivating a special relationship with the Germans, and Genscher in particular.) Genscher turned to Michelis, eyed him coldly, and said, "You're not in the game."

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National Security Council
The White House

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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COMMENTS Impressions for the Ottawa Conference

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