

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Files

OA/ID Number: 91121
Folder ID Number: 91121-003

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] July - September 1989

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (2 pp.)	7/12/89	(b)(1)	
01b. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	7/12/89	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Meeting with Secretary Cheney, Wednesday, August 8, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.)	8/8/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item: CFE Deputy and Delegation Support (1 pp.)	8/7/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - China FMS Suspension (1 pp.)	8/8/89	(b)(1)	S
02d. Letter	James A. Baker, III to Qian Qichen (China's Minister of Foreign Affairs) (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Outline	Re: Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary John Major (3 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary John Major (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] July - September 1989

Pinksheet Number: cap1024

OA/ID Number: 91121-003

Date Closed: 3/13/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03c. Report	Biography Re: John Major [redacted] (1 pp.)	8/28/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
03d. Cable	Re: Thatcher Writes to President Bush, Mitterrand, Kohl, and Delors Urging Aid for Poland (4 pp.)	9/7/89	(b)(1)	C
04a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Verification of CFE Treaty (1 pp.)	9/15/89	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum to the President on CFE Verification (1 pp.)	9/13/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Political Implications of a CFE Accord (1 pp.)	9/19/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Report	Re: Political Implications of a CFE Accord (5 pp.)	9/19/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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01a. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (2 pp.)	7/12/89	(b)(1)	

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Series: USSR Chronological Files

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] July - September 1989

Date Closed:	3/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	7/12/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

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Series: USSR Chronological Files

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File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] July - September 1989

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5876

July 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ^{AK}ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL ^{RB}

FROM: HEATHER WILSON ^H

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Address to Defense Policy Board
Thursday, July 27, 11:00

Attached are talking points for your address to the Defense Policy Board on Thursday at 11:00. They have asked you to address U.S.-NATO relations including U.S.-FRG problems, and the President's conventional arms control initiative.

Concurrences by: ^{in draft} Peter Rodman, ^{in draft} Philip Zelikow ^{in draft} and Don Mahley

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Talking Points

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
DEFENSE POLICY BOARD

- I would like to concentrate this morning on the status of U.S. relations with our NATO Allies, and progress on the President's initiative on conventional arms control in Europe.

US-NATO RELATIONS

- We had a very successful NATO Summit in Brussels at the end of May which set a clear direction for the Alliance on a broad range of issues, including the priorities for arms control and guiding the Alliance to a new agenda for moving beyond containment to a Europe that is whole and free.
- In a period of tremendous change in Eastern Europe, NATO is united and our relations with our European partners are sound. There is broad agreement that our strong defense posture is the foundation for our pursuit of very ambitious political objectives in East-West relations.
- The Summit was particularly important for our relations with West Germany.
- Agreement at the Summit to accelerate the pace of the conventional arms control negotiations (CFE), and to defer negotiations about short range nuclear forces until after implementation of a CFE agreement is underway, eased tensions with Bonn.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

- Talks on conventional arms control in Europe began on 9 March in Vienna. We have just finished the second round and after eleven weeks of negotiations with the East, we are further along toward agreement than we were after fifteen years at the old Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR).
- At the NATO Summit, the President launched an initiative to accelerate progress in the CFE negotiations and make elimination of the conventional imbalance our highest arms control priority in Europe. He believed that, with Gorbachev's readiness for change, we have a historic opportunity to redraw the whole post-war military -- and political -- map of Europe. His ambitious timetable for progress reflects his desire to seize that opportunity, and effect lasting changes in the size and nature of the Soviet conventional threat.
- On July 13, just before the last round of the negotiations ended, the NATO Allies tabled in Vienna the revised Summit proposal. This puts us some two months ahead of the deadline which we set for ourselves at the Summit.
- For the first time, there is common ground on fundamental issues between East and West on reducing conventional forces in Europe, and it seems that there may be a genuine willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to radically reduce its conventional forces.

- There is much work to be done, here in Washington, with our Allies, and at the negotiations in Vienna. The remaining issues are very tough. We will need an extraordinarily intrusive verification regime. But we are working hard to achieve an early agreement.
- In all of this work, we have not lost sight of the principle that negotiations and agreements are a means to greater security and stability and not ends unto themselves.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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6126
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August 8, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES ^{USA}

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting with Secretary Cheney, Wednesday,
August 8, 7:15 a.m.

The following items have been submitted for your breakfast meeting tomorrow with Secretaries Cheney and Baker:

CFE Deputy and Delegation Support
China FMS Suspension

NSC Tab A
Defense Tab B

Attachments
As stated

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0970-MR
SLC 5/28/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 7, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOHN GORDON, Acting 

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: CFE Deputy and Delegation Support


Defense wants very much to provide the deputy CFE negotiator. It is their systems that are being negotiated and they now play a very minor role in Vienna. This last fact is largely of their own making -- the OSD rep was an MBFR hold-over with little interest in the substance of negotiations. Low on the protocol list, he was never included in the small but important decision making meetings.

That said, we believe that the current Deputy, Lyle Breckon, a Foreign Service Officer, should stay. A new OSD Rep should be elevated to number three in the delegation protocol list. Breckon is solid and experienced, and would be the corporate knowledge for Woolsey. Equally important, with a State Deputy, Jim could have heavy military presence on the delegation, something he clearly desires.

It would be helpful if you could reach closure soon so that the deputy, whoever he is, can begin preparing himself to open the round on September 7. If you agree that Breckon should continue, the primary points to make with Secretary Cheney are the importance of experience, corporate knowledge and continuity with the appointment of a new negotiator -- one who will not be there at the opening of the round. You should support elevating the stature of the OSD rep to a more influential level on the delegation.

You may also want to suggest to Cheney that the fast pace of negotiations argues for a greater military presence and input in the delegation. Now the JCS has only one full time member in addition to Gen St. John. Jim hopes to have several experienced Army and Air Force operators on the delegation.

You may also want to suggest to Secretary Baker that we need to find ways to make timely decisions in the HLTF.

 Heather Wilson concurs.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

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3/31/2010

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

August 8, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON *[Signature]*
FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - China FMS Suspension

Defense will be seeking assurances that its plan to keep the "Peace Pearl" F-8 avionics program alive does not violate the President's current suspension of high-level military exchanges, sales and deliveries.

Defense wants to send low-level DOD officials to Beijing to urge the Chinese to meet their contractual obligation of \$20 million to Grumman on September 1. (An internal Defense review has concluded that payment cannot be deferred until October 1, because DOD cannot guarantee the \$20 million.) The officials will assure the Chinese access -- to be negotiated after September 1 -- to the project if Beijing first commits to making the payment. This is a good approach that will buy time.

A narrow construction of the President's announcements would permit these low-level exchanges. The intent will be to keep the project in a state of "suspension" and not to die. No deliveries are due until the 1990s.

There is some risk of publicity about the DOD officials' travel to China, although it is in the interest of the US and Chinese participants to avoid news leaks. We also have to recognize that Chinese officials will probably return in some form to Grumman to work on the project. This, too, may produce news stories challenging the President's consistency.

Given the time that will elapse before the Chinese could return to Grumman, I recommend that the travel to China and Defense's negotiating strategy receive your endorsement. You should insist on close coordination with the NSC.

Finally, at last week's breakfast State was tasked with writing a letter to China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen proposing this approach. Neither we nor Defense has seen a draft.

Concurrence by: Nancy Dyke *NA*

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2009-0970-MR
SCS 11/26/13

8/8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

General Scowcroft:

This draft letter is mentioned in my memo on the China Peace Pearl Program for tomorrow's breakfast. It arrived late, and looks basically OK.

Doug Paul



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Dear Mr. Minister:

(Opening paragraph)

We share your desire to maintain this relationship in a manner that best serves our mutual interests. As you know, the suspension of weapons sales is one of the actions the President took in early June. There have been calls in Congress for stronger action on this and other fronts. The President has resisted these calls for further action because of his firm belief that the overall US-PRC relationship is important and should continue.

We propose sending a small working level team from the US Department of Defense to China at the earliest possible time for talks on our military technology cooperation. At that time, your concerns about participation of Chinese technical personnel in the Peace Pearl program can be addressed.

We must act [promptly] to ensure the continuation of your FMS programs during the suspension. As you know, we have a legal obligation to initiate action to terminate the contracts that implement your programs if PRC funding is not resumed by September 1.

It is our hope that the proposed talks will result in the continuation of US-China FMS programs.

Sincerely yours,

James A. Baker, III

His Excellency
Qian Qichen,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the People's Republic of China,
Beijing.

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0910-MR
SCS 5/28/13

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

040535

80 AUG 8 8:19

SITUATION ROOM

No. Pages One

MESSAGE NO.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

4318

FROM: James Keith
(Officer name)

EAP/CM
(Office symbol)

76813
(Extension)

(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft Letter

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

NSC Staff

Mr. Doug Paal

395-5746

493 Old Executive
Office Building

FOR:

CLEARANCE ☒

INFORMATION ☐

PER REQUEST ☐

COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer: 

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Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEG 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By Cop NARA, Date 3/13/01

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Philip Hughes	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>27.9.10</u>	<u>at</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>W/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Breakfast meeting - 8/8 7:15 am

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7018

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0970-MR

SCS 5/28/13

MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY JOHN MAJOR

DATE: September 11, 1989

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 10:00-10:30 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 



I. PURPOSE

This will be your first meeting with the new UK Foreign Secretary. After getting acquainted, you may wish to focus on East-West relations, problems in the CFE talks, Poland, your counternarcotics initiative, and the situation in Hong Kong and China.

II. BACKGROUND

Major comes to the US during a difficult period for the Thatcher government. The economic outlook is cloudy and Thatcher's personal style of governance is again under attack, including from within her own party, for her mishandling of the July Cabinet shakeup during which many observers thought she humiliated Sir Geoffrey Howe and her Home Secretary, Sir Douglas Hurd. Major's rise in government has been meteoric, but his inexperience in foreign affairs and dependence on the Prime Minister will, at least for now, accentuate the dominance of Number Ten in the foreign policy process.

East-West Relations. Major will be curious about our preparations for Secretary Baker's meeting with Shevardnadze, to learn whether there are any areas in which we intend to break new ground. Major will also be interested in the timing of any U.S.-Soviet Summit. You may, in turn, wish to ask about Prime Minister Thatcher's plans for her meetings with Gorbachev on September 23.

CFE. The UK was, unfortunately, instrumental in blocking the September 7 tabling of a Western package on CFE verification and information exchange, because London held the package hostage to agreement on a provision to deal with possible circumvention of the treaty which would constrain US forces worldwide. Secretary Baker called Major on September 6 to ask him to release this hold, with no apparent result.

The UK wants the treaty to constrain Soviet rebuilding of its reduced forces in Asia, outside of the CFE zone. We

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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think this threat is remote, and that we would have plenty of time to respond to such efforts. More importantly, we do not want to let Moscow use CFE as a device to constrain the activities of US forces, including naval forces, outside of Europe. You should stress the need to move forward in tabling our verification package and urge that HMG not hold up any movement because of continuing debate over one very difficult issue.

Poland. You received a letter from the Prime Minister on September 5 on this subject (a cable from Embassy London including the text of the letter and a helpful analysis of it is attached at Tab D). The letter signals movement to a more forthcoming U.K. approach to aid for Poland, tracking your own views. This is a helpful step, which you may wish to note and welcome.

Narcotics. You may wish to follow up on your September 5 call to Prime Minister Thatcher to ask Foreign Secretary Major to help in supporting an initiative by the other G-7 countries to match US efforts in providing immediate assistance to Colombia and other Andean nations joining us in the common struggle against the drug traffickers.

Hong Kong/China. Secretary Baker discussed this issue at length with Major in Paris on July 30. The UK agreed to accept the involvement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in managing their problem with Indochinese refugees, but you may wish to note our expectation that any repatriations from Hong Kong to Vietnam will be strictly voluntary. You may also wish to elicit Major's views on the future of Hong Kong, in light of the continuing repressive situation in China.

I do not recommend that you initiate a discussion on South Africa in the limited time available. However, Major may wish to exchange views with you on the recent election. London believes De Klerk has a mandate for change, but thinks the current climate of protest and defiance is likely to force a pause of a couple of months before the new government can begin significant new work on needed reforms.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is provided at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

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V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by meeting.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography
Tab D	London 18239 EXDIS/NOFORN

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TAB

A

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
UK FOREIGN SECRETARY JOHN MAJOR

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- Secretary Baker will be meeting soon with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; we will focus on our usual agenda -- arms control, regional conflicts, human rights, bilateral and transnational issues.
- Secretary Baker can elaborate further on his approach to this meeting. We have a lot to discuss, and we hope to see solid progress across the board. We will be pressing particularly hard to get Moscow to use its leverage with friends and allies to resolve ongoing regional conflicts.
- Can you tell me a bit about Prime Minister Thatcher's plans for her meetings with President Gorbachev in Moscow on September 23?

CFE

- It is extremely unfortunate that Allied disagreements prevented us from tabling the remaining elaboration of our new CFE proposal on September 7, despite the specific commitment we made on this point at the NATO Summit in May.
- Your government, in particular, joined in blocking tabling of the entire verification and information exchange package until your concerns were met on the issue of non-circumvention.

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- The non-circumvention issue is a difficult one, which I hope can be resolved through patient negotiation. We naturally hope to avoid constraints on the activities of our forces outside of the CFE area of application.
- However, I hope that your government agrees that our failure to agree promptly on one or two specific problems should not be a cause for failing to follow through on our Summit commitment to rapid progress in CFE. We need to maintain the momentum we have had since the NATO Summit and move to seize the opportunity to redraw the postwar military map of Europe.

POLAND

- I appreciated the recent letter from Prime Minister Thatcher on the subject of assistance to Poland. Her letter reflects just the sense of urgency that I think is so important at this pivotal time for Poland and for the East bloc as a whole.
- Please convey to the Prime Minister my agreement with her views. We are now working intensively on just the kind of concrete action she has called for, and we welcome her contribution to this common effort.

NARCOTICS

- Your response to the crisis in Colombia has been gratifying. I spoke with the Prime Minister on this issue last Tuesday, welcomed her letter's pledge of assistance, and noted the need for coordination of our programs.

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- I have also spoken with Brian Mulroney and Helmut Kohl about the possibility of the other G-7 countries developing a combined immediate aid package for Colombia and the other Andean nations that would, together, match our own contribution, in the range of \$250-300 million.
- I hope your government can encourage Paris to sponsor this idea, in President Mitterrand's capacity as chairman of the recent G-7 Summit which, as you know, broadly endorsed such assistance.

HONG KONG AND CHINA

- I understand that joint US-UK consultations over the past few weeks have helped identify some ways in which our two governments can work together to address the refugee pressures on Hong Kong. We think the UN High Commission for Refugees can help, both with easing the pressure and with monitoring strictly voluntary repatriation of those who are screened out.
- What is your thinking about how to reassure Hong Kong about its future in light of the continuing repression in China?

SOUTH AFRICA (if raised)

- Although we are still reviewing our policy toward South Africa, we believe the results of the September 6 election do give de Klerk a mandate for change.
- Current sanctions have hurt the South African economy and sent a political signal, but I remain strongly opposed to further economic sanctions against South Africa.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- However, if de Klerk does not move toward genuine reform within the next few months, we will have a much harder time resisting the Congressional push for new sanctions.
- Our ultimate objectives for South Africa are similar. We will work with you to see that our policies remain mutually supportive.

TAB

B

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State

Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

United Kingdom

John Major, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Antony Acland, UK Ambassador to the United States

Sir Patrick Wright, FCO Permanent Undersecretary

Stephen Wall, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State

TAB

C

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	Biography Re: John Major [redacted] (1 pp.)	8/28/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] July - September 1989

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed:	3/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0970-MR (502.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/15/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

John MAJOR**UNITED KINGDOM***Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (since July 1989)*

(b)(1); (b)(3)

John Major has been held up as a shining example of the self-made men who are the epitome of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's meritocratic Britain. His appointment as Foreign Secretary continues his meteoric rise in the ranks of the Conservative Party and has already renewed speculation that Thatcher is grooming him as her crown prince. Major—an aggressive Tory orator since his teens and a well-known Thatcher soldier—

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Major had little foreign policy experience

before moving to the Foreign Office and has rarely commented on foreign affairs. Most observers are carefully watching his approach to the EC, where he is expected

(b)(1); (b)(3)

to smooth ruffled relations with Brussels while supporting Thatcher's policies. One of his first challenges has been the need to calm the apprehension of Hong Kong residents, who fear that Chinese authorities will institute repressive measures after the colony returns to Chinese rule in 1997. This issue will probably continue to be a high priority. Major is well acquainted with the Chinese business community in Hong Kong, having visited there frequently during his banking career. We expect him to draw heavily on his extensive background in private enterprise,

(b)(1); (b)(3)

to quickly establish his own identity as Foreign Secretary on this and other policy questions.

The son of a businessman who once worked as a trapeze artist and played baseball in Philadelphia, Major was born on 29 March 1943. When he was 10 his family moved to Brixton. He left school at 16 in order to help with family finances, working in an insurance office and as a mixer of concrete (he competed for a job as a bus conductor but was rejected because he was too tall). In 1965 he joined the Standard Chartered Bank, and for the next 14 years he held executive posts both in Britain and overseas (he was working in Nigeria during the Biafran war). Upon entering Parliament in 1983, Major was made an assistant in the Government Whips Office, considered by many observers to be a hothouse for party talent. In that position and later, in a series of posts in the Department of Health and Human Services, Major won widespread respect. He continued his success as Chief Secretary in the Exchequer (1987–July 1989), where he adjudicated interministerial spending debates with success and minimal rancor.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Despite his increasing prominence, Major has remained modest and good humored: even after his elevation to the Cabinet he liked to drop into workingmen's cafes for a breakfast of "triple beans on toast with bacon." He is also genuinely popular; one British newspaper has characterized him as a "good egg." Major has retained a strong social conscience and tends to be to the left of the party on issues of social justice and welfare.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Major enjoys opera and cricket. He is married to the former Norma Johnson, whom he met while electioneering in Brixton. Mrs. Major has recently published a biography of opera star Joan Sutherland. The couple has two children.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

LDA M 89-14662
28 August 1989

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PER E.O. 13526**

2009-0970-MR
SCS 5/15/12

T
A
B
D

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Cable	Re: Thatcher Writes to President Bush, Mitterrand, Kohl, and Delors Urging Aid for Poland (4 pp.)	9/7/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] July - September 1989

Date Closed:	3/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

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7134



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

09 SEP 15 P3:26
September 15, 1989

CHRON FILE

CB
9-16

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Verification of a CFE Treaty

We are encountering substantial Allied resistance to U.S. preferences for verification of a CFE Treaty. Allies have strong reservations about the intrusiveness of any verification provisions, especially monitoring production of armaments within the CFE zone and monitoring the entry and exit of armaments to and from the CFE zone. The problem, however, is more fundamental than concerns about intrusiveness. Our standards for verifying a CFE Treaty appear to be much higher than those of our Allies. Their focus is more on the detection of gross violations than accounting for all treaty-limited equipment.

We are engaging in an intensified diplomatic effort to try to persuade our Allies that we need a stringent verification regime. We may be seeking your help in this effort. However, if we cannot convince our Allies to revise their approach to CFE verification, we will face a choice.

To reach agreement with our Allies, we may have to consider an approach to verification which would rely more heavily on national intelligence means and would aim to detect militarily significant violation of the Treaty with a high degree of confidence. Such an approach would mean accepting that we would have less confidence that we could detect smaller violations.

Adopting such an approach would depend on whether the Administration and the Senate can accept a less stringent CFE verification regime. Otherwise, we must press our Allies to accept more robust verification proposals along the lines we have advocated heretofore. This would take more time, would risk slowing down the negotiations, and may ultimately be unsuccessful.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2009-0970-MR
SLC 5/28/13

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7134

September 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER^{AK}/ROBERT BLACKWILL^{RB in draft}

FROM: HEATHER WILSON^H

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on CFE Verification

Allies have strong reservations about several of our verification proposals in the package we hope to table at the CFE negotiations in Vienna. They are concerned about limiting the intrusiveness of such measures, and, in particular, protecting their defense industry from interference which they feel might hurt their industrial competitiveness. We also have standards for verification of arms control agreements which are higher than our Allies'.

In the short-term, we are involved in an intense diplomatic effort to table the bulk of the verification measures with placeholders on contentious issues and we are intensifying our diplomatic efforts to try to win Allied support for more stringent verification proposals.

The memorandum to the President informs him of a decision which we may face in the longer term: can the Administration and the Senate accept a verification regime for CFE which focusses on detection of militarily significant violations of the Treaty? The alternative is to be prepared to delay conclusion of a CFE agreement.

If we cannot convince Allied leaders of the wisdom of our approach, we would raise this issue through the Deputies, to the NSC, and, ultimately, to the President, for decision.

Concurrences by: Philip Zelikow^{PZ in draft}

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0970-MR
SCS 5/28/13

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 7134

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLDG (6A1) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>APK</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>27.9.15</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

83 SEP 13 16:26

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Trans to Pres on CFE
Verification*

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6266 Add-On

~~SECRET~~

September 19, 1989

*First rate
memo.*
(B)



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

PETER W. RODMAN *pmr*

SUBJECT:

Political Implications of a CFE Accord

Attached is a refined version of my thinkpiece on this subject, which I originally sent you August 9.

I have spoken to, and gotten comments or ideas from, a number of people -- Jim Woolsey, Bob Blackwill, Reg Bartholomew, Paul Wolfowitz, Steve Hadley, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Richard Haass, Don Mahley, Heather Wilson, Adrian Basora, Philip Zelikow. Not all of them have seen the final product, and the speculations are my own.

If you like it, you may want to send it to Larry. *Davis*

Attachment

Tab I Paper: Political Implications
 of a CFE Accord

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0970-MR
SLC 5/28/13

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Report	Re: Political Implications of a CFE Accord (5 pp.)	9/19/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection

Series: USSR Chronological Files

Subseries: CFE Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe - CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] July - September 1989

Date Closed:	3/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91121-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
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