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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files

OA/ID Number: 91131
Folder ID Number: 91131-006

Folder Title:
Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [6]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	From Moscow to White House, Re: For General Scowcroft from Charge [021520Z Dec 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	11/2/92	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: Telephone Call to President Yeltsin (1 pp.)	12/21/92	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable	Ed A. Hewett to Brent Scowcroft Re: A Luncheon Conversation with Vladimir Lukin (3 pp.)	8/17/92	(b)(1)	S
04. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (1 pp.)	12/20/92	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (8 pp.)	1/3/93	(b)(1)	
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: Letter to President Yeltsin (1 pp.)	11/25/92	(b)(1)	S
06b. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Yeltsin (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [6]

Pinksheet Number: cap1104
OA/ID Number: 91131-006
Date Closed: 4/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09a. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09b. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
10a. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (2 pp.)	10/28/92	(b)(1)	
10b. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	10/28/92	(b)(1)	
11a. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11b. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12a. Memo	Burton J. Lee, III, M.D. and Commander Rodney Savage, MC, USN to POTUS, Re: President Yeltsin's Mother (1 pp.)	8/31/92	(b)(1)	
12b. Report	Re: Conference of Specialist Doctors (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12c. Cable	From White House, Re: Personal Message from President Bush to President Yeltsin [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	9/1/92	(b)(1)	S
12d. Memo	Burton J. Lee, III, M.D. and Commander Rodney Savage, MC, USN to POTUS, Re: President Yeltsin's Mother (1 pp.)	8/31/92	(b)(1)	
12e. Report	Re: Conference of Specialist Doctors (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12f. Cable	From White House, Re: Personal Message from President Bush to President Yeltsin [012150Z Sep 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	9/1/92	(b)(1)	S
12g. Memo	From Nick Burns to General Scowcroft to Admiral Howe, Re: Up-Date on Medical Flight to Russia [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	8/28/92	(b)(1)	S
12h. Cable	From White House, Re: For Charge D'Affaires Jim Collins from General Scowcroft [280405Z Aug 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	8/28/92	(b)(1)	S
12i. Memo	Re: Yeltsin Letter on Chemical Weapons (CW) (6 pp.)	8/27/92	(b)(1)	S
12j. Talking Points	Re: Call Between Dr. Lee and Dr. Grigoriyev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12k. Memo	Burton J. Lee, III, M.D. to Admiral David M. Lichtman, MC, USN Re: Commander Rodney Savage, USN, and HM1 Joni Kooser, USN (2 pp.)	9/22/92	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12l. Memo	Burton J. Lee, III, M.D. to Captain Jay B. Yakeley, III, USN Re: Lieutenant Colonel Dale L. Larson, et.al. (2 pp.)	9/18/92	(b)(1)	

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Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1071-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/29/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

FOR: THE WHITE HOUSE
GENERAL SCOWCROFT

1.4(c)

TOR: 02/1522Z NOV 92

O 021520Z DEC 92 ZYH<<=

FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW<<=

TO WHITE HOUSE<<=

ZEM<<=

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c)

QQQQ<<=

=

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARGE<<=

=

CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER OF<<=
DECEMBER 1 TO YELTSIN AIDE RYURIKOV AT 4:30 PM TODAY.<<=
RYURIKOV READ THE LETTER, BUT PROVIDED NO SUBSTANTIVE<<=
COMMENT.<<=


=

CHARGE NOTED THAT THIS LETTER WAS A DIRECT FOLLOW UP TO<<=
THE PHONE CALL BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS ON NOVEMBER 30.<<=
SPECIFICALLY, IT PROVIDES A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO<<=
PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S PROPOSAL ABOUT SIGNING THE START II<<=
TREATY IN ANCHORAGE. CHARGE ALSO DREW RYURIKOV'S<<=
ATTENTION TO PARA THREE OF THE TEXT, NOTING THAT IT<<=
PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE OUTCOME OF<<=
THE MONDAY PHONE CALL. BECAUSE THE CALL HAD BEEN<<=
INTERRUPTED BY TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES, HOWEVER, THE<<=
PRESIDENT WANTED TO BE CERTAIN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND HE<<=
HAD THE SAME UNDERSTANDING. RYURIKOV STATED THAT A<<=
RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 29 ON THE<<=
START FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IS NOW UNDER PREPARATION. THE<<=
REPLY, WHICH HE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED SOON, WOULD NOW<<=
ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 1 LETTER.<<=
RYURIKOV ALSO WELCOMED THE STATEMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT<<=
INTENDS TO CALL PRESIDENT YELTSIN SOON TO DISCUSS FURTHER<<=
DETAILS ABOUT THE ALASKA MEETING.<<=

=

END TEXT<<=

DECL OADR<<=

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APNSA Has Seen

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2009-1071-MR

10/29/2014 MM

Henry Kissinger

Charter of Confusion

The new Russian-American summit document takes partnership too far.

President Boris N. Yeltsin's dramatic and successful visit to America occasioned a document that seeks to give concrete meaning to the term new world order. Titled Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship, it could, if its ideas take hold, involve a revolutionary reordering of global relationships that should not be implemented without a full national debate.

True, statements of principle are rarely implemented literally. But they do reflect a state of mind and hidden assumptions that shape long-term policy.

The most significant premises of the charter are that, with the end of communism, no geopolitical issues remain between the United States and Russia and that the spread of democracy will guarantee permanent peace. Russia is assumed as sharing identical goals, making possible a "strategic partnership" between the two nuclear superpowers "in the international arena, in the interest of advancing and defending common democratic values."

Are these premises valid? Is it prudent to base policy on the assumption that an evolution barely three years old has already reversed a pattern of centuries?

The collapse of the Soviet Union is surely the seminal event of our time, and the Bush administration has handled it with consummate skill. But the nature of what is to replace it in the vast area stretching from the Polish border to the Pacific, from the Arctic Circle to the approaches to the Middle East, is still unsettled. We must take care not to foster principles of world order that unintentionally encourage instability, even violence, and constrain the evolution of newly free countries.

American leaders have generally justified their policies by universal, often legal, principles rather than by national interest—the last time during the Gulf War. This approach worked during the Cold War because there was an overwhelming ideological and geopolitical danger, and much of the world felt more or less uniformly threatened.

But with ideological fires banked and global threats diminishing, the problem of world order has changed. The United States must mute its undifferentiated globalism. It must learn that it cannot involve itself in every crisis. It must learn to distinguish the vital from the peripheral. Russia, struggling with the end of centuries of imperialism, must not be tempted to reverse that process.

In its approach to international security, the new charter seems to move in the opposite direction. The document is permeated by a tone redolent of a global Russo-American condominium. Russia is called a "strategic partner." In addition, "the United States and the Russian Federation will unite [emphasis added] in their efforts toward strengthening international peace and security, preventing and settling regional conflicts, and solving global problems."

Can America sustain such an undertaking? Are we luring ourselves into commitments beyond our physical and psychological capacity? Should Russia be encouraged into a global role, which is like putting liquor before a reforming alcoholic? Where does this leave America's allies? NATO is included only as a possible contributor to an as yet to be created "Euro-Atlantic Peacekeeping Capability." Japan is not mentioned at all, even though the United States and the Russian Federation have pledged themselves to "cooperate" in strengthening "confidence and stability in Asia and the Pacific region."

This atmosphere of condominium emphasizes the curious clause stating that the two countries abjure "the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of each other [emphasis added]." Could this not be read to mean that the threat of force against other countries is permitted by the charter? Previous American-Soviet statements of principle always contained clauses declaring that nothing in them superseded existing obligations, or they made new mutual obligations general. The new restrictive clause, even if inadvertent, is bound to be noted.

The charter emphasizes a vast new effort by America and the Russian Federation to "support the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic Community" because "security is indivisible from Vancouver to Vladivostok." When this concept first appeared in the Gorbachev era, it was the slogan of European and Soviet leaders seeking to reduce American influence and to gain maximum freedom of action for essentially national purposes. For once everybody is allied to everybody else, existing institutions will dissolve in a vague structure incapable of joint action and therefore, in the end, best suited to nationalistic policies.

The Euro-Atlantic Community seems to include NATO, the European neutrals, the new East European democracies and all the successor states of the Soviet Union—some 15 in number. The interests of all these countries are assumed to be identical and to flow naturally from their democratic domestic structures. But in the real world, can this melange be called a community? Does the phrase "indivisible security" entitle either superpower to act alone in the likely event there is no consensus, or does each side have a veto? Is the choice between hegemony and paralysis?

And in what way can the five Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union or the three new states of the Caucasus be said to belong to a European security structure, not to speak of a Euro-Atlantic Community? If Kirghizstan, one of the Central Asian republics, becomes "European," why not nearby Pakistan or India; if Azerbaijan is European, why not Iran, which it borders? The unspoken premise is that all the states of the former Soviet Union, however different their culture and history, are still treated as if they were under Moscow's tutelage.

This unprecedented role for the European Security Conference and the phrase that "America and the Russian Federation cannot accept another phase of European instability" points up the charter's basic incompatibility with existing Atlantic institutions. Within NATO, America insists on integration of strategy and policy. It opposes a separate European military force on the ground that it weakens the integrated command. The charter, however, leaves little scope for NATO except to contribute forces and resources to the newly invented Euro-Atlantic Peacekeeping Capability, together with the WEU—a heretofore largely moribund grouping of West European states—and other countries of the CSCE. Such a downgrading of NATO is likely to magnify European suspicions of America. The same is even more true of Japan and China. At the same time, the Euro-Atlantic Community is likely to appear to Japan and China as an exclusive anti-Asian club.

The Charter
as aspiration

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White House News Summary

sunday, July 5, 1992 -- page 17 of 17

Similar ambiguities weaken the charter's relevance to the strains produced by the breakup of the Soviet Union. In less than a year, 15 new states have emerged in that vast region. All have become members of the United Nations. The United States has established embassies in each of them. These new nations share some unique features. None of them—except the Baltic states—has known independence for the past 150 years. Hundreds of thousands of troops of the erstwhile Red Army remain on their territories. These come and go and maneuver without asking the permission of independent countries recognized as members of the United Nations. Most republics have been afraid to ask them to leave, and those that have dared—like the Baltic states—have received evasive replies. These troops intervene in local conflicts, as they did recently in Moldova and Georgia directly upon Yeltsin's return from North America—ostensibly to protect Russian minorities.

But Russian minorities are everywhere. The Russian Empire had mixed up the nationalities by conquest, and Stalin, to facilitate central control, drew borders in such a way that no ethnically pure republics remained. Almost all republics also contain other minorities, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. To complicate matters further, most educated Russians identify the origin of their country with Kiev, the capital of the new nation of Ukraine, which has a population of 58 million, and in fact view all the successor nations as ingrates duty-bound to return to the motherland.

While the Russian Republic has not directly challenged the independence of the new states, it has not fully accepted it either. Russian leaders maneuver with great persistence to establish themselves as the linear descendants of the historical empire rather than as an entirely new and separate state. The entry of all the successor republics into the European Security Conference is a measure of the success of this campaign. Russian leaders try—at least tacitly—to keep open the option of repeating the events of 1917-22, when many of the current group of independent republics attempted to break away only to be forced in the end to return to Moscow's fold.

Precisely because economic reform, even with considerable outside help, is certain to be painful, an appeal to the historical empire may be a tempting way to rally support. This may explain why the defense minister of the Russian Republic has declared that his country will consider any troop concentration along the borders of the former Soviet Union as justifying Russian intervention by crossing the territory of theoretically sovereign neighbors. Not a single Western country has commented on this extraordinary proposition.

Such a state of affairs is potentially even more explosive than Yugoslavia, and with far greater implications for the peace of the world. If Moscow attempts to recentralize its former empire, some sort of military conflict is highly probable. If it succeeds—even partially—alarm bells will ring all around the Soviet periphery, but especially in Eastern Europe. The traditional pattern of mutual fear between Russia and its neighbors will reappear. The U.S.-Russian partnership will collapse.

This may not be an acute problem so long as Russia, together with all the successor states, faces economic disaster. But as they recover, the question of whether the new charter reduces the dangers becomes relevant. Some provisions are clearly helpful, for example the reaffirmation of respect for national borders, including those of the new states. At the same time, Russia and the United States promise support and "leadership" to the protection of minorities and the settlement of ethnic disputes. In the code language of the region, these phrases can more readily justify intervention than restraint, for it is so-called ethnic conflicts that will be the most likely pretexts for recentralization.

The Bush administration seems to assume that liberal democracy and market economics will by themselves achieve and preserve peace everywhere. But even if true, that point will not be reached for decades. In the meantime, America must contribute to international stability by a foreign policy going beyond social engineering. The effort to shore up the Russian government is laudable, and Congress should support it. But we must not so idealize and personalize the relationship as to lose sight of geopolitical imperatives. We need to balance the respect and cooperation to which Russia's reforms and potential power entitle it against the dangers of hegemony over smaller successor states. The deferential way Yeltsin is treated in the West, as compared with the leaders of the other republics, and the fact that almost all foreign aid goes to Russia, threaten this balance. Indeed, if present IMF plans are implemented, Western policy will encourage a ruble zone whose practical effect will be to force most successor states back under Moscow's economic tutelage.

The deepest question raised is whether Russia, seeking to build democracy and a market economy without previous experience with either and in need of vast amounts of foreign assistance, can possibly fulfill the role assigned to it by the charter. Is it really wise to divert it into a global enterprise that in the end may keep it from even defining a responsible role with respect to the internal relationships of the former Soviet Union? At the end of an evolution which we should assist, Russia may turn into the partner envisaged by the charter. As of now, such a role is at best premature, at worst dangerous.

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Documents Warned in '85 of Iraqi Nuclear Aims

By ELAINE SCIOLINO
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 4 — Newly declassified Pentagon documents describe warnings as early as 1985 that there was a danger that American technology could be illegally diverted from Iraq's nuclear energy program into an effort to make nuclear weapons.

The documents indicate that Administration officials had warnings about Iraq's dangerous nuclear ambitions much earlier than previously known. They were released this week as Congressional Democrats pressed their case that the policies of the Reagan and Bush Administrations toward President Saddam Hussein of Iraq were flawed up to his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and may have also been criminal.

One May 1985 Defense Department document cited a Central Intelligence Agency report "indicating that Iraq continues to actively pursue an interest in nuclear weapons, that the large number of Warsaw Pact nationals in Iraq makes diversion in place a real possibility and that in the past, Iraq has been somewhat less than honest in regard to the intended end-use of high technology equipment."

Restrictions Were Urged

The paper, written by Richard N. Perle, then Assistant Defense Secretary, to Caspar W. Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense, recommended that "to protect our national security interests" the United States impose certain restrictions on sensitive equipment and technology sold to Iraq.

Another document, a March 1985 Pentagon memo, said Iraq had refused to provide assurances that it would not use two American computers in its nuclear program. The Pentagon memo argued in favor of requiring such assurances, noting that the State Department

was arguing against it.

"Iraq is a problem country, at least in the mid-to-long term," the memo argued, noting that it had "many if not all" of the elements necessary to reprocess uranium in place and possessed about 100 to 112 pounds of highly enriched uranium. "While we have seen no evidence of a weapons-design program, it makes sense to apply controls to help deter the use of U.S. computers in any such program."

It could not be determined whether the two computers were eventually shipped to Iraq, but American computers were used by the Iraqi military. According to a previously released No-

Pentagon papers indicate early knowledge by the Administration.

ember 1986 memorandum, for example, Pentagon officials warned that a license for a hybrid computer for the Saad 16 missile complex near Mosul should be denied "because of the high likelihood of military end use and the association of the involved companies in sensitive military applications." The memo stated that the computer could be used to monitor wind-tunnel tests for ballistic missiles.

Overrode by Commerce Dept.

But the Commerce Department overrode the objections and the sale went through without any conditions. The Saad 16 complex was a key target of allied bombing raids in 1991 in the American-led assault to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Representative Sam Gejdenson, the Connecticut Democrat who released the newly declassified documents on Wednesday, said he was doing so to counter President Bush's statement on a network news program that day that the United States had not enhanced Iraq's "nuclear, chemical or biological capability." Mr. Bush said that he had issued an executive order on the subject, adding, "You have repeated something that isn't true."

"I'm watching the CBS Morning News and the President says we didn't help his chemical or nuclear or missile capability at all, and that is not factually correct based on the Administration's own documents," Mr. Gejdenson said in an interview.

Some of Mr. Bush's own aides are uncomfortable with his blanket denial, which he first articulated last month at a news conference in Rio de Janeiro. The aides have noted that American technology did enhance, albeit inadvertently, that capability.

October 1989 Directive

Even the executive order to which Mr. Bush referred, a national security directive signed in October 1989 that became the cornerstone for his Iraq policy of economic and political incentives, implied that the United States should sell Iraq equipment related to its nuclear energy projects as long as it was not weapons-related.

Other memos released earlier by Mr. Gejdenson showed that Bush Administration officials were convinced that Mr. Hussein would continue to develop his military capability despite the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. An undated State Department memo written early in the Bush Administration, for example, stated that Iraq's military attaché in Washington was actively trying to buy equipment that could have military applications.

Democrats Are Expected to Seek Probe Of White House Role in Iraq-BNL Affair

By PETER TRUETT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—Congressional Democrats are expected this week to call for a special counsel to investigate what they claim were criminal acts by the Bush administration in its policy toward Iraq, and particularly its handling of the BNL affair.

Such an investigation, at the least, would be embarrassing to the administration. It would highlight how the White House aggressively backed Saddam Hussein with taxpayer-financed programs, helping to create the very Iraqi military machine the U.S. and its allies had to subdue in the 1991 Gulf War.

The Atlanta branch of BNL, or Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, an Italian government-controlled bank, provided \$4.5 billion in loans to Iraq between 1986 and August 1989, some of which helped to build its war machine. The Bush administration, the U.S. attorney's office in Atlanta and Federal Reserve officials have sought to portray the loans as the isolated work of a few BNL officers in Atlanta.

But in a speech to the House yesterday, Rep. Henry Gonzalez, chairman of the House Banking Committee, which is investigating the BNL affair, tried to show that the White House had intervened directly in the criminal probe. The Texas Democrat quoted notes made by a Treasury Department official who had talked with Gail McKenzie, the assistant U.S. attorney handling the BNL case in the U.S. attorney's office in Atlanta. One of the notes, which date from Nov. 7, 1989, reads, "McKenzie: She has been called by the White House — got impression concerned about embarrassment level." This conversation occurred just as the Bush administration was preparing to authorize a \$1 billion Commodity Credit Corp. loan for Iraq. BNL itself had earlier provided many U.S.-guaranteed CCC loans.

Gerrilyn Brill, first assistant U.S. attorney in Atlanta, acknowledged the telephone call, but said: "Ms. McKenzie informs me that the individual in no way attempted to interfere with the handling of the case."

Mr. Gonzalez also cited the notes of an administration official that showed the White House — including both President Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft — was directly involved in 1991 in trying to limit the information given to Congress about the administration's policy toward Iraq. The administration has used executive privilege to limit congressional access to documents dealing with Iraqi policy.

"Scowcroft will take the lead on exerting EP" (executive privilege) reads a July 1991 note by a senior Commerce Department official involved in an interagency effort to decide what data the lawmakers

should be given. Another note reads, "Pres. very, very mad, heated discussion."

The administration has maintained that it used taxpayer-financed programs for Iraq to help U.S. farmers and exporters at a time when it was seeking to bolster Iraq after its many years of war with Iran. The administration has consistently maintained that no laws were broken.

Yesterday, Mr. Gonzalez also disclosed a CIA report dated Nov. 6, 1989, that was sent to the State Department and the National Security Council. Rep. Gonzalez said the report indicated that Iraq was using BNL loans to finance its "clandestine missile and nuclear weapons procurement program." Nevertheless, two days later, the administration approved \$1 billion of Commodity Credit Corp. loans for Iraq, which was hard-pressed to raise money elsewhere.

Rep. Charles Schumer, who heads a House Judiciary subcommittee, said yesterday that he was drafting a letter to Rep. Jack Brooks, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, requesting that an independent counsel look into the Iraq-BNL affair. Rep. Schumer pledged to raise the required number of votes by the end of this week. "In view of the information placed in the record by Rep. Henry Gonzalez, Congress is left with no option but to seek an independent counsel to investigate possible criminal activity in the Iraq-BNL affair," the New York Democrat said.

A probe by a special counsel, which would be appointed by the Attorney General, would likely focus on the alleged doctoring of information relating to exports to Iraq that was provided to Congress by the Commerce Department. Many congressional Democrats maintain these alterations were designed to mislead Congress and are criminal.

Democrats believe that an investigation of the BNL affair by a special counsel would also turn up more incriminating information of the administration's use of taxpayer-financed government programs, of an attempted cover-up by the administration once Iraq became an adversary, and even of interference in the judicial process to prevent information from coming to light.

Rep. Brooks is expected to send a letter to the 21 Democratic members of his committee asking for their support for a special counsel as early as today or tomorrow, according to an aide involved in the drafting of the letter. The Texas Democrat's office declined to comment on the issue. Before he can officially call for a special counsel, Mr. Brooks needs the support of a majority of the Democrats on his committee. Most of the Democrats are expected to support such a call, but it is unlikely that any of the 13 Republican committee members will give their support.

It may be difficult for the administration to oppose the appointment of an independent counsel, even though it may seek to do so.

*Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak*

Why a Second Term?

Frank advice to President Bush from his campaign chiefs—to forgo “speed” golf and cigarette boats in Maine this summer and instead take his case to America—begs an important question: What is his case?

The warning that this is no year for prolonged vacationing, made during a campaign conference call last weekend, reflects deep concern in the Bush-Quayle campaign. In private, some even admit that the president has no coherent program—or at least none ready to push today.

That harsh reality was actually voiced in the Oval Office last month when the president's former drug czar, William J. Bennett, was invited in and offered a national co-chairmanship of the reelection effort. Bennett respectfully declined, temporarily on grounds of television commitments but more permanently because he simply does not know what a Bush second term would stand for. Bennett blames the campaign for failing to provide a theme for the president. The campaign blames the White House for not putting Bush on a steady policy course. The White House blames the Treasury and Office of Management Budget for rigidity and reluctance to accept new policy ideas.

But the blame-passing buck stops on the president's desk. “I do not think there is really anything that we can do for the president right now,” one policy adviser confided to us. “It's up to him.” That is a tall order for a president whose base is drifting away and whose performance in recent weeks has been alarmingly uneven. He still cannot accept the fact that the failing economy is a millstone around his neck. When asked in last month's New York Times interview about America's biggest problem, he reflexively replied that it was education.

If, after 12 years at the seat of power, Bush cannot shape a consistent message for the country by himself, his closest supporters wonder where it will come from. There is no sign it will come from inside the administration.

Much-abused White House Chief of Staff Sam Skinner is viewed by Republican politicians as less responsible for what has happened than the two most prominent economic policy makers, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and OMB Director Richard Darman. The pols complain that any idea not coming from within Treasury and OMB is dead on arrival.

That's what seems to have happened to the revived civilian conservation corps pushed after the Los Angeles riots by the campaign's idea man, James Pinkerton. It picked up wide support, but not from Pinkerton's old nemesis, Darman, who belittled the notion. The CCC remains dead.

According to White House aides, the president earlier this year seriously considered dropping Brady and Darman overboard and bringing in a new team. But he viewed such a shakeup, so soon after Skinner replaced John Sununu, as posing too great a threat. If too risky in January, it is out of the question in July.

A somewhat more realistic change, still talked about in the inner reaches of the campaign, might be James A. Baker III's coming over from the State Department to take charge.

But this misses a broader problem raised by one experienced Republican hand: “There have been many cases where the White House runs the campaign, but I've never heard of one where the campaign runs the White House. I don't think it can be done.”

The last option is the kind of campaign Democrats have always expected and many Bush advisers think now cannot be avoided: an unrelenting attack on Bill Clinton and, if he is still around, Ross Perot. That's not the answer the Bill Bennetts of the GOP have in mind when they ask what George Bush's second term will be like.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 21, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President
Yeltsin

Attached are the proposed talking points
for President Bush's call to President
Yeltsin today. May I have your
concurrence by noon.

The President will talk to President
Yeltsin at 1:00 today.



Brent Scowcroft

Attachment
As stated

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By MM NARA, Date 7/19/2013

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- Boris, I now have had an opportunity to consider your last letter, including the approach you outlined on the destruction of SS-18s. And I have discussed it with my advisors.
- I think we are close to agreement on the major issues which would in turn clear the way for final agreement on the precise text of the agreement.
- I am prepared to send my experts to meet with yours in Geneva as early as tomorrow if we have a common understanding on these matters. Specifically:
- o That all SS-18 missiles be destroyed, both deployed and non-deployed.
 - o That all SS-18 silos be destroyed in accordance with START procedures except for a specified number which would be converted in a manner that would preclude the possibility of their later reuse for heavy missiles. I understand from you that you need only to keep a small number of these silos, I think you said "a few tens." I need to know what you think that number is. Can we settle on a number that is not greater than 50?
 - o As you stated in an earlier letter, our governments would have to agree on the procedures for destroying the missiles and converting the silos, including appropriate inspection and verification procedures.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 135262009-1071-MR
10/29/2014 MM

- o On SS-19s, I think we are in agreement on the retention and downloading of not more than 120 SS-19 missiles in existing SS-19 silos.
 - o We have met your concerns with heavy bombers with the language Eagleburger offered in Stockholm in which we accepted several of your proposals. However, you must understand that the U.S. must be able to reorient to a conventional role, B-1 heavy bombers that have never been equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. I need to know that you find our bomber position acceptable.
- Boris, you and I need to agree on these major points. If we are agreed, we can turn this over to our experts to refine the details. If you are ready to proceed on this basis, our experts should be able to agree quickly on the treaty document.
- I think it would be premature to finalize our meeting until we have an agreed treaty. Without a treaty, there is no sense to our meeting.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Cable	Ed A. Hewett to Brent Scowcroft Re: A Luncheon Conversation with Vladimir Lukin (3 pp.)	8/17/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [6]

Date Closed:	4/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Joche

P/ Yeltsin 12/20/92

Fly to Saudi Jan 2. Sign treaty Jan 3
Eagle + Roz green talk Monday to
finalize details on SS-18

- If necessary you & I can talk
Sunday evening

Yeltsin will contact Clinton about
W. on East Coast

- Unless Yeltsin wants Bush
to do it.



P/ Yeltsin 1/3/93

Y Would you ever to lead off
P Fine, Gorbachev me a chance to thank
you. Sobchik would have been nice
but getting to sign in Kremlin.
I salute teams who did a hard
work.

To anyone in US supports your
reforms. I know new Pavlov
to thank you to continue down the
path. As long as you stay on path
forward, new dawn should be
strongly supportive.

You have been very frank & honest
w/ me & I grateful. How do you think
reforms really go? - new learn.

Y Thank you for warm words over
time. (Nice words for all).

As for cabinet, there were only 4 changes
Gorbachev made a poor showing. Health
care Min & some. Vice PM was not
reforms minded. Prob Ed Min because of
worrying in Ministry. Reform minded
members of team are safe. And I
am keeping a close watch on all. I
know Chernomyrdin for 30 yrs. He is
very loyal. Sometimes, for cause, Chernomyrdin
would not in favor of nuclear prod.
rather than budget but he is
of set long — born in 1963 +

a member. So this group grows where
is not needed. Anyway, they can do all
our work. We have a special list
of economy of transition & he has that.
Foggo your brass & Crabtree ^{agony man} is in
favor of cutting armed forces.

We will preserve our FP orientation in
friendly coop w/US.

I visited S. Korea & Beijing & you can
understand ~~we~~ our interest in Asia
& Pacific because of our history there.
You & we possess greatest military
forces & US retains top priority for us.
Because treaty signing here I won't
be able to go to US before Jan 20 to see
Clinton. I wrote him that perhaps we
could meet soon in neutral territory
before his formal visit here.

We know you made a contribution
in that relationship & I will be remembered
for that. I hope you will work for
important support for a relationship.
P Won't be active, but certainly supports
anything I worry about & says.
We have been close to it so far but
because of your spec reliability
I can see a lot becoming trained.
You are close to seeing them as

and I will tell Clinton it is important
to stay close on this cover & only line
divide us.

Y We have supported you in your
drifts as your position gets tougher
it is harder for us w/ Poland.
opposition. We see some sign. So
if you plan some steps for our
support perhaps we could join
w/ SU-27 for example to stay close
together. I assure you I will stay
in touch w/ Clinton to our positions
are mutually supportive.

Regarding strict treaty, do you still
have negative doubts? I think
a draft is carefully drawn. It will
lead us to destroy a equip, both
w/c 400 million provided by a core
& perhaps (some) of 400 additional
which could be provided at rotation
in a factory, it will help. We do
do have some opponents in a factory
you can't have any. We have support
of Iraq & former Czechs who oppose
everything. At a time of a hearing
& plan to be there personally & see
end I expect it will be
ratified.

There is a prob w/ Kazak & Ukrainians

Uzair wrote you a letter. Because
he just finished w/ subcommittee of State
I, he wrote a letter. In State I, CIS
should ~~to~~ show 100% of their
assets w/in 2 yrs. This morning
I called Krawcheck & asked if he
had any questions. He was supportive.

P Stalled to him recently & he said
right thing. I worry there are some
there who want to retain some media

Y There may be some elements but I
made formal statement of non-union
status. But I share your concern
what matters is Krawcheck realizing
they can't survive w/o Russia. He
wants 45 mil for oil & other
arrangements.

B They want an arrangement for
HEU

Y Fact is if we try to balance up a
relationship it would be very disad-
vantagel. I think they hope to get 1.5
bil from you

P You asked if we were satisfied w/
terms of treaty. Yes. Harry, would
you describe a cost sharing?

E Better promising at least 400 mil
to help costs of ~~disarmament~~ destruction. It
true there has been talk of 1.5 bil from

Y Ukraine, but no official request
I don't think Ukraine should get
175 mil for destruction because all
that will take place in Russia, incl
transportation

E That's why I said conversion.

B Their obligation is there in treaty
from both to Russia & US.

E I told them we expect them to follow
them & if they don't it could affect a
relationship

Y They got a point, I think
H3. We being very polite, we both should
encourage them in every way. I offer
a team to explain everything to them -

Y Can we switch to core officers?

You are ~~conveying~~ ^{conveying} w/ your agreement
& we pleased - that we have seen our
own platform announced by Clinton.
We glad you are working your promise
of improvement in core to the people -
you have achieved 3.4 (2.7). That is very
good. Do you think Clinton would be
many promises & if he has to fulfill
them it will be at expense of aid
to Russia

P In campaigns, many promises are
made. There was a "come home
America" element to his campaign.

But nothing since a election ^{has} ~~has~~ indicated he would pull back.

My advice would be that when you meet w/ him you reiterate your commitment to reform. Your continued reform should do most to guarantee continued support. Debt resched. before 20 years would be a reassuring sign.

Y K. Next point is external debt of FSU. There is emerging consensus ~~at~~ of Paris Club + concept for approval by London Club. We must keep in mind we took over all external debt. We have no hope of ~~other~~ other CIS paying their share. It may hope is however they will agree. Then there are ~ 1.1 mil in grain credits. Could we defer for another year? We must in position to repay now & are still recovering from recession.

P Just a word on grain. There would be deep support in US to continue w/c credits. But a law is specific on creditworthiness. When you stopped payment in 70s, that raised a question of creditworthiness. But if you reach a process resolved & then resume payment on non-resched debt, we could restart a prog.

Y At least if you could offer an \$15.5 mil. let Mr E & Mr B do that.

B There is no discretion on grain cred. It would take now 12 yrs.

Y Then what is solution. We have no money. We could deal w/ China - they offered 20 mil tons. We don't want to do that.

B That might force Com to do it. If they that we might lose Russian grain purchases.

If you do a Paris Club & work out deal w/ IMF...

Y We expect an agreement w/ IMF. Where is that

S Close to agreement, Ukraine - Rus division of proceeds - and 400 mil in price

Y I think it is really 200 m/yr of \$1.60 mil 13 / ton

+ S That is ⁱⁿ EU

Y ~~Can we~~ get agreement by June 20 for ^{is it possible to}

S I think so yes.

Y Now, KAK 103. Let ICJ appropriate blame. We think a KAK event was grossly negligent. Of course we ^(FSU) can't escape all blame, but it should be apportioned

P That ~~is~~ sounds OK. ^{we don't} ~~But this is not~~ consider this a big issue but yes

Let's agree discussion of compensation.

- Y But a families want compensation.
We can't be held resp for a fault of FSC
Union of other CIS would contribute.
- P The course you are sounds fine.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


November 25, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY EAGLEBURGER
DICK CHENEY
BOB GATES
COLIN POWELL
RON LEHMAN

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin

Enclosed is the draft letter from President Bush to President Yeltsin that we agreed to in yesterday's Oval Office meeting. May I have your comments by COB today.

*Please keep
this very close
hold. B*


Brent Scowcroft

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA Date 7/19/2013

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

Dear Boris:

I am writing to share my thoughts on how we may work together during the time remaining to me in office on the most important issue in our bilateral relationship -- our common desire to end forever the threat of nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Governor Clinton and I agreed last week that support for reform in Russia must remain a priority for the United States, and that our partnership with you is too important to allow the U.S. transition period to delay progress on the vital issues before us. In particular, the Governor hoped we could complete the START II treaty by mid-January. I hope you agree, as we discussed on November 4, that you and I should conclude this treaty together.

Together we made the important and tough decisions that led to our Joint Understanding at the June Summit. That was the major task and it is now behind us. We now have before us the task of codifying our historic accomplishment into treaty language. A successful conclusion of that task would lock in a foundation for a close, cooperative American-Russian partnership for the remainder of this decade and into the next century.

Our Joint Understanding calls for dramatic reductions in the strategic forces of both sides. Even more importantly, it greatly improves stability by banning the most destabilizing

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systems now held by both countries. But, as we have discussed, there is much more to the agreement than the changes it requires in our nuclear forces. Underlying it is a profound break from the past in how we look at arms control, at stability, and at each other. For that, you deserve much of the credit. It was, as I recall, at your initiative that we decided to abandon the old standard of numerical parity just hours before we announced the agreement in the Rose Garden.

Another novel feature of our agreement that stands in sharp contrast to the years of competitive arms build up is the provision that the United States might help Russia to reduce its forces more quickly. As you know, we are already discussing with your government U.S. assistance to help alleviate the financial burden of implementing the new agreement.

The draft treaty Jim Baker provided to your government in July was a faithful translation into treaty language of the June 17 Joint Understanding. In view of that, I was surprised by the changes which were proposed by your Foreign Ministry. The proposals to permit conversion of SS-18 silos and downloading of SS-19s seem clearly out of step with the June accord. Similarly, the proposals on heavy bombers would reopen issues that were settled in the START talks. I am at a loss to understand why these changes would be suggested unless it is to permit Russian forces to reach the 3500 warhead ceiling and to do so in the most

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3

economical manner. If that interpretation is correct, it seems clearly at odds with your statement in the Oval Office that you wanted to break symmetry as a symbol of our new relationship.

With respect to the proposed statements on the ABM Treaty, our countries have begun to make progress toward a global defense against ballistic missile along the lines you suggested at Camp David. I would hope we could build on that progress rather than return to statements that seem outdated in our new relationship.

Boris, I think we should remain true to our June framework agreement. The initial response to our treaty draft seems to take us in a different direction. I would ask that you reflect on the issues that I have raised and that we discuss them together very soon. I am convinced that only you and I can make the necessary decisions and provide the impetus to conclude this agreement during the next several weeks.

I know the tremendous problems Russia is facing and the pressures on you and your team of reformers. I am doing all that is within my power to assist you and to demonstrate support for your reforms. I remain hopeful that a Paris Club debt rescheduling agreement and the full range of economic assistance we have already delivered will help to secure the success of your programs. Conclusion of this new treaty would drastically reduce the burden of strategic forces left over from the Cold War, would

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~~SECRET~~

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bolster your and Russia's standing in the world community, and would be the crowning accomplishment of our historic cooperation together. I am ready to work hard to reach final agreement with you and will call you after you have had a chance to reflect on this letter.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

*Letter - please return
after perusing - 7/1*

Translated from Russian

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

May I, as behooves a sincere friend, address you my words of personal respect and support in this watershed moment in the political life of the United States and in your personal life.

I have closely followed the course of the election campaign in which you have again demonstrated your supreme qualities of a leading political figure in the contemporary world, courage, and commitment to the ideals of democracy and peace. A convincing proof of that are the many votes given to you by the American people. This resonates with what a great Russian writer Ivan Turgenev, whom I love very much, said once: "The feeling of a battle fought fairly is, perhaps, even deeper than the triumph of victory".

Like you, Mr. President, we respect the freely made choice of the American people and, on the eve of the change of administration, we wish to pay tribute to the outstanding role and contribution which you personally have made to the achievement of a new quality of relations between our two countries and to the harmonization of international relations as a whole.

I highly value the friendly and trusting contacts that we have developed during the period of truly epoch-making and historic changes both in Russia and in the world community at large. We shall never forget your unflinching support for the just cause of the Russian people during the critical days of severe trials of August, 1991, and your active efforts to develop cooperation between Russia and the United States based on the principles of trust and partnership. A graphic

manifestation of this approach was the passing of the Freedom Support Act by the US Congress to the elaboration and adoption of which you gave so much of your personal effort and energy.

History offered us a unique chance to lay a solid groundwork for joint advancement of both our peoples to the future on the basis of humanism and supreme moral values. Unprecedented steps have been made toward resolute dismantlement of the whole structure of military-political confrontation and ideological standoff, which we inherited from the Cold War period. We have achieved a real breakthrough in ridding our peoples and the entire international community of the nuclear threat. I believe we can be proud of the fact that within a rather short period of time we have been able to arrive at major agreements in the military field - on radical reductions in strategic offensive arms, safe elimination of nuclear munitions, destruction of chemical weapons, and on preventing the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Thus, a solid infrastructure has been developed for a long-term cooperation between Russia and the United States in areas where mutual suspicion and adversarial relations reigned not very long ago.

We in Russia give credit to your sincere efforts, Mr. President, to develop the potential for Russian-US economic cooperation. We are grateful to you for your fundamentally important understanding of the importance for the United States of the profound transformations taking place in Russia and the need to give those changes an all-round support, and not only financial support but by creating favorable conditions for mutually beneficial trade and economic interaction between our two nations.

Over the recent months we have done some fruitful work to create a solid treaty and legal foundation for our bilateral partnership and have moved to conduct our bilateral affairs on a civilized basis of mutual respect. Perhaps, this manifested itself in a most striking way - that all people in the US and Russia could relate to - in our joint effort to make our

societies more open to each other, to clear the logjams of all kinds of absurd reciprocal prohibitions, restrictions and barriers that piled up during the era of totalitarianism and ideological confrontation.

For all the clear and indisputable importance of what has been accomplished over such a historically short period of time in so many specific areas of our relations, I think you will agree, George, that of greatest value is and will continue to be this totally new atmosphere of mutual affinity and sympathy that has emerged in the relations of our two peoples and governments.

I am confident that during the final stage of your being in the office of the President of the United States of America you will make efforts to preserve and utilize the valuable experience we have jointly gained. Also, I have no doubt that you will continue - in any new capacity - your noble activities for the benefit of two great democracies, for the benefit of the Russian and American people.

I would be remiss if I failed to say a few warm and sincere words about Barbara. Naina and I recall her cordiality, thoughtfulness and hospitality during our stay in the United States. We will be happy to see you in Moscow as would be convenient to you.

In conclusion, I would like to once again express my sincere thanks to you for the joint work and to wish you every success in whatever area that you will choose to pursue, as well as good health and well-being to you and your family. Rest assured that you can always count on my friendship and good feelings.

Sincerely yours,

Boris YELTSIN

Translated from Russian

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

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I highly value the friendly and trusting contacts that we have developed during the period of truly epoch-making and historic changes both in Russia and in the world community at large. We shall never forget your unflinching support for the just cause of the Russian people during the critical days of severe trials of August, 1991, and your active efforts to develop cooperation between Russia and the United States based on the principles of trust and partnership. A graphic

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In conclusion, I would like to once again express my sincere thanks to you for the joint work and to wish you every success in whatever area that you will choose to pursue, as well as good health and well-being to you and your family. Rest assured that you can always count on my friendship and good feelings.

Sincerely yours,

Boris YELTSIN

Handwritten: Russian Federation

Translated from Russian

Dear Mr. President,

I consider it necessary to inform you about the complex situation obtaining around the withdrawal of the Russian Federation's armed forces from the territory of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

First of all, I wish to emphasize that the Russian leadership clearly and unequivocally reaffirms its intention to withdraw the troops from the territory of the Baltic states within a short and realistically feasible time-frame. We are aware of the great importance of the troops pullout for strengthening regional and European security, for the realization of the Baltic States' sovereignty, and for ensuring the national interests of Russia itself.

At the same time, we continue to believe that this problem should be resolved in a civilized manner and that the troops withdrawal ought to be carried out on a planned basis, on the basis of the agreements which are being negotiated at our intergovernmental bilateral talks with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

From the very outset of the talks on this issue, we repeatedly stated our position of principle to our partners, which is that the troops may be withdrawn provided we reach agreements on several questions which are inseparably linked to the withdrawal, above all, on assuring a normal functioning of the troops for the duration of the pullout and providing guarantees of social and legal protection and the individual rights for the servicemen, military pensioners, and their families. One has to note that, unfortunately, thus far these vital issues have not been resolved, and the absence of agreements on them does not permit to conclude the agreement on the troops withdrawal.

These circumstances have seriously complicated the situation of the Russian servicemen and their families who are stationed in the

The President

The White House

Baltic states and are having a negative impact on the internal political situation in Russia. In these conditions we are compelled to temporarily suspend the withdrawal of our troops from the territory of the Baltic states.

In order to deal with this situation, we propose concluding in the nearest future interim agreements with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which would provide social guarantees to the Russian servicemen and their families, and to speed up the signing of the main agreements on the troops withdrawal. The Russian side is prepared for constructive work in this direction.

I would like to stress that the completion of the troops pullout within a short period of time would be significantly helped if real assistance were to be given in building housing projects in Russia for the servicemen and their families. A number of countries expressed readiness to provide financial and technical assistance to Russia in constructing housing for the troops that are being pulled out, and some plans have already been developed (for example, the "Shelter" program.). However, to date only Denmark has specified its intentions. In this connection, I ask you to give a thought to what practical contribution to resolving this problem could be made by your country.

I consider it necessary to dwell on another problem which causes us most serious concern. It is the problem of assuring the rights of the Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states, of eliminating the discrimination they are subjected in Latvia and Estonia in the political, economic, and social areas.

The unwillingness of the Latvian and Estonian authorities to grant citizenship to non-Latvians and non-Estonians and their policy of forcing these people out to the "historical homeland" puts hundreds of thousands of residents of those countries in an extremely difficult situation of a serious infringement of not only their political, but social, economic, and cultural rights. This prompts us to raise before the international community the issues of mass human rights violations in those countries, which can have unpredictable implications.

Russia will be consistently defending the rights and interests of the Russians in the Baltic states. We must not allow a situation where, at the end of the 20th century, Europe would see creation of conditions of flagrant discrimination of significant parts of states' populations and the emergence of new hotbeds of tensions and conflicts.

Since contemporary international law considers human rights as an international issue and not solely an internal affair of a particular state, we intend to actively involve the United Nations, the CSCE and other international forums in dealing with this problem. In this, we are counting on the understanding and support of your country.

I am convinced, Mr. President, that your personal contribution and your country's efforts would be timely and useful in terms of exercising a restraining influence on the extremist-minded nationalist forces in the Baltic countries.

Sincerely,

Boris YELTSIN

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Считаю необходимым информировать Вас о сложной ситуации, складывающейся вокруг вывода с территории Латвии, Литвы и Эстонии вооруженных сил Российской Федерации.

Прежде всего хотел бы подчеркнуть, что российское руководство ясно и недвусмысленно подтверждает свое намерение вывести войска с территории государств Балтии в сжатые и реально возможные сроки. Мы сознаем важное значение вывода войск для укрепления региональной и европейской безопасности, для реализации суверенитета балтийских государств, а также и для обеспечения национальных интересов самой России.

В то же время мы исходили и исходим из того, что эта проблема должна решаться цивилизованным путем, что вывод войск должен проводиться планомерно, на основе соглашений, которые вырабатываются на двусторонних межгосударственных переговорах с Латвией, Литвой и Эстонией.

С самого начала переговоров по этому вопросу мы неоднократно излагали своим партнерам нашу принципиальную позицию, заключающуюся в том, что вывод войск может быть осуществлен при достижении договоренностей по ряду неразрывно связанных с ним вопросов, прежде всего это – обеспечение нормального функционирования войск на период их вывода и гарантий социально-правовой защищенности и личных прав военнослужащих, военных пенсионеров и членов их семей. С сожалением приходится констатировать, что на данный момент эти жизненно важные вопросы не решены, а отсутствие договоренностей по ним не позволяет заключить соглашение о выводе войск.

Создавшаяся ситуация серьезно осложняет положение российских военнослужащих и их семей, находящихся в государствах Балтии, негативно отражается на внутривнутриполитической обстановке в России. В таких условиях мы вынуждены пойти на временную приостановку вывода войск с территории государств Балтии.

Для того, чтобы выйти из создавшегося положения мы предлагаем в самое ближайшее время заключить с Латвией, Литвой и Эстонией временные соглашения, обеспечивающие социальные

гарантии военнослужащим российских войск и членам их семей, а также ускорить подписание основных соглашений о выводе войск. Российская сторона готова к конструктивной работе в этом направлении.

Хочу подчеркнуть, что осуществление вывода войск из государств Балтии в сжатые сроки было бы существенно облегчено реальной помощью в строительстве жилья в России для военнослужащих и членов их семей. Целый ряд стран выражал готовность оказать России финансовое и техническое содействие в строительстве жилья для выводимых войск, вырабатывались соответствующие планы (например, программа "Шелтер"). Однако на сегодняшний день лишь Дания конкретизировала свои намерения. В этой связи обращаюсь к Вам с просьбой подумать над тем, какой практический вклад в решение указанной проблемы могла бы внести ваша страна.

Считаю необходимым остановиться еще на одной проблеме, вызывающей у нас самую серьезную озабоченность. Речь идет об обеспечении прав русскоязычного населения в государствах Балтии, устранении дискриминации, которой оно подвергается в Латвии и Эстонии в политической, экономической и социальной областях.

Нежелание властей Латвии и Эстонии предоставлять гражданство лицам некоренной национальности и проводимая линия на их вытеснение "на историческую родину" ставит сотни тысяч жителей этих стран в крайне сложное положение, когда серьезно ущемляются не только их политические, но и социальные, экономические и культурные права. Это побуждает нас ставить перед мировым сообществом вопрос о массовых нарушениях прав человека в этих странах, способных повлечь непредсказуемые последствия.

Россия будет последовательно отстаивать права и интересы россиян в государствах Балтии. Мы не должны допустить, чтобы в конце XX века в Европе формировались условия для вопиющей дискриминации значительной части населения государств и создавались новые очаги напряженности и конфликтных ситуаций.

Поскольку в современном международном праве вопрос обеспечения прав человека рассматривается как международный, а не

только как внутреннее дело того или иного государства, мы намерены активно подключить механизмы ООН, СБСЕ и других международных форумов к решению данной проблемы. При этом мы рассчитываем на понимание и поддержку вашей страны.

Убежден, уважаемый господин Президент, что Ваши личный вклад и усилия вашей страны были бы своевременны и полезны в плане оказания сдерживающего влияния на экстремистски настроенные националистические силы в странах Балтии.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЫЦИН

Handwritten: 10-21-92
by [illegible]

Translated from Russian

October 28, 1992

Moscow

Dear George,

I was greatly pleased to learn of your signing the Freedom Support Act which provides a legal foundation for the large-scale program, declared by you last April, of assisting Russia and other C.I.S. countries in pursuing profound political and economic reform. Thus, one more step has been made toward further rapprochement of our two countries and strengthening our cooperation in the interest of freedom and democracy.

You know very well how essential, in these difficult times for our country, is the assistance and support on the part of the international community for our effort to transform Russia. But we attach an even greater importance to the new opportunities that become available to us after the passing of the Freedom Support Act in terms of achieving a closer economic cooperation between our two nations. It is precisely on mutually beneficial cooperation, and not only on economic assistance, that we place our hopes to get Russia back to the community of civilized nations.

What is important now is that the realization of the measures provided for in the Freedom Support Act not get stalled because of various bureaucratic barriers, but on the contrary, lend a new powerful impetus to a further development partnership relations between Russia and the United States.

For our part, we are pursuing a vigorous effort to create an organizational mechanism for implementing projects in all areas of our cooperation envisioned in the Freedom Support Act.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

In conclusion, dear George, may I express my sincerest thanks to you for your personal active contribution to the adoption of this legislation, which has great importance for Russian-US relations.

Wishing you every success,

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

28 октября 1992 года
г. Москва

Дорогой Джордж,

С большим удовлетворением узнал о том, что Вы подписали Закон "О поддержке свободы", который подводит юридическую базу под объявленную Вами в апреле с.г. широкомасштабную программу содействия России, другим странам СНГ в проведении глубоких политических и экономических реформ. Таким образом, сделан еще один шаг к дальнейшему сближению наших двух стран, усилению нашего взаимодействия в интересах свободы и демократии

Вам хорошо известно, какое важное значение в это трудное для нашей страны время имеют помощь и поддержка со стороны международного сообщества нашим усилиям по преобразованию России. Но еще большее значение мы придаем тем новым возможностям, которые открываются с подписанием Закона "О поддержке свободы" для более тесного экономического сотрудничества между нашими странами. Именно с взаимовыгодным сотрудничеством, а не только с экономической помощью мы связываем надежды на возвращение России в сообщество цивилизованных государств.

Сейчас важно, чтобы реализация предусмотренных законом мер не споткнулась о бюрократические барьеры, а наоборот, придавала бы новый мощный импульс дальнейшему развитию партнерских отношений между Россией и Соединенными Штатами.

Со своей стороны, ведем активную работу по созданию организационного механизма реализации проектов по всем направлениям сотрудничества, предусмотренным Законом "О поддержке свободы".

В заключение позвольте, дорогой Джордж, выразить мою самую искреннюю признательность за Ваше личное активное содействие принятию этого важного для российско-американских отношений закона.

С пожеланием всяческих успехов.

Искренне

Б.ЕЛЦИН

Его Превосходительству
Господину Джорджу БУШУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки

Translated from Russian

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

May I, as behooves a sincere friend, address you my words of personal respect and support in this watershed moment in the political life of the United States and in your personal life.

I have closely followed the course of the election campaign in which you have again demonstrated your supreme qualities of a leading political figure in the contemporary world, courage, and commitment to the ideals of democracy and peace. A convincing proof of that are the many votes given to you by the American people. This resonates with what a great Russian writer Ivan Turgenev, whom I love very much, said once: "The feeling of a battle fought fairly is, perhaps, even deeper than the triumph of victory".

Like you, Mr. President, we respect the freely made choice of the American people and, on the eve of the change of administration, we wish to pay tribute to the outstanding role and contribution which you personally have made to the achievement of a new quality of relations between our two countries and to the harmonization of international relations as a whole.

I highly value the friendly and trusting contacts that we have developed during the period of truly epoch-making and historic changes both in Russia and in the world community at large. We shall never forget your unflinching support for the just cause of the Russian people during the critical days of severe trials of August, 1991, and your active efforts to develop cooperation between Russia and the United States based on the principles of trust and partnership. A graphic

manifestation of this approach was the passing of the Freedom Support Act by the US Congress to the elaboration and adoption of which you gave so much of your personal effort and energy.

History offered us a unique chance to lay a solid groundwork for joint advancement of both our peoples to the future on the basis of humanism and supreme moral values. Unprecedented steps have been made toward resolute dismantlement of the whole structure of military-political confrontation and ideological standoff, which we inherited from the Cold War period. We have achieved a real breakthrough in ridding our peoples and the entire international community of the nuclear threat. I believe we can be proud of the fact that within a rather short period of time we have been able to arrive at major agreements in the military field - on radical reductions in strategic offensive arms, safe elimination of nuclear munitions, destruction of chemical weapons, and on preventing the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Thus, a solid infrastructure has been developed for a long-term cooperation between Russia and the United States in areas where mutual suspicion and adversarial relations reigned not very long ago.

We in Russia give credit to your sincere efforts, Mr. President, to develop the potential for Russian-US economic cooperation. We are grateful to you for your fundamentally important understanding of the importance for the United States of the profound transformations taking place in Russia and the need to give those changes an all-round support, and not only financial support but by creating favorable conditions for mutually beneficial trade and economic interaction between our two nations.

Over the recent months we have done some fruitful work to create a solid treaty and legal foundation for our bilateral partnership and have moved to conduct our bilateral affairs on a civilized basis of mutual respect. Perhaps, this manifested itself in a most striking way - that all people in the US and Russia could relate to - in our joint effort to make our

societies more open to each other, to clear the logjams of all kinds of absurd reciprocal prohibitions, restrictions and barriers that piled up during the era of totalitarianism and ideological confrontation.

For all the clear and indisputable importance of what has been accomplished over such a historically short period of time in so many specific areas of our relations, I think you will agree, George, that of greatest value is and will continue to be this totally new atmosphere of mutual affinity and sympathy that has emerged in the relations of our two peoples and governments.

I am confident that during the final stage of your being in the office of the President of the United States of America you will make efforts to preserve and utilize the valuable experience we have jointly gained. Also, I have no doubt that you will continue - in any new capacity - your noble activities for the benefit of two great democracies, for the benefit of the Russian and American people.

I would be remiss if I failed to say a few warm and sincere words about Barbara. Naina and I recall her cordiality, thoughtfulness and hospitality during our stay in the United States. We will be happy to see you in Moscow as would be convenient to you.

In conclusion, I would like to once again express my sincere thanks to you for the joint work and to wish you every success in whatever area that you will choose to pursue, as well as good health and well-being to you and your family. Rest assured that you can always count on my friendship and good feelings.

Sincerely yours,

Boris YELTSIN

Его Превосходительству
Джорджу БУШУ,
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
Вашингтон

Дорогой Джордж!

Позвольте мне, на правах искреннего друга, обратиться к Вам со словами личного уважения и поддержки в нынешний этапный момент в политической жизни Соединенных Штатов и в Вашей судьбе.

Я пристально следил за ходом избирательной кампании, в которой Вы вновь продемонстрировали свои высокие качества ведущего политического деятеля современного мира, мужество, преданность идеалам демократии и мира. Об этом убедительно говорят отданные за Вас многочисленные голоса американских избирателей. На ум приходят слова любимого мною большого русского писателя Ивана Тургенева: "Сознание честно выдержанной борьбы едва ли не выше торжества победы".

Как и Вы сами, господин Президент, мы уважаем свободный выбор американского народа и на пороге смены администрации хотели бы отдать должное той выдающейся роли и вкладу, которые Вы лично внесли в становление нового качества отношений между двумя нашими странами, а также в гармонизацию международных отношений в целом.

Я высоко ценю те дружеские, доверительные контакты, которые установились между нами в период поистине эпохальных исторических перемен как в России, так и в целом в мировом сообществе. Мы не забудем Вашу решительную поддержку правого дела российского народа в критические дни нелегких испытаний августа прошлого года, вашу активную деятельность по динамичному развитию сотрудничества между Россией и США на принципах доверия и партнерства. Ярким проявлением такого подхода явилось принятие американским конгрессом Закона "О поддержке свободы", в разработку и принятие которого Вы вложили много сил и энергии.

История предоставила нам с Вами уникальную возможность заложить надежную основу для совместного продвижения наших народов в будущее на основах гуманизма и высоких моральных ценностей. Сделаны беспрецедентные шаги по решительному демонтажу всей структуры военно-политической конфронтации и идеологического противостояния, доставшейся нам в наследство от "холодной войны". Достигнут настоящий прорыв и избавлении наших народов и всего международного сообщества от ядерной угрозы. Думаю, мы вправе гордиться тем, что за совсем небольшой период времени удалось выйти на крупные договоренности в военной области — о радикальном сокращении СНВ, безопасной ликвидации ядерных боеприпасов, уничтожении химоружия, предотвращении распространения оружия массового уничтожения. Тем самым создана солидная инфраструктура для долгосрочного взаимодействия между Россией и США там, где еще недавно царили взаимная подозрительность и враждебность.

В России по достоинству ценят, господин Президент, Ваши искренние усилия по развитию потенциала российско-американского экономического сотрудничества. Мы благодарны Вам за принципиальной важности понимание значения для Соединенных Штатов происходящих в России фундаментальных преобразований, необходимости оказания им разносторонней поддержки, причем не только финансовой, но и путем создания благоприятных условий для взаимовыгодного торгово-экономического взаимодействия между нашими странами.

В последние месяцы мы плодотворно поработали над созданием прочной договорно-правовой базы двустороннего партнерства, обеспечили переход к ведению двусторонних дел на цивилизованной, уважительной основе. Пожалуй, наиболее наглядно и понятно для всех в России и Америке это проявилось в совместной работе по расширению открытости наших обществ друг для друга, расчистке завалов из всякого рода абсурдных взаимных запретов, ограничений и барьеров, нагроможденных в эпоху тоталитаризма и идеологической конфронтации.

При всей очевидности и неоспоримой значимости достигнутого за столь исторически краткое время во многих конкретных сферах нашего взаимодействия, думается, Вы согласитесь, Джордж, что

наибольшую ценность имеет и будет иметь та совершенно новая атмосфера взаимного расположения и симпатии, которая возникла в отношениях двух наших народов и правительств.

Уверен, что на завершающем этапе Вашего пребывания на посту президента Соединенных Штатов Америки, Вы предпримете усилия для сохранения и использования совместно наработанного нами ценного опыта. Не сомневаюсь также, что Вы и в дальнейшем в любом новом качестве продолжите свою благородную деятельность на благо двух великих демократий, американского и российского народов.


Не могу не сказать несколько теплых и искренних слов в адрес Барбары. Наине и мне памятни ее сердечное внимание и гостеприимство в период нашего пребывания в США. Мы будем рады принять Вас в Москве в удобное для Вас время.

В заключение хотел бы еще раз выразить искреннюю признательность за совместную работу, пожелать всяческих успехов на той стезе, которую Вы изберете, здоровья и благополучия Вам и Вашей семье. Знайте, что всегда можете рассчитывать на мою дружбу и участие.

Искренне Ваш,

Б.ЕЛЫЦИН

9-04-92



General Scowcroft,
The enclosed was FAXed this
morning at 1:32 a.m. from
Dr. Paul Grundy of the U.S.
Embassy in Russia.

Debbie Sudduth
Dr. Lee's Office



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 31, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: President Yeltsin's Mother

This 85 year old female with generalized arteriosclerosis, whose first heart attack was in July/August 1991, had a second heart attack which occurred approximately 3 days prior to our arrival in Sverdlosk, Russia, at 1 a.m., August 29, 1992. Dr. Savage brought an electrocardiograph along and she was able to operate the equipment at the local hospital, which they had previously been unable to use. The test confirmed rather extensive inferior and lateral wall damage to the heart. During our visit, she was clinically stable and in no distress. Her local doctors, in concert with Moscow consultants, were doing a very competent job. We fine tuned her medications, made several other general management recommendations, and left a large carton of medications difficult to obtain in Russia.

All of the several doctors from Moscow, and the multiple local physicians agreed with us on the final medical recommendations. Invasive or surgical procedures are specifically not recommended in this type of case at this point in time. In addition, the patient herself strongly objects to being transferred to any other hospital.

Our prognosis will be a 50% chance of living 2 years. The Russian physicians prefer to leave the prognosis to God!

No follow-up from this end appears to be indicated at this time, but the Russian physicians do feel free to pick up the phone to consult with us at any time.

President Yeltsin's physician, Dr. Grigoriev, was present continuously during our visit. General Scowcroft has been briefed on all other aspects of our meetings. A complete and detailed copy of our medical recommendations, which was left on the patient's chart, will be filed with General Scowcroft tomorrow.

Burton J. Lee, III, M.D.
Physician to the President

Commander Rodney Savage, MC, USN
Chief, Naval Cardiology
Bethesda Naval Hospital

Reviewed by Dr. Lee and Dr. Savage
on 8/31/92, 4:37 p.m.



Embassy of the United States of America

September 2, 1992

Dr. Lee
The White House

Attached is the Russian report you requested along with a translation by Dr. Sibersky.

Your visit was in fact reported in the Sunday newspaper and TV news in Moscow, but had a low key play. The reports were simple comments with no details. It was stated that the trip was requested by President Yeltsen. The story was no longer news by Monday evening. The president's physician reported to Dr. Sibersky that Yeltsen was very pleased by the visit and was visibly more relaxed after being told "all that can be done is being done."

It was fun working with you and from the embsssy standpoint, a trip well worth doing. Good call!

Regards,

Paul

CONFERENCE OF SPECIALIST DOCTORS

Dr. Lee - President's Doctor

Dr. Savage - Chief Navy Cardiologist

Dr. P. Grundy - Regional Medical Officer, 1st Secretary of US Embassy

Professor Riabov - Chief Anaesthesiologist

Professor Gogin - Chief Military Cardiologist

Dr. Sedov - Chief Ultrasound Doctor

Dr. Grigoriev - President's Doctor

Professor Barats - Head of the Cardiological School (Ekaterinburg)

Professor Heinonnen - General Physician (Ekaterinburg)

Dr. Sibirsky - Post Medical Adviser for the US Embassy, Moscow

On the moment of examination the patient is conscious, doesn't have any complaints. There is no shortness of breathing, chest pain. The condition of the patient is defined as grave in connection with the diagnosis and the stage of the disease.

The skin is slightly cyanotic and pale. HR - 85-87 per min. The pulse is full and regular. BP - 120/70 mm Hg. Physical examination and heart ultrasound revealed moderate enlargement of the left ventricle and atrium. The area of precordial pulsation is dilated. On auscultation: cardiac sounds are dull. The 4th sound and accentuation of the 2nd sound on the aorta are noted. Slight systolic murmur mostly on the cardiac apex. Non-sonorous dry rales are detected in both subscapular areas. Pleural crepitation - in the left side above diaphragm.

There is no peripheral edema. Vascular murmur on the right a. carotis. Pulsation on the lower extremities vessels is weakened. The lower extremities are warm. The abdomen is soft and unpainful on palpation. The liver - +1,5 sm. Stool and urination are normal.

Heart Ultrasound - moderate dilation of the left cardiac chambers. Myocardial wall thickness is normal. Hypokinesia of the posterior and antero-lateral walls as well as of the lower one-third of the septum. Dyskinesia of the basal area. The signs of terminal diastolic overloading of the left ventricle and atherosclerotic lesion of aorta and the main trunk of the left a. carotis without evident stenosis.

Dopler's examination - slight mytral regurgitation.

ECG findings (in dynamics) - changes of the terminal part of ventricular complex without alteration of R-wave in all chest leads, which indicate spread subendocardial infarction development.

Body temperature is normal. Moderate leucocytosis without significant shift to the left. Anaemia. Elevated BUN.

Conference of specialist doctors discussed the diagnosis, basic points of treatment and prognosis of the disease. It considers the treatment to be adequate and successful. But taking in consideration the patient's age and the nature of the disease there is no possibility to exclude the recurrent heart attack and progressive heart failure.

It's necessary to continue Nitroglycerin i.v., small dosages of anticoagulants and antiagregants. Small dosages of Digoxin (0,125 mg o.d.), Captopril are indicated. The treatment with uro-antiseptics and diuretics should be continued. The salt-restricted diet is indicated.

Clinical Diagnosis: Ischemic Heart Disease. Repeat wide-spread infarction 25.08.92 complicated by pulmonary edema. Atherosclerotic and postinfarction cardiosclerosis (inferior M.I. 29.05.92) CHF. Supraventricular ectopic beats. Atherosclerosis of the aorta, brain and heart vessels, peripheral arteries. Dyscirculatory encephalopathy. Urolythiasis. Urolythotomia in May 1991. Chronic pyelonephritis. Chronic Renal Failure. Anaemia. Retrosternal diffuse euthyreoid goitre. Chronic cholecystitis and pancreatitis. Vertebral osteochondrosis. Polyarthrosis.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12c. Cable	From White House, Re: Personal Message from President Bush to President Yeltsin [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	9/1/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [6]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/12/2022

Date Closed: 4/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91131-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1070-MR(503.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

01 01

00 00 SSSS

AA ZYUW VAX535

WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c)

~~SECRET~~

1.4(c)

QQQQ

FOR AMBASSADOR STRAUSS

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN.

BEGIN TEXT:

SEPTEMBER 1, 1992

DEAR BORIS,

DR. BURTON LEE, MY PERSONAL DOCTOR, AND DR. ROD SAVAGE, BOTH
JUST BACK FROM RUSSIA, BROUGHT ME UP TO DATE ON YOUR MOTHER'S
CARE. HE AGREES WITH THE RUSSIAN DOCTORS THAT INVASIVE OR
SURGICAL PROCEDURES ARE NOT RECOMMENDED AT THIS POINT IN TIME.

DR. SAVAGE FOUND YOUR MOTHER CLINICALLY STABLE AND IN NO
DISTRESS. SOME FINE TUNING WAS MADE ON YOUR MOTHER'S MEDICATION,
AND DR. SAVAGE LEFT SOME MEDICATIONS THAT WE HOPE PROVE
BENEFICIAL. DR. SAVAGE MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIAN
DOCTORS TO CALL HERE AT ANY TIME; AND HE, OF COURSE, STANDS READY
TO ENLIST ANY SPECIAL OPINIONS FROM ANY U.S. SPECIALIST SHOULD
THE NEED ARISE.

DR. LEE AND DR. SAVAGE ASKED ME TO CONVEY THEIR THANKS AND
RESPECTS TO DR. GRIGORIEV AND THE OTHER DOCTORS WITH WHOM
DR. SAVAGE MET.

BARBARA JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR WARMEST BEST WISHES TO YOU AND
NAINA, AND WE'LL SAY ANOTHER PRAYER FOR YOUR WONDERFUL MOTHER.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0000

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1070-MR

MM 10/28/2015



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1992

Dear Rose,


This memo is corrected on line five from electro - to echocardiographer.

Please also note the letter from Dr. Grundy dated September 2nd which you had not received. It provides additional information on our visit.

It should be clarified that the document entitled "Conference of Specialist Doctors" was dictated by Professor Barats. It is a bit confusing and badly translated, but this was the "official" document which he dictated at the time.

I will send a copy of our medical document to you shortly which should complete the file.

Sincerely,



Burton J. Lee, III, M.D.
Physician to the President

Ms. Rose Zamaria
Office of the President
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: President Yeltsin's Mother


This 85 year old female with generalized arteriosclerosis, whose first heart attack was in July/August 1991, had a second heart attack which occurred approximately 3 days prior to our arrival in Sverdlosk, Russia, at 1 a.m., August 29, 1992. Dr. Savage brought an echocardiographer along and she was able to operate the equipment at the local hospital, which they had previously been unable to use. The test confirmed rather extensive inferior and lateral wall damage to the heart. During our visit, she was clinically stable and in no distress. Her local doctors, in concert with Moscow consultants, were doing a very competent job. We fine tuned her medications, made several other general management recommendations, and left a large carton of medications difficult to obtain in Russia.

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Our prognosis will be a 50% chance of living 2 years. The Russian physicians prefer to leave the prognosis to God!

No follow-up from this end appears to be indicated at this time, but the Russian physicians do feel free to pick up the phone to consult with us at any time.

President Yeltsin's physician, Dr. Grigoriev, was present continuously during our visit. General Scowcroft has been briefed on all other aspects of our meetings. A complete and detailed copy of our medical recommendations, which was left on the patient's chart, will be filed with General Scowcroft tomorrow.



Burton J. Lee, III, M.D.
Physician to the President

Commander Rodney Savage, MC, USN
Chief, Naval Cardiology
Bethesda Naval Hospital

Reviewed by Dr. Lee and Dr. Savage
on 8/31/92, 4:37 p.m.



Embassy of the United States of America

September 2, 1992

Dr. Lee
The White House

Attached is the Russian report you requested along with a translation by Dr. Sibersky.

Your visit was in fact reported in the Sunday newspaper and TV news in Moscow, but had a low key play. The reports were simple comments with no details. It was stated that the trip was requested by President Yeltsen. The story was no longer news by Monday evening. The president's physician reported to Dr. Sibersky that Yeltsen was very pleased by the visit and was visibly more relaxed after being told "all that can be done is being done."

It was fun working with you and from the embsssy standpoint, a trip well worth doing. Good call!

Regards,

Paul



To Send via pouch

PAUL H. GRUNDY, M.D., MPH
REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER
FIRST SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1705-030
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20521-5430
(202) 647-8122

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
ULITSA, CHAYKOVSKOGO
MOSCOW, USSR
252-2450-59

CONFERENCE OF SPECIALIST DOCTORS

Dr. Lee - President's Doctor

Dr. Savage - Chief Navy Cardiologist

Dr. P. Grundy - Regional Medical Officer, 1st Secretary of US Embassy

Professor Riabov - Chief Anaesthesiologist

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Dr. Sedov - Chief Ultrasound Doctor

Dr. Grigoriev - President's Doctor

Professor Barats - Head of the Cardiological School (Ekaterinburg)

Professor Heinonnen - General Physician (Ekaterinburg)

Dr. Sibirsky - Post Medical Adviser for the US Embassy, Moscow

On the moment of examination the patient is conscious, doesn't have any complaints. There is no shortness of breathing, chest pain. The condition of the patient is defined as grave in connection with the diagnosis and the stage of the disease.

The skin is slightly cyanotic and pale. HR - 85-87 per min. The pulse is full and regular. BP - 120/70 mm Hg. Physical examination and heart ultrasound revealed moderate enlargement of the left ventricle and atrium. The area of precordial pulsation is dilated. On auscultation: cardiac sounds are dull. The 4th sound and accentuation of the 2nd sound on the aorta are noted. Slight systolic murmur mostly on the cardiac apex. Non-sonorous dry rales are detected in both subscapular areas. Pleural crepitation - in the left side above diaphragm.

There is no peripheral edema. Vascular murmur on the right a. carotis. Pulsation on the lower extremities vessels is weakened. The lower extremities are warm. The abdomen is soft and unpainful on palpation. The liver - +1,5 sm. Stool and urination are normal.

Heart Ultrasound - moderate dilation of the left cardiac chambers. Myocardial wall thickness is normal. Hypokinesia of the posterior and antero-lateral walls as well as of the lower one-third of the septum. Dyskinesia of the basal area. The signs of terminal diastolic overloading of the left ventricle and atherosclerotic lesion of aorta and the main trunk of the left a. carotis without evident stenosis.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12f. Cable	From White House, Re: Personal Message from President Bush to President Yeltsin [012150Z Sep 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	9/1/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [6]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 8/31/15

Date Closed:	4/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1070-MR(503.06)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/1/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANTT HOWE COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE 1.4(c) OUT SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 012150Z SEP 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO 1.4(c)

~~SECRET~~

1.4(c)

EYES ONLY

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FOR AMBASSADOR STRAUSS

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN.

BEGIN TEXT:

SEPTEMBER 1, 1992

DEAR BORIS.

DR. BURTON LEE, MY PERSONAL DOCTOR, AND DR. ROD SAVAGE, BOTH
JUST BACK FROM RUSSIA, BROUGHT ME UP TO DATE ON YOUR MOTHER'S
CARE. HE AGREES WITH THE RUSSIAN DOCTORS THAT INVASIVE OR
SURGICAL PROCEDURES ARE NOT RECOMMENDED AT THIS POINT IN TIME.

DR. SAVAGE FOUND YOUR MOTHER CLINICALLY STABLE AND IN NO
DISTRESS. SOME FINE TUNING WAS MADE ON YOUR MOTHER'S MEDICATION.
AND DR. SAVAGE LEFT SOME MEDICATIONS THAT WE HOPE PROVE
BENEFICIAL. DR. SAVAGE MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIAN
DOCTORS TO CALL HERE AT ANY TIME: AND HE, OF COURSE, STANDS READY
TO ENLIST ANY SPECIAL OPINIONS FROM ANY U.S. SPECIALIST SHOULD
THE NEED ARISE.

DR. LEE AND DR. SAVAGE ASKED ME TO CONVEY THEIR THANKS AND

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1070-MR
12/1/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

RESPECTS TO DR. GRIGORIEV AND THE OTHER DOCTORS WITH WHOM
DR. SAVAGE MET.

BARBARA JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR WARMEST BEST WISHES TO YOU AND
NAINA. AND WE'LL SAY ANOTHER PRAYER FOR YOUR WONDERFUL MOTHER.

SINCERELY.

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0134

~~SECRET~~

August 27, 1992

PRESIDENTIAL MISSION TO YEKATERINBERG, RUSSIA

Aircraft C-20 #60203

Friday, August 28

12:30 am	Depart Andrews AFB
0119	ACTUAL DEPARTURE TIME
1:35 am	Arrive Martha's Vineyard
2:20 am	Depart Martha's Vineyard
12:45 pm	Arrive Shannon, Ireland
1:30 pm	Depart Shannon, Ireland
8:25 pm	Arrive Moscow
9:10 pm	Depart Moscow

Saturday, August 29

1:05 am Arrive Yekaterinberg

NOTE: If aircraft is not delayed from planned departure and arrival, crew will be 1/2 hour under crew rest. A waiver has been granted in case aircraft is delayed, and crew will continue flying.

PAX

Dr. Burton Lee
Dr. Rodney Savage
HML Joni Koozer, Medical Technician
Sgt Barry Howe WHCA
Sgt Wayne Kwiatkowski, WHCA

WH - Sgt Burns 2006
SAM - Tom Zupancic

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12g. Memo	From Nick Burns to General Scowcroft to Admiral Howe, Re: Up-Date on Medical Flight to Russia [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	8/28/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [6]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/12/2022

Date Closed: 4/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91131-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1070-MR(503.07)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 8/14/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~



August 28, 1992

Note for General Scowcroft ✓
Admiral Howe

From: Nick Burns NB

Subject: Up-Date on Medical Flight to Russia

We completed preparations for the Presidential Mission of Doctors Lee and Savage last evening:

- The President's letter to President Yeltsin on the health of his mother was sent 1.4(c); 1.4(d) to Jim Collins in Moscow. We also sent Collins the letter from the President on the situation in Iraq and Yeltsin's offer of a naval vessel. Both letters are attached to this note (I suggest that we send copies to State for Secretary Eagleburger this morning).
 - I spoke with Collins and he intended to deliver the letters separately, but simultaneously, to Yeltsin today. We should have confirmation of that meeting from Jim this morning.
 - Collins and staff will make all necessary preparations for the flight's arrival, including flight clearances, visa waivers, refueling etc.
 - As you can see from the attached itineray, the plane will proceed to Yekaterinburg tonight after a brief refueling, stop in Moscow.
 - On a separate matter, I have also attached a copy of the letter on the Chemical Weapons Convention that Yeltsin mentioned to the President in their phone call yesterday. As Yeltsin indicated, Russia is willing to sign the treaty but wants to work out compromises to assure it does not have to pay for all the costs of destruction which it deems to be prohibitive.
- In addition, Yeltsin mentions that the Russians are studying our draft text of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, and proposes that Kozyrev and Eagleburger discuss this fully during their meeting at the UNGA.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1070-MR
MH 8/14/2015

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12h. Cable	From White House, Re: For Charge D'Affaires Jim Collins from General Scowcroft [280405Z Aug 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	8/28/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [6]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 8/1/15

Date Closed:	4/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1070-MR(503.08)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/1/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTT HOWE COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: BURNS HAASS FILE 1.4(c) OUT SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 280405Z AUG 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO 1.4(c) NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY

0000

FOR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JIM COLLINS FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

PLEASE DELIVER THE TWO LETTERS ON THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S MOTHER AND THE SITUATION IN IRAQ. RESPECTIVELY. TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TODAY, AUGUST 28.

THEY SHOULD BE DELIVERED SIMULTANEOUSLY AS SEPARATE LETTERS.

NICK BURNS WILL PROVIDE DETAILS SEPARATELY BY PHONE ON THE ARRIVAL OF DOCTORS LEE AND SAVAGE.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS.

I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW AS QUICKLY AS IS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE MADE TO ASSIST YOUR MOTHER. I HAVE ASKED MY PERSONAL PHYSICIAN. DR. BURTON LEE. AND OUR NAVY'S CHIEF CARDIOLOGIST. DR. RODNEY SAVAGE. TO TRAVEL TO RUSSIA IN ORDER TO CONFER WITH YOUR PHYSICIANS AND TO TREAT YOUR MOTHER IN YEKATERINBURG. IF YOU WISH.

BOTH OF THESE MEN HAVE MY ABSOLUTE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. THEY ARE EXCELLENT PHYSICIANS AND IT IS MY STRONG HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ASSIST YOUR OWN PHYSICIANS IN TREATING YOUR MOTHER.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1070-MR
12/1/2014 44

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

THEY ARE AT YOUR DISPOSAL TO HELP IN ANY WAY.

DOCTORS LEE AND SAVAGE, ACCOMPANIED BY A NURSE AND TWO OTHER OFFICIALS, WILL ARRIVE IN MOSCOW FRIDAY EVENING, AUGUST 28. OUR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, JIM COLLINS, WILL MEET THEM AND ARRANGE FOR THEM TO MEET WITH YOUR STAFF. IN DEFERENCE TO YOU, WE WILL ASSURE THERE IS NO PUBLICITY CONCERNING THEIR TRIP.

BORIS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THERE IS ANYTHING ELSE THAT I CAN DO TO ASSIST YOUR MOTHER. I AM MOST WILLING TO OFFER ANY ADDITIONAL HELP IF NEED BE. BARBARA AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOUR MOTHER IS IN OUR THOUGHTS, AND WE ARE PRAYING FOR HER RECOVERY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

DEAR BORIS,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CALL YESTERDAY. I WANTED TO RESPOND TO YOU RIGHT AWAY ON YOUR GENEROUS OFFER TO SEND A RUSSIAN NAVAL VESSEL TO THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IN SUPPORT OF OUR COALITION EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ.

I APPRECIATE YOUR OFFER AND KNOW IT IS YET ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN BRINGING OUR TWO COUNTRIES CLOSER TOGETHER. YOUR DECISION TO JOIN WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND OURSELVES IN PRESENTING A DEMARCHE TO IRAQ SENT A POWERFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SIGNAL TO BAGHDAD AND THE WORLD. SENDING A RUSSIAN VESSEL TO THE GULF IN SUPPORT OF OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES WOULD MAKE RUSSIA'S SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION THAT MUCH MORE CLEAR.

WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR PARTICIPATION IN OUR COALITION EFFORT IN

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THE GULF TO ENSURE IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. I HAVE ASKED OUR MILITARY OFFICIALS TO CONTACT YOUR MILITARY ADVISERS IN MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THE APPROPRIATE WAY AND TIME TO BEGIN THIS COOPERATION.

-

AGAIN. I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I VALUE YOUR OFFER AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO END IRAQI AGGRESSION.

-

SINCERELY.

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

-

END TEXT:

-

DECL: OADR

#0091

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Aug-1992 22:56 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

(WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

~~SECRET~~ CONVENTIO

YELTSIN LETTER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

<DIST>

SIT: BURNS FICKLIN FRY POTTS PRES_MSGS TOBEY VAX

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

RUEHMO

<DTG>

271841Z AUG 92

<ORIG>

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8130
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1128

<SUBJ>

YELTSIN LETTER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)
CONVENTION AND START FOLLOW-ON TREATY

<TEXT>

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 025876

EXDIS

S/S PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT FOR T AND PM

DEPT PLEASE PASS ACDA FOR HANMER AND MOODIE

DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UNGA, CDG, CBW, RS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

CONVENTION AND START FOLLOW-ON TREATY

REF: MOSCOW 25172

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. -

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S RESPONSE TO

*Text begins
on page 3*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1070-MA
12/1/2014 MA

PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER ON CW, WHICH WAS DRAFTED BEFORE FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV'S AUGUST 27 TALKS WITH THE ACTING SECRETARY, REITERATES THE POSITION OUTLINED BY RUSSIAN CW INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN KUNTSEVICH TO A/DCM AUGUST 21 (REFTEL). IN HANDING OVER THE LETTER, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BERDENNIKOV STRESSED THAT A POLITICAL DECISION TO SUPPORT THE CW CONVENTION HAS BEEN MADE, BUT KEY FINANCIAL ISSUES REMAIN TO BE SOLVED. THE LETTER ALSO ADDRESSES THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, STATING THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV PLANS TO DISCUSS THE FOLLOW-ON TREATY AT HIS PRE-UNGA MEETING WITH ACTING SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER. INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF YELTSIN LETTER FOLLOWS IN PARA 9. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

3. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BERDENNIKOV CALLED IN A/POLCOUNS AUGUST 27 TO HAND OVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH DEALING WITH THE CW CONVENTION AND THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY. IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION, BERDENNIKOV SAID THE LETTER WAS DRAFTED BEFORE THE AUGUST 25 KOZYREV-EAGLEBURGER MEETINGS IN LONDON. HE HAD NOT RECEIVED A READ-OUT ON MEETINGS BUT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SUBJECT OF THE CWC AND VERIFICATION COSTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. SUPPORT FOR CW CONVENTION

4. ON CW, BERDENNIKOV STRESSED THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO SUPPORT THE CONVENTION, SAYING THAT RUSSIA "OPPOSES HOLDING UP THE CONVENTION." HE STRESSED THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONCERNS ARE STRICTLY FINANCIAL, NOT POLITICAL. A/POLCOUNS SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE PROBLEM, AND WANTED TO WORK WITH THE RUSSIANS BILATERALLY TO KEEP COSTS DOWN. ...BUT COST OF VERIFICATION A PROBLEM

5. TO ILLUSTRATE RUSSIA'S CONCERNS, BERDENNIKOV SAID THAT RUSSIA ESTIMATED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AT LEAST EIGHT PERMANENT VERIFICATION LOCATIONS, "LIKE (THE INF-TREATY MANDATED FACILITY) AT VOTKINSK," WITH THIRTY INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS, EACH OF WHOM WOULD HAVE TO BE PAID 200 DOLLARS A DAY IN HARD CURRENCY. BERDENNIKOV ARGUED THAT THE COSTS OF VERIFICATION AS CURRENTLY OUTLINED IN THE CONVENTION WERE EXCESSIVE. HE SAID RUSSIA IS READY TO WORK WITH THE U.S. ON THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION COSTS. U.S. WELCOMES RUSSIAN POSITION ON THE CONVENTION

6. A/POLCOUNS WELCOMED BERDENNIKOV'S STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT TO HOLD UP CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION. SHE NOTED THAT THE U.S. IS ALSO INTERESTED IN KEEPING COSTS DOWN WHILE MAINTAINING

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VERIFICATION SCHEME.
A/POLCOUNS POINTED OUT THAT U.S. EXPERTS USUALLY CAN
DEVISE SEVERAL OPTIONS TO KEEP COSTS DOWN.

7. BERDENNIKOV ALLOWED THAT THERE MAY BE VARYING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONVENTION'S REQUIREMENTS. HE
EMPHASIZED THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO KEEP
COSTS DOWN IN ORDER TO PRESENT THE CONVENTION TO THE
PARLIAMENT. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE COST ESTIMATE
INCLUDES PROVIDING INFRASTRUCTURE FOR VERIFICATION
AND "SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS" OR COMPENSATION FOR
CITIZENS IN AREAS WHERE CW IS TO BE DESTROYED, TO
MAKE THE DESTRUCTION FACILITY ACCEPTABLE TO THEM.
START FOLLOW-ON

8. BERDENNIKOV DID NOT ADDRESS THE START FOLLOW-ON
SUBSTANTIVELY, SAYING ONLY THAT FOREIGN MINISTER
KOZYREV WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH ACTING SECRETARY
EAGLEBURGER WHEN THEY MEET PRIOR TO THE UNGA.

BT

#5876

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 025876

EXDIS

S/S PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT FOR T AND PM

DEPT PLEASE PASS ACDA FOR HANMER AND MOODIE

DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UNGA, CDG, CBW, RS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

CONVENTION AND START FOLLOW-ON TREATY

INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF YELTSIN LETTER

9. INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF YELTSIN LETTER
FOLLOWS. LETTER IS BEING POUCHED TO DEPARTMENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

-- PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
-- AUGUST 27, 1992
-- NO. PR - 1514
-- MOSCOW

DEAR GEORGE,

I SHARE YOUR EFFORT AT THE SPEEDIEST POSSIBLE
CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION FOR A GLOBAL BAN ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE EXPENDED
CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. NOW WE
STAND AT THE THRESHOLD OF AN IMPORTANT DECISION,
WHICH CAN OPEN THE WAY TO RIDDING THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY OF THESE BARBAROUS WEAPONS.
SINCE WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONVENTION IS A
COMPROMISE, WE ARE READY TO ACCEDE TO THE POLITICAL
IMPERATIVE OF OUR TIME AND WILL NOT INSIST ON A WHOLE
RANGE OF OUR POSITIONS WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE
TEXT OF THE CONVENTION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CANNOT,
OBJECTIVELY, AGREE WITH THOSE PROVISIONS PROPOSED BY

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION WHICH WOULD PUT RUSSIA IN THE POSITION OF NOT BEING ABLE, FOR ECONOMIC REASONS, TO FULFILL IN FULL MEASURE, ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION. AS IS EVIDENT FROM YOUR LETTER, THE GROUNDS FOR OUR CONCERNS ARE VERY WELL KNOWN TO YOU. FIRST OF ALL, WHAT IS AT ISSUE HERE IS THAT RUSSIA, HAVING VOLUNTARILY TAKEN UPON ITSELF THE OBLIGATION TO DESTROY THE LARGEST STOCK OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE WORLD, INHERITED FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, WOULD BE FORCED, ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CURRENT DRAFT CONVENTION, TO BEAR ALL THE COSTS OF THAT PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION SCHEME WHICH CONCERNS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THEIR RELATED FACILITIES. ACCORDING TO OUR PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES, WHICH WERE PREPARED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT AMERICAN DATA, THESE COSTS COULD BE UP AS HIGH AS 450 MILLION DOLLARS. IN OUR VIEW, THIS COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS FAIR, NOR WOULD IT REFLECT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC CHOICE THAT RUSSIA HAS MADE AND OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN WHICH IT FINDS ITSELF. I KNOW THAT YOU WELL UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WE ARE UNDERGOING IN THIS PERIOD.

-

WE SEE TWO POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS HERE:

FIRST, TO REGISTER IN THE TEXT OF THE CONVENTION THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES TO AGREE BEFORE THE SIGNING A PROVISION ON THE ALLOCATION OF EXPENSES FOR INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IN THE END, ANY ACTIVITY OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING ACTION RELATED TO VERIFICATION OF STORAGE AND DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE FACILITIES FOR THEIR PRODUCTION, WILL BE COVERED BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR SCALE OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN.

A SECOND POSSIBLE SOLUTION, BASED ON YOUR COMMENT THAT OUR CONCERNS MAY BE ALLAYED BY THE CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT (BETWEEN US): WE COULD AGREE TO THE CURRENT TEXT OF THE CONVENTION IF WE COULD HAVE GUARANTEES THAT A FINANCIAL MECHANISM OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT COULD BE AGREED UPON WITH PARTICIPATION BY YOUR COUNTRY AND OTHER LEADING WESTERN STATES, WHICH WOULD PERMIT US TO LIMIT OUR EXPENSES FOR INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION TO THE EXTENT OF WHAT WE WOULD PAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR UN SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS.

RELATED TO THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE CONVENTION IS THE QUESTION OF CONVERSION OF FORMER CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THERE ARE PROVISIONS IN THE DRAFT CONVENTION, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH SPECIFY WHICH EQUIPMENT MUST BE DESTROYED IN THE COURSE OF

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BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 025876

EXDIS

S/S PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT FOR T AND PM

DEPT PLEASE PASS ACDA FOR HANMER AND MOODIE

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UNGA, CDG, CBW, RS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN LETTER ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

CONVENTION AND START FOLLOW-ON TREATY

CONVERTING FACILITIES, WHICH MAKE SUCH CONVERSION

PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. MOREOVER, WE WOULD HAVE TO

DESTROY FACILITIES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN CONVERTED.

ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATES OF OUR EXPERTS, THE DAMAGE

TO OUR ECONOMY WOULD AMOUNT TO MORE THAN 50 BILLION

RUBLES.

WITH RESPECT TO OUR PERMANENT PARTICIPATION IN THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, WE THINK THIS QUESTION CAN BE
DECIDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
GROUP. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR
THE U.S., TO CONFIRM, IN THE APPROPRIATE FORUM, THAT
THE ACTIVITY OF AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WITHOUT RUSSIA
AS A PERMANENT MEMBER WOULD NOT BE VERY PRODUCTIVE.

I WANT TO BE EXTREMELY FRANK WITH YOU ABOUT THIS.

RUSSIA IS COMMITTED TO A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION FOR
THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AND WE WILL
MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT WE CAN REALIZE THAT
COMMITMENT BY OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE CONVENTION ON
THE BASIS OF EQUALITY.

I AM COUNTING ENTIRELY ON YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THESE
PROBLEMS AND SUPPORT IN THEIR RESOLUTION. IT IS
IMPORTANT TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE SPEEDIEST
POSSIBLE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS CONVENTION.

GEORGE,

I AM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE
WITH YOU SOME THOUGHTS ON OUR NEXT STEPS ON THE
QUESTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

WE ARE CONTINUING OUR DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE
DRAFT TREATY, BASED ON THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, WHICH
THE AMERICAN SIDE PRESENTED TO US. THE FIRST
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON THIS QUESTION CAN BE HELD
DURING THE UPCOMING MEETING OF OUR RESPECTIVE
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN SEPTEMBER.

I THINK THAT MEETINGS OF OUR MINISTERS ON THIS
SUBJECT SHOULD BE HELD REGULARLY, LET US SAY, EVERY
MONTH. THIS WILL FACILITATE THE RESOLUTION OF THE
KNOTTY PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE
MINISTERS COULD ALSO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
TO HAVE A BILATERAL EXPERTS' GROUP PREPARE FOR THEIR
MEETINGS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE DIALOGUE
BETWEEN OUR MINISTERS WOULD PERMIT THE RESOLUTION OF

OTHER QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO US.

-
SINCERELY YOURS,
B. YEL'TSIN. END TEXT. COLLINS

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CALL BETWEEN DR. LEE AND DR. GRIGORIYEV (CONDUCTED OVER SECURE LINK (DVL) TO MOSCOW)

INTERPRETER: PETER AFANASENKO

WHSR: SIGLER/BAKER

DR. LEE QUESTIONS:

WHERE IS SHE?

IS SHE IN THE HOSPITAL?

WHERE IS THE HOSPITAL?

WHAT KIND OF HOSPITAL IS IT?

ARE THEY CONTEMPLATING MOVING HER TO MOSCOW?

WHAT DO THEY NEED FROM THE US?

DO I NEED TO SEND A TEAM ?

DO I NEED TO BRING HER TO THE US?

SINCE THERE IS ONE GOOD HOSPITAL IN MOSCOW, DO I NEED TO SEND JUST A DOCTOR IF THEY MOVE HER THERE?

WHAT DO THEY NEED FROM US?

DR. GRIGORIYEV'S ANSWERS:

SHE IS 85, IS IN ORENBURG NEAR SVERDLOVSK, URIL MOUNTAINS

QUITE SOME WAYS FROM MOSCOW, 1000 MILES PERHAPS

GOOD CARDIOLOGY CENTER THERE BUT SHE REFUSES TO GO TO IT.
SHE WANTS TO STAY AND BE TREATED IN THE ORDINARY CITY HOSPITAL

IT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO MOVE HER RIGHT NOW

3 MONTHS AGO THE TOP DOCTORS FROM THE CARDIOLOGY CENTER SAW HER WHEN SHE HAD HER FIRST ATTACK; NOW SHE HAS SUFFERED A SECOND ATTACK.

SHE STILL DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO THE CARDIO CENTER

MAYBE A TEAM OR ONE DOCTOR COULD GO THERE TO SEE HER
SINCE IT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO MOVE HER TO MOSCOW

FOLLOW ON QUESTION BY DR. LEE TO PETER AFANASENKO - IN YOUR OPINION IS THE RUSSIAN DOCTOR PRETTY SET IN THIS MODE?

PETER SAID HE BELIEVED SO.

DR. LEE SAID THERE WAS NO SENSE IN SENDING A TEAM IF THAT'S THE CASE.

HE COULD SEND ONE CARDIOLOGIST OVER TO CONSULT WITH HER DOCTORS.
(PERSONAL COMMENT, THAT WOULD BE MORE DIPLOMATIC THAN ANYTHING ELSE)

DR. GRIGORIYEV RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT DR. LEE'S RECOMMENDATION TO SEND A CARDIOLOGIST IS PROBABLY MOST REASONABLE . HE WELCOMES THAT AND SAID HE WOULD ACCEPT ANY PERSON DR. LEE DESIGNATED FROM WASHINGTON.

DR. LEE SAID HE DID NOT THINK HE WOULD NEED THAT SPECIAL AIRCRAFT, BUT THEN ASKED TO TALK TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT. OPERATOR THEN DROPPED HIM FROM CONFERENCE AND CONNECTED WITH SCOWCROFT OFFICE.

PETER ASKED DR. GRIGORIYEV FOR CONTACTS, NUMBERS, ETC.

DR. GRIGORIYEV SAID THE BEST WAY TO REACH HIM IS THROUGH PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S OFFICE.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL DAVID M. LICHTMAN, MC, USN
NATIONAL NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER

FROM: BURTON J. LEE, III, M.D. 
PHYSICIAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Commander Rodney Savage, USN,
and HM1 Joni Kooser, USN

At midnight on Thursday, August 27th, at the request of the President, I left for Sverdlosk, (Ekaterinburg), a town in Siberia east of the Urals, to see President Yeltsin's mother who had had a recent heart attack.

Commander Savage and Petty Officer Kooser came with me as my cardiology consultant and as my echocardiographer. They came on three-hour notice on a Friday night after being contacted while out at dinner. They brought all of the requisite medications and equipment with them, as well as reference books and journals for the Russian physicians.

Their performance on this trip was absolutely outstanding in every conceivable way. Dr. Savage directed a rewarding and comprehensive consultation over a 12-hour period with at least 15 participating Russian physicians from both Moscow and Ekaterinburg. Petty Officer Kooser put together and operated an echocardiogram machine that was on the premises but had never been used because no one there in Siberia knew how to operate it. She ran an absolutely superb study on Mrs. Yeltsin, a study that was an eye-opener for the Soviet cardiologists, and most instructive.

It was a grueling, uncomfortable, 48-hour trip, starting at midnight and ending two days later at 4:00 a.m. Commander Savage and Petty Officer Kooser were professional beyond belief over that period of time, and I and all of the Russian physicians, and all of the other liaison personnel there, were extremely impressed by their competence, their judgement, and their equanimity under trying and difficult circumstances. It should be noted that most of the Russian physicians present had variable and conflicting interests in Mrs. Yeltsin's case, all of which were satisfactorily resolved.

The Navy should be very proud of these two committed and able individuals. I am personally extremely grateful to them both, as is the President of the United States, President Yeltsin and his mother, and all of the Russians involved in this case.

It has been said in the White House, by someone I greatly admire, that if you want to find consistently the best professionals in government, you should look to the military. For two days in late August I found this to be the case, again!

cc: Rear Admiral Donald Hagen
Commander Rodney Savage
HM1 Joni Kooser
✓ General Brent Scowcroft
President Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN JAY B. YAKELEY, III, USN
WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

FROM: BURTON J. LEE, III, M.D. 
PHYSICIAN TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Lieutenant Colonel Dale L. Larson, USAF,
Major Antone E. Gajeski, USAF,
Technical Sergeant Craig R. Goodfellow, USAF,
Technical Sergeant Guy M. Santiago, USAF,
Master Sergeant Bobbie R. Williams, USAF,
Staff Sergeant Wayne Kwiatkowski, USAF,
and Technical Sergeant Barry Howe, USAF

At midnight on Thursday, August 27th, at the request of the President, I left for Sverdlosk, (Ekaterinburg), a town in Siberia east of the Urals, to see President Yeltsin's mother who had had a recent heart attack.

The above personnel operated the plane on which we went and served as my communication link to Washington. They came on four-hour notice on a Friday night. They were flying to a location in Siberia where very few, if any, American aircraft have ever landed. We had multiple stops along the way and the weather was atrocious during the entire trip. It was a grueling, uncomfortable, 48-hour journey which started at midnight and ended two days later at 4:00 a.m.

The aircraft personnel were professional beyond belief over that period of time and I, and all of the Russian physicians who flew with us from Moscow to Sverdlosk, and all of the other government liaison personnel, were extremely impressed by their competence, "cool", and judgement under trying and difficult circumstances.

The two communications technicians were extremely impressive, rapidly setting up their satellite systems which were highly effective. The sophistication of their operation impressed the Russians a great deal and they collected a good deal of interest. Needless to say, they never left their equipment, or their room, during our visit and their experience was quite stressful. I was personally most impressed by their knowledge, ability, sophistication, and the way they handled themselves in that rather unusual and difficult setting.

The Air Force should be very proud of these seven individuals. I am personally extremely grateful to all of them as is the President of the United States, President Yeltsin and his mother, and all of the Russians involved in this case. Watching these people operate on this particular mission gave me a great sense of personal pride. Their technical brilliance was matched by their equanimity under pressure.

It has been said in the White House, by someone I greatly admire, that if you want to find consistently the best professionals in government, you should look to the military. For two days in late August I found this to be the case, again!

cc: Lieutenant Colonel Kurt F. Bock
Colonel Thomas Hawes
Lieutenant Colonel Dale L. Larson
Major Antone E. Gajeski
Technical Sergeant Craig R. Goodfellow
Technical Sergeant Guy M. Santiago
Master Sergeant Bobbie R. Williams
Technical Sergeant Wayne Kwiatkowski
Staff Sergeant Barry Howe
✓ Timothy McBride
General Brent Scowcroft
President Bush