Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files

OA/ID Number: 91131
Folder ID Number: 91131-004

Folder Title:
Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to White House, Re: Eyes Only for Secretary Baker [301414Z Mar 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	3/30/92	(b)(1)	S
02. Cable	Bob Strauss to General Scowcroft, Re: Collins [261515Z Mar 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	3/26/92	(b)(1)	S
03a. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss or DCM Collins [242026Z Mar 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	3/24/92	(b)(1)	C
03b. Draft Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss or DCM Collins [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04a. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (1 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	
04b. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	3/10/92	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Bildt (1 pp.)	3/2/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1102
OA/ID Number: 91131-004
Date Closed: 4/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: President Mitterrand to President Bush (3 pp.)	2/12/92	(b)(1)	TS
06b. Cable	President Francois Mitterrand to President George Bush Re: [Unofficial Situation Room Translation] (2 pp.)	2/12/92	(b)(1)	TS
07. Cable	Ambassador Strauss to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Ambassador Strauss, February 17 Meeting with Yeltsin [171615Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S
08. Cable	Ambassador Strauss to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Ambassador Strauss, February 17 Meeting with Yeltsin [171615Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S
09. Draft Memcon	Re: One-on-One Meeting with Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia (4 pp.)	2/1/92	(b)(1)	TS
10a. Memo	Lawrence S. Eagleburger to the Secretary Re: Call from Ambassador Strauss (1 pp.)	1/17/92	(b)(1)	S
10b. Memo	Lawrence S. Eagleburger to the Secretary Re: Soviet Assistance (2 pp.)	1/17/92	(b)(1)	
11a. Cable	Re: Secretary of State's Meeting (4 pp.)	1/20/92	(b)(1)	C
11b. Cable	Re: Secretary of State's Meeting (2 pp.)	1/20/92	(b)(1)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Strauss from Brent Scowcroft [220314Z Jan 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (11 pp.)	1/22/92	(b)(1)	S
13a. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss, Re: Bob -- [FOIA restrictions redacted] (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
13b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Strauss from Brent Scowcroft [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	1/21/92	(b)(1)	S
14. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss, Re: Bob -- [FOIA restrictions redacted] (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to White House, Re: Eyes Only for Secretary Baker [301414Z Mar 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	3/30/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/13/2022

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91131-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE 1.4(c) IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 301414Z MAR 92

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE
STATE/RCI

~~SECRET~~ 301414Z MAR 92 1.4(c)
MOSCOW SECTION 01 OF 02
PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE.
ALSO PASS TO SECRETARY JAMES BAKER III, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AND TO DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
O 301414Z MAR 92 ZFF
FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
QQQQ
BEGIN TEXT:
EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY BAKER, GENERAL SCOWCROFT, AND
DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM STRAUSS
I AM FACING TWO SERIOUS PROBLEMS HERE WHICH I NEED TO
DRAW TO YOUR ATTENTION. THE FIRST IS PROCEDURAL --
THE QUESTION OF MY OWN AND THE MOSCOW EMBASSY'S ROLE
HERE. THE SECOND IS THE POLICY MATTER OF HOW WE DEAL
WITH RUSSIA, UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN, AND BYELARUS ON THE
SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
ON THE ISSUE OF MY OWN AND THE EMBASSY'S ROLE,
COMPLAINING ISN'T MY OBJECTIVE IN WRITING TO YOU: I
HOPE YOU EACH KNOW ME WELL ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT WHILE I
SOMETIMES RAISE HELL I RARELY COMPLAIN. AND, WHILE I
MIGHT HAVE A MORE PERSONAL AND SELFISH INTEREST IF I

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1074-NR
MM 10/3/2016

WERE GOING TO BE HERE LONGER, DURING THE BRIEF TIME I EXPECT TO BE HERE THE ISSUES DISCUSSED AREN'T OF ANY REAL CONCERN TO ME PERSONALLY OR FOR MY EGO. IT IS OF CONCERN INSOFAR AS I AM TRYING TO HELP JIM COLLINS PUT IN PLACE A PROCESS AND PROCEDURES TO MAKE THIS PLACE WORK BETTER TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS YOU HAVE OUTLINED THEM TO ME.
THAT SAID, I FIND IT INTOLERABLE TO DISCOVER FROM THE PRESS, WASHINGTON PRESS BRIEFINGS, AND LAST MINUTE PHONE CALLS SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA, AND ALSO BEING ASKED TO CONVEY MESSAGES WHEN I HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND. ONE EXAMPLE: FRIDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE PURCHASE OF PLUTONIUM AND THE TOPAZ REACTOR. HELEN SPOTTED THAT ONE ON CNN ABOUT THE SAME TIME JIM COLLINS GOT A CALL, SO I HAD SOME KNOWLEDGE FROM HER BRIEFING WHEN THE PRESS CALLED AND I WAS ONLY EMBARRASSED WITH HER. A SIMILAR EXAMPLE: THIS MORNING I RECEIVED A TELEGRAM (STATE 98600) ASKING ME TO DELIVER A MESSAGE ON START FROM JIM TO ANDREY KOZYREV. BAKER'S MESSAGE TO KOZYREV BEGINS: "I HAVE REVIEWED THE PAPER THAT AMBASSADOR LUKIN GAVE ME ON YOUR BEHALF, AND DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER HAS REPORTED TO ME ON HIS

MEETING WITH YOU IN HELSINKI." MY PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IN SEEING KOZYREV IS THAT I HAVEN'T REPEAT HAVEN'T SEEN THE PAPER THAT LUKIN HANDED OVER, AND I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY REPORT FROM LARRY. ALSO, I LEARNED FROM THE PRESS AND ANOTHER LAST MINUTE PHONE CALL TO COLLINS THAT WE ARE PREPARING A LARGE PACKAGE FOR RUSSIA AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL PUBLICLY DISCUSS AND PRESENT IT THIS WEEK. WHAT IT MIGHT CONTAIN WE HAVE NO IDEA. I KNOW YOU UNDERSTAND THAT AS A GENERAL MATTER THIS IS NO WAY TO DO BUSINESS. IT PREVENTS US FROM DOING OUR JOB IN BRIEFING U.S. VISITORS INTELLIGENTLY AND APPROPRIATELY, RESPONDING TO CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS,

AND RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS FROM THE RUSSIANS. I THINK THE EMBASSY AND I HAVE BEEN DOING A GOOD JOB ALONG THESE LINES. IN PRESENTING U.S. POLICY. MY OWN FEELING IS THAT THE EMBASSY -- WHICH HAS ITS FINGERS ON MOSCOW PULSES IN A WAY THAT WASHINGTON OFFICIALS AT ANY LEVEL DO NOT AND CANNOT -- SHOULD BE INVOLVED.
I ALSO HAVE A FAR MORE SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT HOW WE DEAL WITH THESE PEOPLE ON THE SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE I KNOW LITTLE ABOUT THE TECHNICAL SIDE OF THIS ISSUE, I ALSO KNOW THAT I UNDERSTAND HOW TO NEGOTIATE THIS KIND OF ISSUE SO AS TO HAVE A POINT OF VIEW WORTH BEING HEARD EVEN IF NOT FOLLOWED.
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR IMMEDIATE IMPULSE FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE UNION -- MANIFESTED IN JIM'S TRAVEL HERE AND IN SEVERAL VISITS BY BARTHOLOMEW -- WAS THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES ARE A DOMINANT AND ABIDING CONCERN FOR US AND FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD. I STRESSED THAT IN SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY, AS DID BAKER AND REGGIE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS: ONLY ONE NUCLEAR STATE (RUSSIA) SHOULD EMERGE ON FORMER SOVIET TERRITORY AND START SHOULD BE PROMPTLY RATIFIED AS A BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN TREATY. THOSE VIEWS WERE CORRECT, AND I AM TROUBLED THAT WE SEEM TO BE DEPARTING FROM THEM. IT IS VERY CLEAR TO ME THAT THE
=3060
ZEM
~~SECRET~~ 301414Z MAR 92 1.4(c)
MOSCOW FINAL SECTION OF 02
UKRAINIANS AND KAZAKHS PARTICULARLY HAVE NOT GOTTEN OUR BASIC MESSAGE. THAT IS: SCREW AROUND WITH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND EVEN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY LEVERS, IF YOU MUST, PLAY AS MANY GAMES AS YOU WANT, AS YOU COME TO TERMS WITH EACH OTHER AND THE RUSSIANS FOLLOWING THE SOVIET COLLAPSE. BUT DON'T REPEAT DON'T MESS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR YOU FACE SUBSTANTIAL CONSEQUENCES, IN TERMS OF YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE

UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. IF YOU DO.
INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING UP ON OUR EARLY PREACHINGS, WE HAVE BEEN SLOUCHING ALONG LATELY TOWARD BUSINESS AS USUAL. ALONG THE ROAD FROM MINSK TO KIEV AND BEYOND, AND WITH SENATE RATIFICATION OF START MUCH ON OUR MINDS, WE HAVE INADVERTENTLY MANAGED TO LEND U.S. SUPPORT TO UKRAINIAN AND KAZAKH PRETENSIONS TO THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY WEIGHING IN WITH SUPPORT FOR THE MINSK FORMULA FOR SUPERVISION OF DESTRUCTION. IN OUR COMMENDABLE DESIRE NOT TO BE PRO-RUSSIAN, WE ARE AT RISK OF OVERLOOKING THE BASIC FACT THAT UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN ARE NOT NOW NUCLEAR-ARMED (THEY CANNOT

FIRE THE WEAPONS LOCATED ON THEIR TERRITORY AS I UNDERSTAND IT), AND WE MAY UNWITTINGLY BE JOINING THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO TALK THEMSELVES INTO BEING NUCLEAR-ARMED. WE NEED TO STICK TO THE BASICS: THEY ARE NOT NUCLEAR ARMED, AND WE SUPPORT THEM AND WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM IF THEY WANT TO RID THEIR TERRITORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF THEY DON'T, THAT'S ANOTHER MATTER.
FURTHER, WITH THE UKRAINIANS HAVING PULLED THE FLOOR, NOT JUST THE RUG, OUT FROM UNDER US BY SUSPENDING THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR TRANSFERS WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS OR US, SO FAR AS WE KNOW OUT HERE, WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE A NORMAL AGENDA WITH THEM: SCIENCE CENTER, TRADE RELATIONS, ETC. I AM NOT SUGGESTING WE DECLARE WAR BUT WE NEED, FORCEFULLY, TO MAKE CLEAR HOW UNHAPPY AND CONCERNED WE ARE. KRAVCHUK IS WHAT A HORSE-TRAINER WOULD CALL "HARD IN THE MOUTH." HE WILL GO AS FAR AS WE LET HIM AND NO FARTHER IF WE SIT ON HIM AS WE DEVELOP OUR PLANS FOR THIS AREA. ONE MORE EXAMPLE: JUST AS NAZARBAYEV IS OPENLY SAYING KAZAKHSTAN INTENDS TO SIGN THE NPT AS A NUCLEAR STATE 1.4(d) [redacted], WE ARE URGING HIM TO SIGN THE PAPERS NECESSARY FOR MFN, A

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TRADE AGREEMENT. ETC.
I HAVE GONE ON LONG ENOUGH. AGAIN, I AM WRITING IN THIS VEIN TO STIMULATE AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATION AND PERFORMANCE. NOT TO BE A NUISANCE. I KNOW IT MAY BE SOMEWHAT PRESUMPTUOUS FOR AN 8 MONTH-OLD AMBASSADOR TO MAKE THESE COMMENTS BUT I'M CONVINCED THAT THEY ARE CLOSE ENOUGH TO BEING ON TARGET THAT I'D BE DERELICT IF I DIDN'T QUIETLY TELL THE THREE OF YOU WHAT I THINK. FOR ONE FINAL PRESUMPTUOUS REMARK, IT IS MY SINCERE BELIEF THAT THESE OVERSIGHTS ARE IN NO WAY INTENDED, BUT CAUSED SOLELY BY LACK OF COORDINATION. PLEASE BELIEVE ME WHEN I EMPHASIZE THAT MY BEEF WOULD PROBABLY BE PERSONAL IF I WERE GOING TO BE HERE VERY LONG. SINCE THAT IS NOT THE CASE, I'M PRETTY CERTAIN MY MOTIVATIONS ARE DECENT AND OBJECTIVE. I HOPE THEY ARE RECEIVED IN THAT VEIN.
END TEXT:
DECL OADR
~~S E C R E T~~
#3060

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Cable	Bob Strauss to General Scowcroft, Re: Collins [261515Z Mar 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	3/26/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/13/2022

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91131-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(501)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: HOWE SCOWCROFT ~~SIT~~ GANTT
SIT: FILE 1.4(c) IN SIT SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 261515Z MAR 92

FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ 261515Z MAR 92 1.4(c)
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCROWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. THE WHITE HOUSE
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: BOB STRAUSS
BEGIN TEXT:
COLLINS DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT YEL'TSIN ON CW DESTRUCTION TO YEL'TSIN'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER RYURIKOV TODAY. YEL'TSIN WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV IS OUT OF TOWN.
RYURIKOV THANKED COLLINS FOR THIS PROMPT RESPONSE TO YEL'TSIN'S MARCH 16 PROPOSAL, AND SAID HE WOULD HAVE THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TRANSLATED AND CONVEYED TO YEL'TSIN IMMEDIATELY. HIS PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE PROPOSED EARLY APRIL TIME-FRAME FOR THE U.S. EXPERTS. VISIT WAS POSITIVE.
IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHO WOULD BE THE EMBASSY'S WORKING LEVEL POINT OF CONTACT ON THIS SUBJECT, RYURIKOV SUGGESTED WE CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED CHANNELS AT THE MFA AND WITH THE MOD. HE SAID KUNTSEVICH'S ROLE WOULD BE TO MANAGE AND COORDINATE THE VARIOUS INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES ON CW DESTRUCTION, BUT HE WAS NOT YET SURE WHETHER KUNTSEVICH HAD A STAFF OR FACILITIES.
ONE FINAL POINT. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN THE TEXT OF THE YEL'TSIN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD APPRECIATE

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2009-1074-MR
MM 10/3/2016

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A COPY AS WELL AS ANY FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE DATES FOR THE U.S. EXPERTS VISIT.
END TEXT.
DECL OADR
=2994

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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03a. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss or DCM Collins [242026Z Mar 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	3/24/92	(b)(1)	C

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

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DATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PRT: GANTT HOWE COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: GORDON FILE 1.4(c) OUT SIT SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 242026Z MAR 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO 1.4(c) MOSCOW//NIACT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
QQQQ

.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OR DCM COLLINS ONLY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

.

BOB -- THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDS TO HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON MARCH 16. YOU OR JIM COLLINS SHOULD DELIVER THIS LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON MOVING AHEAD PROMPTLY WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS, TO IMPLEMENT THE JUNE 1990 SUMMIT AGREEMENT AND TO FACILITATE CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BEING NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

.

JIM BAKER HAS CLEARED ON THIS.

.

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO YELTSIN:

.

DEAR BORIS:

.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO FACILITATE SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THIS REAFFIRMATION OF YOUR COMMITMENT TO RIDDING THE WORLD OF THESE WEAPONS IS MOST WELCOME. I ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR STATEMENT THAT YOU WILL ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1074-NR
MM 10/3/2016

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1972.

WE MUST SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF DESTROYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO ASSIST YOUR COUNTRY IN SOLVING THE CHALLENGING PROBLEMS RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION, INCLUDING IN AREAS YOU MENTION IN YOUR LETTER.

I AGREE TO YOUR PROPOSAL TO FORM A JOINT RUSSIAN-U.S. EXPERTS GROUP TO DEVELOP A PRACTICAL PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION. THE UNITED STATES WILL SEND A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO MOSCOW EARLY NEXT MONTH TO DISCUSS THE RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM. THIS WILL BE OUR INITIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT GROUP YOU HAVE PROPOSED. THE U.S. TEAM WILL BE PREPARED TO BEGIN WORK IMMEDIATELY ON THE PROBLEM AREAS YOU RAISED WITH THE AIM OF RESOLVING THEM QUICKLY. WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM OUR ARSENALS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.
DECL: OADR

#0110

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

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03b. Draft Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss or DCM Collins [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Subseries: Yeltsin Files
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FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

01 01 OO OO CCCC AA ZYUW VAX250

WHITE HOUSE
1.4(c) MOSCOW
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
QQQQ

.
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OR DCM COLLINS ONLY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

.
BOB -- THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDS TO HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON MARCH 16. YOU OR JIM COLLINS SHOULD DELIVER THIS LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON MOVING AHEAD PROMPTLY WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS, TO IMPLEMENT THE JUNE 1990 SUMMIT AGREEMENT AND TO FACILITATE CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BEING NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

.
JIM BAKER HAS CLEARED ON THIS.

.
BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO YELTSIN:

.
DEAR BORIS:

.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO FACILITATE SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THIS REAFFIRMATION OF YOUR COMMITMENT TO RIDDING THE WORLD OF THESE WEAPONS IS MOST WELCOME. I ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR STATEMENT THAT YOU WILL ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1972.

.
WE MUST SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF DESTROYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO ASSIST YOUR COUNTRY IN SOLVING THE CHALLENGING PROBLEMS RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION, INCLUDING IN AREAS YOU MENTION IN YOUR LETTER.

.
I AGREE TO YOUR PROPOSAL TO FORM A JOINT RUSSIAN-U.S. EXPERTS GROUP TO DEVELOP A PRACTICAL PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION. THE UNITED STATES WILL SEND A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO MOSCOW EARLY NEXT MONTH TO DISCUSS THE RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM. THIS WILL BE OUR INITIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT GROUP YOU HAVE PROPOSED. THE U.S. TEAM WILL BE PREPARED TO BEGIN WORK IMMEDIATELY ON THE PROBLEM AREAS YOU RAISED WITH THE AIM OF RESOLVING THEM QUICKLY. WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM OUR ARSENALS.

.
SINCERELY,

.
GEORGE BUSH

.
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0000

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2009-1074-MR
MM 10/3/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL

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IMMEDIATE

1.4(c) MOSCOW

FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT FOR AMBASSADOR STRAUSS -- EYES ONLY VIA WHITE HOUSE 1.4(c)

PLEASE DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OR DCM COLLINS ONLY.

BOB -- THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDS TO HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON MARCH 16. YOU OR JIM COLLINS SHOULD DELIVER THIS LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON MOVING AHEAD PROMPTLY WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS, TO IMPLEMENT THE JUNE 1990 SUMMIT AGREEMENT AND TO FACILITATE CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BEING NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

JIM BAKER HAS CLEARED ON THIS.

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO YELTSIN:

DEAR BORIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO FACILITATE SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THIS REAFFIRMATION OF YOUR COMMITMENT TO RIDDING THE WORLD OF THESE WEAPONS IS MOST WELCOME. I ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR STATEMENT THAT YOU WILL ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1972.

WE MUST SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF DESTROYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO ASSIST YOUR COUNTRY IN SOLVING THE CHALLENGING PROBLEMS RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION, INCLUDING IN AREAS YOU MENTION IN YOUR LETTER.

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SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

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2009-1074-MR
MM 10/3/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

Hand delivered to Gen. Scowcroft 3/13/91 by Russian Amb. Lukin

Translated from Russian

Dear George:

I am very grateful to you for resolving the issues involved in speeding up the realization of the 1.25 billion dollars food credit granted to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The arriving food is being distributed among the CIS countries in shares determined by the November Agreement.

We view the intention of the United States Government to provide humanitarian assistance to Russia in the amount of 645 million dollars as understanding our problems in a difficult period of transition of the country's national economy to market relations.

At the same time, the extremely severe food situation emerging in several regions of Russia, primarily in its industrial centers, compels me to request you to grant the Russian Federation a 600 million dollars credit to finance grain purchases.

I very much count on your support.

Sincerely,

B.YELTSIN

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

ПРЕЗИДЕНТ

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

«10» III 1992 г.

№ Пр-532

г. МОСКВА

Дорогой Джордж,

Весьма признателен Вам за решение вопросов по ускорению реализации предоставленного странам Содружества Независимых Государств кредита на сумму 1,25 млрд.долларов для закупки продовольствия. Поступающие продовольственные товары распределяются между странами Содружества в соотношениях, определенных Ноябрьским Соглашением.

Намерение Правительства Соединенных Штатов Америки предоставить России гуманитарную помощь в размере 645 млн.долларов мы расцениваем как понимание наших проблем в сложный период перехода хозяйства страны на рыночные отношения.

Вместе с тем складывающаяся в ряде регионов России крайне напряженная ситуация с продовольственным обеспечением, прежде всего в промышленных центрах, вынуждает меня обратиться к Вам с просьбой о предоставлении Российской Федерации кредита в размере 600 млн.долларов для финансирования закупок зерна.

Я очень рассчитываю на Вашу поддержку.

С уважением

Б.Ельцин

Его Превосходительству
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Джорджу Бушу
г.Вашингтон

P/Biddt 3/2/92

B I only wanted to mention ~ ISU. We would like more elected Republicans at our mtgs.

P We don't have as much a structure as you all have

Discussion of policies

IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1074-MR
MM 2/9/2015

PRT: GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE^IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <DTG> 122ØØ7Z FEB 92

FM ELYSEE PALACE

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ
~~TRES SECRET~~ GOUVERNMENTAL
FM MONSIEUR FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
TO MONSIEUR GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT DES ETATS UNIS D'AMERIQUE
LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

PARIS, LE 12 FEVRIER 1992

CHER GEORGE

JE VOUS REMERCIE DE VOTRE MESSAGE DU 4 FEVRIER DERNIER, QUE J'AI LU AVEC INTERET. JE VOUDRAIS A MON TOUR VOUS FAIRE PART DE QUELQUES IMPRESSIONS PERSONNELLES A L'ISSUE DE LA VISITE D'ETAT QUE LE PRESIDENT ELTSINE VIENT DE FAIRE A PARIS.

LA CONVERSATION AVEC LE PRESIDENT RUSSE A ETE SUBSTANTIELLE, VIVANTE ET DIRECTE. C'EST UN HOMME QUI AIME ABORDER LES CHOSES DIRECTEMENT ET EN TOUTE CLARTE. J'AJOUTERAI QU'IL PORTE EN LUI LE SENTIMENT TRES FORT D'INCARNER UN PAYS SECOUE MAIS FIER ET TOUJOURS AMBITIEUX. DANS LE MEME TEMPS, IL A SOULIGNE A PLUSIEURS REPRISES QU'IL N'AVAIT PAS DE VISEES HEGEMONIQUES, ET QU'IL RESPECTAIT LES CHOIX DE L'UKRAINE, PERCUE PAR LUI COMME UN PARTENAIRE DIFFICILE, MAIS RESPECTABLE.

LA DISCUSSION A PORTE AVANT TOUT SUR LES QUESTIONS ECONOMIQUES ET SUR LE DESARMEMENT. NOUS AVONS DONNE NOTRE ACCORD

SUR DEUX CREDITS IMPORTANTS, L'UN DE 2 MILLIARDS DE FRANCS POUR LES CEREALES, VITALES POUR LA FIN DE L'HIVER, ET L'AUTRE DE 1,5 MILLIARDS POUR DES BIENS INDUSTRIELS. PLUSIEURS ACCORDS TECHNIQUES ONT EN OUTRE ETE SIGNES PAR LES MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, LES MINISTRES DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES ET LES MINISTRES DE L'INTERIEUR.

S'AGISSANT DE LA COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONALE, LE PRESIDENT DE LA FEDERATION DE RUSSIE A MARQUE SON INTERET POUR UNE PARTICIPATION AU PROCHAIN SOMMET DES PAYS INDUSTRIALISES A MUNICH, EN SE REFERANT A LA FORMULE ADOPTEE L'AN DERNIER A LONDRES POUR M. GORBATCHEV. SANS M'ENGAGERCAR IL S'AGIT D'UNE DECISION COLLECTIVE, JE LUI AI FAIT PART DE MA DISPONIBILITE DE PRINCIPE.

S'AGISSANT DES QUESTIONS STRATEGIQUES, QUI ONT ETE LE THEME PRINCIPAL DE NOS CONVERSATIONS, NOUS AVONS LONGUEMENT ECHANGE NOS VUES SUR LES PERSPECTIVES DE REDUCTIONS ET LE PASSAGE DE LA RUSSIE A UNE DISSUASION MINIMALE. LE PRESIDENT RUSSE A BIEN ACCUEILLI LA POSITION DE LA FRANCE, QUIACCOMPAGNERA EN TANT QUE DE BESOIN LE MOUVEMENT, SANS PARTICIPER POUR LE MOMENT A LA NEGOCIATION, AFIN DE RESTER AU DESSUS DU SEUIL DE SUFFISANCE.

COMME AVEC VOUS, LE PRESIDENT ELTSINE ET SES MILITAIRES ONT MARQUE LEUR INTERET POUR UNE COOPERATION DANS LE RETRAITEMENT A DES FINS CIVILES DES MATIERES FISSILES EXTRAITES DES ARMES DEMANTELEES. JE VOUS PROPOSE QUE LES EXPERTS DE NOS DEUX PAYS SE

RENCONTRENT DES QUE POSSIBLE POUR EN PARLER.

JE RELEVE EGALEMENT SA VOLONTE DE REDUIRE PAR ETAPES LA PART DE LA PRODUCTION ET DE LA VENTE D'ARMEMENTS, ET SON INTERET POUR UNE INITIATIVE INTERNATIONALE QUI PERMETTRAIT DE SOUTENIR LA RECHERCHE FONDAMENTALE RUSSE, DE FACON A PREVENIR LA FUITE DES CERVEAUX.

ENFIN ET SURTOUT, NOUS AVONS COMME PREVU MIS AU POINT ET SIGNE LE TRAITE ENTRE LA FRANCE ET LA RUSSIE, QUI PERMET DE REPRENDRE LE FILD'UNE LONGUE HISTOIRE COMMUNE ET DE TRACER UN CADRE QUI ASSOCIE PLEINEMENT LA NOUVELLE RUSSIE AU DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'EUROPE DEMOCRATIQUE.

JE VOUS PRIE, MON CHER GEORGE, DE CROIRE A L'EXPRESSION

DE MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS ET DE MES CORDIALES PENSEES.

FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR GEORGE BUSH

PRESIDENT DES ETATS UNIS D'AMERIQUE.

#0002

UNOFFICIAL SITUATION ROOM TRANSLATION MESSAGE 122007Z FEB 92

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1074-MR
MM 2/9/2015

FROM MR. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
TO MR. GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PARIS 12 FEBRUARY 1992

Dear George,

I thank you for your letter of 4 February, which I read with interest. I would like to impart to you some of my personal impressions at the conclusion of the state visit which President Yeltsin just made to Paris.

The conversation with the Russian President was substantial, lively, and direct. He is an man who likes to discuss things directly and with absolute clarity. I'll add that he has within him a strong desire to represent his country as reawakening, but still strong and ambitious. At the same time, he reiterated several times that he does not have any hegemonic visions, and that he respects the choices of the Ukraine, which is perceived by him as a difficult, but respectable, partner.

The discussion focussed for the most part on economic questions and disarmament. We agreed to two important credits, one for 2 million francs for cereals, vital until the end of the winter, and another other for 1.5 million francs for industry. Several technical accords were also signed by the Foreign Minister, the Minister for the Economy and Finance, and the Minister of the Interior.

On the topic of international economic cooperation, the Russian President highlighted his interest in participating in the next industrialized nations' summit in Munich, by referring to the formula adopted last year at London for Mr. Gorbachev. Without committing myself, I indicated it must be a collective decision, I gave him my assent in principle.

On the topic of strategic questions, which were the main theme of our conversations, we exchanged our views at length on the perspective reductions and the passage of Russia to a level of minimal deterrent. The Russian President understood the position of France, which is supported by the need for movement, without participating at this time in negotiation, in order to stay above the threshold of sufficiency.

As with you, President Yeltsin and his military advisors highlighted their interest in cooperation international

retreatment for civil uses of fissile materials from dismantled arms. I propose to you that the experts of both our countries meet as soon as possible to discuss this.

I reveal also his desire to reduce in stages the production and sale of arms, and his interest in an international initiative that will permit the retention of Russian fundamental research science, to prevent a brain drain.

Finally, and above all, we closed by restating and signing a treaty between France and Russia, which allows us to again pick up the long line of common history and to delineate a framework that will include Russia fully in the development of democratic Europe.

I ask you, dear George, to accept my best wishes and my most cordial thoughts.

Francois Mitterrand.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Cable	Ambassador Strauss to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Ambassador Strauss, February 17 Meeting with Yeltsin [171615Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/13/2022

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91131-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(506)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE 1.4(c) IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 171615Z FEB 92

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 171615Z FEB 92 1.4(c)
SECTION 01 OF 02
O 171617Z FEB 92 ZFF1/4
FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
~~SECRET~~ VIA 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
QQQQ
FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: AMBASSADOR STRAUSS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR STRAUSS, FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH YEL,TSIN

>BEGIN SUMMARY>

1. SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 17 AMBASSADOR STRAUSS PASSED TO YEL,TSIN THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH, STRESSING CONTINUED US SUPPORT FOR THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT AND SPIKING CHARGES IN THE FEBRUARY 11 HOAGLAND ARTICLE THAT THE US VIEWED YEL,TSIN AS A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. YEL,TSIN, WHO WAS AWARE OF THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE, EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND TO AMBASADOR STRAUSS PERSONALLY FOR TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO REBUT THE ALLEGATIONS, WHICH YEL,TSIN SAID HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED AND WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MACHINATIONS OF THOSE WHO OPPOSED THE IMPROVEMENT IN US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. END SUMMARY

>END SUMMARY>

2. AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OPENED BY NOTING THAT THE

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2009-1074-MR
MM 10/3/2016

HOAGLAND ARTICLE WAS NOT AN IMPORTANT MATTER IN ITSELF, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESIDENT BUSH THAT YEL,TSIN UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARTICLE IN NO WAY REFLECTED THE US APROACH TO DEALING WITH RUSSIA AND WITH YEL,TSIN PERSONALLY. YEL,TSIN INTERJECTED THAT HE FOLLOWED THE US PRESS CLOSELY, AS HE ASSUMED THE US FOLLOWED THE RUSSIAN PRESS AND THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE HOAGLAND STORY THAT STRAUSS HAD REFERRED TO. AMBASSADOR STRAUSS CONTINUED THAT UPON LEARNING OF THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE HE HAD IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED PRESIDENT BUSH, WHO WAS FURIOUS AT THE STORY. AFTER DISCUSSING AT SOME LENGTH WHAT, IF ANYTHING TO TO ABOUT THE STORY, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY FITZWATER WOULD USE A REGULAR WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING TO DENOUNCE THE STORY AS UNTRUE. THE PRESIDENT VIEWED THE HOAGLAND STORY AS AN OUTRAGE AND WAS CONCERNED THAT OTHERS IN THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS MIGHT BELIEVE THERE WAS SOME LEGITIMACY TO IT. ACCORDINGLY, STRAUSS SAID THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO DEAL WITH IT IMMEDIATELY.

3. AFTER THAT FITZWATER BRIEFING, AMBASSADOR STRAUSS SAID, A NUMBER OF STORIES HAD APPEARED IN THE US MEDIA THAT STRESSED US SUPPORT FOR YEL,TSIN. (THE

AMBASSADOR GAVE YEL,TSIN A COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTION OF THE FITZWATER FEBRUARY 13 BRIEFING AND OF A FEBRUARY 14 LOS ANGELES TIMES ARTICLE BASED ON IT BY JAMES GERSTENZANG.)

4. NOTING AGAIN THAT THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION, YEL,TSIN THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR TAKING THE PERSONAL INITIATIVE TO MEET WITH HIM ON THIS. YEL,TSIN SAID THAT HIS FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AT CAMP DAVID WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE INSINUATIONS OF SOME JOURNALIST AND THAT HE HAD NOT BELIEVED THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT OTHERS NEEDED TO SEE THE PUBLIC

STATEMENTS REFUTING THE ARTICLE. YEL,TSIN SAID HE HAD ASSUMED THE ARTICLE WAS INSPIRED BY THOSE WHO WERE OPPOSED TO THE CURRENT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND RUSSIA AND THAT SUCH ARTICLES COULD BE EXPECTED DURING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. NEVERTHELESS, YEL,TSIN CONTINUED, IT HAD NOT BEEN PLEASANT TO READ SUCH AN ARTICLE FROM THOSE WHO WANTED TO SOW DISCORD BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BRIEFED THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET IN POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID MEETING AND THIS KIND OF ARTICLE DOES CAUSE CONFUSION.

5. YEL,TSIN SAID HE VIEWED THE PRESIDENT,S LETTER AS A FRIENDLY GESTURE TOWARD HIM. IT WAS MUCH APPRECIATED AND YEL,TSIN STRESSED THAT HE CONSIDERED THE MATTER CLOSED AND THAT HE SAW NO NEED TO REPLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH,S LETTER. YEL,TSIN ALSO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION TO THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS ROLE IN THIS MATTER WHICH, HE SAID, WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP HE HAD WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

6. COMMENT: THE AMBASSADOR HAD ORIGINALLY ASKED TO SEE YEL,TSIN ON FEBRUARY 15, AFTER YEL,TSIN RETURNED FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT AT MINSK. YEL,TSIN WAS

#2216

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 171615Z FEB 92 1.4(c)

SECTION 02 OF 02

DELAYED IN RETURNING TO MOSCOW AND HIS OFFICE CALLED THE EMBASSY ON FEBRUARY 17 TO SUGGEST THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEE YEL,TSIN THAT MORNING. YEL,TSIN WAS CLEARLY AWARE OF AND ANGERED BY THE HOAGLAND STORY. HE SEEMED PLEASED TO GET THIS MATTER OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE MEETING LATER TODAY WITH THE SECRETARY.

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#2216

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Cable	Ambassador Strauss to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Ambassador Strauss, February 17 Meeting with Yeltsin [171615Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/13/2022

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AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(506)
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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>
PRT: GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE 1.4(c) IN SIT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKOHR <DTG> 171615Z FEB 92

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>TO WHITE HOUSE

<SUBJ>AMBASSADOR STRAUSS, FEBRUARY I7 MEETING WITH
YEL,TSIN

<TEXT>ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ 171615Z FEB 92 1.4(c)
SECTION 01 OF 02
O 171617Z FEB 92 ZFF1/4
FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
QQQQ
FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: AMBASSADOR STRAUSS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR STRAUSS, FEBRUARY I7 MEETING WITH
YEL,TSIN
~BEGIN SUMMARY~
1. SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY I7 AMBASSADOR STRAUSS PASSED TO YEL,TSIN THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH, STRESSING CONTINUED US SUPPORT FOR THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT AND SPIKING CHARGES IN THE FEBRUARY II HOAGLAND ARTICLE THAT THE US VIEWED YEL,TSIN AS A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. YEL,TSIN, WHO WAS AWARE OF THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE, EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND TO AMBASADOR STRAUSS PERSONALLY FOR TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO REBUT THE ALLEGATIONS, WHICH YEL,TSIN SAID HE HAD NEVER BELIEVED AND WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MACHINATIONS OF THOSE WHO OPPOSED THE IMPROVEMENT IN US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. END SUMMARY
~END SUMMARY~
2. AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OPENED BY NOTING THAT THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE WAS NOT AN IMPORTANT MATTER IN ITSELF, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESIDENT BUSH THAT YEL,TSIN UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARTICLE IN NO WAY REFLECTED THE US APROACH TO DEALING WITH RUSSIA AND WITH YEL,TSIN PERSONALLY. YEL,TSIN INTERJECTED THAT HE FOLLOWED THE US PRESS CLOSELY, AS HE ASSUMED THE US FOLLOWED THE RUSSIAN PRESS AND THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE HOAGLAND STORY THAT STRAUSS HAD REFERRED TO. AMBASSADOR STRAUSS CONTINUED THAT UPON LEARNING OF THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE HE HAD IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED PRESIDENT BUSH, WHO WAS FURIOUS AT THE STORY. AFTER DISCUSSING AT SOME LENGTH WHAT, IF ANYTHING TO TO ABOUT THE STORY, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY FITZWATER WOULD USE A REGULAR WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING TO DENOUNCE THE STORY AS UNTRUE. THE PRESIDENT VIEWED THE HOAGLAND STORY AS AN OUTRAGE AND WAS CONCERNED THAT OTHERS IN THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS MIGHT BELIEVE THERE WAS SOME LEGITIMACY TO IT. ACCORDINGLY, STRAUSS SAID THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO DEAL WITH IT IMMEDIATELY.

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3. AFTER THAT FITZWATER BRIEFING, AMBASSADOR STRAUSS SAID, A NUMBER OF STORIES HAD APPEARED IN THE US MEDIA THAT STRESSED US SUPPORT FOR YEL,TSIN. (THE AMBASSADOR GAVE YEL,TSIN A COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTION OF THE FITZWATER FEBRUARY 13 BRIEFING AND OF A FEBRUARY 14 LOS ANGELES TIMES ARTICLE BASED ON IT BY JAMES GERSTENZANG.)
4. NOTING AGAIN THAT THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION, YEL,TSIN THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR TAKING THE PERSONAL INITIATIVE TO MEET WITH HIM ON THIS. YEL,TSIN SAID THAT HIS FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AT CAMP DAVID WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE INSINUATIONS OF SOME JOURNALIST AND THAT HE HAD NOT BELIEVED THE HOAGLAND ARTICLE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT OTHERS NEEDED TO SEE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS REFUTING THE ARTICLE. YEL,TSIN SAID HE HAD ASSUMED THE ARTICLE WAS INSPIRED BY THOSE WHO WERE OPPOSED TO THE CURRENT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND RUSSIA AND THAT SUCH ARTICLES COULD BE EXPECTED DURING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. NEVERTHELESS, YEL,TSIN CONTINUED, IT HAD NOT BEEN PLEASANT TO READ SUCH AN ARTICLE FROM THOSE WHO WANTED TO SOW DISCORD BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BRIEFED THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET IN POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID MEETING AND THIS KIND OF ARTICLE DOES CAUSE CONFUSION.
5. YEL,TSIN SAID HE VIEWED THE PRESIDENT,S LETTER AS A FRIENDLY GESTURE TOWARD HIM. IT WAS MUCH APPRECIATED AND YEL,TSIN STRESSED THAT HE CONSIDERED THE MATTER CLOSED AND THAT HE SAW NO NEED TO REPLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH,S LETTER. YEL,TSIN ALSO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION TO THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS ROLE IN THIS MATTER WHICH, HE SAID, WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP HE HAD WITH THE AMBASSADOR.
6. COMMENT: THE AMBASSADOR HAD ORIGINALLY ASKED TO SEE YEL,TSIN ON FEBRUARY 15, AFTER YEL,TSIN RETURNED FROM THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT AT MINSK. YEL,TSIN WAS
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SECTION 02 OF 02
DELAYED IN RETURNING TO MOSCOW AND HIS OFFICE CALLED THE EMBASSY ON FEBRUARY 17 TO SUGGEST THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEE YEL,TSIN THAT MORNING. YEL,TSIN WAS CLEARLY AWARE OF AND ANGERED BY THE HOAGLAND STORY. HE SEEMED PLEASED TO GET THIS MATTER OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE MEETING LATER TODAY WITH THE SECRETARY.
DECL: OADR
~~S E C R E T~~
#2216
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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 2216 <TOR> 920217115124 MSG000319636284

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This is the
only copy
Pres has over.

TO: The President

FROM: Peter Afanasenko
Interpreter

SUBJECT: One-on-One Meeting with Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia.

PLACE: Camp David

DATE: February 1, 1992

TIME: Approximately 10:30 a.m.

Introduction:

The President invited Boris Yeltsin into his private office to spend some time, one-on-one, in order to give him the opportunity to speak his mind in absolute confidence. Coffee was served; President Yeltsin patiently waited until the steward was out of the room and then began to speak.

I. Biological Weapons

(Paraphrase)...I wanted to see you alone Mr. President, in the hope that by being completely candid and open with you and by unloading several extremely sensitive questions that I have been carrying around with me, I might be able to begin this new era between us and between our two countries without any of this "baggage" that is on my heart.

I am very well aware of the importance that biological weapons has to the U.S. and I am one who personally is quite knowledgeable on this matter since this industry is located in my home region around Sverdlovsk. Gorbachev never really understood this issue and he was fooled by those around him. He was told that the plants were closed and that upon his orders, the programs were terminated. In fact, he didn't even know the people who ran the programs. When he was turning the reins of power to me, he was not even aware of the top few people who ran the program. I knew them extremely well. I could name the top five people by their names and patronymics. When I asked him who were the top people he said he did not know.

In any case, back many years ago, the biological program produced so much waste (there was even a leak that killed 78 people) that the authorities had to cover up the causes of death. They claimed that pigs had gotten into a pile of waste and a terrible case of swine flu was spread around among the population. They never owned up to the true cause of the deaths.

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Things got so bad that they shut down the facilities in and near Chaliyabinsk and wholesale moved thousands of people and workers to two other towns that don't even have names. I and many other people in the region never knew what was going on. Approximately t w o thousand (2000) scientists are involved in this effort and they were moved to continue the efforts. They were so good they got down to the level of being able to affect gene structure. Unlike nuclear scientists who can be used for productive work in other fields, biological warfare scientists know only one thing -- how to kill masses of people and they want to keep doing that at all costs.

In the next month and a half or two, I plan to close down all of the facilities personally and send these scientists away from the sites. They will be moved around the country and watched so that they not begin this work again. I will raise their pay to 5000 rubles and pension them off so that they can live comfortably and not have to work. It will take some time to accomplish this, but I will personally travel to the sites in question and will then report to you on what I found so that you and I do not have this thing hanging over us. I wanted to be absolutely frank and honest on this score.

The President: Boris, I very much appreciate your candor and know how difficult it is for you to accomplish this task. Is there any other issue you want to talk about ?

President Yeltsin:

II. Nuclear Warheads

(Paraphrase) Yes, there is the second issue that I wanted to have you know from me personally, and that is the question of nuclear weapons, namely the number of warheads on both strategic and tactical weapons. Again, when Gorbachev was handing over matters to me I asked him about this too. Now, unlike biological weapons, Gorbachev did know his nuclear weapons. But here , too, he was tricked by his aides, maybe even Yazov.

The President: Maybe he simply didn't want to know or maybe even Yazov didn't want to know either ?

President Yeltsin:

That may be, I don't know, but the problem is that regarding strategic weapons -- it's not hard to count them; the U.S. has satellites that can easily track the big missiles and you can't get away from that. However, tactical missiles are another matter. They can be hidden in forests and spread around the country and

concealed so that one never can be sure of their number. In short, the number of weapons together -- both strategic and tactical were said to be 30,000. In fact the number of tacticals alone were underestimated to Gorbachev by 5,000 so that the real total number of both strategics and tacs is thirty-five thousand (35,000) and that is why I am telling you this myself so that I can come clean and be totally frank and honest with you about this issue as well.

I want to be able to cut both of our sides' warheads down to a number of two and a half (2,500) thousand warheads for each of us. This , of course, will require some follow-on negotiations as soon as possible so that we can take account of all of the necessary details involved in such cuts.

The President: I think you are right; we should get these talks moving. Now, is there any other issue you wanted to discuss ?

III. Manpower Levels in Russia's Armed Forces

President Yeltsin :

Yes, there is the third issue of strength levels of the Armed Forces. You know, here too, Gorbachev was fooled by the military and by his aides. When you proposed cuts of half a million men (500,000), Gorbachev said he would cut by 700,000 men. But that was from stated figures by the military, or from a total of three million and two hundred thousand men (3,200,000) which would have meant that our forces would be down to two and a half million men (2,500,000). In fact we really had 3,700,000 men in the military and a 700,000 - man cut would have only gotten us down to a level of three million (3,000,000). So, in fact, by lying to him, they would have sustained a cut of only 200,000 men.

What I am going to do is insist that (and you can see it in our official statement that I put out to the military) they cut the promised 700,000 men from <u>real,actual levels as they really exist</u> and this will get us down to the two-and-a-half million men (2,500,000).

President Yeltsin:

Mr. President, I am very happy that you heard me out patiently and that you gave me an opportunity to remove from my heart these issues in order that we can start fresh in our relationship. I will do everything possible to implement my words. I also want to thank you for all of your efforts and the efforts of Jim Baker in organizing aid to our country during these difficult reforms.

The President: You know it is difficult for me to do all of this in view of the economic conditions that our citizens are experiencing currently.

President Yeltsin: Yes, yes I know and that is why in all of my pronouncements and travels I never use the word " aid "; I always says things like " support ", " cooperation ", and similar words. I just don't want to make it harder on your citizens and taxpayers here in the U.S. But, I appreciate very much the Coordinating Conference that your Jim Baker set up in order to bring other countries into the aid effort. If our reforms are not carried out, the people will lose hope and we will see a return to people who are absolutely willing to use hard methods -- and we will all go back to the old days of the Cold War and another Arms Race.

CONCLUSION :

The two Presidents finished the conversation by discussing possible summits and the fact that President Yeltsin will come to the U.S. no sooner than June or July of this year, since Yeltsin said that otherwise the time between today's meeting and the next official State Visit will be too short. The President said he would be happy to accept Yeltsin's invitation to come to Moscow in the second half of 1992, but not before the elections. The Presidents agreed that this is what they would tell the others they talked about, namely summit preparations and schedules.

2-1-92

CAMP DAVID DECLARATION

BY

PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN

At the conclusion of this historic meeting between an American President and the President of a new and democratic Russia, we -- the leaders of two great peoples and nations -- are agreed that a number of principles should guide relations between Russia and America:

First, that the relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation will be characterized by friendship and partnership, founded on mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy and economic freedom.

Second, that we will work to remove any remnants of Cold War hostility.

Third, that we will do all we can to promote the mutual well-being of our peoples and to expand as widely as possible the ties that now bind our peoples. Openness and tolerance should be the hallmark of relations between our peoples and governments.

Fourth, that we will actively promote free trade, investment, and economic cooperation between our two countries.

Fifth, that well will make every effort to support the promotion of our shared values of democracy; the rule of law; respect for human rights, including minority rights; respect for borders; and peaceful change around the globe.

Sixth, that we will work actively together to:

-- prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies and curb the spread of advanced conventional arms;

-- settle regional conflicts peacefully; and

-- counter terrorism, halt drug trafficking, and forestall environmental degradation.

In adopting these principles, the United States and Russia today launch a new era in our relations. In this new era, we seek a peace, an enduring peace that rests on lasting common values. This can be an era of peace and friendship that offers hope not only to our peoples, but to the peoples of the world. For while our conflict helped divide the world for a generation, now, working with others and with each other, we can help unite the globe through our friendship -- a new alliance of partners working against the common dangers we face.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

January 17, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Call from Ambassador Strauss

This morning I received a somewhat incoherent, somewhat strident 'phone call from Bob Strauss. His message was that the situation in Russia is deteriorating at an alarming rate and that it is essential that we contemplate doing "more than humanitarian aid and technological assistance." He criticized the IMF for having sent "junior officials" to Russia and said that what was needed was high level attention and presence in Moscow from the IMF. He also said that the Russian Central Bank was totally out of Yeltsin's control and was daily doing what it could to torpedo Yeltsin's reform program.

When I pushed Bob on the specific measures he thought would be necessary in the face of this "crisis," he punted. He did say that he thought a stabilization fund of somewhere between $5-10 billion was necessary, but could make no specific suggestions.

I promised Bob I would pass this information on to you and Brent. I also suggested that it would be important for you and him to talk when you next meet face to face, but reminded him that this was not a time of unconstrained resources. I also said that in my judgment simply dumping large quantities of aid into Russia at this stage would not necessarily produce much, beyond temporary surcease; the longer term problems would soon be back to haunt us all.*

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

* But agreed, but....

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Soviet Assistance

At the Conference you will be able to present as an Administration proposal an overall assistance package of $1.4 billion for FY 1992 and FY 1993 combined. This would include $1 billion in humanitarian and technical assistance and $400 million for nuclear disarmamant (Tab 1 provides a detailed breakout of the funding package). When combined with the $3.75 billion in USDA export guarantees, the United States will have provided or proposed $5.2 billion in assistance and credits to the former Soviet Union.

While we will be able to move forward with $735 million of the $1.4 billion without further Congressional action, $705 million will have to be reprogrammed or require new appropriations. We need to be very careful in discussing publicly the $705 million that requires congressional action as a pending request of Congress and in no way a done deal. If Congress senses the latter, we will be in big trouble. Even if we avoid this trap we can expect some problems in moving it forward. In particular:

For FY 1992:

- The $150 million in additional humanitarian assistance for FY 1992 (part of the additional $500 million special account you negotiated with Darman) relies on Congress agreeing to the technical adjustments to the international affairs cap and providing additional appropriations.

  -- While OMB is confident that the cap adjustments are consistent with the Budget Enforcement Act, CBO and the Budget and the Appropriations Committees will all have to agree before the additional resources are available. We could encounter very rough sledding from any or all of these quarters.

- The $80 million in FY 1992 ESF requires reprogramming notices (similar to the Pakistan reallocation process we are doing now for FY 1991). Before allowing any FY 1992 ESF to be tapped, we can expect to be pressed to use some of this outstanding FY 1991 ESF. Only a third of the $100 million Pakistan reprogramming has been released, the rest has Congressional holds or has yet to be notified (e.g., Haiti).

- The Committees will likely be reluctant to release FY 1992 ESF for the Soviet Union before they act on the final FY 1992 foreign operations appropriation in March or before they are comfortable with our overall assistance strategy. We are taking a risk in allocating ESF to the former Soviet Union before we know the final appropriation. However, given the need I see no alternative.

For FY 1993:

- The proposed funding for FY 1993 will be caught up in a lengthy appropriations process. Given election year politics and the need to finish the FY 1992 cycle, we can expect FY 1993 action to drag out.

Next Steps:

Despite these hurdles, we will push Congress to get as much as we can as fast as we can. We critically need additional resources for technical assistance. Only $20 million of the $735 million in assistance that we currently have available is for technical assistance. I am going to begin to press the Appropriation Committees to release some of the FY 1992 ESF for technical assistance (see Tab 2 for thoughts on how it would be spent).

To be successful, we are going to have to make some compromises. In particular, I need your concurrence that Janet and I have the necessary flexibility to close out the FY 1991 Pakistan reallocation. We will seek to get as much of your original priorities as possible and anything we cannot get will go to the former Soviet Union.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Assistance to the Former Soviet Union

($ Millions)

	FY 1992 *	FY 1993	92+93 TOTAL
I. Firm Commitments			
(No additional congressional action necessary.)			
DOD Assistance			
Transportation Funds	100	–	100
Nuclear Disarmament	400	–	400
Subtotal	500		500
Technical & Medical			
AID Medical Assistance	5	–	5
ESF, 1991 Reprogramming	5	–	5
USDA Technical Assistance	5	–	5
P.L. 480, Farmer–to–Farmer	10	–	10
Subtotal	25		25
Food Aid			
USDA Food Aid ("up to...")	165	–	165
DOD Surplus Stock Donations	45	–	45
Subtotal	210		210
Total, Firm Commitments	**735**	**–**	**735**
II. Additional Proposed			
(Requires congressional approval.)			
Requires FY 92 & 93 Appropriation			
Humanitarian/TechnicalAssistance Account	150	350	500
Requires 92 Reprogramming and 93 Appropriation			
Economic Support Funds	80	100	180
Development Assistance	5	10	15
Requires 93 Appropriation			
P.L. 480, Farmer–to–Farmer	–	10	10
Total, Additional Proposed	**235**	**470**	**705**
TOTAL, AVAILABLE & PROPOSED	**970**	**470**	**1,440**

* Excludes $3.75 billion in USDA export guarantees ($2.5 billion in FY 1991 and $1.25 billion in FY 1992). Excludes $5 million in FY 1991 AID medical assistance. Some of the funds made available in FY 1992 may be programmed in FY 1993.

Soviet Assistance Chronology

(In rough order of when decisions were made to use or seek funds.)

	$ Millions FY92+FY93	Comments
October, 1991		
USDA Food Aid ("up to...")	165	Grant componant of $1.5 billion commitment made by USDA October 1.
USDA Technical Assistance	5	Technical assistance of $1.5 billion commitment made by USDA October 1.
AID Medical Assistance	5	Second tranche of Project Hope funded by Disaster Assistance account.
November, 1991		
ESF, 1991 Reprogramming	5	Part of FY 1991 Pakistan reprogramming (Congress has approved).
December, 1991		
Princeton Speech:		
DOD Transportation & Disarmamant	500	Sec'y said we will use the funds, President must sign emergency designation.
ESF	100	Sec'y said we would commit $100 m for technical assistance
Other:		
ESF	80	Dep Sec'y decides to seek $100 m of non-food asst. in '92 and $100 m in '93. (The $80 million of ESF is combined with the $5 m AID medical and the $5 m of '91 ESF shown above and $10 m of the P.L. 480 shown below for $100m in 91 non-food assistance. An additional $100m ESF will be requested in '93.)
DOD Surplus Stock Donations	45	DOD reserved surplus Gulf food supplies for former Soviet Union.
Development Assistance	15	Dep. Sec'y asked Roskins for $5 m in 92 and $10m in 93.
P.L. 480, Farmer-to-Farmer	20	USDA and AID agree to use P.L. 480 resources for technical assistance.
January, 1992		
Humanitarian/Technical Asst. Special Acct.	500	Sec'y and Darman agree to request additional $150 m in '92 and $350 m in '93 for humanitarian/technical assistance.
Total Proposed for FY 1992 & FY 1993	1440	

Plans for FY 1992 ESF Funds

The FY 1992 ESF funds would be devoted to providing technical assistance in the five areas that you and the President have highlighted as well as meeting any short-term emergency requirements in moving humanitarian assistance. In particular, I want to design a program that would roughly reflect our priorities as follows:

- Approximately 35-40 percent of the funds would be spent on economic restructuring and the creation of market economy mechanism with immediate impact. This would include:

  -- promoting competition, assisting in privatization and developing a framework for commercial and property law;

  -- promoting trade and investment, particularly in areas of agribusiness, medical supplies, and shelter (which will tie in to Conference initiatives);

  -- support for macroeconomic reform programs (carried out by IFIs) through technical assistance and advice in areas like fiscal and monetary policy, banking, and finance; and

  -- management and business training.

- Approximately 10-15 percent would be spent on strengthening food distribution and humanitarian systems. This would include activities in the agricultural and medical sectors to help Republics prepare for the next year and supporting U.S. PVO's providing assistance to indigenous PVO's. (This would support and enhance USDA's current technical assistance plans.)

- Roughly 15 percent of the funds would go to democratic institution building. This would focus on stimulating democratic legislatures, public administration, and private organizations.

- Defense conversion activities, including feasibility studies, retraining workers, developing new opportunities for scientists, and selected housing assistance could account for 10 to 15 percent of the funds.

- Projects in energy and the environmental sector could account for the remaining 15-20 percent. This includes steps to promote conservation and "quick fixes" to get more oil and gas flowing.

Within these categories we plan to find some quick-action "demonstration projects" to be announced at the Conference with particular relevance to humanitarian needs.

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ACTION OFFICER: BURNS DUE: 21 JAN 92

- [x] Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Howe
- [ ] Prepare Memo For Brady
- [ ] Prepare Memo _____
- [ ] Appropriate Action
- [ ] Prepare Memo For Sittmann to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 6849

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☐	☐	Fry	☐	☐	Needles	☐	☐	Wayne
☐	☐	Gordon	☐	☐	O'Leary	☐	☐	Whitley
☐	☒	Gompert	☐	☐	Paal	☐	☐	Working
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INFORMATION

- [x] Sittmann
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 183
OF 201530Z JANUARY 92
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR HMA AND MINISTER)

A FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNOS 175, 176 AND 182

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH YELTSIN: 20 JANUARY: BW

1. YELTSIN ALSO TALKED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, ABOUT BW.

2. HE SAID THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD SIGNED WHAT HE CALLED AN INSTRUMENT ON THE CESSATION OF ALL BW (PRESUMABLY THE BW CONVENTION), AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT IN HANDING OVER TO YELTSIN GORBACHEV AND THE FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENCE HAD SWORN THAT THE SOVIET BW PROGRAMME HAD BEEN DISCONTINUED, YELTSIN HAD FOUND THAT THE PROGRAMME WAS CONTINUING, COVERTLY.

3. YELTSIN SAID HE KNEW SOME OF THE BW SCIENTISTS INVOLVED. THEY WERE FANATICS: MISGUIDED GENIUSES. HE WOULD FORCE THEM TO STOP THIS ILLEGAL WORK DIRECTED AGAINST HUMANITY. HE KNEW THAT THE WORK WAS BEING DONE AT 2 PARTICULAR PLACES. WHEN HE HAD VISITED THE 2 PLACES TO CHECK THAT WORK HAD STOPPED HE WOULD ASK AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF VERIFICATION TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES. HE IMAGINED THAT SOME CRITICS (IN RUSSIA) WOULD CLAIM THAT THE AMERICANS ALSO HAD A COVERT BW PROGRAMME. SO IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO EXCHANGE VERIFICATION TEAMS.

4. YELTSIN SAID THE LEADER OF THE BW PROGRAMME WOULD HAVE TO RETIRE IMMEDIATELY. THE OTHER SCIENTISTS MIGHT BE DIVERTED INTO GENETIC WORK ON LIVESTOCK BREEDING GIVEN THEIR EXPERIENCE OF WORK ON HUMAN GENES IN THE BW PROGRAMME.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE SOVIET BW PROGRAMME HAD FOR LONG BEEN A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO US. YELTSIN'S ACCOUNT AND DECISIONS WOULD BE VERY WARMLY WELCOMED. VERIFICATION WAS AN INTERNATIONAL QUESTION: THE NOTABLE DEFECT OF THE BW CONVENTION WAS THAT IT DID NOT PROVIDE VERIFICATION.

6. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS, PS/NO 10, PS/PUS, BROOMFIELD, GOULDEN, TAIT, HEAD SOVIET DEPT AND PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY (STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR WEBB).

BRAITHWAITE

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1070-MR
MM 3/2/2015

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MXLNAN 1827

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Strauss from Brent Scowcroft [220314Z Jan 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (11 pp.)	1/22/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/13/2022

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91131-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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PAGE 01 OF 11

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TO 1.4(c) MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
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SECTION 01 OF 04
1.4(c) MOSCOW PLEASE THE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

PLEASE DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 22 TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OR DCM COLLINS ONLY.

21 JANUARY 1992.

BEGIN TEXT.

BOB -- THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO ANNOUNCE A STRATEGIC WEAPONS INITIATIVE IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS NEXT WEEK. IT ANNOUNCES THE UNILATERAL CURTAILMENT OF SEVERAL MAJOR U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND URGES YELTSIN TO FOLLOW THIS LEAD BY CURTAILING RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. THE INITIATIVE REEMPHASIZES THE DEMIRVING PROPOSAL FIRST MADE BY THE PRESIDENT LAST SEPTEMBER AND SPECIFICALLY DEFINES THE STEPS THE U.S. WOULD MAKE IF RUSSIA WILL DO LIKEWISE. YOU SHOULD SEEK TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO YELTSIN PERSONALLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT PLACES ON SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE BEFORE US, AND URGING A POSITIVE RESPONSE. WE ALSO ASK THAT YELTSIN KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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YOU SHOULD ALSO DELIVER THE OTHER LETTERS TO SHUSHKEVICH AND NAZARBAYEV AND GET KRAVCHUK'S LETTER TO JOHN GUNDERSON FOR DELIVERY IN DOING SO PLEASE ADVISE ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE CONTENTS KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28

JIM BAKER HAS CLEARED THE LETTERS.

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO YELTSIN:

DEAR BORIS

IN THE WAKE OF LAST AUGUST'S FAILED COUP, AND THE VICTORY OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN YOUR COUNTRY, I ANNOUNCED A NUMBER OF STEPS TO REDUCE THE U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND SUGGESTED WAYS WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO REDUCE FURTHER NUCLEAR FORCES AND TO IMPROVE STABILITY. I KNOW THAT YOU HAD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE RESPONSE TO MY INITIATIVE AND HIS AGREEMENT TO A NUMBER OF RECIPROCAL AND JOINT EFFORTS. I KNOW THAT THE INITIATIVE OF LAST FALL IS NOW BEING IMPLEMENTED UNDER YOUR FIRM LEADERSHIP. MANY STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE NO LONGER ON ALERT. THOUSANDS OF TACTICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN SLATED FOR ELIMINATION, AND DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR EXPERTS ARE UNDERWAY IN IMPORTANT AREAS.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ALONG WITH THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE FURTHER PROMOTED CONFIDENCE THAT RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEW STATES INTEND TO BUILD A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON COOPERATION, NOT ON THREATS OR INTIMIDATION. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS DONE EVEN MORE TO REDUCE THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. AGAIN, I KNOW THAT MANY OF THESE REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN HAVE NOT BEEN WITHOUT POLITICAL RISK.

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE CHANGES IN WHICH YOU HAVE HAD SUCH A STRONG AND COURAGEOUS HAND THAT WE NOW FACE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO GO EVEN FURTHER IN REDUCING THE THREAT POSED BY EACH OTHER'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOW IS THE TIME TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF OUR STRATEGIC ARSENALS.

I KNOW YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE: A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL; A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLAYS NO ROLE. THE SQUANDERING OF SCARCE RESOURCES ON BUILDING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS ONLY TAKES AWAY FROM ECONOMIC REBUILDING. I WANT TO TAKE STEPS THAT MAKE IT EASIER FOR YOU TO SHIFT HUMAN AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO PEACEFUL USES.

WITH THESE GOALS IN MIND, I AM DIRECTING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS:

-- THE B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM WILL BE TERMINATED. I WILL BUILD ONLY THOSE FOR WHICH PROCUREMENT HAS ALREADY BEGUN -- TWENTY AIRCRAFT.

-- PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SMALL ICBM WILL BE CANCELLED.

-- PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, HIGHLY ACCURATE WARHEAD -- CALLED THE W-88 -- FOR OUR SUBMARINE-BASED DETERRENT WILL CEASE. LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS WARHEAD TO A SMALL FRACTION OF OUR ORIGINAL PLAN.

-- PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SPARE PEACEKEEPER MISSILES WILL BE TERMINATED.

-- PRODUCTION OF THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE TERMINATED, LIMITING THOSE WEAPONS TO A NUMBER WELL

BELOW THE ORIGINAL PLAN.

BORIS. THESE ARE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE REGARDLESS OF ANY FURTHER ACTIONS OF YOUR OWN BECAUSE OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR RELATIONSHIP ALREADY HAS CHANGED. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM HOPEFUL THAT THEY ALSO WILL HELP YOU TO REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO MORE VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS. MUCH AS I DID IN MY SEPTEMBER 27 INITIATIVE WHEN I URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO BE RESPONSIVE, I URGE YOU TO TAKE YOUR OWN BOLD MEASURES TO CURTAIL STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND FOREGO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.
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SECTION 02 OF 04

THERE IS STILL MORE WE CAN AND SHOULD DO TO LESSEN THE THREAT, TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE ARSENALS WE EACH MAINTAIN. IN PARTICULAR, I ASK YOU TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE PROPOSAL I MADE LAST SEPTEMBER TO ELIMINATE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC WEAPONS FROM THE ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES -- LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS) WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS (MIRVS).

THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES TO REMOVE MULTIPLE WARHEADS FROM ALL ITS ICBMS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. WE WOULD ELIMINATE ALL OUR PEACEKEEPER ICBMS AND REDUCE THE WARHEADS ON THE MINUTEMAN MISSILES THAT WOULD REMAIN AFTER START REDUCTIONS TO ONLY ONE WARHEAD EACH. YOU, IN TURN, WOULD AGREE TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS AND REDUCE THE SIZE OF YOUR STRATEGIC FORCES TO A LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY THREAT FROM THE WEST.

JIM BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT SOME ON YOUR SIDE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT "DEMIRVING" LAND-BASED ICBMS WOULD CREATE AN UNACCEPTABLE IMBALANCE BECAUSE OF THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF THE

U.S. SUBMARINE-BASED FORCE. MY UNILATERAL DECISION TO CANCEL PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, ADVANCED WARHEAD FOR OUR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES WAS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THOSE CONCERNS. BUT I AM PREPARED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS. IF YOU AND I CAN AGREE TO DEMIRV THE LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCE, I AM PREPARED TO REDUCE BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THE U.S. SUBMARINE FORCE AS A WHOLE. THESE ACTIONS WOULD REDUCE START-ACCOUNTABLE U.S. STRATEGIC WARHEADS TO A NUMBER ABOUT 40 PERCENT BELOW THAT PERMITTED BY THE START TREATY. I ALSO AM PREPARED TO REORIENT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. COMBINED WITH THE STEPS ABOVE, THIS WOULD APPROXIMATE A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL WARHEADS THE U.S. HAD PLANNED TO RETAIN AFTER THE START DRAWDOWN PERIOD.

THESE ARE BOLD STEPS. BUT THEY ARE WELL WITHIN OUR REACH. YOU AND I SHOULD MAKE THESE CHANGES QUICKLY TO UNDERSCORE OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP, TO CAPTURE THE SECURITY BENEFITS THEY PROMISE AND TO REALIZE SIGNIFICANT FISCAL SAVINGS. WITH A CONCERTED EFFORT WE COULD BOTH COMPLETE THESE ACTIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE ELIMINATIONS ALREADY AGREED UNDER START, BY A DATE WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE DEADLINE IN THE START TREATY. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RUSSIA AND THE OTHER STATES IN MEETING THIS AGREED DEADLINE BY PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT IF WARRANTED.

IF YOU ARE WILLING, YOU AND I COULD TAKE ONE MORE STEP TO REDUCE THE IMMEDIATE THREAT EVEN FURTHER BY DEACTIVATING OR BEGINNING MODIFICATION OF THE SYSTEMS AFFECTED BY THIS INITIATIVE BY A FIRM DATE. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE TO DEACTIVATE MOST OR ALL OF THESE SYSTEMS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. ONCE DEACTIVATED, WE WOULD PROCEED ON AN ACCELERATED TIME LINE TO MEET THE AGREED DATE FOR ELIMINATION.

I ALSO WILL BE WRITING TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK, SHUSHKEVICH, AND NAZARBAYEV TO GIVE THEM THE BROAD OUTLINE OF WHAT I AM PROPOSING AND TO ENCOURAGE THEIR SUPPORT. BUT I LOOK TO YOU TO WORK WITH THEM ON

THE DETAILS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE IDEAS.

BORIS. WE HAVE A TRULY HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US TO RESHAPE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT A MAGNITUDE AND PACE NOT DREAMED OF BEFORE. WE SHOULD NOT GET CAUGHT UP IN ENDLESS THEOLOGICAL DEBATES ABOUT PARITY AND EQUALITY OR IN EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS ON TRIVIAL DETAILS. WE SHOULD NOT RETURN TO RIGID "OLD THINKING" ABOUT NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE. IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE WILL CHANGE THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND ACCELERATE THE PACE AT WHICH RUSSIA AND THE OTHER REPUBLICS FULLY JOIN THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC AND PEACELOVING NATIONS.

I PLAN TO OUTLINE THIS PROPOSAL IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28. I KNOW THIS IS A COMPLEX PROPOSAL THAT WILL REQUIRE ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION, BUT IT WOULD OF COURSE BE HELPFUL IF I COULD SAY IN THE SPEECH THAT YOU HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THESE IDEAS. JIM BAKER CAN REVIEW THEM WITH YOU AND GET YOUR INITIAL REACTION DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW. AND WE CAN CERTAINLY DISCUSS THEM WHEN WE ARE TOGETHER AT CAMP DAVID ON FEBRUARY 1.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTERS TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK AND SHUSHKEVICH

DEAR LEONID
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN

I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND

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SECTION 03 OF 04
THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER: TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS, AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS, OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING

THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED

STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

LEONID [MR. CHAIRMAN], I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE THE INITIATIVE YOUR FULL SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND YOUR COUNTERPARTS IN [FOR UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FOR BYELARUS, UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN] TO QUICKLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENT IT.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

DEAR PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE

THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THE BULK OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE ON RUSSIAN TERRITORY, THE GREATEST IMPACT OF THIS INITIATIVE WILL BE THERE. BUT YOUR SUPPORT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO MOVING AHEAD.
IN THAT REGARD I WISH TO RAISE A SUBJECT YOU TOUCHED UPON IN YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 7 -- THE QUESTION OF ADHERENCE BY KAZAKHSTAN TO THE 1968 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. JIM BAKER INFORMED ME OF THREE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE TWO OF YOU HAD ON THIS MATTER, THE FIRST IN ALMA-ATA IN DECEMBER AND THE OTHER TWO IN SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALLS. YOU MADE CLEAR TO HIM ON THOSE OCCASIONS THAT, IN THE

CONTEXT OF THE U.S. ESTABLISHING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH KAZAKHSTAN AND SUPPORTING MEMBERSHIP OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE UNITED
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NATIONS -- BOTH OF WHICH WE HAVE DONE -- YOU WOULD JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. YET YOUR RECENT LETTER INDICATES AN INTENTION TO JOIN THE TREATY AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE.

MR. PRESIDENT, THERE MAY WELL BE A MISUNDERSTANDING HERE ABOUT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADHERING TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. WE NEED TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER AND RESOLVE IT QUICKLY.

I WELCOME THE ASSURANCE YOU GAVE TO JIM BAKER, WHICH YOU REPEATED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, THAT THE TERRITORY OF KAZAKHSTAN WILL BECOME A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. UNTIL THAT OBJECTIVE IS REALIZED, NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WILL, OF COURSE, BE LOCATED ON YOUR SOIL. AND, AS YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AGREED AT ALMA-ATA AND MINSK, THOSE WEAPONS WILL BE MAINTAINED UNDER SINGLE, UNIFIED CONTROL.

I WISH TO STRESS TO YOU THAT THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON YOUR TERRITORY FOR THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- AS LONG AS THEY ARE MAINTAINED UNDER EFFECTIVE UNIFIED CONTROL, AS YOU AND YOUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS HAVE AGREED -- IS NOT A LEGAL BARRIER TO YOUR JOINING THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO BARRIER TO YOUR ADHERING IMMEDIATELY TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AND TO CONCLUDING THE COMPREHENSIVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY THE TREATY.

AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF YOUR CLEAR INTENTION TO JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE OUR ABILITY TO MOVE AHEAD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL MANNER ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES. WE STAND READY TO

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SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC AND MARKET REFORMS IN KAZAKHSTAN. AS YOU KNOW WE RECENTLY SENT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FAUV[illegible] TO ALMA-ATA TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND MEMBERS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION HOW WE CAN TOGETHER WORK TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC REFORM. THIS IS BUT THE FIRST OF

MANY STEPS WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE TO DEVELOP OUR RELATIONSHIP. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR UPCOMING VISIT WHERE WE CAN DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THE CONTENT OF MY STRATEGIC INITIATIVE IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13a. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss, Re: Bob -- [FOIA restrictions redacted] (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/13/2022

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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~~SECRET~~

NIACT IMMEDIATE

1.4(c) MOSCOW

FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT FOR AMBASSADOR STRAUSS -- EYES ONLY VIA WHITE HOUSE 1.4(c)

PLEASE DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 22 TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OR DCM COLLINS ONLY.

BOB -- THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO ANNOUNCE A STRATEGIC WEAPONS INITIATIVE IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS NEXT WEEK. IT ANNOUNCES THE UNILATERAL CURTAILMENT OF SEVERAL MAJOR U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND URGES YELTSIN TO FOLLOW THIS LEAD BY CURTAILING RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. THE INITIATIVE REEMPHASIZES THE DEMIRVING PROPOSAL FIRST MADE BY THE PRESIDENT LAST SEPTEMBER AND SPECIFICALLY DEFINES THE STEPS THE U.S. WOULD MAKE IF RUSSIA WILL DO LIKEWISE. YOU SHOULD SEEK TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO YELTSIN PERSONALLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT PLACES ON SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE BEFORE US, AND URGING A POSITIVE RESPONSE. WE ALSO ASK THAT YELTSIN KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

YOU SHOULD ALSO DELIVER THE OTHER LETTERS TO SHUSHKEVICH AND NAZARBAYEV AND GET KRAVCHUK'S LETTER TO JOHN GUNDERSON FOR DELIVERY. IN DOING SO, PLEASE ADVISE ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE CONTENTS KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28.

JIM BAKER HAS CLEARED THE LETTERS.

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO YELTSIN:

DEAR BORIS

IN THE WAKE OF LAST AUGUST'S FAILED COUP, AND THE VICTORY OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN YOUR COUNTRY, I ANNOUNCED A NUMBER OF STEPS TO REDUCE THE U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND SUGGESTED WAYS WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO REDUCE FURTHER NUCLEAR FORCES AND TO IMPROVE STABILITY. I KNOW THAT YOU HAD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE RESPONSE TO MY INITIATIVE AND HIS AGREEMENT TO A NUMBER OF RECIPROCAL AND JOINT EFFORTS. I KNOW THAT THE INITIATIVE OF LAST FALL IS NOW BEING IMPLEMENTED UNDER YOUR FIRM LEADERSHIP. MANY STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE NO LONGER ON ALERT, THOUSANDS OF TACTICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN SLATED FOR ELIMINATION, AND DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR EXPERTS ARE UNDERWAY IN IMPORTANT AREAS.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ALONG WITH THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES,

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2009-1074-MR
MM 10/3/2016

HAVE FURTHER PROMOTED CONFIDENCE THAT RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEW STATES INTEND TO BUILD A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON COOPERATION, NOT ON THREATS OR INTIMIDATION. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS DONE EVEN MORE TO REDUCE THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. AGAIN, I KNOW THAT MANY OF THESE REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN HAVE NOT BEEN WITHOUT POLITICAL RISK.

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE CHANGES IN WHICH YOU HAVE HAD SUCH A STRONG AND COURAGEOUS HAND THAT WE NOW FACE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO GO EVEN FURTHER IN REDUCING THE THREAT POSED BY EACH OTHER'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOW IS THE TIME TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF OUR STRATEGIC ARSENALS.

I KNOW YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL; A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLAYS NO ROLE. THE SQUANDERING OF SCARCE RESOURCES ON BUILDING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS ONLY TAKES AWAY FROM ECONOMIC REBUILDING. I WANT TO TAKE STEPS THAT MAKE IT EASIER FOR YOU TO SHIFT HUMAN AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO PEACEFUL USES.

WITH THESE GOALS IN MIND, I AM DIRECTING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS:

-- THE B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM WILL BE TERMINATED. I WILL BUILD ONLY THOSE FOR WHICH PROCUREMENT HAS ALREADY BEGUN -- TWENTY AIRCRAFT.

-- PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SMALL ICBM WILL BE CANCELLED.

-- PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, HIGHLY ACCURATE WARHEAD -- CALLED THE W-88 -- FOR OUR SUBMARINE-BASED DETERRENT WILL CEASE, LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS WARHEAD TO A SMALL FRACTION OF OUR ORIGINAL PLAN.

-- PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SPARE PEACEKEEPER MISSILES WILL BE TERMINATED.

-- PRODUCTION OF THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE TERMINATED, LIMITING THOSE WEAPONS TO A NUMBER WELL BELOW THE ORIGINAL PLAN.

BORIS, THESE ARE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE REGARDLESS OF ANY FURTHER ACTIONS OF YOUR OWN BECAUSE OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR RELATIONSHIP ALREADY HAS CHANGED. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM HOPEFUL THAT THEY ALSO WILL HELP YOU TO REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES

TO MORE VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS. MUCH AS I DID IN MY SEPTEMBER 27 INITIATIVE WHEN I URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO BE RESPONSIVE, I URGE YOU TO TAKE YOUR OWN BOLD MEASURES TO CURTAIL STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND FOREGO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

THERE IS STILL MORE WE CAN AND SHOULD DO TO LESSEN THE THREAT, TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE ARSENALS WE EACH MAINTAIN. IN PARTICULAR, I ASK YOU TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE PROPOSAL I MADE LAST SEPTEMBER TO ELIMINATE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC WEAPONS FROM THE ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES -- LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS) WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS (MIRVS).

THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES TO REMOVE MULTIPLE WARHEADS FROM ALL ITS ICBMS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. WE WOULD ELIMINATE ALL OUR PEACEKEEPER ICBMS AND REDUCE THE WARHEADS ON THE MINUTEMAN MISSILES THAT WOULD REMAIN AFTER START REDUCTIONS TO ONLY ONE WARHEAD EACH. YOU, IN TURN, WOULD AGREE TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS AND REDUCE THE SIZE OF YOUR STRATEGIC FORCES TO A LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY THREAT FROM THE WEST.

JIM BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT SOME ON YOUR SIDE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT "DEMIRVING" LAND-BASED ICBMS WOULD CREATE AN UNACCEPTABLE IMBALANCE BECAUSE OF THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF THE U.S. SUBMARINE-BASED FORCE. MY UNILATERAL DECISION TO CANCEL PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, ADVANCED WARHEAD FOR OUR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES WAS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THOSE CONCERNS. BUT I AM PREPARED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS. IF YOU AND I CAN AGREE TO DEMIRV THE LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCE, I AM PREPARED TO REDUCE BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THE U.S. SUBMARINE FORCE AS A WHOLE. THESE ACTIONS WOULD REDUCE START-ACCOUNTABLE U.S. STRATEGIC WARHEADS TO A NUMBER ABOUT 40 PERCENT BELOW THAT PERMITTED BY THE START TREATY. I ALSO AM PREPARED TO REORIENT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. COMBINED WITH THE STEPS ABOVE, THIS WOULD APPROXIMATE A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL WARHEADS THE U.S. HAD PLANNED TO RETAIN AFTER THE START DRAWDOWN PERIOD.

THESE ARE BOLD STEPS, BUT THEY ARE WELL WITHIN OUR REACH. YOU AND I SHOULD MAKE THESE CHANGES QUICKLY TO UNDERSCORE OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP, TO CAPTURE THE SECURITY BENEFITS THEY PROMISE AND TO REALIZE SIGNIFICANT FISCAL SAVINGS. WITH A CONCERTED EFFORT WE COULD BOTH COMPLETE THESE ACTIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE ELIMINATIONS ALREADY AGREED UNDER START, BY A DATE WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE DEADLINE IN THE START TREATY. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RUSSIA AND THE OTHER STATES IN MEETING THIS AGREED DEADLINE BY PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT IF WARRANTED.

IF YOU ARE WILLING, YOU AND I COULD TAKE ONE MORE STEP TO REDUCE THE IMMEDIATE THREAT EVEN FURTHER BY DEACTIVATING OR BEGINNING MODIFICATION OF THE SYSTEMS AFFECTED BY THIS INITIATIVE BY A FIRM DATE. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE TO DEACTIVATE MOST OR ALL OF THESE SYSTEMS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. ONCE DEACTIVATED, WE WOULD PROCEED ON AN ACCELERATED TIME LINE TO MEET THE AGREED DATE FOR ELIMINATION.

I ALSO WILL BE WRITING TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK, SHUSHKEVICH, AND NAZARBAYEV TO GIVE THEM THE BROAD OUTLINE OF WHAT I AM PROPOSING AND TO ENCOURAGE THEIR SUPPORT. BUT I LOOK TO YOU TO WORK WITH THEM ON THE DETAILS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE IDEAS.

BORIS, WE HAVE A TRULY HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US TO RESHAPE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT A MAGNITUDE AND PACE NOT DREAMED OF BEFORE. WE SHOULD NOT GET CAUGHT UP IN ENDLESS THEOLOGICAL DEBATES ABOUT PARITY AND EQUALITY OR IN EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS ON TRIVIAL DETAILS. WE SHOULD NOT RETURN TO RIGID "OLD THINKING" ABOUT NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE. IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE WILL CHANGE THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND ACCELERATE THE PACE AT WHICH RUSSIA AND THE OTHER REPUBLICS FULLY JOIN THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC AND PEACELOVING NATIONS.

I PLAN TO OUTLINE THIS PROPOSAL IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28. I KNOW THIS IS A COMPLEX PROPOSAL THAT WILL REQUIRE ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION, BUT IT WOULD OF COURSE BE HELPFUL IF I COULD SAY IN THE SPEECH THAT YOU HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THESE IDEAS. JIM BAKER CAN REVIEW THEM WITH YOU AND GET YOUR INITIAL REACTION DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND WE CAN CERTAINLY DISCUSS THEM WHEN WE ARE TOGETHER AT CAMP DAVID ON FEBRUARY 1.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTERS TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK AND SHUSHKEVICH

DEAR LEONID
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN

I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST.

THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER; TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS, AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS, OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

LEONID [MR. CHAIRMAN], I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE THE INITIATIVE YOUR FULL SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND YOUR COUNTERPARTS IN [FOR UKRAINE: BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN; FOR BYELARUS: UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN] TO QUICKLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENT IT.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

DEAR PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER; TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS, AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS, OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THE BULK OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE ON RUSSIAN TERRITORY, THE GREATEST IMPACT OF THIS INITIATIVE WILL BE THERE. BUT YOUR SUPPORT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO MOVING AHEAD.

IN THAT REGARD I WISH TO RAISE A SUBJECT YOU TOUCHED UPON IN YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 7 -- THE QUESTION OF ADHERENCE BY KAZAKHSTAN TO THE 1968 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. JIM BAKER INFORMED ME OF THREE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE TWO OF YOU HAD ON THIS MATTER, THE FIRST IN ALMA-ATA IN DECEMBER AND THE OTHER TWO IN SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALLS. YOU MADE CLEAR TO HIM ON THOSE OCCASIONS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE U.S. ESTABLISHING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH KAZAKHSTAN AND SUPPORTING MEMBERSHIP OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS -- BOTH OF WHICH WE HAVE DONE -- YOU WOULD JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. YET YOUR RECENT LETTER

INDICATES AN INTENTION TO JOIN THE TREATY AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE.

MR. PRESIDENT, THERE MAY WELL BE A MISUNDERSTANDING HERE ABOUT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADHERING TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. WE NEED TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER AND RESOLVE IT QUICKLY.

I WELCOME THE ASSURANCE YOU GAVE TO JIM BAKER, WHICH YOU REPEATED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, THAT THE TERRITORY OF KAZAKHSTAN WILL BECOME A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. UNTIL THAT OBJECTIVE IS REALIZED, NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WILL, OF COURSE, BE LOCATED ON YOUR SOIL. AND, AS YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AGREED AT ALMA-ATA AND MINSK, THOSE WEAPONS WILL BE MAINTAINED UNDER SINGLE, UNIFIED CONTROL.

I WISH TO STRESS TO YOU THAT THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON YOUR TERRITORY FOR THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- AS LONG AS THEY ARE MAINTAINED UNDER EFFECTIVE UNIFIED CONTROL, AS YOU AND YOUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS HAVE AGREED -- IS NOT A LEGAL BARRIER TO YOUR JOINING THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO BARRIER TO YOUR ADHERING IMMEDIATELY TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AND TO CONCLUDING THE COMPREHENSIVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY THE TREATY.

AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF YOUR CLEAR INTENTION TO JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE OUR ABILITY TO MOVE AHEAD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL MANNER ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES. WE STAND READY TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC AND MARKET REFORMS IN KAZAKHSTAN. AS YOU KNOW, WE RECENTLY SENT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FAUVER TO ALMA-ATA TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND MEMBERS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION HOW WE CAN TOGETHER WORK TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC REFORM. THIS IS BUT THE FIRST OF MANY STEPS WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE TO DEVELOP OUR RELATIONSHIP. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR UPCOMING VISIT WHERE WE CAN DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THE CONTENT OF MY STRATEGIC INITIATIVE IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Strauss from Brent Scowcroft [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	1/21/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/13/2022

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91131-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WHITE HOUSE
1.4(c) MOSCOW
~~S E C R E T~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
QQQQ
1.4(c) MOSCOW PLEASE THE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

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PLEASE DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 22 TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OR DCM COLLINS ONLY.

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21 JANUARY 1992.

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BEGIN TEXT:

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BOB -- THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO ANNOUNCE A STRATEGIC WEAPONS INITIATIVE IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS NEXT WEEK. IT ANNOUNCES THE UNILATERAL CURTAILMENT OF SEVERAL MAJOR U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND URGES YELTSIN TO FOLLOW THIS LEAD BY CURTAILING RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. THE INITIATIVE REEMPHASIZES THE DEMIRVING PROPOSAL FIRST MADE BY THE PRESIDENT LAST SEPTEMBER AND SPECIFICALLY DEFINES THE STEPS THE U.S. WOULD MAKE IF RUSSIA WILL DO LIKEWISE. YOU SHOULD SEEK TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO YELTSIN PERSONALLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT PLACES ON SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE BEFORE US, AND URGING A POSITIVE RESPONSE. WE ALSO ASK THAT YELTSIN KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. O THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. Space ?

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YOU SHOULD ALSO DELIVER THE OTHER LETTERS TO SHUSHKEVICH AND NAZARBAYEV AND GET KRAVCHUK'S LETTER TO JOHN GUNDERSON FOR DELIVERY. IN DOING SO, PLEASE ADVISE ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE CONTENTS KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28.

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JIM BAKER HAS CLEARED THE LETTERS.

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PER E.O. 13526
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BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO YELTSIN:

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DEAR BORIS

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ALONG WITH THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE FURTHER PROMOTED CONFIDENCE THAT RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEW STATES INTEND TO BUILD A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON COOPERATION, NOT ON THREATS OR INTIMIDATION. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND

AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS DONE EVEN MORE TO REDUCE THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. AGAIN, I KNOW THAT MANY OF THESE REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN HAVE NOT BEEN WITHOUT POLITICAL RISK.

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IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE CHANGES IN WHICH YOU HAVE HAD SUCH A STRONG AND COURAGEOUS HAND THAT WE NOW FACE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO GO EVEN FURTHER IN REDUCING THE THREAT POSED BY EACH OTHER'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOW IS THE TIME TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF OUR STRATEGIC ARSENALS.

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I KNOW YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL; A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLAYS NO ROLE. THE SQUANDERING OF SCARCE RESOURCES ON BUILDING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS ONLY TAKES AWAY FROM ECONOMIC REBUILDING. I WANT TO TAKE STEPS THAT MAKE IT EASIER FOR YOU TO SHIFT HUMAN AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO PEACEFUL USES.

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WITH THESE GOALS IN MIND, I AM DIRECTING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS:

.

-- THE B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM WILL BE TERMINATED. I WILL BUILD ONLY THOSE FOR WHICH PROCUREMENT HAS ALREADY BEGUN -- TWENTY AIRCRAFT.

.

-- PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SMALL ICBM WILL BE CANCELLED.

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-- PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, HIGHLY ACCURATE WARHEAD -- CALLED THE W-88 -- FOR OUR SUBMARINE-BASED DETERRENT WILL CEASE, LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS WARHEAD TO A SMALL FRACTION OF OUR ORIGINAL PLAN.

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-- PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SPARE PEACEKEEPER MISSILES WILL BE TERMINATED.

.

-- PRODUCTION OF THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE TERMINATED, LIMITING THOSE WEAPONS TO A NUMBER WELL BELOW THE ORIGINAL PLAN.

.

BORIS, THESE ARE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE REGARDLESS OF ANY FURTHER ACTIONS OF YOUR OWN BECAUSE OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR RELATIONSHIP ALREADY HAS CHANGED. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM HOPEFUL THAT THEY ALSO WILL HELP YOU TO REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO MORE VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS. MUCH AS I DID IN MY SEPTEMBER 27 INITIATIVE WHEN I URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO BE RESPONSIVE, I URGE YOU TO TAKE YOUR OWN BOLD MEASURES TO CURTAIL STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND FOREGO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

.

THERE IS STILL MORE WE CAN AND SHOULD DO TO LESSEN THE THREAT, TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE ARSENALS WE EACH MAINTAIN. IN PARTICULAR, I ASK YOU TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE PROPOSAL I MADE LAST SEPTEMBER TO ELIMINATE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC WEAPONS FROM THE ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES -- LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS) WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS (MIRVS).

.

THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES TO REMOVE MULTIPLE WARHEADS FROM ALL ITS ICBMS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. WE WOULD ELIMINATE ALL OUR PEACEKEEPER ICBMS AND REDUCE THE WARHEADS ON THE MINUTEMAN MISSILES THAT WOULD REMAIN AFTER START REDUCTIONS TO ONLY ONE WARHEAD EACH. YOU, IN TURN, WOULD AGREE TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS AND REDUCE THE SIZE OF YOUR STRATEGIC FORCES TO A LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY THREAT FROM THE WEST.

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JIM BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT SOME ON YOUR SIDE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT "DEMIRVING" LAND-BASED ICBMS WOULD CREATE AN UNACCEPTABLE IMBALANCE BECAUSE OF THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF THE U.S. SUBMARINE-BASED FORCE. MY UNILATERAL DECISION TO CANCEL PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, ADVANCED WARHEAD FOR OUR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES WAS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THOSE CONCERNS. BUT I AM PREPARED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS. IF YOU AND I CAN AGREE TO DEMIRV THE LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCE, I AM PREPARED TO REDUCE BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THE U.S. SUBMARINE FORCE AS A WHOLE. THESE ACTIONS WOULD REDUCE START-ACCOUNTABLE U.S. STRATEGIC WARHEADS TO A NUMBER ABOUT 40 PERCENT BELOW THAT PERMITTED BY THE START TREATY. I ALSO AM PREPARED TO REORIENT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. COMBINED WITH THE STEPS ABOVE, THIS WOULD APPROXIMATE A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL WARHEADS THE U.S. HAD PLANNED TO RETAIN AFTER THE START DRAWDOWN PERIOD.

.

THESE ARE BOLD STEPS, BUT THEY ARE WELL WITHIN OUR REACH. YOU AND I SHOULD MAKE THESE CHANGES QUICKLY TO UNDERSCORE OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP, TO CAPTURE THE SECURITY BENEFITS THEY PROMISE AND TO REALIZE SIGNIFICANT FISCAL SAVINGS. WITH A CONCERTED EFFORT WE COULD BOTH COMPLETE THESE ACTIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE ELIMINATIONS ALREADY AGREED UNDER START, BY A DATE WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE DEADLINE IN THE START TREATY. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RUSSIA AND THE OTHER STATES IN MEETING THIS AGREED DEADLINE BY PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT IF WARRANTED.

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IF YOU ARE WILLING, YOU AND I COULD TAKE ONE MORE STEP TO REDUCE THE IMMEDIATE THREAT EVEN FURTHER BY DEACTIVATING OR BEGINNING MODIFICATION OF THE SYSTEMS AFFECTED BY THIS INITIATIVE BY A FIRM DATE. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE TO DEACTIVATE MOST OR ALL OF THESE SYSTEMS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. ONCE DEACTIVATED, WE WOULD PROCEED ON AN ACCELERATED TIME LINE TO MEET THE AGREED DATE FOR ELIMINATION.

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I ALSO WILL BE WRITING TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK, SHUSHKEVICH, AND NAZARBAYEV TO GIVE THEM THE BROAD OUTLINE OF WHAT I AM PROPOSING AND TO ENCOURAGE THEIR SUPPORT. BUT I LOOK TO YOU TO WORK WITH THEM ON THE DETAILS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE IDEAS.

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BORIS, WE HAVE A TRULY HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US TO RESHAPE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT A MAGNITUDE AND PACE NOT DREAMED OF BEFORE. WE SHOULD NOT GET CAUGHT UP IN ENDLESS THEOLOGICAL DEBATES ABOUT PARITY AND EQUALITY OR IN EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS ON TRIVIAL DETAILS. WE SHOULD NOT RETURN TO RIGID "OLD THINKING" ABOUT NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE. IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE WILL CHANGE THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND ACCELERATE THE PACE AT WHICH RUSSIA AND THE OTHER REPUBLICS FULLY JOIN THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC AND PEACELOVING NATIONS.

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I PLAN TO OUTLINE THIS PROPOSAL IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28. I KNOW THIS IS A COMPLEX PROPOSAL THAT WILL REQUIRE ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION, BUT IT WOULD OF COURSE BE HELPFUL IF I COULD SAY IN THE SPEECH THAT YOU HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THESE IDEAS. JIM BAKER CAN REVIEW THEM WITH YOU AND GET YOUR INITIAL REACTION DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND WE CAN CERTAINLY DISCUSS THEM WHEN WE ARE TOGETHER AT CAMP DAVID ON FEBRUARY 1.

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I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

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SINCERELY,

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GEORGE BUSH

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BEGIN TEXT OF LETTERS TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK AND SHUSHKEVICH

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DEAR LEONID
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN

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I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

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THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER; TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS, AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS, OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

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IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

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LEONID [MR. CHAIRMAN], I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE THE

INITIATIVE YOUR FULL SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND YOUR COUNTERPARTS IN [FOR UKRAINE: BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN; FOR BYELARUS: UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN] TO QUICKLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENT IT.

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I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

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SINCERELY,

.

GEORGE BUSH

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BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

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DEAR PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

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I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

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THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER; TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS, AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS, OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

.

IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

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MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THE BULK OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE ON RUSSIAN TERRITORY, THE GREATEST IMPACT OF THIS INITIATIVE WILL BE THERE. BUT YOUR SUPPORT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO MOVING AHEAD.
IN THAT REGARD I WISH TO RAISE A SUBJECT YOU TOUCHED UPON IN YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 7 -- THE QUESTION OF ADHERENCE BY KAZAKHSTAN TO THE 1968 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. JIM BAKER INFORMED ME OF

THREE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE TWO OF YOU HAD ON THIS MATTER, THE FIRST IN ALMA-ATA IN DECEMBER AND THE OTHER TWO IN SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALLS. YOU MADE CLEAR TO HIM ON THOSE OCCASIONS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE U.S. ESTABLISHING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH KAZAKHSTAN AND SUPPORTING MEMBERSHIP OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS -- BOTH OF WHICH WE HAVE DONE -- YOU WOULD JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. YET YOUR RECENT LETTER INDICATES AN INTENTION TO JOIN THE TREATY AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE.

.

MR. PRESIDENT, THERE MAY WELL BE A MISUNDERSTANDING HERE ABOUT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADHERING TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. WE NEED TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER AND RESOLVE IT QUICKLY.

.

I WELCOME THE ASSURANCE YOU GAVE TO JIM BAKER, WHICH YOU REPEATED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, THAT THE TERRITORY OF KAZAKHSTAN WILL BECOME A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. UNTIL THAT OBJECTIVE IS REALIZED, NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WILL, OF COURSE, BE LOCATED ON YOUR SOIL. AND, AS YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AGREED AT ALMA-ATA AND MINSK, THOSE WEAPONS WILL BE MAINTAINED UNDER SINGLE, UNIFIED CONTROL.

.

I WISH TO STRESS TO YOU THAT THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON YOUR TERRITORY FOR THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- AS LONG AS THEY ARE MAINTAINED UNDER EFFECTIVE UNIFIED CONTROL, AS YOU AND YOUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS HAVE AGREED -- IS NOT A LEGAL BARRIER TO YOUR JOINING THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO BARRIER TO YOUR ADHERING IMMEDIATELY TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AND TO CONCLUDING THE COMPREHENSIVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY THE TREATY.

.

AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF YOUR CLEAR INTENTION TO JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE OUR ABILITY TO MOVE AHEAD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL MANNER ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES. WE STAND READY TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC AND MARKET REFORMS IN KAZAKHSTAN. AS YOU KNOW, WE RECENTLY SENT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FAUVER TO ALMA-ATA TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND MEMBERS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION HOW WE CAN TOGETHER WORK TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC REFORM. THIS IS BUT THE FIRST OF MANY STEPS WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE TO DEVELOP OUR RELATIONSHIP. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR UPCOMING VISIT WHERE WE CAN DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL.

.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THE CONTENT OF MY STRATEGIC INITIATIVE IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

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SINCERELY,

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GEORGE BUSH

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END TEXT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Strauss, Re: Bob -- [FOIA restrictions redacted] (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
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By MM on 12/13/2022

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91131-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1074-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/3/2016

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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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NIACT IMMEDIATE

1.4(c) MOSCOW

FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT FOR AMBASSADOR STRAUSS -- EYES ONLY VIA WHITE HOUSE 1.4(c)

PLEASE DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 22 TO AMBASSADOR STRAUSS OR DCM COLLINS ONLY.

BOB -- THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO ANNOUNCE A STRATEGIC WEAPONS INITIATIVE IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS NEXT WEEK. IT ANNOUNCES THE UNILATERAL CURTAILMENT OF SEVERAL MAJOR U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND URGES YELTSIN TO FOLLOW THIS LEAD BY CURTAILING RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. THE INITIATIVE REEMPHASIZES THE DEMIRVING PROPOSAL FIRST MADE BY THE PRESIDENT LAST SEPTEMBER AND SPECIFICALLY DEFINES THE STEPS THE U.S. WOULD MAKE IF RUSSIA WILL DO LIKEWISE. YOU SHOULD SEEK TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO YELTSIN PERSONALLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT PLACES ON SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE BEFORE US, AND URGING A POSITIVE RESPONSE. WE ALSO ASK THAT YELTSIN KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

YOU SHOULD ALSO DELIVER THE OTHER LETTERS TO SHUSHKEVICH AND NAZARBAYEV AND GET KRAVCHUK'S LETTER TO JOHN GUNDERSON FOR DELIVERY. IN DOING SO, PLEASE ADVISE ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE CONTENTS KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28.

JIM BAKER HAS CLEARED THE LETTERS.

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO YELTSIN:

DEAR BORIS

IN THE WAKE OF LAST AUGUST'S FAILED COUP, AND THE VICTORY OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN YOUR COUNTRY, I ANNOUNCED A NUMBER OF STEPS TO REDUCE THE U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND SUGGESTED WAYS WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO REDUCE FURTHER NUCLEAR FORCES AND TO IMPROVE STABILITY. I KNOW THAT YOU HAD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE RESPONSE TO MY INITIATIVE AND HIS AGREEMENT TO A NUMBER OF RECIPROCAL AND JOINT EFFORTS. I KNOW THAT THE INITIATIVE OF LAST FALL IS NOW BEING IMPLEMENTED UNDER YOUR FIRM LEADERSHIP. MANY STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE NO LONGER ON ALERT, THOUSANDS OF TACTICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN SLATED FOR ELIMINATION, AND DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR EXPERTS ARE UNDERWAY IN IMPORTANT AREAS.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ALONG WITH THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES,

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1094-MR
MR 10/3/2016

HAVE FURTHER PROMOTED CONFIDENCE THAT RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEW STATES INTEND TO BUILD A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON COOPERATION, NOT ON THREATS OR INTIMIDATION. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS DONE EVEN MORE TO REDUCE THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. AGAIN, I KNOW THAT MANY OF THESE REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN HAVE NOT BEEN WITHOUT POLITICAL RISK.

IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE CHANGES IN WHICH YOU HAVE HAD SUCH A STRONG AND COURAGEOUS HAND THAT WE NOW FACE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO GO EVEN FURTHER IN REDUCING THE THREAT POSED BY EACH OTHER'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOW IS THE TIME TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF OUR STRATEGIC ARSENALS.

I KNOW YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL; A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLAYS NO ROLE. THE SQUANDERING OF SCARCE RESOURCES ON BUILDING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS ONLY TAKES AWAY FROM ECONOMIC REBUILDING. I WANT TO TAKE STEPS THAT MAKE IT EASIER FOR YOU TO SHIFT HUMAN AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO PEACEFUL USES.

WITH THESE GOALS IN MIND, I AM DIRECTING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS:

-- THE B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM WILL BE TERMINATED. I WILL BUILD ONLY THOSE FOR WHICH PROCUREMENT HAS ALREADY BEGUN -- TWENTY AIRCRAFT.

-- PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SMALL ICBM WILL BE CANCELLED.

-- PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, HIGHLY ACCURATE WARHEAD -- CALLED THE W-88 -- FOR OUR SUBMARINE-BASED DETERRENT WILL CEASE, LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS WARHEAD TO A SMALL FRACTION OF OUR ORIGINAL PLAN.

-- PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SPARE PEACEKEEPER MISSILES WILL BE TERMINATED.

-- PRODUCTION OF THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE TERMINATED, LIMITING THOSE WEAPONS TO A NUMBER WELL BELOW THE ORIGINAL PLAN.

BORIS, THESE ARE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE REGARDLESS OF ANY FURTHER ACTIONS OF YOUR OWN BECAUSE OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR RELATIONSHIP ALREADY HAS CHANGED. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM HOPEFUL THAT THEY ALSO WILL HELP YOU TO REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES

TO MORE VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS. MUCH AS I DID IN MY SEPTEMBER 27 INITIATIVE WHEN I URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO BE RESPONSIVE, I URGE YOU TO TAKE YOUR OWN BOLD MEASURES TO CURTAIL STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND FOREGO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

THERE IS STILL MORE WE CAN AND SHOULD DO TO LESSEN THE THREAT, TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE ARSENALS WE EACH MAINTAIN. IN PARTICULAR, I ASK YOU TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE PROPOSAL I MADE LAST SEPTEMBER TO ELIMINATE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC WEAPONS FROM THE ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES -- LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS) WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS (MIRVS).

THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES TO REMOVE MULTIPLE WARHEADS FROM ALL ITS ICBMS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. WE WOULD ELIMINATE ALL OUR PEACEKEEPER ICBMS AND REDUCE THE WARHEADS ON THE MINUTEMAN MISSILES THAT WOULD REMAIN AFTER START REDUCTIONS TO ONLY ONE WARHEAD EACH. YOU, IN TURN, WOULD AGREE TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS AND REDUCE THE SIZE OF YOUR STRATEGIC FORCES TO A LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY THREAT FROM THE WEST.

JIM BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT SOME ON YOUR SIDE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT "DEMIRVING" LAND-BASED ICBMS WOULD CREATE AN UNACCEPTABLE IMBALANCE BECAUSE OF THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF THE U.S. SUBMARINE-BASED FORCE. MY UNILATERAL DECISION TO CANCEL PRODUCTION OF THE NEW, ADVANCED WARHEAD FOR OUR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES WAS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THOSE CONCERNS. BUT I AM PREPARED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS. IF YOU AND I CAN AGREE TO DEMIRV THE LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCE, I AM PREPARED TO REDUCE BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THE U.S. SUBMARINE FORCE AS A WHOLE. THESE ACTIONS WOULD REDUCE START-ACCOUNTABLE U.S. STRATEGIC WARHEADS TO A NUMBER ABOUT 40 PERCENT BELOW THAT PERMITTED BY THE START TREATY. I ALSO AM PREPARED TO REORIENT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. COMBINED WITH THE STEPS ABOVE, THIS WOULD APPROXIMATE A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL WARHEADS THE U.S. HAD PLANNED TO RETAIN AFTER THE START DRAWDOWN PERIOD.

THESE ARE BOLD STEPS, BUT THEY ARE WELL WITHIN OUR REACH. YOU AND I SHOULD MAKE THESE CHANGES QUICKLY TO UNDERSCORE OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP, TO CAPTURE THE SECURITY BENEFITS THEY PROMISE AND TO REALIZE SIGNIFICANT FISCAL SAVINGS. WITH A CONCERTED EFFORT WE COULD BOTH COMPLETE THESE ACTIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE ELIMINATIONS ALREADY AGREED UNDER START, BY A DATE WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE DEADLINE IN THE START TREATY. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RUSSIA AND THE OTHER STATES IN MEETING THIS AGREED DEADLINE BY PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT IF WARRANTED.

IF YOU ARE WILLING, YOU AND I COULD TAKE ONE MORE STEP TO REDUCE THE IMMEDIATE THREAT EVEN FURTHER BY DEACTIVATING OR BEGINNING MODIFICATION OF THE SYSTEMS AFFECTED BY THIS INITIATIVE BY A FIRM DATE. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE TO DEACTIVATE MOST OR ALL OF THESE SYSTEMS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. ONCE DEACTIVATED, WE WOULD PROCEED ON AN ACCELERATED TIME LINE TO MEET THE AGREED DATE FOR ELIMINATION.

I ALSO WILL BE WRITING TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK, SHUSHKEVICH, AND NAZARBAYEV TO GIVE THEM THE BROAD OUTLINE OF WHAT I AM PROPOSING AND TO ENCOURAGE THEIR SUPPORT. BUT I LOOK TO YOU TO WORK WITH THEM ON THE DETAILS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE IDEAS.

BORIS, WE HAVE A TRULY HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US TO RESHAPE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT A MAGNITUDE AND PACE NOT DREAMED OF BEFORE. WE SHOULD NOT GET CAUGHT UP IN ENDLESS THEOLOGICAL DEBATES ABOUT PARITY AND EQUALITY OR IN EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS ON TRIVIAL DETAILS. WE SHOULD NOT RETURN TO RIGID "OLD THINKING" ABOUT NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE. IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE WILL CHANGE THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND ACCELERATE THE PACE AT WHICH RUSSIA AND THE OTHER REPUBLICS FULLY JOIN THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC AND PEACELOVING NATIONS.

I PLAN TO OUTLINE THIS PROPOSAL IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28. I KNOW THIS IS A COMPLEX PROPOSAL THAT WILL REQUIRE ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATION, BUT IT WOULD OF COURSE BE HELPFUL IF I COULD SAY IN THE SPEECH THAT YOU HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THESE IDEAS. JIM BAKER CAN REVIEW THEM WITH YOU AND GET YOUR INITIAL REACTION DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND WE CAN CERTAINLY DISCUSS THEM WHEN WE ARE TOGETHER AT CAMP DAVID ON FEBRUARY 1.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTERS TO PRESIDENTS KRAVCHUK AND SHUSHKEVICH

DEAR LEONID
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN

I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST.

THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER; TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS, AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS, OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

LEONID [MR. CHAIRMAN], I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE THE INITIATIVE YOUR FULL SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND YOUR COUNTERPARTS IN [FOR UKRAINE: BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN; FOR BYELARUS: UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN] TO QUICKLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENT IT.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THIS INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

DEAR PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV:

I WANT TO ADVISE YOU OF A MAJOR INITIATIVE I WILL DISCUSS IN MY STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH ON JANUARY 28.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO REFORM AND MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE PERCEPTION OF A MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST. THE RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO HAS DONE MUCH TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU AND THE OTHER NEW STATES ARE COMMITTED TO BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THESE CHANGES HAVE CREATED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC WEAPONS EVEN FURTHER; TO TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER AND SLASH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS. I INTEND TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. I WILL ANNOUNCE MAJOR CURTAILMENTS, AND IN SOME CASES CANCELLATIONS, OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS -- DECISIONS ON THE B-2 BOMBER, THE SMALL ICBM, THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, WARHEADS FOR SUBMARINE-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILES. THESE WILL BE UNILATERAL STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES; THEY WILL NOT REQUIRE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THESE STEPS WILL HELP YOU DEMONSTRATE TO YOUR SUPPORTERS THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR OWN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM YOUR COUNTRY. I AM ALSO HOPEFUL THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE BOLD STEPS OF HIS OWN TO CURTAIL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION AND REORIENT SCARCE RESOURCES TO VITAL ECONOMIC NEEDS.

IN MY SPEECH I WILL ALSO REEMPHASIZE THE NEED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE EXISTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I WILL CALL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND WILL OUTLINE THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IF THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED -- INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED U.S. WARHEADS AND THE REORIENTING OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE. I BELIEVE THESE MEASURES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY, SOONER EVEN THAN ENVISAGED BY THE START TREATY.

MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THE BULK OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE ON RUSSIAN TERRITORY, THE GREATEST IMPACT OF THIS INITIATIVE WILL BE THERE. BUT YOUR SUPPORT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO MOVING AHEAD.

IN THAT REGARD I WISH TO RAISE A SUBJECT YOU TOUCHED UPON IN YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 7 -- THE QUESTION OF ADHERENCE BY KAZAKHSTAN TO THE 1968 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. JIM BAKER INFORMED ME OF THREE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE TWO OF YOU HAD ON THIS MATTER, THE FIRST IN ALMA-ATA IN DECEMBER AND THE OTHER TWO IN SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALLS. YOU MADE CLEAR TO HIM ON THOSE OCCASIONS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE U.S. ESTABLISHING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH KAZAKHSTAN AND SUPPORTING MEMBERSHIP OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS -- BOTH OF WHICH WE HAVE DONE -- YOU WOULD JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. YET YOUR RECENT LETTER

INDICATES AN INTENTION TO JOIN THE TREATY AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE.

MR. PRESIDENT, THERE MAY WELL BE A MISUNDERSTANDING HERE ABOUT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADHERING TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. WE NEED TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER AND RESOLVE IT QUICKLY.

I WELCOME THE ASSURANCE YOU GAVE TO JIM BAKER, WHICH YOU REPEATED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME, THAT THE TERRITORY OF KAZAKHSTAN WILL BECOME A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. UNTIL THAT OBJECTIVE IS REALIZED, NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WILL, OF COURSE, BE LOCATED ON YOUR SOIL. AND, AS YOU AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AGREED AT ALMA-ATA AND MINSK, THOSE WEAPONS WILL BE MAINTAINED UNDER SINGLE, UNIFIED CONTROL.

I WISH TO STRESS TO YOU THAT THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON YOUR TERRITORY FOR THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD -- AS LONG AS THEY ARE MAINTAINED UNDER EFFECTIVE UNIFIED CONTROL, AS YOU AND YOUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS HAVE AGREED -- IS NOT A LEGAL BARRIER TO YOUR JOINING THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO BARRIER TO YOUR ADHERING IMMEDIATELY TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AND TO CONCLUDING THE COMPREHENSIVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY THE TREATY.

AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF YOUR CLEAR INTENTION TO JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE OUR ABILITY TO MOVE AHEAD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL MANNER ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES. WE STAND READY TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC AND MARKET REFORMS IN KAZAKHSTAN. AS YOU KNOW, WE RECENTLY SENT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FAUVER TO ALMA-ATA TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND MEMBERS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION HOW WE CAN TOGETHER WORK TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC REFORM. THIS IS BUT THE FIRST OF MANY STEPS WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE TO DEVELOP OUR RELATIONSHIP. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR UPCOMING VISIT WHERE WE CAN DISCUSS THESE AND OTHER ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL.

I DO ASK THAT YOU HOLD THE CONTENT OF MY STRATEGIC INITIATIVE IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL AFTER MY JANUARY 28 ADDRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT