

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files

OA/ID Number: 91131
Folder ID Number: 91131-002

Folder Title:
Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	From Moscow to White House, Re: [Call from Mamedov] [000000Z] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Draft Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Yeltsin (4 pp.)	12/9/92	(b)(1)	S
03a. Cable	From White House TO Moscow, Re: [Message to Charge Collins from General Scowcroft] [120103Z Jan 93] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	1/12/93	(b)(1)	C
03b. Memo	Nick Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Charge Collins in Moscow [redacted] (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(1)	C
03c. Message	Re: Message for Charge Jim Collins from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03d. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message from the President to Gorbachev] [120103Z Jan 93] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/12/93	(b)(1)	C
04. Cable	From Moscow to White House, Re: For General Scowcroft and Nick Burns from Charge [301601Z Dec 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	12/30/92	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1100
OA/ID Number: 91131-002
Date Closed: 4/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Cable	From Moscow to White House, Re: President's Letter [101407Z Dec 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	12/10/92	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	To Distribution List Re: Russian Congress of People's Deputies: Yeltsin Throws Down Gauntlet to Congress; Calls January Referendum: "Them or Me" (5 pp.)	12/10/92	(b)(1)	S
07. Cable	American Embassy Harare to Secretary of State Washington DC Re: Mugabe Letters to President Bush and President-elect Clinton (2 pp.)	12/9/92	(b)(1)	S
08. Cable	From Moscow to White House, Re: For General Scowcroft from Charge [021520Z Dec 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	11/2/92	(b)(1)	S
09. Draft Cable	Re: Message from President George Bush to President Yeltsin (4 pp.)	12/9/92	(b)(1)	S
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: Telephone Call to President Yeltsin (1 pp.)	12/21/92	(b)(1)	S
10b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	Ed A. Hewett to Brent Scowcroft Re: A Luncheon Conversation with Vladimir Lukin (3 pp.)	8/17/92	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 3

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (1 pp.)	12/20/92	(b)(1)	
13. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (8 pp.)	1/3/93	(b)(1)	
14a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: Letter to President Yeltsin (1 pp.)	11/25/92	(b)(1)	S
14b. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Yeltsin (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
15. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
16. Letter	President Yeltsin to President Bush [Translated from Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1071-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/29/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: BURNS FILE ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] IN SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 000000Z

FM ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

STATE/RCI

~~SECRET~~ ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED]

0000

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARGE

PLEASE ALSO PASS NICK BURNS

FOR SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

MAMEDOV CALLED CHARGE TO THE MFA AT NOON TODAY ON
START II AND NEXT STEPS. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR
LAST NIGHT'S QUICK TURN AROUND ON THE ORAL MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT. IT HAD BEEN WELL RECEIVED AND KOZYREV WAS
MOST APPRECIATIVE. EVERYONE IS NOW AGREED THAT JANUARY
SHOULD BE THE TARGET DATE FOR A MEETING ACCORDING TO KOZYREV.
MAMEDOV SAID THAT THE NEXT STEP IS TO GET FINAL
APPROVAL ON THE LETTER RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUSH.
YELTSIN AND HIS PARTY TOOK A CLEARED TEXT ON THE PLANE, AND
ALL MAMEDOV NEEDS FROM THE PARTY IS A "YES" OR "NO." HE
CLEARLY EXPECTS THAT ANYTIME, AND SAID HE WILL PASS THE
LETTER THROUGH CHARGE AS SOON AS THE RESPONSE IS RECEIVED
FROM BEIJING.

MAMEDOV CONTINUED THAT THE LETTER WILL NOT, OF
COURSE, BE THE LAST STEP. THERE WILL BE MORE DISCUSSION
REQUIRED. HE THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF AN EXPERTS
MEETING. AS BACKGROUND, HE SAID, HE WANTED CHARGE TO KNOW
THAT PARLIAMENT IS NOW FOCUSSED ON FOREIGN POLICY AND HAS
SUMMONED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS ADAMISHIN AND
BERDENNIKOV TO TESTIFY ON YUGOSLAVIA AND ARMS CONTROL
RESPECTIVELY. WITH THIS ENVIRONMENT, MAMEDOV SAID, HE NOW
THINKS THAT IT MAY BE BEST NOT TO HOLD THE EXPERTS MEETING

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR

10/29/2014 MM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

IN MOSCOW, AND THAT WASHINGTON OR POSSIBLY GENEVA WOULD BE BETTER AS A VENUE. WHAT WILL BE IMPORTANT IS A CALM ATMOSPHERE TO GET THE WORK DONE, AND AS PARLIAMENT IS FOCUSSED ON MFA ISSUES, IT MAY NOT BE A GOOD TIME TO TRY TO HOLD TALKS HERE IN MOSCOW. THIS IS PRELIMINARY THINKING, HE STRESSED. HE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AFTER WE HAVE THE LETTER AND THE U.S. REACTION IN HAND.

UKRAINE WAS ALSO ON MAMEDOV'S MIND. HE SAID UKRAINE'S DELAY IN RATIFYING START AND ADHERING TO THE NPT IS GOING TO MAKE IT HARDER TO COUNTER CRITICS OF RUSSIAN MOVEMENT FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL WHEN THE UKRAINE STONEWALLS. THIS, HE SAID, IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS THE MFA IS HAVING TO ADDRESS. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO PRESS FOR EARLY MOVEMENT BY UKRAINE ON START AND NPT.

FINALLY, MAMEDOV PASSED WHAT HE SAID WERE COMPLETELY INFORMAL REACTIONS ABOUT HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THE SIGNING ASSUMING WE GET START II COMPLETED. HE SAID IN DISCUSSION AT THE AIRPORT BEFORE DEPARTING TO CHINA, YELTSIN HAD INDICATED HIS INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF A SIMULTANEOUS SIGNING IN THE TWO CAPITALS. MAMEDOV WANTED TO STRESS THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS AUTHORITATIVE REACTION THINKING ABOUT ALTERNATIVES TO AN ANCHORAGE MEETING. BUT IT IS THE FIRST REACTION HE AND KOZYREV HAVE HAD TO GETTING THE SIGNING DONE IN A WAY OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF A THREE-PARTY MEETING.

MAMEDOV THEN SAID KOZYREV HAD ASKED HIM TO DISCUSS WITH CHARGE ANOTHER IDEA WHICH KOZYREV THOUGHT MERITED CONSIDERATION A SIGNING SOMEWHERE IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST, PROBABLY VLADIVOSTOK. MAMEDOV UNDERScoreD THAT THIS IDEA WAS GIVEN TO HIM HURRIEDLY AS THE PARTY WAS ON ITS WAY TO DEPARTURE AND HE WAS PASSING ON KOZYREV'S REMARKS AT THE MINISTER'S REQUEST.

END TEXT

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

<MSGID> M0123488

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Sub 12-9-92

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

*2009-1071-MR
mm 8/14/2015*

~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO PRESIDENT
YELTSIN. DELIVER TO CHARGE COLLINS ONLY

JIM, FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT
YELTSIN. PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

WARM REGARDS,
BRENT

BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE

DEAR BORIS,

I WAS HEARTENED BY OUR CONVERSATION ON SUNDAY, IN WHICH YOU
REAFFIRMED YOUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO OUR JUNE AGREEMENT ON
FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS AND THE ELIMINATION OF MIRVED
ICBMS. WE BOTH WANT TO SIGN A TREATY CODIFYING THAT HISTORIC
AGREEMENT; OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO OUR NATIONS AND TO THE WORLD
REQUIRES NO LESS OF US.

THERE IS STILL MUCH WORK TO DO IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO SIGN THE
START II TREATY BEFORE I LEAVE OFFICE. YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE
IMPORTANT ISSUES TO ME. YOUR FOREIGN MINISTRY SENT US A DRAFT
TREATY TEXT THAT DIVERGES EVEN MORE FROM OUR JUNE AGREEMENT AND,
IN SOME INSTANCES, FROM THE START I TREATY. THAT IS WHY I
WELCOME YOUR REAFFIRMATION OF OUR JUNE AGREEMENT AS THE BASIS FOR
THE ACTUAL TREATY, AND YOUR STATEMENT THAT MOST OF THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY TEXTS

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2

REFLECT RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS, NOT POLITICAL OR MILITARY DIFFERENCES.

YOU SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RUSSIA FINANCIALLY AND TECHNICALLY TO IMPLEMENT BOTH THE START TREATY AND START II. INDEED, OUR JUNE AGREEMENT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ARMS CONTROL, FEATURES THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH ASSISTANCE. U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTS WILL BE IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE PROJECTS.

LET ME OFFER A SUGGESTION AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED. ON CONVERSION OF SS-18 SILOS, I MUST TELL YOU THAT THIS IS BEYOND MY ABILITY TO ACCEPT. I UNDERSTAND THAT SENATOR NUNN, WHO WILL PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN OUR RATIFICATION PROCESS, RECENTLY EXPRESSED SIMILAR SENTIMENTS TO YOU. THESE SYSTEMS HAVE BECOME A SYMBOL OF SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT I CANNOT SEE ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO THEIR DESTRUCTION. THEIR RETENTION, EVEN IF CONVERTED WITH THOROUGH SAFEGUARDS, JUST WOULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERATION OF THE PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN START I.

IF YOU AND I CAN AGREE TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE SS-18 ISSUE THROUGH SILO DESTRUCTION, THEN I THINK WE COULD TURN THE REMAINDER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER TO LARRY EAGLEBURGER AND ANDREI KOZYREV FOR RAPID CONCLUSION OF A TREATY TEXT. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE IN THE TIME REMAINING IF LARRY AND ANDREI WORK FROM THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT. I AM SURE YOU CAN

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3

UNDERSTAND HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO WORK FROM YOUR TEXT -- YOUR GOVERNMENT NEEDED FOUR MONTHS TO REVIEW OUR TEXT AND WE HAVE HAD YOUR FAR MORE COMPLICATED ONE, WITH ITS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES, FOR ONLY TWO WEEKS. OF COURSE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES ON SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. I WOULD SEND LARRY WITH CONCRETE INSTRUCTIONS TO ENABLE THE TREATY TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR YOU AND ME TO SIGN.

I ALSO WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO YOUR SUGGESTION THAT GOVERNOR CLINTON MIGHT JOIN US IF WE MEET. I HAVE LOOKED INTO THIS THOROUGHLY AND, ALTHOUGH IT IS A GOOD IDEA IN PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD SIMPLY CREATE TOO MANY COMPLICATIONS IN OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM DURING A TRANSITION BETWEEN TWO POLITICAL PARTIES. AS I MENTIONED IN AN EARLIER LETTER, GOVERNOR CLINTON AND I AGREE THAT THE NEW U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP IS TOO IMPORTANT TO DELAY PROGRESS ON VITAL ISSUES. THEREFORE, GOVERNOR CLINTON HOPES YOU AND I CAN CONCLUDE THIS TREATY.

I UNDERSTAND THE RELUCTANCE YOU MIGHT HAVE AT A SIGNING CEREMONY ON AMERICAN SOIL, WITHOUT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT-ELECT DURING YOUR VISIT. HOWEVER, ASSUMING WE ARE ABLE TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE TREATY IN TIME FOR US TO CONCLUDE THE PROCESS, THERE ARE A VARIETY OF WAYS IN WHICH YOU AND I COULD ACCOMPLISH ITS SIGNATURE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD MEET SOMEWHERE ELSE OR EVEN HAVE SIMULTANEOUS SIGNING CEREMONIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS.

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~~SECRET~~

4

BORIS, I AM READY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO SEE IF WE CAN
CONCLUDE THE TREATY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Cable	From White House TO Moscow, Re: [Message to Charge Collins from General Scowcroft] [120103Z Jan 93] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	1/12/93	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1071-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/29/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: COMM HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: COO FILE OLEARY OLEARY H ^{1.4(c)} OUT SIGLER SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 120103Z JAN 93

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ^{1.4(c)} MOSCOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

^{1.4(c)}

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARGE COLLINS
FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

JIM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
FORMER SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL
SEND THE ORIGINAL TO YOU FOR DELIVERY AT A LATER DATE. THANKS
AND WARM REGARDS. BRENT

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

I AM WRITING TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY KIND LETTER OF
DECEMBER 24 IN WHICH YOU OFFERED HOLIDAY WISHES TO BARBARA AND
MYSELF. WE WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY TO BOTH YOU AND RAISA OUR BEST
WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND HEALTHY NEW YEAR.

AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MOSCOW AND A VERY SUCCESSFUL
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THE START II TREATY THAT WE SIGNED
IS A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT, WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE OF ENORMOUS
BENEFIT TO RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES AS TOGETHER WE APPROACH A
NEW MILLENNIUM. OUR VERY GREAT HOPE IS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO
WORK TOGETHER IN PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW AND PEACEFUL WORLD ORDER, AND
A FUTURE FREE OF THE FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR

10/29/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

I AM VERY SORRY THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET WHILE I WAS IN MOSCOW. AS YOU KNOW, MY TRIP THERE WAS RUSHED, WITH MOSCOW BEING SUBSTITUTED FOR SOCHI AT THE LAST MOMENT. AS IT WAS, I SPENT LESS THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN YOUR CAPITAL. HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE, I WOULD HAVE ENJOYED VERY MUCH THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU.

BARBARA AND I RETAIN VERY GREAT AFFECTION FOR YOU AND RAISA, AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT US DURING YOUR NEXT TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. UNTIL THEN. WE WISH BOTH OF YOU THE BEST OF SUCCESS AND HAPPINESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0002

NNNN

<MSGID> M0160952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0202

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 11, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICK BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Message to Charge Collins
in Moscow



Per our conversation, I recommend that you approve the attached for transmission to Jim Collins in Moscow.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Charge Jim Collins at Tab I and authorize its dispatch today (b)(1)

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachment

Tab I Message to Jim Collins

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR
SCS 12/17/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE FOR CHARGE JIM COLLINS FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT VIA
WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS.

JIM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
FORMER SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL
SEND THE ORIGINAL TO YOU FOR DELIVERY AT A LATER DATE. THANKS
AND WARM REGARDS. BRENT

DEAR MIKHAIL:

I AM WRITING TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY KIND LETTER OF
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BE OF ENORMOUS BENEFIT TO RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES AS
TOGETHER WE APPROACH A NEW MILLENNIUM. OUR VERY GREAT HOPE IS
THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER IN PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW
AND PEACEFUL WORLD ORDER, AND A FUTURE FREE OF THE FEAR OF
NUCLEAR WAR.

I AM VERY SORRY THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET WHILE I
WAS IN MOSCOW. AS YOU KNOW, MY TRIP THERE WAS RUSHED, WITH
MOSCOW BEING SUBSTITUTED FOR SOCHI AT THE LAST MOMENT. AS IT
WAS, I SPENT LESS THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN YOUR CAPITAL. HAD IT
BEEN POSSIBLE, I WOULD HAVE ENJOYED VERY MUCH THE OPPORTUNITY TO
TALK WITH YOU.

BARBARA AND I RETAIN VERY GREAT AFFECTION FOR YOU AND RAISA, AND
WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT US DURING YOUR NEXT TRIP
TO THE UNITED STATES. UNTIL THEN, WE WISH BOTH OF YOU THE BEST
OF SUCCESS AND HAPPINESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR
MM 4/29/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message from the President to Gorbachev] [120103Z Jan 93] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/12/93	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/16/2023

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1071-MR(502.03)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/29/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

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OAAMZYUW ^{1.4(c)} 0002 0120104-MNSH- ^{1.4(c)}

ZNY MMNSH

120103Z JAN 93

FM WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT:***NO SUBJECT FOUND***

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARGE COLLINS
FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

JIM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
FORMER SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL
SEND THE ORIGINAL TO YOU FOR DELIVERY AT A LATER DATE. THANKS
AND WARM REGARDS. BRENT

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

I AM WRITING TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY KIND LETTER OF
DECEMBER 24 IN WHICH YOU OFFERED HOLIDAY WISHES TO BARBARA AND
MYSELF. WE WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY TO BOTH YOU AND RAISA OUR BEST
WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND HEALTHY NEW YEAR.

AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MOSCOW AND A VERY SUCCESSFUL
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN. THE START II TREATY THAT WE SIGNED
IS A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT, WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE OF ENORMOUS
BENEFIT TO RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES AS TOGETHER WE APPROACH A
NEW MILLENNIUM. OUR VERY GREAT HOPE IS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO
WORK TOGETHER IN PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW AND PEACEFUL WORLD ORDER, AND
A FUTURE FREE OF THE FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR.

I AM VERY SORRY THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET WHILE I WAS
IN MOSCOW. AS YOU KNOW, MY TRIP THERE WAS RUSHED, WITH MOSCOW BEING
SUBSTITUTED FOR SOCHI AT THE LAST MOMENT. AS IT WAS, I SPENT LESS
THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN YOUR CAPITAL. HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE, I
WOULD HAVE ENJOYED VERY MUCH THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU.

BARBARA AND I RETAIN VERY GREAT AFFECTION FOR YOU AND RAISA, AND WE
HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT US DURING YOUR NEXT TRIP TO THE
UNITED STATES. UNTIL THEN, WE WISH BOTH OF YOU THE BEST OF SUCCESS
AND HAPPINESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#0002
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR
MM 4/29/2016



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Cable	From Mostcow to White House, Re: For General Scowcroft and Nick Burns from Charge [301601Z Dec 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	12/30/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1071-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/29/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: GANTT HILL HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: BURNS FILE 1.4(c) IN SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 301601Z DEC 92

FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c)

QQQQ

SECTION ONE OF TWO

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NICK BURNS FROM CHARGE
WHITE HOUSE PASS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
AND S/P DIRECTOR DENNIS ROSS ONLY

AS WE DISCUSSED, MAMEDOV SUGGESTED TODAY THAT EACH
PRINCIPAL MAKE ONE STATEMENT AT THE SOCHI PRESS CONFERENCE.
FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S REVISED DRAFT WHICH COMBINES THE TWO
DRAFT STATEMENTS (BILATERAL RELATIONS. START-2) WE FORWARDED
YESTERDAY.

MAMEDOV TOLD US, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, THAT THE RUSSIAN
DRAFT STATEMENT IS WITH YELTSIN FOR APPROVAL. WE THINK HE
WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHARE THE RUSSIAN DRAFT ONCE IT COMES
BACK FROM THE KREMLIN AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION
TO SHARE AN APPROPRIATELY EDITED VERSION OF THIS DRAFT WITH
MAMEDOV.

BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT.

THE U.S. AND RUSSIA -- AN ENDURING PARTNERSHIP FOR CHANGE
WORKING TOGETHER OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE UNITED
STATES AND RUSSIA HAVE TRANSFORMED A FUNDAMENTALLY
HOSTILE RELATIONSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL DESTRUCTIVE
POTENTIAL INTO A PARTNERSHIP, IN THE FULLEST SENSE OF THE
TERM, BASED ON MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND RESPECT.

PAGE 002 MOSCOW ~~SECRET~~

DURING THE COLD WAR, THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
PERFECTED THEIR ABILITY TO DESTROY EACH OTHER IN 30
MINUTES. THE REALITIES OF THIS TERRIBLE ACCOMPLISHMENT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR
10/29/2014 MM

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

ARE INESCAPABLE. THE START-2 TREATY WE HAVE SIGNED TODAY REPRESENTS--FOR AMERICANS, RUSSIANS, AND ALL OTHER PEOPLES--AN HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT. IT TAKES THE U.S. AND RUSSIA A FURTHER LARGE STEP BACK FROM THE SPECTER OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST. IT WILL FREE UP ENERGIES AND RESOURCES FOR THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS TO CONCENTRATE ON THE BUSINESS OF IMPROVING LIFE, RATHER THAN DESTROYING IT.

START-2 IS RADICAL IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS OF BOTH SIDES. IT IS A GOOD TREATY BECAUSE IT FULLY RESPECTS THE INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. IT WAS CONCLUDED AFTER STRENUOUS AND DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES PRESSED THEIR VIEWPOINTS TO THE FULL. IT ENHANCES STABILITY BY ELIMINATING ALL HEAVY ICBM'S AND ALL LAND-BASED MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETED RE-ENTRY VEHICLES--BOTH U.S. AND RUSSIAN. ITS PROMPT RATIFICATION BY THE U.S. SENATE, AS WELL AS BY THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET, IS NOW OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OUR PEOPLES. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA TO HELP IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF START-2, TO AID IN THE DESTRUCTION (AND MODIFICATION) OF SILOS AND THE DISMANTLING OF MISSILES. THIS MONEY WILL BE A PERMANENT AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN A MORE SECURE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND IN SAFER NUCLEAR ARSENALS IN RUSSIA AND THE U.S.

START-2 REFLECTS THE ROLE OF CHANGE IN THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP. OVER THE COMING YEARS, THE TREATY MAKES MAKES CONSTRUCTIVE AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE POSSIBLE FOR BOTH OUR PEOPLES. WE WERE ABLE TO CONCLUDE THE TREATY BECAUSE OUR RELATIONSHIP ITSELF HAS CHANGED.

SIXTEEN MONTHS AGO, ALL AMERICANS WATCHED WITH ADMIRATION AND RESPECT AS THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE, WITH BORIS YELTSIN'S COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP, MADE THEIR DECISION IN
PAGE 003 MOSCOW ~~SECRET~~
FAVOR OF DEMOCRACY AND REFORM. AND TO REJOIN THE MAINSTREAM OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY FROM WHICH TOTALITARIAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

COMMUNISM HAD EFFECTIVELY ISOLATED THEM FOR 74 YEARS. SINCE THEN, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND RUSSIAN LEADERS HAVE WORKED STEADFASTLY TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO WAY BACK TO TOTALITARIANISM. DURING THE COLD WAR, WE IN THE UNITED STATES REGARDED THE SOVIET UNION AS A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY. NOW, WE WELCOME RUSSIA AS AN EVEN MORE WORTHY PARTNER. RUSSIA IS A GREAT POWER, WITH A GREAT HISTORY AND GREAT CIVILIZATION, AND ITS DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION HAS OPENED TO THE WORLD THE EXAMPLE AND CREATIVE GENIUS OF THE BEST RUSSIAN TRADITIONS. RUSSIA HAS AN HONORED PLACE AMONG DEMOCRATIC, INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, AS A PARTNER IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC COMMUNITIES, AND AND AS PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES HAS APPROACHED THE NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPECT FOR FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES:

- Ø FIRST, THE UNITED STATES SEEKS NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM RUSSIA'S TRANSFORMATION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT NO ADVANTAGE CAN BE SUSTAINABLE WHICH IS NOT MUTUAL. WE WANT A TOLERANT, DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA WHICH RESPECTS ITS NEIGHBORS AND ITS CITIZENS; IS STRONG AND PROSPEROUS; DISPOSES SUFFICIENT MILITARY FORCE TO MEET REASONABLE SECURITY NEEDS, AND RESPECTS INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WORLD.
- Ø SECOND, THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA REMAIN UNIQUELY IMPORTANT TO EACH OTHER. FOR AMERICANS, STABLE, OPEN, AND DEMOCRATIC RUSSIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND RISING LIVING-STANDARDS BASED ON A SUCCESSFUL MARKET ECONOMY ARE PREREQUISITES FOR A HEALTHY AND SECURE WORLD ENVIRONMENT. AN ECONOMICALLY STRONG RUSSIA IS AN IMPORTANT POTENTIAL OUTLET FOR AMERICAN PRODUCTS AND INVESTMENT, WHICH WILL GENERATE U.S. JOBS.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

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FINAL SECTION OF TWO

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NICK BURNS FROM CHARGE
WHITE HOUSE PASS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
AND S/P DIRECTOR DENNIS ROSS ONLY

PAGE 004 MOSCOW ~~SECRET~~

Ø THIRD, THE UNITED STATES RESPECTS RUSSIA'S DISTINCT
IDENTITY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS. WHILE OUR MUTUAL
INTERESTS OUTWEIGH OUR DIFFERENCES. WE KNOW THAT
PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT AND CANNOT MEAN AGREEMENT
ABOUT ALL THINGS AT ALL TIMES. IT IS A SIGN OF THE
STRENGTH OF OUR RELATIONSHIP THAT DISPUTES TODAY
ARE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATION IN PURSUIT OF
MUTUAL BENEFIT.

Ø FOURTH, FUNDAMENTAL U.S. INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY
OUR INVOLVEMENT. TO THE EXTENT OF OUR RESOURCES AND
WITH RESPECT FOR RUSSIA'S SOVEREIGNTY, IN THE
COUNTRY'S TRANSFORMATION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE
RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR
ENGAGEMENT DEPENDS ON RUSSIA'S FORWARD MOVEMENT IN
MAKING ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS
IRREVERSIBLE.

IN THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN A RANGE OF
EFFORTS AIMED AT HELPING TO SECURE THE SUCCESS OF
RUSSIA'S TRANSFORMATION AS WELL AS HELPING TO EASE ITS
HARDSHIPS. BESIDES UNDERTAKING SHARPLY TO REDUCE WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION -- CHEMICAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR
WEAPONS -- WE HAVE CONCLUDED A WIDE RANGE OF AGREEMENTS
AIMED AT ALLOWING OUR RELATIONSHIP TO DEVELOP FULLY AND
NORMALLY. THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, BILATERAL
TRADE AGREEMENT WITH MFN STATUS, AND OPIC AGREEMENT WILL
ENHANCE BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT. COOPERATION AND
JOINT ACTIVITIES AIMED AT ASSISTING RUSSIA TO ADDRESS
SERIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ARE ALSO AN IMPORTANT
ELEMENT OF OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP.

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

AMERICANS DID NOT END WITH THE COLD WAR. OUR SHARED
EXPERIENCE SINCE AUGUST 1991 HAS MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAVE
AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP WHICH WILL BE A DYNAMIC,
CREATIVE, AND STRONG FORCE IN SHAPING THE FUTURE.

END TEXT:

DECL OADR

~~SECRET~~

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<MSGID> M0144041

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Cable	From Moscow to White House, Re: President's Letter [101407Z Dec 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	12/10/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1071-MR(504)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/29/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GANTI HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: FILE OLEARY ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] IN SIGLER SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 101407Z DEC 92

FM ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] MOSCOW

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED]

0000

FROM CHARGE COLLINS FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER

I DELIVERED PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER TO YELTSIN TO HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, DMITRIY RYURIKOV. (YOU CAN IMAGINE THAT WITH WHAT IS GOING ON HERE TODAY SEEING YELTSIN WAS IMPOSSIBLE.) RYURIKOV READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY AND PROMISED TO GET IT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN PROMPTLY. HE MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. I TOLD RYURIKOV THAT I WAS AVAILABLE IF THE RUSSIANS WANT TO PASS A REPLY. I ALSO CONFIRMED THAT LARRY EAGLEBURGER IS SCHEDULED TO SEE KOZYREV IN STOCKHOLM, ON DECEMBER 13. RYURIKOV SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO US WHEN A REPLY IS READY.

END TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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<MSGID> M0109582

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2009-1071-MR
10/29/2014 MM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: HILL HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN

SIT: BURNS FILE POTTS SUM SUM2 VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 100921Z DEC 92

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8479

RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 1095

RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0819

RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 1221

RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1120

RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0966

RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0971

RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0802

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0814

RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1411

RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMA ATA 1911

RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 3969

RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0891

RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 1732

RUEHxD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 037832

STATE NIACT FOR S/S-O AND EUR/ISCA

DEPT ALSO FOR S, D, P, C, E, S/P, HA, L, PA, INR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, PREL PARM, PHUM, RS

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES:

YELTSIN THROWS DOWN GAUNTLET TO CONGRESS;

CALLS JANUARY REFERENDUM: "THEM OR ME"

REF: MOSCOW 37824

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN TOLD THE RUSSIAN

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2009-1071-MR
10/29/2014 MM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

CONGRESS THURSDAY MORNING HE WILL GO DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE IN A JANUARY REFERENDUM ON WHETHER HE OR THE CONGRESS SHOULD CONDUCT ECONOMIC REFORM. HE SAID GAYDAR WILL REMAIN IN CHARGE OF ECONOMIC REFORM AS ACTING PRIME MINISTER (DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE CONGRESS TO CONFIRM HIM AS PRIME MINISTER THE PREVIOUS DAY, REFTEL). IN RESPONSE TO YELTSIN'S REMARKS, SPEAKER KHASBULATOV OFFERED HIS RESIGNATION, WHICH THE CONGRESS REFUSED TO CONSIDER. THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IS MEETING IN SPECIAL SESSION TO CONSIDER THE LEGALITY OF YELTSIN'S PROPOSAL. SOME RADICAL REFORMERS HAVE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MOVE, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT PRO-REFORM FORCES ARE DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE. STREET DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PLANNED BY THE OPPOSITION.

END SUMMARY

3. YELTSIN TOOK THE FLOOR AT THE OPENING OF THE THURSDAY MORNING SESSION OF THE RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES FOR TEN MINUTES. HE SPOKE, HE SAID, NOT ONLY TO THE CONGRESS BUT ALSO DIRECTLY TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. YELTSIN SAID THAT AS PRESIDENT HE HAS THE POWER TO CALL A REFERENDUM AND WILL DO SO IN JANUARY 1993. THE QUESTION TO BE PUT TO THE PEOPLE WILL BE "WHOM DO YOU CHARGE WITH CARRYING OUT ECONOMIC REFORM, THE CONGRESS OR THE PRESIDENT?" YELTSIN'S REMARKS WERE GREETED WITH A MIXTURE OF APPLAUSE AND BOOS. YELTSIN, GAYDAR AND OTHER GOVERNMENT FIGURES THEN LEFT THE HALL. WE HAVE REPORTS THE GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY MEETING IN CLOSED SESSION.

4. COMMENT: A STRICT READING OF THE EXISTING RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION GIVES THE CONGRESS ALONE THE POWER TO DECLARE REFERENDA; ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT MAY PETITION THE CONGRESS TO DO SO. THE PRESIDENT'S OWN LAWYERS HAVE TOLD US THEY DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE YELTSIN HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A REFERENDUM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE CONGRESS. THIS VIEW IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACT THAT YELTSIN ASKED THE CONGRESS EARLIER THIS WEEK TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO GIVE HIM SUCH AUTHORITY, A PROPOSAL WHICH THE CONGRESS PREDICTABLY REJECTED. END COMMENT.

5. SPEAKER RUSLAN KHASBULATOV DECLARED TO THE CONGRESS IMMEDIATELY AFTER YELTSIN'S SPEECH THAT HE "HAD BEEN INSULTED BY THE HIGHEST POWER IN THE LAND" AND "I ANNOUNCE MY RESIGNATION". KHASBULATOV THEN LEFT THE HALL. THE CONGRESS LATER VOTED (148-583) NOT/NOT TO CONSIDER THE SPEAKER'S RESIGNATION. KHASBULATOV RETURNED TO THE HALL, BUT NOT/NOT TO THE SPEAKER'S CHAIR.

6. YELTSIN'S SPEECH WAS DELIVERED TO A HALL PARTLY EMPTY ON WHAT HAD BEEN PLANNED AS A ROUTINE FINAL MORNING OF THE CONGRESS. THE CONGRESS BARELY HAD A QUORUM (694) WHEN IT REJECTED A PROPOSAL TO RECESS BRIEFLY AFTER KHASBULATOV LEFT THE HALL (151-548). (A NUMBER OF DEPUTIES HAVE TOLD EMBOFFS AT THE SESSION THAT THEY FEAR A GOVERNMENT LOCKOUT IF THEY RECESS.)

7. DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS WAS STORMY AND EMOTIONALLY CHARGED. THE CONGRESS VOTED (681-39-13) THAT THE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 037832
STATE NIACT FOR S/S-O AND EUR/ISCA

DEPT ALSO FOR S, D, P, C, E, S/P, HA, L, PA, INR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ECON, PREL PARM, PHUM, RS

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES:

YELTSIN THROWS DOWN GAUNTLET TO CONGRESS;

CALLS JANUARY REFERENDUM: "THEM OR ME"

MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, SECURITY AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS SHOULD GIVE THE CONGRESS THEIR VIEWS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. IN ADDITION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IS MEETING IN SPECIAL SESSION TO CONSIDER THE VALIDITY OF YELTSIN'S PROPOSED REFERENDUM IN TERMS OF THE 1978 RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONSTITUTION. COURT CHAIRMAN ZORKIN

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

IS EXPECTED TO REPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS TO THE CONGRESS LATER IN THE DAY. THE CONGRESS IS NOW CONTINUING WITH ITS AGENDA, DEBATING A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON LOCAL GOVERNORS AND HEARING A REPORT ON CRIME IN RUSSIA.

8. YELTIN'S DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE CONGRESS HAS SPLIT THE PRO-REFORM FORCES WITHIN THE CONGRESS. SOME OF THE RADICAL REFORMERS ARE READY TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. GLEB YAKUNIN (PROTECT) TOLD POLOFF HE WELCOMES THE PRESIDENT'S MOVE. HOWEVER, OTHER DEMOCRATS VALUE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE MORE THAN ECONOMIC REFORM, AND ARE WARY OF A DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND LEGISLATURE. BOTH ANTI-YELTSIN HARDLINERS AND SOME "CENTRISTS" ARE PROCLAIMING THE START OF A YELTSIN "DICTATORSHIP". THE HARDLINE "RUSSIAN UNITY" GROUP HAS CALLED FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS STARTING THIS AFTERNOON.

COMMENT

9. SOME OF YELTSIN'S ADVISORS HAVE COUNSELLED HIM TO GO DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE IN HIS INCREASINGLY TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE. THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT HAS NOW CHOSEN TO DO SO, IN THE AFTERMATH OF ACTIONS BY THE CONGRESS TO APPROVE HIS COMPROMISE PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO GIVE THE SUPREME SOVIET THE POWER TO CONFIRM THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, SECURITY AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BUT ITS REJECTION OF HIS NOMINATION OF GAYDAR AS FULL PRIME MINISTER.

10. THROUGHOUT THIS YEAR, YELTSIN HAS STRUGGLED WITH THE DILEMMA OF HOW TO CONDUCT RADICAL ECONOMIC REFORM UNDER A CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM DATING FROM THE BREZHNEV ERA AND WITH A LEGISLATURE ELECTED IN THE GORBACHEV ERA. YELTSIN HAS BEEN ALTERNATELY COUNSELLED BY VARIOUS PRO-REFORM ELEMENTS EITHER TO COMPROMISE WITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

THE SELF-STYLED CENTRISTS OR TO CONFRONT HIS DILEMMA BY
DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE PEOPLE. HE HAS NOW CHOSEN THE
LATTER PATH. THIS PATH WILL NOT BE SMOOTH, AS HIS
OPPONENTS WILL CERTAINLY ACCUSE THE PRESIDENT OF
VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION AND WILL CHALLENGE THE
VALIDITY OF ANY REFERENDUM HE MAY CONDUCT WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE CONGRESS. THE BATTLE LINES BETWEEN
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE, AND BETWEEN RADICAL REFORM
AND STATUS QUO IN RUSSIA, HAVE NEVER BEEN MORE TIGHTLY
DRAWN. END COMMENT.

COLLINS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: HILL HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT

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<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 090719Z DEC 92

FM AMEMBASSY HARARE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6755

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HARARE 013700

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, KSTT, PREL, US, ZI

SUBJ: MUGABE LETTERS TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND

- PRESIDENT-ELECT CLINTON

1. ON DECEMBER 8, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROVIDED THE EMBASSY WITH COURTESY COPIES OF MESSAGES SENT BY ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT MUGABE TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT ELECT CLINTON. THE TEXTS FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT OF MUGABE-BUSH LETTER.

"17TH NOVEMBER, 1992.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

IT IS MY HONOUR TO WRITE TO YOU PERSONALLY TO EXPRESS MY GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE YOU PLAYED AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN ESTABLISHING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE, NOT ONLY BY ENHANCING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BUT ALSO BY IMPROVING PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN YOURSELF, AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND MYSELF. I REMEMBER VIVIDLY MY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AT YOUR INVITATION AND THE USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WE HELD ON OUR COUNTRIES' RELATIONS AS WELL AS ON MATTERS AFFECTING NOT ONLY OUR AFRICAN REGION BUT OTHERS AS WELL. IT IS NOW THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES THAT YOU RETIRE. I SINCERELY WISH YOU WELL IN YOUR RETIREMENT. MAY YOU CONTINUE TO ENJOY GOOD HEALTH.

ROBERT GABRIEL MUGABE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR
10/29/2014 MM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE" END TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF MUGABE-CLINTON TELEGRAM.

"FROM: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HARARE, ZIMBABWE
TO: STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON DC, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

COMPLIMENTS

HONOR TO REQUEST TRANSMISSION OF FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE, HIS
EXCELLENCY ROBERT GABRIEL MUGABE, TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MR. BILL CLINTON.

"ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE, AND
INDEED ON MY OWN BEHALF, I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU,
PRESIDENT-ELECT BILL CLINTON, OUR MOST HEARTY
CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION TO THE HIGH OFFICE OF
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

AS WE JOIN YOU IN CELEBRATING YOUR IMPRESSIVE ELECTORAL
VICTORY, WE IN ZIMBABWE DEEPLY CHERISH THE EXCELLENT
RELATIONS THAT HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS OVER
THE YEARS. I PERSONALLY LOOK FORWARD TO THE
CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF THESE RELATIONS ON THE
BASIS OF SHARED IDEALS AND VALUES.

I WISH YOU PERSONAL GOOD HEALTH AND SUCCESS IN YOUR
ENDEAVOURS TO REALISE THE DREAM YOU HAVE CHERISHED FOR
THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT-ELECT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

ROBERT GABRIEL MUGABE

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE"

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION." END TEXT. LANPHER

BT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Cable	From Moscow to White House, Re: For General Scowcroft from Charge [021520Z Dec 92] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	11/2/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1071-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/29/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

FOR: THE WHITE HOUSE
GENERAL SCOWCROFT

1.4(c)

TOR: 02/1522Z NOV 92

O 021520Z DEC 92 ZYH<<=

FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW<<=

TO WHITE HOUSE<<=

ZEM<<=

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c)

QQQQ<<=

=

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARGE<<=

=

CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER OF<<=
DECEMBER 1 TO YELTSIN AIDE RYURIKOV AT 4:30 PM TODAY.<<=
RYURIKOV READ THE LETTER, BUT PROVIDED NO SUBSTANTIVE<<=
COMMENT.<<=


=

CHARGE NOTED THAT THIS LETTER WAS A DIRECT FOLLOW UP TO<<=
THE PHONE CALL BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS ON NOVEMBER 30.<<=
SPECIFICALLY, IT PROVIDES A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO<<=
PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S PROPOSAL ABOUT SIGNING THE START II<<=
TREATY IN ANCHORAGE. CHARGE ALSO DREW RYURIKOV'S<<=
ATTENTION TO PARA THREE OF THE TEXT, NOTING THAT IT<<=
PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE OUTCOME OF<<=
THE MONDAY PHONE CALL. BECAUSE THE CALL HAD BEEN<<=
INTERRUPTED BY TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES, HOWEVER, THE<<=
PRESIDENT WANTED TO BE CERTAIN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND HE<<=
HAD THE SAME UNDERSTANDING. RYURIKOV STATED THAT A<<=
RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 29 ON THE<<=
START FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IS NOW UNDER PREPARATION. THE<<=
REPLY, WHICH HE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED SOON, WOULD NOW<<=
ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 1 LETTER.<<=
RYURIKOV ALSO WELCOMED THE STATEMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT<<=
INTENDS TO CALL PRESIDENT YELTSIN SOON TO DISCUSS FURTHER<<=
DETAILS ABOUT THE ALASKA MEETING.<<=

=

END TEXT<<=

DECL OADR<<=

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APNSA Has Seen

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR

10/29/2014 MM

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Start 12-9/92

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1071-MR
MM 8/14/2015

~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO PRESIDENT
YELTSIN. DELIVER TO CHARGE COLLINS ONLY

JIM, FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT
YELTSIN. PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE

DEAR BORIS,

I WAS HEARTENED BY OUR CONVERSATION ON SUNDAY, IN WHICH YOU
REAFFIRMED YOUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO OUR JUNE AGREEMENT ON
FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS AND THE ELIMINATION OF MIRVED
ICBMS. WE BOTH WANT TO SIGN A TREATY CODIFYING THAT HISTORIC
AGREEMENT; OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO OUR NATIONS AND TO THE WORLD
REQUIRES NO LESS OF US.

THERE IS STILL MUCH WORK TO DO IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO SIGN THE
START II TREATY BEFORE I LEAVE OFFICE. YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE
IMPORTANT ISSUES TO ME. YOUR FOREIGN MINISTRY SENT US A DRAFT
TREATY TEXT THAT DIVERGES EVEN MORE FROM OUR JUNE AGREEMENT AND,
IN SOME INSTANCES, FROM THE START I TREATY. THAT IS WHY I
WELCOME YOUR REAFFIRMATION OF OUR JUNE AGREEMENT AS THE BASIS FOR
THE ACTUAL TREATY, AND YOUR STATEMENT THAT MOST OF THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY TEXTS

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2

REFLECT RUSSIAN ECONOMIC CONCERNS, NOT POLITICAL OR MILITARY DIFFERENCES.

YOU SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RUSSIA FINANCIALLY AND TECHNICALLY TO IMPLEMENT BOTH THE START TREATY AND START II. INDEED, OUR JUNE AGREEMENT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ARMS CONTROL, FEATURES THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH ASSISTANCE. U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTS WILL BE IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE PROJECTS.

LET ME OFFER A SUGGESTION AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED. ON CONVERSION OF SS-18 SILOS, I MUST TELL YOU THAT THIS IS BEYOND MY ABILITY TO ACCEPT. I UNDERSTAND THAT SENATOR NUNN, WHO WILL PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN OUR RATIFICATION PROCESS, RECENTLY EXPRESSED SIMILAR SENTIMENTS TO YOU. THESE SYSTEMS HAVE BECOME A SYMBOL OF SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT I CANNOT SEE ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO THEIR DESTRUCTION. THEIR RETENTION, EVEN IF CONVERTED WITH THOROUGH SAFEGUARDS, JUST WOULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERATION OF THE PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN START I.

IF YOU AND I CAN AGREE TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE SS-18 ISSUE THROUGH SILO DESTRUCTION, THEN I THINK WE COULD TURN THE REMAINDER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER TO LARRY EAGLEBURGER AND ANDREI KOZYREV FOR RAPID CONCLUSION OF A TREATY TEXT. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE IN THE TIME REMAINING IF LARRY AND ANDREI WORK FROM THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT. I AM SURE YOU CAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

UNDERSTAND HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO WORK FROM YOUR TEXT -- YOUR GOVERNMENT NEEDED FOUR MONTHS TO REVIEW OUR TEXT AND WE HAVE HAD YOUR FAR MORE COMPLICATED ONE, WITH ITS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES, FOR ONLY TWO WEEKS. OF COURSE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES ON SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. I WOULD SEND LARRY WITH CONCRETE INSTRUCTIONS TO ENABLE THE TREATY TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR YOU AND ME TO SIGN.

I ALSO WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO YOUR SUGGESTION THAT GOVERNOR CLINTON MIGHT JOIN US IF WE MEET. I HAVE LOOKED INTO THIS THOROUGHLY AND, ALTHOUGH IT IS A GOOD IDEA IN PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD SIMPLY CREATE TOO MANY COMPLICATIONS IN OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM DURING A TRANSITION BETWEEN TWO POLITICAL PARTIES. AS I MENTIONED IN AN EARLIER LETTER, GOVERNOR CLINTON AND I AGREE THAT THE NEW U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP IS TOO IMPORTANT TO DELAY PROGRESS ON VITAL ISSUES. THEREFORE, GOVERNOR CLINTON HOPES YOU AND I CAN CONCLUDE THIS TREATY.

I UNDERSTAND THE RELUCTANCE YOU MIGHT HAVE AT A SIGNING CEREMONY ON AMERICAN SOIL, WITHOUT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT-ELECT DURING YOUR VISIT. HOWEVER, ASSUMING WE ARE ABLE TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE TREATY IN TIME FOR US TO CONCLUDE THE PROCESS, THERE ARE A VARIETY OF WAYS IN WHICH YOU AND I COULD ACCOMPLISH ITS SIGNATURE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD MEET SOMEWHERE ELSE OR EVEN HAVE SIMULTANEOUS SIGNING CEREMONIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

BORIS, I AM READY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO SEE IF WE CAN
CONCLUDE THE TREATY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Henry Kissinger

Charter of Confusion

The new Russian-American summit document takes partnership too far.

President Boris N. Yeltsin's dramatic and successful visit to America occasioned a document that seeks to give concrete meaning to the term new world order. Titled Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship, it could, if its ideas take hold, involve a revolutionary reordering of global relationships that should not be implemented without a full national debate.

True, statements of principle are rarely implemented literally. But they do reflect a state of mind and hidden assumptions that shape long-term policy.

The most significant premises of the charter are that, with the end of communism, no geopolitical issues remain between the United States and Russia and that the spread of democracy will guarantee permanent peace. Russia is assumed as sharing identical goals, making possible a "strategic partnership" between the two nuclear superpowers "in the international arena, in the interest of advancing and defending common democratic values."

Are these premises valid? Is it prudent to base policy on the assumption that an evolution barely three years old has already reversed a pattern of centuries?

The collapse of the Soviet Union is surely the seminal event of our time, and the Bush administration has handled it with consummate skill. But the nature of what is to replace it in the vast area stretching from the Polish border to the Pacific, from the Arctic Circle to the approaches to the Middle East, is still unsettled. We must take care not to foster principles of world order that unintentionally encourage instability, even violence, and constrain the evolution of newly free countries.

American leaders have generally justified their policies by universal, often legal, principles rather than by national interest—the last time during the Gulf War because there was an overwhelming ideological and geopolitical danger, and much of the world felt more or less uniformly threatened.

But with ideological fires banked and global threats diminishing, the problem of world order has changed. The United States must mute its undifferentiated globalism. It must learn that it cannot involve itself in every crisis. It must learn to distinguish the vital from the peripheral. Russia, struggling with the end of centuries of imperialism, must not be tempted to reverse that process.

In its approach to international security, the new charter seems to move in the opposite direction. The document is permeated by a tone redolent of a global Russo-American condominium. Russia is called a "strategic partner." In addition, "the United States and the Russian Federation will unite [emphasis added] in their efforts toward strengthening international peace and security, preventing and settling regional conflicts, and solving global problems."

Can America sustain such an undertaking? Are we luring ourselves into commitments beyond our physical and psychological capacity? Should Russia be encouraged into a global role, which is like putting liquor before a reforming alcoholic? Where does this leave America's allies? NATO is included only as a possible contributor to an as yet to be created "Euro-Atlantic Peacekeeping Capability." Japan is not mentioned at all, even though the United States and the Russian Federation have pledged themselves to "cooperate" in strengthening "confidence and stability in Asia and the Pacific region."

This atmosphere of condominium emphasizes the curious clause stating that the two countries abjure "the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of each other [emphasis added]." Could this not be read to mean that the threat of force against other countries is permitted by the charter? Previous American-Soviet statements of principle always contained clauses declaring that nothing in them superseded existing obligations, or they made new mutual obligations general. The new restrictive clause, even if inadvertent, is bound to be noted.

The charter emphasizes a vast new effort by America and the Russian Federation to "support the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic Community" because "security is indivisible from Vancouver to Vladivostok." When this concept first appeared in the Gorbachev era, it was the slogan of European and Soviet leaders seeking to reduce American influence and to gain maximum freedom of action for essentially national purposes. For once everybody is allied to everybody else, existing institutions will dissolve in a vague structure incapable of joint action and therefore, in the end, best suited to nationalistic policies.

The Euro-Atlantic Community seems to include NATO, the European neutrals, the new East European democracies and all the successor states of the Soviet Union—some 15 in number. The interests of all these countries are assumed to be identical and to flow naturally from their democratic domestic structures. But in the real world, can this melange be called a community? Does the phrase "indivisible security" entitle either superpower to act alone in the likely event there is no consensus, or does each side have a veto? Is the choice between hegemony and paralysis?

And in what way can the five Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union or the three new states of the Caucasus be said to belong to a European security structure, not to speak of a Euro-Atlantic Community? If Kirghizstan, one of the Central Asian republics, becomes "European," why not nearby Pakistan or India; if Azerbaijan is European, why not Iran, which it borders? The unspoken premise is that all the states of the former Soviet Union, however different their culture and history, are still treated as if they were under Moscow's tutelage.

This unprecedented role for the European Security Conference and the phrase that "America and the Russian Federation cannot accept another phase of European instability" points up the charter's basic incompatibility with existing Atlantic institutions. Within NATO, America insists on integration of strategy and policy. It opposes a separate European military force on the ground that it weakens the integrated command. The charter, however, leaves little scope for NATO except to contribute forces and resources to the newly invented Euro-Atlantic Peacekeeping Capability, together with the WEU—a heretofore largely moribund grouping of West European states—and other countries of the CSCE. Such a downgrading of NATO is likely to magnify European suspicions of America. The same is even more true of Japan and China. At the same time, the Euro-Atlantic Community is likely to appear to Japan and China as an exclusive anti-Asian club.

debr 1973

maybe

OK

In some way we called 50 & new

not really the state feel that way

Worse worse dangerous today

misses the point of mission for NATO & NATO purposes

The Charter is aspiration

strangely similar w/ their 1973 principles

Purposes assumption too far, change valid only

Passed this last Friday

entirely license

we need them in VNS

Precious

White House News Summary

sunday, July 5, 1992 -- page 17 of 17

Similar ambiguities weaken the charter's relevance to the strains produced by the breakup of the Soviet Union. In less than a year, 15 new states have emerged in that vast region. All have become members of the United Nations. The United States has established embassies in each of them. These new nations share some unique features. None of them—except the Baltic states—has known independence for the past 150 years. Hundreds of thousands of troops of the erstwhile Red Army remain on their territories. These come and go and maneuver without asking the permission of independent countries recognized as members of the United Nations. Most republics have been afraid to ask them to leave, and those that have dared—like the Baltic states—have received evasive replies. These troops intervene in local conflicts, as they did recently in Moldova and Georgia directly upon Yeltsin's return from North America—ostensibly to protect Russian minorities.

But Russian minorities are everywhere. The Russian Empire had mixed up the nationalities by conquest, and Stalin, to facilitate central control, drew borders in such a way that no ethnically pure republics remained. Almost all republics also contain other minorities, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. To complicate matters further, most educated Russians identify the origin of their country with Kiev, the capital of the new nation of Ukraine, which has a population of 58 million, and in fact view all the successor nations as ingrates duty-bound to return to the motherland.

While the Russian Republic has not directly challenged the independence of the new states, it has not fully accepted it either. Russian leaders maneuver with great persistence to establish themselves as the linear descendants of the historical empire rather than as an entirely new and separate state. The entry of all the successor republics into the European Security Conference is a measure of the success of this campaign. Russian leaders try—at least tacitly—to keep open the option of repeating the events of 1917-22, when many of the current group of independent republics attempted to break away only to be forced in the end to return to Moscow's fold.

Precisely because economic reform, even with considerable outside help, is certain to be painful, an appeal to the historical empire may be a tempting way to rally support. This may explain why the defense minister of the Russian Republic has declared that his country will consider any troop concentration along the borders of the former Soviet Union as justifying Russian intervention by crossing the territory of theoretically sovereign neighbors. Not a single Western country has commented on this extraordinary proposition.

Such a state of affairs is potentially even more explosive than Yugoslavia, and with far greater implications for the peace of the world. If Moscow attempts to recentralize its former empire, some sort of military conflict is highly probable. If it succeeds—even partially—alarm bells will ring all around the Soviet periphery, but especially in Eastern Europe. The traditional pattern of mutual fear between Russia and its neighbors will reappear. The U.S.-Russian partnership will collapse.

This may not be an acute problem so long as Russia, together with all the successor states, faces economic disaster. But as they recover, the question of whether the new charter reduces the dangers becomes relevant. Some provisions are clearly helpful, for example the reaffirmation of respect for national borders, including those of the new states. At the same time, Russia and the United States promise support and "leadership" to the protection of minorities and the settlement of ethnic disputes. In the code language of the region, these phrases can more readily justify intervention than restraint, for it is so-called ethnic conflicts that will be the most likely pretext for recentralization.

The Bush administration seems to assume that liberal democracy and market economics will by themselves achieve and preserve peace everywhere. But even if true, that point will not be reached for decades. In the meantime, America must contribute to international stability by a foreign policy going beyond social engineering. The effort to shore up the Russian government is laudable, and Congress should support it. But we must not so idealize and personalize the relationship as to lose sight of geopolitical imperatives. We need to balance the respect and cooperation to which Russia's reforms and potential power entitle it against the dangers of hegemony over smaller successor states. The deferential way Yeltsin is treated in the West, as compared with the leaders of the other republics, and the fact that almost all foreign aid goes to Russia, threaten this balance. Indeed, if present IMF plans are implemented, Western policy will encourage a ruble zone whose practical effect will be to force most successor states back under Moscow's economic tutelage.

The deepest question raised is whether Russia, seeking to build democracy and a market economy without previous experience with either and in need of vast amounts of foreign assistance, can possibly fulfill the role assigned to it by the charter. Is it really wise to divert it into a global enterprise that in the end may keep it from even defining a responsible role with respect to the internal relationships of the former Soviet Union? At the end of an evolution which we should assist, Russia may turn into the partner envisaged by the charter. As of now, such a role is at best premature, at worst dangerous.

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wrong
The Russian
CIS troops
could be
all

stretching
it

Partly
valid

On the
one hand
we have
the rubles

check

Good
point

Documents Warned in '85 of Iraqi Nuclear Aims

By ELAINE SCIOLINO
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 4 — Newly declassified Pentagon documents describe warnings as early as 1985 that there was a danger that American technology could be illegally diverted from Iraq's nuclear energy program into an effort to make nuclear weapons.

The documents indicate that Administration officials had warnings about Iraq's dangerous nuclear ambitions much earlier than previously known. They were released this week as Congressional Democrats pressed their case that the policies of the Reagan and Bush Administrations toward President Saddam Hussein of Iraq were flawed up to his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and may have also been criminal.

One May 1985 Defense Department document cited a Central Intelligence Agency report "indicating that Iraq continues to actively pursue an interest in nuclear weapons, that the large number of Warsaw Pact nationals in Iraq makes diversion in place a real possibility and that in the past, Iraq has been somewhat less than honest in regard to the intended end-use of high technology equipment."

Restrictions Were Urged

The paper, written by Richard N. Perle, then Assistant Defense Secretary, to Caspar W. Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense, recommended that "to protect our national security interests" the United States impose certain restrictions on sensitive equipment and technology sold to Iraq.

Another document, a March 1985 Pentagon memo, said Iraq had refused to provide assurances that it would not use two American computers in its nuclear program. The Pentagon memo argued in favor of requiring such assurances, noting that the State Department

was arguing against it.

"Iraq is a problem country, at least in the mid-to-long term," the memo argued, noting that it had "many if not all" of the elements necessary to reprocess uranium in place and possessed about 100 to 112 pounds of highly enriched uranium. "While we have seen no evidence of a weapons-design program, it makes sense to apply controls to help deter the use of U.S. computers in any such program."

It could not be determined whether the two computers were eventually shipped to Iraq, but American computers were used by the Iraqi military. According to a previously released No-

Pentagon papers indicate early knowledge by the Administration.

vember 1986 memorandum, for example, Pentagon officials warned that a license for a hybrid computer for the Saad 16 missile complex near Mosul should be denied "because of the high likelihood of military end use and the association of the involved companies in sensitive military applications." The memo stated that the computer could be used to monitor wind-tunnel tests for ballistic missiles.

Overrode by Commerce Dept.

But the Commerce Department overrode the objections and the sale went through without any conditions. The Saad 16 complex was a key target of allied bombing raids in 1991 in the American-led assault to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Representative Sam Gejdenson, the Connecticut Democrat who released the newly declassified documents on Wednesday, said he was doing so to counter President Bush's statement on a network news program that day that the United States had not enhanced Iraq's "nuclear, chemical or biological capability." Mr. Bush said that he had issued an executive order on the subject, adding, "You have repeated something that isn't true."

"I'm watching the CBS Morning News and the President says we didn't help his chemical or nuclear or missile capability at all, and that is not factually correct based on the Administration's own documents," Mr. Gejdenson said in an interview.

Some of Mr. Bush's own aides are uncomfortable with his blanket denial, which he first articulated last month at a news conference in Rio de Janeiro. The aides have noted that American technology did enhance, albeit inadvertently, that capability.

October 1989 Directive

Even the executive order to which Mr. Bush referred, a national security directive signed in October 1989 that became the cornerstone for his Iraq policy of economic and political incentives, implied that the United States should sell Iraq equipment related to its nuclear energy projects as long as it was not weapons-related.

Other memos released earlier by Mr. Gejdenson showed that Bush Administration officials were convinced that Mr. Hussein would continue to develop his military capability despite the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. An undated State Department memo written early in the Bush Administration, for example, stated that Iraq's military attaché in Washington was actively trying to buy equipment that could have military applications.

A12

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 1992

20

Democrats Are Expected to Seek Probe Of White House Role in Iraq-BNL Affair

By PETER TRUETT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Congressional Democrats are expected this week to call for a special counsel to investigate what they claim were criminal acts by the Bush administration in its policy toward Iraq, and particularly its handling of the BNL affair.

Such an investigation, at the least, would be embarrassing to the administration. It would highlight how the White House aggressively backed Saddam Hussein with taxpayer-financed programs, helping to create the very Iraqi military machine the U.S. and its allies had to subdue in the 1991 Gulf War.

The Atlanta branch of BNL, or Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, an Italian government-controlled bank, provided \$4.5 billion in loans to Iraq between 1986 and August 1989, some of which helped to build its war machine. The Bush administration, the U.S. attorney's office in Atlanta and Federal Reserve officials have sought to portray the loans as the isolated work of a few BNL officers in Atlanta.

But in a speech to the House yesterday, Rep. Henry Gonzalez, chairman of the House Banking Committee, which is investigating the BNL affair, tried to show that the White House had intervened directly in the criminal probe. The Texas Democrat quoted notes made by a Treasury Department official who had talked with Gail McKenzie, the assistant U.S. attorney handling the BNL case in the U.S. attorney's office in Atlanta. One of the notes, which date from Nov. 7, 1989, reads, "McKenzie: She has been called by the White House — got impression concerned about embarrassment level." This conversation occurred just as the Bush administration was preparing to authorize a \$1 billion Commodity Credit Corp. loan for Iraq. BNL itself had earlier provided many U.S.-guaranteed CCC loans.

Gerrilyn Brill, first assistant U.S. attorney in Atlanta, acknowledged the telephone call, but said: "Ms. McKenzie informs me that the individual in no way attempted to interfere with the handling of the case."

Mr. Gonzalez also cited the notes of an administration official that showed the White House — including both President Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft — was directly involved in 1991 in trying to limit the information given to Congress about the administration's policy toward Iraq. The administration has used executive privilege to limit congressional access to documents dealing with Iraqi policy.

"Scowcroft will take the lead on exerting EP" (executive privilege) reads a July 1991 note by a senior Commerce Department official involved in an interagency effort to decide what data the lawmakers

should be given. Another note reads, "Pres. very, very mad, heated discussion."

The administration has maintained that it used taxpayer-financed programs for Iraq to help U.S. farmers and exporters at a time when it was seeking to bolster Iraq after its many years of war with Iran. The administration has consistently maintained that no laws were broken.

Yesterday, Mr. Gonzalez also disclosed a CIA report dated Nov. 6, 1989, that was sent to the State Department and the National Security Council. Rep. Gonzalez said the report indicated that Iraq was using BNL loans to finance its "clandestine missile and nuclear weapons procurement program." Nevertheless, two days later, the administration approved \$1 billion of Commodity Credit Corp. loans for Iraq, which was hard-pressed to raise money elsewhere.

Rep. Charles Schumer, who heads a House Judiciary subcommittee, said yesterday that he was drafting a letter to Rep. Jack Brooks, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, requesting that an independent counsel look into the Iraq-BNL affair. Rep. Schumer pledged to raise the required number of votes by the end of this week. "In view of the information placed in the record by Rep. Henry Gonzalez, Congress is left with no option but to seek an independent counsel to investigate possible criminal activity in the Iraq-BNL affair," the New York Democrat said.

A probe by a special counsel, which would be appointed by the Attorney General, would likely focus on the alleged doctoring of information relating to exports to Iraq that was provided to Congress by the Commerce Department. Many congressional Democrats maintain these alterations were designed to mislead Congress and are criminal.

Democrats believe that an investigation of the BNL affair by a special counsel would also turn up more incriminating information of the administration's use of taxpayer-financed government programs, of an attempted cover-up by the administration once Iraq became an adversary, and even of interference in the judicial process to prevent information from coming to light.

Rep. Brooks is expected to send a letter to the 21 Democratic members of his committee asking for their support for a special counsel as early as today or tomorrow, according to an aide involved in the drafting of the letter. The Texas Democrat's office declined to comment on the issue. Before he can officially call for a special counsel, Mr. Brooks needs the support of a majority of the Democrats on his committee. Most of the Democrats are expected to support such a call, but it is unlikely that any of the 13 Republican committee members will give their support.

It may be difficult for the administration to oppose the appointment of an independent counsel, even though it may seek to do so.

*Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak*

Why a Second Term?

Frank advice to President Bush from his campaign chiefs—to forgo “speed” golf and cigarette boats in Maine this summer and instead take his case to America—begs an important question: What is his case?

The warning that this is no year for prolonged vacationing, made during a campaign conference call last weekend, reflects deep concern in the Bush-Quayle campaign. In private, some even admit that the president has no coherent program—or at least none ready to push today.

That harsh reality was actually voiced in the Oval Office last month when the president's former drug czar, William J. Bennett, was invited in and offered a national co-chairmanship of the reelection effort. Bennett respectfully declined, temporarily on grounds of television commitments but more permanently because he simply does not know what a Bush second term would stand for. Bennett blames the campaign for failing to provide a theme for the president. The campaign blames the White House for not putting Bush on a steady policy course. The White House blames the Treasury and Office of Management Budget for rigidity and reluctance to accept new policy ideas.

But the blame-passing buck stops on the president's desk. “I do not think there is really anything that we can do for the president right now,” one policy adviser confided to us. “It's up to him.” That is a tall order for a president whose base is drifting away and whose performance in recent weeks has been alarmingly uneven. He still cannot accept the fact that the failing economy is a millstone around his neck. When asked in last month's New York Times interview about America's biggest problem, he reflexively replied that it was education.

If, after 12 years at the seat of power, Bush cannot shape a consistent message for the country by himself, his closest supporters wonder where it will come from. There is no sign it will come from inside the administration.

Much-abused White House Chief of Staff Sam Skinner is viewed by Republican politicians as less responsible for what has happened than the two most prominent economic policy makers, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and OMB Director Richard Darman. The pols complain that any idea not coming from within Treasury and OMB is dead on arrival.

That's what seems to have happened to the revived civilian conservation corps pushed after the Los Angeles riots by the campaign's idea man, James Finkerton. It picked up wide support, but not from Finkerton's old nemesis, Darman, who belittled the notion. The CCC remains dead.

According to White House aides, the president earlier this year seriously considered dropping Brady and Darman overboard and bringing in a new team. But he viewed such a shakeup, so soon after Skinner replaced John Sununu, as posing too great a threat. If too risky in January, it is out of the question in July.

A somewhat more realistic change, still talked about in the inner reaches of the campaign, might be James A. Baker III's coming over from the State Department to take charge.

But this misses a broader problem raised by one experienced Republican hand: “There have been many cases where the White House runs the campaign, but I've never heard of one where the campaign runs the White House. I don't think it can be done.”

The last option is the kind of campaign Democrats have always expected and many Bush advisers think now cannot be avoided: an unrelenting attack on Bill Clinton and, if he is still around, Ross Perot. That's not the answer the Bill Bennetts of the GOP have in mind when they ask what George Bush's second term will be like.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


December 21, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President
Yeltsin

Attached are the proposed talking points
for President Bush's call to President
Yeltsin today. May I have your
concurrence by noon.

The President will talk to President
Yeltsin at 1:00 today.


Brent Scowcroft

Attachment
As stated

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/15/2013

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- Boris, I now have had an opportunity to consider your last letter, including the approach you outlined on the destruction of SS-18s. And I have discussed it with my advisors.
- I think we are close to agreement on the major issues which would in turn clear the way for final agreement on the precise text of the agreement.
- I am prepared to send my experts to meet with yours in Geneva as early as tomorrow if we have a common understanding on these matters. Specifically:
- o That all SS-18 missiles be destroyed, both deployed and non-deployed.
 - o That all SS-18 silos be destroyed in accordance with START procedures except for a specified number which would be converted in a manner that would preclude the possibility of their later reuse for heavy missiles. I understand from you that you need only to keep a small number of these silos, I think you said "a few tens." I need to know what you think that number is. Can we settle on a number that is not greater than 50?
 - o As you stated in an earlier letter, our governments would have to agree on the procedures for destroying the missiles and converting the silos, including appropriate inspection and verification procedures.

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Declassify on: OADR

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2009-1071-MR
10/29/2014 JMM

- o On SS-19s, I think we are in agreement on the retention and downloading of not more than 120 SS-19 missiles in existing SS-19 silos.
 - o We have met your concerns with heavy bombers with the language Eagleburger offered in Stockholm in which we accepted several of your proposals. However, you must understand that the U.S. must be able to reorient to a conventional role, B-1 heavy bombers that have never been equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. I need to know that you find our bomber position acceptable.
- Boris, you and I need to agree on these major points. If we are agreed, we can turn this over to our experts to refine the details. If you are ready to proceed on this basis, our experts should be able to agree quickly on the treaty document.
- I think it would be premature to finalize our meeting until we have an agreed treaty. Without a treaty, there is no sense to our meeting.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memo	Ed A. Hewett to Brent Scowcroft Re: A Luncheon Conversation with Vladimir Lukin (3 pp.)	8/17/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Yeltsin Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Yeltsin (January - December) 1992 [2]

Date Closed:	4/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91131-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Sackie

P/ Yeltsin 12/20/92

Fly to Sochi Jan 2. Sign treaty Jan 3
Eagle + Kozlov talk Monday to
finalize details on SS-18

- If necessary you & I can catch
Sunday evening

Yeltsin will contact Clinton about
W. on East Coast

- Unless Yeltsin wants Bush
to do it.

P/Yeltsin 1/3/93

Y Would you care to lead off
P Fine, gives me a chance to thank
you. Sochi would have been nice
but fitting to sign in Kremlin.
I salute a team who did a hard
work.

To anyone in US supports your
reform. I know new Pavell want
to thank you to continue down this
path. As long as you stay in power
from now, new dawn should be
strongly supportive.

You have been very frank & honest
w/ me & I grateful. How do you think
a reform really go on a new team.
Y Thank you for warm words to our
team. (Nice words for all).

As for a cabinet, there were only 4 changes.
Also made a poor showing. Health
care Min & some. Vice PM was not
reform minded. Prob Ed Min because of
straying in Ministry. Reform minded
members of team are safe. And I
am keeping a close watch on all. I
know Chernom. for 30 yrs. He is
very loyal. Sometimes, of course, Chernom.
would not in favor of rules: prod.
rather than budget, but he is
set by — born in 1963 &

a member. So this group favors reform
is not correct. Chuyway Gaydan will
come back. We have a special foot
of economy of transition & he has that.
Foggo you know & Crabbe, ^{a young man} is in
front of cutting armed forces.

We will preserve our FP orientation in
friend coop w/US.

I visited G. Kren & Beijing & you can
understand ~~we~~ our interest in Asia
& Pacific because of our territory there.
You & we possess greatest military
forces & US retains top priority for us.
Because treaty signing here I won't
be able to go to US before you go to see
Clinton. I wrote him that perhaps we
could meet soon in neutral territory
before his formal visit here.

We know you need a better situa-
tion that. relationships & forged partner-
ship w/ us & you will be remembered
for that. I hope you will work for
highest support for a relationship
P Won't be active, but certainly supportive
anything I worry about is you.
We have been close to you but
because of your spec relationship
I can see a lot becoming strained.
You are closer to seeking than we

and I will tell Clinton it is important
to stay close on this cover & don't
divide us.

Y We have supported y since 1/80.
but as your position gets tougher
it is harder for us w/ Poland.
opposition. We see some diff. So
if you plan more efforts for air
support perhaps we could join -
w/ SU-27 for example to stay close
together. I assure you I will stay
in touch w/ Clinton to see positions
are mutually supportive.

Regarding start of treaty, do you still
have engineering drafts? I think
a draft is carefully drawn. It will
help for us to destroy a equip, but
w/c 400 million provided by a crew
& perhaps (some) of a 400 additional
which could be provided at various times
in a future, it will help. We do.

do have some opponents in a Parliament
you don't have any. We have supporters
of Iraq & former Soviets who oppose
everything. At a time of a hearing
I plan to be there personally & see
end I confident it will be
ratified.

There is a prob w/ Kazak & Ukrainians

- Nazar wrote you a letter. Because he just finished w/ subcommittee of Start I, he wrote a letter. In Start I, CIS should ~~to eliminate~~ 100% of their arrears w/in 2 yrs. This morning I called Kravchuk + asked if he had any questions. He was supportive. I talked to him recently + he said a right thing. I worry there are some there who want to retain some needs.
- Y There may be some elements but SS make formal statement of non-vic status. But I share your concern. What matters is Kravchuk realizing they can't see us w/o Russia. He wants 45 mil for oil & other arrangements.
- B They want an arrangement for HEU
- Y Fact is if we try to balance up econ relationship it would be very disadvantageous. I think they hope to get 1.5 bil from you
- P You asked if we were satisfied w/ terms of treaty. Yes. Harry, would you describe a cost sharing?
- E Better promising at least 400 mil to help costs of ~~disarmament~~ disarmament. It true there has been talk of 1.5 bil from

Y Ukraine lost us official request
I don't think Ukraine should get
175 mil for destruction because all
that will take place in Russia, incl
transportation

E That's why I said conversion.

B Their obligation is there in treaty
from both to Russia & US.

E I told them we expect them to follow
them & if they don't it would affect a
relationship

Y They got a point, I think
H3. We being very polite, we both should
encourage them in every way. I offered
a team to explain everything to them -

Y Can we switch to economic affairs?

You are ~~congregating~~ ^{congregating} w/ your agreement
& we pleased - that we have seen our
own platform acknowledged by Clinton.
We glad you are honoring your promise
of improvement in econ to the people - &
you have achieved 3, 4 (2, 7). That is very
good. Do you think Clinton would do
many promises & if he has to fulfill
them it will be at expense of aid
to Russia

P In campaigns, many promises are
made. There was a "rose home
America" element to his campaign.

But nothing since a election ^{has} ~~trans~~ indicated he would pull back.

My advice would be that when you meet w/ him you reiterate your intent to reform. Your continued reform should do most to guarantee continued support. Debt is schd. before 20 you would be re-assessing repay.

4 R. Next point is external debt of FSU. There is emerging consensus of Paris Club + concept for deal set by London Club. We must keep in mind we took over all external debt. We have no hope of ~~other~~ other CIS paying their share. It my hope is however they will agree. Then there are ~ 1.1 mil in grain credits. Could we defer for another year? We must in position to repay now & are still recovering from recession.

P Just a word on grain. There would be support in US to continue w/c credits. But a line is specific on credit-worthiness. When you stopped payment in 70s, that raised a question of creditworthiness. But if you could agree on resolved & then resume payment on non-resolved debt, we could restart a prog.

Y At least if you could agree on £75.5
mil. let Mr E & Mr B do that.

B There is no discretion on grain cred.
It would take now legs.

Y Then what is solution. We have no
money. We could deal w/ China - they
offered 20 mil tons. We don't want to
do that.

B That might force Corg to do it. If they
that we might lose Russian grain
purchases.

If you do a Paris Club & work out
deal w/ IMF...

Y We expect an agreement over IMF.
Where is that

S Close to agreement, Ukraine - Rus
division of proceeds - and 400 mil is price

Y I think it is really you 1/yr of 1.60
mil 13 / ton

+ S That is ^{FEU}

Y ~~Can we~~ get agreement before 20 Jan
S I think so yes.

Y Now, KAK 103. Let 105 appropriate
a blame. We think a KAK crew was
grossly negligent. Of course we ^(FEU) can't
escape all blame, but it should
be apportioned

P That ~~is~~ sounds OK. ^{we don't} ~~that is not~~
consider this a big issue but as

Let's defer discussion of compensation.

- Y But a families want compensation.
We can't be held resp for a fault of FSC
None of other CIS would contribute.
P The course you are sounds fine.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 25, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY EAGLEBURGER
DICK CHENEY
BOB GATES
COLIN POWELL
RON LEHMAN

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin

Enclosed is the draft letter from President Bush to President Yeltsin that we agreed to in yesterday's Oval Office meeting. May I have your comments by COB today.

*Please keep
this very close
hold. B*


Brent Scowcroft

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/15/2013

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~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

Dear Boris:

I am writing to share my thoughts on how we may work together during the time remaining to me in office on the most important issue in our bilateral relationship -- our common desire to end forever the threat of nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Governor Clinton and I agreed last week that support for reform in Russia must remain a priority for the United States, and that our partnership with you is too important to allow the U.S. transition period to delay progress on the vital issues before us. In particular, the Governor hoped we could complete the START II treaty by mid-January. I hope you agree, as we discussed on November 4, that you and I should conclude this treaty together.

Together we made the important and tough decisions that led to our Joint Understanding at the June Summit. That was the major task and it is now behind us. We now have before us the task of codifying our historic accomplishment into treaty language. A successful conclusion of that task would lock in a foundation for a close, cooperative American-Russian partnership for the remainder of this decade and into the next century.

Our Joint Understanding calls for dramatic reductions in the strategic forces of both sides. Even more importantly, it greatly improves stability by banning the most destabilizing

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systems now held by both countries. But, as we have discussed, there is much more to the agreement than the changes it requires in our nuclear forces. Underlying it is a profound break from the past in how we look at arms control, at stability, and at each other. For that, you deserve much of the credit. It was, as I recall, at your initiative that we decided to abandon the old standard of numerical parity just hours before we announced the agreement in the Rose Garden.

Another novel feature of our agreement that stands in sharp contrast to the years of competitive arms build up is the provision that the United States might help Russia to reduce its forces more quickly. As you know, we are already discussing with your government U.S. assistance to help alleviate the financial burden of implementing the new agreement.

The draft treaty Jim Baker provided to your government in July was a faithful translation into treaty language of the June 17 Joint Understanding. In view of that, I was surprised by the changes which were proposed by your Foreign Ministry. The proposals to permit conversion of SS-18 silos and downloading of SS-19s seem clearly out of step with the June accord. Similarly, the proposals on heavy bombers would reopen issues that were settled in the START talks. I am at a loss to understand why these changes would be suggested unless it is to permit Russian forces to reach the 3500 warhead ceiling and to do so in the most

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

economical manner. If that interpretation is correct, it seems clearly at odds with your statement in the Oval Office that you wanted to break symmetry as a symbol of our new relationship.

With respect to the proposed statements on the ABM Treaty, our countries have begun to make progress toward a global defense against ballistic missile along the lines you suggested at Camp David. I would hope we could build on that progress rather than return to statements that seem outdated in our new relationship.

Boris, I think we should remain true to our June framework agreement. The initial response to our treaty draft seems to take us in a different direction. I would ask that you reflect on the issues that I have raised and that we discuss them together very soon. I am convinced that only you and I can make the necessary decisions and provide the impetus to conclude this agreement during the next several weeks.

I know the tremendous problems Russia is facing and the pressures on you and your team of reformers. I am doing all that is within my power to assist you and to demonstrate support for your reforms. I remain hopeful that a Paris Club debt rescheduling agreement and the full range of economic assistance we have already delivered will help to secure the success of your programs. Conclusion of this new treaty would drastically reduce the burden of strategic forces left over from the Cold War, would

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bolster your and Russia's standing in the world community, and would be the crowning accomplishment of our historic cooperation together. I am ready to work hard to reach final agreement with you and will call you after you have had a chance to reflect on this letter.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

*Larry - please return
after reading - 741*

Translated from Russian

Return

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

May I, as behooves a sincere friend, address you my words of personal respect and support in this watershed moment in the political life of the United States and in your personal life.

I have closely followed the course of the election campaign in which you have again demonstrated your supreme qualities of a leading political figure in the contemporary world, courage, and commitment to the ideals of democracy and peace. A convincing proof of that are the many votes given to you by the American people. This resonates with what a great Russian writer Ivan Turgenev, whom I love very much, said once: "The feeling of a battle fought fairly is, perhaps, even deeper than the triumph of victory".

Like you, Mr. President, we respect the freely made choice of the American people and, on the eve of the change of administration, we wish to pay tribute to the outstanding role and contribution which you personally have made to the achievement of a new quality of relations between our two countries and to the harmonization of international relations as a whole.

I highly value the friendly and trusting contacts that we have developed during the period of truly epoch-making and historic changes both in Russia and in the world community at large. We shall never forget your unflinching support for the just cause of the Russian people during the critical days of severe trials of August, 1991, and your active efforts to develop cooperation between Russia and the United States based on the principles of trust and partnership. A graphic

manifestation of this approach was the passing of the Freedom Support Act by the US Congress to the elaboration and adoption of which you gave so much of your personal effort and energy.

History offered us a unique chance to lay a solid groundwork for joint advancement of both our peoples to the future on the basis of humanism and supreme moral values. Unprecedented steps have been made toward resolute dismantlement of the whole structure of military-political confrontation and ideological standoff, which we inherited from the Cold War period. We have achieved a real breakthrough in ridding our peoples and the entire international community of the nuclear threat. I believe we can be proud of the fact that within a rather short period of time we have been able to arrive at major agreements in the military field - on radical reductions in strategic offensive arms, safe elimination of nuclear munitions, destruction of chemical weapons, and on preventing the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Thus, a solid infrastructure has been developed for a long-term cooperation between Russia and the United States in areas where mutual suspicion and adversarial relations reigned not very long ago.

We in Russia give credit to your sincere efforts, Mr. President, to develop the potential for Russian-US economic cooperation. We are grateful to you for your fundamentally important understanding of the importance for the United States of the profound transformations taking place in Russia and the need to give those changes an all-round support, and not only financial support but by creating favorable conditions for mutually beneficial trade and economic interaction between our two nations.

Over the recent months we have done some fruitful work to create a solid treaty and legal foundation for our bilateral partnership and have moved to conduct our bilateral affairs on a civilized basis of mutual respect. Perhaps, this manifested itself in a most striking way - that all people in the US and Russia could relate to - in our joint effort to make our

societies more open to each other, to clear the logjams of all kinds of absurd reciprocal prohibitions, restrictions and barriers that piled up during the era of totalitarianism and ideological confrontation.

For all the clear and indisputable importance of what has been accomplished over such a historically short period of time in so many specific areas of our relations, I think you will agree, George, that of greatest value is and will continue to be this totally new atmosphere of mutual affinity and sympathy that has emerged in the relations of our two peoples and governments.

I am confident that during the final stage of your being in the office of the President of the United States of America you will make efforts to preserve and utilize the valuable experience we have jointly gained. Also, I have no doubt that you will continue - in any new capacity - your noble activities for the benefit of two great democracies, for the benefit of the Russian and American people.

I would be remiss if I failed to say a few warm and sincere words about Barbara. Naina and I recall her cordiality, thoughtfulness and hospitality during our stay in the United States. We will be happy to see you in Moscow as would be convenient to you.

In conclusion, I would like to once again express my sincere thanks to you for the joint work and to wish you every success in whatever area that you will choose to pursue, as well as good health and well-being to you and your family. Rest assured that you can always count on my friendship and good feelings.

Sincerely yours,

Boris YELTSIN

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of America
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Sincerely yours,

Boris YELTSIN