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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91130
Folder ID Number: 91130-004

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	Charge Collins to General Scowcroft and Ed Hewitt [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Note	Nick Burns to General Scowcroft Re: Note for General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	11/13/91	(b)(1)	
02b. Chronology	Re: Chronology of the President's Warning to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	8/31/91	(b)(1)	
03b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	8/31/91	(b)(1)	
04. Letter	G. Yanayev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05. Cable	Prime Minister to President Bush Re: [No Subject] (2 pp.)	8/22/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Cable	J S Wall to Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (3 pp.)	8/23/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

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Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1094
OA/ID Number: 91130-004
Date Closed: 4/27/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
08a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	12/24/92	(b)(1)	
08b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	12/24/92	(b)(1)	
08c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Reagan [Russian] (1 pp.)	12/24/92	(b)(1)	
08d. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Reagan [English] (1 pp.)	12/24/92	(b)(1)	
09. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
10. Handwritten Notes	Re: [Conversation Notes] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11. Telcon	Re: President Bush - President Gorbachev Phone Call (3 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	
12. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (5 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13a. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message from George Bush to Mikhail Gorbachev] [272317Z Aug 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/27/91	(b)(1)	S
13b. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14. Handwritten Note	Re: President/Yeltsin (2 pp.)	8/20/91	(b)(1)	
15a. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message to Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft] [292332Z Aug 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	8/29/91	(b)(1)	S
15b. Draft Cable	Re: [Message to Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	To White House, Re: [Message to General Scowcroft] [291220Z Aug 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	8/29/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Telcon	Re: President Bush - President Gorbachev Phone Call (3 pp.)	8/21/91	(b)(1)	
18a. Draft Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation President Bush with Mikhail Gorbachev (8 pp.)	7/30/91	(b)(1)	S
18b. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev (18 pp.)	7/30/91	(b)(1)	

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19. Cable	Jack Matlock to Ed Hewett, Re: [Meeting with Bessmertnykh] [220930Z Jul 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	7/22/91	(b)(1)	S
20a. Draft Cable	Re: Begin Text of Draft Cable to Ambassador Matlock, United States Embassy Moscow: (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
20b. Message	Re: Unofficial Translation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
21a. Cover Sheet	From White House Situation Room, Re: [211811Z Jul 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	7/21/91	(b)(1)	S
21b. Cable	Jack Matlock to Ed Hewett, Re: [Meeting with Edward Malayan] [211535Z Jul 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	7/21/91	(b)(1)	S

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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1064-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/11/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



~~SECRET~~

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND ED HEWITT
FROM: CHARGE COLLINS

BEGIN TEXT:

ON THE EVE OF THE CHRISTMAS DAY STATEMENTS BY GORBACHEV, THE
PRESIDENT AND YELTSIN, [1.4(d)]

[1.4(d)] ASKED CHARGE TO MEET HIM PRIVATELY AT HIS OFFICE TO
DISCUSS THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TRANSITION
PERIOD FOLLOWING U.S. RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA. [1.4(d)]
MESSAGE WAS THE FOLLOWING:

-- IN THE WAKE OF GORBACHEV'S RESIGNATION AND A U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT
REGARDING RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA, THERE WILL BE A PERIOD OF
TRANSITION FOR THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

-- DURING THAT PERIOD THE LOGIC OF THE TRANSITION WILL
INVOLVE CHANGES OF PERSONNEL. (NOTE: [1.4(d)] SAID HE WAS
NOT AT LIBERTY TO DISCUSS THE COMING CHANGES IN PART
BECAUSE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CHANGE WERE NOT YET DECIDED.
HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT KOMPLEKTOV WILL BE RECALLED AND
THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "SOVIET" TEAM ARE PROBABLY
GOING TO BE REPLACED.)

-- THE CHANGE FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN EMBASSY MANAGEMENT
AND DIRECTION WILL POSE SOME DELICATE PROBLEMS AMONG
THE EMBASSY STAFF. HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED TO KOLOSOVSKY
ABOUT THIS AND UNDERSTOOD KOLOSOVSKY HAD DISCUSSED THIS
ISSUE WITH ED HEWETT.

-- IN LIGHT OF THE COMPLICATED CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE
PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION IF THE USG USED THE U.S. AMBASSADOR/
CHARGE AND EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AS THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION
TO SENIOR LEVELS OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- [1.4(d)] AND KOLOSOVSKY HAD DISCUSSED THE FOREGOING.
HOWEVER, THE ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED IS A SENSITIVE MATTER
AND [1.4(d)] SAID HE HOPED I COULD CONVEY IT DIRECTLY
AND UNOFFICIALLY TO WASHINGTON.

I TOLD [1.4(d)] I WOULD, OF COURSE, PASS HIS COMMENTS AND
ADVICE ON TO WASHINGTON DISCREETLY. WITHOUT COMMITTING
TO DO MORE THAN THAT, I TOLD HIM THAT I DID UNDERSTAND
THAT THE TRANSITION FROM A SOVIET TO A RUSSIAN MISSION WOULD
POSE A VARIETY OF DELICATE PROBLEMS, AND THAT I WAS CERTAIN
THE USG WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THOSE PROBLEMS DID NOT
INTERFERE WITH A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN THE CONDUCT OF
OUR RELATIONS.

COMMENT: THERE IS CLEARLY A SELF SERVING ELEMENT IN
ALL OF THIS IN THAT [1.4(d)] SEEKING
TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES FIRMLY HERE AS THE CHANNEL TO
US ON THINGS AMERICAN AND SEE U.S. RELIANCE ON OUR EMBASSY HERE
AS THE CHANNEL TO THE NEW RUSSIAN MFA -- AS OPPOSED TO THE
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON -- AS THE MOST LIKELY WAY TO ENSURE
THE FUTURE RELEVANCE AND SURVIVAL OF [1.4(d)]

[1.4(d)]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1064-MR
4/11/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

-2-

AT THE SAME TIME, WE SUSPECT THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP HERE IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT SOME OF THE WASHINGTON STAFF. KOLOSOVSKY IS THEIR MAN, BUT HE IS NOT RUNNING THE PLACE; NOR, WE ASSUME, DOES HE HAVE PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT RELATIONS OUTSIDE THE EXISTING EMBASSY STRUCTURE (I.E. AMB KOMPLEKTOV AND HIS STAFF WHOSE FUTURE POSITION HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED). IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS, THEREFORE, PROBABLE THAT OUR BEST AND MOST RELIABLE MEANS OF CONVEYING U.S. VIEWS AND POSITIONS TO THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO DO SO DIRECTLY IN MOSCOW. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT KOLOSOVSKY IS KEPT FULLY IN THE LOOP ON WHAT WE DO HERE. FOR THE PRESENT THIS WILL ENSURE THAT WE KNOW THE RECIPIENT AND HAVE THE ABILITY TO ENSURE CLARITY.

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
END TEXT.
DECLAS: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Mikhail:

I am writing at what I know is an extremely challenging time for you following last week's dramatic events and amid your many responsibilities during the current session of the Supreme Soviet. The purpose of my letter is to communicate my strong belief that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should be accorded the status of free and independent states as members of the international community as quickly as possible.

You know our long-standing position that the Baltic states were illegally incorporated into the USSR and should be free. I have also told you more than once that I believe very strongly that the USSR would be better off with them as neighbors than as unwilling members of the union.

We have both heard this week a clear and decisive call from the international community that the Balts ought to achieve their independence now. While the United States has not yet made a definitive statement, I want you to know that I will not be able to maintain this position for much longer.

I would prefer that the government of the Soviet Union act decisively and quickly to make a clear commitment to the Balts that the USSR recognizes their legitimate claim to independence. This should include immediate negotiations and other practical steps necessary to make them truly independent and in control of their national territories. We would support such a decision and would follow with an announcement of our intention to establish diplomatic relations with the three states.

I believe this is by far the best course of action for you and the Baltic states. I urge you to adopt it without hesitation. If you are unable to take this step by August 30, I will nevertheless be forced to announce the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the three Baltic states to establish diplomatic relations.

I do not underestimate the difficulty of this and the many other issues you are facing and would be most willing to discuss this in more detail by telephone if that would be helpful.

You and Raisa have Barbara and my best wishes during this complex time. Please convey to Raisa our hope that she and the rest of your family have recovered from your terrible ordeal last week. All of you are in our thoughts and prayers.

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0303- F/1
10/20/03 MM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



November 13, 1991

Note for General Scowcroft

As promised, I have attached a chronology of the President's warning to Gorbachev in June about a possible coup attempt.

I have also attached the memcon from the President's call to Gorbachev on June 21 which includes a reference (bottom page 2, top of page 3) to the coup information.

Nick Burns **NB**

Copy given
to the
Pres. +
Gov.
Sumner

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

~~SECRET~~

CHRONOLOGY OF THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV CONCERNING A POSSIBLE COUP ATTEMPT

June 20, 1991

- Moscow Mayor Popov alerted Ambassador Matlock to a possible coup against Gorbachev by right-wing forces.
- Matlock reported the conversation to the White House and State and sought guidance.
- The White House instructed Matlock to seek a meeting with Gorbachev to pass the information to him at the request of the President.
- Matlock saw Gorbachev the same day and passed the message.
- During the President's meeting with Boris Yeltsin the same day, the President conveyed the information to Yeltsin at the request of Popov.
- Yeltsin suggested that he and the President call Gorbachev from the Oval Office to discuss this and other issues. Gorbachev was not available to take the call.

June 21, 1991

- The President called Gorbachev to brief on the Yeltsin meeting and to follow-up on Matlock's message about a possible coup (see attached memcon beginning bottom of page two and top of page three).

Note: Moscow Mayor Popov specifically asked Ambassador Matlock at the time not to divulge his name in connection with the coup rumor. Matlock and the President inadvertently mentioned Popov's name to Gorbachev. We understand from Popov that Gorbachev later accused him of disloyalty for not having come to him directly with the information. Popov remains angry at the USG that his name surfaced in this connection.

In backgrounding the press, we should take special care to keep Popov's name out of the story.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2000-1202-F/2
4/26/12 MM

Dear George,

Today, at some distance from the recent dramatic events, I would like to write to you again.

Those were three very difficult days for me, and it's not easy now either, but I constantly feel your support.

I express my gratitude for the firm uncompromised position of condemnation of the plotters. It also played a role in foiling their criminal designs.

Now, having defended democracy, we should resolutely advance our business, first of all in economy matters. A very difficult part of the road is still ahead, and I count on support of the partners, on your, George, support. I hope, that very soon we shall be able, in one form or another, to discuss thoroughly, how we should interact during these months.

Raisa Maksimovna gradually feels better after what we had to come through last week. She appreciated the care displayed by Barbara, and sends warm greetings to her, to which I subscribe.

Sincerely yours,

Mikhail

Moscow, the Kremlin

August 31, 1991

Дорогой Джордж!

Сегодня, на некотором отдалении от недавних драматических событий, хочу еще раз обратиться к Вам.

Мне было очень трудно в те три дня, да и сейчас нелегко, но я постоянно ощущаю Вашу поддержку.

Выражаю Вам свою признательность за твердую, бескомпромиссную позицию осуждения заговорщиков. Она тоже сыграла свою роль в срыве их преступных замыслов.

Сейчас, отстояв демократию, мы должны решительно двинуть вперед наши дела, прежде всего в экономике. Впереди — очень нелегкий отрезок пути, и я рассчитываю на поддержку партнеров, на Вашу, Джордж, поддержку. Надеюсь, что в ближайшее время мы сможем в той или иной форме обстоятельно обсудить, как нам взаимодействовать в эти месяцы.

Раиса Максимовна постепенно приходит в себя после пережитого на прошлой неделе. Она оценила проявленное Барбарой внимание, передает ей теплый привет, к которому присоединяюсь и я.

С уважением,

Михаил

Москва, Кремль

31 августа 1991 года

Hand-delivered to Robert Gates
by Soviet Amb Komplektov at
3:30 pm, Monday, August 19, 1991
at the White House (Gates' ofc)

Dear Mr. President,

I am sending this message to you at a point which is critical for the destiny of the Soviet Union and for the international situation in the whole world. Having embarked upon the path of profound reforms and having gone a significant way in this direction, the Soviet Union is now facing a ^{deep} profound crisis whose further exacerbation can both call into question the very course of reform and lead to major cataclysms in international environment.

Of course, it is no secret for you that a sharp decline of production in our country not as yet compensated by the functioning of alternative industrial and agricultural structures is creating a real threat to continued existence and development of the peoples of the Soviet Union. There has emerged a situation of uncontrollability with too many centers of power. All this cannot but cause wide-spread discontent of the population.

There has also been a real threat of the country's disintegration, of a break-down of the single economic space, the single civil rights space, the single defense and the single foreign policy. A normal life under these conditions is impossible. As a result of inter-ethnic clashes there has been bloodshed in many areas of the USSR. A disintegration of the USSR would have gravest consequences not only internally, but internationally as well.

Under these circumstances we have no other choice but to take resolute measures in order to stop the slide toward catastrophe. We were compelled to impose a state of emergency in some areas of the USSR for a period of six months. This is a temporary measure, but one that is necessary today. This step is not an abandonment of the reforms started by M.S.Gorbachev. The reforms shall be continued. Our choice has been made, and we shall stick to it. We shall proceed on the basis of democracy

and glasnost. We shall be building a multifarious economy, including private enterprise. We shall continue with the policy of ensuring civil rights and freedoms. In the international sphere, all treaties and agreements remain in force, the foreign policy course of our country shall be continued. We are determined to further develop the Helsinki process, to expand mutually beneficial cooperation with our foreign partners. But in order for this course to succeed, and for what was begun by Gorbachev not to be totally discredited, we must restore political stability in our country and to move, at last, to a controlled process of changes.

I wish to lay particular emphasis on the fact that we are taking all these actions in a situation of maintaining and continued functioning of all constitutional organs of power in the country and within the framework of existing laws.

I would like to be able to count not only on understanding but support by all our foreign partners and, of course, first of all, by your country. While the main part of the effort can only be made by ourselves, we cherish your good attitude and believe that continued cooperation between our two states has been and remains in our mutual interest, and meets the interests of stability and tranquility all over the world.

For your information, Mikhail Sergeyevich is in complete safety, and nothing is threatening him.

Sincerely,

G. YANAYEV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Free 21

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANNI GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE^{IN}

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 221512Z AUG 91

FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO WHITEHOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

OOQQ

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

TO: PRESIDENT BUSH

DEAR GEORGE,

I HAVE SPOKEN TO MIKHAIL GORBACHEV THIS MORNING AND HE ONCE AGAIN SAID HOW GRATEFUL HE WAS FOR THE UNWAVERING SUPPORT OF THE WEST OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. HE SOUNDED IN GOOD HEART, FULLY RECOGNISING THE TREMENDOUS PART PLAYED BY BORIS YELTSIN AND THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC IN DEFEATING THE COUP AND VERY KEEN TO CARRY FORWARD OUR DISCUSSIONS AT THE G7 SUMMIT.

I THINK WE SHOULD ASSESS QUICKLY WHETHER THE WAY IS NOW CLEAR FOR FASTER AND DEEPER REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND WHETHER THE WEST NEEDS TO DO MORE TO HELP THE SOVIET AND RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW BREATHING SPACE.

I SENSE THAT EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES WISH TO LOOK QUICKLY AT HOW WE MIGHT BUILD ON WHAT WE AGREED AT THE MEETING OF G7 LEADERS IN LONDON WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS WITH YOU IN KENNEBUNKPORT. BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW STRAIGHTAWAY THAT AS CHAIRMAN IN OFFICE OF THE G7 I AM SUGGESTING TO G7 PARTNERS THAT OUR SHERPAS SHOULD MEET NEXT WEEK TO REVIEW THE POSITION. SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES ARE ALREADY CALLING FOR THE PROVISION OF SIGNIFICANT NEW FINANCIAL AID. I AM SURE YOUR VIEWS AND MINE WILL REMAIN CLOSE ON THIS AND IT IS BEST FOR THIS MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED INITIALLY BY SHERPAS LEST COLLEAGUES CALL FOR A MEETING AT HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL.

ANOTHER POINT FOR CONSIDERATION IS WHETHER IN THE NEW

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0215-MR
7/9/2013 MH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SITUATION IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO CONSIDER FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE IMF FOR THE SOVIET UNION, AND NOT JUST TO CONFINED OURSELVES TO RAPID PROGRESS OVER SPECIAL ASSOCIATION. I SUGGEST THIS BECAUSE IT MIGHT PROVE INFINITELY PREFERABLE TO WHAT OTHERWISE MAY BE IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURE FOR SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL AND COLLECTIVE CASH ASSISTANCE. I RECOGNISE OF COURSE THAT THERE ARE SOME DIFFICULT ISSUES INVOLVED HERE WHICH MAY TAKE TIME FOR RESOLVE. BUT WE NEED TO MAKE A START. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE CASE FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IS LIKELY TO PROVE IRRESISTIBLE IN THESE DRAMATIC NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

I AM MAKING THESE PROPOSALS BECAUSE I FEEL THAT UNLESS YOU AND I TAKE A GRIP ON THESE MATTERS URGENTLY DEMANDS FOR ASSISTANCE WILL RUN OUT OF CONTROL. I AM FAXING SEPARATELY SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON AREAS OF ASSILOMNC WE MIGHT LOOK AT.

WITH WARMEST GOOD WISHES,

JOHN

#0001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(George Bush Library)

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (2 pp.)	1/27/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	4/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1992 DEC 24 PM 1:55

C

091087

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION U No. Pages 5

FROM: S/S-O: BYJors S/S-O 74512 7516
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>WHSP</u>	<u>WHSP</u>		
	<u>Scowcroft</u>		
	<u>Howe</u>		
	<u>Franklin</u>		
	<u>Potts</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Please deliver attached texts to Presidents Bush
and Reagan

S/S Officer: Byjors

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE : 12/24/92

FROM (name) J. Mandel

(office) POL, American Embassy Moscow

(PTS #)

(FAX #)

TO (name) SWO

(office) Operations Center, Department of State

(FAX #) 647 1811

SUBJECT : Letters from Gorbachev to Bush, Reagan
For Transmission to addressees

NUMBER OF PAGES TO BE SENT : 4

Per conversation with Watch Officer, attached are letters from former President Gorbachev to President Bush and former President Reagan. Please fax to addressees. Originals will follow by pouch.



№ _____

№ _____

ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ США ДЖОРДЖУ БУШУ

Дорогой Джордж!

В эти декабрьские дни от себя и Раисы Максимовны хочу поздравить тебя и всю вашу большую, дружную семью с Рождеством - нашим общим христианским праздником.

Желаем вам в новом году всего самого доброго, успехов во всех начинаниях, здоровья.

Надеюсь, что в оставшиеся недели и дни твоей деятельности на посту Президента, а также в дальнейшем ты продолжишь ту работу, которую мы совместно осуществляли, чтобы сблизить наши страны и народы. Знаю, что сейчас решаются важные вопросы, связанные с заключением нового Договора о стратегических наступательных вооружениях. Его заключение станет блестящим завершением твоей деятельности во главе США, равно как и большим успехом для России, Президента Ельцина.

Хочу выразить надежду, что остающиеся вопросы найдут взаимоприемлемое решение с учетом законных интересов безопасности обеих наших стран.

С любовью, как всегда,

Михаил Сергеевич Горбачев

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

21 декабря 1992 года

рождество
всегда.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES GEORGE BUSH

DEAR GEORGE,

DURING THESE DECEMBER DAYS, RAISA AND I WOULD LIKE TO WISH YOU AND ALL YOUR BIG, FRIENDLY FAMILY HAPPY CHRISTMAS - OUR MUTUAL CHRISTIAN HOLIDAY.

I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST IN THE COMING YEAR, SUCCESS IN ALL YOUR ENDEAVORS, AND GOOD HEALTH.

I HOPE THAT IN THE REMAINING WEEKS AND DAYS OF YOUR ACTIVITIES AS PRESIDENT, AS WELL AS IN THE FUTURE, YOU WILL CONTINUE THE WORK THAT WE ACCOMPLISHED IN BRINGING OUR COUNTRIES AND PEOPLE CLOSER TOGETHER. I KNOW THAT IMPORTANT QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE CONCLUSION OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ARE BEING DECIDED UPON NOW. THE CONCLUSION [OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT] WOULD BE A BRILLIANT COMPLETION OF YOUR ACTIVITIES AS THE LEADER OF THE U.S.A., AS WELL AS A GREAT SUCCESS FOR RUSSIA AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN.

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE WISH THAT THE REMAINING UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS WILL BE RESOLVED IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

M. GORBACHEV

DECEMBER 24, 1992

HANDWRITTEN POSTSCRIPT: WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES AND HOPING TO SEE YOU SOON.

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ
ФОНД СОЦИАЛЬНО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ И
ПОЛИТОЛОГИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ
(ГОРБАЧЕВ ФОНД)



THE INTERNATIONAL
FOUNDATION FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL STUDIES
(THE GORBACHEV FOUNDATION)

№ _____

№ _____

ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ РОНАЛЬДУ РЕЙГАНУ

Дорогой Рональд!

Прими наши поздравления с Рождеством и Новым годом. Мы с Раисой Максимовной желаем тебе и Нэнси здоровья и благополучия в наступающем 1993 году, надеемся на новые встречи.

Я с большим интересом ознакомился с твоим письмом, содержащим предложение о проведении серии конференций по проблемам разоружения и безопасности. Сейчас вместе с моими коллегами по Фонду мы обдумываем форму нашего участия в осуществлении этой интересной инициативы. В начале будущего года сообщим наши предложения твоим сотрудникам.

С теплыми чувствами и наилучшими пожеланиями

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

24 декабря 1992 года

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

DEAR RONALD:

PLEASE ACCEPT OUR GOOD WISHES FOR CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR. RAISA MAKSIMOVA AND I WISH YOU AND NANCY HEALTH AND SUCCESS IN THE COMING YEAR, AND HOPE THAT WE WILL MEET AGAIN.

I READ WITH GREAT INTEREST YOUR LETTER CONTAINING A PROPOSAL FOR A SERIES OF CONFERENCES ON THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY. MY COLLEAGUES IN THE FUND AND I ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING HOW WE MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN THE REALIZATION OF THIS INTERESTING INITIATIVE. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW YEAR, WE WILL INFORM YOUR STAFF OF OUR PROPOSALS.

WITH WARM WISHES AND OUR BEST REGARDS.

M. GORBACHEV
DECEMBER 24, 1992

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 4/27/2009	OA/ID Number: 91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Y Reporting on latest
on events.

Calvin back in Moscow
in good health

U.S. ^{correspondents} Y, R, P have

been taken into custody
upon Yeltsin's order but
under sanction of P.
att'y of SC. Case is being
built

Convinced that democracy
has won & we
have great future. Used
work to exhibit that
this ~~idea~~ reported

Thanks for great
help & support
& world community
Thanks also to all
people

P Congratulations to you
your stock is high.
H You showed great
courage and strength
& we congrat. you
on it. Now you
should get some rest.

Y Thanks. Victory triumphed
Thank you for your
strong support. No
more liabilities

P wonderful day for
world. You prepared
brilliantly & world
loves you.

Y We will stay in
touch. I got thousands
moral support from
contact w/ you.

P De Mossey is kidding
himself

4 No. We not holding
~~any~~ because that our
~~issue~~ for Corb. personally
to decide. They or her
won't rely to a big 3

Moyers
on PBS

Frank-Corona

President Bush - President Gorbachev Phone Call.
12:19-12:31, 21 August 1991

Gorbachev talking to Peter Afanasenko, the U.S. translator:

Peter: Thank God you're alive.

Gorbachev: There is a God. ... I've been four here four days in a fortress.

Peter: The President isn't available yet.

Gorbachev: We can wait. You can't believe what it was like here. I was completely blocked.

Peter: The President tried to talk to you.

Gorbachev: I gave the order to Moiseyev to pull the troops out.

Peter: How is Raisa?

Gorbachev: It was very hard for the family.

I have complete security here, my guards didn't let any one in. The Republics took a strong position for me.

Communications: Mr. President, Mr. Gorbachev is on the line.

President: Oh my God, that's wonderful. Mikhail!

Gorbachev: My dearest George. I'm so happy to hear your voice again.

President: My God I'm glad to hear you. How are you doing?

Gorbachev: Mr. President the adventurers have not succeeded. I have been here four days. They tried to pressure me, using every method. They had me blocked by sea and land. My guards protected me, we withstood the challenge.

President: Where are you now?

Gorbachev: I'm in Crimea. It's only been one hour since I have assumed Presidential powers. I have maintained full contact with the Republic leaders and handed over the Ministry of Defense to Moiseyev. He is to follow my orders only. Troops are to move out of the city or back to where they are normally based.

President: That's good.

Gorbachev: Everything we've done together to improve cooperation with the Republics has worked beautifully. All of them have taken positions of principle. The greatest opponent of these illegal acts was Yeltsin, the Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, and K...

President: Well I was damned worried about it.

Gorbachev: You know this was a terrible tragedy. It showed

that the adventurers won't succeed. The society is different now. Things like this won't work.

President: Where are the adventurers?

Gorbachev: Some are coming this way to me. I don't know what they are bearing in their hands. The next two days I must make all these crucial decisions.

President: Have you talked to Yeltsin yet?

Gorbachev: He was the first one.

President: I don't know what news you've been getting, but we've been supporting Yeltsin and you as President of the USSR.

Gorbachev: I have to congratulate you and the position you took from the first minute. You have been stalwart. Thanks for taking off from your vacation. You affected everyone with your strong statements, except Qadhafi.

President: Don't know what news you got in the last few days.

Gorbachev: I was cut off completely.

President: Were you filled in just now?

Gorbachev: Yes, everything started with me now.

President: When are you going back to Moscow?

Gorbachev: Either tonight or early tomorrow morning.

President: Good luck. If I can say or do anything I will be available night or day. Don't hesitate to call.

Gorbachev: Yes George, absolutely. I will have the need to talk to you. I have to go back to take some steps and then we will have some matters to discuss with you.

President: I'm happy that you are safe and back. Barbara is here and sends her love to Raisa.

Gorbachev: George, thank you and Barb both for your position of principle, but also for your humanity and friendship.

President: Just glad you're well. I want to say to the press and the world that we've had this conversation.

Gorbachev: Yes, I'd only be thankful to you for that.

President: I'll get that message out to the whole world now.

Bless you and your family.

Gorbachev: We want to keep going ahead with you. What happened- say one thing that this was prevented by democracy. This is a guarantee for us. We will keep working in the country and out to keep cooperation going.

President: Sounds like the same old Mikhail Gorbachev, confident, one full of life. Once you get back we'll talk about what to work on since our talks in Moscow.

Gorbachev: OK George. Please proceed on this basis.
Good-bye.

President: Good-bye.

P/ Yeltsin

12:00 PM
8-21-91

Y 2 days sitting here w/o leaving premises. We have had all night discussions w/ KGB & mil. Forces did not come sep & 100 of thousands of people prevented it. This am RSS decided unanimously that camp was illegal & w/o effect on RFSSS. Also gave me new powers if local govt support camp they could be released. Kravch & I agreed we could fly together to meet Gov. RFSS won't let me. Instead, I ^{primarily, Ryzhkov, Bakhtin, RFSSR people.} sending a delegation. Also Primor' & Bakhtin. Unfortunately, 40 min ahead, Yazar & others left for Gov. They want to force Gov to sign paper or about him. I trying to work to Kravch to prevent them from getting to Gov 1st. There are 3 a/cft going down there. Question is who gets there 1st (Sov people) Meanwhile, seizure of Parl. seizures but Cdr of all airborne has come to our side & airborne have moved back out of city to their bases. My deputy is in center of Russia

For 3

To continue ops if I am taken.
Also last night, Krawchuk & Yazov
decided not to respond to orders of
joints. 1000's of Moscowites surround
my building. Based on my
order, troops are moving out.
But K & B & Spitzner are still
here ~~not~~ ^{and} under my orders.

P Will Krawchuk try to prevent
B & Yazov from leaving today
and

Y I not sure. He said he would
try, but those a/cft packed w/
security. He said he would try
to make them land in Sec/except
rather than For 3.

P Is anyone on touch w/Corb?

Y I have to say no. I tried, w/special
switching device, but there is
no way to get thru to him or
his assets. We found - there
guards - that he is healthy &
determined not to release his
power to anyone. We will try
to intercept & grab when they get
back to Moscow - if they don't
stop in Crimea.

P What happened to other camp leaders

Y Kubyakov is backtracking & pretending

Name Cates fit in former P's.

Wagner
could be
planned

- Strauss phone call -

- Wanted US members

RSS declaring

Talked to Yeltsin, Strauss, Major

he was never part of it. Packer
went to hospital

P True illness?

Y Diplomatic

A Bessacretive?

Y Back in office but retaining careful
neutrality

A I want to be helpful but not
interfering. Any suggestions?

Y Unfortunately, only propagandizing
our plight. Otherwise I don't
see how you can assist us.
Main Task is on 26th a vote
of SASS & we hope for a vote
declaring this anti-semitism.
Then this map could be out &
could be tried

P Are you optimistic?

Y The other side is also lobbying
for a different outcome.

P I want to help w/o interfering
in your internal affairs. I made
a strong statement yesterday
supporting you & returning to

Y I received your comments. That
is not interfering, it is helpful

P What happening in Berlin

Y 30 act of Special Forces are
going there to take over key sites

We are copying in a special
ide to come over to our side

P I ~~can~~ will give full report
on our call to press if you
think it would be helpful.

Y Thank you for all your support.
I'll tell my SS of your support
& that warmly rec'd. If we could
talk tomorrow at same time...

830

330

P We will ~~should~~ I tell the press &
your statement conversation.

Y That would help.

P What about Morisey?

Y Carrying out rules of himself. He
wouldn't come over.

P The world - except Iraq, Cuba,
Kutya - supports you.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13a. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message from George Bush to Mikhail Gorbachev] [272317Z Aug 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/27/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 1/10/2023

Date Closed: 4/27/2009	OA/ID Number: 91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2004-1936-MR(78)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/31/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

file 07/20/91



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: BURNS PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 272317Z AUG 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO DCM COLLINS FOR
EITHER CHERNYAYEV OR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV 00B AUGUST 28.

NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

I AM WRITING AT WHAT I KNOW IS AN EXTREMELY CHALLENGING TIME FOR YOU
FOLLOWING LAST WEEK'S DRAMATIC EVENTS AND AMID YOUR MANY
RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET.
THE PURPOSE OF MY LETTER IS TO COMMUNICATE MY STRONG BELIEF THAT
LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE STATUS OF FREE
AND INDEPENDENT STATES AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

YOU KNOW OUR LONG-STANDING POSITION THAT THE BALTIC STATES WERE
ILLEGALLY INCORPORATED INTO THE USSR AND SHOULD BE FREE. I HAVE
ALSO TOLD YOU MORE THAN ONCE THAT I BELIEVE VERY STRONGLY THAT THE
USSR WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITH THEM AS NEIGHBORS THAN AS UNWILLING
MEMBERS OF THE UNION.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2004-1936-MR
MM 10/31/2016

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WE HAVE BOTH HEARD THIS WEEK A CLEAR AND DECISIVE CALL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE BALTS OUGHT TO ACHIEVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE NOW. WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT YET MADE A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS POSITION FOR MUCH LONGER.

I WOULD PREFER THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION ACT DECISIVELY AND QUICKLY TO MAKE A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO THE BALTS THAT THE USSR RECOGNIZES THEIR LEGITIMATE CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER PRACTICAL STEPS NECESSARY TO MAKE THEM TRULY INDEPENDENT AND IN CONTROL OF THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORIES. WE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A DECISION AND WOULD FOLLOW WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR INTENTION TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE THREE STATES.

I BELIEVE THIS IS BY FAR THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOR YOU AND THE BALTIC STATES. I URGE YOU TO ADOPT IT WITHOUT HESITATION. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO TAKE THIS STEP BY AUGUST 30, I WILL NEVERTHELESS BE FORCED TO ANNOUNCE THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE THREE BALTIC STATES TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS AND THE MANY OTHER ISSUES YOU ARE FACING AND WOULD BE MOST WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DETAIL BY TELEPHONE IF THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL.

YOU AND RAISA HAVE BARBARA AND MY BEST WISHES DURING THIS COMPLEX TIME. PLEASE CONVEY TO RAISA OUR HOPE THAT SHE AND THE REST OF YOUR FAMILY HAVE RECOVERED FROM YOUR TERRIBLE ORDEAL LAST WEEK. ALL OF YOU ARE IN OUR THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

END TEXT

DECLAS. OADR

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MOSCOW

#0055

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13b. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 4/27/2009	OA/ID Number: 91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P/yeltser

8-20-91
K. Port

D. Peroshina
F

Gorb in Crimea - isolated
Yanayev - allows a pretext
Cute actions illegal & w/o force
in Russia

- We are surrounded & expect
them to storm the ramparts
~~to be successful~~
- 100,000 people outside ready
to defend us
- Right wing camps. Want to depose
democratic leadership everywhere
- rich cities
- We ~~have~~ gave 10 demands to ~~the~~ ^{representatives}
- meet w/ Gorb.
- ask P to demand to speak to Gorb
- Try to rally world opinion
- Situation is critical.
- Most factories are striking
- we will continue until Gorb
thrown out & brought to trial
- Wait give up unless they resort
to the bloodiest measures
- They may do just that.
- We should ask for WHO doctors
to check Gorb.
- Let's try to speak tomorrow at
end of day - things are
5 pm call.
- You should not call Yanayev. It
would legit. them.

- We tried to send del. to Coen
 - He surrounded by 3 rings of LGB & we can't get thru.
- Thanks much. This call is historic & will help in our struggle.

Hague { Accelerating prog or assoc.
agreement w/ E.E.U.

- Susp. food credits & Tech assist
Ford aid
- Only if SC met all human rights
- Heads of Gov't met on Friday
- Tróika trip to Moscow dropped.

*** - Kaifu calling for unity of 6-7 sheeps.
or Pol. Dir.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15a. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message to Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft] [292332Z Aug 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	8/29/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1064-MR(514)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/8/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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~~SECRET~~

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1.4(c)

PAGE 1 MLN=32907
DAN=404-025050

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

TOR = 292344Z AUG 91

ACTION = [SVC]+WHSR(1)
INFO = [SVC]+CIA(1) TCHIEF(1)



OAAMZYUW 1.4(c) 0068 241233Z-MNSH- 1.4(c)

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 292332Z AUG 91 ZYH

FM WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c) //NIACT IMMEDIATE//

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c)

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARGE JIM COLLINS FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 2
BEFORE MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON OUR INTENTION TO ESTABLISH
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES. I WOULD APPRECIATE
IT VERY MUCH IF YOU YOU WOULD SEE CHERNYAYEV AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
ON AUGUST 30 TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED THE MESSAGE CONVEYED BY PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV IN RESPONSE TO HIS AUGUST 27 LETTER CONCERNING THE
BALTICS.

THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO MEET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S
REQUEST TO DELAY A U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BALTIC STATES UNTIL MONDAY,
SEPTEMBER 2.

WE WILL FOLLOW THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES DEBATE ON
THE BALTICS WITH GREAT INTEREST AND EXPECT THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT TO ACT ON SEPTEMBER 2 ON COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE
FOR THE BALTICS.

THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE HIS DECISION TO ESTABLISH

* * * * *

~~SECRET~~

* * * * *

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2009-1064-MP

5/8/2014 MM

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PAGE 2 MLN=32907
DAN=404-025050

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES ON SEPTEMBER 2.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
BT
#0068

~~SECRET~~

1.4(c)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15b. Draft Cable	Re: [Message to Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1064-MR(514.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/8/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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~~SECRET~~



From: White House

1.4(c)

// NIAct Immed //

1.4(c)

~~SECRET~~

→ Please deliver the following message to Charge Jim Collins from
For Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft General Scowcroft.

→ Begin Text:

→ The President has decided to wait until Monday, September 2 before making an announcement on our intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Baltic states. I would appreciate it very much if you would see Chernyayev at opening of business on August 30 to convey the following information:

→ -- The President received the message conveyed by President Gorbachev in response to his August 27 letter concerning the Baltics.

→ -- The President has decided to meet President Gorbachev's request to delay a U.S. announcement on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Baltic states until Monday, September 2.

→ -- We will follow the Congress of People's Deputies debate on the Baltics with great interest and expect the Soviet government to act on September 2 on complete independence for the Baltics.

→ -- The President will announce his decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Baltic states on September 2.

→ END TEXT

→ DECL. OADR

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2009-1064-MR

5/8/2014 MM



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
 PRIORITY
 ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 2

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Outgoing Privacy To Moscow

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

K-PORT

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

REMARKS _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cof NARA, Date 4/27/09

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Cable	To White House, Re: [Message to General Scowcroft] [291220Z Aug 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	8/29/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By mm on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1064-MR(515)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/8/2014

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: BURNS FILE HEWETT ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] IN SIT SUM

Secret Copy

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 291220Z AUG 91

1.4(c) [REDACTED]

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 291220Z AUG 91 ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED]

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND

PLEASE ALERT ED HEWETT AND NICK BURNS.
BEGIN TEXT

CHARGE HAS JUST (1415 MOSCOW TIME) TALKED WITH CHERNAYEV WHO HAD CALLED AT MID-DAY TO CONVEY GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE/REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON THE BALTICS DELIVERED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

CHERNAYEV SAID HE HAD REPORTED TO GORBACHEV THIS MORNING ON THE MEETING WE HAD YESTERDAY AND HAD CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. THE PRESIDENT HAD READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY AND ASKED THAT CHERNAYEV CALL THE CHARGE TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING TO THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE.

-- THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES THAT BEGINS MEETING ON MONDAY SEPTEMBER 2 WILL TAKE UP AND "DECIDE" THE ISSUE OF THE BALTICS.

-- FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT DISCUSSED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AT THE TIME INDICATED (AUGUST 30) WILL COMPLICATE AN ALREADY COMPLEX SITUATION.

-- GORBACHEV REQUESTS THEREFORE THAT THE U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT BE DELAYED.

TO BE CERTAIN THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING CHARGE REPEATED THE KEY POINTS OF CHERNAYEV'S MESSAGE, AND CHERNAYEV CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE ACCURATE.

CHARGE TOLD CHERNAYEV HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY THIS MESSAGE AND REQUEST TO WASHINGTON AND SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED ED HEWETT TO ALERT HIM TO THE ESSENCE OF GORBACHEV'S REQUEST.

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5/8/2014 MM

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

REQUEST GUIDANCE ON RESPONSE TO CONVEY TO CHERNAYEV AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

END TEXT

DECL OADR

#0030

~~SECRET~~

President Bush - President Gorbachev Phone Call.
12:19-12:31, 21 August 1991

Gorbachev talking to Peter Afanassenko, the U.S. translator:

Peter: Thank God you're alive.

Gorbachev: There is a God. ... I've been four here four days in a fortress.

Peter: The President isn't available yet.

Gorbachev: We can wait. You can't believe what it was like here. I was completely blocked.

Peter: The President tried to talk to you.

Gorbachev: I gave the order to Moiseyev to pull the troops out.

Peter: How is Raisa?

Gorbachev: It was very hard for the family.

I have complete security here, my guards didn't let any one in. The Republics took a strong position for me.

Communications: Mr. President, Mr. Gorbachev is on the line.

President: Oh my God, that's wonderful. Mikhail!

Gorbachev: My dearest George. I'm so happy to hear your voice again.

President: My God I'm glad to hear you. How are you doing?

Gorbachev: Mr. President the adventurers have not succeeded. I have been here four days. They tried to pressure me, using every method. They had me blocked by sea and land. My guards protected me, we withstood the challenge.

President: Where are you now?

Gorbachev: I'm in Crimea. It's only been one hour since I have assumed Presidential powers. I have maintained full contact with the Republic leaders and handed over the Ministry of Defense to Moiseyev. He is to follow my orders only. Troops are to move out of the city or back to where they are normally based.

President: That's good.

Gorbachev: Everything we've done together to improve cooperation with the Republics has worked beautifully. All of them have taken positions of principle. The greatest opponent of these illegal acts was Yeltsin, the Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, and K...

President: Well I was damned worried about it.

Gorbachev: You know this was a terrible tragedy. It showe:

that the adventurers won't succeed. The society is different now. Things like this won't work.

President: Where are the adventurers?

Gorbachev: Some are coming this way to me. I don't know what they are bearing in their hands. The next two days I must make all these crucial decisions.

President: Have you talked to Yeltsin yet?

Gorbachev: He was the first one.

President: I don't know what news you've been getting, but we've been supporting Yeltsin and you as President of the USSR.

Gorbachev: I have to congratulate you and the position you took from the first minute. You have been stalwart. Thanks for taking off from your vacation. You affected everyone with your strong statements, except Qadhafi.

President: Don't know what news you got in the last few days.

Gorbachev: I was cut off completely.

President: Were you filled in just now?

Gorbachev: Yes, everything started with me now.

President: When are you going back to Moscow?

Gorbachev: Either tonight or early tomorrow morning.

President: Good luck. If I can say or do anything I will be available night or day. Don't hesitate to call.

Gorbachev: Yes George, absolutely. I will have the need to talk to you. I have to go back to take some steps and then we will have some matters to discuss with you.

President: I'm happy that you are safe and back. Barbara is here and sends her love to Raisa.

Gorbachev: George, thank you and Barb both for your position of principle, but also for your humanity and friendship.

President: Just glad you're well. I want to say to the press and the world that we've had this conversation.

Gorbachev: Yes, I'd only be thankful to you for that.

President: I'll get that message out to the whole world now.

Bless you and your family.

Gorbachev: We want to keep going ahead with you. What happened, say one thing that this was prevented by democracy. This is a guarantee for us. We will keep working in the country and out to keep cooperation going.

President: Sounds like the same old Mikhail Gorbachev, confident, one full of life. Once you get back we'll talk about what to work on since our talks in Moscow.

Gorbachev: OK George. Please proceed on this basis.
Good-bye.

President: Good-bye.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PG ONE

has not been
swept up -

~~SECRET~~

~~1SECRET~~

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D R A F T

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President Bush with Mikhail Gorbachev

July 30, 1991

(One-on-one)

10:30 a.m. - 12:30 a.m. ???

G: Welcome. We will be doing important and necessary work. My impression is that regular contacts let us get down to business immediately. I haven't counted how many meetings, phone calls, letters.

P: The more the better. It reduces the chances for misunderstanding.

G: I agree. I think this is an important quality of yours. Your approach makes it possible to move forward on the most difficult subjects.

Let's discuss how to proceed. Tomorrow we will be at our Camp David. It is a nice place in the country. After the welcome, we will take off our jackets and have relaxed talks. Tomorrow's talks will be about the future, strengthening strategic stability, cooperation in world affairs--this is what we can focus on tomorrow. In delegation meetings we can discuss bilateral relations. Our ministers can also talk. They did useful work yesterday. What shall we do now?

P: You are the host.

G: First, may I continue something we raised in London. I very much want to be sure that we are predictable to each other, therefore we must say what kind of country we want to see for each other. For you this is of special interest, for you find us in a period of special change. It is understandable that you want to know where it is heading. After London I outlined it to my colleagues and received full support on decisions to move on the path of democratic change and market economy.

We have no illusions about the difficulties of transition to private property, national relations, etc. We know it will be tough. We have come so far there is no way to turn back. That would be a serious error, to reverse course. The intelligentsia know the need first to move forward. Now it is also known by our

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2009-1065-AR
12/1/2014 MM

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workers, farmers, peasants. All want the process to go forward, but without affecting them in a vital way. That is not possible.

We have completed work on the Union Treaty--that is the Ukraine is involved. There is of course a portion against it, but 2/3 to 3/4 is for the Union. The question now is when to sign the treaty. It is possible not all will sign it at once. The process will continue until the Ukraine decides to sign. Then the next step is a new constitution, election of the President and Supreme Soviet, and formation of new government body.

P: The constitution comes after the Union Treaty?

G: Yes. The constitution will be based on it. It may be integral part of the constitution. Another important event this year--the Central Committee Plenum decided on a Congress to formulate a new program. Here, too, new changes are taking place. There is growing momentum for change, for reform. This is important because the party has played a critical role in society in the past. The time is ripe for reform, and a democratically-oriented program. There were efforts to avoid facing such a decision, but in the vote only 13-14 voted to postpone such a program. Now all my places will be part of the program.

P: In the US, those opposed are thought mostly to be old guard party and military. Is that accurate?

G: Overall, there is some opposition in all sections of society, but it is lessening. Includes collective managers, military, etc. Some are vociferous and our media pay attention. So we take account of it. But the process of cooperation with the republics is gaining momentum as well. The most difficult period will be the rest of 1991 and 1992. It is good that people begin to do it more on their own. That is good.

In my letter to you I said there were 47,000 separate farms. Now it is 69,000. In two months 22,000 more have started up. People want to farm on their own--do their own thing. But too many still think the government has to do everything--large and small.

We determined to accelerate destatization, privatization, etc. to let people get down to work. But we have to learn by the experience of Eastern Europe, including East Germany. Recently a leader in Saxony (sic) They are too weak on denationalization and privatization. That was moving slowly so long as organization created by Kohl was in charge. Now that there are 12 regional groups in charge, it is moving faster.

I spoke yesterday to Nazarbaev and Yeltsin and we agreed we had to do the same, giving the republics more opportunity to assist in this process. We don't want to impose things on the people,

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~~SECRET~~

3

like collectivisation in the past, but it won't happen spontaneously. The people need help. In this we believe help from the West in training, creating market infrastructure, etc. will be important. We have created a government organization to coordinate that assistance which is becoming far reaching. People find their way more easily when there are joint ventures. Fiat and _____, want to set up joint venture, and perhaps over 50% will belong to Fiat. They built the factory and have long-standing ties.

P: You know Agnelli?

G: Yes. Well. Our conclusion is that we must move faster to get the West's cooperation, to create competition. At the Plenum there was discussion of private property. There was discussion of capitalism and socialism. One Professor Denisov said we should end the stupid debate about which kind of ownership is better and get the right policies to create motivation. It is good that today you recall glasnost. Without it we wouldn't have been able to move ahead. In the beginning the structure was not receptive to perestroika. Now, however, glasnost is sometimes so successful we don't know what to do.

But we have, mostly, to improve people's lives. That will make it succeed. So the three principle areas are: 1) the Union Treaty, 2) financial stabilization, and 3) de-statization. For the coming months those will be the areas of concentration. Yesterday Yeltsin and Nazarbaev said the after the Union Treaty we should have a pause before elections to let the situation stabilize. WE must discuss this. If elections were to be held at a certain stage of reform, conservatives could take advantage of it to say, "...look at the chaos reform brings." But we have to move faster on reform. There's something I didn't say in London publicly --I hope we will get some real and practical support from the West to win this battle.

P: What kind of real and practical support?

G: As we liberalize prices we will need support, especially food and medicine. Also, convertibility of the ruble. We will be receiving your Minister of Finance. Lamont is coming tomorrow. It has to be well-timed; joint monetary step we'll be taking. We have opportunities here for more consumer goods, but we must modernize plants to take advantage of it. We now have large package of major projects and the groups you plan to send -- food distribution, energy, etc. will have a lot to discuss. I liked your letter about the G-7 meeting and will prepare papers to discuss with these groups. The dramatic near-term steps--and this is the crucial time. This is the key time in the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

P: This is extraordinarily helpful. But let me get something out on the table. Some here seem to feel there are sub groups in the US who want the demise or disintegration of the Soviet Union. There are some--in my party--who do wish just that. There are some on the left who flood you with human rights and want to impose reforms from outside. When you and Yeltsin were in dispute, many people jumped up and said "bet on Yeltsin." Those never were the views of my advisers or the American people. I don't know if I can make this point clear publicly.

G: We saw that position of yours. In the Soviet Union we are aware of your position but we do hear these other voices. Some here would take advantage of those voices to say this is the position of the US and the American people. We must rebuff such attitudes. I make a lot of public statements defending US-Soviet relations.

P: When we came into office, we were accused of being too prudent and cautious. Now the press has shifted and says Bush is too much in love with Gorbachev. We can't let the press run us. I take no joy in Soviet difficulties. Some European allies think we are dragging our feet and holding them back.

G: Peter Jennings yesterday wanted me to say you were dragging your feet. I refused and said it may be only a matter of style. He really tried to put words in my mouth.

P: Europeans also want to hide behind the US. I take second place to none in wanting to help. WE can do more. We are a most inventive society and wholly behind the changes you wish to pursue. On the republics--like the Ukraine. On this trip we will do nothing to exacerbate the many problems you have.

G: This is another point Peter Jennings raised. I said I went to Minnesota and California and Bush can go where he wants. He said no compassion.

P: No, Minnesota voted against.

G: They told me. So I made a point of greeting the republics as well. There is a report that the Heritage Foundation urged you to stimulate separateness in your visit to the Ukraine.

P: I don't know of any such report. But I will not do any such thing. I insisted that any outside trip have your blessing. I would gladly have gone anywhere.

We do have differences over the Baltics and Landsbergis wanted us to stop there on the way back. A bad idea -- but for us, cutting them loose is the best possible thing. But that is your business.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

But we want to help. When Brady comes, let us see if we can help more on the ruble convertibility and other areas. Union Treaty is one of the best ways to move this forward. I believe one example--which may not be a good one. (P discusses the Chevron deal. Over one billion in hard currency which would help other projects (i.e. RJR) to build the Soviet economy. This (Chevron) is bottled up in the center-republic conflicts. Now there are new committees considering it. I have no axe to grind for Chevron.)

G: The focus in Kazakhstan. I am sympathetic with this project as well. We have done a lot to facilitate this consortium. But at the last minute an academic research organization sent us a letter saying this deal is not advantageous for the Soviet Union. Since this was the opinion of energy-knowledgeable people, I sent it for investigation. But I'm in favor.

P: I'm uneasy talking about Chevron. But it is an example of the problems which can be created. When an academic institute can stop a business deal, US business will say, "What the hell? What can we do?" That deal aside, if the Union Treaty eliminates barriers, it would be seen as a tremendous opportunity for US businesses. Whatever we can do to reduce barriers will be the best thing we can do to support your reforms.

G: When we finally get convertibility, that will really open things up. Convertibility is now a short term--not a future--task for us. We decided that it is the big requirement.

P: Chevron-type deals would aid convertibility because they will earn hard currency.

Let us ask a sensitive question. How about securing loans with your gold reserves? Is that too tough?

G: We have done some, but not on a large scale. Our potential here is being exaggerated. The main thing is to adopt mutually practical and profitable ventures. The potential is enormous.

One other point for private meeting. There are promising projects shelved because of COCOM. Trans-Siberian fiber optics would complete the global fiber optics line. Line would be operated jointly by the Soviet Union and US West consortium. It is suspended because of a ban on terminals exceeding 560 megabytes. Under Lake Baikal, French signed a deal to do it. But, component was COCOM, so it is suspended. Mitterrand was astonished. Another venture US businesses would like is space boosters.

P: I have to get details. Is it because fiber optics projects have military applications?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6

G: US companies want to cooperate on space boosters because we have good liquid fuel technology and motors. We could cooperate well here. (G hands the President a paper).

P: Let me look into this. Others have a problem with COCOM policy. Iran wants to buy aircraft with US engines. So the whole project is held up.

G: But in boosters we would give some of our technology to you.

P: There may here be vestiges of cold war thinking. I will look into it.

G: Our two countries could cooperate significantly in space. We have a lot to offer.

P: I promise to look into it. Should I raise Chevron with Nazarbaev.

G: No need. We have a good understanding.

P: My only point is one big project moving forward will release billions of dollars.

G: While we are alone, could we avoid that long time period in the IMF. We would like to profit by facilities and a long waiting period will hold us back.

P: Associate status was not to put the Soviet Union down.

G: I understand. This is not prestige, but pragmatics. But within this status could we get something more concrete and practical than advice?

P: We were surprised at your letter... [requesting membership in the IMF]

G: I had already signed it before summit.

P: Lots of things can be done. But before big loans can be made there are certain preconditions. Not US rules, but IMF preconditions.

G: Maybe we can make association more alive than dead.

P: That we can do.

G: If Bank decides a loan to a full member is bad, it won't be made.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7

P: That is true. I just want to emphasize there is no discrimination. But privately, what is it you really want. If you could wave a magic wand?

G: I think maybe we could discuss Banks involvement in the convertibility structure of debt, involvement in large projects. We want to extricate ourselves from this transition as soon as possible.

We had a big conversation about this yesterday with Yeltsin and Nazarbaev. Here is the major location for these projects. They agree we must move rapidly. We want you all working with us for mutual advantage.

In some areas we would like to enter your market to earn dollars. An example: space satellite launching rocket. I hear that this is a \$12-\$14 billion market. We could launch western satellites. Here too are COCOM and other restrictions. We could think of some guarantees to preserve secrecy and prevent hanky-panky. The dollars we earn would help pay for things like food distribution, etc. Of course there are energy projects to earn dollars, and payments in kind.

Please ask Atwood to discuss space launch cooperation. We need to earn foreign currency..

P: Our Agriculture Secretary is coming also. There are opportunities here too.

G: Agriculture, not an area we will be selling to you. We need dollars.

P: True. But it makes you self-sufficient. And in the long run it could earn you dollars.

G: Yes. We could save hard currency by not having to buy. Main thing is opening up and doing some large projects. Once that happens our businessmen will keep it growing.

P: Yes. We'll look into obstructions to your earning dollars. We have a fundamental problem which won't go away soon. Remember the map you gave me? If your military feel encircled, that is a problem here. When you modernize missiles it creates problems for us. (Congress won't let us do it.) It is so far from the things we are discussing here.

G: Among the people this change is moving faster than in the establishment. Reality is we still have these powerful weapons. So what do we do? I would like to discuss tomorrow. I want it to be philosophical and also practical. The situation has changed so much that we need to talk about where we go.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8

P: Neither of us is a fill man on this. These military visits are a good thing--like Colin Powell. What you did on Iraq was enormously helpful. I don't have full (answer ?). COCOM exists because of the past.

G: Our cooperation in security may be even more important than in economic affairs. World affairs may require much more cooperation to channel developments.

P: You talked about criticality of 1992. Just for you, I dread it. The rhetoric gets bad. I can tell our people cooperation is good and can get better. But in our politics, differences get accentuated. Like Peter Jennings, many times magnified. It won't be as bad on Soviet affairs as in the past because US people support perestroika. But there will be Helms on one side and human rights on the other, and rhetoric will be inflamed.

G: I understand, and we now have the same general process. I get accused of giving the US on a silver platter what it has been seeking for decades.

-- end one on one--

~~SECRET~~

P/Corbo 7/30/91
1001

- G Welcome - We will be doing important & necessary work. My impression that regular critiques let us get down to business immediately. I haven't counted land survey trips, phone calls, letters.
- P The more the better. It reduces chances for misunderstanding.
- G I agree. I think this is an important quality of yours. Your approach makes it possible to make progress on most difficult subjects. Let's discuss how to proceed. Tomorrow we will have our camp David. Nice place - ice country. After welcome, we will take off jackets & have relaxed talks. For tomorrow talks about future, strengthening strategic stability, cooperation in world affairs - this is what we can focus on tomorrow. So delegation trips we can discuss bilateral relations. Our minutes can also talk. They did useful work yesterday. What shall we do now.
- P You are lost.
- G First, may I continue something

we raised in London. I want
very much that we be predictable
to each other, ∴ we must say what
kind of country we each see for
other. For you this is special
interest for you just as in
period of special change. It
understandable you want to
know where it is heading.
After London I continued it to
my colleagues & recd full support
on decision to move ^{confronting} to new
change & market economy.
We have no choice of about
diff transition to private
property, with relatives, etc is.
But know it will be tough.
We have come so far there is
no way to turn back. That
would be a serious error, to
reverse course. The intelligencia
knows & need 1st to move
forward. Now it is also
known by our workers, farmers,
peasants. All want process to
go forward w/o affecting them
in a real way - That is not possible.
We have completed working
united treaty - That is a Ukraine

is involved. There is of course a
partisan against but 2/3 to 3/4 are
for union. Question now is when
to sign a treaty. It is possible not
all at once will sign. Process will
continue until Ukraine decides
to sign. Then next step is new
const., election of P + SS & new
govt body.

P Const comes after union treaty
G Yes. Const will be based on it.
It may be integral part of const.
Another important event this year -
CC plenum decided to begin
to formulate new prog. New
too need changes are taking place.
There is growing momentum for
change, for reform. This important
cause party has played a critical
role in society in past. Time
is ripe for reform & some
oriented prog. There were efforts
to avoid having such a decision,
but in a vote only 13-14 voted
to postpone such a prog. Now
all my places will be part of a
prog.

P In the US, those opposed are that
worthy to be. All guard party & mil.

Is that accurate?

- G Overall, there is some opposition in all sectors of society but lessening. Includes collective wages, mind, etc. Some are dangerous to our mind pay attention. So we take account of it. But a process of coop w/ repub is gaining momentum as well. The most key period will be next of 71 & 72. It's good that people begin to act more on their own. That is good. In my letter to you I said 47,000 separate farms. Now it is 67,000. In 2 was 22000 more than skilled. People want to farm on their own & do their own thing. But too many still think against us & do everything - large & small. We determined to accelerate de-stalinization, privatization, etc, to let people get down to work. But we have to learn by experience of E. Eur, incl H. Ger. Recently a leader in Saxony. They too work on de-natualization & privatization. That was moving slowly so long as argued by Kohl was in charge. Now

that there are 12 required groups
in average, it is moving
faster. I spoke quite long to Nazar
& Yeltsin & we agreed we had to
do same - give people more
opportunity to assist in this
process. We don't want to make
things on a people - like collectivization in a part - but want
happen spontaneously. The
people need help. In this we
believe help from West in
training, creating market
infrastructure, etc will be
important. We have created
a joint org to coordinate that
assistance which is becoming
for ^{RANGING} increasing. People find their
way more easily when there
are joint ventures. Feet
& — want to set up joint
venture & perhaps we 50% will
belong to them. They built a
factory & now they standing ties
P You know equality?
G Yes. Well. Our conclusion is
we must work faster to get
West, coop, to create competition.
At plennum there was discussion

of private property. Then was
discussion of capitalism & socialism.
One professor Demos said we
should end a stupid debate
about which kind of ownership
is better & get a right policies
to create motivation. It is good
that today you recall of socialist.
w/o it we wouldn't have been
able to move ahead. In beginning
a structure was not receptive
to perestroika. Now, the
glasnost sometimes means will.
We don't know what to do. But
we have really to improve
people's lives. That will make
it succeed. So 3 principle
areas are: Union Treaty, ~~financial~~ ^{privatization}, &
de-stetization. For carrying
months those will be a case
of concentration. Yesterday Y.
H. said after Union Treaty we
should have a pause ~~at~~ before
elections to let set, stabilize.
We must discuss this. If
elections held at ~~current~~ ^{early} stage
of reform, conservatives could take
advantage got to say - look at

C Chaos reform troops. But
we have to move faster on
reform. There is something I
don't say in hard on ~~publicly~~ -
I hope we will get ^{your} real
& practical support, to win this
battle

P What kind of real & practical
support?

G As we will liberalize prices,
we will need support - esp
food & medicine. Also ~~we~~
convertibility of ruble. We will
be seeing your Min Fin,
haven't coming tomorrow. It
has to be well trained, joint
monetary step will be taking.
We have opportunities here for
more consumer goods, but we
must modernize plants to
take advantage of it. We now
have large scale up of major
projects to ~~groups~~ you plan
to send - food dist., energy, etc
will have lots to discuss. I
liked your letter about 6-7
mty & will will prepare papers
to discuss w/ these ~~and~~ groups.
The director's near term steps -

& this is crucial time. This is
a key time in SC

P This is extraordinarily difficult.
But let me get something out on
a table. Some here seem to feel
there are ~~serb~~ groups in
US who want demise or dis-
integration of SC. There are
some - in my party - who
do wish just that. There are
some on left who feel
you w/ ~~human~~ rights &
want to wage war from
outside. When you get Yeltsin
disappearing, many jumped up
& said let on Yeltsin.

Those were for views
of my admiring a few people.
Don't know I can make
this point clear publicly
G We saw ~~some~~ that
position of press. In SC?
we are aware of your position
that we do hear this & other
voices. Some here would take
advantage of those voices to
say this is a position of US &
American people. We must ~~uphold~~
such attitudes.

I make a lot of public statements
depending US-Sov relations.

P When we came into office, we
were accused of being too prudent
& cautious. Now a press has shifted
& says Bush too in love w/ Cuba.
We can't let press run us. We
take no joy in Sov life. Some
E. us allies think we are dragging
feet & holding them back.

G Peter Jennings yesterday wanted
my to say you were dragging
your feet. I refused & said it
may be only a matter of style.
He really tried to put words in
my mouth.

P Gorbachev also wants to hide behind
US. I take second place now
in wanting ~~up~~ to help. We
can do more. We are a most
inventive society & wholly
behind a changes' process
to ourselves. On a reports-like
Ukraine on this trip. we will
do nothing to exacerbate any
prob. you know.

G This another Peter Jennings
raised. I said I went to Russia
& Cal. & Bush can go where

he words. He said ~~no longer~~
P No. Nixon ~~is~~ ~~could~~ ~~against~~ ~~in~~
G They told me. So I made a point of
greeting Repuls as well.
There is report that Heritage Found.
urged you to stimulate separations
in your visit to Ukraine.

P Don't know of any such report. But
I will not do any such thing.
I needed that any outsiders
trip have your ~~best~~ blessing. I
would gladly turn ~~over~~ anywhere
we do have before Bill's
Kushesjes wanted to stop there
on way out. Bad idea - but
firms, cutting them ~~are~~ ~~lose~~
a best possible thing. But that
your business.

But we want to help. Let's
Buddy Carver, let us ~~see~~ ~~see~~
if we can help ~~more~~ ~~or~~ ~~little~~
convert ^{+ other} ~~American~~ ~~Twenty~~ is one
of the best ways to make this
project. I was one ~~example~~ -
which may not be a good one,
(Chernobyl deal, Over 1 bil in
hard currency which would help
other ~~great~~ projects (RJR) to
build ~~low~~ ~~energy~~. It bottled

- up in center - reports conflicts.
New committee. I have no
affection for Chernom
G The plan is in Kazakhstan.
I symp. w/ this project as well. We
have done a lot to facilitate this
consortium. But at last minute
an academic researcher the
sent me a letter saying this was
not a humanitarian project for the SC. Since
this was opinion of every know-
ledgeable people I sent it for
investigation. But I'm in favor.
P I'm really talking Chernom. But
it is example of a provocation
can be created. When an
acadrist can stop a
business deal. Don't US business
will say what a hell, what can
we do? That deal aside, if
a Union Treaty eliminates barriers
it would ~~lead to~~ ^{create} tremendous
opportunities for US business. What-
ever we can do to reduce barriers
will be a best thing we can
do to support our reports.
G When we finally get something
that will really open things
up.

Convertibility is now a short term
- not a future - task for us. we
decided that is a big requirement
P Chevron-type details would aid
convertibility cause it will even
hard currency. But we ~~are~~ a
sensitive question. How about
securing loans w/ your gold
reserves? Is that too tough.
C We have been some but not
on large scale. Our potential
here is being exaggerated. The
new thing is to develop mutually
practical & profitable ventures.
Potential is enormous
Another point for private ~~int'l~~ ^{int'l}.
There are promising projects
shutted because of COCOM.
Trans - Siberian fiber optics.
Would complete global fiber
optics link. Link would be
operated jointly by SC & US/UK
consortium. It superseded because
of ban of outerworlds exceeding
560 megabytes. Under have
Baird, French ~~seizure~~ ^{seizure} deal
to do it. But, component was
COCOM so it is superseded.
Mithun was ~~abandoned~~.

Another venture US business
would like is space boosters.

P I have to get a details. Is it
because filter of the ^{project} ideas and
applications?

G US companies want to coop
on space boosters because
we know good liquid fuel
tech & motors. We could
coop well here. (Hanks on paper)

P Let me look into this. ~~James~~
Others have prob w/ COCOM
policy. Durr wants to buy
a craft w/ US engines. So whole
project is held up.

G But in boosters we ~~could~~ give
some of our tech to you.

P There may be vestiges
cold war thinking. Durr look
into it.

G Our 2 executives could
cooperate reg. in space.
We know what to offer.

P I promise to look into it. Should
I raise the issue w/ Nazari.

G No need. We know good
understanding.

P My only point is one big
project moving forward will

- release within of \$.
- G Certain way alone, could we avoid that long time period in IMF, we would like to profit by facilities & long waiting period will hold us back
- P Arab status was not to put Sudan
- G I understood. This not prestige but pragmatic. But if in this status could not get something more concrete & practical than this
- P We could see period of your letter...
- G I had already signed by summit.
- P Lots of things can be done. But before big loans can be made there are certain preconditions. Not US rules, but IMF preconditions.
- G Therefore we can well do more than had
- P That we can do.
- G If Bank makes a loan to full member is bad, it won't be made.
- P That is true. I just wanted to emphasize

there no discrimination. But
privately, what is it you
really want? If you could have
a way in road?

- 6 I think maybe we could discuss
Bonds involvement in ~~road~~
structure of debt, involvement
in large projects. We want
to extract ourselves from
this transition A & A.P. into
Big conversation yesterday w/ 1/
+ N. Here is a major location
for these projects. They agree
we must move rapidly. We
want you all working w/ us
for mutual advantage. In
some cases we would like
to enter your market, to
earn \$. One example: space
satellite launching market.
I hear that is \$12-14 bil
market. We can't launch
Western satellites. Hence too
are COCOM & other restrictions.
We could think of some guarantees
to preserve secrecy & protect
data heavily - proprietary. The \$ we
earn would help pay for things
like fuel dist, etc. Of course

energy
there are ~~several~~ projects to earn &
payments in kind.

*

Please ask Atwood to discuss space
launch loop. We need to learn
foreign currency. ~~Our~~ Our Agri.
~~stop~~ Leg earning also. There are
opportunities here too.

G Agri, not an area well in selling
to you. We need \$.

P True. But it makes you self-
suff. And in long run it could
earn you \$.

G Yes. we could save some hard
currency by not having to buy.
Main thing is opening up &
doing some large projects. Once
that happens our business
will be it growing.

P Yes. We'll look into ~~the~~ ~~obstructions~~
to your earning \$.

We have a fundamental prob
which can't go away soon.

Remember I mean you ask
me? If you will full ~~understand~~
that a prob here. When you
modernize ~~missile~~ ~~it~~ ~~create~~
probs for us. ~~It is so for you~~
& things we are discussing here.

G Among & people this ~~stage~~ is

moving faster than in
establishment. ~~Death~~ ~~Rev~~ ~~Rev~~
is not still there. These powerful
works. So what do we do?
Would like to discuss tomorrow.
Want it to be philosophical & also
practical. It has changed so
much we need to talk about
where we go.

† Neither of us is a full wave enthusiast.
These kind visits are good thing -
like Colin Powell. What you did
on day was enormously helpful.
Don't have full answer. COCOM
exists - because of - past.

6 Our coop is security, run by
even more important than
in core affairs. World affairs
may receive more time
coop to Channel disputes.

† You talked about criticality of 72.
Just for you - I dread it. The
rhetoric gets bad. I can tell
Am people coop is good & can get
better. But in our politics, they
get accentuated. Like Peter
Gunning many times mentioned.
Won't be as bad as for affairs
as in past because US people


support perestroika. But there
will be Helms on one side &
human rights on other & neither
will be influenced.

6. Dushkevich - and we now
have a same good process. Is it
accused of giving us a sheer
plutts what it been seeking for
decades.

- Plenary -

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/1/2014

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

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SIT BURNS HEWETT ^{1.4(c)} IN FILE SIT SUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 220930Z JUL 91

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 220930Z JUL 91 ^{1.4(c)}

O 220930Z JUL 91 ZYM ZFF

FM ^{1.4(c)}

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA ^{1.4(c)} EYES ONLY

0000

BEGIN PLAT.

FOR: ED HEWETT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

1. IN A PRIVATE MEETING THIS MORNING, BESSMERTNYKH REVERSED FIELD ON KIEV AND AGREED THAT PRESIDENT COULD VISIT THERE "OR ANY OTHER LARGE CITY HE WISHES." HE CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE BEEN AU COURANT ON PREVIOUS MESSAGES.

2. SPECIFICALLY, HE PROPOSED THAT DAY ONE INCLUDE MEETINGS MOSCOW WITH THE SOVIET-HOSTED DINNER THAT EVENING. DAY TWO WOULD HAVE THE PRESIDENTS MEETING AT A DACHA OUTSIDE MOSCOW (NOVO-DGARYOVA WAS MENTIONED), WITH THE U.S. RECIPROCAL DINNER THAT EVENING. DAY THREE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S TRAVEL TO KIEV OR ANY OTHER CITY OF HIS CHOOSING. BESSMERTNYKH ASKED ONLY THAT WE WORK WITH MFA PROTOCOL IN MAKING THE ARRANGEMENTS.

3. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD CONVEY THESE SUGGESTIONS TO THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT THEY SEEMED TO ME CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRES.

END OF TEXT.

DECL OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1065-MR

12/1/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: **IMMEDIATE**
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: MM

DTG: 210221Z

MESSAGE NO. 37 CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 4

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM X7712 SITROOM
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (Agency) ANKARA DELIVER TO: FLO GANTT FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT DEPT/ROOM NO. PHONE NUMBER

REMARKS DELIVER DOB 21 JULY. DR. HEWETT

REQUESTS CLEARANCE OF MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/27/09

~~SECRET~~

THE FOLLOWING DRAFT CABLE IS SUBMITTED FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT'S CLEARANCE.

BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT CABLE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, UNITED STATES EMBASSY MOSCOW:

WE HAVE RECEIVED TONIGHT VIA SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON THE APPENDED COMMUNICATION WHICH REQUESTS THAT THE PRESIDENT NOT VISIT THE UKRAINE AFTER THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND WE ASK YOU TO CONTACT THE APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL WITH THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE:

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR COMMUNICATION REGARDING OUR PLANS TO VISIT KIEV AFTER THE MOSCOW SUMMIT.

2. WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO FURTHER COMPLICATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOSCOW AND KIEV. THAT IS WHY WE FIRST APPROACHED THE MFA ABOUT OUR TO PLANS TO GO TO KIEV. THE PRESIDENT SIMPLY THOUGHT THAT AFTER THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, HE WOULD BENEFIT FROM VISITING ANOTHER MAJOR SOVIET CITY, MUCH AS PRESIDENT GORBACHEV BENEFITED WHEN HE DECIDED TO VISIT MINNESOTA AND CALIFORNIA AFTER LAST YEAR'S WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

3. WE WILL, OF COURSE, NOW FORGO A VISIT TO KIEV. UNFORTUNATELY, WHEN WE TOLD THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF OUR PLANS TO VISIT KIEV, WE RECEIVED NO INDICATION THAT THIS MIGHT BE A PROBLEM. WE THEN APPROACHED THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT AND IT HAS GIVEN US A TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR A VISIT ON AUGUST 1. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD EXPLAIN TO THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT WHY IT IS NOW NECESSARY TO CHANGE OUR PLANS.

4. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR OFFER FOR A AUGUST 1ST VISIT TO STAVROPOL OR A SUBURBAN SITE NEAR MOSCOW. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT ANOTHER MAJOR SOVIET CITY AFTER THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. WE PROPOSE THAT WE VISIT LENINGRAD ON AUGUST 1. IF YOU AGREE, THEN WE WILL IMMEDIATELY APPROACH LENINGRAD AUTHORITIES TO MAKE ALL THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

END OF TALKING POINTS.

THE AMBASSADOR MAY WANT TO POINT OUT, ON A PURELY INFORMAL BASIS, THAT WE WERE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR VISIT TO THE UKRAINE WOULD NOT WORSEN TENSIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND KIEV. WE PROPOSED THE VISIT TO THE UKRAINIANS ONLY BECAUSE WE FELT WE HAD ASSURANCES THAT THE CENTRAL

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2009-1065-MR
12/1/2014 MM

GOVERNMENT HAD NO PROBLEM WITH IT. WE SINCERELY HOPE
THAT THIS CHANGE IN OUR PLANS DOES NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF
HEIGHTENING THE TENSIONS, WHICH WE AND THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT, WISH TO AVOID.

-
ED HEWETT

In connection with the preparation of the visit by the President of the United States to the USSR we would like in a preliminary way to share some considerations concerning the general framework of the program of the visit.

July 30 and 31 - talks in Moscow.

As for the third day of the visit (August 1), two following options are suggested:

a) A trip to Stavropol, the birthplace of the Soviet President, where meetings with local population could take place. Then - a flight by helicopters together with President Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush to the Caucasian mountains, where in a picturesque vicinity conversations in a very narrow circle could take place (like conversations in Camp David).

b) Conversations in a suburban residence near Moscow.

The Soviet President himself prefers the first option - i.e. the joint trip to Stavropol region.

We are aware that the American side is considering at the working level a possibility of a trip by the President to Kiev.

However, taking into consideration complicated circumstances which have developed there, this would hardly be advisable since it could inadvertently contribute to tension.

It is important for us to receive the answer at the earliest convenience so that the preparation for the visit could be conducted in the remaining few days.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21a. Cover Sheet	From White House Situation Room, Re: [211811Z Jul 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	7/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1065-MR(520)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/2/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: J. Barker

DTG: 211811Z JUL 91

MESSAGE NO. 25 CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PAGES 2

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

X7712

SITROOM

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION 1.4(c)

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

FLO GANTT FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

TOR: 211842Z

REMARKS

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2009-1065-MR
5/2/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21b. Cable	Jack Matlock to Ed Hewett, Re: [Meeting with Edward Malayan] [211535Z Jul 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	7/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed: 4/27/2009	OA/ID Number: 91130-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1065-MR(520.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/1/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: BURNS HEWETT 1.4(c) IN FILE SIT SUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 211535Z JUL 91

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 2021535Z JUL 91 1.4(c)

O 2021535Z JUL 91 ZYH ZFF

FM 1.4(c)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY

QQQQ

BEGIN TEXT:

FOR: ED HEWETT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

AFTER REPEATED EFFORTS WITH THE MFA, THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIAL WE COULD REACH TODAY WAS EDWARD MALAYAN. MALAYAN IS THE MFA OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SUMMIT ARRANGEMENTS AND THE DEPUTY TO GEORGIY MAMDOVY DIRECTOR OF THE USSR DIVISION. DCM COLLINS, THEREFORE, DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE ON THE KIEV STOP TO HIM AT 1415 HOURS THIS AFTERNOON.

THE DCM READ MALAYAN THE MESSAGE, WHICH MALAYAN WROTE DOWN. AFTER HEARING THE FULL MESSAGE MALAYAN SOUGHT CLARIFICATION THAT IT MEANT THE PRESIDENT PREFERRED TO VISIT LENINGRAD IN LIEU OF STAVROPOL. THE DCM CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO VISIT A MAJOR SOVIET CITY AFTER THE SUMMIT. IF IT IS THEIR REQUEST THAT THE PRESIDENT NOT VISIT KIEV, HE WOULD NOT DO SO, BUT WOULD THEN LIKE TO VISIT LENINGRAD INSTEAD. MALAYAN SAID HE WOULD REPORT THE MESSAGE URGENTLY TO THE MINISTER WHO WAS NOT IN TOWN.

FOLLOWING THIS FORMAL EXCHANGE ON THE MESSAGE, THE DCM SAID HE WANTED TO EXPRESS ONE ADDITIONAL THOUGHT ON BEHALF OF THE AMBASSADOR AND THE EMBASSY. THIS AMOUNTED TO A NOTE OF CONCERN

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2009-1065-MR
12/1/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~