Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

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2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91130
Folder ID Number: 91130-003

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev (2 pp.)	9/6/91	(b)(1)	
02a. Cover Sheet	To K-Port to Flo Gantt for General Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	8/28/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Cable	From James Collins to General Scowcroft, Re: [Letter from President Bush on the Baltics] [281615Z Aug 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/28/91	(b)(1)	S
03a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	10/21/91	(b)(1)	
03b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (3 pp.)	10/21/91	(b)(1)	
03c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	10/21/91	(b)(1)	
03d. Cable	From White House, Re: [September 26 Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev] [260037Z Sep 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S
04a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	10/18/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1093
OA/ID Number: 91130-003
Date Closed: 4/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	10/18/91	(b)(1)	
04c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (4 pp.)	10/18/91	(b)(1)	
05. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	10/21/91	(b)(1)	
06. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
07. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
08. Cable	Re: Letter from President Bush to Gorbachev (5 pp.)	10/27/91	(b)(1)	S
09a. Report	Re: First… [Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)	10/31/91	(b)(1)	
09b. Report	Re: First… [Russian] (4 pp.)	10/31/91	(b)(1)	
10. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	10/18/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1093
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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message to General Scowcroft from Bob Strauss on Meeting with Gorbachev] [101709Z Nov 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	11/10/91	(b)(1)	S
12a. Cover Sheet	From Washington [redacted] (1 pp.)	11/7/91	(b)(1)	S
12b. Cable	To White House, Re: [Message to General Scowcroft from Bob Strauss on Meeting with Gorbachev] [071215Z Nov 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	11/7/91	(b)(1)	S
13a. Report	Re: On November 14 (1 pp.)	11/15/91	(b)(1)	
13b. Report	Re: [Russian] (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14. Report	Re: USSR State Council's session… (4 pp.)	11/15/91	(b)(1)	
15. Letter	Boris Yeltsin to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	11/26/91	(b)(1)	
16a. Message	Boris Yeltsin to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	12/20/91	(b)(1)	
16b. Message	Boris Yeltsin to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1093
OA/ID Number: 91130-003
Date Closed: 4/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
16c. Message	Boris Yeltsin to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
16d. Message	Boris Yeltsin to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	12/25/91	(b)(1)	
17b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	12/25/91	(b)(1)	
18. Cable	Charge Collins to General Scowcroft and Ed Hewitt, Re: [No Subject] [261100Z Dec 91] [FOIA EXEPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	12/26/91	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S
19. Letter	Susan Porter Rose to Mrs. Nancy Schon Re: Make Way for Ducklings Statue [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1093
OA/ID Number: 91130-003
Date Closed: 4/24/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

APNSA Has Seen

September 6, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Mrs. Bush has written the attached handwritten letter to Mrs. Gorbachev. We would be very grateful if you would see that Mrs. Gorbachev personally receives this.

With appreciation and all best wishes,

Sincerely,

Susan Porter Rose
Chief of Staff to Mrs. Bush

His Excellency Viktor Komplektov
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 16th Street
Washington, D.C. 20036

Enclosure

bcc: ✓General Scowcroft

THE WHITE HOUSE

September 6-1991

Dear Raisa,

I was so happy to hear your husband say that he could report that you are doing well.... that every thing is okay. We have been so concerned about you. Thank God that you and your husband were not harmed and that your husband is back. We are also grateful that

your family was over heart. Our
television has kept us right-
up to date.

The reports of your book
sound very good. We are seeing
and hearing about the book.
I hope it sells well.

Take care of yourself. My
best to your fine husband.

Warmly —

Barbara

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Cover Sheet	To K-Port to Flo Gantt for General Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	8/28/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 10/31/14

Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1062-MR (501)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



GEORGE H.W. BUSH
501
PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ **PRIORITY** **ROUTINE**

RELEASER: Byler

DTG: 281745Z

MESSAGE NO. 637 **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 2

FROM W HSR (Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION (b)(1) MOSCOW: 281615Z AUG 91

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
K-PORT	PLO GANTT FOR	GENERAL SCOWCROFT	

REMARKS DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT!

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1062-MR
SCS 12/17/13

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Cable	From James Collins to General Scowcroft, Re: [Letter from President Bush on the Baltics] [281615Z Aug 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/28/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 7/12/2022

Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1062-MR(501.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/6/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
501.01

APNSA Has Seen

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: GANTT FILE 1.4(c) [redacted] N SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 281615Z AUG 91

FM 1.4(c) [redacted] MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ 281615Z AUG 91 1.4(c) [redacted]
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
BEGIN TEXT
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: JAMES COLLINS

CHARGE DELIVERED THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH ON THE BALTICS TO PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT CHERNYAYEV AT 3:00 PM MOSCOW TIME TODAY. CHERNYAYEV READ THE LETTER. DID NOT COMMENT DIRECTLY ON IT OR U.S. INTENTIONS, BUT LAID OUT FOR CHARGE WHAT CHERNYAYEV DESCRIBED AS THE "FACTUAL SITUATION" AND THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A DECISION ON BALTIC INDEPENDENCE.

CHERNYAYEV SAID THE BALTIC ISSUE WAS AT THAT MOMENT BEING DISCUSSED IN THE SUPREME SOVIET, BUT THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAD ALREADY DECIDED THE BALTIC REPUBLICS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE USSR. CHERNYAYEV NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SUPREME SOVIET HAD NO LEGAL POWER TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO THE BALTICS. WHILE IT COULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS, ONLY THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES COULD GIVE APPROVAL. SINCE THE CONGRESS WILL MEET ON MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, NO FINAL DECISION WOULD BE POSSIBLE BEFORE THE AUGUST 30 DATE IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

CHERNYAYEV THEN ADDED THAT THE BALTICS WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW CERTAIN LEGALITIES IN MOVING TO INDEPENDENCE. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE NEEDED ON THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE BALTICS, COVERING SUCH ISSUES AS THE CREATION OF A NEW ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE RESOLUTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND MILITARY ISSUES. THIS PROCESS NEEDED TO TAKE PLACE CALMLY, CHERNYAYEV SAID.

CHERNYAYEV RAISED THE ISSUE OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE SEVERAL

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1062-MR
MM 4/6/2015

TIMES DURING THE MEETING. HE COMMENTED THAT THE UKRAINE WOULD CERTAINLY VIEW INDEPENDENCE FOR THE BALTICS AS A PRECEDENT WHICH IT WOULD TRY TO FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT THE UKRAINE WAS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT MATTER FROM THE BALTICS FOR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND MANY OTHERS. ADDING THAT SOME DEPUTIES WILL USE THE FEAR OF SETTING A PRECEDENT AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST LETTING THE BALTICS GO.

CHERNYAYEV ADDED THAT LENINGRAD MAYOR ANATOLIY SOBCHAK IS CURRENTLY LEADING A DELEGATION TO KIEV TO DISCUSS WITH UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK THE RECENT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY THE UKRAINE. ANOTHER DELEGATION, OF "RSFSR OFFICIALS", WAS ALSO ON ITS WAY TO KIEV FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

CHARGE NOTED THAT THE U.S. SEES THE STATUS OF UKRAINE AS DIFFERENT FROM THE BALTICS, WHOSE INCORPORATION INTO THE USSR THE U.S. HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED. HE SAID THAT, AS CHERNYAYEV KNEW, THE BALTIC ISSUE IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR US, AND PRESSURES ARE MOUNTING TO MOVE FASTER ON THE BALTICS. CHERNYAYEV CONCLUDED THE DISUCSSION BY RESTATING THE FACT THAT THE FORMAL DECISION ON BALTIC INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD THEN BE NEEDED TO WORK OUT THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF SPLITTING THE BALTICS AWAY FROM THE USSR.

END TEXT

DECL OADR

=0025

Hand delivered by
Amb Komplektov to
Gen Scowcroft
10/22/91 CPM

Unofficial translation

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

I am really thankful to you for the positive resolution of the issue of the 1.5 billion dollar increase in the credit to finance food supplies from the US to the USSR, the improved terms of credit guarantees for the portion which has yet not been utilized, and your personal role in this.

I know how difficult it is, even for such a country as the United States, to resolve such problems and yet, the dangerously deteriorating food situation in our country prompts me to once again appeal to you.

The newly formed political structures in the USSR in which the prevailing attitude now is commitment to the ideas of perestroika and the fundamentally changed situation following the well-known events of August have now created most favorable opportunities for radical economic transformations, democratization of society, affirmation of market economy principles, and a wide-spread development of entrepreneurship.

At the same time, a number of actions implemented at this stage of reform combined with the unsatisfactory results of this year's harvest and the not-yet-established system of its support on a new basis are causing considerable tensions in the society which, unless appropriate measures are taken, may lead to consequences that would be extremely undesirable for the future of perestroika.

In this situation food supplies for the population acquire paramount importance, and we will not be able to solve this problem without importing significant quantities of food from outside, without the United States' participation in it.

The pressing requirements for this year and the first half of 1992, i.e. before the next harvest is in, are a compelling reason for this appeal of mine to you both with respect to expediting the use of the currently available credit to the full extent even before the end of this year, and in terms of a possibility of extending new credits for 1992 totalling 3-3.5 billion dollars to finance Soviet purchases of agricultural and food commodities that we need the most. Besides, given the state of our economy, there is an urgent need for receiving a portion of food supplies in the form of free humanitarian assistance in the amount of about 1 billion dollars.

Believe me, this request is based on the most realistic assessments of our food requirements for the said period of time, and I am counting on the United States' possibilities and support. As you perhaps already know, for the remainder of this year and for the first half of next year those requirements in dollar cost are estimated at 10.2 billion dollars.

Last month I communicated a request to the Coordinator of the Group of Seven leading industrial nations Mr. John Major, to leaders of a number of countries and the Chairman of the EC Commission Mr. J.Delors, to extend credit support and humanitarian assistance to the USSR in providing food for the said amount. On October 7 last, the EC Council decided to extend assistance to us in the amount of 1.25 billion ecu, or 1.5 billion dollars, out of the requested 5-6 billion ecu.

I wish to tell you that, frankly, this solution shall fall short of fully meeting our pressing needs. What is required is additional support on the part of the West both in the form of grant assistance and in the form of food credits.

There is a unanimous decision of the State Council regarding the matters of attracting these credits, their use, and their shared-responsibility repayment. Further credit processing and realization effort will, as before, be pursued in a coordinated and centralized manner.

I would like to take this opportunity in order to assure you that attracting food credits is looked upon by the Soviet leadership, the sovereign Republics and by me personally as an emergency measure in the current transition period most difficult for us. We see the way out of the food crisis in moving toward increased efficiency of the entire food complex of our country and we sincerely hope for broad cooperation with the United States in this area, including for the purpose of extensive development of farmer business as one of the most important means of resolving the present problems on the basis of the proven American experience.

I would appreciate your understanding of my request and a positive action on it.

M.GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin
October 21, 1991

Его Превосходительству
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Джорджу БУШУ
г. Вашингтон

Дорогой Джордж,

Весьма признателен Вам за положительное решение вопроса об увеличении на I,5 млрд.долларов кредита для финансирования поставок из США в СССР продовольственных товаров, улучшения условий кредитных гарантий на остающуюся еще не использованной его часть и Вашу личную роль в этом.

Представляю, как непросто даже для такого государства, как Соединенные Штаты, решать подобные проблемы, тем не менее, опасно усугубляющаяся ситуация в стране с продовольствием вновь заставляет меня обратиться к Вам.

Сформировавшиеся в СССР новые политические структуры, в которых теперь преобладает преданное идеям перестройки влияние, и в корне изменившаяся после известных августовских событий обстановка создают отныне самые благоприятные возможности для радикальных экономических преобразований, демократизации общества, утверждения рыночных принципов хозяйствования, широкого распространения предпринимательства.

Вместе с тем, ряд акций, проводимых на данном этапе реформ, в сочетании с неудовлетворительными итогами урожая текущего года и еще не сложившейся системой его обеспечения на новых основах вызывают заметную напряженность в обществе, которая может, если не принять должных мер, привести к крайне нежелательным для судьбы перестройки последствиям.

Продовольственное снабжение населения в такой ситуации приобретает первостепенное значение, и решить эту проблему без привлечения значительных объемов продовольствия извне, без участия в этом Соединенных Штатов, нам не удастся.

Неотложные потребности в текущем году и первой половине 1992 года, т.е. до нового урожая, настоятельно обуславливают это мое обращение к Вам в отношении как ускорения использования ныне действующего кредита в полной мере еще до конца текущего года, так и возможности предоставления на 1992 год новых кредитов на общую сумму 3-3,5 млрд.долларов для финансирования поставок в Советский Союз сельскохозяйственных и продовольственных товаров первой необходимости. Кроме того, учитывая состояние нашей экономики, имеется настоятельная необходимость получения части продовольствия в форме безвозмездной гуманитарной помощи на сумму примерно 1 млрд.долларов.

Это обращение, поверьте, основывается на самых реальных оценках наших потребностей в продовольствии в указанный период, и я рассчитываю на возможности и поддержку Соединенных Штатов. Как Вам, видимо, уже известно, эти потребности на конец текущего и первую половину следующего года оцениваются по стоимости в 10,2 млрд.долларов.

В сентябре с.г. я обратился к координатору группы семи ведущих промышленных стран мира господину Дж.Мейджеру, руководителям ряда стран и председателю Комиссии Европейских сообществ господину Ж.Делору с просьбой оказать кредитную поддержку и гуманитарную помощь СССР в обеспечении продовольствием на указанную сумму. 7 октября с.г. Совет ЕС принял решение предоставить нам помощь в размере 1,25 млрд. экю или 1,5 млрд.долларов из запрошенных 5-6 млрд. экю.

Хочу откровенно Вам сказать, что такое решение не позволит удовлетворить полностью наши насущные потребности. Требуется дополнительная поддержка со стороны Запада как в форме безвозмездной помощи, так и в форме кредитов на приобретение продовольствия.

На привлечение всех этих кредитов, их использование и по согласованной ответственности за их погашение имеется единогласное решение Государственного Совета. Дальнейшая работа по оформлению и реализации кредита будет, как и ранее, вестись скоординированно и централизованно.

Хотел бы одновременно заверить Вас в том, что привлечение кредитов на продовольственные цели рассматривается советским руководством, суверенными республиками и мною лично как чрезвычайная мера в нынешний переходный и наиболее сложный для нас период. Выход из продовольственного кризиса мы видим на путях повышения эффективности всего продовольственного комплекса страны и искренне рассчитываем на широкое сотрудничество с Соединенными Штатами в этой сфере, в том числе в целях широкого развития фермерства как одного из важнейших средств решения нынешних проблем на основе оправдавшего себя американского опыта.

Буду благодарен за Ваше понимание моей просьбы и положительное ее решение.

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

Москва, Кремль
21 октября 1991 г.

Unofficial translation

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

I am really thankful to you for the positive resolution of the issue of the 1.5 billion dollar increase in the credit to finance food supplies from the US to the USSR, the improved terms of credit guarantees for the portion which has yet not been utilized, and your personal role in this.

I know how difficult it is, even for such a country as the United States, to resolve such problems and yet, the dangerously deteriorating food situation in our country prompts me to once again appeal to you.

The newly formed political structures in the USSR in which the prevailing attitude now is commitment to the ideas of perestroika and the fundamentally changed situation following the well-known events of August have now created most favorable opportunities for radical economic transformations, democratization of society, affirmation of market economy principles, and a wide-spread development of entrepreneurship.

At the same time, a number of actions implemented at this stage of reform combined with the unsatisfactory results of this year's harvest and the not-yet-established system of its support on a new basis are causing considerable tensions in the society which, unless appropriate measures are taken, may lead to consequences that would be extremely undesirable for the future of perestroika.

In this situation food supplies for the population acquire paramount importance, and we will not be able to solve this problem without importing significant quantities of food from outside, without the United States' participation in it.

The pressing requirements for this year and the first half of 1992, i.e. before the next harvest is in, are a compelling reason for this appeal of mine to you both with respect to expediting the use of the currently available credit to the full extent even before the end of this year, and in terms of a possibility of extending new credits for 1992 totalling 3-3.5 billion dollars to finance Soviet purchases of agricultural and food commodities that we need the most. Besides, given the state of our economy, there is an urgent need for receiving a portion of food supplies in the form of free humanitarian assistance in the amount of about 1 billion dollars.

Believe me, this request is based on the most realistic assessments of our food requirements for the said period of time, and I am counting on the United States' possibilities and support. As you perhaps already know, for the remainder of this year and for the first half of next year those requirements in dollar cost are estimated at 10.2 billion dollars.

Last month I communicated a request to the Coordinator of the Group of Seven leading industrial nations Mr. John Major, to leaders of a number of countries and the Chairman of the EC Commission Mr. J.Delors, to extend credit support and humanitarian assistance to the USSR in providing food for the said amount. On October 7 last, the EC Council decided to extend assistance to us in the amount of 1.25 billion ecu, or 1.5 billion dollars, out of the requested 5-6 billion ecu.

I wish to tell you that, frankly, this solution shall fall short of fully meeting our pressing needs. What is required is additional support on the part of the West both in the form of grant assistance and in the form of food credits.

There is a unanimous decision of the State Council regarding the matters of attracting these credits, their use, and their shared-responsibility repayment. Further credit processing and realization effort will, as before, be pursued in a coordinated and centralized manner.

I would like to take this opportunity in order to assure you that attracting food credits is looked upon by the Soviet leadership, the sovereign Republics and by me personally as an emergency measure in the current transition period most difficult for us. We see the way out of the food crisis in moving toward increased efficiency of the entire food complex of our country and we sincerely hope for broad cooperation with the United States in this area, including for the purpose of extensive development of farmer business as one of the most important means of resolving the present problems on the basis of the proven American experience.

I would appreciate your understanding of my request and a positive action on it.

M.GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin
October 21, 1991

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Cable	From White House, Re: [September 26 Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev] [260037Z Sep 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
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By MM on 7/12/2022

Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1062-MR(502.03)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/6/2015

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FM WHITE HOUSE

TO 1.4(c) MOSCOW

~~S E C R E T~~ 1.4(c)
QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR CHARGE JIM COLLINS FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.
-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AT 00B SEPTEMBER 26. MESSAGE SHOULD BE DELIVERED ONLY TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV OR HIS ADVISOR CHERNYAYEV.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
-
DEAR MIKHAIL
-
I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I CALLED BORIS YEL'TSIN SEPTEMBER 25 TO INQUIRE ABOUT HIS HEALTH, AND TO OFFER HELP ON HIS ILLNESS IF HE FELT THAT WAS APPROPRIATE. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT REST AND THE MEDICAL TREATMENT HE WAS RECEIVING WOULD QUICKLY RESTORE HIS HEALTH. HE ALSO MENTIONED HOW WELL YOU AND HE ARE WORKING TOGETHER.
-
I ALSO HAD A VERY INFORMATIVE MEETING TODAY AT THE WHITE HOUSE WITH LEONID KRAVCHUK, WHO IS VISITING THE US IN CONNECTION WITH HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. CHAIRMAN KRAVCHUK OUTLINED FOR ME HIS VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF UKRAINE IN THE NEW UNION. I EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR UKRAINE TO WORK OUT WITH THE CENTER, AND THAT WE HOPED THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WOULD

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2009-1062-MR
MR 4/6/2015

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BE RESOLVED SOON SO THAT ECONOMIC REFORM COULD MOVE AHEAD.

-

BARBARA AND I SEND OUR BEST WISHES TO YOU AND RAISA.

-

SINCERELY,

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

-

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
  SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

-

END TEXT.
DECLAS: OADR
=0017

Unofficial translation

Moscow, October 18, 1991

Dear George,

I take advantage of the visit to the United States of the President of Kirghizstan, A.A.Akayev, to share some thoughts with you.

The putsch and its quick failure have revealed in an explosive way the contradictions that accumulated in the process of profound change in our society. The impressive victory of the democratic forces has created moral and political conditions for accelerated movement along the path of democracy and a market economy. But to establish an orderly process there is a need for effective mechanisms and a stable political structure on the scale of a vast and multifaceted country. This is what we are preoccupied with today. Specifically, I refer to the Economic agreement and the preparation of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States.

Whatever the complications and however dramatic the debate on these two tasks, I think that agreement will be reached. We will have a single economic space and a new union state. Therefore the answer to the question I am frequently asked by my foreign interlocutors, including Mr.Madigan recently, with whom we had a very good talk, i.e. who to deal with in our country? - the answer will be encouraging and businesslike.

HIS EXCELLENCY
Mr.GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON D.C.

Of course, the state of the country's economy, which has worsened during this year, greatly complicates the entire process of economic reorganization. The winter and spring will be difficul The danger of social explosion remains.

We have counted our internal resources and capabilities. We hope to prevent a situation where even some regions would be hungry and cold. But support from abroad is very important now.

In this regard I want to convey to you, George, my profound gratitude for the leadership role assumed by the United States in promoting economic assistance to us. This also relates to the humanitarian and other support.

I see in this an expression of the entirely new nature of international relations, the core of which is the trust and profound mutual understanding between the two of us personally and as leaders of two great countries. We have once again seen "the hand of Washington" in the actions of the IMF, in the results of the Bangkok meeting, in the decision to send to Moscow the finance ministers of the G7, and in other important steps, including those taken by the EC.

Your bold programme of scaling down the nuclear arsenals, which we immediately supported and to which we responded with our own specific proposals, definitively transfers one of the main areas of world politics onto a new dimension. It is a major step toward a new era in international politics. We regard Mr.Bartholomew's consultations in Moscow as a very good beginning of the practical implementation of our joint initiatives. As part of the preparation for regular cooperation on all the aspects of these initiatives, in-depth work on our positions has begun, according to my instructions.

The idea for a joint group to discuss strategic stability and global prospects is also a sign of the new nature of our interaction in international affairs. I have asked A.N.Yakovlev to organize our component of the group. First deputy foreign minister V.F.Petrovski will probably be in change of the group's regular work on our side. We agree to hold the first meeting in Washington. Our team at that meeting will be led by Alexander Yakovlev.

It seems quite clear that you and I, having left the old era irrevocably behind us, have started in earnest regular coordination in the main areas of world politics.

Apart from disarmament and the economic revival of our Union on the lines of democracy - that too is a problem of global importance, the priorities for us today are the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia.

Given the all-European nature of the danger and brutality of the armed conflict in Yugoslavia which is just inconceivable between nations that are brothers, I decided to invite to Moscow the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia. The talks were very difficult but in the end we were able to achieve minimum agreement: cease fire and begin negotiations.I understand that they will not have an easy time implementing it. Nevertheless I hope that my efforts will not be in vain. S.Milosevic and F.Tudjman have asked us, the United States and the European Community to help with good offices. Boris Pankin will discuss this with Jim Baker.

The conference for the final settlement in Cambodia is another demonstration of the effectiveness of new world politics. It is our common success.

We are close to succeeding in bringing to the peace conference table the parties to the Middle East conflict. Jim has done tremendous work to achieve this, which deserves the highest praise. I have instructed Boris Pankin to continue to cooperate closely with him. We will in the coming days reestablish diplomati relations with Israel. As soon as it becomes quite clear that the Conference will take place and the date and venue have been determined, I will be ready, as you and I agreed, to be present at its opening.

The prospects for the Afghan settlement are taking more concrete shape following our joint statement of September 13. Our contacts with the leaders of the moderate Afghan opposition indicate that reaching agreement is possible. Najibullah takes a reasonable and responsible attitude. But he, just like we are, is worried about the position of a part of the Pakistani military, which continue to rely on the extremist group of Hekmatiar, which means supporting a military solution.

Rereading this letter, I come to the conclusion that quite a few major subjects have accumulated for a substantive discussion in a secluded and informal setting. A friendly handshake to you, and from me and Raisa Maximovna - warm regards to Barbara.

Sincerly

Mikhail

Handed to Pres. by Pres Akayev of Kyrgyzstan 10/25/91

Unofficial translation

Moscow, October 18, 1991

Copy provided to Baker/State by E. Hewett

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Sincerly

Mikhail

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Москва, "18" октября 1991 года

Дорогой Джордж,

Пользуюсь поездкой в США президента Кыргызстана А.А.Акаева, чтобы поделиться с Вами некоторыми соображениями.

Путч и его стремительный провал взрывным образом обнажили противоречия, накопившиеся в ходе глубокой перестройки общества. Внушительная победа демократических сил создала морально-политические условия для ускоренного движения по пути демократии и рыночной экономики. Но для налаживания этого процесса нужны адекватные механизмы, устойчивая политическая структура в масштабах огромной и многоликой страны. Этим сейчас мы и поглощены. Конкретно речь идет об Экономическом Соглашении и подготовке Договора о Союзе Суверенных Государств.

При всех сложностях и остроте дискуссий вокруг этих двух задач, я думаю, согласие будет достигнуто. Мы будем иметь единое экономическое пространство и новое союзное государство. Так что ответ на вопрос, который мне задают мои иностранные собеседники, в том числе недавно и мистер Мэдиган, с которым у нас была очень хорошая беседа, - а именно: с кем у нас тут иметь дело? - будет обнадеживающим и деловым.

Конечно, крайне осложняет весь процесс демократической реорганизации экономическое состояние страны. Оно ухудшилось за этот год. Зима и весна будут тяжелыми. Опасность социального взрыва сохраняется.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
Г-ну ДЖОРДЖУ БУШУ
г.Вашингтон

Мы подсчитали свои внутренние ресурсы и возможности. Надеемся что не допустим, чтобы даже отдельные районы оказались в голоде и холоде. Но очень важна сейчас поддержка из-за рубежа.

В этой связи я хочу выразить Вам, Джордж, глубокую благодарность за ту лидирующую роль, которую приняли на себя Соединенные Штаты в налаживании экономического содействия нам. Это относится и к гуманитарной и иной поддержке.

В этом я вижу выражение совершенно нового характера международных отношений, стержень которых - в доверии и глубоком взаимопонимании между нами лично и как руководителями двух великих стран "Руку Вашингтона" мы вновь почувствовали и в действиях МВФ, и в итогах Бангкока, и в решении направить в Москву министров финансов "большой семерки", в других важных акциях, в том числе со стороны ЕС.

Ваша смелая программа по свертыванию ядерных арсеналов, которую мы сразу же поддержали и ответили конкретными встречными предложениями, окончательно переводят одно из кардинальных направлений мировой политики в новое качество. Это - крупнейший шаг к новой эпохе международных отношений. Консультации Р.Бартоломью в Москве мы расцениваем как очень хорошее начало практической реализации совместных инициатив. В порядке подготовки к регулярному сотрудничеству по всем темам, вытекающим из этих инициатив, начата, по моему поручению, углубленная проработка позиций.

Знаком нового характера нашего взаимодействия в международных делах является и идея совместной группы по стратегической стабильности и обсуждению глобальных перспектив. Я поручил А.Н.Яковлеву заняться организацией нашей части группы. Текущую ее работу с нашей стороны возглавит, наверно, первый заместитель министра

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иностранных дел В.Ф.Петровский. Мы согласны провести первое ее заседание в Вашингтоне. Возглавит "команду" от нас на это заседание Александр Яковлев.

Видимо, теперь уже ясно, что мы с Вами, бесповоротно оставив позади послевоенную эпоху, вплотную приступили к регулярной координации на основных направлениях мировой политики.

Помимо разоружения и экономического возрождения на путях демократии нашего Союза - проблема тоже всемирного масштаба - сейчас в качестве приоритетных перед нами - Ближний Восток, Афганистан, Югославия.

Ввиду общеевропейского характера опасности и просто немыслимой между братскими народами жестокости вооруженного конфликта в Югославии я решил пригласить в Москву президентов Сербии и Хорватии. Разговор был очень трудным, но все же в конце концов удалось выйти на минимум согласия: прекратить огонь и вступить в переговоры. Понимаю, что не просто им будет добиться этого. Тем не менее, надеюсь, мои усилия не будут напрасными. С.Милошевич и Ф.Туджман обратились к нам, к США и Европейскому сообществу с просьбой оказать добрые услуги. Б.Д.Панкин будет говорить об этом с Джимом Бейкером.

Открывающаяся на днях в Париже конференция по окончательному урегулированию в Камбодже - еще одно свидетельство результативности новой мировой политики. Это наш общий успех.

Кажется, удается подвести к столу мирной конференции и стороны в ближневосточном конфликте. Джим проделал тут огромную работу. Она заслуживает самой высокой оценки. Я поручил Борису Панкину и дальше тесно сотрудничать с ним. На днях мы восстановим дипломатические отношения с Израилем. Как только окончательно

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Miscellaneous Handwriting

станет ясно, что конференция состоится, будет определена дата и место ее проведения, я готов, как мы с Вами договорились, присутствовать при открытии.

Перспектива афганского урегулирования после совместного нашего заявления от 13 сентября приобретает более конкретные очертания. Наши контакты с лидерами умеренной афганской оппозиции показывают, что достижение согласия возможно. Наджибулла занимает разумную и ответственную позицию. Но его, как и нас, беспокоит позиция части военных кругов Пакистана, которые продолжают делать ставку на экстремистскую группу Хекматьяра, то есть на военное решение.

Перечитывая написанное, прихожу к выводу, что накопилось порядочно крупных тем для основательного разговора в уединенной, неофициальной обстановке. Дружески жму руку.

Теплый привет Барбаре - от меня и Раисы Максимовны.

Искренне

Михаил

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1991

APNSA Has Seen

General Scowcroft,

Per our conversation, I talked to the Soviet Ambassador and told him, with the idea he might want to cable Moscow, that Mrs. Bush would not be accompanying the President to Madrid. I also told him we would be responding immediately to press inquiries about this, but I wanted to tell him before we told the press. He was appreciative of the call.

susan porter rose

Unofficial translation

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

I am really thankful to you for the positive resolution of the issue of the 1.5 billion dollar increase in the credit to finance food supplies from the US to the USSR, the improved terms of credit guarantees for the portion which has yet not been utilized, and your personal role in this.

I know how difficult it is, even for such a country as the United States, to resolve such problems and yet, the dangerously deteriorating food situation in our country prompts me to once again appeal to you.

The newly formed political structures in the USSR in which the prevailing attitude now is commitment to the ideas of perestroika and the fundamentally changed situation following the well-known events of August have now created most favorable opportunities for radical economic transformations, democratization of society, affirmation of market economy principles, and a wide-spread development of entrepreneurship.

At the same time, a number of actions implemented at this stage of reform combined with the unsatisfactory results of this year's harvest and the not-yet-established system of its support on a new basis are causing considerable tensions in the society which, unless appropriate measures are taken, may lead to consequences that would be extremely undesirable for the future of perestroika.

In this situation food supplies for the population acquire paramount importance, and we will not be able to solve this problem without importing significant quantities of food from outside, without the United States' participation in it.

The pressing requirements for this year and the first half of 1992, i.e. before the next harvest is in, are a compelling reason for this appeal of mine to you both with respect to expediting the use of the currently available credit to the full extent even before the end of this year, and in terms of a possibility of extending new credits for 1992 totalling 3-3.5 billion dollars to finance Soviet purchases of agricultural and food commodities that we need the most. Besides, given the state of our economy, there is an urgent need for receiving a portion of food supplies in the form of free humanitarian assistance in the amount of about 1 billion dollars.

Believe me, this request is based on the most realistic assessments of our food requirements for the said period of time, and I am counting on the United States' possibilities and support. As you perhaps already know, for the remainder of this year and for the first half of next year those requirements in dollar cost are estimated at 10.2 billion dollars.

Last month I communicated a request to the Coordinator of the Group of Seven leading industrial nations Mr. John Major, to leaders of a number of countries and the Chairman of the EC Commission Mr. J.Delors, to extend credit support and humanitarian assistance to the USSR in providing food for the said amount. On October 7 last, the EC Council decided to extend assistance to us in the amount of 1.25 billion ecu, or 1.5 billion dollars, out of the requested 5-6 billion ecu.

I wish to tell you that, frankly, this solution shall fall short of fully meeting our pressing needs. What is required is additional support on the part of the West both in the form of grant assistance and in the form of food credits.

There is a unanimous decision of the State Council regarding the matters of attracting these credits, their use, and their shared-responsibility repayment. Further credit processing and realization effort will, as before, be pursued in a coordinated and centralized manner.

I would like to take this opportunity in order to assure you that attracting food credits is looked upon by the Soviet leadership, the sovereign Republics and by me personally as an emergency measure in the current transition period most difficult for us. We see the way out of the food crisis in moving toward increased efficiency of the entire food complex of our country and we sincerely hope for broad cooperation with the United States in this area, including for the purpose of extensive development of farmer business as one of the most important means of resolving the present problems on the basis of the proven American experience.

I would appreciate your understanding of my request and a positive action on it.

M.GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin
October 21, 1991

P / Gorbachev 9/27/91

G Read your letter & very much want to talk to you

P Let me go thru some T.P. first

G I have prelim. analysis. Consider this a step in continuing U.S. Pres view & think of closest assoc. Just one question. Will you do this unilaterally & ask us to follow?

P Yes (describes).

G Thank you for clarification. Since you are urging us to reciprocate steps our response will be positive, I understand.

P Great. I'll contact w/ Gorb & while they haven't had time to discuss & find their response will be positive

G That would be fine. George. I suggest that I consult your position reaction on our 9 pm runs. I have some points & questions: Hope for some detail.

P Absolutely.

G Will you unilat other nuc forces. Deeper plans to minimize allies.

P Told Bu + Fu & need to plan further consultations, but we feel this is really a superpower relationship

G OK. Question of nuc testing.

P We are silent on it. But will

- Macedonia has accepted initialing of pact.
- If we declare C & S subject, Serbs will act against Yugoslavia.
- Please treat as important part. of central Europe.
- If we don't stop Serbs, we could get 1000000 refugees
- anti Croats of Serbia also need encouragement
- Adria pipeline has been shut off by Serbs?
  - Oil & Czech reserves are dwindling
- Also possibility Slovakia will declare ind. not ok
- Best solution commonwealth of seven nations but this has become a fiction
- Czechs would give up Slovakia, but there would be pats in Slovakia & 600000 Hungarians in E Slovakia.
- If world can't control Yugo, it raises problems in many other areas.

Request: US/UK get UN mandate to send stern warning.

- wants unity out of it
- P We agree that using C+S subject could lead to escalation. You wish a statement from US+SC. What do you think such a statement should say?
- A EC should take unified position. That hasn't happened. US/UK could perhaps C-7 should make separate statements

consider request on Testing & will have consultations w/ you on this point.

G — . . . —

Does this affect carriers & strategic fleet?

P Carriers yes, strategic no.

G What do you think is a right way to discuss this? Our strategic stability talks?

P Initial feeling is positive but will get back to you. Should be broader than nuc-nuc.

G Thank you. Do you want to see you on major + his Cox initiative.

P Yeltsin (courtesy notification)

G OK. Pleased w/ mtg w/ Baker Bradley Greenspan.
Sent data to Major.

P Too Pleased w/ your response. We can do great things together.

P/Yeltsin 9/27/91

Yeltsin - Been here 3 dmp. Feel letter
P Hope he got letter. Hope he can
support. Good words from Carla
Y Read it. I mentioned to you
an initiative like this only
narrower. Won't go into detail
But I appreciate it highly
Corresponds to new level of
confidence but ex. Value
it very highly.
Corresponds to policies pursued by
Russians. We will do what
we can to push Congress to
implement your initiative
Now we have abolished c. mil Cents
c mil peoplecare were emphasized.
Now Def Min + Chiefs are in
favor of Trump Baker Cheney.
Your initiative is a breathtaking
concept.
Step Toward eliminating nucs entirely
Next step should be CTB.

+ Underscore Nuke part very good
Date of Nichols

...Last & strongest to NATO's access.

Sons should be drawn in because
JNA goals still listen to Sons
Condemn it & voice warning - by
US/SU/+ EU
- Bring attention to potential sanctions
against Serbia + world
coop w/ country which does same
things.
- Important to have EC announce
first can in
- If cGPs threaten to veto lift of CoS, -
Serbs may hold back.
- Would only work if US/UK/SU were
signatories
- Thurs mentioned this to Kohl - who agrees
this shouldn't be done by H, Ger, It.

NODIS ROUTING

The attached State Department message is provided on a strict need-to-know basis. Discussion of this message and its contents should be limited to the below named individuals.

State Cable Number: State 354276

Scowcroft	
Gates	
Sittmann	
Hill	
Hewett	
Gompert	
Gordon	
O'Leary (File)	

IMMEDIATE ~~SECRET~~ OUTGOING

NODIS NODIS NODIS

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S/S-O:LEBUTLER NSCS:KHILL
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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 354276

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR STRAUSS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: UR
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO GORBACHEV

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THIS LETTER TO GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT NO LATER THAN 00B MONDAY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MIKHAIL

BECAUSE OUR TIME WILL BE SO LIMITED WHEN YOU AND I MEET IN MADRID, I WANT TO TELL YOU HOW THE UNITED STATES IS PROGRESSING ON THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE I ANNOUNCED ON SEPTEMBER 27 AND GIVE YOU MY REACTIONS TO YOUR OCTOBER 5 SPEECH.

NODIS NODIS NODIS

MIKHAIL IN THE SPACE OF LESS THAN ONE MONTH, YOU AND I HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT STRIDES IN ENHANCING NUCLEAR STABILITY. WE HAVE DONE THIS WITHOUT LENGTHY AND COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS. OUR INITIATIVES HAVE HELPED CUT

THROUGH MANY IMPEDIMENTS TO ADJUSTING FORCES TO REFLECT THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE U.S. TEAM, LED BY UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW, AND SOVIET OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLICS HELPED CLARIFY MY INITIATIVE AND YOUR WISE AND COURAGEOUS RESPONSE.

THE UNITED STATES IS MAKING RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING THE SPECIFIC STEPS I OUTLINED. 450 MINUTEMAN II MISSILES ARE OFF ALERT AND CANNOT BE LAUNCHED. WE ARE NOW STUDYING HOW QUICKLY THESE MISSILES CAN BE ELIMINATED, ONCE START IS RATIFIED, WHILE MAINTAINING THE HIGHEST SAFETY AND SECURITY STANDARDS. ALL OUR HEAVY BOMBERS ARE OFF ALERT AND THEIR WEAPONS STORED IN SECURE AREAS. THE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS I SAID WOULD BE CANCELLED HAVE BEEN TERMINATED.

WE ARE COORDINATING WITH OUR ALLIES ON THE SAFE AND SECURE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL GROUND-LAUNCHED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ALL THESE SYSTEMS WILL BE WITHDRAWN TO THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THREE YEARS AND THEIR ELIMINATION WILL BE UNDERWAY. OUR NAVY HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO REMOVE ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM SHIPS, SUBMARINES, AND BASES FOR LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT. THESE ACTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN EIGHT TO NINE MONTHS.

YOUR AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS THE LIMITED DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR MISSILE DEFENSES IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD GREATER STABILITY IN A TIME OF CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL IN

NODIS NODIS NODIS

THE WORLD. WE HAVE ALREADY BRIEFED A NUMBER OF YOUR SENIOR OFFICIALS ON THE MAJOR CHANGES I HAVE MADE IN OUR SDI PROGRAM. THE NEW GPALS PROGRAM IS AIMED TO COUNTER THE THREAT POSED BY THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES -- NOT TO UNDERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR STRATEGIC FORCES. TO ADDRESS CONCERNS THAT GPALS IN FACT BE LIMITED, WE HAVE PROPOSED A NEW APPROACH IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS TO DEFINE A NEW REGIME WHICH WOULD PERMIT, BUT LIMIT, THE DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES.

I AM QUITE PLEASED THAT YOU ACCEPTED MY INVITATION TO BEGIN EXPERT-TO-EXPERT TALKS ON A VARIETY OF NUCLEAR ISSUES. I VIEW THESE NOT AS NEGOTIATIONS, BUT AS FORA IN WHICH OUR EXPERTS CAN DISCUSS THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. I HOPE THESE DISCUSSIONS CAN STRENGTHEN COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, IMPROVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY AND SECURITY, AND HASTEN THE SAFE

ELIMINATION OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE HAVE BOTH PLEDGED TO DESTROY.

SOME OF THE ISSUES YOU RAISED IN YOUR RESPONSE, INCLUDING A BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURPOSES AND THE CENTRAL STORAGE OF AIR-DELIVERED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL REQUIRE MORE DETAILED STUDY AND CONSULTATIONS. SINCE MY SEPTEMBER 27 ANNOUNCEMENT, NATO HAS ANNOUNCED ITS DECISIONS TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBER OF AIR-DELIVERED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITS STOCKPILE. I HOPE YOU WILL TAKE THIS STEP INTO CONSIDERATION IN FUTURE DECISIONS CONCERNING SOVIET AIR-DELIVERED TACTICAL WEAPONS.

BOTH OF US HAVE CALLED FOR CUTS IN STRATEGIC ARMS, BEYOND THOSE IN START. YOUR PROPOSAL FOCUSES PRINCIPALLY ON REDUCING THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC

NODIS NODIS NODIS

WEAPONS. MY PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS FOCUSES ON ELIMINATING THE SINGLE GREATEST THREAT TO STABILITY, ICBMS WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS. I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS IS THE MOST PROMISING AND PRODUCTIVE WAY TO MOVE BEYOND START AND MAKE REAL IMPROVEMENTS TO STRATEGIC STABILITY. THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED WOULD BE FOR U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS CANDIDLY THEIR RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE AND MODERNIZATION PLANS. OUT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS MAY COME A SHARED VIEW OF HOW TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND MAKE THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES LESS THREATENING TO EACH OTHER.

IT COMES AS NO SURPRISE TO ME THAT DESPITE THE BROAD AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND THE SHARING OF MANY COMMON GOALS, WE ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT ON EVERY POINT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR TESTING AND "NO FIRST USE." THE POSITIONS OF BOTH COUNTRIES ON THESE POINTS ARE WELL KNOWN, AND WILL REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. I AM DETERMINED, HOWEVER, NOT TO LET THESE DIFFERENCES SLOW THE PROGRESS WE ARE MAKING IN OTHER AREAS.

UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW WILL CONTACT YOUR OFFICIALS SOON TO ARRANGE AN EARLY MEETING IN WASHINGTON TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN MOSCOW IN EARLY OCTOBER -- AND TO ANSWER QUESTIONS EITHER SIDE MAY HAVE -- AND TO SET UP THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND OTHER EXPERTS' DISCUSSIONS NOTED ABOVE.

MIKHAIL I AM EXTREMELY ENCOURAGED BY YOUR OCTOBER 5 SPEECH AND THE OPENNESS OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN MOSCOW. TOGETHER YOU AND I HAVE MADE GREAT STRIDES

TOWARD A SAFER AND MORE SECURE WORLD AND I COMMEND YOUR BOLDNESS AND DECISIVENESS IN JOINING WITH ME ON SO MANY OF THESE STEPS. OUR TASK NOW IS TO ENSURE THEIR FULL IMPLEMENTATION.

SINCERELY,

END TEXT.
BAKER

Hand carried by
Amb. Kompelenov
Oct 25 1991

Copy given to Anne
Kanter by Amb.

THE LIST OF THE SOVIET
DELEGATION ON STRATEGIC
STABILITY TALKS IN WASHINGTON

1. YAKOVLEV A. - head of the delegation, member of President Gorbachev' political consultative council

MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION

2. RYZHOV Y. - member of President Gorbachev' consultative council
3. PRIMAKOV E. - director of Central intelligence services
4. PETROVSKY V. - First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister
5. SHAKHNAZAROV G. - counselor to President Boris Yeltsin
6. BLAGOVOLIN Y. - director of Institute of National Security and Strategic Research
7. POLITSYN A. - Lt.-General , chief of the operative and strategic research; Department of Defense
8. ZHURKIN V. - director of Institute of Europe, USSR Academy of Sciences
9. BOVIN A. - political commentator, "Izvestia"
10. ARBATOV A. - doctor of history, Institute of International economy and foreign relations

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Hand carried by
Anat Kompaniets
Oct 31, 1991

Unofficial translation

First. Russia decisively breaks with the communist past. Today, we live in a practically new country. The failed coup meant the failure of the whole totalitarian system based on the diktat of one party and the domination of a conservative center.

Pushing its reforms the Russian leadership had thus far had to confront a strong center. Over the past year each small step had to be fought for. Following the defeat of the putsch this course is no longer valid. We took a pause in order to make adjustments to our actions, given a totally new situation, and to take a responsible attitude to developing the reform program.

Now we are past the stage of reflection. In his statement to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies President Yeltsin spelled out the program for a major reformist breakthrough which Russia is resolved to implement.

We would wish to follow the path of radical transformations together with Union Republics. But we cannot now engage in tying the reform timeframe with the achievement of comprehensive inter-Republic agreements. We recognize the Republics' right to determine their own strategy and tactics, but we are not going to take cue from others.

We believe that Russia can and should become a kind of "locomotive", play a decisive role in getting the country

Out of the crisis. The essential thing is that reforms in Russia are a path to democracy, and not to an empire.

It was stated clearly and unambiguously: Russia has one power - the Congress, the Supreme Soviet, the Government, the President. Russia will not permit a revival of a new command center that would stand above it and other states. There shall be no more diktat from above.

President Yeltsin stated his willingness to personally assume leadership of the reform government. A new Cabinet of Ministers will be set up - a government of popular trust and one based not on political, but professional considerations and having broadest authority.

Second. We have now identified the main elements of the new economic course. They are:

Economic stabilization based on lifting price controls as early as this year, a tough monetary-financial and credit policy, tax reform, and strengthening of the ruble.

Switching to market prices will be a one-time operation and will be implemented before the end of this year. Over the course of the next twelve months we hope to balance supply and demand, to fill the consumer goods market and stabilize its situation.

State expenditures shall be sharply reduced so that the 1992 budget deficit be minimal. We shall be cutting outlays for unprofitable enterprises, defense, and the administrative apparatus. As of November 1, Russia shall stop financing those

central institutions whose existence is not provided for in the Treaty on Economic Commonwealth.

The tax and customs systems of Russia shall be strengthened. A stringent mechanism shall be set up against monetary and credit emission. We shall proceed to establish a genuine reserve banking system with firm currency. We have also proposed a single inter-Republic bank for the entire ruble zone. It is feasible if other Republics agree not to introduce their own currencies.

A second option is for Russia to have its own currency with the emission concentrated in the Russian State Bank.

We intend to proceed to form a powerful private sector. We believe it is a realistic goal to privatize up to one half of small and medium-size enterprises within 3 months. The lands of unprofitable collective and state farms shall be given to producers.

Russia is completing the elaboration of the program of deep conversion. A portion of defense factories shall be fully re-oriented to civilian production.

We shall take measures of social protection for the most vulnerable segments of population. Yet, as was stated, we shall not be able to protect the standards of living of the whole population.

Third. In embarking upon this program of radical reforms, we seek to enter the world economy on an equal footing with others and are ready to comply with international standards.

We seek a direct participation in international financial and economic organizations and shall adopt their principles. We intend to formally request the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD to provide us technical assistance. We are making the same request of all developed countries and your government.

We attach extreme importance to attracting private foreign capital. We want to be seen as a reliable partner and we intend to fulfill the international obligations assumed by the Union. At the same time we hope to be supported by the community and urge the leading Western countries to provide guarantees to private firms that are entering the Russian market.

Forth. We believe it is essential to ensure continuity in terms of international obligations in conditions where true sovereignty is vested with Russia and other Republics. We operate on the assumption that the Union Foreign Ministry will be preserved as a coordinator of Republics' international activities with a staff approximately ten times smaller than at present.

President Yeltsin stressed that the situation in Russia is difficult, but not hopeless. There is no cause for panic, for the entire experience of world civilization proves that an economic malady is curable. We have defended political freedom, and now we shall give the people economic freedom. What we need is a precise diagnosis, strict rules of conduct and coordinated action. We expect to see the first positive results in the market place already by the fall of 1992.

We are beginning these reforms not in order to please

someone; we need them ourselves. We hope that the world community will be able to substantially facilitate movement along this path and realize its role in the re-birth of a free and democratic Russia.

Hand carried by
Amb Kornblum
Oct 31, 1991

Первое. Россия решительно порывает с коммунистическим прошлым. Сегодня мы живем практически в новой стране. Провал государственного переворота оказался провалом для всей тоталитарной системы, основанной на диктате одной партии и господстве консервативного центра.

Пробивая реформы, российское руководство до сих пор исходило из противостояния сильному центру. Целый год каждый маленький шаг приходилось отвоевывать. После поражения путча такая линия изжила себя. Мы взяли паузу, чтобы внести коррективы в наши действия с учетом совершенно новой обстановки и ответственно подойти к составлению программы реформ.

Теперь этап размышлений позади. В выступлении Президента РСФСР Б.Н.Ельцина на Съезде народных депутатов изложена программа крупного реформаторского прорыва, которую намерена осуществить Россия.

Мы хотели бы вместе с союзными республиками идти по пути радикальных преобразований. Но у нас нет возможности увязывать сроки реформ с достижением всеобъемлющих межреспубликанских соглашений. Мы признаем право республик определять свою собственную стратегию и тактику, но подстраиваться под других мы не будем.

Считаем, что Россия может и должна стать своего рода "локомотивом", сыграть решающую роль в выводе страны из кризиса. Главное, что реформы в России - это путь к демократии, а не к империи.

Четко и ясно заявлено: в России одна власть - съезд, Верховный Совет, правительство, Президент. Россия не допустит возрождения нового командного центра, стоящего над ней и другими государствами. Диктата сверху уже не будет.

Президент Б.Н.Ельцин заявил о готовности лично возглавить правительство реформ. Будет сформирован новый кабинет министров - правительство народного доверия, на основе не политических, но профессиональных соображений, с самыми широкими полномочиями.

Второе. Названы основные элементы нового экономического курса.

Экономическая стабилизация. В ее основе - освобождение цен уже в этом году, жесткая денежно-финансовая и кредитная политика, налоговая реформа, укрепление рубля.

Переход к рыночным ценам будет единовременным и состоится уже в этом году. Надеемся в течение года уравновесить спрос и предложение, наполнить потребительский рынок товарами, стабилизировать на нем ситуацию.

Будут резко сокращены государственные расходы, с тем чтобы дефицит бюджета на 1992 год был минимальным. Сокращаются ассигнования на убыточные предприятия, оборону и управленческий аппарат. С 1 ноября Россия прекращает финансировать учреждения центра, существование которых не оговорено Договором об экономическом сообществе.

Будет укреплена налоговая и таможенная системы России. Вводится жесткий механизм против эмиссии денег и кредитов. Мы приступим к созданию настоящей резервной банковской системы с твердыми деньгами. Предложили единый для всей рублевой зоны

межгосударственный банк. Это возможно, если другие республики согласятся не вводить свою валюту.

Второй вариант - у России будет своя валюта, а эмиссия сосредоточена в российском Госбанке.

Намерены приступить к формированию мощного частного сектора. Считаем реальным за 3 месяца приватизировать до половины мелких и средних предприятий. Землю убыточных колхозов и совхозов будем передавать производителям.

Россия завершает разработку программы глубокой конверсии. Часть военных заводов полностью переориентируется на гражданскую продукцию.

Будут приняты меры социальной защиты для наиболее уязвимых слоев. Одновременно заявлено, что защитить жизненный уровень всего населения мы не сможем.

Третье. Предпринимая эту программу радикальных реформ, мы стремимся на равных с другими войти в мировую экономику, готовы подчиняться международным стандартам. Хотим прямо участвовать в международных финансовых и экономических организациях, принять их принципы. Намерены официально обратиться в МВФ, Мировой банк, ЕБРР за техническим содействием. Обращаемся с просьбой об этом и ко всем развитым странам, к правительству страны пребывания.

Исключительное значение придаем привлечению частного иностранного капитала. Хотим, чтобы в нас видели надежного партнера, намерены соблюдать международные обязательства Союза. Одновременно надеемся на поддержку мирового сообщества, призываем ведущие страны Запада предоставить гарантии частным фирмам, выходящим на российский рынок.

Четвертое. Считаем важным, чтобы была обеспечена преемственность международных обязательств в условиях, когда реальными носителями суверенитета выступают Россия и другие республики. Мы исходим из того, что МИД Союза будет сохранен как координатор международной деятельности республик с численностью аппарата примерно в десять раз меньшей, чем сегодня.

Б.Н. Ельцин подчеркнул, что ситуация в России сложная, но не безнадежная. Нет повода для паники, весь опыт мировой цивилизации показывает, что экономическая болезнь излечима. Мы отстояли политическую свободу, теперь дадим людям экономическую. Необходим точный диагноз, строгие правила поведения и согласованные действия. Первые позитивные результаты на рынке рассчитываем получить уже к осени 1992 года.

Мы начинаем реформы не для того, чтобы угодить кому-то, они нужны нам самим. Надеемся, что мировое сообщество сможет существенно облегчить движение по этому пути, осознать свою роль в деле возрождения свободной, демократической России.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 1, 1991

NOTE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT:

The Soviet DCM delivered the attached message from President Gorbachev to the President this afternoon.

Nick Burns NB

It was with great concern and chagrin that President Mikhail Gorbachev learned about the strong storm that struck the north-eastern United States affecting his friend George Bush's residence at Kennebunkport. Quite recently in Madrid both leaders had an extensive and very meaningful discussion which added ever more cordiality and trust to their personal relationship. Mikhail Sergeyevich hopes that the damage that the hurricane caused the President's residence is minimal and that it has not hurt his spiri

С тревогой и сожалением М.С.Горбачев узнал о сильном урагане, обрушившемся на Северо-Восток США, где в Кеннебанкпорте находится резиденция его друга Джорджа Буша. Совсем недавно в Мадриде оба руководителя имели обширную и очень содержательную беседу, которая придала еще большую сердечность и доверительность их личным отношениям. Михаил Сергеевич надеется, что ущерб, причиненный ураганом резиденции президента, был минимальным и не омрачил состояния его духа.

Unofficial translation

Moscow, October 18, 1991

Dear George,

I take advantage of the visit to the United States of the President of Kirghizstan, A.A.Akayev, to share some thoughts with you.

The putsch and its quick failure have revealed in an explosive way the contradictions that accumulated in the process of profound change in our society. The impressive victory of the democratic forces has created moral and political conditions for accelerated movement along the path of democracy and a market economy. But to establish an orderly process there is a need for effective mechanisms and a stable political structure on the scale of a vast and multifaceted country. This is what we are preoccupied with today. Specifically, I refer to the Economic agreement and the preparation of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States.

Whatever the complications and however dramatic the debate on these two tasks, I think that agreement will be reached. We will have a single economic space and a new union state. Therefore the answer to the question I am frequently asked by my foreign interlocutors, including Mr.Madigan recently, with whom we had a very good talk, i.e. who to deal with in our country? - the answer will be encouraging and businesslike.

HIS EXCELLENCY
Mr.GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON D.C.

Of course, the state of the country's economy, which has worsened during this year, greatly complicates the entire process of economic reorganization. The winter and spring will be difficul The danger of social explosion remains.

We have counted our internal resources and capabilities. We hope to prevent a situation where even some regions would be hungry and cold. But support from abroad is very important now.

In this regard I want to convey to you, George, my profound gratitude for the leadership role assumed by the United States in promoting economic assistance to us. This also relates to the humanitarian and other support.

I see in this an expression of the entirely new nature of international relations, the core of which is the trust and profound mutual understanding between the two of us personally and as leaders of two great countries. We have once again seen "the hand of Washington" in the actions of the IMF, in the results of the Bangkok meeting, in the decision to send to Moscow the finance ministers of the G7, and in other important steps, including those taken by the EC.

Your bold programme of scaling down the nuclear arsenals, which we immediately supported and to which we responded with our own specific proposals, definitively transfers one of the main areas of world politics onto a new dimension. It is a major step toward a new era in international politics. We regard Mr.Bartholomew's consultations in Moscow as a very good beginning of the practical implementation of our joint initiatives. As part of the preparation for regular cooperation on all the aspects of these initiatives, in-depth work on our positions has begun, according to my instructions.

The idea for a joint group to discuss strategic stability and global prospects is also a sign of the new nature of our interaction in international affairs. I have asked A.N.Yakovlev to organize our component of the group. First deputy foreign minister V.F.Petrovski will probably be in change of the group's regular work on our side. We agree to hold the first meeting in Washington. Our team at that meeting will be led by Alexander Yakovlev.

It seems quite clear that you and I, having left the old era irrevocably behind us, have started in earnest regular coordination in the main areas of world politics.

Apart from disarmament and the economic revival of our Union on the lines of democracy - that too is a problem of global importance, the priorities for us today are the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia.

Given the all-European nature of the danger and brutality of the armed conflict in Yugoslavia which is just inconceivable between nations that are brothers, I decided to invite to Moscow the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia. The talks were very difficult but in the end we were able to achieve minimum agreement: cease fire and begin negotiations.I understand that they will not have an easy time implementing it. Nevertheless I hope that my efforts will not be in vain. S.Milosevic and F.Tudjman have asked us, the United States and the European Community to help with good offices. Boris Pankin will discuss this with Jim Baker.

The conference for the final settlement in Cambodia is another demonstration of the effectiveness of new world politics. It is our common success.

We are close to succeeding in bringing to the peace conference table the parties to the Middle East conflict. Jim has done tremendous work to achieve this, which deserves the highest praise. I have instructed Boris Pankin to continue to cooperate closely with him. We will in the coming days reestablish diplomati relations with Israel. As soon as it becomes quite clear that the Conference will take place and the date and venue have been determined, I will be ready, as you and I agreed, to be present at its opening.

The prospects for the Afghan settlement are taking more concrete shape following our joint statement of September 13. Our contacts with the leaders of the moderate Afghan opposition indicate that reaching agreement is possible. Najibullah takes a reasonable and responsible attitude. But he, just like we are, is worried about the position of a part of the Pakistani military, which continue to rely on the extremist group of Hekmatiar, which means supporting a military solution.

Rereading this letter, I come to the conclusion that quite a few major subjects have accumulated for a substantive discussion in a secluded and informal setting. A friendly handshake to you, and from me and Raisa Maximovna - warm regards to Barbara.

Sincerly

Mikhail

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Cable	From White House, Re: [Message to General Scowcroft from Bob Strauss on Meeting with Gorbachev] [101709Z Nov 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	11/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 7/12/2022

Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1062-MR(510)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/6/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 101709Z NOV 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO 1.4(c) TOKYO

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c)
QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 02

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN AN ENVELOPE LABELED "EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY BAKER FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT".

.

BEGIN TEXT:

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071215Z NOV 91

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MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM BOB STRAUSS

.

IN ADDITION TO THE FRONT CHANNEL REPORT I SENT TODAY ON MY MEETING LAST NIGHT WITH GORBACHEV, I WANTED TO PROVIDE A BIT MORE FLAVOR IN THIS CHANNEL.

.

THE FRONT CHANNEL CABLE COVERS NEARLY ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE DISCUSSION THAT DEALT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR ADDITIONAL AGRICULTURAL HELP AND GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE REACTION. WHAT I DID NOT GET INTO IN THAT CABLE, HOWEVER, WAS THE STRONG REITERATION OF A PLEA GORBACHEV MADE FOR MORE GENERAL SUPPORT. IN IT HE LARGELY REITERATED THE POINTS HE MADE PRIVATELY TO THE PRESIDENT IN MADRID. IN ADDITION TO THE STATEMENT THAT THE USSR NEEDS DOLLARS 3.5 BILLION IN AGRICULTURAL AID BY JULY 1, GORBACHEV WENT OVER THE REQUEST HE MADE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR: 1) DOLLARS 320 MILLION IN CASH TO COVER SHORTFALLS BEGINNING IN MID-NOVEMBER AND, 2) DOLLARS 2.5 BILLION

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1062-MR
MM 4/6/2015

STANDBY FACILITY. HE ALSO REMINDED ME HE HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT ASSISTANCE IN ENCOURAGING KOREA. SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHERS TO COME FORTH ON CREDITS THEY HAD EITHER PROMISED OR WERE DISCUSSING. THE POINT OF ALL THIS, IT SEEMED TO ME, WAS AGAIN TO GET ON THE RECORD THE EXCEPTIONAL NEED THE USSR NOW HAS FOR HELP, AND GORBACHEV'S PITCH TO US THAT THE PRESIDENT IS THE ONLY ONE IN A POSITION TO EXERT LEADERSHIP IN MEETING THE DEMANDS IN THIS REGARD. I THOUGHT IT SIGNIFICANT THAT GORBACHEV TOOK PAINS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IN MADRID AND JIM BAKER'S ADVICE TO HIS AIDE THAT GORBACHEV SHOULD TAKE IT. HE HAD CLEARLY GOT THE MESSAGE AND HAD DONE THE NECESSARY TO BE READY TO ACCEPT THE OFFER AT THE NEXT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, WHICH HE DID WHEN I SAW HIM YESTERDAY.

WHEN GORBACHEV HAD FINISHED WITH THE FINANCIAL SIDE. HE TURNED TO POLITICS. HE WENT THROUGH MUCH OF THE SAME ARGUMENTATION HE HAD WITH DON ATWOOD ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE DEBATES IN THE STATE COUNCIL ON MONDAY AND THE REVIVAL OF A RECONSTITUTED CENTRAL AUTHORITY. HE HAD LITTLE NEW TO ADD. THOUGH HE RELISHED IN TELLING ME THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM A CEREMONY AT WHICH UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA HAD SIGNED ONTO THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT. HE SAID THEN IN A MORE GENERAL VAIN, THAT HE THOUGHT THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLICS WERE BEGINNING TO SEE THINGS MORE SENSIBLY AND TO FACE REALITY. HE HAD,

HE SAID, MADE THE POINT STRONGLY TO HIS STATE COUNCIL COLLEAGUES THAT IN MADRID AND WITH MITTERRAND IT WAS CLEAR THE WEST SIMPLY WAS NOT GOING TO UNDERSTAND SOVIET AND REPUBLIC AND DRIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRACY, REFORM AND UNION. HE HAD ALSO TOLD THEM "OUR PARTNERS EXPECT US TO PURSUE ONE FOREIGN POLICY," AND THAT HAD BROUGHT THE REPUBLICS ROUND TO UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL FOREIGN MINISTRY. GORBACHEV SAID ALSO THAT BEFORE THE STATE COUNCIL MEETINGS, HE AND YELTSIN HAD DISCUSSED WHAT TO DO AND HAD AGREED TO GIVE THINGS A PUSH. "WE DID", HE SAID, "AND THERE WAS PROGRESS." FURTHER, HE TOLD ME, A RECENT POLL SHOWED THAT EVEN IN KIEV THERE EXISTED SOMETHING LIKE A 55 PER CENT MARGIN OF SUPPORT FOR PRESERVING THE UNION, AND THAT FIGURE WAS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER IN

OTHER CITIES LIKE KHABAROVSK AND ALMA ATA. HAVING THUS DELIVERED THE MESSAGE THAT THINGS POLITICALLY ARE ON THE UPSWING FOR BACKERS OF THE SOVIET UNION REFORM AND THEGORBACHEV WAY, GORBACHEV CAME TO HIS FINAL POINT. THESE ARE EXTRAORDINARY TIMES. HIS COUNTRY IS IN A PERIOD OF EXCEPTIONAL CHANGE. AND THIS CALLS FOR EXCEPTIONAL EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE U.S. AND WEST TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF REFORM AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS THAT IS SO MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. HE KNEW HIS FRIEND PRESIDENT BUSH UNDERSTOOD THIS.

.

AT THIS POINT I ENDED THE MEETING WHICH HAD GONE ON FAR LONGER THAN I HAD EXPECTED OR WANTED BY SAYING THAT AS ONE POLITICIAN TO ANOTHER. I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV UNDERSTAND THE EXCEPTIONAL EFFORTS PRESIDENT BUSH WAS MAKING AT A TIME WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY. WERE INCREASINGLY QUESTIONING THE PRESIDENT'S DEVOTION OF PRIORITY ATTENTION AS WELL AS SCARCE RESOURCES TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I SAID I WAS TELLING HIM THIS BECAUSE NEITHER PRESIDENT BUSH, IN MY JUDGMENT, NOR I COULD PREDICT WHAT LEVEL OF HELP THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD SUPPORT IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. NO MATTER WHAT EFFORTS PRESIDENT BUSH EXERTED, AND I THOUGHT IT VERY IMPORTANT FOR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO UNDERSTAND THESE REALITIES AS HE LOOKED AT THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS DURING THE PERIOD AHEAD. I CAN TELL YOU. THIS PARTICULAR DOSE OF REALISM WAS NOT WELCOMED BY GORBACHEV. WHO LARGELY CHOSE TO IGNORE IT IN FINAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUCCESS OF REFORM SUCCESS HERE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK HE LISTENED, AND I HAVE LAID DOWN A MARKER THAT OPEN-ENDED SUPPORT IS SIMPLY NOT IN THE CARDS. IN CLOSING I WOULD ADD THAT HIS INSISTANCE ON BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HIS NEEDS AND THE STAKE OF

#0062

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c) [redacted]

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

THE U.S. IN THIS WHOLE EFFORT WAS FAR MORE INTENSE THAN I HAVE PREVIOUSLY SEEN AND HEARD.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH JIM BAKER.

END TEXT:
DECL: OADR
=0063

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Cover Sheet	From Washington [redacted] (1 pp.)	3/7/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 10/31/14

Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1062-MR (511)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MESSAGE NO. 43 **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 3

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION (b)(1) MOSCOW 071215Z NOV 91

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
Rome	FLO GANTT FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT		

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12b. Cable	To White House, Re: [Message to General Scowcroft from Bob Strauss on Meeting with Gorbachev] [071215Z Nov 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	11/7/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 7/12/2022

Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1062-MR(511.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/6/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM GATES SIT
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FM 1.4(c) MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

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2009-1062-MR
MM 4/6/2015

~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE 1.4(c)

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM BOB STRAUSS

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IN THIS REGARD, I THOUGHT IT SIGNIFICANT THAT GORBACHEV TOOK PAINS

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IN MADRID AND JIM BAKER'S ADVICE TO HIS AIDE THAT GORBACHEV SHOULD TAKE IT. HE HAD CLEARLY GOT THE MESSAGE AND HAD DONE THE NECESSARY TO BE READY TO ACCEPT THE OFFER AT THE NEXT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, WHICH HE DID WHEN I SAW HIM YESTERDAY. WHEN GORBACHEV HAD FINISHED WITH THE FINANCIAL SIDE, HE TURNED TO POLITICS. HE WENT THROUGH MUCH OF THE SAME ARGUMENTATION HE HAD WITH DON ATWOOD ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE DEBATES IN THE STATE COUNCIL ON MONDAY AND THE REVIVAL OF A RECONSTITUTED CENTRAL AUTHORITY. HE HAD LITTLE NEW TO ADD, THOUGH HE RELISHED IN TELLING ME THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM A CEREMONY AT WHICH UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA HAD SIGNED ONTO THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT. HE SAID THEN IN A MORE GENERAL VAIN, THAT HE THOUGHT THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLICS WERE BEGINNING TO SEE THINGS MORE SENSIBLY AND TO FACE REALITY. HE HAD, HE SAID, MADE THE POINT STRONGLY TO HIS STATE COUNCIL COLLEAGUES THAT IN MADRID AND WITH MITTERRAND IT WAS CLEAR THE WEST SIMPLY WAS NOT GOING TO UNDERSTAND SOVIET AND REPUBLIC AND DRIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRACY, REFORM AND UNION. HE HAD ALSO TOLD THEM "OUR PARTNERS EXPECT US TO PURS
UE
ONE FOREIGN POLICY," AND THAT HAD BROUGHT THE REPUBLICS ROUND TO UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL FOREIGN MINISTRY. GORBACHEV SAID ALSO THAT BEFORE THE STATE COUNCIL MEETINGS, HE AND YELTSIN HAD DISCUSSE
D
WHAT TO DO AND HAD AGREED TO GIVE THINGS A PUSH. "WE DID", HE SAID, "AND THERE WAS PROGRESS." FURTHER, HE TOLD ME, A RECENT POLL SHOWED THAT EVEN IN KIEV THERE EXISTED SOMETHING LIKE A

55 PER CENT MARGIN OF SUPPORT FOR PRESERVING THE UNION, AND THAT FIGURE WAS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER IN OTHER CITIES LIKE KHABAROVSK AND ALMA ATA. HAVING THUS DELIVERED THE MESSAGE THAT THINGS POLITICALLY ARE ON THE UPSWING FOR BACKERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, REFORM AND THE GORBACHEV WAY, GORBACHEV CAME TO HIS FINAL POINT. THESE ARE EXTRAORDINARY TIMES. HIS COUNTRY IS IN A PERIOD OF EXCEPTIONAL CHANGE, AND THIS CALLS FOR EXCEPTIONAL EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE U.S. AND WEST TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF REFORM AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS THAT IS SO MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. HE KNEW HIS

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FRIEND PRESIDENT BUSH UNDERSTOOD THIS.
AT THIS POINT I ENDED THE MEETING WHICH HAD GONE ON FAR LONGER THAN I HAD EXPECTED OR WANTED BY SAYING THAT AS ONE POLITICIAN TO ANOTHER, I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV UNDERSTAND THE EXCEPTIONAL EFFORTS PRESIDENT BUSH WAS MAKING AT A TIME WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, WERE INCREASINGLY QUESTIONING THE PRESIDENT'S DEVOTION OF PRIORITY ATTENTION AS WELL AS SCARCE RESOURCES TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I SAID I WAS TELLING HIM THIS BECAUSE NEITHER PRESIDENT BUSH, IN MY JUDGMENT, NOR I COULD PREDICT WHAT LEVEL OF HELP THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD SUPPORT IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. NO MATTER WHAT EFFORTS PRESIDENT BUSH EXERTED, AND I THOUGHT IT VERY IMPORTANT FOR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO UNDERSTAND THESE REALITIES AS HE LOOKED AT THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS DURING THE PERIOD AHEAD. I CAN TELL YOU, THIS PARTICULAR DOSE OF REALISM WAS NOT WELCOMED BY GORBACHEV, WHO LARGELY CHOSE TO IGNORE IT IN FINAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUCCESS OF REFORM SUCCESS HERE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK HE LISTENED, AND I HAVE LAID DOWN A MARKER THAT OPEN-ENDED SUPPORT IS SIMPLY NOT IN THE CARDS. IN CLOSING I WOULD ADD THAT HIS INSISTANCE ON BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HIS NEEDS AND THE STAKE OF THE U.S. IN THIS WHOLE EFFORT WAS FAR MORE INTENSE THAN I HAVE PREVIOUSLY SEEN AND HEARD.
I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH JIM BAKER.
=0265

Hand carried by Soviet Ambassador Nov. 15, 1991 7:30 p.m.

On November 14 the USSR State council adopted a decision on establishing the USSR Ministry of External Relations (MER) using as a basis the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) acquiring a part of the functions of USSR Ministry of External Economic Relations.

This decision is based on the proposals of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs about restructuring the diplomatic service which were finalized and provided detailed substance taking into account the discussion of this issue held at the meeting of the USSR State Council on November 4.

The statute concerning MER major tasks and functions was approved.

Under the statute the Ministry of External Relations carry out its activity under direct guidance of the USSR President and the USSR State Council. The MER is an all-union (inter-republican) ministry and within its competence delegated by the sovereign states through the USSR State Council, formulates and implements a single foreign and external economic policy acting in the international scene both on behalf of the Union and sovereign states as full-fledged members of the international community.

The proposal on the structure and functions for the Council of the Union and Republican Ministers for External Relations as a body of interaction and coordination was approved.

Due to delegating to the MER not only foreign policy but also external economic policy function, the USSR Embassies will have economic policy sections (USSR trade missions are abolished).

With a view to training personnel and carrying out analytical reserch for the foreign policy and external economic policy structures of the Union and Republican bodies at the Ministry of External Relations, there will be operating a training and scientific and reserch complex on the basis of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and the Scientific reserch Economic and Trade Institute.

The USSR Ministry of External Relations shall be funded on a centralized basis.

I4 ноября с.г. Государственный совет СССР принял решение об образовании Министерства внешних сношений СССР на базе Министерства иностранных дел СССР и с передачей ему части функций Министерства внешних экономических связей СССР.

В основу этого решения положены предложения МИД СССР о реорганизации дипломатической службы, доработанные и конкретизированные с учетом состоявшегося обсуждения этого вопроса на заседании Госсовета СССР 4 ноября с.г.

Утверждено положение об основных задачах и функциях МВС.

В положении предусматривается, что Министерство внешних сношений СССР (МВС) осуществляет свою деятельность под непосредственным руководством Президента СССР и Государственного совета СССР. МВС является общесоюзным (межреспубликанским) министерством и в пределах компетенции, делегированной суверенными государствами через Государственный совет СССР, вырабатывает и проводит единую внешнюю и внешнеэкономическую политику, выступая на международной арене как от имени Союза, так и суверенных государств - полноправных членов международного сообщества.

Одобрено предложение о структуре и функциях Совета Министров внешних сношений Союза и суверенных государств, являющимся, как об этом вам сообщалось ранее, органом взаимодействия и координации.

В связи с приданием МВС наряду с внешнеполитическими и внешнеэкономических функций в посольствах СССР будут создаваться отдела экономической политики (торговые представительства СССР упраздняются).

В целях подготовки кадров и проведения аналитических исследований для внешнеполитических и внешнеэкономических структур союзных и республиканских органов при Министерстве внешних сношений СССР будет действовать учебный и научно-исследовательский комплекс на базе Московского государственного института международных отношений и научно-исследовательского коньюнктурного института.

Установлено централизованное финансирование деятельности Министерства внешних сношений СССР.

I4 ноября на заседании Госсовета СССР был рассмотрен проект нового союзного договора. В заседании, проходившем под председательством М.С.Горбачева, приняли участие президент РСФСР Б.Н.Ельцин, председатель Верховного Совета Республики Беларусь С.С.Шушкевич, президент Казахстана Н.Назарбаев, президент Азербайджана А.Муталибов, президент Киргизии А.Акаев, заместитель председателя Верховного Совета Таджикистана А.Искандеров, председатель Верховного Совета Туркменистана С.Муратов.

В результате активного заинтересованного обсуждения проект союзного договора был согласован.

В проекте договора предусматривается, что государства, подписавшие договор, создают на новых началах Союз суверенных государств (ССГ).

Союз суверенных государств будет конфедеративным демократическим государством, осуществляющим власть в пределах полномочий, которыми его добровольно наделяют участники договора.

Государства, образующие союз, сохраняют за собой право на самостоятельное решение всех вопросов своего развития, считают важнейшим принципом приоритет прав человека, самостоятельно определяют свое национально-государственное и административно-территориальное устройство, систему органов власти и управления. Они считают одной из важнейших задач сохранение и развитие национальных традиций государств, поддержку образования, здравоохранения, науки и культуры.

Союз суверенных государств выступает в международных отношениях в качестве суверенного государства, субъекта международного права - преемника Союза Советских Социалистических Республик. Его главными целями на международной арене являются прочный мир, разоружение, ликвидация ядерного и другого оружия массового уничтожения, сотрудничество государств и солидарность народов в решении глобальных проблем человечества.

Государства, образующие Союз, являются полноправными субъектами международного права. Они вправе устанавливать непосредственные дипломатические, консульские связи, торговые и иные отношения с иностранными государствами, обмениваться с ними полномочными

представительствами, заключать международные договоры и участвовать в деятельности международных организаций, не ущемляя интересы каждого из государств, образующих Союз, и их общие интересы, не нарушая международные обязательства Союза.

Членство государств в Союзе является добровольным. Союз открыт для вступления в него других демократических государств, признающих договор.

Гражданин государства, входящего в Союз является одновременно гражданином ССГ.

Территория Союза состоит из территорий всех государств - участников договора. Союз гарантирует нерушимость государств, которые в него входят.

Договор определяет принципы, регулирующие отношения между государствами, образующими Союз.

Союз суверенных государств имеет единые вооруженные силы и централизованное управление войсками стратегического назначения, включая ракетно-ядерные.

Государства - участники договора образуют единое политическое и экономическое пространство и основывают свои отношения на принципах, закрепленных в договоре. Отношения с государствами, не входящими в ССГ, основываются на общепринятых нормах международного права. В договоре определяются полномочия союзных органов, порядок приема законов Союза и формирования союзного бюджета.

Законодательную власть Союза осуществляет Верховный Совет ССГ, состоящий из двух палат: Совет Республик и Совет Союза. Верховный Совет Союза избирает председателя Верховного Совета ССГ. В проекте договора определяется порядок представительства суверенных государств, полномочия палат.

Главой конфедеративного государства является президент ССГ.

Президент Союза выступает гарантом соблюдения договора о Союзе суверенных государств и законов Союза ; является главнокомандующим вооруженными силами Союза ; представляет Союз в отношениях с зарубежными странами ; осуществляет контроль за выполнением международных обязательств Союза.

Президент избирается гражданами Союза в порядке, определяемом законом, сроком на 5 лет и не более чем на 2 срока подряд.

Вместе с президентом избирается вице-президент ССГ.

Для согласованного решения вопросов внутренней и внешней политики, затрагивающих общие интересы государств - участников договора, создается Государственный совет Союза суверенных государств, который состоит из президента ССГ и высших должностных лиц государств - участников договора.

Правительство Союза, возглавляемое премьер-министром, является органом исполнительной власти Союза. Оно подчиняется президенту ССГ и несет ответственность перед Верховным Советом ССГ.

Договором предусматривается создание Верховного суда ССГ, Высшего арбитражного суда ССГ, Прокуратуры Союза, определяются функции этих союзных органов.

Участники договора самостоятельно определяют свой государственный язык. Языком межнационального общения в Союзе участники договора признают русский язык.

Союз суверенных государств обладает всеми правами и несет все обязанности, вытекающие из вступивших в силу на момент подписания договора международных соглашений Союза Советских Социалистических Республик.

Проектом договора предусматривается, что договор должен быть одобрен высшими органами государственной власти государств, образующих Союз, и вступит в силу после его подписания их полномочными делегациями. С той же даты будет считаться утратившим силу Договор об образовании Союза ССР 1922 года.

Hand carried by
Soviet Amb. 11-15-91

USSR State Council's session of November, 14th, has considered the draft of the new Union Treaty. The session held under the chairmanship of M.Gorbachev, was attended by B.Yeltsin, president of the RSFSR, S.Shushkevish, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic Belarus', N.Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, A.Mutalibov, presidlent of Axerbaidzaqn, A.Akayev, president of Kyrghyzstan, A.Iskanderov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tadzikistan, S.Muratov, chairman of the Supreme soviet of Turkmenistan.

Following an active and interested discussion the draft of the Union Treaty was agreed upon.

The draft Treaty envisions that those states, signing the Treaty, shall form the Union of Sovereign States (UofSS) on new foundations.

The Union of Sovereign States will be a confederative democratic state, exercising its power within the terms of references, which will be voluntarily delegated to it by the parties to the Treaty.

The states, forming the Treaty, shall preserve their right to deal independently with all issues related to their development, they shall regard the priority of human rights as the most important principle, they shall also independently establish their national state and administrative system, the system of governing bodies and administration. They shall regard it as one of most important tasks to preserve and develop states' national traditions, promoting education, health care, science and culture.

The Union of Sovereign States shall perform international relations as a sovereign state, subject of international law, successor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Its main goals at the international arena shall include durable peace, disarmament, elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass distruction, cooperation of states and solidarity of people in dealing with global problems of the humankind.

The States, forming the Union, shall be full and equal subjects of the international law. They shall enjoy rights to establish direct diplomatic, consular, commercial and other relations with foreign states, to exchange with them plenipotentiary missions, to conclude treaties and participate in international organizations, not enfringing upon the interests of each other state, forming the Union, and their common interests, and not violating international obligations, of the Union.

The membership in the Union shall be voluntary. The Union shall be open to entry for any other democratic states, recognizing the Treaty.

The citizen of the state, entering the Union, shall be also the citizen of the UofSS.

The territory of the Union shall comprise the territories of all states parties to the Treaty. The Union shall guarantee the inviolability of member states.

The Treaty shall determine the principles, governing relations between states, forming the Union.

The Union of Sovereign States shall have united armed forces and central control of strategic forces, including nuclear missiles forces.

The states parties to the treaty shall form a unified political and economic space and build their relations according to the principles, enshrined in the Treaty. Their relations with the states, not entering the UofSS, shall be founded on the universally accepted norms of the international law. The Treaty stipulates prerogatives of the Union bodies, the procedure of passing the Union laws and shaping of the Union budget.

The legislative power of the Union shall be executed by the Supreme Soviet of the Uof SS, which is composed of two chambers: the Union of Republics and the Council of Union. The Supreme Soviet of the Union shall elect chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the UofSS. The draft Treaty provides for the procedures of representation of sovereign states, and terms of references of the chambers.

President of the UofSS shall be head of the confederative state.

The president of the Union shall serve guarantor of compliance with provisions of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States and Union laws; he shall be commander in chief of the armed forces of the Union; he shall represent the Union in relations with foreign states; he shall exercise control over compliance with international obligations of the Union.

President is elected by the citizens of the Union as provided by the law for a period of 5 years and no more than two consecuitive terms.

Concurrently with the President elections are held for the Vice-President of the UofSS.

For coordination of the foreign and domestic policy issues affecting the common interests of the States Parties to the Treaty, the State Council of the Union of Sovereign States is established which consists of the UofSS President and the highest officials of the States Parties to the Treaty.

The government of the Union headed by the Prime Minister is an executive branch of the Union. It is guided by the UofSS President and is responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the UofSS.

The Treaty provides for establishing the Supreme Court of the UofSS, the Highest Arbitration Court of the UofSS, the Procurator's office of the Union and defines the functions of this Union bodies.

The participants in the Treaty determine themselves their state language. The Russian language is recognized by the participants in the Treaty as the language of international communication in the Union.

The Union of Sovereign States has all rights and bear all obligations comming from international agreements of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which came into force at the time of signing this Treaty .

The draft Treaty stipulates that the Treaty should be approved by the highest bodies of the State power in the states making the Union and comes into force after its signing by the plenipotentiary delegations. From this date on the Treaty on establishing the Union of SSR of 1922 shall be deemed null and void.

Handed to Pres. by Russian
FM Kozyrev during 11-26-91 mtg

Unofficial translation

Moscow,
November , 1991

Dear Mr. George Bush,

After putting forward a program of decisive and profound transformations in Russia several days ago, I feel I should write to you personally so as to explain the plans of the Russian leadership.

Russia is breaking with the Communist past. The totalitarian regime has been crushed. A new democratic state system is in the making, one that is based on supremacy of law, the principle of free elections and political pluralism. For the first time in its history Russia has a real chance to integrate into the international community of democratic law-governed states.

We, however, face serious trials. The fate of the nascent Russian democracy hinges above all on the success of the economic reform. Russia will now have to address perhaps the most difficult task, that of overcoming the economic crisis and at the same time laying the groundwork for a modern market economy.

It is these objectives that the announced program seeks to achieve. Its substance is this: price de-control even before the end of this year, a stringent monetary-financial and credit policy, a tax reform, and strengthening of the ruble. Along with stabilization measures we shall proceed to form a powerful private sector, an accelerated privatization of enterprises,

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

transferring land to producers, and liberalization of foreign trade.

We are aware that under the prevailing circumstances the reform shall inevitably be a heavy and socially painful process that will increase tensions within the society. Combating inflation will cause a further decline of the population's real income, and will require cuts in the social programs. The structural changes will entail a massive unemployment. This is an inescapable payment for the insidious economic policy of the Communist regime.

However, to delay further would be a criminal thing to do. The people's patience is wearing thin.

As the President of Russia I am assuming full responsibility for this choice and am personally assuming the leadership of the Government of Reform.

We want to follow the path of radical changes together with other Republics. At the same time we can no longer afford putting off reforms until comprehensive inter-Republic agreements have been achieved. We have reason to believe that Russia, with its enormous economic weight can and should become the "Locomotive" of the reform process, a nucleus of the market space.

We believe that we shall be able to create an equal-rights economic community with the participation of the Ukraine and other sovereign Republics. We shall continue to pursue the policy of entering into a political union with them, fully compatible with the new European and world order and based on inviolability of frontiers, good-neighborliness and respect for human rights and other rules of international law.

We proceed from the premise that we need reforms for ourselves and that their implementation is our national survival. At the same time we are counting on outside assistance as well. We regard the community of developed democratic countries to be our principal partner in the world arena. We are confident that these countries will be able to play its historic role in reviving a free and democratic Russia.

We want the Russian program of economic transformations and the establishment of a system of free enterprise to be developed and implemented in close cooperation with the governments of democratic countries, above all, the United States, and with the international financial and economic institutions. We intend to formally request the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD to provide technical assistance, and in the future, to directly participate in the activities of those organizations. Our goal is integration as a full-fledged member into regional and global economic structures and the world economy as a whole.

We attach enormous importance to attracting private foreign capital. We want to be seen as a reliable partner. We re-affirm the international obligations of the Union and intend to ensure their fulfilment. At the same time we urge developed countries of the West to provide guarantees to private firms which enter the Russian market.

To reduce the social costs resulting from freeing prices for food, we will need food assistance. We shall establish appropriate controls with the donors' direct participation so that this assistance go to whom it is intended for, first of all to the lowest-income sectors of the population. Of great value to us would be the US experience in farm development and your support of our agrarian reform.

The chance of success of the stabilization program would be considerably greater if a special hard currency fund were to be established under the auspices of international financial organizations to support the ruble rate of exchange. Convertibility of the Russian currency is an indispensable condition for effective inter-Republic trade and for the stability of monetary circulation in all Republics.

In the military-political area Russia is firmly committed to preserving centralized and effective control over nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation. We reiterate our support for the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the US-Soviet Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Russia is interested in becoming an open and predictable partner so that no military threat would ever come from our soil. We have started an earnest effort to demilitarize our society and economy, we are reducing our army, our weapons procurement and our military spending. We think it is essential that we overcome the legacy of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States when our military potentials were aimed at each other.

We are in favor of expanding the direct Russian-American dialogue and the information exchange on political and military issues. Russia has no intentions to substitute for the Union at the disarmament talks. However, we are sure to actively influence toward the speediest progress. We are convinced that our contacts on this subject with the United States will contribute to the international stability.

The Russian leadership positively assesses the outcome of the session of the NATO Council in Rome. We are in support of the NATO efforts to build a new system of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Russia is prepared to facilitate this both in the framework of a renewed Union and independently. We welcome the decision by the NATO Council to establish the Atlantic council on cooperation and intend to get involved in the work of this body.

Dear Mr. President, at this difficult and really crucial moment for our country I urge you to show understanding and support.

The peoples of Russia have paid a dear price for the socio-economic experiment carried out in the USSR. Our today's objective is to come back to the mainstream of world civilization. That is why it is particularly important to rely on the world experience in developing the market economy. A reformed and democratic Russia will become a guarantee of stability in the world, of final and irreversible overcoming of confrontation, creating, as I hope, in the near future a vast and single world market.

Boris YELTSIN

Delivered by Amb Kornyelektov 12/20/91

The establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the end of existence of the USSR as a subject of international law require that issues of those independent states' membership in the UN, including the question of the Security Council permanent member's seat, be urgently addressed.

In considering these issues we certainly proceed from the interests of Russia and other Independent States which are legal successors to the former USSR, as well as from the interests of our foreign partners, above all, the "PermFive". We seek to act in such a way as not to permit a destabilization of the system of international security which has been formed on the basis of the UN Charter and which has recently proved its effectiveness. It is important to avoid a revision of fundamental principles of the UN Charter, to avoid a discussion of numerical or geographic composition of the Council and its permanent members.

We believe that from this perspective and for purely practical reasons the option of rotating the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States for a permanent member's seat in the Security Council is not suitable. The Commonwealth itself, as an inter-state entity, cannot, from the standpoint of international law, claim this seat. Besides, we understand that membership of such an entity in the Security Council could have certain implications in terms of expeditiousness and effectiveness in the work of this body.

Given all these factors, there is in fact only one option which is being considered now within the framework of the on-going consultations with the other legal successors of the USSR, which permits to avoid a revision of the UN Charter; under this option Russia would assume the seat of the former USSR in the Security Council. This would fully meet the important requirements imposed on the Security Council members as bearing special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, including the questions of settlement of regional conflicts, elaboration and execution of UN operations, etc. Russia's permanent membership in the Security

Council is also important because it will help strengthen the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime.

In practical terms, following their international recognition, all former USSR republics, except Russia (and, of course, Byelarus and Ukraine which are already UN members) would be admitted to the United Nations as new members.

Russia would be a state - successor to the USSR with respect to its seat in the UN and the Security council

Russia would also assume responsibility for the financial arrears of the former USSR to the UN.

Such a solution would not require a revision of the UN charter, despite the fact that the Soviet Union is referred to in its text as a permanent member of the Security Council. We have a precedent here: when the Chinese People's Republic restored its rights in the United Nations, the text of the UN Charter continued - and does so to date - to refer to the Republic of China. Today this is viewed as merely a historical fact.

In negotiating the above with other sovereign USSR successor states we are counting on their support. In our consultations we proceed from the premise that Russia shall closely coordinate its position with them on issues affecting the interests of common military security of the Commonwealth members, which will be considered in the Security Council.

We hope that the permanent members of the Security Council will support this solution to the issue of Russia's membership in the United Nations.

We look forward to receiving your positive response, whereupon we intend to formally raise this question in the Security Council.

Sincerely,

B.N.YELTSIN

non-paper
сов тонце

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Рассматривая эти вопросы, мы, разумеется, исходим из интересов России и других независимых государств - правопреемников бывшего СССР, а также из интересов наших зарубежных партнеров, прежде всего стран "пятерки". Мы стремимся действовать таким образом, чтобы не допустить дестабилизации системы международной безопасности, которая сложилась на основе Устава ООН и доказала свою эффективность в последнее время. Важно избежать пересмотра основополагающих уставных принципов ООН, уйти от дискуссии о численности и географическом составе Совета и его постоянных членов.

Полагаем, что с этой точки зрения, да и по соображениям практической целесообразности, не подходит вариант ротации участников Содружества Независимых Государств на месте постоянного члена Совета Безопасности. Само Содружество, будучи межгосударственным образованием, также не может претендовать на это место с международно-правовой точки зрения. К тому же мы понимаем, что участие такого образования в Совете Безопасности мело бы последствия для оперативности и эффективности работы этого органа.

С учетом всех этих факторов, в рамках начавшихся консультаций с другими правопреемниками СССР рассматривается по сути дела единственный вариант, позволяющий избежать ревизии Устава ООН: занятие Россией места бывшего СССР в Совете Безопасности. Это в полной мер отвечало бы высоким требованиям, предъявляемым членам СБ как несущим особую ответственность за поддержание международного мира и безопасности, включая вопросы урегулирования региональных конфликтов, разработку и осуществление операций ООН и т.д. Постоянное членство России в Совете Безопасности важно еще и потому, что оно поможет укреплению международного режима нераспространения ядерного оружия.

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Надеемся, что постоянные члены Совета Безопасности поддержат такое решение вопроса о членстве России в ООН.

Рассчитываем получить Ваш положительный ответ, после чего имеем в виду официально поставить этот вопрос в Совете Безопасности.

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non-paper
oral message

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С уважением,

Б.Н.ЕЛЬЦИН

Delivered to the Pres
12/25/91 by Soviet
Embassy

Unofficial translation

Dear George,

Today, as I am terminating my responsibilities as the USSR President, I wish to share with you some of my thoughts and feelings.

I will be frank - those are complex feelings. I feel a great deal of concern and alarm for the fate of the country whose integrity I have sought to preserve, and with it - the future of the new international relations to the building of which you and I have given so much effort. A lot will now depend on the viability of the Commonwealth.

I would very much like to believe that the democratic gains of the past years shall be saved and that the peoples of my country shall go together on the basis of the Commonwealth.

On many occasions and in difficult circumstances you and I acted decisively and responsibly in order to hold developments on the right track. Sharp turns are possible in the future too, and I trust that level-headedness and a sensible choice shall forever be with you under any circumstances.

I will be helping those who have now assumed the burden of responsibility for the cause of reform and democratic change. Russia, more than others, needs support and help at the present time. Yet it is Russia which is in the most difficult economic situation. And everything depends on Russia.

I am confident that partnership between the United States and Russia, between the US and other new states has a future. You and I have laid a good groundwork for developing this relationship on the basis of confidence and solidarity, of understanding the great responsibility to the whole world.

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
and Mrs. BUSH

I hope that our personal friendship that we have developed in the course of our important work together shall continue.

Raisa and I have the warmest recollections of our meetings with Barbara and feel sincere liking and respect for her. Please convey our best wishes to her. We would be happy to meet both of you again in the future.

All the best.

Sincerely,

Mikhail

December 25, 1991

Его Превосходительству
Джорджу БУШУ
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки

и

Госпоже БУШ

Дорогой Джордж,

Сегодня, когда я заканчиваю выполнение обязанностей президента СССР, хочу поделиться некоторыми мыслями и чувствами.

Скажу откровенно: это сложные переживания. В них немало тревоги и беспокойства за судьбу страны, единство которой я стремился сохранить, а вместе с этим и будущее новых международных отношений, строительству которых мы вместе отдавали столько сил. Многое теперь будет зависеть от жизнеспособности Содружества.

Я очень хочу верить, что демократические завоевания последних лет будут спасены, что народы моей страны пойдут вместе на основе Содружества.

Мы с тобой не раз в трудных обстоятельствах действовали решительно и ответственно, чтобы удержать развитие событий в правильном русле. В будущем тоже возможны крутые повороты, и я рассчитываю, что взвешенность, разумный выбор не изменят тебе ни при каких обстоятельствах.

Я буду помогать тем, кто взял сейчас на свои плечи груз ответственности за дело реформы, демократических преобразований. В поддержке и помощи нуждается сейчас прежде всего Россия. Но именно в России самое тяжелое экономическое положение. А все зависит от нее.

Уверен, что у партнерства США с Россией, с другими новыми государствами есть будущее. Мы с тобой заложили хорошие основы для развития отношений на основах доверия и солидарности, понимания высокой ответственности перед всем миром.

Наша личная дружба, сложившаяся в ходе совместной большой работы, надеюсь, сохранится.

Мы с Раисой храним самые теплые воспоминания о встречах с Барбарой, испытываем к ней чувства сердечной симпатии и уважения. Просим передать ей наши наилучшие пожелания. Были бы рады новым встречам с Вами обоими.

Всего доброго.

С уважением,

Михаил

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18. Cable	Charge Collins to General Scowcroft and Ed Hewitt, Re: [No Subject] [261100Z Dec 91] [FOIA EXEPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	12/26/91	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
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Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1063-MR(517)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
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TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ 1.4(c)
QQQQ
FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND ED HEWITT
FROM CHARGE COLLINS
BEGIN TEXT:
ON THE EVE OF THE CHRISTMAS DAY STATEMENTS BY GORBACHEV, THE PRESIDENT AND YELTSIN, (b)(6) (b)(6) ASKED CHARGE TO MEET HIM PRIVATELY AT HIS OFFICE TO DISCUSS THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD FOLLOWING U.S. RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA. (b)(6) MESSAGE WAS THE FOLLOWING:
-- IN THE WAKE OF GORBACHEV'S RESIGNATION AND A U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA, THERE WILL BE A PERIOD OF TRANSITION FOR THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.
-- DURING THAT PERIOD THE LOGIC OF THE TRANSITION WILL INVOLVE CHANGES OF PERSONNEL. (NOTE: (b)(6) SAID HE WAS NOT AT LIBERTY TO DISCUSS THE COMING CHANGES IN PART BECAUSE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CHANGE WERE NOT YET DECIDED. HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT KOMPLEKTOV WILL BE RECALLED AND THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "SOVIET" TEAM ARE PROBABLY GOING TO BE REPLACED.)
-- THE CHANGE FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN EMBASSY MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTION WILL POSE SOME DELICATE PROBLEMS AMONG THE EMBASSY STAFF. HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED TO KOLOSOVSKY ABOUT THIS AND UNDERSTOOD KOLOSOVSKY HAD DICUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH ED HEWETT.
-- IN LIGHT OF THE COMPLICATED CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1063-MR
5/2/2014 MM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION IF THE USG USED THE U.S. AMBASSADOR/ CHARGE AND EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AS THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO SENIOR LEVELS OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- (b)(6) AND KOLOSOVSKY HAD DISCUSSED THE FOREGOING. HOWEVER THE ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED IS A SENSITIVE MATTER AND (b)(6) SAID HE HOPED I COULD CONVEY IT DIRECTLY AND UNOFFICIALLY TO WASHINGTON.

I TOLD (b)(6) I WOULD, OF COURSE, PASS HIS COMMENTS AND ADVICE ON TO WASHINGTON DISCREETLY. WITHOUT COMMITING TO DO MORE THAN THAT. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID UNDERSTAND THAT THE TRANSITION FROM A SOVIET TO A RUSSIAN MISSION WOULD POSE A VARIETY OF DELICATE PROBLEMS. AND THAT I WAS CERTAIN THE USG WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THOSE PROBLEMS DID NOT INTERFERE WITH A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONS.

COMMENT: THERE IS CLEARLY A SELF SERVING ELEMENT IN ALL OF THIS IN THAT (b)(6) AS THE CHANNEL TO US ON THINGS AMERICAN AND SEE U.S. RELIANCE ON OUR EMBASSY HERE AS THE CHANNEL TO THE NEW RUSSIAN MFA -- AS OPPOSED TO THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON -- AS THE MOST LIKELY WAY TO ENSURE THE FUTURE RELEVANCE AND SURVIVAL OF THE U.S. AND CANADA

DIVISION.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE SUSPECT THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP HERE IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT SOME OF THE WASHINGTON STAFF. KOLOSOVSKY IS THEIR MAN. BUT HE IS NOT RUNNING THE PLACE; NOR, WE ASSUME, DOES HE HAVE PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT RELATIONS OUTSIDE THE EXISTING EMBASSY STRUCTURE (I.E. AMB KOMPLEKTOV AND HIS STAFF WHOSE FUTURE POSITION HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED). IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS, THEREFORE, PROBABLE THAT OUR BEST AND MOST RELIABLE MEANS OF CONVEYING U.S. VIEWS AND POSITIONS TO THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO DO SO DIRECTLY IN MOSCOW. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT KOLOSOVSKY IS KEPT FULLY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

IN THE LOOP ON WHAT WE DO HERE. FOR THE PRESENT THIS WILL ENSURE THAT WE KNOW THE RECIPIENT AND HAVE THE ABILITY TO ENSURE CLARITY

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

END TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

=1065

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Letter	Susan Porter Rose to Mrs. Nancy Schon Re: Make Way for Ducklings Statue [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive July - December 1991 [1]

Date Closed:	4/24/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91130-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1990

Dear Nancy,

It was a pleasure to talk to you again today, and this is to confirm our conversation giving you the go-ahead to proceed with casting of the Make Way for Ducklings Statue in preparation for its donation by the United States to the Soviet Union, particularly to the children of the Soviet Union. This is a lovely idea. With the concurrence of both the Soviets and the Americans, an appropriate park for the statue is being sought in Moscow.

We are delighted to learn that a group of private citizens in Boston has agreed to raise the money necessary to cover the costs of its casting, transit, and installation. We would hope to work closely with you in order that the new sculpture would be properly sited, delivered, and installed. No dates have been set for a summit at which the completed statue could be visited and dedicated by Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush, however, the hope would be to proceed immediately in the event such a meeting were to be possible after the first of the year. I also look forward to working with Robert McCloskey with the hope of having Make Way for Ducklings translated into Russian and available for Mrs. Bush to take it with her to Moscow.

I know Mrs. Bush would want me to convey her deep appreciation to you for this most generous offer and also to all who will be contributing to the ultimate success of this wonderful project.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Susan Porter Rose

Susan Porter Rose
Chief of Staff to Mrs. Bush

Mrs. Nancy Schon

[redacted]

C

bcc: Nick Burns
General Scowcroft