

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91129
Folder ID Number: 91129-007

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [EUR/SOV Translation] (1 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	S
02a. Note	James A. Baker, III to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	
02b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	
02c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	
04a. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev [Gates Version] (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	
04c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Telcon	Re: Phone Call to Gorbachev (9 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Telcon	Re: Phone Call to Gorbachev (9 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 5

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1090
OA/ID Number: 91129-007
Date Closed: 4/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07a. Letter	President Bush to Eduard Shevardnadze (2 pp.)	2/20/91	(b)(1)	
07b. Letter	Eduard Shevardnadze to President Bush (2 pp.)	1/20/91	(b)(1)	
08. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (2 pp.)	3/1/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [EUR/SOV Translation] (4 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Message	Re: Text of a Message Dated 5 March 1991 from the Prime Minister to the President (5 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	S
12a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
12b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	
12c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12d. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	3/7/91	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
14b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	
14c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14d. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	3/7/91	(b)(1)	S
14e. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
14f. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
14g. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14h. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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15. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (2 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (4 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
17a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Response to Gorbachev on CFE (2 pp.)	4/6/91	(b)(1)	S
17b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [translation] (7 pp.)	3/27/91	(b)(1)	
17d. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	
18. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	3/23/91	(b)(1)	S
19. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	S
20. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	4/8/91	(b)(1)	S
21. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] [redacted] (4 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
22. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S
23. Cable	General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock to White House Re: President's Letter on CFE (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S


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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 14, 1991



TO: NSC - General Scowcroft
FROM: S/S - Stape Roy *Stape*
SUBJECT: Translation of Gorbachev Letter

Attached is an EUR/SOV translation of the Gorbachev letter which the Secretary asked me to send you on an eyes only basis.

We will be sending over a proposed response very shortly.

Attachment:

February 13, 1991 Gorbachev letter
and translation



~~SECRET~~

Moscow, February 13, 1991

Dear George:

I want to inform you about the results of the trip to Baghdad of my personal representative, Ye. M. Primakov.

Our representative devoted his meeting with S. Hussein to the task of convincing the Iraqi leadership to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council. On our side it was clearly stated that, in the circumstances that have developed, the matter can only be dealt with in the following manner: the leadership of Iraq must announce its readiness to withdraw its forces from Kuwait and simultaneously specify the period during which they will be withdrawn. A ceasefire can only take place after such an announcement. Immediately following the ceasefire, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops must begin without fail and without delay. In this regard, it was underscored that it is necessary to renounce in full the shelling of Israel.

Based on the assessment of our representative, his discussion with the President of Iraq brought to light several hopeful points. On this occasion, S. Hussein displayed a more concrete interest than previously in the conditions that would have to accompany the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait -- indeed, not denying such a possibility. S. Hussein expressed himself in favor of a continuation of the dialogue.

We gave our agreement to this. It is envisaged that, to this end, a special representative of the President of Iraq will come to Moscow at the end of this week or the beginning of next week. It will most likely be the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Aziz.

It is, of course, difficult to predict the outcome of the discussions in Moscow. However, if there is even the slightest chance of emerging with an appropriate political outcome and of averting further bloodshed, then this chance should be seized. I think you will agree, in considering the circumstances, that it would not be desirable to conduct any massive ground operations, if they are being planned, during the period of the Moscow talks. For our part we will, of course, not allow this dialogue to be used by the Iraqis to buy time, if that appears to be their intention.

We will inform you at once about the results of the talks with the special representative of the President of Iraq.

I also want to inform you that, in his discussion with T. Aziz, Ye. M. Primakov raised in a firm manner the question of captured pilots.

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

His Excellency
Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
09/04/2007 MM

~~SECRET~~

Москва, 10 февраля 1991 года

Дорогой Джордж,

Хочу проинформировать Вас о результатах поездки в Багдад моего личного представителя Е.М. Примакова.

Свой разговор с С.Хусейном наш представитель подчинил задаче убедить иракское руководство выполнить резолюции Совета Безопасности. С нашей стороны было ясно сказано, что в создавшихся условиях речь может идти только о следующем: руководство Ирака должно заявить о готовности вывести войска из Кувейта и одновременно назвать срок, в течение которого они будут выведены. Прекращение огня может произойти лишь после такого заявления. После прекращения огня обязательно и безотлагательно должен начаться вывод иракских войск. При этом было подчеркнуто, что нужно полностью отказаться от обстрелов Израиля.

По оценке нашего представителя, его беседа с президентом Ирака высветила некоторые обнадеживающие моменты. На этот раз С.Хусейн проявил более конкретную, чем раньше, заинтересованность условиями, которыми сопровождался бы вывод войск из Кувейта, явно не отрицая такую возможность. С.Хусейн высказался за продолжение диалога.

Мы дали на это согласие. Имеется в виду, что с этой целью в Москву прибудет в конце этой - начале будущей недели специальный представитель президента Ирака. Им будет, скорее всего, заместитель премьер-министра, министр иностранных дел Т.Азиз.

Трудно, конечно, предсказать исход бесед в Москве. Однако, если есть хотя бы малейший шанс выйти на соответствующую политическую развязку и предотвратить тем самым дальнейшее

Его Превосходительству
Г-ну Джорджу Бушу
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
03/03/2010 MM

~~SECRET~~

2.

кровопролитие, то им следует воспользоваться. Думаю, Вы со мной согласитесь, что с учетом этих обстоятельств проведение каких-либо массированных наземных операций, если таковые планируются, было бы на период Московских переговоров нежелательно. Со своей стороны мы, разумеется, не допустим, чтобы этот диалог был использован врагами для выигрыша времени, если у них проявятся такие намерения.

Мы сразу же сформируем Вас об итогах переговоров со специальным представителем президента Ирана.

Почту также сообщить, что в беседе с Т.Азисом В.м.Примаков в нажимной форме поставил вопрос о пленным летчиках.

С уважением,

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

~~SECRET~~

United States Department of State

The Secretary

2/19/91

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JABIII

SAB III

This is what we communicated
to the Soviets last night.

*hostilities stop
+ we withdrew
(No way)*

*1.
-2.
-3*

*1. 6 firm
weapons
POW's
Mens Disturb
CN's =*

Dear Mr. President:

Handwritten:
I have received
the letter from
Mr. Aziz
2/10/91

Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort you are making.

I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal, which the international community called for over six months ago.

In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be "immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.

Second, all of us have said many times that all of the Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted should be fully implemented, including obligations relating to compensation. Your proposal, as I read it, does not appear to refer to the implementation of any Security Council resolution that deals with issues other than withdrawal.

Third, while you mentioned in your letter on the Primakov visit that POW's were raised with the Iraqis, there is no mention in your proposal of the exchange of POW's -- or of the release of third-country nationals being held against their will (like the CBS camera crew).

Mikhail, let me say more generally that I remain strongly convinced that we must create the conditions for a very different kind of Middle East -- one whose peace and security depend on reconciliation, arms reductions, and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. That will not be possible if Saddam can retain disproportionate military power and go back to business-as-usual. Our task is to ensure that the outcome of this war sets the stage for a more peaceful and secure future in the Middle East.

I know that is a future we both desire. Both the outcome of this war and its aftermath will determine if we get there. We will want to consult closely together on the substance and the process of moving toward that goal. From my standpoint, I believe we have to be careful not to embrace a process or format for discussions that creates an impediment to progress, not a catalyst. While the United Nations certainly has a role to play, we should think carefully before embracing the UN as the sole or immediate forum for discussions of the broad complex of Middle East issues.

With respect to your suggestion about military action, I must repeat that our military strategy will be shaped by concerns for the well-being of the coalition's military forces.

I will be interested to hear from you regarding Iraq's response. However, I do not intend to engage in any negotiation of the principles of the UN resolutions and any response therefore must fully address the concerns I've mentioned above if it is to be satisfactory to the United States. Let me say again that I appreciate your efforts.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev,

President of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics,

Moscow.

Dear Mikhail:

Relayed by State *Hand delivered to Sec State by State* *Hand delivered to Sec State by State*

Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort you are making.

I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal, which the international community called for over 6 months ago.

In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be "immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.

Second, all of us have said many times that all of the Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted should be fully implemented. Your proposal, as I read it, does not appear to refer to the implementation of any Security Council resolution that deals with issues other than withdrawal.

Third, while you mentioned in your letter on the Primakov visit that POW's were raised with the Iraqis, there is no mention in your proposal of the exchange of POW's -- or of the release of third-country nationals being held against their will (like the CBS camera crew).

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I know that is a future we both desire. Both the outcome of this war and its aftermath will determine if we get there. We will want to consult closely together on the substance and the process of moving toward that goal. From my standpoint, I believe we have to be careful not to embrace a process or format for discussions that creates an impediment to progress, not a catalyst. While the U.N. certainly has a role to play, we should think carefully before embracing the U.N. as the sole or immediate forum for discussions of the broad complex of Middle East issues.

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Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev,

President of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics,

Moscow.

(insert) However, I do not intend to engage in any negotiations of the principles of the UN resolutions and any response, therefore, must fully address the concerns I have mentioned above if it is to be satisfactory to the United States.

Dear Mr. President:

*no answer
to Soviet Charge
by State 2/12/91*

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I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal, which the international community called for over six months ago.

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Second, all of us have said many times that all of the Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted should be fully implemented, including obligations relating to compensation. Your proposal, as I read it, does not appear to refer to the implementation of any Security Council resolution that deals with issues other than withdrawal.

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George Bush

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev,

President of the Union of

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Moscow.

CLASSIFIED FACSIMILE COVERSHEET

COPY

URGENT

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

To: General Scowcroft 456-2255 NSC
Officer Office Phone Number Bureau/Agency

From: The Secretary S
Officer Office Phone Number Office Symbol

Secure Facsimile Number: 395-1206

Number of Pages Excluding Coversheet: 3

S/S-O Approving Officer: _____

Date/Time of Transmission: 2/19/91

Transmitted By: _____

*Flt
Dennis' office
says this was
faxed to NSC
yesterday.
cj*

Remarks: URGENT! EYES ONLY - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/17/99

Transmit Replies To 202/647-6434 & Alert Recipient Via Telephone

*revised to Soviet
Charge by Baker on*
~~SECRET~~ 1-19-9

Dear Mikhail:

I have now had more time to reflect on your letter reporting on the talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, and I want to share my views with you.

My initial reaction noted several basic problems with your proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the timing and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary to the clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate withdrawal. I said that anything longer than ninety-six hours would not meet the test of immediacy. Second, your proposal does not insist upon Iraqi compliance with all the relevant UNSC resolutions, as demanded in Resolution 678. And, third, there is no mention of the exchange of POWs or release of third country nationals held against their will.

Mikhail, I do appreciate your efforts, but I worry that perhaps incompleteness and ambiguities in your proposal may give heart to Saddam Hussein that he can somehow escape the consequences of his actions and obtain an unclear outcome, which he can exploit politically. Accordingly, I want to convey to you amplification of my earlier points.

Specifically:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0855-MR

34 8/8/13

~~SECRET~~

- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait begins and no formal cessation of the overall state of hostilities until that withdrawal is completed. That withdrawal must be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other arrangements would risk the lives of coalition forces. We will not attack withdrawing Iraqi troops, but any Iraqi breach of the agreements respecting withdrawal would bring instant and sharp response.

- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the withdrawal.

- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring not only a devastating coalition response, but would affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq after the war.

The joint efforts of many nations, including the Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of an historic rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression through negotiation or divisive tactics.

Consequently, until all of these conditions are accepted, coalition military operations will continue as planned.

George Bush

1/19/91 (1030)

*Low
revision*

Dear Mikhail:

I have now had more time to reflect on your letter reporting on the talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, and I want to share my views with you.

My initial reaction noted several basic problems with your proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the timing and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary to the clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate withdrawal. I said that anything longer than ninety-six hours would not meet the test of immediacy. Second, your proposal does not insist upon Iraqi compliance with all the relevant UNSC resolutions, as demanded in Resolution 678. And, third, there is no mention of the exchange of POWs or release of third country nationals held against their will.

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-- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait begins [and no cessation of overall hostilities until that withdrawal is completed]. That withdrawal must be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other arrangements would risk the lives of coalition forces. We will

not attack retreating Iraqi troops, but any Iraqi breach of the conditions would bring instant resumption of hostilities.

-- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the withdrawal.

OUT -- All Iraqi SCUD missile attacks must cease simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal.

-- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring not only a devastating coalition response, but would ensure war crimes prosecutions once the war is over.

COU Any Iraqi response must fully accept the conditions I have described if it is to be satisfactory to the United States and our coalition partners. Should the Iraqis accept the conditions I have described, the coalition would be prepared to talk directly with them regarding their implementation. Until all of these conditions are accepted, allied military operations will continue as planned.

The joint efforts of many nations, including the Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of a historic rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression through negotiation or divisive tactics.

CLASSIFIED FACSIMILE COVERSHEET

~~SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

URGENT

EYES ONLY

To: General Scowcroft 456-2255 NSC
~~General~~ Gates Office Phone Number Bureau/Agency

From: The Secretary Office Phone Number S
Officer Office Symbol

Secure Facsimile Number: 395-1206

Number of Pages Excluding Coversheet: 3

S/S-O Approving Officer: SD MWR SM

Date/Time of Transmission: 2/19/91

Transmitted By: BP

Remarks: URGENT! EYES ONLY - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Col NARA, Date 11/17/09

Transmit Replies To 202/647-6434 & Alert Recipient Via Telephone

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mikhail:

I have now had more time to reflect on your letter reporting on the talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, and I want to share my views with you.

My initial reaction noted several basic problems with your proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the timing and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary to the clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate withdrawal. I said that anything longer than ninety-six hours would not meet the test of immediacy. Second, your proposal does not insist upon Iraqi compliance with all the relevant UNSC resolutions, as demanded in Resolution 678. And, third, there is no mention of the exchange of POWs or release of third country nationals held against their will.

Mikhail, I do appreciate your efforts, but I worry that perhaps incompleteness and ambiguities in your proposal may give heart to Saddam Hussein that he can somehow escape the consequences of his actions and obtain an unclear outcome, which he can exploit politically. Accordingly, I want to convey to you amplification of my earlier points. Specifically:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0855-MR
Zu 8/8/13

~~SECRET~~

-- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait begins, ^{deleted bracketed} and no formal cessation of the overall state of hostilities until that withdrawal is completed. That withdrawal must be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other arrangements would risk the lives of coalition forces. We will not attack withdrawing Iraqi troops, but any Iraqi breach of the agreements respecting withdrawal would bring instant and sharp response.

-- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the withdrawal.

-- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring not only a devastating coalition response, but would affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq after the war.

> next para deleted
The joint efforts of many nations, including the Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of an historic rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression through negotiation or divisive tactics.

Consequently, until all of these conditions are accepted, coalition military operations will continue as planned.

George Bush

Phone call to Gorbachev

Secretary Baker Hello

The President was trying to reach you and I tried to reach Sasha -- we could not, he asked that I give the message that he wanted to give to you.

I am calling you from his office -- he has gone to another engagement.

Had he been able to talk to you, he wanted to say the following.

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And we recognize that Iraq's position has changed. But Saddam is now blowing up Kuwait's oil production and refining capabilities -- in fact he seems to have adopted a "scorched earth" policy. It seems he is taking advantage of the talks with you to destroy Kuwait and play for time. Much of this seems to have been started earlier today. We do not believe that the world can wait and let him do this. So we will be proposing a procedure by which we can avert a ground campaign and bring the war to an end. In effect, this builds on what you have done.

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Complete military withdrawal from Kuwait in one week.

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Within the first forty-eight hours remove all forces from Kuwait City to allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government of Kuwait and remove its forces from prepared defenses along the Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq border. From Bub'ian and Warbah and from Kuwait's Rumayllah oil field.

Within the one week specified above return all forces to their positions of August 1 in accordance with 660.

In cooperation with the ICRC release all POWs and third country civilians being held against their will.

Return the remains of deceased and killed coalition servicemen. This action to commence immediately with the initiation of the withdrawal and to be completed within 48 hours.

Remove all explosives and booby-traps including those on Kuwaiti oil installations. (As an aside, I may say that it may already be too late for that.) And designate Iraqi military liaison officers to work with Kuwaiti personnel on the operational details of withdrawal to include the provision of information on land or sea mines.

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Mr. President, in the beginning of this statement which I did not read there is a statement that the conditions in the Iraqi offer to you must be eliminated. This means the statement that there must be a rescission of all other U.N. resolutions. And the suggestion that there should be a lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for partial withdrawal. President Bush has arrived back while I have been reading this to you and wants to talk with you.

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in the Soviet Union. We won't depart from that. But we have elements -- crossing liberal and conservative lines -- here who take a different view than Jim and I do.

In spite of that we continue to make clear that we support your role and value your role and believe you are making a contribution. I mean it right from my heart and so does Jim. We view, and I would be glad to say this publicly, what you have tried to do as politically courageous given your long relationship (with Iraq), your standing as a superpower and your ethnic groups' sentiment.

I don't want to see us pull apart even though we have profound differences at this moment on this particular question.

Let me tell you what is driving our view. It is not just the U.S. -- it is a unanimous coalition view. First, I don't trust Saddam Hussein. Second, what he said yesterday is totally incompatible with not only what we are asking but what you asked. He is trying to restore himself in terms of the Arab world to the prestige of the status quo ante. What he has done and has done today does not merit that kind of restoration in our view. He knows that you have been working hard to bring a peaceful solution here. But what he is trying to do is to wiggle around and try to find time -- he has made time too short to go back to some kind of combination approach. I felt strongly about that after I stayed awake last night thinking about your suggestions and knowing that you have brought him much further than anyone could have thought after his speech.

But very candidly, he is taking advantage of this time and, I think, of your good-faith to destroy Kuwait. Get your people to show you photographs of what he has done to Kuwait this morning. About 9:00 this morning, our intelligence people brought me pictures and showed me the pictures from yesterday and the one from today and there is the blackest fire covering almost all of Kuwait you have ever seen in your life. This is the entire city I mean. And he did it after you were dealing with Tariq Aziz in good faith. And yesterday he fired a bunch of SCUD missiles again. So please understand, I have a lot of young soldiers over there and you and I have talked enough that I hope you know that I share your values on human life that you so eloquently outlined to me. But Mikhail do you know the whole time this propaganda was going on about civilian life -- that we worried about and didn't target -- do you know up to 200 young people 15-20 years old were killed and mutilated and the breasts cut off of the young women. That is the kind of man that we are up against. I know this is a report of the Emir of Kuwait.

Let me reassure you that I have not changed my view on human life. I dread sending young men and women into battle and because of our position -- the forces of the coalition. And I know that what I am going to ask will put you in a difficult position. I would understand it if you simply said "Geroge I

cannot do it." I want you to tell Aziz that the hand-writing is on the wall. It is not just the U.S.-- it is the rest of this coalition and that we must have compliance with our proposal now. This is a serious proposal. He has not responded to your proposal. We have waited and waited and waited. We have been patient. We need an answer now. There are deadlines here and after what he has done in Kuwait -- we cannot yield. This proposal is deadly serious.

I will send this statement to you instantly and, of course, my request is that you support our position after trying hard for a more reasonable position from your point of view but one that for the reasons I have given, we cannot go along with it now. If you can't support it, we would appreciate your not opposing it. We have not lost our senses and know the importance of the Soviet Union in all of this. Whatever happens in the next few days, I want to keep all doors open with you and with your country. We will never change from the view that you have a critically important role -- it is your neighborhood and some of them are your friends. We recognize Soviet interests in the area. I want to get our forces out of there just as soon as possible. I know how the Iranians and others feel. I want them out as soon as possible. I want to continue to stay in touch. Please examine what we have proposed. If you can encourage his adoption of this that is the best -- and at this point -- only way -- to save the lives you and I both want to.

That is my appeal. I know you want to think about it. We will send the proposal on and welcome your views.

Gorbachev. I got it all and I want to make a brief comment or two.

First, in practice we have the same assessment of Hussein. I think that his fate has been foreshadowed. Far be it from us to try to white wash him or try and save him or to raise his prestige. You and I are compelled to deal with him because on the other side he is the only realistic figure there.

Second, I am not talking about Hussein or the methods he has employed over the last few hours -- I am talking about the possibility of taking advantage of the accomplishments we have behind us given the burden of the entire operation that rests with you and the tremendous contributions we have both made. I am talking about trying to attain the goals we both seek by turning things in a political direction. By doing so we could avoid great tragedy -- that is the central point and the main concern. And that is the main merit of this approach.

Third, you have requested that we relay your demands to Tariz Aziz and the Iraqi leadership. If you can very rapidly send them to us, we will convey them to him. We will also describe your approach and position to him. But my final suggestion is as follows -- that we tentatively decide:

We and you should come out with a joint initiative to convene the U.N. Security Council meeting in order to consider this package of demands. There would certainly be a lot of pressure in that meeting to take advantage and formalize what we get out of that meeting in a document. It would be a good thing if we got the best possible results. It would be just as good if we got an intermediate result that would satisfy both of us. As before we will continue to give priority to our relationship with the United States. And of course the responsibility we bear before the international community and our peoples is to resolve the conflict and to accomplish the goals we set out before while avoiding a tragedy.

The President. The problem is we have heard nothing out of Saddam Hussein. That is essential before we implement this through the U.N. We have resolutions and a mandate under 678 through the U.N. He is stalling and ducking and sending Jordan and the PLO and Yemen in to stall and give his side. We have a mandate and we have to have a positive reply from him. But having spelled out the U.S. proposal, we cannot hold off. I will discuss this with Jim and with Scowcroft and others and let you know my reaction. But this is my first reaction.

Gorbachev. George, we did get a reaction from Hussein and his agreement to withdraw troops. We don't believe everything is satisfactory in his position. We made our position tougher. Now we need to hear from him again.

The President. You have brought him along on delinkage and a concept of withdrawal but it falls far short of the unconditional withdrawal called for in the resolution. Let us talk about that here. Before I hang up I want to make one further point.

Life goes on and I want to assure you we are pushing our people on the arms control proposals. I wrote you recently on CFE and naval infantry. I urge your personal attention to that because no matter what happens here -- common ground there would be very good. I have not lost my interest in moving forward with START -
- I want to personally assure you of that.

Thank you for the time. I am sorry for what might be difference but the relationship is too important and it is not going to fall apart over Iraq.

Gorbachev. Good George. I am saying good by. I want you to know that I have given instructions to my people to look into the matter you just mentioned. One more word on Iraq -- we must give some serious thought to the way the position is developing and where detail and substance the two positions coincide. Logic would prompt that we decide in favor of one option -- building on what we have done to try to avert a tragic turn in the situation. Best regards to your family.

The President. Thank you and to Raisa. We need to do this more often in these difficult times.

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Secretary Baker Hello

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In spite of that we continue to make clear that we support your role and value your role and believe you are making a contribution. I mean it right from my heart and so does Jim. We view, and I would be glad to say this publicly, what you have tried to do as politically courageous given your long relationship (with Iraq), your standing as a superpower and your ethnic groups' sentiment.

I don't want to see us pull apart even though we have profound differences at this moment on this particular question.

Let me tell you what is driving our view. It is not just the U.S. -- it is a unanimous coalition view. First, I don't trust Saddam Hussein. Second, what he said yesterday is totally incompatible with not only what we are asking but what you asked. He is trying to restore himself in terms of the Arab world to the prestige of the status quo ante. What he has done and has done today does not merit that kind of restoration in our view. He knows that you have been working hard to bring a peaceful solution here. But what he is trying to do is to wiggle around and try to find time -- he has made time too short to go back to some kind of combination approach. I felt strongly about that after I stayed awake last night thinking about your suggestions and knowing that you have brought him much further than anyone could have thought after his speech.

But very candidly, he is taking advantage of this time and, I think, of your good-faith to destroy Kuwait. Get your people to show you photographs of what he has done to Kuwait this morning. About 9:00 this morning, our intelligence people brought me pictures and showed me the pictures from yesterday and the one from today and there is the blackest fire covering almost all of Kuwait you have ever seen in your life. This is the entire city I mean. And he did it after you were dealing with Tariq Aziz in good faith. And yesterday he fired a bunch of SCUD missiles again. So please understand, I have a lot of young soldiers over there and you and I have talked enough that I hope you know that I share your values on human life that you so eloquently outlined to me. But Mikhail do you know the whole time this propaganda was going on about civilian life -- that we worried about and didn't target -- do you know up to 200 young people 15-20 years old were killed and mutilated and the breasts cut off of the young women. That is the kind of man that we are up against. I know this is a report of the Emir of Kuwait.

Let me reassure you that I have not changed my view on human life. I dread sending young men and women into battle and because of our position -- the forces of the coalition. And I know that what I am going to ask will put you in a difficult position. I would understand it if you simply said "Geroge I

cannot do it." I want you to tell Aziz that the hand-writing is on the wall. It is not just the U.S.-- it is the rest of this coalition and that we must have compliance with our proposal now. This is a serious proposal. He has not responded to your proposal. We have waited and waited and waited. We have been patient. We need an answer now. There are deadlines here and after what he has done in Kuwait -- we cannot yield. This proposal is deadly serious.

I will send this statement to you instantly and, of course, my request is that you support our position after trying hard for a more reasonable position from your point of view but one that for the reasons I have given, we cannot go along with it now. If you can't support it, we would appreciate your not opposing it. We have not lost our senses and know the importance of the Soviet Union in all of this. Whatever happens in the next few days, I want to keep all doors open with you and with your country. We will never change from the view that you have a critically important role -- it is your neighborhood and some of them are your friends. We recognize Soviet interests in the area. I want to get our forces out of there just as soon as possible. I know how the Iranians and others feel. I want them out as soon as possible. I want to continue to stay in touch. Please examine what we have proposed. If you can encourage his adoption of this that is the best -- and at this point -- only way -- to save the lives you and I both want to.

That is my appeal. I know you want to think about it. We will send the proposal on and welcome your views.

Gorbachev. I got it all and I want to make a brief comment or two.

First, in practice we have the same assessment of Hussein. I think that his fate has been foreshadowed. Far be it from us to try to white wash him or try and save him or to raise his prestige. You and I are compelled to deal with him because on the other side he is the only realistic figure there.

Second, I am not talking about Hussein or the methods he has employed over the last few hours -- I am talking about the possibility of taking advantage of the accomplishments we have behind us given the burden of the entire operation that rests with you and the tremendous contributions we have both made. I am talking about trying to attain the goals we both seek by turning things in a political direction. By doing so we could avoid great tragedy -- that is the central point and the main concern. And that is the main merit of this approach.

Third, you have requested that we relay your demands to Tariz Aziz and the Iraqi leadership. If you can very rapidly send them to us, we will convey them to him. We will also describe your approach and position to him. But my final suggestion is as follows -- that we tentatively decide:

We and you should come out with a joint initiative to convene the U.N. Security Council meeting in order to consider this package of demands. There would certainly be a lot of pressure in that meeting to take advantage and formalize what we get out of that meeting in a document. It would be a good thing if we got the best possible results. It would be just as good if we got an intermediate result that would satisfy both of us. As before we will continue to give priority to our relationship with the United States. And of course the responsibility we bear before the international community and our peoples is to resolve the conflict and to accomplish the goals we set out before while avoiding a tragedy.

The President. The problem is we have heard nothing out of Saddam Hussein. That is essential before we implement this through the U.N. We have resolutions and a mandate under 678 through the U.N. He is stalling and ducking and sending Jordan and the PLO and Yemen in to stall and give his side. We have a mandate and we have to have a positive reply from him. But having spelled out the U.S. proposal, we cannot hold off. I will discuss this with Jim and with Scowcroft and others and let you know my reaction. But this is my first reaction.

Gorbachev. George, we did get a reaction from Hussein and his agreement to withdraw troops. We don't believe everything is satisfactory in his position. We made our position tougher. Now we need to hear from him again.

The President. You have brought him along on delinkage and a concept of withdrawal but it falls far short of the unconditional withdrawal called for in the resolution. Let us talk about that here. Before I hang up I want to make one further point.

Life goes on and I want to assure you we are pushing our people on the arms control proposals. I wrote you recently on CFE and naval infantry. I urge your personal attention to that because no matter what happens here -- common ground there would be very good. I have not lost my interest in moving forward with START -- I want to personally assure you of that.

Thank you for the time. I am sorry for what might be difference but the relationship is too important and it is not going to fall apart over Iraq.

Gorbachev. Good George. I am saying good by. I want you to know that I have given instructions to my people to look into the matter you just mentioned. One more word on Iraq -- we must give some serious thought to the way the position is developing and where detail and substance the two positions coincide. Logic would prompt that we decide in favor of one option -- building on what we have done to try to avert a tragic turn in the situation. Best regards to your family.

The President. Thank you and to Raisa. We need to do this more often in these difficult times.



THE PRESIDENT

Feb. 20, 1991

Dear Edward,
Your very warm letter of Jan 20th
reached me yesterday. Thank you
very much. You can take great
credit for elevating U.S. - Soviet
relations to a new plane - Your
efforts will be given a very positive
mark by history. I am sorry

that your French and mine
Mikhail Gorbachev is having
difficulties; for he, too, will be judged
most kindly by history.

I hope that you will stay in
touch with Jim Baker and with
me. We both will always be grateful
to you for many many things —
with respect & sincere best wishes,
Ag Bush

The Minister
of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

Moscow, January 20, 1991

Dear Mr. President:

In completing a major and, possibly, the most important phase of my life connected with my work as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, I should like to thank you sincerely for your kind attitude toward me and my mission. If it has succeeded even in part, this is due mostly to the desire of U.S. leaders--and first among them, to your desire--to see in me a worthy and honest partner, one that I have endeavored to be.

The decision to resign did not come easily. After weighing all the "pros" and "contras", I felt that precisely that step was necessary today for me and for my country. In a certain way I took that decision to protect all that we have managed to attain during the past five and a half years.

His Excellency

George Bush, President

of the United States of America

Washington, D.C.

These have been the years of an historic turn from an anomalous confrontation of two great powers and nations to a natural status of friendliness and partnership between them. I am happy that much in this truly epoch-making endeavor has been accomplished in cooperation with your administration and with you personally.

I firmly believe that what has been achieved during these years is immune to destructive action. The stability of the foundations laid and of the walls of the new structure of world policy being erected is warranted by the clearly expressed intent of the leaders and the people of the USSR to continue on that path.

I am certain that this is your intent as well.

Many difficult crossroads still lie ahead of us. I have spoken out frankly and openly about the dangers that threaten our progress. My words that democracy and freedom must prevail were not uttered casually or accidentally.

I shall never forget our encounters, especially the last one, when your wife and you received us at the White House at the wonderful Christmas tree. And although the Christmas lights have gone out, I am happy in my conviction that the great work accomplished together will continue to shine forever.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. Shevardnadze

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (2 pp.)	3/1/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	11-0860-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	8/22/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 011245Z MAR 91

FM (b)(1) MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0854-MR
3r 8/22/13

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

BRENT:

MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV HAS REPLIED TO YOUR NOTE LAST MONTH WISHING
HIM A SPEEDY RECOVERY. WE ARE POUCHING YOU THE ORIGINAL LETTER. AN
INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT

ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.

DEAR MR. SCOWCROFT:

I THANK YOU FOR THE GOOD WISHES. I HAVE RECOVERED AND I RETURNED
TO WORK AT THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY.

I THINK THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN US HAVE ALREADY TURNED OUT TO BE
SUCH THAT OUR MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TOWARD WHICH YOU ARE
EXPRESSING HOPE, WOULD BE USEFUL.

I WISH YOU SUCCESS IN YOUR RESPONSIBLE WORK AND ALL THE BEST FOR
YOUR FAMILY.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

WITH RESPECT.
S AKHROMEYEV
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
22 FEBRUARY 1991.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#0925

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [EUR/SOV Translation] (4 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

GEORGE BUSH

Bunt

very interesting

Please get a

cc for TAB *Done*

Need I reply

or can we

discuss at

Bermuda.

3-6-91

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Message	Re: Text of a Message Dated 5 March 1991 from the Prime Minister to the President (5 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated our excellent personal communication throughout this crisis from its earliest days until now. I valued our many discussions, including the productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and our recent telephone conversations. This cooperation, both when we agreed and even when we had different perspectives, permitted unprecedented achievements between our two countries at the UN Security Council during a critical time. It was a measure of how our relations have changed, and the potential that change has for the world. The success of the international coalition would not have been possible without the strong and principled contribution of the Soviet Union under your personal leadership.

Now we will turn to the urgent work of building a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This will not be easy. But I believe we have an opportunity to provide for lasting security in the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many problems separating Israel and both the Arab states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the potential to play an important role in this effort. It is my hope that we will be able to work together toward common objectives, once again laying the basis for success.

Jim Baker looks forward to having a good discussion with you on March 15. He will report to you on his Middle East trip and review in detail our current assessment of that troubled region. I have also asked Jim to discuss

thoroughly with you the critical question of how we can regain momentum in arms control. As I have said before, this will require that we resolve the current difficulties with CFE. I would ask that you consider carefully the message he will bring and the importance of these two issues for the course of our future relationship.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

P.S.

I am signing this letter at Camp David; and I am recalling our most relaxed and pleasant discussions here.

I often think about the problems you face at home, and I hope you will tell Tim if there's anything you'd like me to know on a very private basis. As you know I consider myself lucky to be your friend



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1719

SIGNEDACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

Purpose

To express your gratitude to Gorbachev for the excellent personal cooperation you had with him throughout the Gulf crisis and to reconfirm our interest in working with the Soviets on post-war problems in the Middle East and on arms control.

BACKGROUND

Attached at Tab A is a letter from you to President Gorbachev which seeks to end the Gulf crisis on a positive note and build on our work with the Soviets to establish the ground for cooperation on postwar problems. We have made the letter short and somewhat personal to convey a positive message.

The letter thanks Gorbachev for the excellent personal communication you had with him throughout the crisis and points to our unprecedented cooperation in the UNSC to build the international coalition. It also states that our eventual success would have been difficult to achieve without Gorbachev's personal leadership.

The letter also covers the opportunity ahead for progress on the Middle East and indicates that the Soviets have a potentially important role to play. It mentions that Jim will brief Gorbachev on his Middle East trip when they meet in Moscow on March 16 and will also want to engage in a detailed discussion of arms control issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
11/29/2007 MM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

LIMITED ACCESS

1719

March 7, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

As requested, attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev which is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 06/01/2011

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mikhail:

Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated our excellent personal communication throughout this crisis from its earliest days until now. I valued our many discussions, including the productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and our recent telephone conversations. This cooperation, both when we agreed and even when we had different perspectives, permitted unprecedented achievements between our two countries at the UN Security Council during a critical time. The success of the international coalition would not have been possible without the strong and principled contribution of the Soviet Union under your personal leadership.

Now we will turn to the urgent work of building a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This will not be easy. But I believe we have an opportunity to provide for lasting security in the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many problems separating Israel and both the Arab states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the potential to play an important role in this effort. It is my hope that we will be able to work together toward common objectives.

Jim Baker looks forward to having a good discussion with you on March 16. He will report to you on his Middle East trip and review in detail our current assessment of that troubled region. I have also asked Jim to discuss

thoroughly with you the critical question of how we can regain momentum in arms control. I would ask that you consider carefully the message he will bring and the importance of these two issues for the course of our future relationship.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101719
RECEIVED: 07 MAR 91 17

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 10 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
ARMS CONTROL
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSIAN GULF
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA WHSR

DUE DATE: 11 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 4/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

[Signature]

DATE

3/12

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF

CLOSED BY: NSEF

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9101719

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
002
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91031013 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
X 91031016 PRES SGD LTR
X 91031016 CABLE SENT VIA WHSR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 4/17/09

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9101719
DATE 10 MAR 91

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9101719

REFERRAL

DATE: 12 MAR 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 10 MAR 91

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC

POUCHE **

DUE DATE:

COMMENT: ** PLEASE DISPATCH VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH ***

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cal NARA, Date 4/17/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed: 4/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated our excellent personal communication throughout this crisis from its earliest days until now. I valued our many discussions, including the productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and our recent telephone conversations. This cooperation, both when we agreed and even when we had different perspectives, permitted unprecedented achievements between our two countries at the UN Security Council during a critical time. It was a measure of how our relations have changed, and the potential that change has for the world. The success of the international coalition would not have been possible without the strong and principled contribution of the Soviet Union under your personal leadership.

Now we will turn to the urgent work of building a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This will not be easy. But I believe we have an opportunity to provide for lasting security in the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many problems separating Israel and both the Arab states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the potential to play an important role in this effort. It is my hope that we will be able to work together toward common objectives, once again laying the basis for success.

Jim Baker looks forward to having a good discussion with you on March 15. He will report to you on his Middle East trip and review in detail our current assessment of that troubled region. I have also asked Jim to discuss

thoroughly with you the critical question of how we can regain momentum in arms control. As I have said before, this will require that we resolve the current difficulties with CFE. I would ask that you consider carefully the message he will bring and the importance of these two issues for the course of our future relationship.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

P.S.

I am signing this letter at Camp David; and I am recalling our most relaxed and pleasant discussions here.

I often think about the problems you face at home, and I hope you will tell Tim if there's anything you'd like me to know on a very private basis. As you know I consider myself lucky to be your friend



THE WHITE HOUSE

1719

WASHINGTON

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

Purpose

To express your gratitude to Gorbachev for the excellent personal cooperation you had with him throughout the Gulf crisis and to reconfirm our interest in working with the Soviets on post-war problems in the Middle East and on arms control.

BACKGROUND

Attached at Tab A is a letter from you to President Gorbachev which seeks to end the Gulf crisis on a positive note and build on our work with the Soviets to establish the ground for cooperation on postwar problems. We have made the letter short and somewhat personal to convey a positive message.

The letter thanks Gorbachev for the excellent personal communication you had with him throughout the crisis and points to our unprecedented cooperation in the UNSC to build the international coalition. It also states that our eventual success would have been difficult to achieve without Gorbachev's personal leadership.

The letter also covers the opportunity ahead for progress on the Middle East and indicates that the Soviets have a potentially important role to play. It mentions that Jim will brief Gorbachev on his Middle East trip when they meet in Moscow on March 16 and will also want to engage in a detailed discussion of arms control issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
11/29/2007 MM

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

LIMITED ACCESS

1719

March 7, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

As requested, attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev which is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 06/01/2011

~~SECRET~~



Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- 
- ① Bob
 - ② Brent

Sec Baker has
cleared this version
of the letter to
Gorbo.

David



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(1917) 3/7/91

Bob:

David Gompert just called and asked that I pass the following note with the Gorbachev letter:

Bob Zoellick, State, thinks the letter is fine; however, he feels very strongly that Sec Baker should look at it. Zoellick has faxed the letter to Baker and has requested his concurrence as soon as possible. Gompert does not feel this will take long.

v/r

A handwritten signature, possibly "R.", written in dark ink.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14e. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14f. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock fro Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Now we will turn to the urgent work of building a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This will not be easy. But I believe we have an opportunity to provide for lasting security in the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many problems separating Israel and both the Arab states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the potential to play an important role in this effort. It is my hope that we will be able to work together toward common objectives, once again laying the basis for success.

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Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE

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Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (2 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	11-0861-MR(514)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT FILE PRIVACY_IN SIT SUM

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 111025Z MAR 91

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT NOON TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT GORBACHEV IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING
SECRETARY BAKER FRIDAY AND APPRECIATES PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOOD
WISHES. HE ADDED THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE THAT
PRESIDENT BUSH HAD PUBLICLY REFUTED THE ASSERTION THAT GORBACHEV HAD
BEEN LESS THAN COOPERATIVE DURING THE GULF WAR.

WE HAD TIME FOR ONLY THE BRIEFEST CHAT BECAUSE HE WAS SUMMONED
BY GORBACHEV JUST AFTER I ARRIVED. REGARDING THE WEEKEND'S POLITICAL
ANTICS, HE SEEMED MORE RELAXED THAN HE WAS WHEN I LAST SAW HIM. HE
THOUGHT YELTSIN HAD FINALLY DISCREDITED HIMSELF WITH THE PUBLIC AND
THAT THE KEY REPUBLICS WOULD SOON SIGN THE UNION TREATY.

THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I FEEL MAY BE
JUSTIFIED, BUT I WAS STRUCK BY THE MORE CONFIDENT MOOD HE CONVEYED AS
COMPARED WITH THE LAST TIME WE MET.

REGARDS,
JACK.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0853-MR

32 9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

~~SECRET~~

#0180

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (4 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By SSS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	11-0861-MR(515)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY OUT SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 221605Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

0000

SECTION 01 OF 02

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: (b)(1) PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK EYES ONLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER, WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY
SECRETARY BAKER, TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF
GORBACHEV IS UNAVAILABLE, LETTER MAY BE DELIVERED TO CHERNAYEV.
ANY REPORTING ON DELIVERY OR REACTIONS SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THIS
CHANNEL.

2. IN DELIVERING LETTER, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE PRESIDENT
IS TRYING TO OPEN THE DOOR TO A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE REMAINING
CFE PROBLEMS, AND URGE GORBACHEV TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WALK
THROUGH THAT DOOR WITH A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT PUTS THIS
ISSUE BEHIND US.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY
HAS REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV
ON BW, AND THAT THE SECRETARY WILL SHORTLY BE SENDING BESSMERTNYKH
THE PAPERS GORBACHEV REQUESTED SO THAT GORBACHEV CAN TAKE THE
ACTIONS NEEDED TO GET THE PROGRAM OF VISITS AND EXCHANGES BACK ON
TRACK.

BEGIN TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0853-MR

32 9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

DEAR MIKHAIL:

JIM BAKER HAS JUST REPORTED TO ME ON HIS TALKS WITH YOU IN MOSCOW. IT CLEARLY WAS A GOOD EXCHANGE, AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NOT ONLY THE GULF BUT ALSO THE BROADER U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL. PRESERVING OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP--INDEED DEVELOPING IT FURTHER--IS KEY TO SHAPING A NEW WORLD ORDER, A GOAL THAT I KNOW WE SHARE.

JIM DESCRIBED TO ME THE STEP YOU TOOK TO HELP RESOLVE THE CFE PROBLEM. IT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP, AND I GENUINELY APPRECIATE THAT EFFORT. AT THE SAME TIME, I MUST TELL YOU THAT IT DOES NOT MEET THE BASIC CONCERN I EXPRESSED IN MY FEBRUARY 9 LETTER. AS I EXPLAINED IN THAT LETTER, MY CONCERN CENTERS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF EACH OF THE SIGNATORIES TO FULFILL THE OBLIGATIONS HE UNDERTOOK WHEN HE SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS NOT HELPFUL TO THINK OF OUR DIFFERENCES AS BEING ABOUT A FEW HUNDRED TANKS, MORE OR LESS. THAT ALSO IS WHY THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY AGREEING ON SOME NUMBER THAT IS BETWEEN WHAT THE TREATY PERMITS AND WHAT ONE OR ANOTHER SIGNATORY NOW PROPOSES.

NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE YOU WERE ABLE TO TAKE THE STEP YOU DID, WE WERE ABLE TO RESPOND WITH THE APPROACH THAT JIM DESCRIBED IN THE PAPER HE GAVE TO FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH ON SATURDAY. THAT APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME DIFFERENCES ABOUT ARTICLE III OF THE CFE TREATY, BY CONCENTRATING ON PRODUCING PRACTICAL RESULTS THAT CORRESPOND TO THE OBLIGATIONS YOU AND I AND THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES ASSUMED WHEN WE SIGNED IT.

THE PROPOSED APPROACH IS BASED ON THREE SIMPLE PRINCIPLES. FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) COULD NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

THESE LIMITS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONVERTED OR DESTROYED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD. OF COURSE. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD NEED TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CFE TREATY WE ALREADY HAVE SIGNED (INCLUDING THE LIMITS BY ZONE AND ON HOLDINGS IN ACTIVE UNITS), SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS.

I AM PERSUADED THAT A SOLUTION THAT IS BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES WILL MEET OUR RESPECTIVE NEEDS. CONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY, IT WOULD PERMIT YOUR MILITARY TO ALLOCATE TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES AMONG YOUR NAVAL AND OTHER MILITARY UNITS IN WHATEVER MANNER BEST FITS THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION. YOU WOULD BE FREE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO INCREASE OR DECREASE THE NUMBER OF TANKS ASSIGNED TO COASTAL DEFENSE DIVISIONS OR NAVAL INFANTRY PROVIDED THAT THE TREATY LIMITS ON TOTAL TANK HOLDINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED AND THAT THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF TANKS WERE CONVERTED OR DESTROYED.

WE WOULD BE SATISFIED THAT THE OBLIGATIONS WE EACH ASSUMED WHEN THE CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED WOULD BE MET. YOU AND I TOGETHER WOULD HAVE FOUND A PRACTICAL WAY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, REFLECTING AND BUILDING ON THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. I AM EQUALLY PERSUADED THAT IF WE CAN FIND SUCH A SOLUTION, THE OTHER REMAINING CFE ISSUES ALSO CAN BE RESOLVED.

IF YOU AGREE THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE BASED ON THESE THREE PRINCIPLES, I AM CONFIDENT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY MY NATO ALLIES, AND I WOULD DIRECT JIM TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY TO SECURE ITS ACHIEVEMENT.

LEAVING CFE UNRESOLVED CASTS A CLOUD OVER THE FUTURE OF ALL OF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS AND IMPEDES COOPERATION ON OUR BROADER AGENDA. I DO NOT WANT THAT. IN EMPHASIZING TO JIM BAKER YOUR COMMITMENT TO THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND UNDERSCORING ITS CENTRALITY TO A PEACEFUL AND ENDURING WORLD ORDER, IT IS CLEAR THAT YOU DO NOT WANT THAT EITHER. RESOLVING CFE NOW WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS POSITIVE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

IMPACT FACILITATING PROGRESS ON OTHER DIFFICULT ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES. AND HELPING TO PAVE THE WAY FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT MEETING.

#0027

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

MIKHAIL, LET US PROMPTLY PUT THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES BEHIND US ON
THE BASIS I HAVE DESCRIBED.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END OF TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0028

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Response to Gorbachev on CFE (2 pp.)	4/6/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS No. 134636
CT/AO
Russian

Dear George,

I was pleased to learn from your letter of March 22 that you are satisfied with the talks that we had this month in Moscow with Secretary of State James Baker on a broad range of issues. In this regard, our assessments completely coincide. In Moscow, yet another important step forward was made toward broadening and deepening the USSR-U.S. interaction in the interest of building a new world order based on the new thinking and democratic principles.

The review of the questions relating to the ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe occupied an important place at the Moscow talks. Taking into account the views presented in your letter of February 9, we made an important step aimed at removing the U.S. side's concerns. It was an honest attempt to find solutions to the existing problems on a basis of compromise, and I was pleased to learn that you value it on its merits. It is precisely in this manner, in an atmosphere of frankness and openness, that we should pursue this dialog--for we are talking about the future of a Treaty which will have, in the fullest sense of this word, an historic importance for the destiny of peace in Europe and far beyond.

His Excellency
George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

I must say that I strongly favor completing this dialog in the nearest possible future by achieving mutual understanding on the entire range of aspects with which we are dealing at present. I believe that the final agreement on conventional forces in Europe would open the way for a rapid completion of a no less important treaty on radical reductions in strategic offensive arms.

George, you are writing that the moves we made in Moscow on conventional arms still fall short of resolving the problem as a whole, and you present your arguments. They have been carefully analyzed. As a result of this analysis, we have decided that we can take yet another step, which we are convinced will ensure a comprehensive settlement in terms of creating the necessary conditions for the ratification of the Paris Treaty.

In this connection, let me say from the outset that the approach presented by Secretary Baker in Moscow and supported by you in your letter of March 22, under which we should set aside our differences regarding the interpretation of Article III of the Treaty and focus on practical approaches, appeals to us. Like you, we have no desire to make an issue out of who "won" and who "lost." This point of view, as we have been able to observe, is taking hold also among the other parties to the Treaty. Like the United States, the Soviet side favors a solution which would make it possible to remove the problem in such a way as not to put any party in an embarrassing situation. This serves the goals of trust and mutual respect in resolving the difficult problems involved in arms reductions and in safeguarding legitimate security interests.

Thus, we are for a compromise that would not infringe on anyone's interests, one that would not require amending the Treaty text and would ensure its non-circumvention.

//

As a gesture of good will and in order to eliminate U.S. concerns, we are prepared to offer the following comprehensive solution:

1. Within the aggregate ceilings established for the USSR by the Treaty for tanks (13,150), armored combat vehicles (20,000), and artillery systems (13,175), as well as the levels of arms in regular units (10,500 tanks, 17,920 armored combat vehicles, and 10,825 artillery pieces), the actual quantities of these Soviet arms in Europe will be reduced by the number of these arms that the USSR will have in the coastal defense units, even though, according to our approach, the latter do not fall under the Treaty.

This is our new constructive step, which takes into account the views presented by the U.S. side in Moscow with respect to the regular units' arms. This aspect is now adequately dealt with as well.

Of course, the relevant reduction will be carried out also within the limits established for the extended area of Central Europe and for the flank areas.

2. The additionally reduced arms will be withdrawn beyond the treaty application area for the purpose of replacing the obsolete arms, which subsequently would be destroyed or converted.

As you can see, here too we are offering a solution which is fully consistent with the objectives of reducing arms and drastically lowering the level of military confrontation.

3. The one hundred percent compensation for the coastal defense arms by all the parameters of the Treaty is the most important element of the package proposed by the Soviet side. As for the

naval infantry arms (120 tanks, 753 armored combat vehicles, and 234 artillery pieces), they of course should remain outside the Treaty. As you know, no "reassignment" issue arose with those weapons, as in the case with the three Soviet coastal defense divisions. Our naval infantry has always existed as part of our naval forces. Incidentally, it certainly cannot be compared with the 200,000-strong U.S. Marine Corps.

As was said earlier, we are prepared to make a unilateral, politically binding statement outside the Treaty regarding the non-buildup of naval infantry arms. This obligation would also cover the arms of the coastal defense forces--those levels that would remain after additional reductions (the point is that the reductions under paragraph 1 would be made by cutting the numbers of arms both in deployed ground-troops divisions and in coastal defense divisions).

This means that the issue of circumventing the Treaty through a possible buildup of naval infantry arms would be completely eliminated.

Of course, we are aware of the fact that a number of states party to the Paris Treaty also have corresponding systems in their naval infantry units, and that these states have accepted the inclusion of these systems in the Treaty-limited items. In this connection, we would also be ready--for the purpose of ensuring reciprocity--to have all states party to the Treaty join the statement (outside the Treaty) on the non-buildup of their naval infantry arms within the reductions zone. In this context, one could also agree that these systems of other states not be counted, and their slots be taken by the relevant ground-forces arms.

In other words, in this area too, we are not seeking any unilateral advantages for ourselves. Our goal is to resolve the issue on the basis of the balance of the parties' legitimate interests.

4. We would also make a unilateral statement outside the Treaty about a non-buildup of armored combat vehicles (1,701 pieces) in the units guarding the Strategic Rocket Forces. The reason for this solution is that these armored combat vehicles (ACVs) are not part of the ground forces; their mission is to guard missile complexes of the strategic nuclear forces, on which we have a separate negotiation. Accordingly, within the context of the CFE Treaty, they could in principle be listed under Table IV [Translator's note: Table I in Russian text], which contains the list of systems that do not fall under reductions.

In Moscow the U.S. side raised the question of converting a portion of the Soviet armored combat vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces into ACV-like machines. I would like to note that in the interest of reaching a settlement the Soviet side is prepared to accept this and agree with the United States on the number of ACVs that would be subject to conversion. This is another of our new major steps to meet the U.S. halfway.

Subsequently, the number of the relevant vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces would be determined taking into account the START Treaty.

5. Verification of the above measures could, in our view, be performed in the following way. With respect to coastal defense and naval infantry units, it would be done through challenge inspections. With respect to the armored combat vehicles in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Soviet side would be prepared, as a gesture of good will, to provide the relevant information to all the parties to the Paris Treaty.

6. As for the issue of the equipment moved beyond the Urals, we have already provided information to this effect. We intend to continue, as a gesture of good will, to notify the U.S. side on elimination and conversion.

Summing up, I would like to stress that we have now proposed a solution which ensures a comprehensive settlement. I must say with all frankness that this has not been easy. After all, to comply with the ceilings established by the Treaty, one has to literally "cut into the quick," because from the very beginning, in accordance with the mandate for the Vienna talks, we have assumed that the coastal defense forces, as those of the naval infantry, are not covered by the relevant limitations.

As you can see, for the purpose of reaching agreement and to demonstrate our good will, we have accepted a pragmatic settlement of the coastal defense problem. We have also taken into account the U.S. side's considerations concerning the method of implementing additional reductions, verification, and conversion of a portion of the armored combat vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces. We have also made a serious accommodating move on the question of the naval infantry. We are prepared to provide notifications of the arms pulled out of the Treaty zone.

George, the package of measures that we are proposing can be convincingly argued even in the Supreme Soviet. But to expect the Supreme Soviet to react positively to any measures that would go beyond this package would, quite frankly, be highly problematic.

As you see, Mr. President, I have taken the step that you expected of me, to go as far as I can go in the existing situation. It ought to eliminate your concerns completely and

get the arms reduction and limitation process back on a productive track. I hope for your agreement in principle. In that event I would be ready to appoint plenipotentiary representatives who, together with your authorized experts, would translate our understanding into the language of a concrete agreement.

Respectfully,

M. Gorbachev

March 27, 1991

LIMITED ACCESS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker has just reported to me on his talks with you in Moscow. It clearly was a good exchange, and I am pleased that you had the opportunity to discuss not only the Gulf but also the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship, including arms control. Preserving our broader relationship--indeed developing it further--is key to shaping a new world order, a goal that I know we share.

Jim described to me the step you took to help resolve the CFE problem. It was an important step, and I genuinely appreciate that effort. At the same time, I must tell you that it does not meet the basic concern I expressed in my February 9 letter. As I explained in that letter, my concern centers on the willingness of each of the signatories to fulfill the obligations he undertook when he signed the CFE treaty. For this reason, it is not helpful to think of our differences as being about a few hundred tanks, more or less. That also is why the issue cannot be resolved by agreeing on some number that is between what the treaty permits and what one or another signatory now proposes.

Nevertheless, because you were able to take the step you did, we were able to respond with the approach that Jim described in the paper he gave to Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh on Saturday. That approach is designed to overcome differences about Article III of the CFE treaty, by concentrating on producing practical results that correspond to the obligations you and I and the other twenty signatories assumed when we signed it.

The proposed approach is based on three simple principles. First, total Soviet holdings of tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles in the CFE zone (regardless of the branch of the military service to which they may be assigned) could not exceed the limits specified in the treaty. Second, any such equipment in excess of these limits would have to be converted or destroyed using agreed procedures. Third, of course, such an approach would need to be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the CFE treaty we already have signed (including the limits by zone and on holdings in active units), so that it will not be necessary to renegotiate its terms.

I am persuaded that a solution that is based on these principles will meet our respective needs. Consistent with the treaty, it would permit your military to allocate tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles among your naval and other military units in whatever manner best fits the needs of the Soviet Union. You would be free, for example, to increase or decrease the number of tanks assigned to coastal defense divisions or naval infantry provided that the treaty limits on total tank holdings were not exceeded and that the required number of tanks were converted or destroyed.

We would be satisfied that the obligations we each assumed when the CFE treaty was signed would be met. You and I together would have found a practical way to resolve the issue, reflecting and building on the spirit of cooperation and mutual accommodation that you and I have developed. I am equally persuaded that if we can find such a solution, the other remaining CFE issues also can be resolved.

If you agree that a solution could be based on these three principles, I am confident it would be accepted by my NATO allies, and I would direct Jim to follow up quickly to secure its achievement.

18

Leaving CFE unresolved casts a cloud over the future of all of our arms control efforts and impedes cooperation on our broader agenda. I do not want that. In emphasizing to Jim Baker your commitment to the U.S.-Soviet relationship and underscoring its centrality to a peaceful and enduring world order, it is clear that you do not want that either. Resolving CFE now would have an enormous positive impact, facilitating progress on other difficult arms control issues, and helping to pave the way for our next summit meeting.

Mikhail, let us promptly put the remaining CFE issues behind us on the basis I have described.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	3/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	11-0861-MR(517)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT. GATES SCOWCROFT

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(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND ARE IN THE
PROCESS OF TRYING TO CONTACT CHERNAYEV. (HIS OFFICE DOES NOT ANSWER
THE TELEPHONE ON WEEKENDS.) WHILE I SHALL DO MY BEST TO DELIVER THE
LETTER EITHER TO GORBACHEV OR CHERNAYEV THIS WEEKEND, IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THEY WILL MAKE THE APPOINTMENT ONLY ON MONDAY. IF THAT IS THE
CASE, I PRESUME YOU WOULD WAIT UNTIL MONDAY RATHER THAN DELIVERING
THROUGH OTHER HANDS. I SHALL OF COURSE LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS
DELIVERY HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

WARM REGARDS,

JACK.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

*0162

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0853-MR

31 9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed: 4/17/2009 **OA/ID Number:** 91129-007

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

AR Case #:

AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	4/8/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 10/23/2015

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0853-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/21/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> FLASH ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 081806Z APR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

1. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE REPLY IN PARAGRAPH 3 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV'S MARCH 27 LETTER ON CFE. IT HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY SECRETARY BAKER. IF GORBACHEV IS UNAVAILABLE, LETTER MAY BE DELIVERED TO CHERNAYEV. ANY REPORTING SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL.

2. IN DELIVERING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT HIS PROPOSAL IS THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE ALL THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES QUICKLY AND COMPLETELY SO THAT RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY CAN GO FORWARD.

-- BUILDING ON THE IDEAS IN GORBACHEV'S MARCH 27 LETTER, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS INTENDED TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING CFE PROBLEMS.

-- THE NUMERICAL REPEAT NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S APPROACH AND GORBACHEV'S APPROACH IS VERY SMALL: THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL DOES NOT REQUIRE MUCH MORE WITHDRAWAL OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE CFE ZONE NOR DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT THAN DOES GORBACHEV'S OWN PROPOSAL. THE DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, IS ESSENTIAL TO RESOLVING THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS. AS SUCH, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO BE A PRACTICAL SOLUTION THAT CAN OVERCOME DIFFERENCES ABOUT ARTICLE III.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS AS FAR AS WE CAN GO IN HELPING THE SOVIETS FIND A SOLUTION TO THEIR CFE PROBLEMS, AND IS THE LEAST WE CAN ACCEPT.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL REFLECTS HIS OWN IDEAS. HE CANNOT SPEAK FOR HIS NATO ALLIES OR THE OTHER CFE SIGNATORIES. IF, HOWEVER, GORBACHEV CAN ACCEPT IT, THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE THE OTHER SIGNATORIES--AND THE U.S. SENATE--TO ACCEPT IT AS WELL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MIKHAIL:

I APPRECIATE YOUR MARCH 27 LETTER AND YOUR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN WITH ME IN THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS. IN THE SAME POSITIVE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND FRANKNESS,



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
4/21/2014 MM

LET ME PROPOSE A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH THAT ELABORATES YOUR IDEAS IN A WAY THAT ALSO WOULD ACHIEVE A PRACTICAL RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULT NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE, AND WOULD REMOVE ALL OF THE REMAINING ROADBLOCKS TO THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY.

UNDER THIS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD, AS YOU PROPOSE, MAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT OUTSIDE THE TREATY NOT TO INCREASE THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY UNITS IN THE COASTAL DEFENSE, NAVAL INFANTRY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES.

THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO WOULD MAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT TO HAVE 933 FEWER TANKS, 1,725 FEWER ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND 1,080 FEWER ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE CFE ZONE AND IN ACTIVE UNITS THAN THE QUANTITIES TO WHICH IT BELIEVES IT IS ENTITLED UNDER THE CFE CEILINGS. SOVIET EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS IN THE CFE SUBZONES AND ON THE FLANKS WOULD BE REDUCED ACCORDINGLY. THE SOVIET SIDE COULD WITHDRAW EQUAL NUMBERS OF TANKS, ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND ARTILLERY PIECES OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE. IT WOULD DESTROY OR CONVERT EQUAL NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL TANKS, ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND ARTILLERY PIECES CURRENTLY LOCATED INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE USING CFE TIMETABLES AND CFE PROCEDURES (OR SOME OTHER AGREED PROCEDURES FOR EQUIPMENT OUTSIDE THE ZONE THAT PROVIDED VISIBLE EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD BEEN DESTROYED OR RENDERED MILITARILY UNUSABLE).

AS YOU PROPOSE, THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY AND COASTAL DEFENSE UNITS WITHIN THE CFE ZONE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS INSTEAD OF THE DECLARED SITE VERIFICATION REGIME THAT APPLIES TO OTHER GROUND FORCE UNITS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL ALLOW THESE INSPECTIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN A MANNER THAT FACILITATES EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

AS AN ADDITIONAL EFFORT TO PUT US IN A POSITION TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE THAT THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS THAT WERE ASSIGNED TO THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES WHEN THE TREATY WAS SIGNED WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST THE TREATY'S NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NO OTHER ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES OR OTHER EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE SRF.

MIKHAIL, I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THE EFFORT YOU HAVE MADE TO BRING US TO THIS POINT, AND I HOPE THAT YOU CAN APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE STEPS I WOULD ASK THE OTHER TWENTY-ONE SIGNATORIES TO TAKE IN RESPONSE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN OUR VIEW, EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITH COASTAL DEFENSE UNITS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SAME VERIFICATION REGIME THAT APPLIES TO OTHER GROUND FORCE UNITS. BECAUSE OF MY COMMITMENT TO WORK WITH YOU TO FIND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, HOWEVER, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE TO YOUR VERIFICATION PROPOSAL.

I LIKEWISE MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT ADDS TO OUR ALREADY SERIOUS CONCERNS

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~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

REGARDING THE VERY LARGE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WITHDREW FROM THE CFE ZONE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. ALTHOUGH THESE EARLIER WITHDRAWALS WERE TECHNICALLY LEGAL, THEY RAISE QUESTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES THAT COULD UNDERMINE THE VERY OBJECTIVES OF THE CFE TREATY THAT YOU AND I SO STRONGLY SUPPORT.

NEVERTHELESS, I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS AS PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH I HAVE OUTLINED IF YOU CAN FORMALLY CONFIRM WHAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ALREADY HAVE TOLD US IN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR SIDES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. YOUR ASSURANCE IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THAT THE EQUIPMENT ALREADY WITHDRAWN OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE COULD NOT BE QUICKLY MOVED BACK AND INTEGRATED INTO MILITARY UNITS THAT REMAIN IN THE CFE ZONE, OR BE USED TO BUILD UP SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN WAYS THAT COULD DESTABILIZE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE, ASIA, OR ELSEWHERE. SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD ASK THAT THE SOVIET SIDE FORMALLY:

-- REAFFIRM THAT YOU WILL DESTROY OR CONVERT BETWEEN NOW AND 1995 AT LEAST 6,000 TANKS, 1,500 ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND 7,000 ARTILLERY PIECES NOW LOCATED EAST-OF-THE-URALS, IN ADDITION TO THE DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION OBLIGATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. (AS YOU CAN UNDERSTAND, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR YOU TO COMMIT TO CARRY OUT THESE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED PLANS TO ENSURE THAT YOUR COMMITMENT TO DESTROY OR CONVERT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AS PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WAS MEANINGFUL.

-- PROVIDE NOTIFICATION OF THE CONVERSION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS EQUIPMENT, AS YOU HAVE PROPOSED, AND PERFORM THE PLANNED DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION USING AGREED CFE PROCEDURES OR IN SOME OTHER VISIBLE WAY THAT BUILDS CONFIDENCE THAT THE EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN DESTROYED OR PERMANENTLY RENDERED MILITARILY UNUSABLE.

-- PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT THE WITHDRAWN EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE USED TO CREATE NEW MILITARY UNITS OR A STRATEGIC RESERVE, AND WILL NOT BE STORED IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE EQUIPMENT TO BE RETURNED QUICKLY TO THE CFE ZONE, AND THAT THE MILITARY UNITS REMAINING IN THE CFE ZONE WILL NOT BE ORGANIZED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE ABLE TO ABSORB QUICKLY LARGE QUANTITIES OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT.

-- FINALLY, IF YOUR SIDE COULD IDENTIFY THE CURRENT LOCATIONS OF THE TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES TOLD US HAVE BEEN MOVED TO DEPOTS AND UNITS EAST-OF-THE-URALS SINCE JANUARY, 1989, IT WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE THE RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DATA THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY.

MIKHAIL, THIS ELABORATION OF YOUR PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO ALL THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES IN A MANNER THAT SATISFACTORILY ADDRESSES OUR RESPECTIVE CONCERNS AND CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY PRESENTED TO OUR LEGISLATURES. IT DIFFERS ONLY SLIGHTLY FROM THE NUMBERS YOU HAVE PROPOSED, BUT IT HAS ONE CRUCIAL ADVANTAGE: IT WILL ALLOW US TO MOVE FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY BECAUSE IT WILL BRING THE SOVIET UNION INTO PRACTICAL CONFORMITY WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS AS THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD BY THE OTHER TWENTY-ONE SIGNATORIES.

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROPOSED APPROACH REQUIRES FURTHER MOVEMENT

BY BOTH OF US, BUT WITHOUT SUCH RECIPROCAL EFFORTS THE CFE TREATY AND ALL THE BENEFITS THAT FLOW FROM IT ARE IN JEOPARDY. I THEREFORE KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PUT THE ENTIRE MATTER BEHIND US, QUICKLY AND COMPLETELY, BEFORE IT UNDERMINES ALL THAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED.

WE HAVE COME SO FAR AND ACCOMPLISHED SO MUCH THROUGH THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION AND TRUST THAT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED. WE MUST NOT LET THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AND FORWARD ELUDE US. IF YOU CAN JOIN WITH ME IN ACCEPTING THIS COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION, I WILL URGE MY NATO ALLIES AND THE U.S. SENATE TO ACCEPT IT AS WELL, AND WILL DIRECT MY EXPERTS TO FOLLOW UP IMMEDIATELY WITH YOURS TO FORMALIZE OUR AGREEMENT.

WITH CFE RESOLVED BY OUR PERSONAL EFFORTS, I WILL BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU--IN THE SAME SPIRIT OF OPENNESS, FRANKNESS, AND COOPERATION--TO FIND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING START ISSUES SO THAT WE CAN SIGN THAT TREATY AT AN EARLY DATE. I ALSO WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO MOVE AHEAD ON OUR BROADER AGENDA. WE HAVE SO MUCH YET TO ACHIEVE. RESOLVING THE CURRENT PROBLEMS NOW WILL SET THE STAGE FOR FUTURE PROGRESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END OF TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

#0088

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0087 <TOR> 910408140939 MSG000292428579

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0088 <TOR> 910408140909 MSG000292428549

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] [redacted] (4 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/6/13

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0861-MR (520)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/16/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

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DTG 251349Z MAR 91

(b)(1)

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV THIS AFTERNOON, JUST AFTER HE MET WITH THE JAPANESE DELEGATION LED BY OZAWA. ONLY CHERNYAYEV WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING BESIDES THE TWO OF US.
2. I DESCRIBED TO GORBACHEV THE MAIN POINTS IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER AND STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS OPENING THE DOOR TO A PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS, AND WE SINCERELY HOPED HE WOULD FIND THIS APPROACH ACCEPTABLE. SINCE IT IS IMPORTANT TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR OTHER POSITIVE STEPS.
3. GORBACHEV SAID HE WOULD GIVE PROMPT ATTENTION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S IDEAS, AND INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THESE ISSUES. HE ASKED ME TO ASSURE "GEORGE" THAT HE UNDERSTANDS VERY WELL THAT CONTINUED U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IS THE CORNERSTONE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT HE, GORBACHEV, WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IT THAT WAY.
4. I GAVE HIM THE MESSAGE REGARDING THE BW INFORMATION, AND HE REPLIED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO RECEIVE THIS INFORMATION SO THAT HE CAN BETTER

UNDERSTAND HOW TO REASSURE US. "WE ARE ACTING WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE," HE SAID, "BUT IF YOU DON'T LET OUR PEOPLE VISIT YOUR FACILITIES THAT WILL

RAISE QUESTIONS." I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WISHED TO KEEP THE EXCHANGES ON TRACK AND THOUGHT THAT THE PAPERS WE WOULD GIVE BESSMERTNYKH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THE SORT OF ACTIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.

5. FINALLY, I TOOK THE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT THE REPORT HE MENTIONED TO SECRETARY BAKER REGARDING AN ALLEGED CONVERSATION WITH YELTSIN

WAS FALSE. (THE REPORT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT YELTSIN HAD ASKED ME WHAT THE USG WOULD DO IF "HIS GROUP" CAME TO POWER BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS.)

I TOLD GORBACHEV THAT YELTSIN HAD NEVER SAID THIS OR ANYTHING LIKE IT TO ME. IN FACT, IF HE HAD, I WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY SEVERED ALL CONTACT WITH

HIM. HE SAID THAT THE REPORT CAME "FROM YELTSIN'S ENTOURAGE," AND I REPLIED THAT, WHATEVER THE SOURCE, THE REPORT WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.

6. GORBACHEV THANKED ME FOR THE EXPLANATION, THEN LAUNCHED A RATHER LENGTHY COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT I AND MY WIFE ARE VERY RESPECTED AND VERY INFLUENTIAL IN THE SOVIET UNION, BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE COUNTRY AND ARE SYMPATHETIC TO ITS CULTURE. THIS MEANS THAT

OUR CONTACTS AND ASSOCIATIONS HAVE A POLITICAL SIDE TO THEM. HE HOPED THAT

I WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE "FIERCE STRUGGLE" GOING ON. "WE HAVE GONE THROUGH

A REAL WAR THESE LAST FEW WEEKS," HE ASSERTED, AND SAID THAT EVEN THE MOST

INNOCENT CONTACTS COULD BE MISCONSTRUED AND THAT CHARGES COULD BE MADE OF COLLUSION.

7. HE QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE HAD FULL CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S ATTITUDE AND MY OWN ACTIVITIES. "OF COURSE, THERE ARE SOME CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES; WE ARE NOT NAIVE," HE SAID, "BUT ALL COUNTRIES DO THAT."

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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I INTERJECTED THAT THERE WERE NO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO SUBVERT THE SOVIET UNION. AND HE HALF-CONCEDED THE POINT, BUT SAID THAT DESPITE THE UNDOUBTED GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER, THERE ARE "ELEMENTS" IN THE U.S. WHICH WOULD WELCOME THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION.

8. IN ANY EVENT, HE CONCLUDED, HE HOPED THAT I WOULD BEAR THE DELICACY OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN MIND. AND DO MY BEST TO COUNSEL MY STAFF TO STAY CLEAR OF TICKLISH SITUATIONS LEST THEIR ACTIVITIES BE MISCONSTRUED. (HE DID NOT DIRECTLY MENTION CONTACTS WITH THE STRIKING MINERS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IS WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.)

9. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD WHAT HE WAS SAYING, BUT WE COULD NOT ENTIRELY

PROTECT OURSELVES FROM MALICIOUS FABRICATIONS. THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR US TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH ALL LEGITIMATE POLITICAL FORCES, AND WE CANNOT DRAW BACK FROM SUCH CONTACT WITHOUT GIVING A NEGATIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL TO OUR AND THEIR PUBLICS. HOWEVER, I WOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE SE

CONTACTS DO NOT CROSS THE LINE INTO INTERFERENCE.

10. HE THEN CLOSED THE TOPIC BY THANKING ME FOR MY EXPLANATION REPEATING THAT HE WAS NOT IN ANY WAY CASTING ASPERSIONS ON MY CONDUCT - WHICH IN FACT HE ADMIRERD - BUT WANTED TO SENSITIZE ME TO THE FACT THAT THERE ARE THOSE WHO WOULD TRY TO USE THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO THEIR OWN POLITICAL BENEFIT.

11. COMMENT: WHEN WE LEFT THE OFFICE, CHERNYAYEV OBSERVED THAT IT WAS "VERY IMPORTANT" THAT I HAD CLARIFIED THE REPORT REGARDING YELTSIN'S ALLEGED QUESTION TO ME. I TAKE IT FROM THIS THAT GORBACHEV MUST HAVE TAKEN

IT SERIOUSLY, INDEED.

12. GORBACHEV SEEMED IN GOOD SPIRITS, BUT LOOKED PUFFY AND TIRED. HIS REFERENCE TO HAVING GONE THROUGH A "WAR" RECENTLY OBVIOUSLY REFERRED TO THE REFERENDUM, AND HIS CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE WON.

13. HE RECEIVED ME IN HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICE, RATHER THAN IN ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN THE KREMLIN, AS IS USUALLY THE CASE. HIS ASSISTANT EXPLAINED THIS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED OZAWA THERE SINCE HE MET OZAWA AS PARTY LEADER RATHER THAN PRESIDENT.

14. WARM REGARDS, JACK MATLOCK.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

END TEXT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
22. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	11-0861-MR(521)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
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TO WHITE HOUSE

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FROM JACK MATLOCK

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR NAME IN THE SECURE TELCON FROM THE WHITE HOUSE WITH JIM TIMBIE ON APRIL 9, I MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV AT 7PM TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE. I COVERED THE TALKING POINTS, EMPHASIZING THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IN A WAY THAT PERMITTED RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION TO OCCUR. I SAID THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED HIS PROPOSAL OFFERED A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE CFE PROBLEMS AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS READY TO URGE THE OTHER CFE SIGNATORIES AND THE SENATE TO ACCEPT IT. OBUKHOV READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY, CALLED IT AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT THAT WOULD REQUEST THOROUGH STUDY AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT PROMPTLY TO HIS PRINCIPAL. SAYING THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT SUBSTANTIVELY ON THE LETTER BEFORE IT HAD BEEN STUDIED, OBUKHOV DID NONETHELESS NOTE THAT THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE.

END TEXT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
23. Cable	General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock to White House Re: President's Letter on CFE (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	11-0861-MR(522)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



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PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 091145Z APR 91

(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0853-MR

31 9/17/13

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 091145Z APR 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS

WHITE HOUSE PASS TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

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TO: WHITE HOUSE

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK.

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE.

BEGIN TEXT:

BRENT:

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE ME TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE. CHERNYAYEV IS ALSO NOT AVAILABLE. HE IS ILL, AND HIS OFFICE TELLS US HE WILL BE OUT AT LEAST TWO DAYS. WITH GORBACHEV AND CHERNYAYEV UNAVAILABLE TODAY AND NO ASSURANCE I CAN GET TO SEE GORBACHEV EVEN TOMORROW, I NEED GUIDANCE ON HOW TO PROCEED.

DELIVERY TO BESSMERTNYKH IS NOT AN OPTION UNTIL LATER THIS WEEK. HE IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE NOT RETURNING UNTIL THE EVENING OF APRIL 10. OTHER OPTIONS ARE VERY LIMITED. AMONG KEY PLAYERS IN THE ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY, THE ONLY FIGURE WE ARE CERTAIN HAS BEEN PRIVY TO THE EXCHANGE ON CFE IS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV. IF URGENT DELIVERY IS REQUIRED, HE IS THE ONE OFFICIAL TO WHOM THE LETTER COULD BE DELIVERED TODAY AND TO WHOM I COULD TURN FOR HELP IN GETTING IT TO GORBACHEV PROMPTLY.

DURING A MEETING WITH OBUKHOV THIS MORNING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, OBUKHOV VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICE HAD CALLED HIM ABOUT MY REQUEST TO SEE THE PRESIDENT OR CHERNYAYEV TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. HE TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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HAD SAID SCHEDULING AN APPOINTMENT FOR ME WAS A PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT OBUKHOV MIGHT RECEIVE IT. I TOLD OBUKHOV ONLY THAT WE WERE AWARE A LETTER WOULD BE COMING AND THAT I WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE. AS USUAL. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT ITS DELIVERY. IF THERE IS TIME. I CAN CONTINUE TO PURSUE APPOINTMENTS WITH GORBACHEV AND CHERNYAYEV, OR WITH BESSMERTNYKH ON HIS RETURN IF DELIVERY OF THE LETTER TO HIM IS ACCEPTABLE. IF TIME IS URGENT I RECOMMEND CONVEYING THE LETTER TO OBUKHOV.

END OF TEXT:

DECL OADR

#0300

~~SECRET~~