

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91129
Folder ID Number: 91129-005

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	From White House, Re: Message for Ambassador Jack Matlock from Brent Scowcroft [261440Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	1/26/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Cable	From Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft [241555Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable	From DCM Collins to General Scowcroft [232148Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S
04a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [231646Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S
05a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S
05b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Pinksheet Number: cap1088
OA/ID Number: 91129-005
Date Closed: 4/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev Regarding the Baltic Situation (1 pp.)	1/22/91	(b)(1)	S
06b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning the Baltic Situation (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [021435Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/2/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Message	Re: Sent to Acting Secretary Bartholomew by Soviet Embassy Minister Counselor Chetverikov (2 pp.)	12/29/90	(b)(1)	
09. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	12/27	(b)(1)	
10. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11a. Handwritten Notes	From the President (1 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	
11b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning th Baltic Situation (3 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S
11c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

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
Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12. Cable	Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (5 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	S
13a. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (4 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	S
13b. Talking Points	Re: Items for the Secretary: Mazowiecki Visit (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
13c. Cable	From American Embassy Vienna to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Re: Austrian Businessman Offers to Mediate Release of Lebanon Hostages [091812Z Mar 90] [DOCUMENT DECLASSIFIED; FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	3/9/90	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (2 pp.)	1/1/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft [021435Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/2/91	(b)(1)	S
16a. Talking Points	Re: Here is the plan (1 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	
16b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with Ambassador Bessmertnykh (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
16c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with Ambassador Bessmertnykh (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
16d. Talking Points	Re: Response to Soviet Proposal (2 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	

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THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE **IMMEDIATE**
PRIORITY
ROUTINERELEASER: HeenDTG: 261656ZMESSAGE NO. 135 CLASSIFICATION~~SECRET~~

PAGES

2FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION WHITE HOUSE 261440Z JAN 91

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

CAMP DAVID

FLO GANTT FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

REMARKS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 4/17/09

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/12/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SII FILE PRIVACY OUT SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 261440Z JAN 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

JACK:

I SEE NO HARM IN A RELATIVELY GENERAL BRIEFING FOR THE BRITISH
AMBASSADOR. I WILL LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION (BASED ON YOUR OWN
RELATIONSHIP WITH AMBASSADOR BRAITHWAITE) WHETHER TO INFORM HIM
OF THE DETAILS OF GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE
SOVIET UNION AND HIS OWN POSITION. I WOULD ASK THAT YOU NOT
MENTION THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE LETTER (THE POSSIBILITY OF A
FREEZE ON ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP). YOU COULD
CERTAINLY CONFIRM THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE LETTER WAS THE BALTIC
SITUATION AND THAT THE PRESIDENT REITERATED HIS CONCERN AND
DESIRE TO SEE THE SOVIETS TURN BACK TO THE PATH OF DIALOGUE WITH
THE BALTIC LEADERS IN VERY STRONG TERMS.

END TEXT

DECL. OADR
#0091

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR
6/12/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Cable	From Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft [241555Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(501)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/12/2014

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 1.4(c)

<DTG> 241555Z JAN 91

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.3(b)(6)

<TO>TO WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>*** INCOMPLETE CABLE ***

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR

6/12/2014 MM

HEREWITH A FULLER ACCOUNT OF MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV TODAY.

I WENT ALONE TO THE MEETING. CHERNYAYEV ATTENDED AND TOOK NOTES, BUT DID NOT ENTER INTO THE CONVERSATION SUBSTANTIVELY. THERE WERE NO OTHERS PRESENT, AND WE CONDUCTED THE MEETING ENTIRELY IN RUSSIAN. I THANKED GORBACHEV FOR RECEIVING ME PROMPTLY, AND AS SOON AS THE STAFF PHOTOGRAPHERS LEFT THE ROOM, I HANDED GORBACHEV THE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND THEN TRANSLATED IT ALOUD INTO RUSSIAN. GORBACHEV FOLLOWED THE ENGLISH TEXT AND WOULD OCCASIONALLY RECOGNIZE A WORD AND PRONOUNCE IT, EXHIBITING CHILDLIKE PLEASURE.

WHEN I FINISHED, GORBACHEV ASKED IF I HAD ANYTHING TO ADD. I SAID THAT I HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS BEYOND THE LETTER ITSELF. HE THEN ASKED IF I HAD ANY "PERSONAL" COMMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD GIVE HIM MY VIEW IF IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD TO BE PRECISELY THAT - MY PERSONAL VIEW AND NOTHING MORE. HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND HE THOUGHT WE KNEW EACH OTHER WELL ENOUGH TO BE COMPLETELY OPEN.

I THEN TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT BUSH IS COMING UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE NOW SINCE IT SEEMS TO OUR PUBLIC AND OUR CONGRESS THAT THE PRESSURE ON THE BALTIC LEADERS HAS BEEN CALCULATED AND ORCHESTRATED, AND THAT THIS CONFRONTATIONAL ATMOSPHERE HAD ENCOURAGED THE SORT OF UNDISCIPLINED ACTIONS BY MILITARY AND POLICE UNITS WHICH RESULTED IN THE TRAGIC DEATHS IN VILNIUS AND RIGA. IF THIS SORT OF SITUATION CONTINUES, I FELT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE ABLE POLITICALLY TO SUSTAIN A SUPPORTIVE ECONOMIC POSTURE.

I ADDED THAT I ALWAYS TRIED TO REPORT AND INTERPRET EVENTS HERE AS OBJECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. I KNEW GORBACHEV WELL ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT HE WAS UNLIKELY TO ABANDON HIS DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE REFORMS AND TO AVOID VIOLENCE. YET, WE HAD WITNESSED OVER THE PAST WEEKS A SERIES OF STEPS WHICH I SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND. WHILE I HAVE NO DOUBT WHATEVER THAT HE HAD NO ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASSAULT ON THE TV TOWER IN VILNIUS OR ON THE POLICE STATION IN RIGA, THERE HAD BEEN A SERIES OF THREATENING GESTURES FROM HIS GOVERNMENT SINCE EARLY DECEMBER, INCLUDING THE ANNOUNCED DISPATCH OF PARATROOPS, AND A DRUMBEAT OF PROPAGANDA ACCUSING THE BALTIC LEADERS OF EVERY SIN IMAGINABLE. SOME DEMANDS ISSUED DIRECTLY IN HIS NAME - SUCH AS THE ULTIMATUM TO RETURN TO "CONSTITUTIONAL RULE" WERE TOO VAGUE TO BE PRECISELY UNDERSTOOD AND ALSO SO SWEEPING AS TO BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO FULFIL.

THE UPSHOT WAS THAT THEIR MOVES INSTILLED A BUNKER MENTALITY IN THE BALTIC LEADERS, PARTICULARLY IN LITHUANIA, AND ENCOURAGED HOTHEADS IN

AND OUT OF UNIFORM TO TAKE MATTERS IN THEIR OWN HANDS.

I ADDED THAT I SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE STRATEGY WHICH LAY BEHIND THIS. CERTAINLY IT DID NOT SEEM POSSIBLE TO REACH POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE, SINCE THREATS AND VIOLENCE SIMPLY CAUSE FURTHER POLARIZATION OF OPINION. I CONCLUDED THAT I COULD CERTAINLY UNDERSTAND WHY HE WOULD FOLLOW POLICIES IN HIS AND HIS COUNTRY'S INTEREST, WHETHER OR NOT THEY PLEASED US. WHAT I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WAS HOW THOSE STEPS WHICH WE HAVE WITNESSED RECENTLY COULD POSSIBLY BE CONSIDERED IN HIS OR HIS COUNTRY'S INTEREST.

GORBACHEV THANKED ME FOR MY CANDOR, WITH SEEMING SINCERITY AND NO TRACE OF IRONY. HE SAID HE WOULD SEND A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, BUT IN THE MEANTIME WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF I WOULD CONVEY HIS THOUGHTS TO THE PRESIDENT.

FIRST, HE WISHED TO RECALL THEIR COOPERATION ON THE PERSIAN GULF ISSUE. SOME PEOPLE IN THE AREA WERE BEGINNING TO ACCUSE HIM OF ENTERING INTO A CONSPIRACY WITH PRESIDENT BUSH TO DEPRIVE THE ARABS OF THEIR MEANS OF DEFENDING THEMSELVES. HOWEVER, HE WOULD RESIST THESE AND OTHER PRESSURES. THE ISSUES AT STAKE ARE TOO PRECIOUS TO BE MADE THE OBJECT OF POLITICAL GAMES. THE MOST BASIC CONCEPT OF HUMAN VALUES IS AT STAKE HERE. AS HE HAD MENTIONED TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE TELEPHONE, WE MUST START THINKING ABOUT WHAT SHOULD FOLLOW IN THE AREA WHEN HOSTILITIES ARE OVER. FOR NOW, HE WANTED ME TO ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT HE VALUES THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED ON THIS ISSUE, AND THAT HE WILL CONTINUE THEIR COOPERATIVE COURSE WITHOUT DEVIATION.

SECOND, HE WOULD ASK FOR UNDERSTANDING OF HIS SITUATION. HE WONDERED IF PRESIDENT BUSH UNDERSTOOD FULLY THE COMPLEXITY AND GRAVITY OF WHAT IS GOING ON HERE. HE, GORBACHEV, MUST DO ALL HE CAN TO AVOID A CIVIL WAR. THAT IS WHAT IS AT STAKE, NO MORE, NO LESS. HE IS TRYING HIS BEST TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY. THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BECAUSE JUST ABOUT EVERY PART OF SOCIETY, HAVING BEEN UNLEASHED, IS PULLING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. HE WOULD HOPE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE IS TRYING TO GOVERN A COUNTRY WHICH LACKS A MATURE POLITICAL CULTURE. HIS GOAL CONTINUES TO BE TO CREATE A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, BUT HE MUST ALSO SEE TO IT THAT THE CONFLICTS WHICH HAVE NOW COME TO THE SURFACE ARE SOMEHOW RESOLVED WITHOUT VIOLENCE. HE MUST USE EVERY MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL - INCLUDING WHAT IS LEFT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, WHICH IS WHY HE CONTINUES TO HOLD THE POSITION OF GENERAL SECRETARY.

THOSE WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES "DEMOCRATS" ARE NOW SAYING THAT HE IS A HOSTAGE OF THE MILITARY AND THE RIGHT WING. THAT IS NONSENSE. HE IS NOBODY'S HOSTAGE. NEVERTHELESS, HE CANNOT BE INDIFFERENT TO STRONG EMOTIONS HELD BY IMPORTANT SECTORS OF THE PUBLIC. IN THE BALTIC, THE RUSSIANS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES HAVE EXPERIENCED THE MOST SEVERE ASSAULTS ON THEIR RIGHTS AS CITIZENS. SOME OF THE BALTIC POLITICIANS ARE SAYING THAT ALL PERSONS WHO SETTLED THERE IN THE LAST 40 YEARS MUST LEAVE. OF COURSE, AS PRESIDENT, HE CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH GROSS VIOLATIONS OF ELEMENTARY CIVIL RIGHTS. THE COMMISSIONS HE SENT THERE FROM THE COUNCIL OF FEDERATION AND SUPREME SOVIET HAVE REPORTED WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS. THIS IS WHY HE DECIDED NOT TO MAKE THEIR REPORTS PUBLIC IMMEDIATELY, SINCE THEY WOULD ONLY INFLAME PASSIONS.

- YES, HE CONTINUED - PICKING UP A FAMILIAR ARGUMENT - IF THE BALTIC STATES WANT INDEPENDENCE, THEY CAN HAVE IT, BUT ONLY IF THEY FOLLOW A CONSTITUTIONAL COURSE.

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#0148

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 02 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

- I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THE BALTIC POSITION IS THAT THEY WERE NEVER ASKED WHETHER THEY WANTED TO BE IN THE USSR OR NOT, THEREFORE LOGICALLY IF THERE IS TO BE A REFERENDUM IT SHOULD BE ON WHETHER TO ENTER THE SOVIET UNION, NOT WHETHER TO LEAVE IT. ASIDE FROM THIS, THE CURRENT LAW ON SECESSION PLACES SO MANY BARRIERS IN THE WAY THAT IT CAN HARDLY BE CONSIDERED AS IMPLEMENTING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. HE OUGHT TO CONSIDER THINGS SO THAT A REFERENDUM WOULD BE THE DEFINITIVE STEP AND THE REST IMPLEMENTING DETAIL, RATHER THAN A SEEMINGLY IMPOSSIBLE OBSTACLE COURSE.

- HE SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH THE BALTIC LEADERS. AND YES - AS THE PRESIDENT REMINDED HIM IN HIS LETTER - HE HAD PROMISED TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LITHUANIANS. HE HAD ENDED SANCTIONS, AND ANNOUNCED HIS READINESS TO NEGOTIATE, BUT AT THE FIRST SESSION LANDSBERGIS HAD DEMANDED A FORMAL RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN. RYZHKOV HAD TO TELL HIM THAT HE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO TAKE THAT STEP, WHICH LOGICALLY SHOULD BE AT THE END OF THE PROCESS, NOT THE BEGINNING. NEVERTHELESS, THEY HAD CONTINUED THE DIALOGUE WITH THE LITHUANIANS, AND THOUGHT THEY WERE MAKING HEADWAY WITH PRUNSKIENE. SHE IS A REASONABLE PERSON, BUT HER POLITICAL MISTAKE IN RAISING PRICES GAVE LANDSBERGIS AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HER REMOVED. NOW, THERE SEEMS TO BE NOBODY IN VILNIUS HE CAN TALK TO RATIONALLY. AS HE TOLD PRUNSKIENE SOME TIME BACK, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE COULD NOT BE A SETTLEMENT IN LITHUANIA SO LONG AS LANDSBERGIS LEADS THE GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, HE WILL KEEP TRYING.

THE PICTURE IS MUCH BRIGHTER IN LATVIA, HE SAID. HE FELT HIS RECENT MEETING WITH GORBUNOV AND RUBIKS WAS SUCCESSFUL. THEY CAME TO AN AGREEMENT AS TO HOW TO PROCEED AND "EVEN RUBIKS" (THE HARDLINE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER WHO APPARENTLY INITIATED THE MILITARY SEIZURE OF THE RIGA PRINTING PLANT) AGREED.

NEVERTHELESS, WHILE HE IS BEGINNING TO MAKE PROGRESS IN REDUCING TENSION IN THE AREA, BORIS YELTSIN CONTINUES TO PLAY POLITICAL GAMES. AT ONE MEETING HE WILL AGREE TO COOPERATE, THEN HE DENOUNCES THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT A FEW DAYS LATER. HE PROMISES COMPLETE FREEDOM TO ALL HIS AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS EVEN THOUGH HE KNOWS VERY WELL HE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT DELIVER. NEVERTHELESS, HE, GORBACHEV, WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE ALIVE BECAUSE "THERE IS NO OTHER WAY."

THEN HE REPEATED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE IS UNDER "HELLISH PRESSURE" BUT THAT HE IS DETERMINED TO "STAY THE COURSE." HE IS STILL FIRMLY OPPOSED TO USING FORCE IN THE BALTIC, AND IF HE SEEMS TO ZIG AND ZAG AT TIMES, THAT IS ONLY BECAUSE HE WANTS TO PREVENT A BLOOD BATH. TENSIONS ARE EXTREMELY HIGH. MANY ARE DEMANDING THAT HE IMPOSE PRESIDENTIAL RULE, AND HE MUST MANEUVER TO KEEP THESE FORCES FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND.

HE ADDED THAT I SHOULD LET PRESIDENT BUSH KNOW THAT HE WILL HOLD A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FEDERATION ON FEBRUARY 1 AND/OR 2, WITH THE PURPOSE OF DECIDING ON A NEGOTIATING APPROACH TO THE BALTICS. HE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IRREGULAR ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE "COUNCILS OF NATIONAL SALVATION" HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING OR LEGAL AUTHORITY.

HE THEN ASKED IF PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SAID THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO FREEZE ELEMENTS OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, OR THAT HE WOULD DECIDE IF THERE WERE NO CHANGE. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT THE SENTENCE "I CANNOT IN

GOOD CONSCIENCE, AND INDEED WILL NOT CONTINUE ALONG THIS PATH," SOUNDED AS IF THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY DECIDED.

I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT THE NEXT PARAGRAPH MADE CLEAR THAT THE DECISION WAS NOT FINAL, SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID "IN THE ABSENCE OF CHANGE... (HE) WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND."

GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN IN A FORMAL REPLY TO THE LETTER, BUT IN THE INTERIM HE COULD ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT HE HAS NOT CHANGED COURSE, EITHER IN RESPECT TO SETTLING DISPUTES WITH THE BALTIC LEADERS PEACEFULLY, OR IN RESPECT TO ECONOMIC REFORM. ON THE LATTER, HE IS STILL DETERMINED TO PROCEED TO DEMONOPOLIZATION, PRIVATIZATION, AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY. THEY JUST RECENTLY MOVED TO REDUCE THE RUBLE OVERHANG, BY WITHDRAWING LARGE BANKNOTES FROM CIRCULATION, AND OTHER STEPS IN THE FORM OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREES, WOULD SOON BE TAKEN TO MOVE TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY.

OF COURSE, IF PRESIDENT BUSH DID PROCEED WITH THE COURSE OF "SANCTIONS" HE MENTIONED, THIS WOULD NOT HELP. (I INTERJECTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT SPEAKING OF "SANCTIONS," BUT RATHER OF THE POLITICAL NECESSITY OF SUSPENDING SOME COOPERATIVE AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE ECONOMIC AREA SHOULD THERE BE NO CHANGE OF COURSE VIS A VIS THE BALTIC. GORBACHEV AGREED THAT PERHAPS "SANCTIONS" WAS NOT THE RIGHT TERM, BUT ADDED THAT WHATEVER THE STEPS ARE CALLED, THEY WOULD NOT ASSIST HIM IN AVOIDING AN EXPLOSION WHICH COULD LEAD TO CIVIL WAR.

HE THEN ASKED ABOUT THE SUMMIT DATES SAYING THAT HE HAD NOTICED THAT "MR. FITZWATER KEEPS PUTTING QUESTION MARKS ON THEM," BUT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING FROM THE PRESIDENT DIRECTLY. "IF THEY MUST BE POSTPONED, I CAN UNDERSTAND," HE SAID. "IT WOULDN'T HURT TO MEET A LITTLE LATER, IF THAT SUITS PRESIDENT BUSH - THOUGH I WOULDN'T WANT TO WAIT UNTIL THE END OF YEAR." HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONSULT AND TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT THAT BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED ON A POSTPONEMENT. HE HOPED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD SHARE HIS CURRENT THINKING WITH HIM ON THIS POINT.

I TOLD HIM THAT ASIDE FROM THE ISSUE WE HAD DISCUSSED, AND THE HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF WHICH REQUIRE PRESIDENT BUSH'S ATTENTION, WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAD ARISEN IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS AND WITH THE CFE DATA. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THERE WERE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS WHICH COULD BE EASILY CLEARED UP. I SAID THAT THE START ISSUES WERE TECHNICAL BUT VERY IMPORTANT. WE ALL HOPED THEY WOULD BE CLEARED UP THIS WEEK. BUT THE CFE ISSUES GET TO THE HEART OF THE TREATY AND MUST NOT BE IGNORED. GORBACHEV DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS AND I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MAY NOT BE FULLY BRIEFED ON THE CFE PROBLEMS.

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#0149

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 <SSN> 0148 <TOR> 910124135623 MSG000286034183

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 0149 <TOR> 910124140439 MSG000286034679

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 1.4(c)

<DTG> 241745Z JAN 91

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.3(b)(6)

<TO>TO WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>*** INCOMPLETE CABLE ***

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

AS I LEFT I SAID WE LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS FURTHER WHEN BESSMERTNYKH RETURNS TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD PICKED BESSMERTNYKH FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BECAUSE HE WANTED SOMEONE WHO HAD A GOOD AND INTIMATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES. "WE HAVE SEVERAL VERY COMPETENT DIPLOMATS, HE SAID, BUT BESSMERTNYKH KNOWS YOU BEST. WE MUST KEEP THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP INTACT, AND BUILD ON IT. WITHOUT THAT, NOTHING ELSE IS POSSIBLE. AND THAT'S WHY I CHOSE HIM."

I TOLD HIM THAT WE TOO HAVE A STRONG DESIRE TO KEEP THAT RELATIONSHIP INTACT, AND THAT IS WHY PRESIDENT BUSH HAD WRITTEN HIM. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT TENSION WILL BE REDUCED IN THE BALTIC AND THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE RESUMED. WE RECOGNIZE THE DELICACY OF THE SITUATION THERE AND ARE NOT TRYING TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR HIM, BUT WE FACE OUR OWN POLITICAL REALITIES. I ADDED THAT, IF AT ANY POINT, THERE ARE WAYS FOR US TO BE DISCREETLY HELPFUL IN SUPPORTING NEGOTIATIONS FOR BALTIC INDEPENDENCE, I WAS SURE THAT WE WOULD GIVE THEM CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

- GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US IF HE FELT THERE WAS ANYTHING WE MIGHT USEFULLY DO. HE REITERATED HIS WARM GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT BUSH.

COMMENT: I HAVE REPRODUCED MUCH OF THE DETAIL OF OUR CONVERSATION TO CONVEY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF ITS FLAVOR.

GORBACHEV CONVEYED A REMARKABLY RELAXED IMPRESSION PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF HIS COMMENTS. HOWEVER, HE LOOKED QUITE TIRED - SOME PUFFINESS AROUND THE EYES AND A PALLOR IN HIS FACE. HE OBVIOUSLY HAS BEEN GETTING LESS THAN EIGHT HOURS OF SLEEP A NIGHT.

I WOULD NOTE THAT HE NEVER EXPRESSED ANY ANGER WHATSOEVER AT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, AND NO HINT OF "THIS IS NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS." RATHER, HIS OVERALL MESSAGE COULD BE SUMMED UP AS: "BELIEVE ME, I'M DOING MY BEST, AND HAVE NOT CHANGED COURSE. LET'S TALK IT OVER BEFORE GETTING INTO A PUBLIC DISAGREEMENT." STARTING OUT WITH A REASSURANCE REGARDING HIS STANCE ON THE GULF WAS DOUBTLESS INTENDED AS A MESSAGE, BUT THE MESSAGE WAS IMPLICIT.

WE SHOULD LEARN VERY SOON WHETHER GORBACHEV CAN CALM THE SITUATION IN THE BALTIC'S, AS HE ASSURES US HE WISHES. AS WE WATCH HIS FUTURE MOVES, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE WISE TO HOLD OFF ON ANNOUNCING ANY OF THE STEPS THE PRESIDENT IS CONSIDERING. I BELIEVE IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO PUT GORBACHEV ON NOTICE AS THE PRESIDENT HAS DONE, BUT OUR LEVERAGE IS PROBABLY GREATER BEFORE WE TAKE SUCH ACTION THAN AFTER.

WARM REGARDS,
JACK.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#0147

<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03 <SSN> 0147 <TOR> 910124140455 MSG000286034695

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Cable	From DCM Collins to General Scowcroft [232148Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/12/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 1.4(c)

<DTG> 232148Z JAN 91

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.3(b)(6)

<TO> TO THE WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM DCM COLLINS


MY ATTEMPTS TO REACH CHERNYAYEV'S OFFICE (SINCE 11:00 PM)
TO ARRANGE FOR RECEIPT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER THIS EVENING HAVE
NOT SUCCEEDED. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, I RECOMMEND HOLDING
THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER UNTIL OOB JANUARY 24 FOR DELIVERY BY
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AS ORIGINALLY INSTRUCTED. ONLY AVAILABLE
ALTERNATIVE AT THIS HOUR WOULD BE TO WORK THROUGH MFA DUTY
PERSONNEL WHICH I DO NOT RECOMMEND.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0113

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0113 <TOR> 910123171403 MSG000285959643



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR
6/12/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [231646Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: PRIVACY_OUT

<PREC> FLASH

<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

1.4(c)

<DTG> 231646Z JAN 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO 1.4(c); 1.4(d)

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. IF AMBASSADOR IS NOT AVAILABLE, PLEASE SEEK FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

JANUARY 23, 1991

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY. IF HE IS NOT AVAILABLE, PLEASE SEEK A MEETING WITH MR. CHERNYAYEV AND ASK THAT HE DELIVER THE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

TEXT FOLLOWS:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

I AM WRITING TO YOU TO EXPRESS MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT TURN OF EVENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES. I THINK THAT YOU KNOW HOW MUCH I VALUE THE UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF COOPERATION THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS. I HAVE ALSO SAID REPEATEDLY THAT OUR SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN DUE IN LARGE PART TO YOUR EFFORTS TO REFORM THE SOVIET UNION. AS SUCH, THE RESPONSE OF MY ADMINISTRATION TO EVENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES OVER THE LAST YEAR HAS BEEN RESTRAINED. YOU, YOURSELF, KNOW THAT I HAVE FACED PRESSURES FROM MANY QUARTERS TO TAKE STRONGER MEASURES AND THAT I HAVE RESISTED DOING SO.

LAST JUNE, DURING THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, WE TALKED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE BALTIC STATES AT GREAT LENGTH. I EXPLAINED THAT I APPRECIATED THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH YOU WERE OPERATING BUT THAT I TOO FACED CERTAIN PRESSURES. NONETHELESS, I HONORED YOUR PERSONAL REQUEST AND SIGNED THE TRADE AGREEMENT IN SPITE OF THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD IMPOSED ON LITHUANIA. YOU GAVE ME ASSURANCES THAT YOU WOULD TAKE STEPS TO SETTLE PEACEFULLY ALL DIFFERENCES WITH THE BALTIC LEADERS. SEVERAL WEEKS LATER, YOU LIFTED THAT BLOCKADE AND BEGAN A DIALOGUE WITH LITHUANIAN AND OTHER BALTIC LEADERS. FROM THAT TIME ON, OUR COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE HAS EXPANDED, CULMINATING IN THE STEPS THAT I TOOK ON DECEMBER 12 IN RESPONSE



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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR

7/31/2014 MM

TO THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT YOUR COUNTRY FACED AS WINTER APPROACHED. I SAID THEN THAT I WANTED TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP THE SOVIET UNION STAY ON THE COURSE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

UNFORTUNATELY, IN VIEW OF THE EVENTS OF THE LAST TWO WEEKS - RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF AT LEAST TWENTY PEOPLE IN THE BALTIC STATES -- I CANNOT, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, AND INDEED, WILL NOT CONTINUE ALONG THIS PATH. I BELIEVE THAT THE LEADERS OF THE BALTIC STATES HAVE ACTED WITH RESTRAINT, PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS, AND DID NOT DESERVE TO HAVE THEIR QUEST FOR NEGOTIATIONS MET WITH FORCE. THE UNRELENTING INTIMIDATION, PRESSURE, AND ARMED FORCE TO WHICH THESE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEADERS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED IS SOMETHING THAT I FRANKLY CANNOT UNDERSTAND.

I HAD HOPED TO SEE POSITIVE STEPS TOWARD THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT WITH THE ELECTED LEADERS OF THE BALTIC STATES. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF THAT AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A POSITIVE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION, I WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND. THUS, UNLESS YOU CAN TAKE THESE POSITIVE STEPS VERY SOON, I WILL FREEZE MANY ELEMENTS OF OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING EXPORT-IMPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES; COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION CREDIT GUARANTEES; SUPPORT FOR "SPECIAL ASSOCIATE STATUS" FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; AND MOST OF OUR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. FURTHER, I WOULD NOT SUBMIT THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY OR TAX TREATY TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE FOR CONSENT TO RATIFICATION WHEN AND IF THEY ARE COMPLETED.

I WOULD NOT TAKE THESE STEPS TO, IN ANY SENSE, PUNISH THE SOVIET UNION. I VIEWED THE EXPANSION OF OUR ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP NOT AS A REWARD BUT RATHER AS A NATURAL RESPONSE TO SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. SADLY, EVENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES CALL INTO QUESTION THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE VERY REFORMS THAT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR MUCH OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. I REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT CONDITIONS IN THE BALTIC STATES WILL SOON PERMIT THE RENEWAL OF OUR EFFORTS.

IN THE MEANTIME, I INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING IN MY POWER TO PRESERVE OUR RELATIONSHIP THROUGHOUT THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD AND TO WORK TOWARD PROGRESS IN AREAS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. WE HAVE COME TOO FAR IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS TO RETURN TO A CONFRONTATIONAL COURSE -- A TURN OF EVENTS THAT WOULD SERVE NO ONE'S INTERESTS. WE HAVE BOTH TALKED OF OUR DESIRE FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER, AND WE BOTH UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT GOAL. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO THAT OBJECTIVE.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY THAT I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT YOU FACE: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE PATH TO FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM IS NEITHER STRAIGHT NOR EASY. NO ONE WISHES TO SEE THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET

#0060

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

UNION. BUT MIKHAIL, I CANNOT HELP BUT RECALL THAT YOU, YOURSELF, TOLD ME THAT YOU PERSONALLY COULD NOT SANCTION THE USE OF FORCE

IN THE BALTIC STATES BECAUSE IT WOULD MEAN THE END OF
PERESTROIKA. YOU SAID THAT ONLY POLITICAL MEANS IN THE SETTLEMENT
OF POLITICAL DISPUTES WERE CONSISTENT WITH YOUR VISION
OF A SOCIETY BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW. I URGE YOU TO TURN BACK
NOW TO A COURSE OF NEGOTIATION AND DIALOGUE AND TO TAKE CONCRETE
STEPS TO PREVENT THE FURTHER USE OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION
AGAINST THE BALTIC PEOPLES AND THEIR ELECTED LEADERS.

SINCERELY,

/S/ GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0061

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0060 <TOR> 910123114920 MSG000285940160
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0061 <TOR> 910123114932 MSG000285940172

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

JANUARY 23, 1991

VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: 1.4(c); 1.4(d)

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. IF AMBASSADOR IS NOT AVAILABLE, PLEASE SEEK FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

TO: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY. IF HE IS NOT AVAILABLE, PLEASE SEEK A MEETING WITH MR. CHERNYAYEV AND ASK THAT HE DELIVER THE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

TEXT FOLLOWS:

Dear Mikhail:

I am writing to you to express my deep concern about the recent turn of events in the Baltic states. I think that you know how much I value the unprecedented level of cooperation that we have achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last two years. I have also said repeatedly that our successes have been due in large part to your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. As such, the response of my Administration to events in the Baltics states over the last year has been restrained. You, yourself, know that I have faced pressures from many quarters to take stronger measures and that I have resisted doing so.

Last June, during the Washington Summit, we talked about the effect of Soviet actions in the Baltic states at great length. I explained that I appreciated the constraints under which you were operating but that I too faced certain pressures. Nonetheless, I

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2011-0857-MR

7/31/2014 MM



(2)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

honored your personal request and signed the Trade Agreement in spite of the economic blockade that the Soviet Union had imposed on Lithuania. You gave me assurances that you would take steps to settle peacefully all differences with the Baltic leaders. Several weeks later, you lifted that blockade and began a dialogue with Lithuanian and other Baltic leaders. From that time on, our cooperation in the economic sphere has expanded, culminating in the steps that I took on December 12 in response to the difficult circumstances that your country faced as winter approached. I said then that I wanted to do something to help the Soviet Union stay on the course of political and economic reform.

Unfortunately, in view of the events of the last two weeks - - resulting in the deaths of at least twenty people in the Baltic states -- I cannot, in good conscience, and indeed, will not continue along this path. I believe that the leaders of the Baltic states have acted with restraint, particularly in the last two weeks, and did not deserve to have their quest for negotiations met with force. The unrelenting intimidation, pressure, and armed force to which these democratically elected leaders have been subjected is something that I frankly cannot understand.

I had hoped to see positive steps toward the peaceful resolution of this conflict with the elected leaders of the Baltic states. But in the absence of that and in the absence of a positive change in the situation, I would have no choice but to

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

respond. Thus, unless you can take these positive steps very soon, I will freeze many elements of our economic relationship including Export-Import credit guarantees; Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees; support for "Special Associate Status" for the Soviet Union in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and most of our technical assistance programs. Further, I would not submit the Bilateral Investment Treaty or Tax Treaty to the United States Senate for consent to ratification when and if they are completed.

I would not take these steps to, in any sense, punish the Soviet Union. I viewed the expansion of our economic and commercial relationship not as a reward but rather as a natural response to Soviet political and economic reform. Sadly, events in the Baltic states call into question the Soviet government's commitment to the very reforms that provide the basis for much of what we are trying to do in the economic sphere. I remain hopeful that conditions in the Baltic states will soon permit the renewal of our efforts.

In the meantime, I intend to do everything in my power to preserve our relationship throughout this difficult period and to work toward progress in areas of mutual advantage. We have come too far in U.S.-Soviet relations to return to a confrontational course -- a turn of events that would serve no one's interests. We have both talked of our desire for a new world order, and we

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

both understand the importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation to the achievement of that goal. I remain committed to that objective.

In closing, let me say that I do not underestimate the difficulties that you face: I understand that the path to fundamental economic and political reform is neither straight nor easy. No one wishes to see the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But Mikhail, I cannot help but recall that you, yourself, told me that you personally could not sanction the use of force in the Baltic states because it would mean the end of perestroika. You said that only political means in the settlement of political disputes were consistent with your vision of a society based on the rule of law. I urge you to turn back now to a course of negotiation and dialogue and to take concrete steps to prevent the further use of force and intimidation against the Baltic peoples and their elected leaders.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

END TEXT.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	1/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

JANUARY 23, 1991

VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: 1.4(c); 1.4(d)

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. IF AMBASSADOR IS NOT AVAILABLE, PLEASE SEEK FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

TO: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY. IF HE IS NOT AVAILABLE, PLEASE SEEK A MEETING WITH MR. CHERNYAYEV AND ASK THAT HE DELIVER THE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

TEXT FOLLOWS:

Dear Mikhail:

I am writing to you to express my deep concern about the recent turn of events in the Baltic states. I think that you know how much I value the unprecedented level of cooperation that we have achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last two years. I have also said repeatedly that our successes have been due in large part to your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. As such, the response of my Administration to events in the Baltics states over the last year has been restrained. You, yourself, know that I have faced pressures from many quarters to take stronger measures and that I have resisted doing so.


Last June, during the Washington Summit, we talked about the effect of Soviet actions in the Baltic states at great length. I explained that I appreciated the constraints under which you were operating but that I too faced certain pressures. Nonetheless, I

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2011-0857-MR

7/31/2014 M4



(2)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

honored your personal request and signed the Trade Agreement in spite of the economic blockade that the Soviet Union had imposed on Lithuania. You gave me assurances that you would take steps to settle peacefully all differences with the Baltic leaders. Several weeks later, you lifted that blockade and began a dialogue with Lithuanian and other Baltic leaders. From that time on, our cooperation in the economic sphere has expanded, culminating in the steps that I took on December 12 in response to the difficult circumstances that your country faced as winter approached. I said then that I wanted to do something to help the Soviet Union stay on the course of political and economic reform.

Unfortunately, in view of the events of the last two weeks - - resulting in the deaths of at least twenty people in the Baltic states -- I cannot, in good conscience, and indeed, will not continue along this path. I believe that the leaders of the Baltic states have acted with restraint, particularly in the last two weeks, and did not deserve to have their quest for negotiations met with force. The unrelenting intimidation, pressure, and armed force to which these democratically elected leaders have been subjected is something that I frankly cannot understand.

I had hoped to see positive steps toward the peaceful resolution of this conflict with the elected leaders of the Baltic states. But in the absence of that and in the absence of a positive change in the situation, I would have no choice but to

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

respond. Thus, unless you can take these positive steps very soon, I will freeze many elements of our economic relationship including Export-Import credit guarantees; Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees; support for "Special Associate Status" for the Soviet Union in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and most of our technical assistance programs. Further, I would not submit the Bilateral Investment Treaty or Tax Treaty to the United States Senate for consent to ratification when and if they are completed.

I would not take these steps to, in any sense, punish the Soviet Union. I viewed the expansion of our economic and commercial relationship not as a reward but rather as a natural response to Soviet political and economic reform. Sadly, events in the Baltic states call into question the Soviet government's commitment to the very reforms that provide the basis for much of what we are trying to do in the economic sphere. I remain hopeful that conditions in the Baltic states will soon permit the renewal of our efforts.

In the meantime, I intend to do everything in my power to preserve our relationship throughout this difficult period and to work toward progress in areas of mutual advantage. We have come too far in U.S.-Soviet relations to return to a confrontational course -- a turn of events that would serve no one's interests. We have both talked of our desire for a new world order, and we

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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

both understand the importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation to the achievement of that goal. I remain committed to that objective.

In closing, let me say that I do not underestimate the difficulties that you face: I understand that the path to fundamental economic and political reform is neither straight nor easy. No one wishes to see the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But Mikhail, I cannot help but recall that you, yourself, told me that you personally could not sanction the use of force in the Baltic states because it would mean the end of perestroika. You said that only political means in the settlement of political disputes were consistent with your vision of a society based on the rule of law. I urge you to turn back now to a course of negotiation and dialogue and to take concrete steps to prevent the further use of force and intimidation against the Baltic peoples and their elected leaders.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

END TEXT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

I am writing to you to express my deep concern about the recent turn of events in the Baltic states. I think that you know how much I value the unprecedented level of cooperation that we have achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last two years. I have also said repeatedly that our successes have been due in large part to your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. As such, the response of my Administration to events in the Baltics states over the last year has been restrained. You, yourself, know that I have faced pressures from many quarters to take stronger measures and that I have resisted doing so.

Last June, during the Washington Summit, we talked about the effect of Soviet actions in the Baltic states at great length. I explained that I appreciated the constraints under which you were operating but that I too faced certain pressures. Nonetheless, I honored your personal request and signed the Trade Agreement in spite of the economic blockade that the Soviet Union had imposed on Lithuania. You gave me assurances that you would take steps to settle peacefully all differences with the Baltic leaders. Several weeks later, you lifted that blockade and began a dialogue with Lithuanian and other Baltic leaders. From that time on, our cooperation in the economic sphere has expanded, culminating in the steps that I took on December 12 in response to the difficult circumstances that your country faced as winter approached. I said then that I wanted to do something to help the Soviet Union stay on the course of political and economic reform.

Unfortunately, in view of the events of the last two weeks -- resulting in the deaths of at least twenty people in the Baltic states -- I cannot, in good conscience, and indeed, will not

continue along this path. I believe that the leaders of the Baltic states have acted with restraint, particularly in the last two weeks, and did not deserve to have their quest for negotiations met with force. The unrelenting intimidation, pressure, and armed force to which these democratically elected leaders have been subjected is something that I frankly cannot understand.

I had hoped to see positive steps toward the peaceful resolution of this conflict with the elected leaders of the Baltic states. But in the absence of that and in the absence of a positive change in the situation, I would have no choice but to respond. Thus, unless you can take these positive steps very soon, I will freeze many elements of our economic relationship including Export-Import credit guarantees; Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees; support for "Special Associate Status" for the Soviet Union in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and most of our technical assistance programs. Further, I would not submit the Bilateral Investment Treaty or Tax Treaty to the United States Senate for consent to ratification when and if they are completed.

I would not take these steps to, in any sense, punish the Soviet Union. I viewed the expansion of our economic and commercial relationship not as a reward but rather as a natural response to Soviet political and economic reform. Sadly, events in the Baltic states call into question the Soviet government's commitment to the very reforms that provide the basis for much of what we are trying to do in the economic sphere. I remain hopeful that conditions in the Baltic states will soon permit the renewal of our efforts.

In the meantime, I intend to do everything in my power to preserve our relationship throughout this difficult period and to work toward progress in areas of mutual advantage. We have come too far in U.S.-Soviet relations to return to a confrontational course -- a turn of events that would serve no one's interests. We have both talked of our desire for a new world order, and we both understand the importance of U.S.-

Soviet cooperation to the achievement of that goal. I remain committed to that objective.

In closing, let me say that I do not underestimate the difficulties that you face: I understand that the path to fundamental economic and political reform is neither straight nor easy. No one wishes to see the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But Mikhail, I cannot help but recall that you, yourself, told me that you personally could not sanction the use of force in the Baltic states because it would mean the end of perestroika. You said that only political means in the settlement of political disputes were consistent with your vision of a society based on the rule of law. I urge you to turn back now to a course of negotiation and dialogue and to take concrete steps to prevent the further use of force and intimidation against the Baltic peoples and their elected leaders.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Gy' with a long, sweeping diagonal stroke extending downwards and to the right.

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 22, 1991

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DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev Regarding the Baltic Situation

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev which is at Tab A. The memorandum lays out the rationale for action at this time.

Dennis Ross has cleared for State.

Concurrence by: David Gompert *DG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0857-AR
5/8/2014 MM

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Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning the Baltic Situation

Purpose

To express your concern to Gorbachev about the turn of events in the Baltic states and to inform him that, shortly, you will freeze many aspects of the economic relationship in response to Soviet actions there.

Background

Gorbachev's response to the ominous events in the Baltic states has been unsatisfactory at best. Today, forty-eight hours after violence in Latvia killed five people and ten days after fifteen people died in Lithuania, Gorbachev finally made a statement regretting the loss of life. While he said that the use of force would be investigated, he prejudged the issue, saying that the Baltic nationalists had provoked the violence. For the second time in the two week period, he refused to take responsibility, saying that he did not order the attacks and did not know that they were taking place. Unfortunately, Gorbachev who is admittedly in a difficult position, has done nothing to return to a course of serious dialogue with the Baltic leaders.

Gorbachev probably did not personally order the use of force at a specific time or at a particular location. But his decision to send additional troops into the Baltic states; threats to impose Presidential rule; and his decree several weeks ago that gave the military the "right" to defend its interests and property created the conditions that led to the violence of the last two weeks. It is worth noting too that Gorbachev -- as Shevardnadze warned when he resigned -- is moving closer to conservative and reactionary elements in the Soviet Union. Seven liberal advisors resigned or were fired over the weekend. Gorbachev's

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR
5/8/2014 MM

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

credibility with liberal reformers is at an all time low. 250,000 people took to the streets in Moscow on Sunday to protest his conservative tilt and the assault on the Baltics.

In light of the developments in the Baltic states, I believe that the time has come for us to take appropriate measures to demonstrate our concern and displeasure about events there. Repeatedly over the last two years, we have cautioned that the use of force in the Baltic states would have consequences for the U.S.-Soviet relationship. On a number of occasions, Gorbachev has assured you personally that he would use political means, not force and intimidation, to address the Baltic problem.

The Soviet leadership must understand that your restraint on the Baltic issue does not constitute acquiescence in the use of force and that the markers that you have repeatedly laid down have meaning and credibility. Gorbachev must, himself, understand that the positive evolution of our relationship depends in large part on his continuing commitment to reform. That is a message that reformers in the Soviet Union need to hear from the United States as well.

You should know that the European Community has already taken action -- delaying on January 22 a \$1 billion technical assistance and food credit program with the Soviet Union. We do not want the distance between us and our Allies to be too great.

I also believe that a measured response on our part now before Congressional and other pressures build to a fever pitch will allow us to preserve the basic U.S.-Soviet relationship. We want to be out in front with a sustainable stance so that we are not constantly responding to Congressional actions which are likely to be too severe and thus counterproductive.

Your letter to Gorbachev tells him that you intend to freeze several aspects of the economic relationship, including those measures of support that you announced on December 12 (Commodity Credit Corporation credits; Export-Import credits; "Special Associate Status" in the IMF and World Bank; and several technical assistance programs). You would also delay submission of the Bilateral Investment Treaty and Tax Treaty to Congress when they are completed. Clearly, a freeze on CCC credits is domestically sensitive but you should know that several farm state Senators -- including Bob Dole -- have recommended that you suspend those credits not currently obligated (about 25%). We would not seek to interfere with delivery of products already purchased or orders already guaranteed.

I believe that a freeze rather than revocation or cancellation of these measures preserves your flexibility to respond to events as they unfold. If conditions get better, the economic benefits can be renewed. Should events remain stagnant or get marginally worse, we would probably be in a position to avoid further steps but you would also have the option of revoking some of the measures.

The tone of the message is intended to be one of concern and regret, not anger. We will do our best to keep the fact of the message private so that Gorbachev can have a few days to respond. But if he does not act quickly and decisively to rectify the situation, I recommend that you announce the freeze on the economic measures outlined above.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mikhail:

I am writing to you to express my deep concern about the recent turn of events in the Baltic states. I think that you know how much I value the unprecedented level of cooperation that we have achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last two years. I have also said repeatedly that our successes have been due in large part to your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. As such, the response of my Administration to events in the Baltic states over the last year has been restrained. You, yourself, know that I have faced pressures from many quarters to take stronger measures and that I have resisted doing so.

Last June, during the Washington Summit, we talked about the effect of Soviet actions in the Baltic states at great length. I explained that I appreciated the constraints under which you were operating but that I too faced certain pressures. Nonetheless, I honored your personal request and signed the Trade Agreement in spite of the economic blockade that the Soviet Union had imposed on Lithuania. You gave me assurances that you would take steps to settle peacefully all differences with the Baltic leaders. Several weeks later, you lifted that blockade and began a dialogue with Lithuanian and other Baltic leaders. From that time on, our cooperation in the economic sphere has expanded, culminating in the steps that I took on December 12 in response to the difficult circumstances that your country faced as winter approached. I said then that I wanted to do something to help the Soviet Union stay on the course of political and economic reform.

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continue along this path. I believe that the leaders of the Baltic states have acted with restraint, particularly in the last two weeks, and did not deserve to have their quest for negotiations met with force. The unrelenting intimidation, pressure, and armed force to which these democratically elected leaders have been subjected is something that I frankly cannot understand.

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In the meantime, I intend to do everything in my power to preserve our relationship throughout this difficult period and to work toward progress in areas of mutual advantage. We have come too far in U.S.-Soviet relations to return to a confrontational course -- a turn of events that would serve no one's interests. We have both talked of our desire for a new world order, and we both understand the importance of U.S.-

Soviet cooperation to the achievement of that goal. I remain committed to that objective.

In closing, let me say that I do not underestimate the difficulties that you face: I understand that the path to fundamental economic and political reform is neither straight nor easy. No one wishes to see the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But Mikhail, I cannot help but recall that you, yourself, told me that you personally could not sanction the use of force in the Baltic states because it would mean the end of perestroika. You said that only political means in the settlement of political disputes were consistent with your vision of a society based on the rule of law. I urge you to turn back now to a course of negotiation and dialogue and to take concrete steps to prevent the further use of force and intimidation against the Baltic peoples and their elected leaders.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Special Message Routing

☒	SCOWCROFT	☒	GATES
The National Security Advisor requests this message also be disseminated to the individuals noted below.			
	GOMPERT		KANTER
	RICE		MILLER
	DEAL		PRYCE
	HAASS		WORKING
	JACKSON		
	VICE PRESIDENT		CHIEF OF STAFF

Guidance:

*Copy sent to
Condi*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [021435Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/2/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(506)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/12/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SDO

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 021435Z JAN 91

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

BRENT,

I WILL BE SEEING KRYUCHKOV THURSDAY AT 3:00 P.M. AND, I HOPE,
CHERNYAYEV THIS WEEK. IT WOULD HELP GREATLY IN STRUCTURING MY
PRESENTATION FOR THEM IF YOU COULD GIVE ME A READOUT ON THE MEETING
THE PRESIDENT HAD WITH BESSMERTNYKH AND GORBACHEV'S LETTER AS
WELL AS THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL YESTERDAY. MANY THANKS.

JACK

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#0540

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2011-0857-MR
6/12/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 060617 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/NODIS~~ No. Pages 2
FROM: Liz McKune S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Message from the Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor
To Acting Secretary Bartholomew

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>W. Sittmann, Hill</u>	<u>456-2224</u>	
	<u>Scowcroft</u>		
	<u>Gates</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Please pass this message to General Scowcroft - EYES ONLY.

S/S Officer: Liz McKune

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 4/17/09

Being naturally concerned with the deadlock in the US-Iraqi dialogue we used a visit to Baghdad of our representatives from Moscow in order to probe very informally and strictly confidentially into the position of Iraq. In a conversation with Aziz our representatives asked about the timeframe of his visit to Washington and a visit of the US Secretary of State to Baghdad. Tentatively, we referred to January 6 as the date for receiving the Secretary of State in Iraq on the assumption that Aziz might come to the United States prior to that.

It is our impression that the Iraqi minister reacted to this idea of a compromise solution with interest though his response was worded in rather cautious terms. He said that the Iraqi side would be ready to examine in a constructive way the new dates for an exchange of visits. If we make specific proposals on both dates the Iraqis will not insist on January 12 as the date for Secretary Baker's visit to Baghdad. However, on the other hand, the new options must not exclude January 10.

Aziz avoided a clear answer to our repeated questions about Iraqi leadership's reaction to the date of January 6 noting, in particular, that a decision on that score can be taken only by President Hussein himself.

At the final stage of the conversation the minister reiterated that the Iraqi side was ready to consider new options for the dates to exchange visits. On the whole, it followed from the logics of what he said during the conversation that these new dates must be first appropriately worked out with Washington and after that suggested to Iraqis.

If the US side wishes to seek out a solution to the issue of dates for these visits with our assistance we would be willing to transmit to Baghdad its respective ideas (also as if they come from us provided it is more convenient to US colleagues).

*Delivered to Pres
by Amb. Beaumont Newhall
12/27*

Unofficial translation

Mr. George BUSH
The President of the
United States of America

Dear George,

In the spirit of the friendly and trusting relationship that has developed between ourselves, I consider it to be my duty to convey to you some explanations concerning Eduard's resignation.

It has caused great agitation within the world public opinion and in the political quarters, a lot of guesses and, frankly, speculations that go far beyond this truly unfortunate episode. I said right there at the Congress - and you are aware of it - that to me his statement was totally unexpected. This is really so and this is what was particularly upsetting - not only because of his act of disloyalty to the President - the fact that he did so without consulting and without telling me in advance, his old friend and comrade, has no justification. That he was extremely tired, that the terrible workload had worn him out, that he, as we say, was giving it his damndest without sparing one bit of himself and at some point broke down - all that is true, and therefore one would like to be sympathetic to what he did, but there is no way I can approve of it. Whatever criticism there had been voiced against the Foreign Minister regarding the policies for which he had, after the President, the foremost responsibility, be that the criticism from Parliamentarians or from socio-political groups, and still less by certain media organs and all kinds of extremists and demagogues, - did not justify such a reaction on the part of Eduard.

Criticism, including unjustified, unfair criticism, even one that hurts, is something which is inevitable in a democratic society to which we have resolved to aspire. You, George, know this better than I, and if everyone is going to resign in response to criticism, no serious policy, especially at a crucial, extremely difficult and turbulent stage in a society's development, will actually be possible to pursue. I talked with Eduard, even though I realized that he would not be able to go back on his resignation, for it would be a loss of face for him, an impossible thing to do, given his sense of honor and dignity. I value very highly his contribution to our new foreign policy, to working out and implementing cardinal decisions, above all those concerning US-Soviet relationship, thanks to which you and I were able, within a short period of time, to change the very nature of world politics, the entire international atmosphere - both in Europe and in other major parts of the world. I believe those have been historic accomplishments on the path toward a peaceful period of our civilization, and I hope they are irreversible. I also greatly appreciate Eduard's role as a man of initiative and courage and as a consistent advocate of a profound internal perestroika which is proceeding with such difficulties at home. In both of those roles I shall be missing him very much, although I don't believe he is going to leave the political scene altogether, but, rather, will assume a position of authority within those new government structures which are now being considered by the Congress of People's Deputies. I cannot as yet tell you who the new Foreign Minister will be. Haven't decided myself yet. But of one thing you can be absolutely firmly assured - our policy course, the new

thinking policy course toward strengthening trust and cooperation between the leadership of both our countries shall remain unchanged, in terms of substance as in form. This goes for our bilateral relations. This goes for the European process. This goes for all the arms control and security issues. This goes for the Persian Gulf and all other things on which you and I have both understanding and agreement. Everything stands unchanged. I would have no objection, if you thought you could tell Jim about my letter. Give him my kindest regards.

Taking this opportunity, I am sending you and all your wonderful family my sincere greetings for the New Year and, as I think I can now also add, Christmas greetings. I hope we shall exchange our televised New Year messages to each other's people.

All the scheduling concerning preparations for our meeting in Moscow remains without change. I will be happy to give you here a friendly welcome.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
господину Джорджу Бушу.

Дорогой Джордж.

В духе дружеских и доверительных отношений, которые сложились между нами, считаю своим долгом сообщить Вам некоторые пояснения в связи с отставкой Эдуарда.

В мировом общественном мнении, в политических кругах она вызвала большое волнение, массу догадок и, прямо скажу, домыслов, далеко выходящих за пределы самого этого действительно неприятного эпизода. Я сказал тут же на съезде — и Вы об этом знаете, — что для меня его заявление было полной неожиданностью. Это действительно так и особенно меня огорчило — не только потому, что была нарушена лояльность по отношению к президенту, то, что он так поступил, не посоветовавшись и не предупредив меня, своего давнего друга и товарища, не имеет никаких оправданий. Что он безмерно устал, что невероятные перегрузки измотали его, что он, как у нас говорят, не жалея себя выкладывался и вот в определенный сорвался — все это так, и поэтому хотелось бы отнестись с пониманием к его поступку, но одобрить его я никак не могу. Какая бы критика ни раздавалась лично в адрес министра по поводу политики, за которую после президента он нес наибольшую ответственность, будь то критика со стороны парламентариев или общественно-политических группировок, тем более — со стороны некоторых органов печати, разного рода экстремистов и демагогов — она не оправдывает такой реакции со стороны Эдуарда.

Критика, в том числе и необоснованная, несправедливая, даже обидная — дело неизбежное в демократическом обществе, к которому мы решились идти, Вам, Джордж, это известно лучше меня, и если в ответ на нее каждый будет подавать в отставку, то никакую серьезную политику, особенно на переломном, крайне сложном, бурном этапе развитии общества, практически проводить будет невозможно. Я говорил с Эдуардом, хотя и понимал, что отозвать свое заявление он уже не сможет, это было бы потерей лица, при его чувстве достоинства это невозможно. Я очень высоко ценю его вклад в нашу новую внешнюю политику, в подготовку и в осуществление кардинальных решений, прежде всего на советско-американском направлении, благодаря чему нам с Вами удалось за короткий срок изменить сам характер мировой политики, всю международную атмосферу — и в Европе, и в других важных пунктах. Я считаю, что это исторические завоевания на пути к мирному периоду цивилизации, и, надеюсь, они необратимы. Я также очень ценю роль Эдуарда как одного из инициативных, смелых и последовательных деятелей глубокой внутренней перестройки, которая идет у нас с такими трудностями. И в том, и в другом мне его будет очень не хватать, хотя, думаю, он не уйдет совсем из политической жизни, займет авторитетное место в новых государственных структурах, которые сейчас рассматриваются Съездом народных депутатов. Кто будет министром иностранных дел, я не могу Вам пока сказать. Сам еще не решил. Но прошу принять мои совершенно твердые заверения: курс нашей политики — политики нового мышления — на укрепление доверия и взаимодействия между руководством наших стран останется неизменным, как по содержанию, так и по форме. Это касается двусторонних отношений.

Это касается европейского процесса. Это касается всех проблем разоружения и безопасности. Это относится к Персидскому заливу и всем другим моментам, по которым у нас с Вами есть и взаимопонимание и договоренность. Все остается в силе. Я не возражал бы, если бы Вы сочли возможным рассказать о моем письме Джиму. Передайте ему мои самые добрые пожелания.

Пользуясь случаем шлю Вам и всей Вашей прекрасной семье искренние поздравления с наступающим Новым годом, а теперь позволю себе сказать — и с Рождеством. Надеюсь, что мы на днях обменяемся телевизионными новогодними посланиями к нашим народам.

Все графики подготовки к нашей с Вами встрече в Москве остаются без изменений. Буду рад дружески приветствовать Вас здесь.

Искренне М.Горбачев

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE:

1-23-91

Bush Lib
George Bush Handwriting

FROM THE PRESIDENT

To:

Brent:

No mention of Summit???

If that is on purpose, O.K.,
let the letter go. I ~~think~~ ink it
is fine.

We might ought to give Bessmyrtnyk
an "heads up", though I'm sure
he knows the problems we face here.

gb .



Discuss

no mention
of Summit
no mention of his
"I didn't do it"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED ACCESS
0544

January 23, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev Concerning the Baltic Situation

Purpose

To express your concern to Gorbachev about the turn of events in the Baltic states and to inform him that, shortly, you will freeze many aspects of the economic relationship in response to Soviet actions there.

Background

Gorbachev's response to the ominous events in the Baltic states has been unsatisfactory at best. Today, forty-eight hours after violence in Latvia killed five people and ten days after fifteen people died in Lithuania, Gorbachev finally made a statement regretting the loss of life. While he said that the use of force would be investigated, he prejudged the issue, saying that the Baltic nationalists had provoked the violence. For the second time in the two week period, he refused to take responsibility, saying that he did not order the attacks and did not know that they were taking place. Unfortunately, Gorbachev who is admittedly in a difficult position, has done nothing to return to a course of serious dialogue with the Baltic leaders.

Gorbachev probably did not personally order the use of force at a specific time or at a particular location. But his decision to send additional troops into the Baltic states; threats to impose Presidential rule; and his decree several weeks ago that gave the military the "right" to defend its interests and property created the conditions that led to the violence of the last two weeks. It is worth noting too that Gorbachev -- as Shevardnadze warned when he resigned -- is moving closer to conservative and reactionary elements in the Soviet Union. Seven liberal advisors resigned or were fired over the weekend. Gorbachev's

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2011-0857-MR
5/8/2014 MM

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

credibility with liberal reformers is at an all time low. 250,000 people took to the streets in Moscow on Sunday to protest his conservative tilt and the assault on the Baltics.

In light of the developments in the Baltic states, I believe that the time has come for us to take appropriate measures to demonstrate our concern and displeasure about events there. Repeatedly over the last two years, we have cautioned that the use of force in the Baltic states would have consequences for the U.S.-Soviet relationship. On a number of occasions, Gorbachev has assured you personally that he would use political means, not force and intimidation, to address the Baltic problem.

The Soviet leadership must understand that your restraint on the Baltic issue does not constitute acquiescence in the use of force and that the markers that you have repeatedly laid down have meaning and credibility. Gorbachev must, himself, understand that the positive evolution of our relationship depends in large part on his continuing commitment to reform. That is a message that reformers in the Soviet Union need to hear from the United States as well.

You should know that the European Community has already taken action -- delaying on January 22 a \$1 billion technical assistance and food credit program with the Soviet Union. We do not want the distance between us and our Allies to be too great.

I also believe that a measured response on our part now before Congressional and other pressures build to a fever pitch will allow us to preserve the basic U.S.-Soviet relationship. We want to be out in front with a sustainable stance so that we are not constantly responding to Congressional actions which are likely to be too severe and thus counterproductive.

Your letter to Gorbachev tells him that you intend to freeze several aspects of the economic relationship, including those measures of support that you announced on December 12 (Commodity Credit Corporation credits; Export-Import credits; "Special Associate Status" in the IMF and World Bank; and several technical assistance programs). You would also delay submission of the Bilateral Investment Treaty and Tax Treaty to Congress when they are completed. Clearly, a freeze on CCC credits is domestically sensitive but you should know that several farm state Senators -- including Bob Dole -- have recommended that you suspend those credits not currently obligated (about 25%). We would not seek to interfere with delivery of products already purchased or orders already guaranteed.

I believe that a freeze rather than revocation or cancellation of these measures preserves your flexibility to respond to events as they unfold. If conditions get better, the economic benefits can be renewed. Should events remain stagnant or get marginally worse, we would probably be in a position to avoid further steps but you would also have the option of revoking some of the measures.

The tone of the message is intended to be one of concern and regret, not anger. We will do our best to keep the fact of the message private so that Gorbachev can have a few days to respond. But if he does not act quickly and decisively to rectify the situation, I recommend that you announce the freeze on the economic measures outlined above.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

I am writing to you to express my deep concern about the recent turn of events in the Baltic states. I think that you know how much I value the unprecedented level of cooperation that we have achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last two years. I have also said repeatedly that our successes have been due in large part to your efforts to reform the Soviet Union. As such, the response of my Administration to events in the Baltics states over the last year has been restrained. You, yourself, know that I have faced pressures from many quarters to take stronger measures and that I have resisted doing so.

Last June, during the Washington Summit, we talked about the effect of Soviet actions in the Baltic states at great length. I explained that I appreciated the constraints under which you were operating but that I too faced certain pressures. Nonetheless, I honored your personal request and signed the Trade Agreement in spite of the economic blockade that the Soviet Union had imposed on Lithuania. You gave me assurances that you would take steps to settle peacefully all differences with the Baltic leaders. Several weeks later, you lifted that blockade and began a dialogue with Lithuanian and other Baltic leaders. From that time on, our cooperation in the economic sphere has expanded, culminating in the steps that I took on December 12 in response to the difficult circumstances that your country faced as winter approached. I said then that I wanted to do something to help the Soviet Union stay on the course of political and economic reform.

Unfortunately, in view of the events of the last two weeks -- resulting in the deaths of at least twenty people in the Baltic states -- I cannot, in good conscience, and indeed, will not

continue along this path. I believe that the leaders of the Baltic states have acted with restraint, particularly in the last two weeks, and did not deserve to have their quest for negotiations met with force. The unrelenting intimidation, pressure, and armed force to which these democratically elected leaders have been subjected is something that I frankly cannot understand.

I had hoped to see positive steps toward the peaceful resolution of this conflict with the elected leaders of the Baltic states. But in the absence of that and in the absence of a positive change in the situation, I would have no choice but to respond. Thus, unless you can take these positive steps very soon, I will freeze many elements of our economic relationship including Export-Import credit guarantees; Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees; support for "Special Associate Status" for the Soviet Union in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and most of our technical assistance programs. Further, I would not submit the Bilateral Investment Treaty or Tax Treaty to the United States Senate for consent to ratification when and if they are completed.

I would not take these steps to, in any sense, punish the Soviet Union. I viewed the expansion of our economic and commercial relationship not as a reward but rather as a natural response to Soviet political and economic reform. Sadly, events in the Baltic states call into question the Soviet government's commitment to the very reforms that provide the basis for much of what we are trying to do in the economic sphere. I remain hopeful that conditions in the Baltic states will soon permit the renewal of our efforts.

In the meantime, I intend to do everything in my power to preserve our relationship throughout this difficult period and to work toward progress in areas of mutual advantage. We have come too far in U.S.-Soviet relations to return to a confrontational course -- a turn of events that would serve no one's interests. We have both talked of our desire for a new world order, and we both understand the importance of U.S.-

Soviet cooperation to the achievement of that goal. I remain committed to that objective.

In closing, let me say that I do not underestimate the difficulties that you face: I understand that the path to fundamental economic and political reform is neither straight nor easy. No one wishes to see the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But Mikhail, I cannot help but recall that you, yourself, told me that you personally could not sanction the use of force in the Baltic states because it would mean the end of perestroika. You said that only political means in the settlement of political disputes were consistent with your vision of a society based on the rule of law. I urge you to turn back now to a course of negotiation and dialogue and to take concrete steps to prevent the further use of force and intimidation against the Baltic peoples and their elected leaders.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "G. H. W. Bush", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

**Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting**

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Guidance:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Cable	Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (5 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Date Closed: 4/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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2011-0857-MR

3/7/2014 MM

Date: March 14, 1990
Time: 12:00 noon - 12:30pm
Participants: Secretary Baker, Soviet Finance Minister Pavlov,
Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Zolotov (interpreters)

Secretary Baker began the conversation by noting that the U.S. government had received some feelers to the effect that the Soviet government would perhaps approach it for a loan. He recalled that that subject had been touched on during talks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the February Moscow ministerial. Now the U.S. has begun getting feelers from other sources on this score. The Secretary asked Minister Pavlov to tell him if it was in fact the case that the Soviet government desired assistance in this area.

Minister Pavlov replied that in view of all the events that are taking place politically in the Soviet Union the measures that were going to have been taken in the economy in the period from 1990 to 1992 will now have to be implemented earlier, e.g., in 1991. He said he was referring to such specific measures as allowing for free prices and permitting various forms of property, including individual property. He said the most immediate difficulties which the Soviet Union faces concern deficits in the area of agricultural products and consumer goods. In order to take some kind of immediate measures to alleviate problems in these areas, the Soviet government would need loan credits in the range of \$10 to \$12 billion dollars. However, he noted that while the Soviet government is desirous of receiving such loan credits from the West, this could not appear to be a loan from the U.S. government. He continued to explain that existing U.S. legislation, over and above the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, e.g., the Johnson Act of 1934, has led to a series of difficulties in Soviet-U.S. business relations. He noted that even if the Jackson-Vanik Amendment were to be waived, that measure would not help too much in view of the overall scale of economic difficulties in the Soviet Union.

Secretary Baker responded that if he understood correctly, it appeared that the Soviet government then was not looking to the U.S. for a loan.

Pavlov replied that domestic political considerations in the Soviet Union do not permit the Soviet government to request or receive a U.S. government loan openly on the governmental level. He continued that in the Soviet Union there are strong internal political forces which would connect such a loan with various Soviet-U.S. agreements which are being worked out. First, those forces would attempt to extract from President Gorbachev certain things and they would also reproach him for agreeing to concessions for the United States in order to secure American loans.

Pavlov continued that on the previous day he had spoken with Rabbi Schneier and that he would meet with him on the following Friday (March 16, 1990) to talk about such a "project." He also said that he would be meeting with a certain Mr. (Henry) Kaufman. Pavlov said that on the previous Friday or Saturday (March 9 or 10, 1990) when he met with Schneier, he had been told that any measures taken in this area would have to have the blessing of the U.S. administration.

Secretary Baker suggested to Pavlov that in conversations with Rabbi Schneier that Pavlov make it clear to the Rabbi that constraints exist in terms of government to government loans. Baker continued that the same types of political forces which lead to the creation of the just-mentioned sensitivities in the Soviet Union lead to the same kinds of political sensitivities in the United States. For example, if there were to be talk of U.S. government credits to the Soviet Union or of U.S. involvement in such financial assistance, great difficulties would arise. It is possible to understand why because of the kinds of considerations which were discussed in the opportunities/costs paper presented to the Soviet side at the Malta summit. That document shows how the Soviet Union is spending on the order of \$12 to \$15 billion dollars to support such countries as Cuba and Cambodia, for example. Cessation of such aid would of course free those funds for other uses. The Secretary added that he believed in talking with Schneier, Pavlov should make it clear that the discussion concerned loans from sources in the private sector, for example, from Western banks.

Pavlov replied that there was one other thing he wanted to mention in this connection. He pointed out there are many legal impediments which hinder Soviet operations in U.S. financial markets. There are, for example, a number of Congressional acts which forbid financial assistance to the Soviet Union even through the private sector or through private businesses. The Soviet Union is not permitted to sell its securities in the U.S. or to form consortia in order to participate in U.S. financial markets and thus secure revenues through U.S. companies. In view of this, he said he understood that Schneier was apprehensive that those companies or individuals who might participate in such business dealings with the Soviet Union could be prosecuted under U.S. law.

Baker replied that he understood all of the existing constraints; however, he said that President Bush and he and the entire administration are interested in doing whatever can be done in order to see that perestroika succeed. Baker continued that, to be very frank, politically speaking in the United States it would be difficult to secure enough domestic political support to eliminate the kinds of existing restrictions Pavlov had mentioned. That is because the Soviet Union is spending over \$10 billion to finance military and economic aid to such countries as Cuba, Angola, Cambodia and Vietnam. Politically, the question would be asked here "How is it that American legislation is being changed to give the USSR financial aid in the face of such circumstances?"

Baker continued that in connection with all of these considerations he had a proposal, namely, the creation of gold-backed ruble. It would not replace existing Soviet currency, but the new ruble could be used so as to avoid the necessity for borrowings from the West. The gold-backed ruble could be used to purchase consumer goods and agricultural goods and thus tide the Soviet Union over in this difficult economic period.

Pavlov replied that he was aware of all of the considerations connected with arms supplies question. He continued that many people in the Soviet Union thought and think that conversion of the military industry into production facilities for consumer goods would be the solution to a great deal of the economic problems. He said that contention is wrong. Over \$6 billion rubles have already been poured into that conversion process, but it is demanding more and more money and more and more time. He suggested that even the economy accrued from curtailing activity in the defense area would not constitute very significant savings in terms of solving the overall economic difficulties. He said he supported the suggestion to create a parallel currency; however, the one measure would not replace the other. He said in order to do this what is needed is a "softer," more extended operation over a longer period of time. The problem now is to get over this hump.

Secretary Baker replied that he understood Pavlov and agreed; however, he did not find these measures mutually exclusive. It would be possible to create a gold-backed currency and also at the same time to secure Western loans. There are a number of other Western countries which do not have the same legislative constraints in terms of lending money to the Soviet Union that the U.S. has. He continued that he did not rule out U.S. support, but in making the case for such support there are certain things which are very troubling, especially Cuba. He admitted that he appreciated the fact that there were in this respect political considerations on the Soviet side. However, the Soviet side has to appreciate the U.S. side's position in this respect. Things would be much easier in the United States politically in the area of assisting the Soviet Union financially if it would be possible to say to the U.S. populace and to Congress that the Soviet Union was committed to discontinuing aid to a regime hostile to the United States and located very close to the U.S. Florida coast. He continued that when he discussed the question of Nicaragua with the Soviet side, he had received the necessary assurances from the Soviet Union; however, they were not believed. When he had discussed the notion of free and fair elections, he had received the necessary assurances from the Soviet side; however, they were not believed. Still in all, as time goes on, and as such assurances prove to be true, the public comes more and more to believe assurances from the Soviet side and confidence is thus built. If it were possible to demonstrate that the United States would not be giving loans to the Soviet Union simply to make up for those funds that it spends to support Cuba, things would be considerably easier politically in the United States, even in terms of the approval of private loans.

Pavlov remarked that positive moves in foreign policy are proceeding very rapidly, and internal policies falling behind because of ethnic strife and other such problems -- and those internal problems are at this point preventing action in terms of taking even more positive steps in the foreign policy area.

At this point the participants, who were late to their working luncheon, proceeded upstairs.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13b. Talking Points	Re: Items for the Secretary: Mazowiecki Visit (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13c. Cable	From American Embassy Vienna to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Re: Austrian Businessman Offers to Mediate Release of Lebanon Hostages [091812Z Mar 90] [DOCUMENT DECLASSIFIED; FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	3/9/90	(b)(1), (b)(6)	ℰ

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By MM (NLGB) on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(512.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	3/7/2014

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<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: BEERS HAASS MONTGOMERY NEEDELS SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUFHVI<DTG> 091812Z MAR 90
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0808
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1093

<SUBJ>SUBJ: AUSTRIAN BUSINESSMAN OFFERS TO MEDIATE
- RELEASE OF LEBANON HOSTAGES

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 02890

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, AU, IR, LE

SUBJ: AUSTRIAN BUSINESSMAN OFFERS TO MEDIATE

- RELEASE OF LEBANON HOSTAGES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: AN AUSTRIAN BUSINESSMAN OF SOMEWHAT SHADY REPUTATION BUT APPARENT GOOD CONTACTS IN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPROACHED THE EMBASSY WITH A PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING THE LEBANON HOSTAGE SITUATION, OSTENSIBLY ON BEHALF OF THE IRANIAN MFA. THE PROPOSAL SUGGESTS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES AND CALLS FOR THE EARLY RELEASE OF TWO OF THE HOSTAGES. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

3. ON MARCH 8, 1990 THE EMBASSY'S EXPORT CONTROL ATTACHE (ECA) MET WITH AUSTRIAN BUSINESSMAN (b)(6) AT (b)(6) REQUEST. ON MARCH 7 (b)(6) HAD CALLED ECA AND ASKED FOR A MEETING REGARDING HIS JUST CONCLUDED VISIT TO TEHRAN. NOTE: (b)(6) TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO TEHRAN WHERE HE HAS GOOD CONTACTS INTO THE GOI, ESPECIALLY IRNA, "TEHRAN TIMES" AND THE ENERGY MINISTRY.

4. DURING THE MEETING, (b)(6) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

-- BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, (b)(6) STATED THAT HE IS A PERSONAL FRIEND OF HOSSAIN MOSAFAIAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE WEST EUROPEAN SECTION OF THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. DURING HIS VISITS TO VIENNA, MOSAFAIAN HAS STAYED IN (b)(6) RESIDENCE (INCLUDING IN AUGUST 1989 AND ON JANUARY 28, 1990) AND WILL STAY IN (b)(6) COUNTRY HOUSE FOR A WEEK IN LATE MARCH 1990 WHILE ON A PRIVATE VISIT TO AUSTRIA. ACCORDING TO (b)(6) MOSAFAIAN (SAID TO BE APPROXIMATELY 30-33 YEARS OLD WITH TWO CHILDREN) IS INTERESTED IN ENTERING INTO A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH (b)(6) ALLEGEDLY, MOSAFAIAN HAS BEEN OFFERED THE IRANIAN AMBASSADORSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, WHICH HE IS CONSIDERING ACCEPTING.

-- DURING THE WEEKEND OF MARCH 2-4, 1990, MOSAFAIAN IS SAID TO HAVE DISCUSSED THE "HOSTAGE SITUATION"

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR
3/7/2014 MM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

file


January 1, 1991

Note for General Scowcroft

Attached are the Memcon on the President's telephone call to President Gorbachev, and draft press guidance which I have given to Roman for use on an if asked basis.

Nick Burns

NB



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail Gorbachev
Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Dmitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME January 1, 1991, 8:00-8:13 A.M.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Mikhail. I am just calling to wish you, Raisa and your family a happy New Year.

President Gorbachev: Thank you for this New Years greeting. It is good to hear from you. On behalf of Raisa and my family, our best to you and Barbara.

The President: We are at Camp David, and we have had a quiet and peaceful Christmas and New Years. I hope everything is going well. I appreciate the message Ambassador Bessmertnykh brought the other day. I won't comment on the open line about the substance. But I want to assure you of our full cooperation and of our keen interest in our good relationship getting better.

President Gorbachev: George, I wanted despite all the things that have happened--you know we have had some hot days here recently--to write that letter to you. I am sure we will continue our good relations based on what Ambassador Bessmertnykh has told me of your conversation.

The President: That is true. We will want to conclude work on START and on the little discrepancies on CFE. And of course we will want to continue our total cooperation and the exchange of information on the Gulf.

President Gorbachev: I fully agree with you. I want to say on this first day of the New Year that this really will be the case, although we have a great deal of work to do yet at home.

The President: We are thinking about you. I wish we had a secure line to talk about some of these problems. We are so committed to your reforms. Any place we can help, we'll do that. Please let us know. We hope you can overcome these difficulties and continue your reforms. You still have the respect and support of the American people.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
08/12/2009 MM

President Gorbachev: I will keep you informed of our efforts, since there is a great deal that needs to be done here which is new for our country and its surroundings. I want to give you information on what we are doing.

The President: Okay. Please stay in touch. Happy New Year to you. I enjoyed this conversation.

President Gorbachev: Okay. Let us then raise our glasses, for me in the evening, and for you in the morning, for the New Year.

The President: All right. Good bye.

President Gorbachev: Thank you. I wish you the same. Good bye.

Press Guidance: Gorbachev Phone Call

The President called President Gorbachev January 1 to wish him and the Soviet peoples a happy New Year. The President assured President Gorbachev of the Administration's interest in maintaining good and positive relations with the USSR on both bilateral issues and on matters of global concern such as the situation in the Gulf.

The President reaffirmed the support of the U.S. government and the American people for the process of reform in the USSR.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft [021435Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/2/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0857-MR(514)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/12/2014

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SDO

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

~~PREC~~ IMMEDIATE ~~CLAS~~ ~~SECRET~~

~~DTG~~ 021435Z JAN 91

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

BRENT,

I WILL BE SEEING KRYUCHKOV THURSDAY AT 3:00 P.M. AND, I HOPE,
CHERNYAYEV THIS WEEK. IT WOULD HELP GREATLY IN STRUCTURING MY
PRESENTATION FOR THEM IF YOU COULD GIVE ME A READOUT ON THE MEETING
THE PRESIDENT HAD WITH BESSMERTNYKH AND GORBACHEV'S LETTER AS
WELL AS THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL YESTERDAY. MANY THANKS.

JACK

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR

6/12/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

for Besonmetnykh
1-11-91
To President

Here is the plan:

- Saddam Hussein announces the withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait.

- The United States officially declares that the possibility of military action against Iraq is ruled out.

- The Security Council adapts a resolution under which the economic sanctions will be lifted upon the completion of the Iraqi troops withdrawal.

- After the Iraqi troops withdrawal is completed, Saudi Arabia and Egypt shall immediately begin negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait on disputed territorial and financial questions (we are prepared to agree on this with Riyadh and Cairo).

- The permanent members of the UN Security Council declare that upon the completion of the Iraqi troops withdrawal an effort will begin to prepare an international conference to establish a strategic security system for the entire Middle East, and it is in this context that the Palestinian problem will be addressed.

- After the Iraqi troops have been withdrawn the number of the US armed forces in Saudi Arabia will be reduced in a phased manner and finally will be fully withdrawn when the situation is normalized.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH AMBASSADOR BESSMERTNYKH

-- I want to thank you for coming in again. I also want President Gorbachev to know how much we appreciate the spirit of cooperation in which this consultation is taking place.

-- I also applaud the spirit in which the Soviet plan is put forth. No one wants a war, and if it can be avoided in a manner fully consistent with the 12 UN Security Council resolutions then we will all benefit.

-- One major reason the policy has been so successful is that the two of us have acted in such close concert. We could not have reached this point had this not been the case.

-- If our efforts are to finally succeed, we must not depart even the slightest bit from what the Security Council has put forth.

-- We agree with diplomatic efforts that include a full and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. We have made it clear that Iraq and Iraqi forces would not be attacked during and after such a withdrawal. But I believe it is essential that we not go beyond that point.

-- It would be a disaster for us all if at this late date we were to do anything which allowed Saddam Hussein to claim victory. Such a move could also lead to serious difficulties within the UN coalition.

-- Thus, while I understand and appreciate the motivation for these proposals I would like to urge you not to proceed with them.

-- The best hope for peace at this point is to convince Saddam Hussein that he has nothing to gain and everything to lose by being obstinate.

-- If we hold out the prospect of concessions, no matter how small, he will take it as a sign of weakness and his reaction will be to see how much more he can get rather than focus on compliance with the U.N. resolutions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR
3/7/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0857-MR
317/2014 MM

*President handed
to Bessmertnykh 3:15
1/11/91*

1 page only

RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL

-- We appreciate the spirit of cooperation in which this consultation is taking place.

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NOT HANDED
OVER - NOT
USED!
1/11/90

-- Please do not misunderstand what I am saying. I am not in a position to say whether President Gorbachev should send an emissary, but only that he must not give Saddam the impression that there is any way out except by full compliance.

-- Maybe you can deliver the message in a way that he can finally understand.