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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91129
Folder ID Number: 91129-004

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Phone Call to Gorbachev (9 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	S
02c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	
04a. Note	James A. Baker, III to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	
04b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	
04c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	
05. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	S
06a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [EUR/SOV Translation] (1 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	S
06b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	S

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1087
OA/ID Number: 91129-004
Date Closed: 4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07a. Cable	From Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [151210Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	S
07b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [150120Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	S
07c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	S
07d. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Response to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	TS
07e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Response to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	TS
07f. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	
07g. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [EUR/SOV Translation] (1 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	S
07h. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	S
07i. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	
07j. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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08. Cable	Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Cable	Re: CFE Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	S
10a. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	
10b. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S
10c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	TS
10d. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Proposed CFE Letter (1 pp.)	2/6/91	(b)(1)	TS
11. Draft Letter	To President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S
13a. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	
13b. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S

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13c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on CFE (1 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	TS
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14. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	
15. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Cable	Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S
18. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Marshal Akhromeyev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/7/91	(b)(1)	C
19a. Cable	Charles Powell to General Scowcroft Re: Message to the President from the Prime Minister (1 pp.)	1/31/91	(b)(1)	C
19b. Letter	King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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File

Phone call to Gorbachev

Secretary Baker Hello

The President was trying to reach you and I tried to reach Sasha -- we could not, he asked that I give the message that he wanted to give to you.

I am calling you from his office -- he has gone to another engagement.

Had he been able to talk to you, he wanted to say the following.

We know you are making an intensive and useful effort as we have said publicly.

And we recognize that Iraq's position has changed. But Saddam is now blowing up Kuwait's oil production and refining capabilities -- in fact he seems to have adopted a "scorched earth" policy. It seems he is taking advantage of the talks with you to destroy Kuwait and play for time. Much of this seems to have been started earlier today. We do not believe that the world can wait and let him do this. So we will be proposing a procedure by which we can avert a ground campaign and bring the war to an end. In effect, this builds on what you have done.

When the President was unable to reach you, he went ahead with a press statement that has just been concluded. I will not repeat that since it will be available to you. Except to say that it provides for a 24 hour waiting period before there would be the initiation of any ground campaign. The President said publicly that he would be releasing a detailed statement on what we think is required by way of Iraqi withdrawal in order to avert a ground campaign.

This statement has not yet been released and I would like to summarize it for you.

It says in the operative part of the statement:

In a final effort to obtain Iraqi compliance with the will of the international community -- the United States after consulting with the government of Kuwait and our other coalition partners declares that a ground campaign will not be initiated against Iraqi forces if prior to 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb 23, Iraq publicly accepts the following terms and communicates that to the United Nations: The terms are as follows:

Begin a large scale withdrawal from Kuwait by 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb. 23.

Complete military withdrawal from Kuwait in one week.

Given the fact that Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in a matter of hours, anything more than a week would not meet the full terms of the U.N. Resolution.

Within the first forty-eight hours remove all forces from Kuwait City to allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government of Kuwait and remove its forces from prepared defenses along the Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq border. From Bub'iyah and Warbah and from Kuwait's Rumayllah oil field.

Within the one week specified above return all forces to their positions of August 1 in accordance with 660.

In cooperation with the ICRC release all POWs and third country civilians being held against their will.

Return the remains of deceased and killed coalition servicemen. This action to commence immediately with the initiation of the withdrawal and to be completed within 48 hours.

Remove all explosives and booby-traps including those on Kuwaiti oil installations. (As an aside, I may say that it may already be too late for that.) And designate Iraqi military liaison officers to work with Kuwaiti personnel on the operational details of withdrawal to include the provision of information on land or sea mines.

Cease combat air patrols over Iraq and Kuwait except for transport flights carrying withdrawing troops. And allow coalition aircraft exclusive control over and use of Kuwaiti airspace.

Cease all actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property and release all Kuwaiti detainees.

U.S. and coalition partners reiterate that their forces will not attack retreating Iraqi forces. And will exercise restraint as long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above guidelines and there are no attacks on other countries.

Mr. President, in the beginning of this statement which I did not read there is a statement that the conditions in the Iraqi offer to you must be eliminated. This means the statement that there must be a rescission of all other U.N. resolutions. And the suggestion that there should be a lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for partial withdrawal. President Bush has arrived back while I have been reading this to you and wants to talk with you.

The President Mikhail, I am anxious to get your reaction. Jim tells me he has read you the entire statement. But I must tell you I can't believe that Tariq Aziz knew what Saddam was going to

do to these oil fields. The photographs from the air are absolutely unbelievable they are so devastating. I am so glad to have this conversation and sorry we couldn't get the call through before I made the public statement. The details of what Jim has read to you have not been made public yet. But Marlin Fitzwater will be announcing it very soon. What is the state of play on your end? Thanks for trying hard once again.

Gorbachev O.K. thanks and hello to you. I was away because I had to attend a big political rally in the Kremlin Palace for Army Day and I really was not in a position to leave that gathering because all the T.V. cameras were there and I had 6000 people there.

The President We are both slaves to the T.V. that's why I had to go ahead with my statement.

Gorbachev So there is no misunderstanding. Now on substance. I listened very carefully to what Jim has been reading out to me and I have several questions. The way I understand it, what we did over the past 24 hours in agreeing with Iraq and what is submitted to Saddam is not acceptable to participants in the coalition. I wish to recall once again, exactly what I mean. And this is how the problem looks and we are awaiting a reply from Saddam.

(1) Iraq agrees to fully comply with the terms of the U.N. Resolution in other words to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all of its troops to their positions prior to August 1. That is quoted from the U.N. resolution.

The resolution does not mention Kuwait but we incorporated it into our first point.

(2) The withdrawal of troops is to begin the day following the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in the air, sea and ground.

(3) The withdrawal of troops is to be completed within 21 days -- including Kuwait city within the first four days.

Jim mentioned that it took a short time for Iraq to send in its troops -- to be true to reality -- he was building that group for seven months.

Now Iraq first demanded a three-four month period then he said he would need six weeks but we pressed for a twenty-one day period and we said if we agreed to that time frame it might still be an unacceptable condition for the U.S. and the coalition.

(4) After the completion of withdrawals from Kuwait the motives behind the other U.N. Resolutions will have run their course and will no longer be necessary.

This is not a precondition this is just for the U.N. Security Council to be seized with the issue and to take appropriate decisions.

(5) All POWs will be released and repatriated within 3 days of the cessation of hostilities. This has even tougher language than your proposal.

(6) Confirmation, verification and monitoring will be carried out by observers and/or by a peacekeeping force to be decided by the U.N. Security Council.

I wish to express my initial reaction to what I heard from Jim. But I must put to you and to myself the following question. Where does our priority lie in putting a final touch on this settlement is it a political approach or the continuation of military operations and the escalation to ground operations. Now, I saw my role in cooperation with you in trying to find a political solution, as trying to protect the U.S. servicemen and peaceful Iraqi civilians from the suffering that may befall them. If you share this understanding then our task is to find a solution that is tough but also implementable.

From this point of view the demands that troops be withdrawn in 1 week would be impossible to comply with and would open the way for continuation of the military course. Now of course it would be different if you see this political option of settlement as unacceptable. But if on the basis of what we have been able to accomplish here, though we are waiting for a reply from Saddam Hussein, and also on the basis of what you have suggested -- if we could combine them for the Security Council into a joint U.S.-Soviet approach. That would be very important solution if we could do that -- I will pass on to something else.

In the Security Council we could promptly consider the whole complex of a joint plan based on what the two of us have said -- we would have a joint thing that we could consider in the U.N. Security Council.

Especially since if we use political language on the need to withdraw troops from Kuwait city within four days there is a convergence between us and also on the POWs.

What matters most is that by acting in this way we could show that as in the first instance, now at the very end we are acting together and have used all possible means including the first phase of military activity and now have succeeded in making Iraq backtrack and comply with the U.N. resolution. This would have taught a lesson to all others and this will be a new reality that all potential and likely aggressors would have to reckon with. Also by acting in this way we would avert the sliding into a difficult and dangerous phase.

I would say that this would be a major victory. The world at large and Americans would give due course to your actions and also to our activities. And in light of the steady cooperation of the the two of us and our other partners this would be indicative of the current state of our relations. This would indicate that the two Presidents while remaining true to their principles never forgot that the highest principle is the preservation of human life.

If we accept that approach we may not get 100% support but there is every likelihood we could get 80-90% support. Therefore now that we have a very good shot at a political solution, I wish that we could avoid the situation sliding into a difficult phase and you and I should not squander the opportunity before us. I think we should not succumb to pressure and grow jittery. I want to be frank, we are feeling pressure in this country and I know there is pressure from others -- some would push us toward what we don't want to do. If we manage to turn events in the direction I have described, it would be an achievement that would last for sometime to come.

So much for my line of argument. I am sorry I have been so emotional and used charged language.

The President. First I have to question. I am correct in saying that Saddam has not agreed to your six points?

Gorbachev. Tariq Aziz said that he was certain the President would support the six points but he had to transmit them personally. This is understandable jsut as Bessmertnykh or Baker cannot consent without the President.

The President. Do you have a time when he is supposed to come back to you?

Gorbachev. He said immediately. This reply could come anytime. Aziz has stayed in Moscow and he is using the lines of communication we offered him. He has a man in our Embassy in Baghdad.

The President. Thanks for that clarification. We and those that I have consulted with and that Jim has consulted and our military are absolutely convinced he can withdraw in one week. Our initial proposal was 96 hours. He can get out if he is serious about it. We think he can get out in one week -- we have a difference there.

Now on the broad philosophical approach you have outlined for me. I expect that you have people in your country that suggest you are too close with the United States. That is particularly true because of the good relationship with Iraq that you have had over the years and we understand that. Similarly, we have elements in this country who suggest we are staying too close to the center

in the Soviet Union. We won't depart from that. But we have elements -- crossing liberal and conservative lines -- here who take a different view than Jim and I do.

In spite of that we continue to make clear that we support your role and value your role and believe you are making a contribution. I mean it right from my heart and so does Jim. We view, and I would be glad to say this publicly, what you have tried to do as politically courageous given your long relationship (with Iraq), your standing as a superpower and your ethnic groups' sentiment.

I don't want to see us pull apart even though we have profound differences at this moment on this particular question.

Let me tell you what is driving our view. It is not just the U.S. -- it is a unanimous coalition view. First, I don't trust Saddam Hussein. Second, what he said yesterday is totally incompatible with not only what we are asking but what you asked. He is trying to restore himself in terms of the Arab world to the prestige of the status quo ante. What he has done and has done today does not merit that kind of restoration in our view. He knows that you have been working hard to bring a peaceful solution here. But what he is trying to do is to wiggle around and try to find time -- he has made time too short to go back to some kind of combination approach. I felt strongly about that after I stayed awake last night thinking about your suggestions and knowing that you have brought him much further than anyone could have thought after his speech.

But very candidly, he is taking advantage of this time and, I think, of your good-faith to destroy Kuwait. Get your people to show you photographs of what he has done to Kuwait this morning. About 9:00 this morning, our intelligence people brought me pictures and showed me the pictures from yesterday and the one from today and there is the blackest fire covering almost all of Kuwait you have ever seen in your life. This is the entire city I mean. And he did it after you were dealing with Tariq Aziz in good faith. And yesterday he fired a bunch of SCUD missiles again. So please understand, I have a lot of young soldiers over there and you and I have talked enough that I hope you know that I share your values on human life that you so eloquently outlined to me. But Mikhail do you know the whole time this propaganda was going on about civilian life -- that we worried about and didn't target-- do you know up to 200 young people 15-20 years old were killed and mutilated and the breasts cut off of the young women. That is the kind of man that we are up against. I know this is a report of the Emir of Kuwait.

Let me reassure you that I have not changed my view on human life. I dread sending young men and women into battle and because of our position -- the forces of the coalition. And I know that what I am going to ask will put you in a difficult position. I would understand it if you simply said "Geroge I

cannot do it." I want you to tell Aziz that the hand-writing is on the wall. It is not just the U.S.-- it is the rest of this coalition and that we must have compliance with our proposal now. This is a serious proposal. He has not responded to your proposal. We have waited and waited and waited. We have been patient. We need an answer now. There are deadlines here and after what he has done in Kuwait -- we cannot yield. This proposal is deadly serious.

I will send this statement to you instantly and, of course, my request is that you support our position after trying hard for a more reasonable position from your point of view but one that for the reasons I have given, we cannot go along with it now. If you can't support it, we would appreciate your not opposing it. We have not lost our senses and know the importance of the Soviet Union in all of this. Whatever happens in the next few days, I want to keep all doors open with you and with your country. We will never change from the view that you have a critically important role -- it is your neighborhood and some of them are your friends. We recognize Soviet interests in the area. I want to get our forces out of there just as soon as possible. I know how the Iranians and others feel. I want them out as soon as possible. I want to continue to stay in touch. Please examine what we have proposed. If you can encourage his adoption of this that is the best -- and at this point -- only way -- to save the lives you and I both want to.

That is my appeal. I know you want to think about it. We will send the proposal on and welcome your views.

Gorbachev. I got it all and I want to make a brief comment or two.

First, in practice we have the same assessment of Hussein. I think that his fate has been foreshadowed. Far be it from us to try to white wash him or try and save him or to raise his prestige. You and I are compelled to deal with him because on the other side he is the only realistic figure there.

Second, I am not talking about Hussein or the methods he has employed over the last few hours -- I am talking about the possibility of taking advantage of the accomplishments we have behind us given the burden of the entire operation that rests with you and the tremendous contributions we have both made. I am talking about trying to attain the goals we both seek by turning things in a political direction. By doing so we could avoid great tragedy -- that is the central point and the main concern. And that is the main merit of this approach.

Third, you have requested that we relay your demands to Tariz Aziz and the Iraqi leadership. If you can very rapidly send them to us, we will convey them to him. We will also describe your approach and position to him. But my final suggestion is as follows -- that we tentatively decide:

We and you should come out with a joint initiative to convene the U.N. Security Council meeting in order to consider this package of demands. There would certainly be a lot of pressure in that meeting to take advantage and formalize what we get out of that meeting in a document. It would be a good thing if we got the best possible results. It would be just as good if we got an intermediate result that would satisfy both of us. As before we will continue to give priority to our relationship with the United States. And of course the responsibility we bear before the international community and our peoples is to resolve the conflict and to accomplish the goals we set out before while avoiding a tragedy.

The President. The problem is we have heard nothing out of Saddam Hussein. That is essential before we implement this through the U.N. We have resolutions and a mandate under 678 through the U.N. He is stalling and ducking and sending Jordan and the PLO and Yemen in to stall and give his side. We have a mandate and we have to have a positive reply from him. But having spelled out the U.S. proposal, we cannot hold off. I will discuss this with Jim and with Scowcroft and others and let you know my reaction. But this is my first reaction.

Gorbachev. George, we did get a reaction from Hussein and his agreement to withdraw troops. We don't believe everything is satisfactory in his position. We made our position tougher. Now we need to hear from him again.

The President. You have brought him along on delinkage and a concept of withdrawal but it falls far short of the unconditional withdrawal called for in the resolution. Let us talk about that here. Before I hang up I want to make one further point.

Life goes on and I want to assure you we are pushing our people on the arms control proposals. I wrote you recently on CFE and naval infantry. I urge your personal attention to that because no matter what happens here -- common ground there would be very good. I have not lost my interest in moving forward with START -- I want to personally assure you of that.

Thank you for the time. I am sorry for what might be difference but the relationship is too important and it is not going to fall apart over Iraq.

Gorbachev. Good George. I am saying good by. I want you to know that I have given instructions to my people to look into the matter you just mentioned. One more word on Iraq -- we must give some serious thought to the way the position is developing and where detail and substance the two positions coincide. Logic would prompt that we decide in favor of one option -- building on what we have done to try to avert a tragic turn in the situation. Best regards to your family.

The President. Thank you and to Raisa. We need to do this more often in these difficult times.

CLASSIFIED FACSIMILE COVERSHEET

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

COPY
URGENT

EYES Only

To: General Scowcroft 456-2255 NSC
Officer Office Phone Number Bureau/Agency

From: The Secretary S
Officer Office Phone Number Office Symbol

Secure Facsimile Number: 395-1206

Number of Pages Excluding Coversheet: 3

S/S-O Approving Officer: _____

Date/Time of Transmission: 2/19/91

Transmitted By: _____

Remarks: URGENT! EYES ONLY - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By Cop NARA, Date 4/16/09

*DDP
Dennis' office
says this was
faxed to NSC
yesterday.
cj*

*Handed to Soviet
Charge by Baker on*
~~SECRET~~ 1-19-91

Dear Mikhail:

I have now had more time to reflect on your letter reporting on the talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, and I want to share my views with you.

My initial reaction noted several basic problems with your proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the timing and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary to the clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate withdrawal. I said that anything longer than ninety-six hours would not meet the test of immediacy. Second, your proposal does not insist upon Iraqi compliance with all the relevant UNSC resolutions, as demanded in Resolution 678. And, third, there is no mention of the exchange of POWs or release of third country nationals held against their will.

Mikhail, I do appreciate your efforts, but I worry that perhaps incompleteness and ambiguities in your proposal may give heart to Saddam Hussein that he can somehow escape the consequences of his actions and obtain an unclear outcome, which he can exploit politically. Accordingly, I want to convey to you amplification of my earlier points.

Specifically:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0855-MR
JL 8/8/13

~~SECRET~~

- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait begins and no formal cessation of the overall state of hostilities until that withdrawal is completed. That withdrawal must be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other arrangements would risk the lives of coalition forces. We will not attack withdrawing Iraqi troops, but any Iraqi breach of the agreements respecting withdrawal would bring instant and sharp response.

- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the withdrawal.

- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring not only a devastating coalition response, but would affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq after the war.

The joint efforts of many nations, including the Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of an historic rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression through negotiation or divisive tactics.

Consequently, until all of these conditions are accepted, coalition military operations will continue as planned.

George Bush

1/19/91 (1030)

*Gates
version*

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-- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait begins [and no cessation of overall hostilities until that withdrawal is completed]. That withdrawal must be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other arrangements would risk the lives of coalition forces. We will

not attack retreating Iraqi troops, but any Iraqi breach of the conditions would bring instant resumption of hostilities.

-- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the withdrawal.

OUT -- All Iraqi SCUD missile attacks must cease simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal.

-- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring not only a devastating coalition response, but would ensure war crimes prosecutions once the war is over.

OUT Any Iraqi response must fully accept the conditions I have described if it is to be satisfactory to the United States and our coalition partners. Should the Iraqis accept the conditions I have described, the coalition would be prepared to talk directly with them regarding their implementation. Until all of these conditions are accepted, allied military operations will continue as planned.

The joint efforts of many nations, including the Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of a historic rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression through negotiation or divisive tactics.

CLASSIFIED FACSIMILE COVERSHEET

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

URGENT

EYES Only

To: General Scowcroft 456-2255 NSC
~~General~~ Gates Office Phone Number Bureau/Agency

From: The Secretary Office Phone Number S
Officer Office Symbol

Secure Facsimile Number: 395-1206

Number of Pages Excluding Coversheet: 3

S/S-O Approving Officer: SD mwr SM

Date/Time of Transmission: 2/19/91

Transmitted By: BP

Remarks: URGENT! EYES ONLY - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
 E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
 By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/99

Transmit Replies To 202/647-6434 & Alert Recipient Via Telephone

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mikhail:

I have now had more time to reflect on your letter reporting on the talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, and I want to share my views with you.

My initial reaction noted several basic problems with your proposal. First, it sets the stage for negotiating the timing and modalities of a withdrawal, a negotiation contrary to the clear demand of UNSC Resolution 660 for immediate withdrawal. I said that anything longer than ninety-six hours would not meet the test of immediacy. Second, your proposal does not insist upon Iraqi compliance with all the relevant UNSC resolutions, as demanded in Resolution 678. And, third, there is no mention of the exchange of POWs or release of third country nationals held against their will.

Mikhail, I do appreciate your efforts, but I worry that perhaps incompleteness and ambiguities in your proposal may give heart to Saddam Hussein that he can somehow escape the consequences of his actions and obtain an unclear outcome, which he can exploit politically. Accordingly, I want to convey to you amplification of my earlier points. Specifically:

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2011-0855-MR
JL 8/8/13

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- There can be no ceasefire before a massive Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait begins ^{deleted brackets} and no formal ~~cessation~~ cessation of the overall state of hostilities until that withdrawal is completed. That withdrawal must be completed within ninety-six hours. Any other arrangements would risk the lives of coalition forces. We will not attack withdrawing Iraqi troops, but any Iraqi breach of the agreements respecting withdrawal would bring instant and sharp response.
- The exchange of prisoners of war must be completed within twenty-four hours of the initiation of the withdrawal.
- Finally, the Iraqis must understand that any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would bring not only a devastating coalition response, but would affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq after the war.

> next para deleted

The joint efforts of many nations, including the Soviet Union, have brought us to the threshold of an historic rebuff to an aggressor. We must not allow that aggressor now to salvage political gain or the basis of future aggression through negotiation or divisive tactics.

Consequently, until all of these conditions are accepted, coalition military operations will continue as planned.

George Bush

Dear Mr. President:

*Hand delivered
to Soviet Charge'
by State 2/12/51*

Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort you are making.

I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal, which the international community called for over six months ago.

In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be "immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.

Second, all of us have said many times that all of the Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted should be fully implemented, including obligations relating to compensation. Your proposal, as I read it, does not appear to refer to the implementation of any Security Council resolution that deals with issues other than withdrawal.

Third, while you mentioned in your letter on the Primakov visit that POW's were raised with the Iraqis, there is no mention in your proposal of the exchange of POW's -- or of the release of third-country nationals being held against their will (like the CBS camera crew).

Mikhail, let me say more generally that I remain strongly convinced that we must create the conditions for a very different kind of Middle East -- one whose peace and security depend on reconciliation, arms reductions, and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. That will not be possible if Saddam can retain disproportionate military power and go back to business-as-usual. Our task is to ensure that the outcome of this war sets the stage for a more peaceful and secure future in the Middle East.

I know that is a future we both desire. Both the outcome of this war and its aftermath will determine if we get there. We will want to consult closely together on the substance and the process of moving toward that goal. From my standpoint, I believe we have to be careful not to embrace a process or format for discussions that creates an impediment to progress, not a catalyst. While the United Nations certainly has a role to play, we should think carefully before embracing the UN as the sole or immediate forum for discussions of the broad complex of Middle East issues.

With respect to your suggestion about military action, I must repeat that our military strategy will be shaped by concerns for the well-being of the coalition's military forces.

I will be interested to hear from you regarding Iraq's response. However, I do not intend to engage in any negotiation of the principles of the UN resolutions and any response therefore must fully address the concerns I've mentioned above if it is to be satisfactory to the United States. Let me say again that I appreciate your efforts.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev,

President of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics,

Moscow.

United States Department of State
The Secretary
2/19/91

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JABIII *JAB III*

This is what we communicated
to the Soviets last night.

*hostilities stop
beg - true withdrawal
(No way)
1. / from
-2. weapons men
-3 POW's
CW's*

Dear Mr. President:

*Hand delivered
to Soviet Charge'
by State 2/18/91*

Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort you are making.

I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal, which the international community called for over six months ago.

In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be "immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.

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Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev,

President of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics,

Moscow.

Dear Mikhail:

*Retyped
by State*

*Hand delivered
by State 2/18/91
See att's to Source Amt. Charge*

Thank you very much for your report on your meeting with Tariq Aziz. I appreciate the full briefing and the effort you are making.

I agree with your emphasis on unconditional withdrawal, the importance of no linkage of Iraqi withdrawal to any other issue, and the urgency of an Iraqi response to you. While I very much want to see the war end, I am also wary of Saddam's effort to get something for agreeing to withdrawal, which the international community called for over 6 months ago.

In that regard, I worry about your proposal from several standpoints. First, there seems to be room for Iraq to negotiate the timeframe for withdrawal. For our part, we are not willing to negotiate the period for Iraq's getting out of Kuwait. UNSC Resolution 660 says it must be "immediate." It took Iraqi forces only a very short time to get in, and we will not accept any period for withdrawal that exceeds ninety-six hours. Anything longer than ninety-six hours wouldn't meet the test of immediacy.

Second, all of us have said many times that all of the Security Council resolutions that we collectively adopted should be fully implemented. Your proposal, as I read it, does not appear to refer to the implementation of any Security Council resolution that deals with issues other than withdrawal.

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Mikhail, let me say more generally that I remain strongly convinced that we must create the conditions for a very different kind of Middle East -- one whose peace and security depend on reconciliation, arms reductions, and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. That will not be possible if Saddam can retain disproportionate military power and go back to business-as-usual. Our task is to ensure that the outcome of this war sets the stage for a more peaceful and secure future in the Middle East.

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With respect to your suggestion about military action, I must repeat that our military strategy will be shaped by concerns for the well-being of the coalition's military forces.

I will be interested to hear from you regarding Iraq's response. • Let me say again that I appreciate your efforts.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev,

President of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics,

Moscow.

(insert) However, I do not intend to engage in any negotiations of the principles of the UN resolutions and any response, therefore, must fully address the concerns I have mentioned above if it is to be satisfactory to the United States.

*Hand delivered
to Baker 2/18/91*

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

As we agreed, I am informing you on the visit of Tariq Aziz to Moscow and the results of our talks with him (he was accompanied by Deputy Premier Hammadi).

After I asked a straightforward question: What is it that you are bringing with you? - the rather difficult conversation that lasted about three hours took on a businesslike nature.

I told them that I consider the statement by the Revolutionary Command Council as a step toward seeking a political settlement. But in order to advance this process, any "linkage" of troops withdrawal with preconditions should be excluded. I noted in passing that the statement did not contain the word "Kuwait". Aziz's reaction was that this, somehow, goes without saying. But if so, said I, then why this state had not been mentioned after all?..

In the course of the discussions concerning the conditions put forward in the statement of the Revolutionary Command Council, the Iraqis were forced to clarify that the statement talked not about the terms of a pullout, but, as it were, about some "program" for a settlement. I asked a direct question: Could one look upon this "program" as a "reminder" of the existence of the problems mentioned, rather than to believe that without their solution there would be no withdrawal from Kuwait? The Iraqis' clarifications suggested that the "program" was designed for a negotiating political process.

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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2011-0855-MR
JL 8/8/13

Tariq Aziz said that he was sent here to listen to recommendations about "how to initiate the peace process which would result in a worthy and honorable peace".

I proposed this plan:

- Iraq would declare its troops withdrawal from Kuwait (precisely from Kuwait, and not in general);
- it would announce a specific date for the complete withdrawal, this time-frame being as short as possible;
- it would begin the actual withdrawal of its troops on the next day after the termination of hostilities;
- the pullout from Kuwait would not be tied to any conditions, except one: a guarantee that the troops being withdrawn would not be attacked, that they would not be "shot in the back", and that there would be no resumption of hostilities.

In contrast to our previous contacts with representatives of the Iraqi leadership, this time our proposals were not met with "resentful" objections. Our interlocutors began to ask additional questions as to whether the Security Council resolutions that imposed a blockade on Iraq would be rescinded; whether the American and other troops of the military coalition would stay in the region following the settlement of the Persian Gulf conflict; how would the Palestinian issue, the Lebanon problem and the Middle East problem in general be resolved in the future; what was the Soviet attitude to the right of Iraq to assure an appropriate access to the sea; and what guarantees there were that the Middle East problem would not again be shelved, etc.

My response was: All those problems pertaining to the second stage could be raised and discussed after Iraq had unconditionally withdrawn from Kuwait, after the war was over. Aziz and Hammadi were told in the strongest possible terms that attempts to "link", as does the Revolutionary Command Council statement, the liberation of Kuwait and the termination of hostilities

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with a direct resolution of all or any of those problems were unacceptable and unrealistic.

I told Aziz that once Iraq began its troops withdrawal, the Soviet Union would propose convening a special meeting of the UN Security Council to address the issue of guarantees of this withdrawal and of non-resumption of hostilities.

In keeping with its well-known position of principle, the USSR will also insist on getting the United Nations to vigorously tackle the whole range of issues involved in the Middle East settlement, including the establishment of a regional security system on which there already exist a number of various projects, including - and that is particularly important - those that originate with Arab states themselves. This process is not an easy one but there is understanding in the world community that the conflict in the Middle East should, at last, be resolved on a just basis, primarily through agreement between the states of the region and with the help of the United Nations.

I warned my interlocutors that the time factor was now of enormous consequence, and that if the lives of their countrymen and the future of Iraq were dear to them, they should act fast.

Thus, the nature of these discussions shows that the Iraqis have not rejected our proposals outright, but have taken them as a subject for serious consideration. However, the final response can, of course, be provided by Iraq only after Aziz has reported the "Gorbachev plan", as he called it, to President Hussein and all members of the Iraqi leadership.

I consider it necessary to add that I personally and all my comrades who were present at the conversation have formed the impression that both the fact of the Revolutionary Command Council statement, the "clarifications" brought by Aziz, and the reaction to

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our arguments and proposals are indicative of a beginning of a certain shift in the understanding of realities by Hussein and his team.

Aziz promised to send a reply very shortly.

It seems to me that this should be taken into account in conducting the military operations in the next few days. Let me note, incidentally, that in various contexts the Iraqis emphasized that Bagdad had been subjected to particularly harsh strength precisely at the time when the personal representative of the USSR President was staying there.

Practical interests make it desirable that the substance of this information remain confidential for the time being.

I will inform you about Hussein's reply in a timely manner.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 14, 1991

TO: NSC - General Scowcroft
FROM: S/S - Stape Roy 
SUBJECT: Translation of Gorbachev Letter

Attached is an EUR/SOV translation of the Gorbachev letter which the Secretary asked me to send you on an eyes only basis.

We will be sending over a proposed response very shortly.

Attachment:

February 13, 1991 Gorbachev letter
and translation

~~SECRET~~

Moscow, February 13, 1991

Dear George:

I want to inform you about the results of the trip to Baghdad of my personal representative, Ye. M. Primakov.

Our representative devoted his meeting with S. Hussein to the task of convincing the Iraqi leadership to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council. On our side it was clearly stated that, in the circumstances that have developed, the matter can only be dealt with in the following manner: the leadership of Iraq must announce its readiness to withdraw its forces from Kuwait and simultaneously specify the period during which they will be withdrawn. A ceasefire can only take place after such an announcement. Immediately following the ceasefire, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops must begin without fail and without delay. In this regard, it was underscored that it is necessary to renounce in full the shelling of Israel.

Based on the assessment of our representative, his discussion with the President of Iraq brought to light several hopeful points. On this occasion, S. Hussein displayed a more concrete interest than previously in the conditions that would have to accompany the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait -- indeed, not denying such a possibility. S. Hussein expressed himself in favor of a continuation of the dialogue.

We gave our agreement to this. It is envisaged that, to this end, a special representative of the President of Iraq will come to Moscow at the end of this week or the beginning of next week. It will most likely be the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Aziz.

It is, of course, difficult to predict the outcome of the discussions in Moscow. However, if there is even the slightest chance of emerging with an appropriate political outcome and of averting further bloodshed, then this chance should be seized. I think you will agree, in considering the circumstances, that it would not be desirable to conduct any massive ground operations, if they are being planned, during the period of the Moscow talks. For our part we will, of course, not allow this dialogue to be used by the Iraqis to buy time, if that appears to be their intention.

We will inform you at once about the results of the talks with the special representative of the President of Iraq.

I also want to inform you that, in his discussion with T. Aziz, Ye. M. Primakov raised in a firm manner the question of captured pilots.

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

His Excellency
Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
09/04/2007 MM

~~SECRET~~

Москва, 13 февраля 1991 года

Дорогой Джордж,

Хочу проинформировать Вас о результатах поездки в Багдад моего личного представителя Е.М.Примакова.

Свой разговор с С.Хусейном наш представитель подчинял задаче убедить иракское руководство выполнить резолюции Совета Безопасности. С нашей стороны было ясно сказано, что в создавшихся условиях речь может идти только о следующем: руководство Ирака должно заявить о готовности вывести войска из Кувейта и одновременно назвать срок, в течение которого они будут выведены. Прекращение огня может произойти лишь после такого заявления. Вслед за прекращением огня обязательно и безотлагательно должен начаться вывод иракских войск. При этом было подчеркнуто, что нужно полностью отказаться от обстрелов Израиля.

По оценке нашего представителя, его беседа с президентом Ирака высветила некоторые обнадеживающие моменты. На этот раз С.Хусейн проявил более конкретную, чем раньше, заинтересованность условиями, которыми сопровождался бы вывод войск из Кувейта, явно не отрицая такую возможность. С.Хусейн высказался за продолжение диалога.

Мы дали на это согласие. Имеется в виду, что с этой целью в Москву прибудет в конце этой - начале будущей недели специальный представитель президента Ирака. Им будет, скорее всего, заместитель премьер-министра, министр иностранных дел Т.Азиз.

Трудно, конечно, предсказать исход бесед в Москве. Однако, если есть хотя бы малейший шанс выйти на соответствующую политическую развязку и предотвратить тем самым дальнейшее

Его Превосходительству
Г-ну Джорджу БУШу
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304/F/1
03/03/2010 MM

~~SECRET~~

2.

кровопролитие, то им следует воспользоваться. Думаю, Вы со мной согласитесь, что с учетом этих обстоятельств проведение каких-либо массированных наземных операций, если таковые планируются, было бы на период Московских переговоров нежелательно. Со своей стороны мы, разумеется, не допустим, чтобы этот диалог был использован иракцами для выигрыша времени, если у них проявятся такие намерения.

Мы сразу же проинформируем Вас об итогах переговоров со специальным представителем президента Ирака.

Хочу также сообщить, что в беседе с Т.Азизом Е.М.Примаков в нажимной форме поставил вопрос о пленных летчиках.

С уважением,

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Cable	From Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [151210Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0855-MR(506)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	1/23/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

SCOWCROFT, GATES, SDO
PRT: FLORENCE

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~

DTG 151210Z FEB 91

FM ^{1.4(c)} MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0855-MR
1/23/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY ^{1.4(c)}
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY. CHERNYAYEV SAID HE WOULD SEND IT TO GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, BUT EXPRESSED SOME DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NO COMMITMENT COULD BE MADE REGARDING GROUND ACTIONS. HE ASKED IF THE PRESIDENT WAS AWARE THAT THEY WERE NOT ASKING FOR TIME TO "NEGOTIATE" BUT ONLY TO RECEIVE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO PRIMAKOV'S PROPOSAL. TARIQ AZIZ, HE SAID, WOULD ARRIVE SUNDAY THE 17TH AND WOULD MEET GORBACHEV ON MONDAY.
2. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS SURE THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN THOUGHTFUL ATTENTION TO GORBACHEV'S REQUEST, BUT I ALSO WAS SURE THAT THEY COULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ALLOW MILITARY PLANNING TO BE AFFECTED BY A HOPE, WHICH COULD WELL PROVE TO BE MISPLACED, THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS NOW PREPARED TO DO SOMETHING WHICH HE HAS REFUSED TO DO FOR OVER SIX MONTHS.
3. CHERNYAYEV THEN ASKED WHAT SORT OF MESSAGE FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, SUPPOSE HE SAYS HE WILL LEAVE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

KUWAIT AND WILL START WITHDRAWING IN TEN DAYS? I TOLD HIM THAT I COULD NOT ANSWER HIS QUESTION OFFICIALLY. BUT WOULD SAY THAT IT SEEMED HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT WE COULD ACCEPT A MERE PROMISE TO DO SOMETHING IN THE FUTURE. AS SECRETARY BAKER HAD POINTED OUT TO CHETVERIKOV WEDNESDAY. THERE MUST BE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE STEPS.

4. CHERNYAYEV THEN ASKED IF THEY COULD RECEIVE, BEFORE GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH AZIZ MONDAY. AN INDICATION FROM US OF WHAT SORT OF ANSWER FROM THE IRAQI'S WE WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE. I UNDERTOOK TO RELAY HIS QUESTIONS, AND CHERNYAYEV SAID HE WOULD SEE ME MONDAY MORNING IF WE SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER TO CONVEY TO GORBACHEV BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH TARIO AZIZ.

5. COMMENT. I WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE ON THE POINT CHERNYAYEV RAISED, IF YOU CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO BE MORE CONCRETE WITH THE SOVIETS.

WARM REGARDS.

JACK MATLOCK

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0659

~~SECRET~~

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [150120Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0855-MR(506.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	1/23/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: NSFEG FILE 1.4(c) SIT

PREC > IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 150120Z FEB 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

TO 1.4(c) MOSCOW

2011-0835-MR
1/23/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c) EYES ONLY
0000

DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER CONCERNING YEVGENY PRIMAKOV'S VISIT TO
BAGHDAD. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE TOGETHER WITH MANY OTHER NATIONS
SOUGHT FOR OVER SIX MONTHS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS.
I AM APPRECIATIVE OF THE FACT THAT WE CONTINUE TOGETHER TO SEEK
THAT COMPLIANCE. THUS I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU ABOUT
THE RESULTS OF FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO YOUR COMMENT ABOUT GROUND OPERATIONS, I
CANNOT MAKE REPRESENTATIONS OR PROMISES ABOUT CHANGES IN STRATEGY
OR PAUSES OF ANY KIND IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR BASED UPON HOPES
THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL FINALLY DO WHAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY HAS
CALLED ON HIM TO DO FOR OVER SIX MONTHS. WE WOULD BE CONCERNED THAT
SADDAM WILL SEEK A PAUSE NOT TO FACILITATE WITHDRAWAL, BUT TO AVOID
WITHDRAWAL--INDEED, TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF HIM AND TO BUILD
PRESSURE ON THE COALITION NOT TO RESUME MILITARY ACTION. THUS, THE
TIMING OF A GROUND CAMPAIGN MUST BE SHAPED BY THE DICTATES OF

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE SAFETY OF THE COALITION'S MANPOWER.

LET ME ALSO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE TO YOU PERSONALLY THAT EVERYTHING WE ARE DOING MILITARILY IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR GOAL, AND ONE I KNOW YOU SHARE, REMAINS THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT, NOT THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ. INDEED, THE COALITION IS GOING TO EXTRAORDINARY LENGTHS--AT TIMES, EVEN TO THE POINT OF ENDANGERING COALITION PERSONNEL--TO AVOID INJURY TO CIVILIANS AND NON-MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

INCIDENTALLY, WE HAVE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE BUNKER TARGETED ON WEDNESDAY WAS INDEED A PROPER MILITARY TARGET. WE MOURN THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE BUT THE BLAME GOES TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.

I AM PARTICULARLY APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. PRIMAKOV RAISED WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN THE MATTER OF OUR CAPTURED PILOTS. AS YOU KNOW, WE WERE PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO INFORM YOU RECENTLY OF THE RELEASE OF THREE OF YOUR OFFICERS BY THE EPLF.

JIM BAKER TELLS ME THAT IN A CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH, HE WAS TOLD THAT YOU ARE MOVING ENERGETICALLY TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS IN MY RECENT LETTER

CONCERNING CFE. THAT IS PARTICULARLY GOOD NEWS BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT MUCH IS DEPENDENT UPON RESOLVING THESE ISSUES QUICKLY. THEIR RESOLUTION, I THINK, WOULD DO MUCH TO RESTORE CREDIBILITY TO THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN US AND WOULD AT LEAST PUT A START AGREEMENT BACK WITHIN REACH, SOMETHING WE BOTH WANT.

WITH WARM REGARDS AND BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV.

PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, MOSCOW

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0050

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 14, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we have together with many other nations sought for over six months Saddam Hussein's full and unconditional compliance with the objectives of the United Nations resolutions. I am appreciative of the fact that we continue together to seek that compliance. Thus I will look forward to hearing from you about the results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to Moscow.

However, with respect to your comment about ground operations, I cannot make representations or promises about changes in strategy or pauses of any kind in the conduct of the war based upon hopes that Saddam Hussein will finally do what the world community has called on him to do for over six months. We would be concerned that Saddam will seek a pause not to facilitate withdrawal, but to avoid withdrawal--indeed, to take the pressure off him and to build pressure on the coalition not to resume military action. Thus, the timing of a ground campaign must be shaped by the dictates of military strategy and the safety of the coalition's manpower.

Let me also use this opportunity to reiterate to you personally that everything we are doing militarily is fully consistent with the resolutions of the Security Council. Our goal, and one I know you share, remains the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. Indeed, the coalition is going to extraordinary lengths --at times, even to the point of endangering coalition personnel--to avoid injury to civilians and non-military installations.


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I am particularly appreciative that Mr. Primakov raised with Saddam Hussein the matter of our captured pilots. As you know, we were pleased to be able to inform you recently of the release of three of your officers by the EPLF.

Jim Baker tells me that in a conversation last night with Minister Bessmertnykh, he was told that you are moving energetically to address the questions in my recent letter concerning CFE. That is particularly good news because we feel that much is dependent upon resolving these issues quickly. Their resolution, I think, would do much to restore credibility to the dialogue between us and would at least put a START agreement back within reach, something we both want.

With warm regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Gorbachev', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07d. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Response to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2-14-91

LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
WITHOUT SPECIFIC
PERMISSION
1152

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Response to President Gorbachev

**DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET**
1999-0304-F/1
05/10/2001 JGP

Purpose

To respond to President Gorbachev's letter on the Gulf.

Background

You have received a letter from President Gorbachev reporting on the meetings of Yevgenyi Primakov in Baghdad. The letter states that Saddam did not reject a sequence in which there would be a ceasefire in response to an announcement of Iraq's intention to withdraw on an unspecified timetable. Tariq Aziz will visit Moscow at the end of this week or early next week to continue these discussions. Gorbachev asks the coalition to delay ground action at least until the Soviet talks with Tariq Aziz in Moscow are completed. He also notes that Primakov raised the issue of the treatment of captured coalition pilots.

Your response thanks Gorbachev for his efforts to convince Saddam to comply with the resolutions but notes that the timing of the ground campaign must be determined by military factors. It also reiterates the theme that our actions fall within the mandate of the Security Council resolutions.

Lastly, your letter thanks him for Soviet efforts on behalf of our pilots and anticipates his response to your recent message on CFE.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to President Gorbachev
Tab B Letter from President Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

1999-0304-F/1 03/03/2010 MM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 14, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we have together with many other nations sought for over six months Saddam Hussein's full and unconditional compliance with the objectives of the United Nations resolutions. I am appreciative of the fact that we continue together to seek that compliance. Thus I will look forward to hearing from you about the results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to Moscow.

However, with respect to your comment about ground operations, I cannot make representations or promises about changes in strategy or pauses of any kind in the conduct of the war based upon hopes that Saddam Hussein will finally do what the world community has called on him to do for over six months. We would be concerned that Saddam will seek a pause not to facilitate withdrawal, but to avoid withdrawal--indeed, to take the pressure off him and to build pressure on the coalition not to resume military action. Thus, the timing of a ground campaign must be shaped by the dictates of military strategy and the safety of the coalition's manpower.

Let me also use this opportunity to reiterate to you personally that everything we are doing militarily is fully consistent with the resolutions of the Security Council. Our goal, and one I know you share, remains the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. Indeed, the coalition is going to extraordinary lengths --at times, even to the point of endangering coalition personnel--to avoid injury to civilians and non-military installations.


Incidentally, we have incontrovertible evidence that the bunker targeted on Wednesday was indeed a proper military target. We mourn the loss of innocent life but the blame goes to Saddam Hussein.

I am particularly appreciative that Mr. Primakov raised with Saddam Hussein the matter of our captured pilots. As you know, we were pleased to be able to inform you recently of the release of three of your officers by the EPLF.

Jim Baker tells me that in a conversation last night with Minister Bessmertnykh, he was told that you are moving energetically to address the questions in my recent letter concerning CFE. That is particularly good news because we feel that much is dependent upon resolving these issues quickly. Their resolution, I think, would do much to restore credibility to the dialogue between us and would at least put a START agreement back within reach, something we both want.

With warm regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Gorbachev', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

Moscow, February 13, 1991

Dear George:

I want to inform you about the results of the trip to Baghdad of my personal representative, Ye. M. Primakov.

Our representative devoted his meeting with S. Hussein to the task of convincing the Iraqi leadership to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council. On our side it was clearly stated that, in the circumstances that have developed, the matter can only be dealt with in the following manner: the leadership of Iraq must announce its readiness to withdraw its forces from Kuwait and simultaneously specify the period during which they will be withdrawn. A ceasefire can only take place after such an announcement. Immediately following the ceasefire, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops must begin without fail and without delay. In this regard, it was underscored that it is necessary to renounce in full the shelling of Israel.

Based on the assessment of our representative, his discussion with the President of Iraq brought to light several hopeful points. On this occasion, S. Hussein displayed a more concrete interest than previously in the conditions that would have to accompany the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait -- indeed, not denying such a possibility. S. Hussein expressed himself in favor of a continuation of the dialogue.

We gave our agreement to this. It is envisaged that, to this end, a special representative of the President of Iraq will come to Moscow at the end of this week or the beginning of next week. It will most likely be the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Aziz.

It is, of course, difficult to predict the outcome of the discussions in Moscow. However, if there is even the slightest chance of emerging with an appropriate political outcome and of averting further bloodshed, then this chance should be seized. I think you will agree, in considering the circumstances, that it would not be desirable to conduct any massive ground operations, if they are being planned, during the period of the Moscow talks. For our part we will, of course, not allow this dialogue to be used by the Iraqis to buy time, if that appears to be their intention.

We will inform you at once about the results of the talks with the special representative of the President of Iraq.

I also want to inform you that, in his discussion with T. Aziz, Ye. M. Primakov raised in a firm manner the question of captured pilots.

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

His Excellency
Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
09/04/2007 MM

~~SECRET~~

Москва, 16 апреля 1991 года

Дорогой Джордж,

Хочу проинформировать Вас о результатах поездки в Багдад моего личного представителя Л.М.Примакова.

Свой разговор с С.Хусейном наш представитель поднимал задачу уговорить иракское руководство выполнить резолюции Совета Безопасности. С нашей стороны было ясно сказано, что в создавшихся условиях речь может идти только о следующем: руководство Ирака должно заявить о готовности вывести войска из Кувейта и одновременно назвать срок, в течение которого они будут выведены. Прекращение огня может произойти лишь после такого заявления. После за прекращением огня обязательно и безотлагательно должен начаться вывод иракских войск. При этом было подчеркнуто, что нужно полностью отказаться от обстрелов Ираком.

По мнению нашего представителя, его беседа с президентом Ирака выявила некоторые обнадеживающие моменты. На этот раз С.Хусейн проявил более конкретную, чем раньше, заинтересованность условиями, которыми сопровождался бы вывод войск из Кувейта, явно не отрицая такую возможность. С.Хусейн высказался за продолжение диалога.

Мы дали на это согласие. Имеется в виду, что с этой целью в Москву прибудет в конце этой - начале будущей недели специальный представитель президента Ирака. Им будет, скорее всего, заместитель премьер-министра, министр иностранных дел Т.Али.

Трудно, конечно, предсказать исход бесед в Москве. Однако, если есть хотя бы малейший шанс выйти на соответствующую политическую развязку и предотвратить тем самым дальнейшее

Ваше Превосходительству
Г-ну Джорджу Бушу
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Г. Вашингтон

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
03/03/2010 MM

~~SECRET~~

11.

кровопродитие, то им следует воспользоваться. Думаю, вы со мной согласитесь, что с учетом этих обстоятельств проведение каких-либо массированных наземных операций, если таковые планируются, было бы на период Московских переговоров нежелательно. Со своей стороны мы, разумеется, не допустим, чтобы этот диалог был использован враждой для выигрыва времени, если у них проявятся такие намерения.

Мы сразу же проинформируем нас об итогах переговоров со специальным представителем президента Ирана.

Ночью также сообщать, что в беседе с Т. Азисом Л. М. Примаков в нажимной форме поставил вопрос о пленных летчиках.

О увещании,

...FORNALL

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 14, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we have together with many other nations sought for over six months Saddam Hussein's full and unconditional compliance with the objectives of the United Nations resolutions. I am appreciative of the fact that we continue together to seek that compliance. Thus I will look forward to hearing from you about the results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to Moscow.

However, with respect to your comment about ground operations, I cannot make representations or promises about changes in strategy or pauses of any kind in the conduct of the war based upon hopes that Saddam Hussein will finally do what the world community has called on him to do for over six months. We would be concerned that Saddam will seek a pause not to facilitate withdrawal, but to avoid withdrawal--indeed, to take the pressure off him and to build pressure on the coalition not to resume military action. Thus, the timing of a ground campaign must be shaped by the dictates of military strategy and the safety of the coalition's manpower.

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Incidentally, we have incontrovertible evidence that the bunker targeted on Wednesday was indeed a proper military target. We mourn the loss of innocent life but the blame goes to Saddam Hussein.

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Jim Baker tells me that in a conversation last night with Minister Bessmertnykh, he was told that you are moving energetically to address the questions in my recent letter concerning CFE. That is particularly good news because we feel that much is dependent upon resolving these issues quickly. Their resolution, I think, would do much to restore credibility to the dialogue between us and would at least put a START agreement back within reach, something we both want.

With warm regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

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His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev,
President of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

W4/SR

Transmit a/c 16

tonight

EYES ONLY - ^{PRIVACY CHANNEL} ~~Back channel~~

Deliver in sealed
envelope EO to
Amb Mottlock

Return orig to me
TONIGHT.

74
DP

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mikhail:

Thank you for your letter concerning Yevgeny Primakov's visit to Baghdad. As you know, we have together with many other nations sought for over six months Saddam Hussein's full and unconditional compliance with the objectives of the United Nations resolutions. I am appreciative of the fact that we continue together to seek that compliance. Thus I will look forward to hearing from you about the results of Foreign Minister Aziz's visit to Moscow.

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08. Cable	Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 2/17/2015

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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

(b)(1)

<DTG> 111302Z FEB 91

(b)(1)

<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 111302Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS

PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE

O 111250Z FEB 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4

FM (b)(1) MOSCOW

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY.
AFTER SUMMARIZING THE MAIN POINTS, I ADDED THAT WHEN THE SUBJECT
WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY DURING MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV I HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON IT. IF THAT WAS THE
CASE, THEN IT IS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DO SO.

CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT BESSMERTNYKH HAD REPORTED ON HIS
CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD FORMED A
GROUP TO STUDY THE MATTER URGENTLY AND REPORT BACK TO HIM.
CHERNYAYEV HIMSELF IS A MEMBER OF THAT GROUP. WHEN THE GROUP
REPORTS, GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER.

I POINTED OUT THAT THE FEBRUARY 17 DEADLINE IS FAST
APPROACHING AND IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BRING THE
SOVIET POSITION IN LINE WITH THE TREATY BY THEN. CHERNYAYEV
SAID THAT THE GROUP WOULD FINISH ITS WORK "SOON." AT ONE
POINT, WHEN I SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO BE ACTING
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY, CHERNYAYEV SAID,
"NOT THE SOVIET UNION - JUST SOME SOVIET GENERALS."

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0574

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0574 <TOR> 910211082555 MSG000287569555



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR

12/17/2013 MM

<DIST>

SIT: WHSR_DUP PRIVACY_IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

(b)(1)

<DTG> 101255Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM (b)(1) MOSCOW

<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~S E C R E T~~ 101255Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
EYES ONLY FROM JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

BRENT:

WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RAISE ANYONE AT CHERNAYEV'S OFFICE TODAY
(FEBRUARY 10), TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO GORBACHEV ON CFE. WE WILL WORK TO DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
ON MONDAY.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0547

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0547 <TOR> 910210084558 MSG000287484357

<DIST>

SIT: PRES MSGS WILSONH

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEHC

<DTG> 130246Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHGV/USDEL NST GENEVA PRIORITY 0000

<SUBJ> CFE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT
- GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 046712

NODIS

USVIENNA FOR CFE-WOOLSEY ONLY; NST GENEVA FOR BURT ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, UR, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: CFE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT
- GORBACHEV

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PARAGRAPH 3 CONTAINS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV CONCERNING CFE. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER ASAP. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH. NOTE: IN THE PARAGRAPH BEGINNING WITH THE PHRASE "LET ME EMPHASIZE...", THE WORD "BEFORE" IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE UNDERLINED.
3. BEGIN TEXT:

FEBRUARY 9, 1991

DEAR MIKHAIL:

JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY VIEWS.

I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY, COASTAL DEFENSE, AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION IN PART BECAUSE BOTH THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE III OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD SO THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY LIMITS.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR
ES 6/6/13

OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMILAR POSITION. LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK WOULD PUT ANY SUCH SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT CASE WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. INDEED I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED, AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY, MIKHAIL IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION. FRANKLY, I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.

YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.

I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS NOT JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH.

SINCERELY,

/S/

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
END TEXT. BAKER

BT

#6712

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6712 <TOR> 910213093541 MSG000287746541

~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100944
RECEIVED: 06 FEB 91 16

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 09 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
CFE
LIMITED ACCESS

ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GORDON
KANTER
NSC CHRON
RICE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 4/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

LRM

DATE

2/11

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 3 OF 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9100944

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	Z	91020810	PRES APPROVED LTR
001	X	91020810	CABLE SENT VIA WH SIT ROOM
001 SITTMANN	Z	91021110	FOR SIGNATURE
002 PRESIDENT	Z	91021110	FOR SIGNATURE
003	X	91020918	PRES SGD LTR
003 STATE	X	91021118	FOR DISPATCH

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 7/14/09

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1991

MR. PRESIDENT:

I understand you approved
this letter to be cabled
on Saturday. This original
will follow.

Thank you.



Phillip D. Brady

FAX'd to Pres.
@ Camp David
2/8/91
6:24 P.M.

Limited Access

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 0944

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG for AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
<i>sf</i> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>Review</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>2/11</u>	<u>2</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 FEB 11 P 4: 01

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Date 2/9/91

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

2/9/91

LIMITED ACCESS

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0944
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>		<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>27. 2/11</u>	<u>DN</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 FEB 7 AID: 35

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9100944
DATE 09 FEB 91

SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

2/11/91

TIME

11:04

SIGNATURE

C. Holmes

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Caf NARA, Date 4/16/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9100944
DATE 09 FEB 91

SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

2/11/91

11:04

CR Holmes

COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9100944

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 FEB 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 09 FEB 91

SUBJ: LTR FM PRES TO GORBACHEV RE CFE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 11 FEB 91

COMMENT:

FOR



GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cof NARA, Date 4/16/09

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last week. I wanted to write you personally with my views.

I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that the Soviet side continues to insist that ground force equipment held by certain units such as naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces is not subject to the limits of the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to explore possible compromises that would allow the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union. Jim told him we simply cannot do that.

I do not understand how the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that equipment such as that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE limits. None of the twenty-one other signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in part because both the treaty text and the negotiating record are so clear about what is covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty applies to the kinds of units and equipment that the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And, accordingly, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment they hold so that it would be subject to CFE Treaty limits.

I must tell you that the United States cannot accept any approach that would amount to a redefinition of the obligations and commitments that all the parties assumed when they signed the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty signatories hold a similar position.

Let me emphasize that this is not a question of the United States or any other signatory seeking unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit Soviet difficulties. I hope that the constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet concerns about the Kiev military district, which required us to reopen an agreement reached by our foreign ministers in New York, would put any such suspicions to rest. We did that even though our allies were neither easy to convince nor particularly pleased with our asking them to go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless, in that case, we were able to work together to address a problem precisely because it was raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not state its position on the treatment of units such as naval infantry when it had every opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was signed, particularly when it successfully argued for other exclusions during the negotiations.

I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were agreed, and I do not underestimate the difficulties you may face in meeting these commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way that would change the obligations that the signatories undertook. This is a matter of principle that determines how much confidence we can place in negotiations and commitments that directly affect our security. Basically, Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and credibility. That is why I will not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification until the Soviet Union has rectified this situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still hope to achieve ratification.

You and I have often said that the CFE Treaty is one of the principal pillars of the new security structure in Europe that we are trying to build. It symbolizes the end of a generation of military confrontation and competition and the beginning of a new era of cooperation. All of that could be put in jeopardy, however, if we are unable to resolve the naval infantry issue or address satisfactorily data discrepancies and the less pressing issue of the large-scale movement of military equipment east of the Urals. The treaty-mandated period for correcting CFE data ends on February 17. I hope we can put these matters behind us by that time.

I am conveying my concerns in this direct and forthright manner because of what is at stake. We stand at a crossroads, not just for CFE but for the entire arms control process. We either can move forward with agreements that enhance our mutual security and international stability, or see our long and hard efforts stall. I know neither of us wants that. I urge you to help us move down the right path.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Gorbachev', with a long, sweeping diagonal line extending from the bottom right of the signature across the page.

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 6/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/22/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT. PRIVACY_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 091910Z FEB 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO 1.4(c) MOSCOW

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR
9/22/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

SECTION 01 OF 02

PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IF UNAVAILABLE, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MAY DELIVER TO
CHERNAYEV.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT
CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY
VIEWS.

I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT
JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND
FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY,
COASTAL DEFENSE, AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION. IN PART BECAUSE BOTH THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE III OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD SO THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY LIMITS.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMLIAR POSITION.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES

OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, WOULD PUT ANY SUCH SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT CASE, WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED. PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED. AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY, MIKHAIL, IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION. FRANKLY, I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.

YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.

I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS, NOT JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH

SINCERELY.

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV

PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

*0012

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

FINAL SECTION OF 02

MOSCOW

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

*0013

~~SECRET~~

FYI: A letter to Gorbachev was faxed to the President on Friday nite. He approved the letter - therefore a cable was sent out from him over the weekend. The original letter came down from Florence this AM - she said we need to check the cable to see how it was signed (Lonnie said he would do that) along with giving to Brady's office for the President to sign the original letter or have it signed on the machine. I will doublecheck with Fran to make sure she is aware of this.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

0944
LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

WASHINGTON

91 FEB 11 AM 10:31

February 8, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on CFE

Purpose

To send a personal letter from you to President Gorbachev urging him to take the steps necessary to resolve a serious problem with the CFE Treaty. Unless resolved, we will not be able to send the treaty forward for ratification.

Background

The Soviets have thus far been unwilling to address a major problem that has arisen since signature of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In short, they would exclude from the treaty several divisions of "naval infantry," thus avoiding the treaty-mandated destruction of the equipment associated with such units. This amounts to an attempt to redefine obligations and commitments after treaty signature.

We have expressed our concerns about this problem to the Soviets consistently and at many levels. Jim Baker has raised it directly with Bessmertnykh. It seems clear that the problem cannot be solved by the Foreign Ministry: Bessmertnykh made clear to Jim that a letter from you to Gorbachev is needed to help resolve the issues within the Soviet Union.

At Tab A is a proposed letter that lays out the problem, tells Gorbachev that failure to resolve this matter puts in jeopardy the progress made in rebuilding the security structure in Europe, and urges he resolve the problem before the February 17 deadline for correcting CFE data mandated by the treaty.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to President Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0850-MR
ES 3/15/13

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

0944

LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 6, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLLEEZA RICE *GR* *CR*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *G*

SUBJECT: Proposed CFE Letter

Per our discussions, at Tab A is the proposed letter from the President to President Gorbachev on CFE. The proposed letter has been reviewed by Secretary Baker.

Concurrence by: David Gompert *[Signature]*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I proposing a letter on CFE to Gorbachev.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Proposed Letter to Gorbachev

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0856-MR
ES 3/15/13

2/7

New page 1 + 3

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Mikhail:

Dear ~~Mr. President~~:

Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last week. I wanted to write you personally with my views.

I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that the Soviet side continues to insist that ground force equipment held by certain units such as naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces is not subject to the limits of the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to explore possible compromises that would allow the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union. Jim told him we simply cannot do that.

I do not understand how the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that equipment such as that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE limits. None of the twenty-one other signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in part because both the treaty text and the negotiating record are so clear about what is covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty applies to the kinds of units and equipment that the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And, accordingly, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment they hold so that it would be subject to CFE Treaty limits.

I must tell you that the United States cannot accept any approach that would amount to a redefinition of the obligations and commitments that all the parties assumed when they signed the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty signatories hold a similar position.

Let me emphasize that this is not a question of the United States or any other signatory seeking unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit Soviet difficulties. I hope that the constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet concerns about the Kiev military district, which required us to reopen an agreement reached by our foreign ministers in New York, would put any such suspicions to rest. We did that even though our allies were neither easy to convince nor particularly pleased with our asking them to go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless, in that case, we were able to work together to address a problem precisely because it was raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not state its position on the treatment of units such as naval infantry when it had every opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was signed, particularly when it successfully argued for other exclusions during the negotiations.

I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were agreed, and I do not underestimate the difficulties you may face in meeting these commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way that would change the obligations that the signatories undertook. This is a matter of principle that determines how much confidence we can place in negotiations and commitments that directly affect our security. * That is why I will not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification until the Soviet Union has rectified this situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still hope to achieve ratification.

Basically, Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and credibility.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 6/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/22/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY OUT RICE SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 1.4(c) <DTG> 091910Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO 1.4(c) MOSCOW

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IF UNAVAILABLE, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MAY DELIVER TO
CHERNAYEV.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:


JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT
CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY
VIEWS.

I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT
JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND
FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY,
COASTAL DEFENSE, AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE
POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY
THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS
EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER
SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION, IN PART BECAUSE BOTH
THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT
IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE III
OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT
THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE
SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH
EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD SO THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY
LIMITS.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH
THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND
COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE
TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMILAR
POSITION.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES



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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-AR
9/22/2014 MM

OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, WOULD PUT ANY SUCH SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT CASE, WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED, AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY, MIKHAIL, IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION. FRANKLY, I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.

YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.

I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS, NOT JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

MOSCOW

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END TEXT

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DECL: OADR

#0013

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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0013 <TOR> 910209175734 MSG000287431054

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last week. I wanted to write you personally with my views.

I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that the Soviet side continues to insist that ground force equipment held by certain units such as naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces is not subject to the limits of the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to explore possible compromises that would allow the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union. Jim told him we simply cannot do that.

I do not understand how the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that equipment such as that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE limits. None of the twenty-one other signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in part because both the treaty text and the negotiating record are so clear about what is covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty applies to the kinds of units and equipment that the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And, accordingly, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment they hold so that it would be subject to CFE Treaty limits.

I must tell you that the United States cannot accept any approach that would amount to a redefinition of the obligations and commitments that all the parties assumed when they signed the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty signatories hold a similar position.

Let me emphasize that this is not a question of the United States or any other signatory seeking unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit Soviet difficulties. I hope that the constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet concerns about the Kiev military district, which required us to reopen an agreement reached by our foreign ministers in New York, would put any such suspicions to rest. We did that even though our allies were neither easy to convince nor particularly pleased with our asking them to go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless, in that case, we were able to work together to address a problem precisely because it was raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not state its position on the treatment of units such as naval infantry when it had every opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was signed, particularly when it successfully argued for other exclusions during the negotiations.

I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were agreed, and I do not underestimate the difficulties you may face in meeting these commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way that would change the obligations that the signatories undertook. This is a matter of principle that determines how much confidence we can place in negotiations and commitments that directly affect our security. Basically, Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and credibility. That is why I will not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification until the Soviet Union has rectified this situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still hope to achieve ratification.

You and I have often said that the CFE Treaty is one of the principal pillars of the new security structure in Europe that we are trying to build. It symbolizes the end of a generation of military confrontation and competition and the beginning of a new era of cooperation. All of that could be put in jeopardy, however, if we are unable to resolve the naval infantry issue or address satisfactorily data discrepancies and the less pressing issue of the large-scale movement of military equipment east of the Urals. The treaty-mandated period for correcting CFE data ends on February 17. I hope we can put these matters behind us by that time.

I am conveying my concerns in this direct and forthright manner because of what is at stake. We stand at a crossroads, not just for CFE but for the entire arms control process. We either can move forward with agreements that enhance our mutual security and international stability, or see our long and hard efforts stall. I know neither of us wants that. I urge you to help us move down the right path.

Sincerely,

A large, bold, handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to Mikhail Gorbachev, written over a diagonal line.

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13b. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 6/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/22/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT. PRIVACY_OUT

<PREC. IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 091910Z FEB 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ^{1.4(c)} MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR
9/22/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

SECTION 01 OF 02

PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
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BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

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CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
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FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY,
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~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION. IN PART BECAUSE BOTH THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE III OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD SO THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY LIMITS.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMILAR POSITION.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES

OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, WOULD PUT ANY SUCH SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT CASE, WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

WHEN IT HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BEFORE THE CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED. PARTICULARLY WHEN IT SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR OTHER EXCLUSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED. AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY, MIKHAIL, IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION. FRANKLY, I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.

YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.

I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS, NOT JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH

SINCERELY.

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV

PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

#0012

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

MOSCOW

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0013

~~SECRET~~

FYI: A letter to Gorbachev was faxed to the President on Friday nite. He approved the letter - therefore a cable was sent out from him over the weekend. The original letter came down from Florence this AM - she said we need to check the cable to see how it was signed (Lonnie said he would do that) along with giving to Brady's office for the President to sign the original letter or have it signed on the machine. I will doublecheck with Fran to make sure she is aware of this.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

0944

LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1991

91 FEB 11 AM 10:31

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on CFE

Purpose

To send a personal letter from you to President Gorbachev urging him to take the steps necessary to resolve a serious problem with the CFE Treaty. Unless resolved, we will not be able to send the treaty forward for ratification.

Background

The Soviets have thus far been unwilling to address a major problem that has arisen since signature of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In short, they would exclude from the treaty several divisions of "naval infantry," thus avoiding the treaty-mandated destruction of the equipment associated with such units. This amounts to an attempt to redefine obligations and commitments after treaty signature.

We have expressed our concerns about this problem to the Soviets consistently and at many levels. Jim Baker has raised it directly with Bessmertnykh. It seems clear that the problem cannot be solved by the Foreign Ministry: Bessmertnykh made clear to Jim that a letter from you to Gorbachev is needed to help resolve the issues within the Soviet Union.

At Tab A is a proposed letter that lays out the problem, tells Gorbachev that failure to resolve this matter puts in jeopardy the progress made in rebuilding the security structure in Europe, and urges he resolve the problem before the February 17 deadline for correcting CFE data mandated by the treaty.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to President Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
201-0856-MR
ES 3/15/13

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0944
LIMITED ACCESS
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

February 6, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ^{GR} ARNOLD KANTER/^{CR} CONDOLEEZZA RICE

FROM: JOHN GORDON ^S

SUBJECT: Proposed CFE Letter

Per our discussions, at Tab A is the proposed letter from the President to President Gorbachev on CFE. The proposed letter has been reviewed by Secretary Baker.

Concurrence by: David Gompert 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I proposing a letter on CFE to Gorbachev.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Letter to Gorbachev

TOP SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-08-06 JMR
ES 61613

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker and I have reviewed the results of our discussions about CFE with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh during his visit to Washington last week. I wanted to write you personally with my views.

I must tell you in all candor that I am deeply troubled by what Jim Baker and I heard from Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. He reported that the Soviet side continues to insist that ground force equipment held by certain units such as naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces is not subject to the limits of the CFE Treaty. On that basis, he wanted to explore possible compromises that would allow the exclusions claimed by the Soviet Union. Jim told him we simply cannot do that.

I do not understand how the Soviet Union has come to the conclusion that equipment such as that held by naval infantry is excluded from CFE limits. None of the twenty-one other signatories shares the Soviet interpretation, in part because both the treaty text and the negotiating record are so clear about what is covered by and excluded from CFE limits. Thus, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--understand that Article III of the CFE Treaty applies to the kinds of units and equipment that the Soviet side wishes to exclude. And, accordingly, all of the signatories--except the Soviet Union--have reported all such equipment they hold so that it would be subject to CFE Treaty limits.

I must tell you that the United States cannot accept any approach that would amount to a redefinition of the obligations and commitments that all the parties assumed when they signed the CFE Treaty. I believe that the other twenty signatories hold a similar position.

Let me emphasize that this is not a question of the United States or any other signatory seeking unilateral advantage nor of trying to exploit Soviet difficulties. I hope that the constructive manner in which we addressed Soviet concerns about the Kiev military district, which required us to reopen an agreement reached by our foreign ministers in New York, would put any such suspicions to rest. We did that even though our allies were neither easy to convince nor particularly pleased with our asking them to go along with a revised approach. Nevertheless, in that case, we were able to work together to address a problem precisely because it was raised before the treaty was signed. Indeed, I cannot understand why the Soviet Union did not state its position on the treatment of units such as naval infantry when it had every opportunity to do so before the CFE Treaty was signed, particularly when it successfully argued for other exclusions during the negotiations.

I also recognize that the CFE Treaty requires the Soviet Union to make large and asymmetrical reductions to reach the equal ceilings that were agreed, and I do not underestimate the difficulties you may face in meeting these commitments. Yet I cannot agree to rewrite the CFE agreement after the fact, much less in a way that would change the obligations that the signatories undertook. This is a matter of principle that determines how much confidence we can place in negotiations and commitments that directly affect our security. Basically, Mikhail, it is a matter of trust and credibility. That is why I will not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification until the Soviet Union has rectified this situation. Frankly, I cannot do so and still hope to achieve ratification.

You and I have often said that the CFE Treaty is one of the principal pillars of the new security structure in Europe that we are trying to build. It symbolizes the end of a generation of military confrontation and competition and the beginning of a new era of cooperation. All of that could be put in jeopardy, however, if we are unable to resolve the naval infantry issue or address satisfactorily data discrepancies and the less pressing issue of the large-scale movement of military equipment east of the Urals. The treaty-mandated period for correcting CFE data ends on February 17. I hope we can put these matters behind us by that time.

I am conveying my concerns in this direct and forthright manner because of what is at stake. We stand at a crossroads, not just for CFE but for the entire arms control process. We either can move forward with agreements that enhance our mutual security and international stability, or see our long and hard efforts stall. I know neither of us wants that. I urge you to help us move down the right path.

Sincerely,

15/

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter to President Gorbachev [091910Z Feb 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By JMM on 6/1/2016

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0856-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/22/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT. PRIVACY_OUT

PREC. IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

DTG 091910Z FEB 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ^{1.4(c)} MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR
9/22/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IF UNAVAILABLE, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MAY DELIVER TO
CHERNAYEV.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

JIM BAKER AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT
CFE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. I WANTED TO WRITE YOU PERSONALLY WITH MY
VIEWS.

I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED BY WHAT
JIM BAKER AND I HEARD FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH. HE
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT GROUND
FORCE EQUIPMENT HELD BY CERTAIN UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY,
COASTAL DEFENSE, AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
LIMITS OF THE CFE TREATY. ON THAT BASIS, HE WANTED TO EXPLORE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

POSSIBLE COMPROMISES THAT WOULD ALLOW THE EXCLUSIONS CLAIMED BY THE SOVIET UNION. JIM TOLD HIM WE SIMPLY CANNOT DO THAT.

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THAT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. NONE OF THE TWENTY-ONE OTHER SIGNATORIES SHARES THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION. IN PART BECAUSE BOTH THE TREATY TEXT AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD ARE SO CLEAR ABOUT WHAT IS COVERED BY AND EXCLUDED FROM CFE LIMITS. THUS, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--UNDERSTAND THAT ARTICLE III OF THE CFE TREATY APPLIES TO THE KINDS OF UNITS AND EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES TO EXCLUDE. AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALL OF THE SIGNATORIES--EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION--HAVE REPORTED ALL SUCH EQUIPMENT THEY HOLD SO THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CFE TREATY LIMITS.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT ANY APPROACH THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REDEFINITION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT ALL THE PARTIES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES HOLD A SIMILAR POSITION.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES

OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE NOR OF TRYING TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES. I HOPE THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER IN WHICH WE ADDRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT, WHICH REQUIRED US TO REOPEN AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK, WOULD PUT ANY SUCH SUSPICIONS TO REST. WE DID THAT EVEN THOUGH OUR ALLIES WERE NEITHER EASY TO CONVINCE NOR PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH OUR ASKING THEM TO GO ALONG WITH A REVISED APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THAT CASE, WE WERE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS RAISED BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. INDEED, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT STATE ITS POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNITS SUCH AS NAVAL INFANTRY

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

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I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CFE TREATY REQUIRES THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE LARGE AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE EQUAL CEILINGS THAT WERE AGREED. AND I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU MAY FACE IN MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS. YET I CANNOT AGREE TO REWRITE THE CFE AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT, MUCH LESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SIGNATORIES UNDERTOOK. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT DETERMINES HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE WE CAN PLACE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND COMMITMENTS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY. BASICALLY, MIKHAIL, IT IS A MATTER OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. THAT IS WHY I WILL NOT SUBMIT THE CFE TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE FOR RATIFICATION UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECTIFIED THIS SITUATION. FRANKLY, I CANNOT DO SO AND STILL HOPE TO ACHIEVE RATIFICATION.

YOU AND I HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT THE CFE TREATY IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PILLARS OF THE NEW SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IT SYMBOLIZES THE END OF A GENERATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION. ALL OF THAT COULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE OR ADDRESS SATISFACTORILY DATA DISCREPANCIES AND THE LESS PRESSING ISSUE OF THE LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT EAST OF THE URALS. THE TREATY-MANDATED PERIOD FOR CORRECTING CFE DATA ENDS ON FEBRUARY 17. I HOPE WE CAN PUT THESE MATTERS BEHIND US BY THAT TIME.

I AM CONVEYING MY CONCERNS IN THIS DIRECT AND FORTHRIGHT MANNER BECAUSE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE. WE STAND AT A CROSSROADS, NOT JUST FOR CFE BUT FOR THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. WE EITHER CAN MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, OR SEE OUR LONG AND HARD EFFORTS STALL. I KNOW NEITHER OF US WANTS THAT. I URGE YOU TO

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

HELP US MOVE DOWN THE RIGHT PATH

SINCERELY.

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV

PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

MOSCOW

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

*0013

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Cable	Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0856-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 111302Z FEB 91

(b)(1)

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 111302Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE
O 111250Z FEB 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4
FM (b)(1) MOSCOW
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY.
AFTER SUMMARIZING THE MAIN POINTS, I ADDED THAT WHEN THE SUBJECT
WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY DURING MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV I HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON IT. IF THAT WAS THE
CASE, THEN IT IS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DO SO.

CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT BESSMERTNYKH HAD REPORTED ON HIS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR
12/17/2013 MY

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD FORMED A GROUP TO STUDY THE MATTER URGENTLY AND REPORT BACK TO HIM. CHERNYAYEV HIMSELF IS A MEMBER OF THAT GROUP. WHEN THE GROUP REPORTS. GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

I POINTED OUT THAT THE FEBRUARY 17 DEADLINE IS FAST APPROACHING AND IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BRING THE SOVIET POSITION IN LINE WITH THE TREATY BY THEN. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT THE GROUP WOULD FINISH ITS WORK "SOON." AT ONE POINT, WHEN I SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO BE ACTING CONTRARY TO THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY, CHERNYAYEV SAID, "NOT THE SOVIET UNION - JUST SOME SOVIET GENERALS."

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0574

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Cable	Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 2/17/2015

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0856-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY_IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> (b)(1) <DTG> 111302Z FEB 91

(b)(1)

<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 111302Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS

PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE

O 111250Z FEB 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4

FM (b)(1) MOSCOW

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV TODAY.
AFTER SUMMARIZING THE MAIN POINTS, I ADDED THAT WHEN THE SUBJECT
WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY DURING MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV I HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT FOCUSED ON IT. IF THAT WAS THE
CASE, THEN IT IS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR HIM TO DO SO.

CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT BESSMERTNYKH HAD REPORTED ON HIS
CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD FORMED A
GROUP TO STUDY THE MATTER URGENTLY AND REPORT BACK TO HIM.
CHERNYAYEV HIMSELF IS A MEMBER OF THAT GROUP. WHEN THE GROUP
REPORTS, GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER.

I POINTED OUT THAT THE FEBRUARY 17 DEADLINE IS FAST
APPROACHING AND IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BRING THE
SOVIET POSITION IN LINE WITH THE TREATY BY THEN. CHERNYAYEV
SAID THAT THE GROUP WOULD FINISH ITS WORK "SOON." AT ONE
POINT, WHEN I SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO BE ACTING
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY, CHERNYAYEV SAID,
"NOT THE SOVIET UNION - JUST SOME SOVIET GENERALS."

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0574

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0574 <TOR> 910211082555 MSG000287569555



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR

12/17/2013 MM

<DIST>

SIT: WHSR_DUP PRIVACY_IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

(b)(1)

<DTG> 101255Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM (b)(1) MOSCOW

<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ 101255Z FEB 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
EYES ONLY FROM JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

BRENT:

WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RAISE ANYONE AT CHERNAYEV'S OFFICE TODAY
(FEBRUARY 10), TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO GORBACHEV ON CFE. WE WILL WORK TO DELIVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
ON MONDAY.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0547

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0547 <TOR> 910210084558 MSG000287484357

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Marshal Akhromeyev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	2/7/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed: 4/16/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0856-MR(517)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PPT GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE PRIVACY_OUT SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 072044Z FEB 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,
EMBASSY MOSCOW FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

JACK:

PLEASE DELIVER THE MESSAGE BELOW TO MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV WHO I
UNDERSTAND IS HOSPITALIZED IN MOSCOW. THANK YOU.

BEGIN TEXT:

FEBRUARY 7, 1991

DEAR MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV:

I AM SORRY TO HEAR OF YOUR ILLNESS. I WANT TO WISH YOU THE
BEST FOR A VERY QUICK RECOVERY.

THOUGH WE INEVITABLY DO NOT ALWAYS AGREE. I VALUE OUR ASSOCIATION
AND THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT WE HAVE HAD TO EXCHANGE VIEWS IN A
SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND COOPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU
IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

AGAIN, BEST WISHES FOR A COMPLETE AND RAPID RETURN TO FULL
HEALTH.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0856-MR

12/17/2013 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

YOURS SINCERELY.

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0161

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19a. Cable	Charles Powell to General Scowcroft Re: Message to the President from the Prime Minister (1 pp.)	1/31/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19b. Letter	King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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