Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91129
Folder ID Number: 91129-003

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (2 pp.)	5/3/91	(b)(1)	S
03a. Letter	Re: The Soviet side… [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03b. Letter	Re: The Soviet side… [Russian] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04. Cable	Re: Gorbachev Letter to President Bush (6 pp.)	4/26/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: President's Letter on CFE (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [redacted] (4 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1086
OA/ID Number: 91129-003
Date Closed: 4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08. Cable	From White House, Re: [No Subject] [081806Z Apr 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	4/8/91	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Response to Gorbachev on CFE (2 pp.)	4/6/91	(b)(1)	S
09b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)	4/5/91	(b)(1)	
09c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Translation] (7 pp.)	3/27/91	(b)(1)	
09d. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	
10. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (1 pp.)	3/23/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (4 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock (2 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1086
OA/ID Number: 91129-003
Date Closed: 4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
14a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
14b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	
15. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
16. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	3/7/91	(b)(1)	S
17a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
17b. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
17c. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17d. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17e. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1086
OA/ID Number: 91129-003
Date Closed: 4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
18a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S
18b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	
18c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
18d. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	3/7/91	(b)(1)	S
19. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [111025Z Mar 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S
20. Message	Re: Text of a Message Dated 5 March 1991 from the Prime Minister to the President (5 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	S
21. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (2 pp.)	3/1/91	(b)(1)	S
22a. Letter	President Bush to Eduard Shevardnadze (2 pp.)	2/20/91	(b)(1)	
22b. Letter	Eduard Shevardnadze to President Bush (2 pp.)	1/20/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1086
OA/ID Number: 91129-003
Date Closed: 4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
23. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [EUR/SOV Translation] (4 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
24. Telcon	Re: Phone Call to Gorbachev (9 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1086
OA/ID Number: 91129-003
Date Closed: 4/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0853-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
500

<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE SIT
<DIST>
SIT: PRIVACY_IN
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> (b)(1) <DTG>

<ORIG> (b)(1)

<TO>TO WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
9/17/13

<TEXT>ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ 071515Z MAY 91 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS ONLY
QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 03
BEGIN TEXT
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK

1. FOLLOWING OUR EXCHANGE ON CFE, WHICH I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY THROUGH STATE CHANNELS, GORBACHEV ASKED ME TO CONVEY PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH SOME CURRENT CONCERNS REGARDING OUR RELATIONSHIP. BECAUSE OF THEIR SENSITIVITY, I HAVE CHOSEN TO UTILIZE THIS CHANNEL. I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL SHARE THIS REPORT WITH SECRETARY BAKER. (BESIDES GORBACHEV AND MYSELF, ONLY CHERNYAYEV WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING.)

2. WHEN WE HAD FINISHED THE DISCUSSIONS OF CFE, GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD SOME CONCERNS WHICH HE WOULD APPRECIATE MY CONVEYING PRIVATELY TO PRESIDENT BUSH. I AGREED TO DO SO, AND HE LAUNCHED A 15-MINUTE MONOLOGUE, WHICH IN A RAMBLING FASHION EXPRESSED HIS DISMAY OVER WHAT HE SEES AS A PATTERN OF DRAWING BACK FROM SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC REFORM HERE.

3. TAKING A PAD, HE MADE DOTS AS HE LISTED SEVERAL RECENT NEGATIVE DECISIONS IN THE ECONOMIC AREA:

PRESIDENT BUSH'S REFUSAL TO EXTEND FURTHER CCC CREDITS; THE REFUSAL OF EXPORT LICENSE FOR SOME COMPUTERS (NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED), EXPORT CONTROL PROBLEMS WITH THE PROJECTED JOINT VENTURE TO BUILD CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. HE JOINED THESE DOTS, EACH AN INCH OR SO APART, WITH LINES, AND SAID "THIS IS ONE PATTERN."

4. THEN, DRAWING A SMALLER PATTERN TO THE SIDE OF THE FIRST, HE SAID "ON THE OTHER HAND, I HAVE PRESIDENT BUSH'S PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR PERISTROIKA, AND OUR PATTERN OF UNDERSTANDINGS, UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH I HAD THOUGHT WERE STRENGTHENED BY OUR COOPERATION DURING THE GULF WAR." HE ADDED THAT SOVIET VOTES IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BROUGHT DOWN UPON HIS HEAD IMPRECATIONS FROM THE "LOUD MOUTHS" OF "OUR CHAUVINISTS", BUT HE HAD BEAT THEM BACK TO PRESERVE HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S..

5. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD TROUBLE "FINDING A CONNECTION" BETWEEN THE FIRST PATTERN HE HAD DRAWN (ALLEGED REFUSALS ON OUR PART) AND THE SECOND (PRESIDENT BUSH'S ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT). "AND NOW I HEAR YOU ARE LEAVING SOON AND I DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT. HAVEN'T WE WORKED TOGETHER CONSTRUCTIVELY OVER THE YEARS?" HE ASKED RHETORICALLY "OR DO YOU THINK THIS SHIP IS SINKING?" AND WITHOUT GIVING ME A CHANCE AT A REJOINDER, OBSERVED THAT HE HAD TO WONDER IF HE WAS NOT WITNESSING THE BEGINNINGS OF A U.S. CHANGE OF COURSE. WHILE WE WERE PRESSING HIM TO GET THE EMIGRATION LAW APPROVED, HE WONDERED IF SOME OTHER PRETEXT FOR DENYING THE SOVIET UNION

NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE FOUND EVEN IF IT WERE PASSED.

6. "WHAT I WANT YOU TO TELL THE PRESIDENT," HE CONTINUED, IS THAT MY POLICY REMAINS THE SAME AS BEFORE. I WILL DEFEND IT TO THE VERY END." OF COURSE, HE ADDED, TACTICS HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED TO REALITIES AND HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT TEMPORARY TACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS MIGHT, FROM TIME TO TIME, BE REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THE UNDERLYING POLICY TO SEEK DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF SOCIETY AND AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM BASED ON THE MARKET WILL REMAIN.

7. AT THIS POINT I BROKE INTO HIS MONOLOGUE TO SAY THAT HE WAS SEEING A PATTERN WHERE NONE EXISTED. I COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT A FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON THE REQUEST FOR CCC CREDITS, BUT I KNEW THAT THERE WERE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO HELP. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE ONLY $1.1 BILLION IN CCC CREDIT AUTHORITY LEFT FOR WORLDWIDE USE THIS FISCAL YEAR AND THAT OUR LEGISLATION PROHIBITS ALLOWING POLITICAL FACTORS TO

BE CONSIDERED IN GRANTING THESE CREDITS. THE OTHER MATTERS HE MENTIONED - IF THEY WERE AS HE UNDERSTOOD THEM - WERE CERTAINLY NOT CONNECTED. HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT BUSH REALLY WANTS TO HELP BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS CLEAR TO US HOW THIS CAN BEST BE DONE, AND SOME THINGS MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF OUR DOMESTIC LEGISLATION.

8. GORBACHEV REJOINED THAT HE HOPED THAT HE WAS NOT SEEING A PATTERN, BUT IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT "THESE NEGATIVE VOICES ARE VERY HARMFUL TO US." I SAID THAT THERE HAVE BEEN CRITICS OF HIS RECENT POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD NOT JOINED THAT PARTICULAR CHORUS.

9. GORBACHEV ANSWERED, "BUT HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT WE ARE NOT CREDIT-WORTHY. THIS WAS QUOTED IN OUR PRESS AND EVERBODY HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DOESN'T BELIEVE WE ARE GOING TO MAKE IT. THIS HURTS US A LOT," HE ADDED.

10. I TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS OUT OF CONTEXT; PRESIDENT BUSH HAD MERELY STATED THE OBVIOUS, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD, AND HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORT REFORMS AND WANT THEM TO SUCCEED.

OUR PROBLEM IS, I SAID, THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO FIND A WAY TO BE OF ASSISTANCE UNLESS THE COUNTRY IS MOVING TOWARD A MARKET SYSTEM. SOME OF THE RECENT MOVES BY HIS PRIME MINISTER DO NOT INSPIRE A LOT OF CONFIDENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE SEE THE PRESERVATION OF THE VERTICAL STRUCTURES OF THE COMMAND ECONOMY, AND WE KNOW VERY WELL THAT WE HAVE NO FORMULA TO MAKE THEM WORK EFFICIENTLY. OUR EXPERIENCE IS JUST NOT RELEVANT TO A COMMAND ECONOMY. FURTHERMORE, SOME BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL LARGE CREDITS NOW, WHEN THERE IS NO CLEAR PLAN TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE REFORMS, CAN DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD. ADDITIONAL CREDITS MEAN HIGHER DEBT, AND IF THEY ARE NOT USED TO MAKE THE SYSTEM MORE PRODUCTIVE, THEY CAN BE A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN FUTURE REFORM EFFORTS.

11. "DO YOU WANT US TO HAND YOU THE TILLER?" HE ASKED. I SAID "HEAVEN FORBID! WE DON'T CLAIM TO HAVE A RECIPE FOR YOUR SUCCESS. BUT WE ALSO KNOW WHAT WE CANNOT DO, AND THAT IS TO MAKE YOUR COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM WORK. IF YOU

HANG ONTO IT, THAT'S YOUR BUSINESS, BUT WE WILL BE IRRELEVANT."

12. I THEN UNDERTOOK TO FIND OUT THE PARTICULARS OF SOME OF THE "CASES" HE HAD MENTIONED, AND TO CONVEY THEM TO HIM VIA CHERNYAYEV. I TOLD HIM I WOULD OF COURSE CONVEY HIS REMARKS TO PRESIDENT BUSH, BUT COULD ASSURE HIM IN ADVANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT CHANGED HIS POLICIES.

13. GORBACHEV SAID WE SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT PAVLOV IS UNDER HELLISH PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES AND IS PRESERVING THE CENTRAL ECONOMIC MINISTRIES ONLY TEMPORARILY, TO AVERT CHAOS. THE NEW MINISTER OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, FOR EXAMPLE, IS ALREADY WORKING OUT A PLAN TO LIQUIDATE HIS MINISTRY. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE COULD ASSURE PRESIDENT BUSH ONCE AGAIN THAT HIS GOALS HAD NOT CHANGED AND THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO DEFEND U.S. - SOVIET COOPERATION IN PUBLIC AS WELL AS IN PRIVATE.

14. COMMENT: SOME OF THESE COMMENTS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE HE MADE TO RUPERT MURDOCH YESTERDAY. I WILL FOLLOW UP TO CLARIFY SOME OF THE PARTICULAR CASES HE MENTIONED AND WILL, OF COURSE, RELAY ANY REACTION THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO SEND.

#1234

ZEM

~~S E C R E T~~ 071515Z MAY 91 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS ONLY

FINAL SECTION OF 03

QQQQ

REGARDING THE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL CCC CREDITS, I AM UNAWARE THAT A FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE. GORBACHEV, IT SEEMS, IS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT HAS BEEN. WHATEVER THAT DECISION MAY BE, IT WOULD PERHAPS BE USEFUL FOR PRESIDENT BUSH TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION IN A DIRECT MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV.

END OF TEXT

DECL OADR

#1234

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 <SSN> 1234 <TOR> 910507144010 MSG000294936010

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 1234 <TOR> 910507141513 MSG000294934513

<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03 <SSN> 1234 <TOR> 910507141917 MSG000294934757

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (2 pp.)	5/3/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0853-MR(501)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
501

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANTT
SIT: GOMPERT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 030319Z MAY 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
9/17/13

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
QQQQ

(b)(1) PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-

1. YOU SHOULD CONVEY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV THAT BEGINS IN PARA. 2 BELOW. BEFORE DOING SO, YOU SHOULD PREVIEW IT WITH BESSMERTNYKH, MAKING CLEAR YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER IT TO GORBACHEV. YOU SHOULD TELL BESSMERTNYKH THAT WE CANNOT AGREE TO A MEETING OF TEAMS IN GENEVA, BUT THAT WE WANT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO HIS IDEA OF ENGAGING MOISEYEV DIRECTLY. IF BESSMERTNYKH INSISTS THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH WASHINGTON BEFORE SCHEDULING AN APPOINTMENT WITH GORBACHEV.

-

2. WE HAVE RECEIVED FM BESSMERTNYKH'S MESSAGE TO SECRETARY ON CFE.

-

3. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO SEE YOU ON THIS MATTER. HE BELIEVES THAT IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE TWO OF YOU WORK TOWARD A PROMPT RESOLUTION. UNTIL THIS PROBLEM IS RESOLVED, THE CFE TREATY IS NOT RATIFIABLE, AND IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SIGN A START TREATY. WE NEED TO GET THIS PROBLEM BEHIND US WITHOUT DELAY.

-

4. WE CANNOT REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON A TREATY THAT ALREADY HAS

BEEN SIGNED BY TWENTY-TWO NATIONS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON EACH OF THE SIGNATORIES BY THE TREATY. WE LIKEWISE CANNOT CONTEMPLATE ANY OUTCOME THAT RELIEVES THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER SIGNATORY OF THE OBLIGATIONS IT ACCEPTED WHEN IT SIGNED THE TREATY. THE NUMERICAL CEILINGS AND DESTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 LETTER ARE DESIGNED TO BRING THE SOVIET UNION INTO PRACTICAL CONFORMITY WITH THE TREATY. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS UNWILLING TO FULFILL ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS, IT WILL KILL THE TREATY, WITH DAMAGE TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, AND TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

-

5. IN HIS APRIL 8 LETTER TO YOU, THE PRESIDENT HAS GONE TO THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL LIMIT IN HIS SEARCH FOR A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE CFE PROBLEM. THIS INCLUDES THE QUESTION OF NAVAL INFANTRY. UNLESS THAT ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED IN THE PRACTICAL WAY PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT, THE DAMAGE TO THE CFE TREATY WILL BE FATAL. WHILE HE IS VERY SENSITIVE TO YOUR INTERNAL POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND DOES NOT WISH TO COMPOUND YOUR PROBLEMS IN ANY WAY, HE ASKS THAT YOU ADDRESS ANY REMAINING CFE QUESTIONS PERSONALLY. THEY CANNOT BE LEFT TO EXPERTS TO SOLVE.

-

6. IF IT WOULD HELP YOU RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WELCOME GENERAL MOISEYEV IN WASHINGTON AS SOON AS HE CAN COME. WE WOULD MAKE OUR TOP OFFICIALS AVAILABLE TO HIM.

-

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0010

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 066155 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages TWO

FROM: BOB PEARSON (Officer name) | S/S (Office symbol) | 75302 (Extension) | 7224 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF OF SOVIET VIEWS REGARDING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	EYES ONLY -- MR. SCROWCROFT		
NSC	EYES ONLY -- MR. SITTMANN		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: URGENT - ASAP

S/S Officer: BP

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09

FORM 7-77 DS-1760

~~SECRET~~

NODIS S/S 9107647

File Copy

DIST:
4/30

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P
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S/S

Unofficial translation

The Soviet side has carefully analysed the views set forth in the letter by the President of the United States dated April 9 regarding the subject of conventional weapons.

By and large, we find the approach by United States to be constructive. A number of proposals contained in the letter by President Bush can be accepted. The principal remaining difference in the two sides' positions concerns the armaments of the Soviet naval infantry (120 tanks, 753 armored fighting vehicles, and 234 artillery systems).

Given the progress in narrowing the differences, which has been possible on the basis of the exchange of messages between President Gorbachev and President Bush, and taking into account the brief discussion of this question in Kislovodsk, we propose to hold a high-level expert meeting in Geneva beginning on May 15 for the purpose of working out a definitive comprehensive solution of this problem. On the Soviet side the group of experts could be led by the Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, General of the Army, Mikhail A.Moiseyev.

The results of the work of the group of experts would be reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Secretary of State, who would submit possible agreements to the Presidents of the USSR and of the United States for their approval. Then, the results of the bilateral discussions would be turned over for consideration to other states participating in the Vienna talks.

We hope for a prompt reply of the US side.

~~SECRET~~

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2011-0853-NR
ES 4/11/13

Советская сторона тщательно проанализировала соображения, изложенные в письме президента США от 9 апреля с.г. по обычным вооружениям.

Мы находим американский подход в целом конструктивным. Ряд предложений, содержащихся в письме Дж.Буша, может быть принят. Главное остающееся расхождение в позициях сторон касается вооружений советской морской пехоты (120 танков, 753 ББМ, 234 артсистемы).

С учетом продвижения в сближении позиций, которого удалось добиться на основе обмена посланиями по обычным вооружениям между М.С.Горбачевым и Дж.Бушем, а также принимая во внимание краткое обсуждение этого вопроса на встрече министров в Кисловодске, предлагаем американской стороне провести в Женеве, начиная с 15 мая, встречу экспертов на высоком уровне для выработки окончательного комплексного решения этой проблемы. С советской стороны группу экспертов мог бы возглавить начальник ГШ ВС СССР генерал армии М.А.Моисеев.

Результаты работы группы экспертов были бы доложены министрам, которые представили бы возможные договоренности на одобрение президентам СССР и США. Затем итоги двусторонних обсуждений были бы переданы на рассмотрение других государств-участников переговоров в Вене.

Надеемся на быстрый ответ американской стороны.

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2011-0853-MR
ES 4/11/13

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

APNSA Has Seen

PRT: GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN
SIT: FILE GOMPERT HAASS BURNS HEWETT PAAL PRES MSGS SIT SUM VAX

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUCNCD/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000

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~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 135498 TOSEC 050491
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH
1. THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 25, SOVIET DCM CHETVERIKOV MET WITH EUR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY DOBBINS TO DELIVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT BUSH DEALING WITH THREE ISSUES (TEXT - PARA 5):
-- KURDISH SITUATION: GORBACHEV EXPRESSES CONCERN THAT INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN IRAQ WITHOUT BAGHDAD'S CONSENT, WHILE JUSTIFIED ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS PRECEDENT. NOT SHOULD IT REVIVE HOPES FOR CREATION OF A KURDISH STATE.
-- JAPAN VISIT: GORBACHEV EXPRESSES SATISFACTION WITH HIS VISIT TO JAPAN AND THE AGREEMENT ON A FORMULA FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION OF THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE.
-- KOREA VISIT: GORBACHEV NOTES WITH SATISFACTION THT ROH TAE WOO DID NOT WAIT TO SEE THE OUTCOME OF PERESTROYKA, BUT BEGAN TO ACT (I.E. ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE), AND REVEALS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT OBJECT TO SOUTH KOREAN SOLE MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN IF THE NORTH KOREANS REJECT SIMULTANEOUS ADMISSION.
3. IN PRESENTING THE LETTER, CHETVERIKOV UNDERSCORED THE POINT THAT THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ IS HIGHLY UNUSUAL; THEREFORE THE U.S. AND ALLIED RESPONSE SHOULD

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2011-0853-NLR
ES 4/11/13

NOT BE SEEN AS A PRECEDENT FOR SIMILAR ACTIONS ELSEWHERE. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS MAY REVIVE HOPES FOR A SEPARATE KURDISH STATE AND STRESSED THAT A CLEAR DISTINCTION MUST BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN OUR HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS AND PROSPECTIVE KURDISH POLITICAL AMBITIONS. DOBBINS SAID OUR VIEWS ON THIS SCORE COINCIDED. AND WE WANTED TO FIND A WAY TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES FROM IRAQ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF KURDISH AMBITIONS, WE HAD NO INTENTION OF CALLING INTO QUESTION THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ANY OF THE STATES IN THE AREA. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE SOVIETS WEIGHED IN WITH THE IRAQIS TO ENCOURAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURE CONDITIONS FOR THE KURDISH REFUGEES THAT WOULD MAKE AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL POSSIBLE. SIMILARLY, DOBBINS URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES TO EXPEDITE THE UN'S EARLY ASSUMPTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE U.S. AND COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ.

4. ON THE ASIA VISITS, CHETVERIKOV STRESSED THAT, IN SPITE OF PRESS REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, GORBACHEV WAS FULLY SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF HIS TRIP TO JAPAN. WITH RESPECT TO GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH ROH, CHETVERIKOV STRESSED THAT THE DPRK HAS NOT/NOT BEEN APPRISED OF THE DISCUSSIONS REGARDING UN MEMBERSHIP. CHETVERIKOV SAID THAT WHEN BRIEFING THE DPRK AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, BESSMERTNYKH SAID THE TALKS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE ROK WERE AIMED AT ADVANCING RELATIONS WITH THE ROK IN ORDER TO FACILITATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS. DOBBINS REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS' ASSESSMENT OF GORBACHEV'S TOKYO VISIT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. WE WERE PLEASED THAT A PROCESS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. DOBBINS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GORBACHEV'S POSITION ON SOUTH KOREAN UN MEMBERSHIP AND THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THIS CONFIDENTIAL.

5. BEGIN TEXT (SOVIET EMBASSY UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION):

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

DEAR GEORGE

- I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 17 CONCERNING MEASURES TO HELP THE IRAQI REFUGEES. THESE ARE EXTRAORDINARILY BUSY DAYS FOR ME. THIS WEEK WILL BE MARKED, I THINK, BY EXTREMELY IMPORTANT DECISIONS THAT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO GET ON THE PATH OF STABILIZATION AND A STEADIER MOVEMENT TOWARD A NEW ECONOMY. FOR ALL THAT, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM THAT YOU RAISED, I DECIDED TO REPLY IN WRITING.

NODIS

- WE IN THE SOVIET UNION, TOO, ARE ALARMED BY THE TERRIBLE SITUATION IN WHICH THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES, FEEL SYMPATHY FOR THEM, AND ANGER TOWARD THE REGIME WHICH IS BEHAVING WITH SUCH CRUELTY. ELEMENTARY HUMANESS REQUIRES THAT ONE HELP PEOPLE IN SUCH PLIGHT, STOP THE DYING, AND LLEVIATE THEIR SUFFERING.

NODIS

- I UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS THE EXTREME SEVERITY OF THE SITUATION THAT NECESSITATED SUCH AN UNUSUAL STEP AS DISPATCHING US AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES' TROOPS TO THE BORDER AREAS OF IRAQ TO SET UP TEMPORARY RELIEF AND PROTECTION CAMPS.

- AT THE SAME TIME IT CANNOT BE DENIED THAT THE FACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOP CONTINGENTS INTO THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHOUT THAT STATE'S REQUEST OR CONSENT, EVEN WITH SUCH A HUMANE GOAL, CAN BE PERCEIVED AS A THREAT TO ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IN THAT SENSE RESOLUTION 688 OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DOES NOT CHANGE THE MEANING OF THE PRECEDENT. SOME OF THE ACTIONS, LIKE THE DEMAND THAT THE IRAQI TROOPS BE PULLED OUT OF THE TOWNS IN THE BORDER AREAS, POINT TO A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THAT RESOLUTION ITSELF.

NODIS

- I DO TRUST THE CLARIFICATIONS CONCERNING THE CHARACTER OF THE OPERATION THAT WAS UNDERTAKEN, ITS OBJECTIVES AND THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE GOALS PURSUED, AS WELL AS THE COMMITMENT TO MOVE THE OPERATION UNDER THE UN CONTROL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT WITHIN SOME QUARTERS

OF OUR PUBLIC AND THE PARLIAMENT THERE ARE DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS. I CANNOT BUT RECKON WITH THIS. AND, GENERALLY, FROM EVERY STANDPOINT, INCLUDING FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE PROSPECTS AND TERMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, IT IS DESIRABLE TO WITHDRAW FOREIGN TROOPS FROM IRAQ'S NORTHERN AREAS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND TO ENTRUST THE WHOLE MATTER TO UN REPRESENTATIVES.

- THERE IS ALSO SUCH A DELICATE ASPECT AS THE REVIVAL OF HOPES FOR CREATING A KURDISH STATE, WHICH I THINK HAS NOT ESCAPED YOUR ATTENTION. YET THIS CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE TERRITORIES OF IRAQ, IRAN, TURKEY, AND SYRIA. IT IS NOT HARD TO IMAGINE WHAT KIND OF A NEW CRISIS CAN BE GENERATED BY THIS DEMAND, IF IT WERE TO BE PURSUED. THEREFORE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY THAT THE US AND ITS ALLIES DRAW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES AND WHATEVER POLITICAL GOALS.

NODIS

NODIS

- IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WE ARE TRYING TO CONVINCE IT THAT THE OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE US, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE HAS A PURELY HUMANITARIAN AND TIME-LIMITED NATURE. WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT IRAQ WILL NOT OPPOSE THIS OPERATION. THE IRAQI TROOPS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TO ENGAGE IN PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE FOREIGN TROOPS DISPATCHED TO HELP THE REFUGEES, BE ISSUED RELEVANT STRICT INSTRUCTIONS AS WELL.

NODIS

- DEAR GEORGE, I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE WITH YOU MY IMPRESSIONS FROM THE RECENT VISIT TO JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA.

NODIS

- THE VISIT WAS NECESSARY. IN A SITUATION OF PROFOUND CHANGES IN THE WORLD THE FROZENNESS OF SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS STOOD OUT AS A CLEAR ANACHRONISM. I UNDERSTOOD THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SATISFY THE HOPES OF THE JAPANESE, BUT IT WAS MY EXPECTATION THAT AN OPEN AND FRANK DIALOGUE WITH MR. KAIFU, A "MEETING WITH JAPAN"

WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO DEEPEN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND GET THE TALKS ON THE MOST PAINFUL ISSUE CLOSER TO THE PRESENT-DAY REALITIES. OUR CONVERSATION WAS NOT EASY BUT, ON THE WHOLE, A SUBSTANTIVE, FRANK, AND FRIENDLY ONE.

- AS A RESULT, WE ADOPTED A FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT DOCUMENT, A JOINT STATEMENT, AND CONCLUDED FIFTEEN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC AND OTHER MATTERS.

- THE PEACE TREATY PROBLEM, INCLUDING TERRITORIAL DELINEATION, TOOK PARTICULARLY MUCH TIME AND EFFORT. AS A RESULT, THE ALMOST TWELVE HOUR-LONG INTENSE WORK AND EIGHT NEGOTIATING SESSIONS PRODUCED A FORMULA WHICH NOW MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO SEARCH MORE CONFIDENTLY FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTING REALITIES BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY, CREATING A TOTALLY NEW NATURE OF RELATIONS AMONG STATES AND PEOPLES - THROUGH A MANY-SIDED AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS.

- I AM SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS. I BELIEVE THEY MEET THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN WITHOUT PREJUDICING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, AND HAVE LAID A SOLID GROUNDWORK FOR MOVING SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS ONTO THE TRACK OF COMPLETE NORMALIZATION.

- THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO WAS SHORT, BUT VERY SUBSTANTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE. AS YOU RECALL, WE HAD FIRST MET IN SAN FRANCISCO - NOT WITHOUT YOUR GOOD OFFICES. THIS FOLLOW-ON SAW FAST PROGRESS. I GREATLY APPRECIATE PRESIDENT ROH'S COURAGE AND FORESIGHT. HE DID NOT WAIT TO SEE WHAT THE OUTCOME OF PERESTROIKA WAS GOING TO BE, BUT, RATHER, AWARE OF THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ITS SUCCESS OR FAILURE FOR HIS COUNTRY AS WELL, BEGAN TO ACT.

- THE TALKS ON THE ISLAND MADE IT POSSIBLE TO DEEPEN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE KOREAN PROBLEM INCLUDING SOUTH KOREA'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS. WE ARE FOR A SIMULTANEOUS ADMISSION OF BOTH THE DPRK AND

NODIS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

THE ROK. BUT IF IT DOESN'T WORK OUT, WE SHALL NOT OPPOSE SOUTH KOREA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN. I ASKED PRESIDENT ROH NOT TO PUBLICIZE THIS POSITION FOR THE TIME BEING. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND WHY

- WE ALSO REITERATED OUR POSITION REGARDING THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES. OUR INSISTENCE BEFORE ITS LEADERSHIP THAT THEY BE PLACED UNDER THE IAEA CONTROL. ROH TAE WOO CAME OUT IN FAVOR OF DEEPENING THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE DPRK AND SEARCHING FOR WAYS OF PEACEFUL UNIFICATION, BUT WITHOUT HASTE AND BEARING IN MIND, BY ANALOGY, SOME EXPERIENCE. WE, FOR OUR PART, ADVOCATED REDUCING TENSIONS, PREVENTING NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION ON THE PENINSULA, AND ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA. THIS IS IN OUR INTERESTS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL. ROH TAE WOO WAS UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE DPRK.
- I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST,
- SINCERELY,
- M. GORBACHEV

END TEXT.

EAGLEBURGER

BT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0853-MR(504)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
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TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
QQQQ
FROM JACK MATLOCK
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR NAME IN THE SECURE TELCON FROM THE WHITE HOUSE WITH JIM TIMBIE ON APRIL 9, I MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV AT 7PM TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE. I COVERED THE TALKING POINTS, EMPHASIZING THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IN A WAY THAT PERMITTED RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION TO OCCUR. I SAID THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED HIS PROPOSAL OFFERED A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE CFE PROBLEMS AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS READY TO URGE THE OTHER CFE SIGNATORIES AND THE SENATE TO ACCEPT IT. OBUKHOV READ THE LETTER CAREFULLY, CALLED IT AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT THAT WOULD REQUEST THOROUGH STUDY AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT PROMPTLY TO HIS PRINCIPAL. SAYING THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT SUBSTANTIVELY ON THE LETTER BEFORE IT HAD BEEN STUDIED, OBUKHOV DID NONETHELESS NOTE THAT THE NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE.
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#0301

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31 9/17/13

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: President's Letter on CFE (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0853-MR(505)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
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9/17/13

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ 091145Z APR 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
WHITE HOUSE PASS TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
QQQQ
TO: WHITE HOUSE
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK.
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE.
BEGIN TEXT:

BRENT:

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE ME TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CFE. CHERNYAYEV IS ALSO NOT AVAILABLE: HE IS ILL, AND HIS OFFICE TELLS US HE WILL BE OUT AT LEAST TWO DAYS. WITH GORBACHEV AND CHERNYAYEV UNAVAILABLE TODAY AND NO ASSURANCE I CAN GET TO SEE GORBACHEV EVEN TOMORROW. I NEED GUIDANCE ON HOW TO PROCEED.

DELIVERY TO BESSMERTNYKH IS NOT AN OPTION UNTIL LATER THIS WEEK. HE IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE NOT RETURNING UNTIL THE EVENING OF APRIL 10. OTHER OPTIONS ARE VERY LIMITED. AMONG KEY PLAYERS IN THE ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY, THE ONLY FIGURE WE ARE CERTAIN HAS BEEN PRIVY TO THE EXCHANGE ON CFE IS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV. IF URGENT DELIVERY IS REQUIRED, HE IS THE ONE OFFICIAL TO WHOM THE LETTER COULD BE DELIVERED TODAY AND TO WHOM I COULD TURN FOR HELP IN GETTING IT TO GORBACHEV PROMPTLY.

DURING A MEETING WITH OBUKHOV THIS MORNING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, OBUKHOV VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICE HAD CALLED HIM ABOUT MY REQUEST TO SEE THE PRESIDENT OR CHERNYAYEV TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. HE TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

HAD SAID SCHEDULING AN APPOINTMENT FOR ME WAS A PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT OBUKHOV MIGHT RECEIVE IT. I TOLD OBUKHOV ONLY THAT WE WERE AWARE A LETTER WOULD BE COMING AND THAT I WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE. AS USUAL. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT ITS DELIVERY. IF THERE IS TIME. I CAN CONTINUE TO PURSUE APPOINTMENTS WITH GORBACHEV AND CHERNYAYEV, OR WITH BESSMERTNYKH ON HIS RETURN IF DELIVERY OF THE LETTER TO HIM IS ACCEPTABLE. IF TIME IS URGENT I RECOMMEND CONVEYING THE LETTER TO OBUKHOV.
END OF TEXT:
DECL OADR
#0300

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Scowcroft Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [redacted] (4 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 11/6/13

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2011-0853-MR (506)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	7/16/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK

.

BEGIN TEXT

.

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

.

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

.

1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV THIS AFTERNOON, JUST AFTER HE MET WITH THE JAPANESE DELEGATION LED BY OZAWA. ONLY CHERNYAYEV WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING BESIDES THE TWO OF US.
2. I DESCRIBED TO GORBACHEV THE MAIN POINTS IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER AND STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS OPENING THE DOOR TO A PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS, AND WE SINCERELY HOPED HE WOULD FIND THIS APPROACH ACCEPTABLE. SINCE IT IS IMPORTANT TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR OTHER POSITIVE STEPS.
3. GORBACHEV SAID HE WOULD GIVE PROMPT ATTENTION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S IDEAS, AND INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THES E
ISSUES. HE ASKED ME TO ASSURE "GEORGE" THAT HE UNDERSTANDS VERY WELL THAT CONTINUED U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IS THE CORNERSTONE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT HE, GORBACHEV, WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IT THAT WAY

.

4. I GAVE HIM THE MESSAGE REGARDING THE BW INFORMATION, AND HE REPLIED

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THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO RECEIVE THIS INFORMATION SO THAT HE CAN BETT
ER
UNDERSTAND HOW TO REASSURE US. "WE ARE ACTING WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE,"
HE SAID, "BUT IF YOU DON T LET OUR PEOPLE VISIT YOUR FACILITIES THAT WIL
L
RAISE QUESTIONS." I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WISHED TO KEEP THE EXCHANGES ON
TRACK AND THOUGHT THAT THE PAPERS WE WOULD GIVE BESSMERTNYKH WOULD MAKE
CLEAR THE SORT OF ACTIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.
5. FINALLY, I TOOK THE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT THE REPORT HE
MENTIONED TO SECRETARY BAKER REGARDING AN ALLEGED CONVERSATION WITH YELT
SIN
WAS FALSE. (THE REPORT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT YELTSIN HAD ASKED ME WHAT
THE USG WOULD DO IF "HIS GROUP" CAME TO POWER BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS.
)
I TOLD GORBACHEV THAT YELTSIN HAD NEVER SAID THIS OR ANYTHING LIKE IT TO
ME. IN FACT, IF HE HAD, I WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY SEVERED ALL CONTACT WI
TH
HIM. HE SAID THAT THE REPORT CAME "FROM YELTSIN'S ENTOURAGE," AND I
REPLIED THAT, WHATEVER THE SOURCE, THE REPORT WAS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.
6. GORBACHEV THANKED ME FOR THE EXPLANATION, THEN LAUNCHED A RATHER
LENGTHY COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT I AND MY WIFE ARE VERY RESPECTED AND
VERY INFLUENTIAL IN THE SOVIET UNION, BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT WE
UNDERSTAND THE COUNTRY AND ARE SYMPATHETIC TO ITS CULTURE. THIS MEANS T
HAT
OUR CONTACTS AND ASSOCIATIONS HAVE A POLITICAL SIDE TO THEM. HE HOPED T
HAT
I WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE "FIERCE STRUGGLE" GOING ON. "WE HAVE GONE THRO
UGH
A REAL WAR THESE LAST FEW WEEKS," HE ASSERTED, AND SAID THAT EVEN THE MO
ST
INNOCENT CONTACTS COULD BE MISCONSTRUED AND THAT CHARGES COULD BE MADE O
F
COLLUSION.
7. HE QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE HAD FULL CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S
ATTITUDE AND MY OWN ACTIVITIES. "OF COURSE, THERE ARE SOME CLANDESTINE
ACTIVITIES; WE ARE NOT NAIVE," HE SAID, "BUT ALL COUNTRIES DO THAT."

I INTERJECTED THAT THERE WERE NO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO SUBVERT THE SOVIET UNION. AND HE HALF-CONCEDED THE POINT, BUT SAID THAT DESPITE THE UNDOUBTED GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER, THERE ARE "ELEMENTS" IN THE U.S. WHICH WOULD WELCOME THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION.

8. IN ANY EVENT, HE CONCLUDED, HE HOPED THAT I WOULD BEAR THE DELICACY OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN MIND. AND DO MY BEST TO COUNSEL MY STAFF TO STAY CLEAR OF TICKLISH SITUATIONS LEST THEIR ACTIVITIES BE MISCONSTRUED. (HE DID NOT DIRECTLY MENTION CONTACTS WITH THE STRIKING MINERS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IS WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.)

9. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD WHAT HE WAS SAYING, BUT WE COULD NOT ENTIREL
Y
PROTECT OURSELVES FROM MALICIOUS FABRICATIONS. THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR US TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH ALL LEGITIMATE POLITICAL FORCES, AND WE CANNOT DRAW BACK FROM SUCH CONTACT WITHOUT GIVING A NEGATIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL TO OUR AND THEIR PUBLICS. HOWEVER, I WOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE SE
CONTACTS DO NOT CROSS THE LINE INTO INTERFERENCE.

10. HE THEN CLOSED THE TOPIC BY THANKING ME FOR MY EXPLANATION REPEATING THAT HE WAS NOT IN ANY WAY CASTING ASPERSIONS ON MY CONDUCT - WHICH IN FACT HE ADMIRED - BUT WANTED TO SENSITIZE ME TO THE FACT THAT THERE ARE THOSE WHO WOULD TRY TO USE THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO THEIR OWN POLITICAL BENEFIT.

11. COMMENT: WHEN WE LEFT THE OFFICE, CHERNYAYEV OBSERVED THAT IT WAS "VERY IMPORTANT" THAT I HAD CLARIFIED THE REPORT REGARDING YELTSIN'S ALLEGED QUESTION TO ME. I TAKE IT FROM THIS THAT GORBACHEV MUST HAVE TA
KEN
IT SERIOUSLY, INDEED.

12. GORBACHEV SEEMED IN GOOD SPIRITS, BUT LOOKED PUFFY AND TIRED. HIS REFERENCE TO HAVING GONE THROUGH A "WAR" RECENTLY OBVIOUSLY REFERRED TO THE REFERENDUM, AND HIS CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE WON.

13. HE RECEIVED ME IN HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICE, RATHER THAN IN ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN THE KREMLIN, AS IS USUALLY THE CASE. HIS ASSISTANT EXPLAINED THIS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED OZAWA THERE SINCE HE MET OZAWA AS PARTY LEADER RATHER THAN PRESIDENT.

14. WARM REGARDS, JACK MATLOCK.

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END TEXT
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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
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Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2011-0853-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/21/2014

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<TO>3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TEXT>ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 02
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
-
-
1. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE REPLY IN PARAGRAPH 3 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV'S MARCH 27 LETTER ON CFE. IT HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY SECRETARY BAKER. IF GORBACHEV IS UNAVAILABLE, LETTER MAY BE DELIVERED TO CHERNAYEV. ANY REPORTING SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL.
-
2. IN DELIVERING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT HIS PROPOSAL IS THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE ALL THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES QUICKLY AND COMPLETELY SO THAT RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY CAN GO FORWARD.
-
-- BUILDING ON THE IDEAS IN GORBACHEV'S MARCH 27 LETTER, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS INTENDED TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING CFE PROBLEMS.
-
- THE NUMERICAL REPEAT NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S APPROACH AND GORBACHEV'S APPROACH IS VERY SMALL: THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL DOES NOT REQUIRE MUCH MORE WITHDRAWAL OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE CFE ZONE NOR DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT THAN DOES GORBACHEV'S OWN PROPOSAL. THE DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, IS ESSENTIAL TO RESOLVING THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS. AS SUCH, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO BE A PRACTICAL SOLUTION THAT CAN OVERCOME DIFFERENCES ABOUT ARTICLE III.
-
-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS AS FAR AS WE CAN GO IN HELPING THE SOVIETS FIND A SOLUTION TO THEIR CFE PROBLEMS, AND IS THE LEAST WE CAN ACCEPT.
-
-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL REFLECTS HIS OWN IDEAS. HE CANNOT SPEAK FOR HIS NATO ALLIES OR THE OTHER CFE SIGNATORIES. IF, HOWEVER, GOBACHEV CAN ACCEPT IT, THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE THE OTHER SIGNATORIES--AND THE U.S. SENATE--TO ACCEPT IT AS WELL.
-
-
3. BEGIN TEXT:
-
-
MIKHAIL:
-
I APPRECIATE YOUR MARCH 27 LETTER AND YOUR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN WITH ME IN THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS. IN THE SAME POSITIVE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND FRANKNESS,

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LET ME PROPOSE A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH THAT ELABORATES YOUR IDEAS IN A WAY THAT ALSO WOULD ACHIEVE A PRACTICAL RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULT NAVAL INFANTRY ISSUE, AND WOULD REMOVE ALL OF THE REMAINING ROADBLOCKS TO THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY.

-

UNDER THIS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD, AS YOU PROPOSE, MAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT OUTSIDE THE TREATY NOT TO INCREASE THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY UNITS IN THE COASTAL DEFENSE, NAVAL INFANTRY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES.

-

THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO WOULD MAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT TO HAVE 933 FEWER TANKS, 1,725 FEWER ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND 1,080 FEWER ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE CFE ZONE AND IN ACTIVE UNITS THAN THE QUANTITIES TO WHICH IT BELIEVES IT IS ENTITLED UNDER THE CFE CEILINGS. SOVIET EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS IN THE CFE SUBZONES AND ON THE FLANKS WOULD BE REDUCED ACCORDINGLY. THE SOVIET SIDE COULD WITHDRAW EQUAL NUMBERS OF TANKS, ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND ARTILLERY PIECES OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE. IT WOULD DESTROY OR CONVERT EQUAL NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL TANKS, ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND ARTILLERY PIECES CURRENTLY LOCATED INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE USING CFE TIMETABLES AND CFE PROCEDURES (OR SOME OTHER AGREED PROCEDURES FOR EQUIPMENT OUTSIDE THE ZONE THAT PROVIDED VISIBLE EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD BEEN DESTROYED OR RENDERED MILITARILY UNUSABLE).

-

AS YOU PROPOSE, THE EQUIPMENT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY AND COASTAL DEFENSE UNITS WITHIN THE CFE ZONE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS INSTEAD OF THE DECLARED SITE VERIFICATION REGIME THAT APPLIES TO OTHER GROUND FORCE UNITS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL ALLOW THESE INSPECTIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN A MANNER THAT FACILITATES EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

-

AS AN ADDITIONAL EFFORT TO PUT US IN A POSITION TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE THAT THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS THAT WERE ASSIGNED TO THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES WHEN THE TREATY WAS SIGNED WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST THE TREATY'S NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NO OTHER ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES OR OTHER EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE SRF.

-

MIKHAIL, I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THE EFFORT YOU HAVE MADE TO BRING US TO THIS POINT, AND I HOPE THAT YOU CAN APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE STEPS I WOULD ASK THE OTHER TWENTY-ONE SIGNATORIES TO TAKE IN RESPONSE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN OUR VIEW, EQUIPMENT LOCATED WITH COASTAL DEFENSE UNITS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SAME VERIFICATION REGIME THAT APPLIES TO OTHER GROUND FORCE UNITS. BECAUSE OF MY COMMITMENT TO WORK WITH YOU TO FIND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, HOWEVER, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE TO YOUR VERIFICATION PROPOSAL.

-

I LIKEWISE MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT ADDS TO OUR ALREADY SERIOUS CONCERNS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

REGARDING THE VERY LARGE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WITHDREW FROM THE CFE ZONE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. ALTHOUGH THESE EARLIER WITHDRAWALS WERE TECHNICALLY LEGAL, THEY RAISE QUESTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES THAT COULD UNDERMINE THE VERY OBJECTIVES OF THE CFE TREATY THAT YOU AND I SO STRONGLY SUPPORT.

-

NEVERTHELESS, I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS AS PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH I HAVE OUTLINED IF YOU CAN FORMALLY CONFIRM WHAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ALREADY HAVE TOLD US IN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR SIDES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. YOUR ASSURANCE IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THAT THE EQUIPMENT ALREADY WITHDRAWN OUTSIDE THE CFE ZONE COULD NOT BE QUICKLY MOVED BACK AND INTEGRATED INTO MILITARY UNITS THAT REMAIN IN THE CFE ZONE, OR BE USED TO BUILD UP SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN WAYS THAT COULD DESTABILIZE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE, ASIA, OR ELSEWHERE. SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD ASK THAT THE SOVIET SIDE FORMALLY:

-

-- REAFFIRM THAT YOU WILL DESTROY OR CONVERT BETWEEN NOW AND 1995 AT LEAST 6,000 TANKS, 1,500 ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, AND 7,000 ARTILLERY PIECES NOW LOCATED EAST-OF-THE-URALS, IN ADDITION TO THE DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION OBLIGATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. (AS YOU CAN UNDERSTAND, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR YOU TO COMMIT TO CARRY OUT THESE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED PLANS TO ENSURE THAT YOUR COMMITMENT TO DESTROY OR CONVERT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AS PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WAS MEANINGFUL.

-

-- PROVIDE NOTIFICATION OF THE CONVERSION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS EQUIPMENT, AS YOU HAVE PROPOSED, AND PERFORM THE PLANNED DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION USING AGREED CFE PROCEDURES OR IN SOME OTHER VISIBLE WAY THAT BUILDS CONFIDENCE THAT THE EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN DESTROYED OR PERMANENTLY RENDERED MILITARILY UNUSABLE.

-

-- PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT THE WITHDRAWN EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE USED TO CREATE NEW MILITARY UNITS OR A STRATEGIC RESERVE, AND WILL NOT BE STORED IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE EQUIPMENT TO BE RETURNED QUICKLY TO THE CFE ZONE, AND THAT THE MILITARY UNITS REMAINING IN THE CFE ZONE WILL NOT BE ORGANIZED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE ABLE TO ABSORB QUICKLY LARGE QUANTITIES OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT.

-

-- FINALLY, IF YOUR SIDE COULD IDENTIFY THE CURRENT LOCATIONS OF THE TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES TOLD US HAVE BEEN MOVED TO DEPOTS AND UNITS EAST-OF-THE-URALS SINCE JANUARY, 1989, IT WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE THE RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DATA THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPORTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY.

-

MIKHAIL, THIS ELABORATION OF YOUR PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO ALL THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES IN A MANNER THAT SATISFACTORILY ADDRESSES OUR RESPECTIVE CONCERNS AND CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY PRESENTED TO OUR LEGISLATURES. IT DIFFERS ONLY SLIGHTLY FROM THE NUMBERS YOU HAVE PROPOSED, BUT IT HAS ONE CRUCIAL ADVANTAGE: IT WILL ALLOW US TO MOVE FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY BECAUSE IT WILL BRING THE SOVIET UNION INTO PRACTICAL CONFORMITY WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS AS THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD BY THE OTHER TWENTY-ONE SIGNATORIES.

-

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROPOSED APPROACH REQUIRES FURTHER MOVEMENT

BY BOTH OF US, BUT WITHOUT SUCH RECIPROCAL EFFORTS THE CFE TREATY AND ALL THE BENEFITS THAT FLOW FROM IT ARE IN JEOPARDY. I THEREFORE KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEW THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PUT THE ENTIRE MATTER BEHIND US, QUICKLY AND COMPLETELY, BEFORE IT UNDERMINES ALL THAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED.
-
WE HAVE COME SO FAR AND ACCOMPLISHED SO MUCH THROUGH THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION AND TRUST THAT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED. WE MUST NOT LET THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AND FORWARD ELUDE US. IF YOU CAN JOIN WITH ME IN ACCEPTING THIS COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION, I WILL URGE MY NATO ALLIES AND THE U.S. SENATE TO ACCEPT IT AS WELL, AND WILL DIRECT MY EXPERTS TO FOLLOW UP IMMEDIATELY WITH YOURS TO FORMALIZE OUR AGREEMENT.
-
WITH CFE RESOLVED BY OUR PERSONAL EFFORTS, I WILL BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU--IN THE SAME SPIRIT OF OPENNESS, FRANKNESS, AND COOPERATION--TO FIND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING START ISSUES SO THAT WE CAN SIGN THAT TREATY AT AN EARLY DATE. I ALSO WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO MOVE AHEAD ON OUR BROADER AGENDA. WE HAVE SO MUCH YET TO ACHIEVE. RESOLVING THE CURRENT PROBLEMS NOW WILL SET THE STAGE FOR FUTURE PROGRESS.
-
-
SINCERELY,
-
-
GEORGE BUSH
-
-
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
-
-
END OF TEXT.
DECLAS: OADR
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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0087 <TOR> 910408140939 MSG000292428579
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0088 <TOR> 910408140909 MSG000292428549

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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APRIL 6, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Response to Gorbachev on CFE

Purpose

To respond to President Gorbachev's March 27 letter (Tab B) and propose a comprehensive solution to all the remaining problems.

Background

Your March 21 letter to Gorbachev (Tab C) emphasized your desire to find practical solutions that would result in the Soviets living up to their treaty obligations without forcing them to make an embarrassing acknowledgement that the public position they have staked out is unsupportable. Although the specific proposals in Gorbachev's March 27 reply represent only modest improvements on what Jim Baker heard in Moscow and still fall short of what we need, his letter shows that he is personally seized with the CFE problem and wants to find a way to put it behind us. Your proposed response offers a comprehensive solution which, if Gorbachev accepts it, should finally allow us to move forward with CFE ratification.

Gorbachev's letter points the way to resolving the problem of the coastal defense divisions that the Soviets have claimed are not covered by CFE limits. He is now prepared to meet all of the treaty limits in a way that amounts to a de facto inclusion of the coastal defense units. He insists, however, that the excess equipment be withdrawn from the CFE zone rather than be destroyed as the treaty envisages. To compensate, he would destroy an equal amount of equipment that is located east-of-the-Urals. The net result is that the Soviets would dismantle the correct quantity of equipment, but would be able to destroy older models instead of more modern equipment. We can accept that as part of an overall agreement.

Gorbachev offered nothing new on naval infantry, the other major category that the Soviets claim is not covered by CFE. Your proposed response (Tab A) suggests that Gorbachev's ideas on

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
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coastal defense be extended to cover naval infantry as well. We cannot be certain how he will react.

Gorbachev might well go for this approach because it would require the Soviets to increase only modestly the amount of additional equipment they would withdraw out of the CFE zone, and without explicitly acknowledging any direct connection between those increased withdrawals and naval infantry. On the other hand, the naval infantry issue (like the entire subject of naval arms control) is so politically charged in Moscow that Gorbachev may find himself politically unable to take this step, even to save the CFE treaty. However, for us to go any further to help the Soviets out of the bind they have created for themselves on naval infantry could lead to serious ratification problems.

To demonstrate that you too are prepared to make the extra effort to solve CFE, your response would accept Gorbachev's proposal for verifying coastal defense divisions. It also would agree not to include under the treaty's numerical limitations the armored personnel carriers assigned to the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. This exclusion makes sense because, like other equipment exempted from CFE limits, they provide internal security rather than being part of the regular Soviet ground forces.

Finally, your letter would seek a series of assurances from Gorbachev regarding the very large amounts of equipment the Soviets moved out of the CFE zone immediately before the treaty was signed in order to escape CFE's destruction requirements. This technically legal evasion has the potential to undermine many of the objectives that CFE was designed to achieve, and is certain to be a major issue during Senate ratification. The proposed assurances would help us deal with both problems.

If Gorbachev responds positively to your letter, we will next seek concurrence from our Allies. They almost certainly will support your proposals provided we continue to consult closely with them.

You will see that the proposed letter is more detailed and technical than your typical correspondence with Gorbachev. This is necessary in order to reach definitive closure with Gorbachev, who alone can settle the issue on the Soviet side. His March 27 letter to you is likewise detailed and technical, so your reply will seem appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Proposed Letter to President Gorbachev
Tab B	March 27 Letter from President Gorbachev
Tab C	Your March 21 Letter to President Gorbachev

U

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mikhail:

I appreciate your March 27 letter and your willingness to join with me in the search for practical solutions to the remaining CFE problems. In the same positive spirit of cooperation and frankness, let me propose a comprehensive approach that elaborates your ideas in a way that also would achieve a practical resolution of the difficult naval infantry issue, and would remove all of the remaining roadblocks to the ratification and implementation of the CFE treaty.

Under this comprehensive approach, the Soviet side would, as you propose, make a binding commitment outside the treaty not to increase the equipment held by units in the coastal defense, naval infantry, and armored combat vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The Soviet side also would make a binding commitment to have 933 fewer tanks, 1,725 fewer armored combat vehicles, and 1,080 fewer artillery pieces in the CFE zone and in active units than the quantities to which it believes it is entitled under the CFE ceilings. Soviet equipment holdings in the CFE subzones and on the flanks would be reduced accordingly. The Soviet side could withdraw equal numbers of tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces outside the CFE zone. It would destroy or convert equal numbers of operational tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces currently located inside or outside the CFE zone

using CFE timetables and CFE procedures (or some other agreed procedures for equipment outside the zone that provided visible evidence that it had been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable).

As you propose, the equipment held by naval infantry and coastal defense units within the CFE zone would be subject to challenge inspections instead of the declared site verification regime that applies to other ground force units, on the understanding that the Soviet side will allow these inspections to be conducted in a manner that facilitates effective verification.

As an additional effort to put us in a position to move forward on the ratification and implementation of the CFE treaty, I am prepared to agree that the armored personnel carriers that were assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces when the treaty was signed will not count against the treaty's numerical limitations, on the understanding that no other armored combat vehicles or other equipment limited by the treaty will be assigned to the SRF.

Mikhail, I very much appreciate the effort you have made to bring us to this point, and I hope that you can appreciate the difficulty of the steps I would ask the other twenty-one signatories to take in response. For example, in our view, equipment located with coastal defense units should be included in the same verification regime that applies to other ground force units. Because of my commitment to work with you to find practical solutions, however, I am prepared to agree to your verification proposal.

I likewise must tell you in all candor that it is very difficult to accept the withdrawal of additional equipment outside the CFE zone, not least because it adds to our already serious concerns regarding the very large quantities of equipment that the Soviet side withdrew from the

CFE zone immediately before the treaty was signed. Although these earlier withdrawals were technically legal, they raise questions and uncertainties that could undermine the very objectives of the CFE treaty that you and I so strongly support.

Nevertheless, I am prepared to accept these additional withdrawals as part of the comprehensive approach I have outlined if you can formally confirm what Soviet representatives already have told us in extensive exchanges between our sides over the last several months. Your assurance is needed to provide confidence that the equipment already withdrawn outside the CFE zone could not be quickly moved back and integrated into military units that remain in the CFE zone, or be used to build up Soviet military forces in ways that could destabilize international stability in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere. Specifically, I would ask that the Soviet side formally:

-- Reaffirm that you will destroy or convert between now and 1995 at least 6,000 tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles, and 7,000 artillery pieces now located east-of-the-Urals, in addition to the destruction and conversion obligations described above. (As you can understand, it would be essential for you to commit to carry out these previously announced plans to ensure that your commitment to destroy or convert additional equipment as part of the comprehensive approach was meaningful.)

-- Provide notification of the conversion or destruction of this equipment, as you have proposed, and perform the planned destruction or conversion using agreed CFE procedures or in some other visible way that builds confidence that the equipment has been destroyed or permanently rendered militarily unusable.

-- Provide assurances that the withdrawn equipment will not be used to create new military units or a strategic reserve, and will not be stored in a way that allows the equipment to be returned quickly to the CFE zone, and that the military units remaining in the CFE zone will not be organized in such a way as to be able to absorb quickly large quantities of additional equipment.

Finally, if your side could identify the current locations of the treaty-limited equipment that your representatives told us have been moved to depots and units east-of-the-Urals since January, 1989, it would greatly facilitate the resolution of the remaining questions concerning the data the Soviet side has reported in connection with the treaty.

Mikhail, this elaboration of your proposal would permit a comprehensive solution to all the remaining CFE issues in a manner that satisfactorily addresses our respective concerns and can be successfully presented to our legislatures. It differs only slightly from the numbers you have proposed, but it has one crucial advantage: it will allow us to move forward with ratification and implementation of the CFE treaty because it will bring the Soviet Union into practical conformity with treaty obligations as they are understood by the other twenty-one signatories.

I recognize that the proposed approach requires further movement by both of us, but without such reciprocal efforts the CFE treaty and all the benefits that flow from it are in jeopardy. I therefore know you share my view that we must do everything possible to put the entire matter behind us, quickly and completely, before it undermines all that we have accomplished.

We have come so far and accomplished so much through the relationship of cooperation and trust that we have established. We must not let

the present opportunity to move forward elude us. If you can join with me in accepting this comprehensive solution, I will urge my NATO allies and the U.S. Senate to accept it as well, and will direct my experts to follow up immediately with yours to formalize our agreement.

With CFE resolved by our personal efforts, I will be ready to work with you--in the same spirit of openness, frankness, and cooperation--to find practical solutions to the remaining START issues so that we can sign that treaty at an early date. I also want to work with you to move ahead on our broader agenda. We have so much yet to achieve. Resolving the current problems now will set the stage for future progress.

Sincerely,

/s/

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS No. 134636
CT/AO
Russian

Dear George,

I was pleased to learn from your letter of March 22 that you are satisfied with the talks that we had this month in Moscow with Secretary of State James Baker on a broad range of issues. In this regard, our assessments completely coincide. In Moscow, yet another important step forward was made toward broadening and deepening the USSR-U.S. interaction in the interest of building a new world order based on the new thinking and democratic principles.

The review of the questions relating to the ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe occupied an important place at the Moscow talks. Taking into account the views presented in your letter of February 9, we made an important step aimed at removing the U.S. side's concerns. It was an honest attempt to find solutions to the existing problems on a basis of compromise, and I was pleased to learn that you value it on its merits. It is precisely in this manner, in an atmosphere of frankness and openness, that we should pursue this dialog--for we are talking about the future of a Treaty which will have, in the fullest sense of this word, an historic importance for the destiny of peace in Europe and far beyond.

His Excellency
George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

10

I must say that I strongly favor completing this dialog in the nearest possible future by achieving mutual understanding on the entire range of aspects with which we are dealing at present. I believe that the final agreement on conventional forces in Europe would open the way for a rapid completion of a no less important treaty on radical reductions in strategic offensive arms.

George, you are writing that the moves we made in Moscow on conventional arms still fall short of resolving the problem as a whole, and you present your arguments. They have been carefully analyzed. As a result of this analysis, we have decided that we can take yet another step, which we are convinced will ensure a comprehensive settlement in terms of creating the necessary conditions for the ratification of the Paris Treaty.

In this connection, let me say from the outset that the approach presented by Secretary Baker in Moscow and supported by you in your letter of March 22, under which we should set aside our differences regarding the interpretation of Article III of the Treaty and focus on practical approaches, appeals to us. Like you, we have no desire to make an issue out of who "won" and who "lost." This point of view, as we have been able to observe, is taking hold also among the other parties to the Treaty. Like the United States, the Soviet side favors a solution which would make it possible to remove the problem in such a way as not to put any party in an embarrassing situation. This serves the goals of trust and mutual respect in resolving the difficult problems involved in arms reductions and in safeguarding legitimate security interests.

Thus, we are for a compromise that would not infringe on anyone's interests, one that would not require amending the Treaty text and would ensure its non-circumvention.

//

As a gesture of good will and in order to eliminate U.S. concerns, we are prepared to offer the following comprehensive solution:

1. Within the aggregate ceilings established for the USSR by the Treaty for tanks (13,150), armored combat vehicles (20,000), and artillery systems (13,175), as well as the levels of arms in regular units (10,500 tanks, 17,920 armored combat vehicles, and 10,825 artillery pieces), the actual quantities of these Soviet arms in Europe will be reduced by the number of these arms that the USSR will have in the coastal defense units, even though, according to our approach, the latter do not fall under the Treaty.

This is our new constructive step, which takes into account the views presented by the U.S. side in Moscow with respect to the regular units' arms. This aspect is now adequately dealt with as well.

Of course, the relevant reduction will be carried out also within the limits established for the extended area of Central Europe and for the flank areas.

2. The additionally reduced arms will be withdrawn beyond the treaty application area for the purpose of replacing the obsolete arms, which subsequently would be destroyed or converted.

As you can see, here too we are offering a solution which is fully consistent with the objectives of reducing arms and drastically lowering the level of military confrontation.

3. The one hundred percent compensation for the coastal defense arms by all the parameters of the Treaty is the most important element of the package proposed by the Soviet side. As for the

naval infantry arms (120 tanks, 753 armored combat vehicles, and 234 artillery pieces), they of course should remain outside the Treaty. As you know, no "reassignment" issue arose with those weapons, as in the case with the three Soviet coastal defense divisions. Our naval infantry has always existed as part of our naval forces. Incidentally, it certainly cannot be compared with the 200,000-strong U.S. Marine Corps.

As was said earlier, we are prepared to make a unilateral, politically binding statement outside the Treaty regarding the non-buildup of naval infantry arms. This obligation would also cover the arms of the coastal defense forces--those levels that would remain after additional reductions (the point is that the reductions under paragraph 1 would be made by cutting the numbers of arms both in deployed ground-troops divisions and in coastal defense divisions).

This means that the issue of circumventing the Treaty through a possible buildup of naval infantry arms would be completely eliminated.

Of course, we are aware of the fact that a number of states party to the Paris Treaty also have corresponding systems in their naval infantry units, and that these states have accepted the inclusion of these systems in the Treaty-limited items. In this connection, we would also be ready--for the purpose of ensuring reciprocity--to have all states party to the Treaty join the statement (outside the Treaty) on the non-buildup of their naval infantry arms within the reductions zone. In this context, one could also agree that these systems of other states not be counted, and their slots be taken by the relevant ground-forces arms.

In other words, in this area too, we are not seeking any unilateral advantages for ourselves. Our goal is to resolve the issue on the basis of the balance of the parties' legitimate interests.

4. We would also make a unilateral statement outside the Treaty about a non-buildup of armored combat vehicles (1,701 pieces) in the units guarding the Strategic Rocket Forces. The reason for this solution is that these armored combat vehicles (ACVs) are not part of the ground forces; their mission is to guard missile complexes of the strategic nuclear forces, on which we have a separate negotiation. Accordingly, within the context of the CFE Treaty, they could in principle be listed under Table IV [Translator's note: Table I in Russian text], which contains the list of systems that do not fall under reductions.

In Moscow the U.S. side raised the question of converting a portion of the Soviet armored combat vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces into ACV-like machines. I would like to note that in the interest of reaching a settlement the Soviet side is prepared to accept this and agree with the United States on the number of ACVs that would be subject to conversion. This is another of our new major steps to meet the U.S. halfway.

Subsequently, the number of the relevant vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces would be determined taking into account the START Treaty.

5. Verification of the above measures could, in our view, be performed in the following way. With respect to coastal defense and naval infantry units, it would be done through challenge inspections. With respect to the armored combat vehicles in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Soviet side would be prepared, as a gesture of good will, to provide the relevant information to all the parties to the Paris Treaty.

6. As for the issue of the equipment moved beyond the Urals, we have already provided information to this effect. We intend to continue, as a gesture of good will, to notify the U.S. side on elimination and conversion.

Summing up, I would like to stress that we have now proposed a solution which ensures a comprehensive settlement. I must say with all frankness that this has not been easy. After all, to comply with the ceilings established by the Treaty, one has to literally "cut into the quick," because from the very beginning, in accordance with the mandate for the Vienna talks, we have assumed that the coastal defense forces, as those of the naval infantry, are not covered by the relevant limitations.

As you can see, for the purpose of reaching agreement and to demonstrate our good will, we have accepted a pragmatic settlement of the coastal defense problem. We have also taken into account the U.S. side's considerations concerning the method of implementing additional reductions, verification, and conversion of a portion of the armored combat vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces. We have also made a serious accommodating move on the question of the naval infantry. We are prepared to provide notifications of the arms pulled out of the Treaty zone.

George, the package of measures that we are proposing can be convincingly argued even in the Supreme Soviet. But to expect the Supreme Soviet to react positively to any measures that would go beyond this package would, quite frankly, be highly problematic.

As you see, Mr. President, I have taken the step that you expected of me, to go as far as I can go in the existing situation. It ought to eliminate your concerns completely and

get the arms reduction and limitation process back on a productive track. I hope for your agreement in principle. In that event I would be ready to appoint plenipotentiary representatives who, together with your authorized experts, would translate our understanding into the language of a concrete agreement.

Respectfully,

M. Gorbachev

March 27, 1991

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker has just reported to me on his talks with you in Moscow. It clearly was a good exchange, and I am pleased that you had the opportunity to discuss not only the Gulf but also the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship, including arms control. Preserving our broader relationship--indeed developing it further--is key to shaping a new world order, a goal that I know we share.

Jim described to me the step you took to help resolve the CFE problem. It was an important step, and I genuinely appreciate that effort. At the same time, I must tell you that it does not meet the basic concern I expressed in my February 9 letter. As I explained in that letter, my concern centers on the willingness of each of the signatories to fulfill the obligations he undertook when he signed the CFE treaty. For this reason, it is not helpful to think of our differences as being about a few hundred tanks, more or less. That also is why the issue cannot be resolved by agreeing on some number that is between what the treaty permits and what one or another signatory now proposes.

Nevertheless, because you were able to take the step you did, we were able to respond with the approach that Jim described in the paper he gave to Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh on Saturday. That approach is designed to overcome differences about Article III of the CFE treaty, by concentrating on producing practical results that correspond to the obligations you and I and the other twenty signatories assumed when we signed it.

The proposed approach is based on three simple principles. First, total Soviet holdings of tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles in the CFE zone (regardless of the branch of the military service to which they may be assigned) could not exceed the limits specified in the treaty. Second, any such equipment in excess of these limits would have to be converted or destroyed using agreed procedures. Third, of course, such an approach would need to be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the CFE treaty we already have signed (including the limits by zone and on holdings in active units), so that it will not be necessary to renegotiate its terms.

I am persuaded that a solution that is based on these principles will meet our respective needs. Consistent with the treaty, it would permit your military to allocate tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles among your naval and other military units in whatever manner best fits the needs of the Soviet Union. You would be free, for example, to increase or decrease the number of tanks assigned to coastal defense divisions or naval infantry provided that the treaty limits on total tank holdings were not exceeded and that the required number of tanks were converted or destroyed.

We would be satisfied that the obligations we each assumed when the CFE treaty was signed would be met. You and I together would have found a practical way to resolve the issue, reflecting and building on the spirit of cooperation and mutual accommodation that you and I have developed. I am equally persuaded that if we can find such a solution, the other remaining CFE issues also can be resolved.

If you agree that a solution could be based on these three principles, I am confident it would be accepted by my NATO allies, and I would direct Jim to follow up quickly to secure its achievement.

Leaving CFE unresolved casts a cloud over the future of all of our arms control efforts and impedes cooperation on our broader agenda. I do not want that. In emphasizing to Jim Baker your commitment to the U.S.-Soviet relationship and underscoring its centrality to a peaceful and enduring world order, it is clear that you do not want that either. Resolving CFE now would have an enormous positive impact, facilitating progress on other difficult arms control issues, and helping to pave the way for our next summit meeting.

Mikhail, let us promptly put the remaining CFE issues behind us on the basis I have described.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (1 pp.)	3/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0853-MR(510)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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PAGE 01

PRT. GATES SCOWCROFT
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<PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 231030Z MAR 91

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
JACK MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
1. WE HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND ARE IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO CONTACT CHERNAYEV. (HIS OFFICE DOES NOT ANSWER THE TELEPHONE ON WEEKENDS.) WHILE I SHALL DO MY BEST TO DELIVER THE LETTER EITHER TO GORBACHEV OR CHERNAYEV THIS WEEKEND, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL MAKE THE APPOINTMENT ONLY ON MONDAY. IF THAT IS THE CASE, I PRESUME YOU WOULD WAIT UNTIL MONDAY RATHER THAN DELIVERING THROUGH OTHER HANDS. I SHALL OF COURSE LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS DELIVERY HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

WARM REGARDS,

JACK.

END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0162

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
9/19/13

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (4 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0853-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 221605Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 02
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: (b)(1) PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK EYES ONLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
-
-
1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER, WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY SECRETARY BAKER, TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF GORBACHEV IS UNAVAILABLE, LETTER MAY BE DELIVERED TO CHERNAYEV. ANY REPORTING ON DELIVERY OR REACTIONS SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL.
-
2. IN DELIVERING LETTER, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS TRYING TO OPEN THE DOOR TO A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE REMAINING CFE PROBLEMS, AND URGE GORBACHEV TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WALK THROUGH THAT DOOR WITH A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT PUTS THIS ISSUE BEHIND US.
-
3. YOU SHOULD ALSO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY HAS REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV ON BW, AND THAT THE SECRETARY WILL SHORTLY BE SENDING BESSMERTNYKH THE PAPERS GORBACHEV REQUESTED SO THAT GORBACHEV CAN TAKE THE ACTIONS NEEDED TO GET THE PROGRAM OF VISITS AND EXCHANGES BACK ON TRACK.
-
BEGIN TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
9/17/13

-

-

DEAR MIKHAIL:

-

JIM BAKER HAS JUST REPORTED TO ME ON HIS TALKS WITH YOU IN MOSCOW. IT CLEARLY WAS A GOOD EXCHANGE, AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NOT ONLY THE GULF BUT ALSO THE BROADER U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL. PRESERVING OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP--INDEED DEVELOPING IT FURTHER--IS KEY TO SHAPING A NEW WORLD ORDER, A GOAL THAT I KNOW WE SHARE.

-

JIM DESCRIBED TO ME THE STEP YOU TOOK TO HELP RESOLVE THE CFE PROBLEM. IT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP, AND I GENUINELY APPRECIATE THAT EFFORT. AT THE SAME TIME, I MUST TELL YOU THAT IT DOES NOT MEET THE BASIC CONCERN I EXPRESSED IN MY FEBRUARY 9 LETTER. AS I EXPLAINED IN THAT LETTER, MY CONCERN CENTERS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF EACH OF THE SIGNATORIES TO FULFILL THE OBLIGATIONS HE UNDERTOOK WHEN HE SIGNED THE CFE TREATY. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS NOT HELPFUL TO THINK OF OUR DIFFERENCES AS BEING ABOUT A FEW HUNDRED TANKS, MORE OR LESS. THAT ALSO IS WHY THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY AGREEING ON SOME NUMBER THAT IS BETWEEN WHAT THE TREATY PERMITS AND WHAT ONE OR ANOTHER SIGNATORY NOW PROPOSES.

-

NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE YOU WERE ABLE TO TAKE THE STEP YOU DID, WE WERE ABLE TO RESPOND WITH THE APPROACH THAT JIM DESCRIBED IN THE PAPER HE GAVE TO FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH ON SATURDAY. THAT APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME DIFFERENCES ABOUT ARTICLE III OF THE CFE TREATY, BY CONCENTRATING ON PRODUCING PRACTICAL RESULTS THAT CORRESPOND TO THE OBLIGATIONS YOU AND I AND THE OTHER TWENTY SIGNATORIES ASSUMED WHEN WE SIGNED IT.

-

THE PROPOSED APPROACH IS BASED ON THREE SIMPLE PRINCIPLES. FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) COULD NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF

THESE LIMITS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONVERTED OR DESTROYED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, OF COURSE, SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD NEED TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CFE TREATY WE ALREADY HAVE SIGNED (INCLUDING THE LIMITS BY ZONE AND ON HOLDINGS IN ACTIVE UNITS), SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS.

-

I AM PERSUADED THAT A SOLUTION THAT IS BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES WILL MEET OUR RESPECTIVE NEEDS. CONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY, IT WOULD PERMIT YOUR MILITARY TO ALLOCATE TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES AMONG YOUR NAVAL AND OTHER MILITARY UNITS IN WHATEVER MANNER BEST FITS THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION. YOU WOULD BE FREE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO
INCREASE OR DECREASE THE NUMBER OF TANKS ASSIGNED TO COASTAL DEFENSE DIVISIONS OR NAVAL INFANTRY PROVIDED THAT THE TREATY LIMITS ON TOTAL TANK HOLDINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED AND THAT THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF TANKS WERE CONVERTED OR DESTROYED.

-

WE WOULD BE SATISFIED THAT THE OBLIGATIONS WE EACH ASSUMED WHEN THE CFE TREATY WAS SIGNED WOULD BE MET. YOU AND I TOGETHER WOULD HAVE FOUND A PRACTICAL WAY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, REFLECTING AND BUILDING ON THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION THAT YOU AND I HAVE DEVELOPED. I AM EQUALLY PERSUADED THAT IF WE CAN FIND SUCH A SOLUTION, THE OTHER REMAINING CFE ISSUES ALSO CAN BE RESOLVED.

-

IF YOU AGREE THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE BASED ON THESE THREE PRINCIPLES, I AM CONFIDENT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY MY NATO ALLIES, AND I WOULD DIRECT JIM TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY TO SECURE ITS ACHIEVEMENT.

-

LEAVING CFE UNRESOLVED CASTS A CLOUD OVER THE FUTURE OF ALL OF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS AND IMPEDES COOPERATION ON OUR BROADER AGENDA. I DO NOT WANT THAT. IN EMPHASIZING TO JIM BAKER YOUR COMMITMENT TO THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND UNDERSCORING ITS CENTRALITY TO A PEACEFUL AND ENDURING WORLD ORDER, IT IS CLEAR THAT YOU DO NOT WANT THAT EITHER. RESOLVING CFE NOW WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS POSITIVE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

IMPACT FACILITATING PROGRESS ON OTHER DIFFICULT ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. AND HELPING TO PAVE THE WAY FOR OUR NEXT SUMMIT MEETING.
#0027
ZEM
~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
0000
FINAL SECTION OF 02
-
MIKHAIL, LET US PROMPTLY PUT THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES BEHIND US ON THE BASIS I HAVE DESCRIBED.
-
SINCERELY,
-
-
GEORGE BUSH
-
-
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
-
-
END OF TEXT.
DECL: OADR
#0028

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock (2 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0853-MR(512)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
512

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT FILE PRIVACY_IN SIT SUM

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 111025Z MAR 91

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT NOON TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT GORBACHEV IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING SECRETARY BAKER FRIDAY AND APPRECIATES PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOOD WISHES. HE ADDED THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD PUBLICLY REFUTED THE ASSERTION THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN LESS THAN COOPERATIVE DURING THE GULF WAR.

WE HAD TIME FOR ONLY THE BRIEFEST CHAT BECAUSE HE WAS SUMMONED BY GORBACHEV JUST AFTER I ARRIVED. REGARDING THE WEEKEND'S POLITICAL ANTICS, HE SEEMED MORE RELAXED THAN HE WAS WHEN I LAST SAW HIM. HE THOUGHT YELTSIN HAD FINALLY DISCREDITED HIMSELF WITH THE PUBLIC AND THAT THE KEY REPUBLICS WOULD SOON SIGN THE UNION TREATY.

THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I FEEL MAY BE JUSTIFIED, BUT I WAS STRUCK BY THE MORE CONFIDENT MOOD HE CONVEYED AS COMPARED WITH THE LAST TIME WE MET.

REGARDS,
JACK.

END TEXT.
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-MR
9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

=0180

Dona - you were going to give me the Gorby pkg — after you sent the orig to Mallock

Sent via classified pouch 3/12 Dona

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Limited Access

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1719

URGENT NOT PROOFED: [illegible] SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
WEST Ken Hill	1	K	A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	3/12	N/R
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres Letter to Gorbachev

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has deskells

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101719
RECEIVED: 07 MAR 91 17

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 10 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
ARMS CONTROL
LIMITED ACCESS
PERSIAN GULF
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA WHSR DUE DATE: 11 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BURNS
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 3/12 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF CLOSED BY: NSEF DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9101719

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	91031013	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
002		X	91031016	PRES SGD LTR
002		X	91031016	CABLE SENT VIA WHSR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/14/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9101719
DATE 10 MAR 91

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
ROY, J DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: ORGINAL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By ___ NARA, Date ___

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9101719

REFERRAL

DATE: 12 MAR 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 10 MAR 91

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO PRES GORBACHEV RE GULF CRISIS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCHE **

DUEDATE:

COMMENT: ** PLEASE DISPATCH VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH ***

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/16/09

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES on 11/30/14

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2011-0853-MR (513)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	6/14/2013	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> [redacted] <DTG> 101446Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

[redacted]

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513

<TEXT>ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

.
BEGIN TEXT:
.
DEAR MIKHAIL:
.
NOW THAT THE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED IN THE GULF, I WANTED TO WRITE TO SAY HOW MUCH I APPRECIATED OUR EXCELLENT PERSONAL COMMUNICATION THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS FROM ITS EARLIEST DAYS UNTIL NOW. I VALUED OUR MANY DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING THE PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS IN HELSINKI AND PARIS AND OUR RECENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS. THIS COOPERATION, BOTH WHEN WE AGREED AND EVEN WHEN WE HAD DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, PERMITTED UNPRECEDENTED ACHIEVEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DURING A CRITICAL TIME. IT WAS A MEASURE OF HOW OUR RELATIONS HAVE CHANGED, AND THE POTENTIAL THAT CHANGE HAS FOR THE WORLD. THE SUCCESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE STRONG AND PRINCIPLED CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION UNDER YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP.
.
NOW WE WILL TURN TO THE URGENT WORK OF BUILDING A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WILL NOT BE EASY. BUT I BELIEVE WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE FOR LASTING SECURITY IN THE GULF AND AN OBLIGATION TO CONFRONT THE MANY PROBLEMS SEPARATING ISRAEL AND BOTH THE ARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS. THE USSR HAS THE POTENTIAL TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS EFFORT. IT IS MY HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD COMMON OBJECTIVES, ONCE AGAIN LAYING THE BASIS FOR SUCCESS.
.
JIM BAKER LOOKS FORWARD TO HAVING A GOOD DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON MARCH 15. HE WILL REPORT TO YOU ON HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP AND REVIEW IN DETAIL OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THAT TROUBLED REGION. I HAVE ALSO ASKED JIM TO DISCUSS THOROUGHLY WITH YOU THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF HOW WE CAN REGAIN MOMENTUM IN ARMS CONTROL. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, THIS WILL REQUIRE THAT WE RESOLVE THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH CFE. I WOULD ASK THAT YOU CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE MESSAGE HE WILL BRING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE TWO ISSUES FOR THE COURSE OF OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.
.
SINCERELY,
.
GEORGE BUSH
.
.
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0853-NLR
ES 6/14/13

MOSCOW
.
P.S.
.
I AM SIGNING THIS LETTER AT CAMP DAVID; AND I AM RECALLING OUR
MOST RELAXED AND PLEASANT DISCUSSIONS HERE.
.
I OFTEN THINK ABOUT THE PROBLEMS YOU FACE AT HOME, AND I HOPE
YOU WILL TELL JIM IF THERE'S ANYTHING YOU'D LIKE ME TO KNOW
ON A VERY PRIVATE BASIS. AS YOU KNOW I CONSIDER MYSELF LUCKY
TO BE YOUR FRIEND.
.
GEORGE BUSH
#0170
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0170 <TOR> 910310095113 MSG000289907473

LIMITED ACCESS

1719

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated our excellent personal communication throughout this crisis from its earliest days until now. I valued our many discussions, including the productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and our recent telephone conversations. This cooperation, both when we agreed and even when we had different perspectives, permitted unprecedented achievements between our two countries at the UN Security Council during a critical time. It was a measure of how our relations have changed, and the potential that change has for the world. The success of the international coalition would not have been possible without the strong and principled contribution of the Soviet Union under your personal leadership.

Now we will turn to the urgent work of building a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This will not be easy. But I believe we have an opportunity to provide for lasting security in the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many problems separating Israel and both the Arab states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the potential to play an important role in this effort. It is my hope that we will be able to work together toward common objectives, once again laying the basis for success.

Jim Baker looks forward to having a good discussion with you on March 15. He will report to you on his Middle East trip and review in detail our current assessment of that troubled region. I have also asked Jim to discuss

thoroughly with you the critical question of how we can regain momentum in arms control. As I have said before, this will require that we resolve the current difficulties with CFE. I would ask that you consider carefully the message he will bring and the importance of these two issues for the course of our future relationship.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

P.S.

I am signing this letter at Camp David; and I am recalling our most relaxed and pleasant discussions here.

I often think about the problems you face at home, and I hope you will tell Jim if there's anything you'd like me to know on a very private basis.

As you know I consider myself lucky to be your friend

~~SECRET~~ SECRET LIMITED ACCESS

1719

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

Purpose

To express your gratitude to Gorbachev for the excellent personal cooperation you had with him throughout the Gulf crisis and to reconfirm our interest in working with the Soviets on post-war problems in the Middle East and on arms control.

BACKGROUND

Attached at Tab A is a letter from you to President Gorbachev which seeks to end the Gulf crisis on a positive note and build on our work with the Soviets to establish the ground for cooperation on postwar problems. We have made the letter short and somewhat personal to convey a positive message.

The letter thanks Gorbachev for the excellent personal communication you had with him throughout the crisis and points to our unprecedented cooperation in the UNSC to build the international coalition. It also states that our eventual success would have been difficult to achieve without Gorbachev's personal leadership.

The letter also covers the opportunity ahead for progress on the Middle East and indicates that the Soviets have a potentially important role to play. It mentions that Jim will brief Gorbachev on his Middle East trip when they meet in Moscow on March 16 and will also want to engage in a detailed discussion of arms control issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
11/29/2007 MM

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR SECRET

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

LIMITED ACCESS

1719

March 7, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

As requested, attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev which is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 06/01/2011

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

① Bob

② Brent

Sec Baker has cleared this version of the letter to Gorbo.

David

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(1917) 3/7/91

Bob:

David Gompert just called and asked that I pass the following note with the Gorbachev letter:

Bob Zoellick, State, thinks the letter is fine; however, he feels very strongly that Sec Baker should look at it. Zoellick has faxed the letter to Baker and has requested his concurrence as soon as possible. Gompert does not feel this will take long.

v/r

R.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17b. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mikhail:

Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated our excellent personal communication throughout this crisis from its earliest days until now. I valued our many discussions, including the productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and our recent telephone conversations. This cooperation, both when we agreed and even when we had different perspectives, permitted unprecedented achievements between our two countries at the UN Security Council during a critical time. It was a measure of how our relations have changed, and the potential that change has for the world. The success of the international coalition would not have been possible without the strong and principled contribution of the Soviet Union under your personal leadership.

Now we will turn to the urgent work of building a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This will not be easy. But I believe we have an opportunity to provide for lasting security in the Gulf and an obligation to confront the many problems separating Israel and both the Arab states and the Palestinians. The USSR has the potential to play an important role in this effort. It is my hope that we will be able to work together toward common objectives, once again laying the basis for success.

Jim Baker looks forward to having a good discussion with you on March 15. He will report to you on his Middle East trip and review in detail our current assessment of that troubled region. I have also asked Jim to discuss

thoroughly with you the critical question of how we can regain momentum in arms control. As I have said before, this will require that we resolve the current difficulties with CFE. I would ask that you consider carefully the message he will bring and the importance of these two issues for the course of our future relationship.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18a. Cable	From White House Re: Message in a Sealed Envelope to Ambassador Jack Matlock for Delivery to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

LIMITED ACCESS

1719

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

Now that the fighting has stopped in the Gulf, I wanted to write to say how much I appreciated our excellent personal communication throughout this crisis from its earliest days until now. I valued our many discussions, including the productive meetings in Helsinki and Paris and our recent telephone conversations. This cooperation, both when we agreed and even when we had different perspectives, permitted unprecedented achievements between our two countries at the UN Security Council during a critical time. It was a measure of how our relations have changed, and the potential that change has for the world. The success of the international coalition would not have been possible without the strong and principled contribution of the Soviet Union under your personal leadership.

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Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

P.S.

I am signing this letter at Camp David; and I am recalling our most relaxed and pleasant discussions here.

I often think about the problems you face at home, and I hope you will tell Jim if there's anything you'd like me to know on a very private basis.

As you know I consider myself lucky to be your friend

~~SECRET~~

LIMITED ACCESS

1719

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

Purpose

To express your gratitude to Gorbachev for the excellent personal cooperation you had with him throughout the Gulf crisis and to reconfirm our interest in working with the Soviets on post-war problems in the Middle East and on arms control.

BACKGROUND

Attached at Tab A is a letter from you to President Gorbachev which seeks to end the Gulf crisis on a positive note and build on our work with the Soviets to establish the ground for cooperation on postwar problems. We have made the letter short and somewhat personal to convey a positive message.

The letter thanks Gorbachev for the excellent personal communication you had with him throughout the crisis and points to our unprecedented cooperation in the UNSC to build the international coalition. It also states that our eventual success would have been difficult to achieve without Gorbachev's personal leadership.

The letter also covers the opportunity ahead for progress on the Middle East and indicates that the Soviets have a potentially important role to play. It mentions that Jim will brief Gorbachev on his Middle East trip when they meet in Moscow on March 16 and will also want to engage in a detailed discussion of arms control issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/
11/29/2007 MM

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

LIMITED ACCESS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1719

March 7, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Gulf Crisis

As requested, attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev which is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 06/01/2011

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Cable	Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [111025Z Mar 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By mm on 6/12/2023

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2011-0854-MR(518)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/12/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY_IN SIT SUM
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> 1.4(c) <DTG> 111025Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TO>TO WHITE HOUSE

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
518

<TEXT>ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
BEGIN TEXT
FROM: JACK MATLOCK
FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT NOON TODAY TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT GORBACHEV IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING SECRETARY BAKER FRIDAY AND APPRECIATES PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOOD WISHES. HE ADDED THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PLEASED TO NOTE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD PUBLICLY REFUTED THE ASSERTION THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN LESS THAN COOPERATIVE DURING THE GULF WAR.

WE HAD TIME FOR ONLY THE BRIEFEST CHAT BECAUSE HE WAS SUMMONED BY GORBACHEV JUST AFTER I ARRIVED. REGARDING THE WEEKEND'S POLITICAL ANTICS, HE SEEMED MORE RELAXED THAN HE WAS WHEN I LAST SAW HIM: HE THOUGHT YELTSIN HAD FINALLY DISCREDITED HIMSELF WITH THE PUBLIC AND THAT THE KEY REPUBLICS WOULD SOON SIGN THE UNION TREATY.

THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN I FEEL MAY BE JUSTIFIED, BUT I WAS STRUCK BY THE MORE CONFIDENT MOOD HE CONVEYED AS COMPARED WITH THE LAST TIME WE MET.

REGARDS,
JACK.

END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
~~S E C R E T~~
#0180
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0180 <TOR> 910311060308 MSG000289980188

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0854-MR
MM 12/12/2016

GEORGE BUSH

Brent

very interesting

Please get a
cc for TAB Done

Need I reply
or can we
discuss at
Bermuda

3-6-91

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

To Staff
Annie
Kanter
& Rick
Berns

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20. Message	Re: Text of a Message Dated 5 March 1991 from the Prime Minister to the President (5 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock (2 pp.)	3/1/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 2/6/15

Date Closed:	4/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	11-0860-MR(520)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	8/22/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
520

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 011245Z MAR 91

FM (b)(1) MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0854-MR
BY 8/22/13

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK

.

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

.

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

.

BRENT:

MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV HAS REPLIED TO YOUR NOTE LAST MONTH WISHING HIM A SPEEDY RECOVERY. WE ARE POUCHING YOU THE ORIGINAL LETTER. AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT FOLLOWS:

.

BEGIN TEXT:

.

MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.
DEAR MR. SCOWCROFT:

I THANK YOU FOR THE GOOD WISHES. I HAVE RECOVERED AND I RETURNED TO WORK AT THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY.

I THINK THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN US HAVE ALREADY TURNED OUT TO BE SUCH THAT OUR MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TOWARD WHICH YOU ARE EXPRESSING HOPE, WOULD BE USEFUL.

I WISH YOU SUCCESS IN YOUR RESPONSIBLE WORK AND ALL THE BEST FOR YOUR FAMILY.

WITH RESPECT.
S AKHROMEYEV
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
22 FEBRUARY 1991.

END TEXT.
DECL. OADR
~~S E C R E T~~
#0925

THE PRESIDENT

Feb. 20, 1991

Dear Edward,
Your very warm letter of Jan 20th reached me yesterday. Thank you very much. You can take great credit for elevating U.S - Soviet relations to a new plane - Your efforts will be given a very positive mark by history. I am sorry

that your friend and mine
Mikhail Gorbachev is having
difficulties; for he, too, will be judged
most kindly by history.

I hope that you will stay in
touch with Jim Baker and with
me. We both will always be grateful
to you for many many things —

with respect + sincere best wishes,

George Bush

The Minister

of Foreign Affairs

of the USSR

Moscow, January 20, 1991

Dear Mr. President:

In completing a major and, possibly, the most important phase of my life connected with my work as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, I should like to thank you sincerely for your kind attitude toward me and my mission. If it has succeeded even in part, this is due mostly to the desire of U.S. leaders--and first among them, to your desire--to see in me a worthy and honest partner, one that I have endeavored to be.

The decision to resign did not come easily. After weighing all the "pros" and "contras", I felt that precisely that step was necessary today for me and for my country. In a certain way I took that decision to protect all that we have managed to attain during the past five and a half years.

His Excellency

George Bush, President

of the United States of America

Washington, D.C.

These have been the years of an historic turn from an anomalous confrontation of two great powers and nations to a natural status of friendliness and partnership between them. I am happy that much in this truly epoch-making endeavor has been accomplished in cooperation with your administration and with you personally.

I firmly believe that what has been achieved during these years is immune to destructive action. The stability of the foundations laid and of the walls of the new structure of world policy being erected is warranted by the clearly expressed intent of the leaders and the people of the USSR to continue on that path.

I am certain that this is your intent as well.

Many difficult crossroads still lie ahead of us. I have spoken out frankly and openly about the dangers that threaten our progress. My words that democracy and freedom must prevail were not uttered casually or accidentally.

I shall never forget our encounters, especially the last one, when your wife and you received us at the White House at the wonderful Christmas tree. And although the Christmas lights have gone out, I am happy in my conviction that the great work accomplished together will continue to shine forever.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. Shevardnadze

2/21/91

EUR/SOV Translation

Dear George,

As I promised during our conversation last night, I am informing you about the continuation of our work with T. Aziz, the representative of the Iraqi leadership. Taking into account the concerns you expressed in our telephone conversation, we have tried to give concrete expression to the commitments of the Iraqi side in relation to the withdrawal of their forces from Kuwait, removing any linkage of this issue with other problems. The conversation with T. Aziz, which A. A. Bessmertnykh and Ye. M. Primakov continued today, was long and difficult, but as a result -- and I can mention this with satisfaction -- great progress was achieved. We managed to agree on all aspects of the implementation of Security Council resolution 660, and received from the Iraqis completely precise commitments on that score. T. Aziz said that for understandable reasons he was obliged to obtain the final agreement of President S. Hussein, to whom the agreed formulations were sent immediately; however, he had no doubt that they would be approved in Baghdad.

As a result, the understanding worked out last night with Iraq includes in definitive form the following provisions:

Iraq took upon itself the commitment to fulfill Security Council resolution 660 literally, i.e., to withdraw its forces from Kuwait-- not in general but precisely out of Kuwait -- immediately and unconditionally, to the positions which they occupied before the invasion of Kuwait. The withdrawal will be carried out from the entire territory of that country. The Iraqis withdrew their stipulations in relation to the future political regime in re-established Kuwait. Any linkages between the withdrawal of the forces and other issues are ruled out. In this manner, the basis for the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 660, and all other understandings which followed it, will be completely eliminated.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0854-NR
ES 3/28/13

We succeeded in establishing a precise timeframe for the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait. In doing so it became apparent that there were truly significant difficulties in doing this in an extremely short timeframe. The Iraqi representative showed that the issue here was not a lack of political will on the part of the Iraqi leadership, but that it was physically impossible to withdraw a half-million-man army from Kuwait with all its weaponry and ammunition in a few days -- all the more so, in conditions in which practically all communications have been destroyed. By the Iraqis' calculations, it would require 3-4 months for this. Nonetheless, we convinced the Iraqis to accept a commitment to complete the withdrawal within a maximum of 21 days and, as far as the capital of Kuwait is concerned, to carry out the withdrawal of its forces from there within four days [96 hours]. I believe it is precisely this fact -- the full liberation of the capital of Kuwait already in the first days -- that has the most substantive significance from all points of view.

Commitments regarding the exchange of POWs were also formulated. The Iraqis strictly promised to do this no later than in the course of three days. Purely technical difficulties prevent it from happening any quicker.

The greatest difficulty appeared in nailing down the details of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the agreement that was reached last night. We convinced the Iraqi side to withdraw the provision requiring economic sanctions to be revoked after Iraq had removed two-thirds of all its armed forces from Kuwait. This formulation really caused us to be suspicious concerning the sincerity of Iraq's promise to completely leave Kuwait. As a result, a formulation was agreed that implies that the remaining resolutions of the Security Council connected with the Kuwait crisis would cease to be in effect only after the last Iraqi soldier departed Kuwait. That, by the way, will be an additional factor encouraging the Iraqis not to draw out the departure of their troops from Kuwait: after the long blockade and war, it is necessary for them as quickly as possible to

resume normal economic relations with other countries. This formulation of the issue is fair in the sense that the subsequent eleven resolutions of the Security Council resulted from the fact of Iraq's refusal to comply with resolution 660.

We deemed it important to place the fulfillment of all of these Iraqi obligations under strict international verification. In accordance with this, we proposed language about the dispatching to Kuwait of observers or peacekeeping forces under the oversight of the UN Security Council.

I tell you without exaggeration that it seems to us that the result that has been achieved allows us at last to declare an end to the development of the military aspect of the conflict and proceed toward full elimination of it through political means. We do not consider this result only on its own merits. That which has today emerged as a possibility to stop the war and subsequently save perhaps many thousands of lives -- Americans, Arabs, and citizens of other lands -- is linked more than anything to the fact that the international community and the Security Council have displayed extraordinary unanimity at all stages of the conflict. For the first time in the history of international relations since the Second World War, joint efforts have succeeded in stopping aggression and dealing an advance lesson to any other possible aggressor. It would not have been achievable if there had not been a fundamental change in relations between the Soviet Union and United States, from confrontation to cooperation and partnership. We have achieved a lot in arriving at a settlement of the Namibian question, in the Cambodian issue, in advancing significantly the matter of an Angolan settlement, and here now, before us, is an excellent opportunity to deepen our cooperation in the successful resolution of the crisis in the Persian Gulf region.

Taking account of the agreement reached with the Iraqi leadership, we will be introducing a proposal to urgently convene the Security Council, which would then set on a practical course the whole process of achieving the liberation

of Kuwait and its reestablishment as a sovereign, territorially whole state and an equal member of the United Nations. It would be magnificent if, in the completion of this step, our countries could proceed together. The Soviet representative in the Security Council has instructions to act in close contact with the representatives of the United States and the other governments represented in the Council.

M. Gorbachev

[Undated; delivered 22 February 1991]

1. General
2. Florence

Phone call to Gorbachev

Secretary Baker Hello

The President was trying to reach you and I tried to reach Sasha -- we could not, he asked that I give the message that he wanted to give to you.

I am calling you from his office -- he has gone to another engagement.

Had he been able to talk to you, he wanted to say the following.

We know you are making an intensive and useful effort as we have said publicly.

And we recognize that Iraq's position has changed. But Saddam is now blowing up Kuwait's oil production and refining capabilities -- in fact he seems to have adopted a "scorched earth" policy. It seems he is taking advantage of the talks with you to destroy Kuwait and play for time. Much of this seems to have been started earlier today. We do not believe that the world can wait and let him do this. So we will be proposing a procedure by which we can avert a ground campaign and bring the war to an end. In effect, this builds on what you have done.

When the President was unable to reach you, he went ahead with a press statement that has just been concluded. I will not repeat that since it will be available to you. Except to say that it provides for a 24 hour waiting period before there would be the initiation of any ground campaign. The President said publicly that he would be releasing a detailed statement on what we think is required by way of Iraqi withdrawal in order to avert a ground campaign.

This statement has not yet been released and I would like to summarize it for you.

It says in the operative part of the statement:

In a final effort to obtain Iraqi compliance with the will of the international community -- the United States after consulting with the government of Kuwait and our other coalition partners declares that a ground campaign will not be initiated against Iraqi forces if prior to 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb 23, Iraq publicly accepts the following terms and communicates that to the United Nations: The terms are as follows:

Begin a large scale withdrawal from Kuwait by 12:00 U.N. time, Saturday Feb. 23.

Complete military withdrawal from Kuwait in one week.

Given the fact that Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait in a matter of hours, anything more than a week would not meet the full terms of the U.N. Resolution.

Within the first forty-eight hours remove all forces from Kuwait City to allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government of Kuwait and remove its forces from prepared defenses along the Saudi-Kuwait and Saudi-Iraq border. From Bub'iyan and Warbah and from Kuwait's Rumayllah oil field.

Within the one week specified above return all forces to their positions of August 1 in accordance with 660.

In cooperation with the ICRC release all POWs and third country civilians being held against their will.

Return the remains of deceased and killed coalition servicemen. This action to commence immediately with the initiation of the withdrawal and to be completed within 48 hours.

Remove all explosives and booby-traps including those on Kuwaiti oil installations. (As an aside, I may say that it may already be too late for that.) And designate Iraqi military liaison officers to work with Kuwaiti personnel on the operational details of withdrawal to include the provision of information on land or sea mines.

Cease combat air patrols over Iraq and Kuwait except for transport flights carrying withdrawing troops. And allow coaltion aircraft exclusive control over and use of Kuwaiti airspace.

Cease all actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property and release all Kuwaiti detainees.

U.S. and coalition partners reiterate that their forces will not attack retreating Iraqi forces. And will exercise restraint as long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above guidelines and there are no attacks on other countries.

Mr. President, in the beginning of this statement which I did not read there is a statement that the conditions in the Iraqi offer to you must be eliminated. This means the statement that there must be a recision of all other U.N. resolutions. And the suggestion that there should be a lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for partial withdrawal. President Bush has arrived back while I have been reading this to you and wants to talk with you.

<u>The President</u> Mikhail, I am anxious to get your reaction. Jim tells me he has read you the entire statement. But I must tell you I can't believe that Tariq Aziz knew what Saddam was going to

do to these oil fields. The photographs from the air are absolutely unbelievable they are so devastating. I am so glad to have this conversation and sorry we couldn't get the call through before I made the public statement. The details of what Jim has read to you have not been made public yet. But Marlin Fitzwater will be announcing it very soon. What is the state of play on your end? Thanks for trying hard once again.

Gorbachev O.K. thanks and hello to you. I was away because I had to attend a big political rally in the Kremlin Palace for Army Day and I really was not in a position to leave that gathering because all the T.V. cameras were there and I had 6000 people there.

The President We are both slaves to the T.V. that's why I had to go ahead with my statement.

Gorbachev So there is no misunderstanding. Now on substance. I listened very carefully to what Jim has been reading out to me and I have several questions. The way I understand it, what we did over the past 24 hours in agreeing with Iraq and what is submitted to Saddam is not acceptable to participants in the coalition. I wish to recall once again, exactly what I mean. And this is how the problem looks and we are awaiting a reply from Saddam.

(1) Iraq agrees to fully comply with the terms of the U.N. Resolution in other words to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all of its troops to their positions prior to August 1. That is quoted from the U.N. resolution.

The resolution does not mention Kuwait but we incorporated it into our first point.

(2) The withdrawal of troops is to begin the day following the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in the air, sea and ground.

(3) The withdrawal of troops is to be completed within 21 days -- including Kuwait city within the first four days.

JIm mentioned that it took a short time for Iraq to send in its troops -- to be true to reality -- he was building that group for seven months.

Now Iraq first demanded a three-four month period then he said he would need six weeks but we pressed for a twenty-one day period and we said if we agreed to that time frame it might still be an unacceptable condition for the U.S. and the coalition.

(4) After the completion of withdrawals from Kuwait the motives behind the other U.N. Resolutions will have run their course and will no longer be necessary.

This is not a precondition this is just for the U.N. Security Council to be seized with the issue and to take appropriate decisions.

(5) All POWs will be released and repatriated within 3 days of the cessation of hostilities. This has even tougher language than your proposal.

(6) Confirmation, verification and monitioring will be carried out by observers and/or by a peacekeeping force to be decided by the U.N. Security Council.

I wish to express my initial reaction to what I heard from Jim. But I must put to you and to myself the following question. Where does our priority lie in putting a final touch on this settlement is it a political approach or the continuation of military operations and the escalation to ground operations. Now, I saw my role in cooperation with you in trying to find a political solution, as trying to protect the U.S. servicemen and peaceful Iraqi civilians from the suffering that may befall them. If you share this understanding then our task is to find a solution that is tough but also implementable.

From this point of view the demands that troops be withdrawn in 1 week would be impossible to comply with and would open the way for continuation of the military course. Now of course it would be different if you see this political option of settlement as unacceptable. But if on the basis of what we have been able to accomplish here, though we are waiting for a reply from Saddam Hussein, and also on the basis of what you have suggested -- if we could combine them for the Security Council into a joint U.S.-Soviet approach. That would be very important solution if we could do that -- I will pass on to something else.

In the Security Council we could promptly consider the whole complex of a joint plan based on what the two of us have said -- we would have a joint thing that we could consider in the U.N. Security Council.

Especially since if we use political language on the need to withdraw troops from Kuwait city within four days there is a convergence between us and also on the POWs.

What matters most is that by acting in this way we could show that as in the first instance, now at the very end we are acting together and have used all possible means including the first phase of military activity and now have succeeded in making Iraq backtrack and comply with the U.N. resolution. This would have taught a lesson to all others and this will be a new reality that all potential and likely aggressors would have to reckon with. Also by acting in this way we would avert the sliding into a difficult and dangerous phase.

I would say that this would be a major victory. The world at large and Americans would give due course to your actions and also to our activities. And in light of the steady cooperation of the the two of us and our other partners this would be indicative of the current state of our relations. This would indicate that the two Presidents while remaining true to their principles never forgot that the highest principle is the preservation of human life.

If we accept that approach we may not get 100% support but there is every likelihood we could get 80-90% support. Therefore now that we have a very good shot at a political solution, I wish that we could avoid the situation sliding into a difficult phase and you and I should not squander the opportunity before us. I think we should not succumb to pressure and grow jittery. I want to be frank, we are feeling pressure in this country and I know there is pressure from others -- some would push us toward what we don't want to do. If we manage to turn events in the direction I have described, it would be an achievement that would last for sometime to come.

So much for my line of argument. I am sorry I have been so emotional and used charged language.

The President. First I have to question. I am correct in saying that Saddam has not agreed to your six points?

Gorbachev. Tariq Aziz said that he was certain the President would support the six points but he had to transmit them personally. This is understandable jsut as Bessmertnykh or Baker cannot consent without the President.

The President. Do you have a time when he is supposed to come back to you?

Gorbachev. He said immediately. This reply could come anytime. Aziz has stayed in Moscow and he is using the lines of communication we offered him. He has a man in our Embassy in Baghdad.

The President. Thanks for that clarification. We and those that I have consulted with and that Jim has consulted and our military are absolutely convinced he can withdraw in one week. Our initial proposal was 96 hours. He can get out if he is serious about it. We think he can get out in one week -- we have a difference there.

Now on the broad philosophical approach you have outlined for me. I expect that you have people in your country that suggest you are too close with the United States. That is particularly true because of the good relationship with Iraq that you have had over the years and we understand that. Similarly, we have elements in this country who suggest we are staying too close to the center

in the Soviet Union. We won't depart from that. But we have elements -- crossing liberal and conservative lines --here who take a different view than Jim and I do.

In spite of that we continue to make clear that we support your role and value your role and believe you are making a contribution. I mean it right from my heart and so does Jim. We view, and I would be glad to say this publicly, what you have tried to do as politically courageous given your long relationship (with Iraq), your standing as a superpower and your ethnic groups' sentiment.

I don't want to see us pull apart even though we have profound differences at this moment on this particular question.

Let me tell you what is driving our view. It is not just the U.S. -- it is a unanimous coalition view. First, I don't trust Saddam Hussein. Second, what he said yesterday is totally incompatible with not only what we are asking but what you asked. He is trying to restore himself in terms of the Arab world to the prestige of the status quo ante. What he has done and has done today does not merit that kind of restoration in our view. He knows that you have been working hard to bring a peaceful solution here. But what he is trying to do is to wiggle around and try to find time -- he has made time too short to go back to some kind of combination approach. I felt strongly about that after I stayed awake last night thinking about your suggestions and knowing that you have brought him much further than anyone could have thought after his speech.

But very candidly, he is taking advantage of this time and, I think, of your good-faith to destroy Kuwait. Get your people to show you photographs of what he has done to Kuwait this morning. About 9:00 this morning, our intelligence people brought me pictures and showed me the pictures from yesterday and the one from today and there is the blackest fire covering almost all of Kuwait you have ever seen in your life. This is the entire city I mean. And he did it after you were dealing with Tariq Aziz in good faith. And yesterday he fired a bunch of SCUD missiles again. So please understand, I have a lot of young soldiers over there and you and I have talked enough that I hope you know that I share your values on human life that you so eloquently outlined to me. But Mikhail do you know the whole time this propaganda was going on about civilian life -- that we worried about and didn't target-- do you know up to 200 young people 15-20 years old were killed and mutilated and the breasts cut off of the young women. That is the kind of man that we are up against. I know this is a report of the Emir of Kuwait.

Let me reassure you that I have not changed my view on human life. I dread sending young men and women into battle and because of our position -- the forces of the coaltion. And I know that what I am going to ask will put you in a difficult position. I would understand it if you simply said "Geroge I

cannot do it." I want you to tell Aziz that the hand-writing is on the wall. It is not just the U.S.-- it is the rest of this coaltion and that we must have compliance with our proposal now. This is a serious proposal. He has not responded to your proposal. We have waited and waited and waited. We have been patient. We need an answer now. There are deadlines here and after what he has done in Kuwait -- we cannot yield. This proposal is deadly serious.

I will send this statement to you instantly and, of course, my request is that you support our position after trying hard for a more reasonable position from you point of view but one that for the reasons I have given, we cannot go along with it now. If you can't support it, we would appreciate your not opposing it. We have not lost our senses and know the importance of the Soviet Union in all of this. Whatever happens in the next few days, I want to keep all doors open with you and with your country. We will never change from the view that you have a critically important role -- it is your neighborhood and some of them are your friends. We recognize Soviet interests in the area. I want to get our forces out of there just as soon as possible. I know how the Iranians and others feel. I want them out as soon as possible. I want to continue to stay in touch. Please examine what we have proposed. If you can encourage his adoption of this that is the best -- and at this point -- only way -- to save the lives you and I both want to.

That is my appeal. I know you want to think about it. We will send the proposal on and welcome your views.

Gorbachev. I got it all and I want to make a brief comment or two.

First, in practice we have the same assessment of Hussein. I think that his fate has been foreshadowed. Far be it from us to try to white wash him or try and save him or to raise his prestige. You and I are compelled to deal with him because on the other side he is the only realistic figure there.

Second, I am not talking about Hussein or the methods he has employed over the last few hours -- I am talking about the possibility of taking advantage of the accomplishments we have behind us given the burden of the entire operation that rests with you and the tremendous contributions we have both made. I am talking about trying to attain the goals we both seek by turning things in a political direction. By doing so we could avoid great tragedy -- that is the central point and the main concern. And that is the main merit of this approach.

Third, you have requested that we relay your demands to Tariz Aziz and the Iraqi leadership. If you can very rapidly send them to us, we will convey them to him. We will also describe your approach and position to him. But my final suggestion is as follows -- that we tentatively decide:

We and you should come out with a joint initiative to convene the U.N. Security Council meeting in order to consider this package of demands. There would certainly be a lot of pressure in that meeting to take advantage and formalize what we get out of that meeting in a document. It would be a good thing if we got the best possible results. It would be just as good if we got an intermediate result that would satisfy both of us. As before we will continue to give priority to our relationship with the United States. And of course the responsibility we bear before the international community and our peoples is to resolve the conflict and to accomplish the goals we set out before while avoiding a tragedy.

The President. The problem is we have heard nothing out of Saddam Hussein. That is essential before we implement this through the U.N. We have resolutions and a mandate under 678 through the U.N. He is stalling and ducking and sending Jordan and the PLO and Yemen in to stall and give his side. We have a mandate and we have to have a positive reply from him. But having spelled out the U.S. proposal, we cannot hold off. I will discuss this with Jim and with Scowcroft and others and let you know my reaction. But this is my first reaction.

Gorbachev. George, we did get a reaction from Hussein and his agreement to withdraw troops. We don't believe everything is satisfactory in his position. We made our position tougher. Now we need to hear from him again.

The President. You have brought him along on delinkage and a concept of withdrawal but it falls far short of the unconditional withdrawal called for in the resolution. Let us talk about that here. Before I hang up I want to make one further point.

Life goes on and I want to assure you we are pushing our people on the arms control proposals. I wrote you recently on CFE and naval infantry. I urge your personal attention to that because no matter what happens here -- common ground there would be very good. I have not lost my interest in moving forward with START -- I want to personally assure you of that.

Thank you for the time. I am sorry for what might be difference but the relationship is too important and it is not going to fall apart over Iraq.

Gorbachev. Good George. I am saying good by. I want you to know that I have given instructions to my people to look into the matter you just mentioned. One more word on Iraq -- we must give some serious thought to the way the position is developing and where detail and substance the two positions coincide. Logic would prompt that we decide in favor of one option -- building on what we have done to try to avert a tragic turn in the situation. Best regards to your family.

The President. Thank you and to Raisa. We need to do this more often in these difficult times.