

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91129
Folder ID Number: 91129-002

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	From White House Re: [No Subject] [redacted] (3 pp.)	7/6/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Cable	From White House Re: [No Subject] [redacted] (5 pp.)	7/6/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [redacted] (1 pp.)	7/25/91	(b)(1)	S
04a. Cable	From White House Re: Message from the President to President Gorbachev [redacted] (3 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Message	Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Cable	From White House Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Ambassador Matlock or DCM Collins [redacted] (1 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 6

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1085
OA/ID Number: 91129-002
Date Closed: 4/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Cable	American Embassy to Secretary of State Re: Meeting with Gorbachev (3 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Cable	To White House, Re: Deliver to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Cable	From White House Re: Message from the President to President Gorbachev [redacted] (3 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State Re: Reported Attempt to Remove Gorbachev (3 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S
11a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on Soviet Biological Program (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Call with Gorbachev (2 pp.)	6/21/91	(b)(1)	
13. Cable	To White House, Re: General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/24/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	To White House, Re: No Subject Found (2 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
16. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to White House Re: [No Subject] (2 pp.)	6/11/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Cable	From White House, Re: Text of June 5 Letter from the President to President Gorbachev [120003Z Jun 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	S
18. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to White House Re: [No Subject] (2 pp.)	6/11/91	(b)(1)	S
19. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
20a. Memo	John Gordon/Rich Davis to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on START (1 pp.)	6/6/91	(b)(1)	S
20b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on START (1 pp.)	6/6/91	(b)(1)	S
20c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (4 pp.)	6/5/91	(b)(1)	S
21. Cable	To White House Re: [No Subject] [redacted] (2 pp.)	5/25/91	(b)(1)	S
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (7 pp.)	5/11/91	(b)(1)	S

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23. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S
24. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S
25. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/8/91	(b)(1)	S
26. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/8/91	(b)(1)	S
27. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S
28a. Draft Message	Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
28b. Draft Message	Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
28c. Memo	Ed A. Hewett to Brent Scowcroft Re: Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock (1 pp.)	5/8/91	(b)(1)	S
28d. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S
28e. Message	Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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28f. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/8/91	(b)(1)	S
28g. Memo	William F. Sittmann to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
28h. Message	Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
28i. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S
28j. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/8/91	(b)(1)	S
29. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Proposed Presidential Letter to Gorbachev Responding to His Request for Additional CCC Credits (3 pp.)	4/30/91	(b)(1)	S
30. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	3/20/91	(b)(1)	S
31. Memo	Edward Madigan to POTUS Re: Request by the Soviet Union for Additional Export Credit Guarantees (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
32. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Proposed Presidential Letter to Gorbachev Responding to His Request for Additional CCC Credits (3 pp.)	4/30/91	(b)(1)	S

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33. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
34. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	3/20/91	(b)(1)	S
35. Memo	Edward Madigan to POTUS Re: Request by the Soviet Union for Additional Export Credit Guarantees (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
36. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
37a. Memo	Ed A. Hewett to Brent Scowcroft Re: Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock (1 pp.)	5/8/91	(b)(1)	S
37b. Message	Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock from the President (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
37c. Memo	William F. Sittmann to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
37d. Message	Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock from the President (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
37e. Message	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 1/3/14

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1055-MR (511)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <GLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> (b)(1) <DTG> 060135Z JUL 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> (b)(1) MOSCOW

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, EYES ONLY, OPENING OF
BUSINESS, SATURDAY JULY 6.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO DELIVER, ORALLY, A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH (POINTS ARE AT PARA 3). (THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY SECRETARY BAKER.) AMBASSADOR MAY LEAVE COPY OF THE POINTS WITH GORBACHEV.

2. FYI. AS YOU KNOW, LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE ON START AT THE RECENT BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING IN GENEVA. DESPITE OPENING STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES THAT THEY WERE IN GENEVA TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS, NOT JUST TO NARROW ISSUES FOR MINISTERS, WE DID NOT CLOSE A SINGLE MAJOR ISSUE. BARTHOLOMEW ADVANCED A NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS AND IDEAS DEVELOPED IN GENEVA BY THE WASHINGTON TEAM. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT OBUKHOV WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CLOSE ON ANY NEW POSITIONS AND HAD TO REFER EVERYTHING TO MOSCOW. HE ALSO WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO MAKE THE BARTHOLOMEW TEAM BELIEVE THAT HE HAD NO LEEWAY WHATSOEVER ON "DOWNLOADING" DESPITE BARTHOLOMEW'S INITIATIVE TO SUGGEST HOW THE U.S. COULD BE FLEXIBLE ON "NEW TYPES" AS PART OF A PACKAGE THAT INCLUDED THE SOVIETS COMING TO US ON DOWNLOADING. COMPLETING START IN TIME FOR A JULY SUMMIT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY IF THE REMAINING DIFFICULT ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED QUICKLY. THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV IS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT WE NEED HIGH-LEVEL PARTICIPANTS TO MEET WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS. IN THIS REGARD, SECRETARY BAKER IS READY TO MEET WITH BESSMERTNYKH NEXT WEEK. GIVEN HIS APPARENTLY DECISIVE ROLE IN CLOSING CFE, WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE MOISEYEV PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE MEETING TO CLOSE ON A START TREATY. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE ARE REPEATING NST GENEVA 07462 FOR YOUR BACKGROUND. IN DISCUSSING MOISEYEV'S ATTENDANCE, IF ASKED ABOUT WHETHER HE WILL INTERACT WITH COLIN POWELL, YOU SHOULD RESPOND THAT WE ANTICIPATE THAT MOISEYEV WILL WORK WITH US AS HE DID DURING THE CFE DISCUSSIONS. END FYI.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF ORAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV ON START:

-- JUST GOT A REPORT ON THE BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING IN GENEVA ON START.

-- I UNDERSTAND IT WAS A GOOD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION, BUT ALSO THAT THERE WERE NO BREAKTHROUGHS AND THAT NO ISSUES REALLY GOT SETTLED.

-- YOU KNOW FROM MY JUNE 5 LETTER THAT I AM COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING A SOUND START TREATY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I KNOW FROM YOUR JUNE 15 RESPONSE THAT YOU HAVE PRECISELY THE SAME OBJECTIVE.



DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2009-1055-MR

565 4/18/13, 5/30/13

-
-- BUT AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING, IT IS HARD TO SAY WE ARE REALLY
CLOSER TO BEING IN A POSITION TO SIGN THE START TREATY AT THE
END OF THE MONTH AT A MOSCOW SUMMIT.
-
-- PART OF THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS THAT THE KEY ISSUES WE
DISCUSSED IN OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ARE HARD.
-
-- BUT ANOTHER PART OF THE PROBLEM IS, FRANKLY, THAT YOUR SIDE IN
GENEVA DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SETTLE ISSUES.
EVERYTHING HAD TO BE REFERRED BACK TO MOSCOW.
-
-- WE SENT AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW TO GENEVA WITH A VERY SENIOR
INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT HAD ALL THE AUTHORITY AND THE PEOPLE
NEEDED TO FINISH THE JOB AT THAT MEETING. WHILE IN GENEVA THEY
DEVELOPED AND PRESENTED PROPOSALS TO RESOLVE RAPIDLY OUR
DIFFERENCES ON DATA DENIAL, AND TO SETTLE OTHER REMAINING ISSUES
AS WELL.
-
-- THE SOVIET SIDE WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND TO THESE NEW PROPOSALS ON
DATA DENIAL AND IN AT LEAST HALF A DOZEN OTHER AREAS.
-
-- I AM REMINDED OF THE MEETING JIM BAKER AND REG BARTHOLOMEW HAD
WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND MOISEYEV LAST NOVEMBER IN MOSCOW TO
RESOLVE THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES SO THAT WE COULD SIGN THE
TREATY IN PARIS A COUPLE OF WEEKS LATER.
-
-- THAT MOSCOW MEETING WAS A DECISION-MAKING MEETING AT WHICH BOTH
SIDES CAME TO THE TABLE READY AND ABLE TO CLOSE OUT ISSUES.
-
-- THAT IS NOT WHAT HAPPENED IN GENEVA BETWEEN BARTHOLOMEW AND
OBUKHOV, BUT IT IS THE KIND OF MEETING WE WILL NEED IF WE HOPE
TO WRAP UP START ANY TIME SOON. WE MUST ENSURE WE HAVE THE
RIGHT PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES, AND THAT THEY COME TO THE
TABLE WITH THE WILL TO FIND SOLUTIONS AND THE FULL AUTHORITY TO
MAKE DECISIONS.
-
-- I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT I JUST DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE IS
ENOUGH TIME LEFT TO GET A START TREATY READY TO SIGN AT A SUMMIT
LATER THIS MONTH.
-
-- BUT I STILL WANT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL IF YOU THINK IT IS
A REALISTIC ONE. LET ME MAKE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTION, ASK YOU
TO THINK IT OVER, AND THEN GET BACK TO ME WITH YOUR REACTIONS.
-
-- WE WOULD MAKE ONE MORE INTENSE EFFORT NEXT WEEK TO SETTLE ALL
THE REMAINING START ISSUES SO THAT WE COULD SIGN THE TREATY AT A
LATE JULY SUMMIT.
-
-- JIM BAKER IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH SASHA BESSMERTNYKH IN
WASHINGTON BEGINNING LATE IN THE AFTERNOON ON THURSDAY, JULY 11
AND ALL DAY FRIDAY, JULY 12.

-
-- SECRETARY BAKER WOULD BE BACKED UP BY UNDER SECRETARY

#0032

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

BARTHOLOMEW AND OUR INTERAGENCY TEAM.

-- I WOULD HOPE FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH AND HIS SENIOR-LEVEL TEAM WOULD HAVE YOUR AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIVELY SETTLE ISSUES. GIVEN GENERAL MOISEYEV'S HELPFUL ROLE IN RESOLVING THE LAST CFE ISSUES DURING HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON, HE WOULD BE WELCOME AS PART OF THIS EFFORT TO COMPLETE START.

-- THIS PLAN FOR COMPLETING START IS AMBITIOUS, MAYBE TOO AMBITIOUS. THE TIMETABLE IS VERY TIGHT, OUR DIFFERENCES OVER A NUMBER OF ISSUES MAY BE TOO GREAT TO BRIDGE QUICKLY, AND TRYING TO GET DECISIONS MADE PROMPTLY MAY NOT BE PRACTICABLE. BUT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY I KNOW TO HAVE A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING THE TREATY IN TIME FOR US TO HAVE A SUMMIT BY THE END OF THIS MONTH.

-- WE SHOULD NOT GO FORWARD WITH SUCH A PLAN UNLESS YOU THINK IT IS REALISTIC, BECAUSE TO DO SO INEVITABLY WILL RAISE EXPECTATIONS ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT START AND A SUMMIT TO VERY HIGH LEVELS. RAISING AND THEN DASHING THOSE EXPECTATIONS COULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE VERY OBJECTIVES THAT YOU AND I ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE.

-- AFTER YOU HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO DIGEST THESE IDEAS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU THINK WE SHOULD MAKE ONE FINAL PUSH ALONG THE LINES I SUGGESTED TO COMPLETE START IN TIME FOR A SUMMIT LATER THIS MONTH.

END TEXT OF ORAL MESSAGE.

DECLAS: OADR

#0033

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0032 <TOR> 910705213917 MSG000300058757

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0033 <TOR> 910705213924 MSG000300058764

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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1055-MR (512)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 060135Z JUL 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO (b)(1) MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

0000

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, EYES ONLY, OPENING OF
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BEGIN TEXT:
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IT WAS CLEAR THAT OBUKHOV WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CLOSE ON ANY NEW
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GREAT LENGTHS TO MAKE THE BARTHOLOMEW TEAM BELIEVE THAT HE HAD NO
LEEWAY WHATSOEVER ON "DOWNLOADING" DESPITE BARTHOLOMEW'S INITIATIVE
TO SUGGEST HOW THE U.S. COULD BE FLEXIBLE ON "NEW TYPES" AS PART OF
A PACKAGE THAT INCLUDED THE SOVIETS COMING TO US ON DOWNLOADING.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2009-1055-MR

SCS 5/30/13

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

COMPLETING START IN TIME FOR A JULY SUMMIT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY IF THE REMAINING DIFFICULT ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED QUICKLY. THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV IS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT WE NEED HIGH-LEVEL PARTICIPANTS TO MEET WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS. IN THIS REGARD, SECRETARY BAKER IS READY TO MEET WITH BESSMERTNYKH NEXT WEEK. GIVEN HIS APPARENTLY DECISIVE ROLE IN CLOSING CFE, WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE MOISEYEV PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE MEETING TO CLOSE ON A START TREATY. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE ARE REPEATING NST GENEVA 07462 FOR YOUR BACKGROUND. IN DISCUSSING MOISEYEV'S ATTENDANCE, IF ASKED ABOUT WHETHER HE WILL INTERACT WITH COLIN POWELL, YOU SHOULD RESPOND THAT WE ANTICIPATE THAT MOISEYEV WILL WORK WITH US AS HE DID DURING THE CFE DISCUSSIONS. END FYI.

-
3. BEGIN TEXT OF ORAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV ON START:

-
-- JUST GOT A REPORT ON THE BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING IN GENEVA ON START.

-
-- I UNDERSTAND IT WAS A GOOD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION, BUT ALSO THAT THERE WERE NO BREAKTHROUGHS AND THAT NO ISSUES REALLY GOT SETTLED.

-
-- YOU KNOW FROM MY JUNE 5 LETTER THAT I AM COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING A SOUND START TREATY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I KNOW FROM YOUR JUNE 15 RESPONSE THAT YOU HAVE PRECISELY THE SAME OBJECTIVE.

-
-- BUT AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING, IT IS HARD TO SAY WE ARE REALLY CLOSER TO BEING IN A POSITION TO SIGN THE START TREATY AT THE END OF THE MONTH AT A MOSCOW SUMMIT.

-
-- PART OF THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS THAT THE KEY ISSUES WE DISCUSSED IN OUR EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ARE HARD.

-
-- BUT ANOTHER PART OF THE PROBLEM IS, FRANKLY, THAT YOUR SIDE IN

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

GENEVA DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SETTLE ISSUES. EVERYTHING HAD TO BE REFERRED BACK TO MOSCOW.

-- WE SENT AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW TO GENEVA WITH A VERY SENIOR INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT HAD ALL THE AUTHORITY AND THE PEOPLE NEEDED TO FINISH THE JOB AT THAT MEETING. WHILE IN GENEVA THEY DEVELOPED AND PRESENTED PROPOSALS TO RESOLVE RAPIDLY OUR DIFFERENCES ON DATA DENIAL, AND TO SETTLE OTHER REMAINING ISSUES AS WELL.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND TO THESE NEW PROPOSALS ON DATA DENIAL AND IN AT LEAST HALF A DOZEN OTHER AREAS.

-- I AM REMINDED OF THE MEETING JIM BAKER AND REG BARTHOLOMEW HAD WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND MOISEYEV LAST NOVEMBER IN MOSCOW TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES SO THAT WE COULD SIGN THE TREATY IN PARIS A COUPLE OF WEEKS LATER.

-- THAT MOSCOW MEETING WAS A DECISION-MAKING MEETING AT WHICH BOTH SIDES CAME TO THE TABLE READY AND ABLE TO CLOSE OUT ISSUES.

-- THAT IS NOT WHAT HAPPENED IN GENEVA BETWEEN BARTHOLOMEW AND OBUKHOV, BUT IT IS THE KIND OF MEETING WE WILL NEED IF WE HOPE TO WRAP UP START ANY TIME SOON. WE MUST ENSURE WE HAVE THE RIGHT PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES, AND THAT THEY COME TO THE TABLE WITH THE WILL TO FIND SOLUTIONS AND THE FULL AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS.

-- I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT I JUST DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE IS ENOUGH TIME LEFT TO GET A START TREATY READY TO SIGN AT A SUMMIT LATER THIS MONTH.

-- BUT I STILL WANT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL IF YOU THINK IT IS A REALISTIC ONE. LET ME MAKE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTION, ASK YOU TO THINK IT OVER, AND THEN GET BACK TO ME WITH YOUR REACTIONS.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

-- WE WOULD MAKE ONE MORE INTENSE EFFORT NEXT WEEK TO SETTLE ALL THE REMAINING START ISSUES SO THAT WE COULD SIGN THE TREATY AT A LATE JULY SUMMIT.

-- JIM BAKER IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH SASHA BESSMERTNYKH IN WASHINGTON BEGINNING LATE IN THE AFTERNOON ON THURSDAY, JULY 11 AND ALL DAY FRIDAY, JULY 12.

-- SECRETARY BAKER WOULD BE BACKED UP BY UNDER SECRETARY

#0032

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

0000

FINAL SECTION OF 02

BARTHOLOMEW AND OUR INTERAGENCY TEAM.

-- I WOULD HOPE FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH AND HIS SENIOR-LEVEL TEAM WOULD HAVE YOUR AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIVELY SETTLE ISSUES. GIVEN GENERAL MOISEYEV'S HELPFUL ROLE IN RESOLVING THE LAST CFE ISSUES DURING HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON, HE WOULD BE WELCOME AS PART OF THIS EFFORT TO COMPLETE START.

-- THIS PLAN FOR COMPLETING START IS AMBITIOUS, MAYBE TOO AMBITIOUS. THE TIMETABLE IS VERY TIGHT, OUR DIFFERENCES OVER A NUMBER OF ISSUES MAY BE TOO GREAT TO BRIDGE QUICKLY, AND TRYING TO GET DECISIONS MADE PROMPTLY MAY NOT BE PRACTICABLE. BUT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY I KNOW TO HAVE A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING THE TREATY IN TIME FOR US TO HAVE A SUMMIT BY THE END OF THIS MONTH.

-- WE SHOULD NOT GO FORWARD WITH SUCH A PLAN UNLESS YOU THINK IT IS REALISTIC, BECAUSE TO DO SO INEVITABLY WILL RAISE EXPECTATIONS ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT START AND A SUMMIT TO VERY HIGH LEVELS. RAISING AND THEN DASHING THOSE EXPECTATIONS COULD SERIOUSLY

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

DAMAGE THE VERY OBJECTIVES THAT YOU AND I ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE.

-

-- AFTER YOU HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO DIGEST THESE IDEAS, PLEASE LET ME
KNOW WHETHER YOU THINK WE SHOULD MAKE ONE FINAL PUSH ALONG THE
LINES I SUGGESTED TO COMPLETE START IN TIME FOR A SUMMIT LATER
THIS MONTH.

-

-

END TEXT OF ORAL MESSAGE.

DECLAS: OADR

#0033

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Cable	To White House Re: Message to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [redacted] (1 pp.)	7/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 1/3/14

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1055-MR (513)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

FRT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 251317Z JUL 91

FM (b)(1) MOSCOW

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK
MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

I PASSED TO CHERNYAYEV THE PROPOSAL FOR A BILATERAL WORKING
LUNCH IN LONDON, JULY 17 AT WINFIELD HOUSE FROM 12:00 - 2:00 P.M.
HE SAID THAT THE REQUEST FOR A CHANGE IN TIMING WAS NOT UNEXPECTED
INASMUCH AS THE BRITISH HAD CHANGED THE SCHEDULE. ASSUMING THERE
ARE NO PLANS FOR A GENERAL LUNCHEON, HE WAS SURE THAT THE TIME
PROPOSED WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. IF THERE SHOULD BE ANY PROBLEM, HE
WILL CONTACT ME LATER TODAY. IF HE DOES NOT DO SO BY TOMORROW
MORNING, WE CAN CONSIDER THE TIME CONFIRMED.

END TEXT

DECL OADR

~~SECRET~~

#2345

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1055-MR
SCS 5/30/13

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Cable	From White House Re: Message from the President to President Gorbachev [redacted] (3 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 5/30/13

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1055-MR (514)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT KANTER PRIVACY_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 192356Z JUN 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO (b)(1) BERLIN//NIACT IMMED//

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO DENNIS ROSS OR BOB
PEARSON WITH SECRETARY BAKER'S PARTY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

FOR PEARSON/ROSS:

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV THAT SECRETARY BAKER SHOULD CONVEY TO FOREIGN MINISTER
BESSMERTNYKH DURING THEIR JUNE 20 MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

JUNE 19, 1991

DEAR MIKHAIL:

YOU AND I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER ABOUT A
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN THE PAST AND HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FIND SOLUTIONS
TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. YOU MADE A DECISIVE STEP ON CFE THAT HAS
ALLOWED ALL 22 NATIONS TO PUT THAT MATTER BEHIND US. THE STEPS I
HAVE PROPOSED ON START ARE OFFERED IN AN EARNEST EFFORT TO REACH
FINAL AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON A TREATY THAT WE COULD SIGN
AT A SUMMIT. YOUR RESPONSE TO MY LETTER DEMONSTRATES YOUR PERSONAL
COMMITMENT TO THESE SAME GOALS.

THERE REMAINS, HOWEVER, A SERIOUS PROBLEM THAT I FIRST RAISED WITH

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2009-1055-MR
SCS 5/30/13

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

YOU A YEAR AGO AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT -- THE SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS SPOKEN ABOUT THIS WITH YOU AS WELL. AND JIM BAKER HAS DISCUSSED IT WITH YOU AND WITH MINISTERS SHEVARDNADZE AND BESSMERTNYKH. SEVERAL TIMES. BASED ON SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT YOU NO LONGER HAD SUCH A PROGRAM, WE DEFERRED BRIEFING OUR CONGRESS UNTIL AFTER THE VISIT TO SEVERAL SOVIET FACILITIES EARLIER IN THE YEAR BY A TEAM OF U.S. AND U.K. EXPERTS. BUT THE VISIT REINFORCED RATHER THAN DIMINISHED OUR CONCERNS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A MILITARY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM WHOSE NATURE AND SCOPE GO FAR BEYOND ANY LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS PERMITTED BY THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONVENTION.

IN THE SPIRIT OF FRANKNESS AND GOOD WILL THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED OUR COMMUNICATIONS, I MUST TELL YOU DIRECTLY THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM THAT YOU MUST SOLVE BEFORE IT JEOPARDIZES WHAT WE ARE BOTH TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. CONTRARY TO THE CLAIMS OF SOVIET EXPERTS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS A LARGE-SCALE, OFFENSIVELY-ORIENTED PROGRAM TO DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN CONTRAVENTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY. YOU AND I CANNOT IGNORE THIS FACT WITHOUT RISKING ALL THAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED AND HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN OUR STEADILY IMPROVING RELATIONSHIP.

THERE IS ONLY ONE SOLUTION: FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DISMANTLE THIS PROGRAM AND PROVIDE CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT IT IS DOING SO. OTHERWISE, WE ARE FACING A TREATY COMPLIANCE PROBLEM OF GRAVE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES. WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE OVER THE LAST YEAR TO HELP YOU SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, BUT WITH LITTLE APPARENT PROGRESS. WITH CFE READY FOR REVIEW BY OUR SENATE AND A START TREATY WITHIN REACH, THIS PROBLEM NOW TAKES ON INCREASED URGENCY.

THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP HAS NOW BEEN BRIEFED ABOUT THE SOVIET PROGRAM. WITH ITS ROLE IN APPROVING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND OTHER IMPORTANT LEGISLATION THAT WILL BE KEY TO MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR COOPERATION, CONGRESS WILL NOT IGNORE SOVIET BIOLOGICAL

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

WEAPONS ACTIVITIES. THERE IS A VERY REAL CHANCE THAT THE SENATE WILL NOT RATIFY EITHER TREATY UNLESS AND UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION BEGINS TO DISMANTLE ITS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

I AM WILLING TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS NOW IF IT WILL HELP YOU SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. I AM PREPARED TO HAVE MY EXPERTS MEET WITH YOURS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL OUR FINDINGS AT THE FACILITIES THEY HAVE VISITED THUS FAR AND REMEDIAL STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION, AS SUMMARIZED IN THE PAPERS JIM BAKER GAVE TO SASHA BESSMERTNYKH IN MARCH. AFTER THAT MEETING OF EXPERTS, AND AGAIN IN THE SPIRIT OF HELPING YOU RESOLVE THIS MATTER, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO HOST A VISIT OF A SOVIET TEAM TO U.S. FACILITIES, BEFORE U.S. EXPERTS CONDUCT ADDITIONAL VISITS TO SOVIET FACILITIES OF CONCERN. THE VISITS IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD DEMONSTRATE HOW BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CAN BE CONDUCTED IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. IN THE MEANTIME, I URGE YOU TO WASTE NO TIME IN TAKING STEPS TO TERMINATE THE SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU ARE READY TO UNDERTAKE THE EXPERTS MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT VISITS I HAVE PROPOSED SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN TO PUT THIS MATTER BEHIND US.

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0183

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

June 19, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

You and I have been able to speak frankly to each other about a number of subjects in the past and have been able to find solutions to difficult problems. You made a decisive step on CFE that has allowed all 22 nations to put that matter behind us. The steps I have proposed on START are offered in an earnest effort to reach final agreement as soon as possible on a treaty that we could sign at a summit. Your response to my letter demonstrates your personal commitment to these same goals.

There remains, however, a serious problem that I first raised with you a year ago at the Washington summit -- the Soviet biological weapons program. Prime Minister Thatcher has spoken about this with you as well, and Jim Baker has discussed it with you, and with Ministers Shevardnadze and Bessmertnykh, several times. Based on Soviet assurances that you no longer had such a program, we deferred briefing our Congress until after the visit to several Soviet facilities earlier in the year by a team of U.S. and U.K. experts. But the visit reinforced rather than diminished our concerns that the Soviet Union has a military biological weapons program whose nature and scope go far beyond any legitimate defensive needs permitted by the Biological Warfare Convention.

In the spirit of frankness and good will that has characterized our communications, I must tell you directly that this is a problem that you must solve before it jeopardizes what we are both trying to achieve in our relationship. Contrary to the claims of Soviet experts, the Soviet Union has a large-scale, offensively-oriented program to develop biological weapons in contravention of an international treaty. You and I cannot ignore this fact without risking all that we have accomplished and hope to achieve in our steadily improving relationship.

There is only one solution: for the Soviet Union to dismantle this program and provide concrete evidence that it is doing so. Otherwise, we are facing a treaty compliance problem of grave dimensions and consequences. We have done everything possible over the last year to help you solve this problem, but with little apparent progress. With CFE ready for review by our Senate and a START Treaty within reach, this problem now takes on increased urgency.

The Congressional leadership has now been briefed about the Soviet program. With its role in approving arms control agreements and other important legislation that will be key to many other aspects of our cooperation, Congress will not ignore Soviet biological weapons activities. There is a very real chance that the Senate will not ratify either treaty unless and

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1055-MR
SCS 5/30/13

~~SECRET~~

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until the Soviet Union begins to dismantle its biological weapons program.

I am willing to take additional steps now if it will help you solve this problem. I am prepared to have my experts meet with yours as soon as possible to discuss in detail our findings at the facilities they have visited thus far and remedial steps that could be taken by the Soviet Union, as summarized in the papers Jim Baker gave to Sasha Bessmertnykh in March. After that meeting of experts, and again in the spirit of helping you resolve this matter, the United States would be willing to host a visit of a Soviet team to U.S. facilities, before U.S. experts conduct additional visits to Soviet facilities of concern. The visits in the United States would demonstrate how biological research can be conducted in full compliance with the treaty. In the meantime, I urge you to waste no time in taking steps to terminate the Soviet biological weapons program.

Please let me know if you are ready to undertake the experts meeting and subsequent visits I have proposed so that we can begin to put this matter behind us.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "G" and a stylized "Bush".

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

as soon as possible
Ambassador or DCM Collins is requested to seek a meeting with Chernyayev ~~morning of June 19~~ to propose that the President and President Gorbachev meet in London on July 17 after the G-7 leaders' meeting with Gorbachev. The President would like to suggest a meeting at the American Ambassador's residence from 3:00 to 5:00pm. (FYI, we understand the British are planning activities for Gorbachev from 5:30pm on.)

If President Gorbachev agrees to this proposal, we would work out the details with his staff soon and coordinate a joint announcement. We would appreciate knowing as soon as possible the Soviet response to this proposal.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Cable	From White House Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Ambassador Matlock or DCM Collins [redacted] (1 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 1/3/14

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1055-MR (516)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT GANTI COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 191621Z JUN 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO (b)(1) MOSCOW//NIACT//

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
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-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, TO DCM COLLINS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
AMBASSADOR OR DCM COLLINS IS REQUESTED TO SEEK A MEETING WITH CHERNYAYEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PROPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MEET IN LONDON ON JULY 17 AFTER THE G-7 LEADERS' MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST A MEETING AT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE FROM 3:00 TO 5:00PM. (FYI, WE UNDERSTAND THE BRITISH ARE PLANNING ACTIVITIES FOR GORBACHEV FROM 5:30PM ON.)

-
IF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AGREES TO THIS PROPOSAL, WE WOULD WORK OUT THE DETAILS WITH HIS STAFF SOON AND COORDINATE A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL.

-
END TEXT

-
DECL: OADR
#0177

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1055-MR
SCS 5/30/13

~~SECRET~~

NODIS ROUTING

The attached State Department message is provided on a strict need-to-know basis. Discussion of this message and its contents should be limited to the below named individuals.

State Cable Number: MOSCOW 17382

Scowcroft	
Gates	
Sittmann	
Hill	
GOMPERT	
HEWETT	
O'Leary (File)	

FLASH

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING



NSC
YES ONLY

Subaru
Scowcroft/Gates

PAGE 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 17382 201809Z

C07/10 023686 NOD132

INFO: SS (10)

----- 20/1818Z A2 TCK (TOTAL COPIES: 010)

SUB: MTG W/ GORBACHEV

///NOT/NOT RPT TOSEC BY SWO//

DIST AUTH BY

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DEPEXSEC

(S/S-1)

DATE/TIME

REPEATED TO

BY

DATE/TIME

SENSITIVE

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND, IF NOT EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED, BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED, GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION, OR DISCUSSED WITH NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

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2009-1055-MR

SCS 4/19/13

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 17382 201809Z
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C07/10 023686 NOD132

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S/S-O PLEASE DELIVER EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. GORBACHEV RECEIVED ME IMMEDIATELY THIS EVENING. I TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO HIM A REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED. THOUGH WE COULD NOT VOUCH FOR IT, IT WAS SUFFICIENTLY DISTURBING THAT THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT GORBACHEV SHOULD BE AWARE OF IT. IT INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TOMORROW TO REMOVE HIM. I ADDED THAT WE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS -- PERHAPS IT WAS BASED ON A MISREADING OF THE SITUATION IN THE SUPREME SOVIET -- BUT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WANTED HIM TO BE APPRISED OF IT.

3. GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT HE APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTFULNESS IN CONVEYING THE REPORT. IT SHOWED HOW MUCH HE VALUED THEIR RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT BUSH SHOULD NOT WORRY. HE, GORBACHEV, HAD MATTERS IN HAND AND SUCH A DEVELOPMENT

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PAGE 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 17382 201809Z C07/10 023686 NOD132

IS "EXCLUDED". HE WENT ON TO OBSERVE THAT PAVLOV, WHO IS EXPERIENCED IN FINANCIAL MATTERS, IS JUST LEARNING POLITICS AND KEEPS MAKING UNFORTUNATE STATEMENTS. THEN THEY ARE PICKED UP BY "LOUD MOUTHS" LIKE ALKSNIS AND KOGAN. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD BE AT THE SUPREME SOVIET TOMORROW FOR CEREMONIES COMMEMORATING THE GERMAN INVASION. (THE IMPLICATION SEEMED TO BE THAT BOTH THE NATURE OF THE CEREMONIAL OCCASION AND HIS PRESENCE IN THE CHAMBER WOULD GIVE HIM CONTROL OVER THE PROCEEDINGS.)

4. HE SEEMED RELAXED AND FIT AND EVEN A BIT AMUSED BY THE THOUGHT THAT PAVLOV MIGHT BE VIEWED AS A THREAT TO HIM. (I DID NOT RPT NOT MENTION TO HIM THE FOUR NAMES POPOV HAD ALLUDED TO.)

MATLOCK

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Cable	To White House, Re: Deliver to General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0851-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATE SCOWCROFT SIT
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(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT:

ACCOMPANIED BY DCM COLLINS, I MET WITH CHERNYAYEV AT 1530 TODAY TO CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO MEET IN LONDON. CHERNYAYEV GREETED THE INVITATION WARMLY, SAYING IT WAS AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD PASS THE MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV THIS AFTERNOON AND WOULD GET BACK TO ME WITH A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

AT 1730 CHERNYAYEV CALLED COLLINS TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AGREES WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO MEET IN LONDON, AND ACCEPTS THE INVITATION WITH PLEASURE. COLLINS CONFIRMED WITH HIM THAT THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE ON JULY 17 FROM 3:00 TO 5:00 P.M. AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR.

CHERNYAYEV HAD TOLD ME THAT HE ALSO AGREED THERE SHOULD BE A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. WHEN HE CALLED BACK WITH GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE, HE REITERATED THAT WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE THE MEETING PUBLICLY AND ASKED FOR OUR PROPOSAL IN THAT REGARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. COLLINS SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE REQUEST TO WASHINGTON AND PROVIDE OUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE AND TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS SOON AS WE RECEIVED WORD.

ACTION REQUEST:

GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSE TO CHERNYAYEV ON ANNOUNCING THE LONDON

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

MEETING.

END TEXT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Cable	From White House Re: Message from the President to President Gorbachev [redacted] (3 pp.)	6/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 1/3/14

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1055-MR (519)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

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TO (b)(1) BERLIN//NIACT IMMED//

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO DENNIS ROSS OR BOB PEARSON WITH SECRETARY BAKER'S PARTY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

FOR PEARSON/ROSS:

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT SECRETARY BAKER SHOULD CONVEY TO FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH DURING THEIR JUNE 20 MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

JUNE 19, 1991

DEAR MIKHAIL:

YOU AND I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER ABOUT A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN THE PAST AND HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. YOU MADE A DECISIVE STEP ON CFE THAT HAS ALLOWED ALL 22 NATIONS TO PUT THAT MATTER BEHIND US. THE STEPS I HAVE PROPOSED ON START ARE OFFERED IN AN EARNEST EFFORT TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON A TREATY THAT WE COULD SIGN AT A SUMMIT. YOUR RESPONSE TO MY LETTER DEMONSTRATES YOUR PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THESE SAME GOALS.

THERE REMAINS, HOWEVER, A SERIOUS PROBLEM THAT I FIRST RAISED WITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

YOU A YEAR AGO AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT -- THE SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS SPOKEN ABOUT THIS WITH YOU AS WELL. AND JIM BAKER HAS DISCUSSED IT WITH YOU AND WITH MINISTERS SHEVARDNADZE AND BESSMERTNYKH. SEVERAL TIMES. BASED ON SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT YOU NO LONGER HAD SUCH A PROGRAM, WE DEFERRED BRIEFING OUR CONGRESS UNTIL AFTER THE VISIT TO SEVERAL SOVIET FACILITIES EARLIER IN THE YEAR BY A TEAM OF U.S. AND U.K. EXPERTS. BUT THE VISIT REINFORCED RATHER THAN DIMINISHED OUR CONCERNS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A MILITARY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM WHOSE NATURE AND SCOPE GO FAR BEYOND ANY LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS PERMITTED BY THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONVENTION.

IN THE SPIRIT OF FRANKNESS AND GOOD WILL THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED OUR COMMUNICATIONS, I MUST TELL YOU DIRECTLY THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM THAT YOU MUST SOLVE BEFORE IT JEOPARDIZES WHAT WE ARE BOTH TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. CONTRARY TO THE CLAIMS OF SOVIET EXPERTS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS A LARGE-SCALE, OFFENSIVELY-ORIENTED PROGRAM TO DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN CONTRAVENTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY. YOU AND I CANNOT IGNORE THIS FACT WITHOUT RISKING ALL THAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED AND HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN OUR STEADILY IMPROVING RELATIONSHIP.

THERE IS ONLY ONE SOLUTION: FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DISMANTLE THIS PROGRAM AND PROVIDE CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT IT IS DOING SO. OTHERWISE, WE ARE FACING A TREATY COMPLIANCE PROBLEM OF GRAVE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES. WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE OVER THE LAST YEAR TO HELP YOU SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, BUT WITH LITTLE APPARENT PROGRESS. WITH CFE READY FOR REVIEW BY OUR SENATE AND A START TREATY WITHIN REACH, THIS PROBLEM NOW TAKES ON INCREASED URGENCY.

THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP HAS NOW BEEN BRIEFED ABOUT THE SOVIET PROGRAM. WITH ITS ROLE IN APPROVING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND OTHER IMPORTANT LEGISLATION THAT WILL BE KEY TO MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR COOPERATION, CONGRESS WILL NOT IGNORE SOVIET BIOLOGICAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

WEAPONS ACTIVITIES. THERE IS A VERY REAL CHANCE THAT THE SENATE WILL NOT RATIFY EITHER TREATY UNLESS AND UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION BEGINS TO DISMANTLE ITS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

I AM WILLING TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS NOW IF IT WILL HELP YOU SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. I AM PREPARED TO HAVE MY EXPERTS MEET WITH YOURS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL OUR FINDINGS AT THE FACILITIES THEY HAVE VISITED THUS FAR AND REMEDIAL STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION, AS SUMMARIZED IN THE PAPERS JIM BAKER GAVE TO SASHA BESSMERTNYKH IN MARCH. AFTER THAT MEETING OF EXPERTS, AND AGAIN IN THE SPIRIT OF HELPING YOU RESOLVE THIS MATTER, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO HOST A VISIT OF A SOVIET TEAM TO U.S. FACILITIES, BEFORE U.S. EXPERTS CONDUCT ADDITIONAL VISITS TO SOVIET FACILITIES OF CONCERN. THE VISITS IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD DEMONSTRATE HOW BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CAN BE CONDUCTED IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. IN THE MEANTIME, I URGE YOU TO WASTE NO TIME IN TAKING STEPS TO TERMINATE THE SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU ARE READY TO UNDERTAKE THE EXPERTS MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT VISITS I HAVE PROPOSED SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN TO PUT THIS MATTER BEHIND US.

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State Re: Reported Attempt to Remove Gorbachev (3 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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LIMITED ACCESS
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on Soviet Biological Program

Purpose

To approve a letter from you to President Gorbachev on the Soviet biological program.

Background

It was agreed at your meeting yesterday that you should send a tough letter to Gorbachev on the illegal Soviet biological warfare program. A proposed letter, which has been reviewed by all of the principals that were at your meeting, is at Tab A. Jim meets with Bessmertnykh tomorrow, June 20, in Berlin. We plan to cable the text of the letter to Jim to give to Bessmertnykh at that time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the text of the proposed letter to Gorbachev at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Letter to Gorbachev

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Declassify on: OADR

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2011-0851-MR
8/21/2013 JMM

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June 19, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

You and I have been able to speak frankly to each other about a number of subjects in the past and have been able to find solutions to difficult problems. You made a decisive step on CFE that has allowed all 22 nations to put that matter behind us. The steps I have proposed on START are offered in an earnest effort to reach final agreement as soon as possible on a treaty that we could sign at a summit. Your response to my letter demonstrates your personal commitment to these same goals.

There remains, however, a serious problem that I first raised with you a year ago at the Washington summit -- the Soviet biological weapons program. Prime Minister Thatcher has spoken about this with you as well, and Jim Baker has discussed it with you, and with Ministers Shevardnadze and Bessmertnykh, several times. Based on Soviet assurances that you no longer had such a program, we deferred briefing our Congress until after the visit to several Soviet facilities earlier in the year by a team of U.S. and U.K. experts. But the visit reinforced rather than diminished our concerns that the Soviet Union has a military biological weapons program whose nature and scope go far beyond any legitimate defensive needs permitted by the Biological Warfare Convention.

In the spirit of frankness and good will that has characterized our communications, I must tell you directly that this is a problem that you must solve before it jeopardizes what we are both trying to achieve in our relationship. Contrary to the claims of Soviet experts, the Soviet Union has a large-scale, offensively-oriented program to develop biological weapons in contravention of an international treaty. You and I cannot ignore this fact without risking all that we have accomplished and hope to achieve in our steadily improving relationship.

There is only one solution: for the Soviet Union to dismantle this program and provide concrete evidence that it is doing so. Otherwise, we are facing a treaty compliance problem of grave dimensions and consequences. We have done everything possible over the last year to help you solve this problem, but with little apparent progress. With CFE ready for review by our Senate and a START Treaty within reach, this problem now takes on increased urgency.

The Congressional leadership has now been briefed about the Soviet program. With its role in approving arms control agreements and other important legislation that will be key to many other aspects of our cooperation, Congress will not ignore Soviet biological weapons activities. There is a very real chance that the Senate will not ratify either treaty unless and

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until the Soviet Union begins to dismantle its biological weapons program.

I am willing to take additional steps now if it will help you solve this problem. I am prepared to have my experts meet with yours as soon as possible to discuss in detail our findings at the facilities they have visited thus far and remedial steps that could be taken by the Soviet Union, as summarized in the papers Jim Baker gave to Sasha Bessmertnykh in March. After that meeting of experts, and again in the spirit of helping you resolve this matter, the United States would be willing to host a visit of a Soviet team to U.S. facilities, before U.S. experts conduct additional visits to Soviet facilities of concern. The visits in the United States would demonstrate how biological research can be conducted in full compliance with the treaty. In the meantime, I urge you to waste no time in taking steps to terminate the Soviet biological weapons program.

Please let me know if you are ready to undertake the experts meeting and subsequent visits I have proposed so that we can begin to put this matter behind us.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR CALL WITH GORBACHEV

Matlock Message to Gorbachev

- Mikhail, let me say first why I thought it was important for Ambassador Matlock to have given you the message yesterday about the rumor we had heard.
- It came from a reliable person and I wanted to make sure that you had all the information we did.
- As I have said to you many times before, we want you to succeed. Our work together has been beneficial for both of our countries and I want us to continue that work.

Yeltsin Visit

- As you know, Boris Yeltsin and I had a long meeting yesterday. He also saw the Vice President, Dick Cheney and Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher.
- This was a private visit. Yeltsin was here at the invitation of our Congress.
- We tried to call you yesterday to talk to you together about our meeting but did not succeed. I am glad for this chance today to give you a read out.
- I found him to be an impressive man. He and I had a good conversation about the state of reform in the USSR and his plans to carry out further economic reform and democratization in the Russian republic.
- I want you to know that I stated publicly and told Mr. Yeltsin privately that my relationship with you would continue to be the focus of our ties to the Soviet Union.
- I spoke to the press about the imperative of maintaining the closest possible working relationship with you.
- I also commended you publicly for having begun the work that brought about the present historic changes in the USSR.
- One last point about the Yeltsin visit. He asked me to establish a joint program to work together in four areas: management training, transport, food distribution and defense conversion.

- I told him we might be able to consider a program with him in these areas but only if you were comfortable with it and thought it would be useful. I was very careful to make him understand this point.

Summit/START

- Jim Baker reports that he had a good meeting with Bessmertnykh in Berlin yesterday.
- It appears we still have some hard work to do on START. I hope you will join me in asking our experts to work as hard as they can on START in the coming weeks so that we can finish the treaty and schedule a summit meeting in Moscow.
- We think it would be a good idea for Moiseyev to go to Geneva to speed up these negotiations. We plan to have Ambassador Bartholomew there soon.
- In the meantime, I hope we can schedule a meeting in London after your session with me and my G-7 colleagues.
- Ambassador Matlock has proposed to Chernyayev that you and I meet at our Ambassador's residence between 3:00-5:00 p.m. on July 17. I hope we can do this.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Cable	To White House, Re: General Scowcroft from Jack Matlock [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed: 4/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0851-MR(503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

FRT GATED SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT GANIT FILE SIT SUM

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 201510Z JUN 91

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT:

ACCOMPANIED BY DCM COLLINS, I MET WITH CHERNYAYEV AT 1530 TODAY TO CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO MEET IN LONDON. CHERNYAYEV GREETED THE INVITATION WARMLY, SAYING IT WAS AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD PASS THE MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV THIS AFTERNOON AND WOULD GET BACK TO ME WITH A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

AT 1730 CHERNYAYEV CALLED COLLINS TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AGREES WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO MEET IN LONDON, AND ACCEPTS THE INVITATION WITH PLEASURE. COLLINS CONFIRMED WITH HIM THAT THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE ON JULY 17 FROM 3:00 TO 5:00 P.M. AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR.

CHERNYAYEV HAD TOLD ME THAT HE ALSO AGREED THERE SHOULD BE A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. WHEN HE CALLED BACK WITH GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE, HE REITERATED THAT WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE THE MEETING PUBLICLY AND ASKED FOR OUR PROPOSAL IN THAT REGARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. COLLINS SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE REQUEST TO WASHINGTON AND PROVIDE OUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE AND TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS SOON AS WE RECEIVED WORD.

ACTION REQUEST:

GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSE TO CHERNYAYEV ON ANNOUNCING THE LONDON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR
9/18/2013 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

MEETING.

END TEXT

DECL OADR

#1345

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	6/24/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0851-MR(504)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 241805Z JUN 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
OPENING OF BUSINESS 6/25.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: HONORABLE JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

BEGIN TEXT:

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO SEEK A NEW TIME FOR A MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN LONDON ON JULY 17. THE
BRITISH HAVE INFORMED US OF CHANGES TO THE LONDON SUMMIT SCHEDULE
AND FOR THE G-7 MEETING WITH GORBACHEV WHICH MAKE THE LATE
AFTERNOON MEETING WE HAD HOPED FOR IMPOSSIBLE.

YOU ARE THEREFORE REQUESTED TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH
CHERNYAYEV EARLY JUNE 25 TO INFORM HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

~~SECRET~~

2011-0851-MR
9/18/2013 MM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

LIKE TO HOST A BILATERAL WORKING LUNCH FOR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV BETWEEN 12:00 - 2:00 P.M. AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN EARLY SOVIET RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. ONCE WE HAVE SETTLED ON A DATE. WE WILL WORK OUT THE NECESSARY DETAILS WITH THE SOVIETS.

END TEXT.

#0192

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Cable	To White House Re: No Subject Found (2 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR
ES 5113

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT. GANIT FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 111610Z JUN 91

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE
O 111610Z JUN 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO WHITE HOUSE
Q000

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK
I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OFFERING \$1.5 BILLION IN GRAIN
CREDITS TO CHERNYAYEV AT 3:30 P.M. TODAY. GORBACHEV, WITH WHOM I
HAD SOUGHT AN APPOINTMENT, IS OUT OF MOSCOW, APPARENTLY AT HIS
DACHA.

AS I GAVE THE LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV, I NOTED THAT IT WAS FURTHER TO
THE AGRICULTURAL DELEGATION THAT HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW VERY RECENTLY.
CHERNYAYEV, AFTER SCANNING THE LETTER, COMMENTED WITH A SMILE THAT
IT WAS A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND IT WOULD BE WELCOME. HE DID NOT
REMARK ON THE PHASED CALENDAR FOR THE CREDITS OR COMMENT FURTHER.
HE SAID HE WOULD, OF COURSE, PASS THE LETTER IMMEDIATELY TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV.

IN RESPONSE TO A GENERAL QUESTION ABOUT HOW PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IS
THINKING OF APPROACHING THE LONDON MEETING WITH THE G-7, CHERNYAYEV
SAID GORBACHEV WILL PROBABLY FOCUS ON THREE MAJOR THEMES. HE WILL
ELABORATE THE IDEAS HE PUT FORTH IN SCANDANAVIA ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF WESTERN SUPPORT FOR THE USSR'S ECONOMIC REFORM; HE WILL
DESCRIBE THE UNION TREATY AND WHERE EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE IT STAND;
AND HE WILL TALK ABOUT THE INTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET AND WORLD

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ECONOMIES, ELABORATING ON IDEAS LIKE THOSE BEING DEVELOPED BY YAVLINSKIY AND THE HARVARD GROUP. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER THEME, CHERNYAYEV SAID ONE PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV IS THE SEEMING INSISTENCE OF MANY IN THE WEST THAT SUPPORT CAN NOT BE PROVIDED UNTIL THE ECONOMY IS REFORMED. WHAT IS NEEDED, HOWEVER, HE SAID, IS A SYNCHRONIZED APPROACH IN WHICH THE WEST SUPPORTS THE REFORM PROCESS FROM THE BEGINNING. I SAID I THOUGHT THE IMPORTANT THING FOR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IS TO PROVIDE A PROGRAM THAT IS CONVINCING. I SAID I DID NOT THINK ANYONE IN THE WEST DOUBTED THAT SUPPORT FOR SOVIET REFORM IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST; WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS A PROGRAM THAT WILL PERSUADE THE WEST'S PRIVATE SECTOR THAT IT CAN INVEST PROFITABLY AND SAFELY IN THE SOVIET UNION. CHERNYAYEV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

REGARDS, JACK.

DECL: OADR

#1234

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Cable	From White House, Re: Text of June 5 Letter from the President to President Gorbachev [120003Z Jun 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0851-MR(507)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/18/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: DAVISR GANTT FILE KANTER PRIVACY OUT SIT SUM

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 120003Z JUN 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR: FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. THERE FOLLOWS THE
TEXT OF A JUNE 5 LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. SECRETARY BAKER PROVIDED THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE TO
FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH IN THEIR JUNE 7 MEETING IN GENEVA.

BEGIN TEXT:

JUNE 5, 1991

DEAR MIKHAIL:

I AM GRATIFIED THAT, WORKING TOGETHER, YOU AND I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
RESOLVE ALL THE REMAINING CFE ISSUES. BUILDING ON THAT SUCCESS, AND
PROCEEDING ON THE SAME BASIS OF COOPERATION AND FRANKNESS, I PROPOSE
THAT WE NOW JOIN FORCES IN THE SAME WAY TO RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING
START ISSUES. LET US USE OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, AND OUR COMMON
COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THESE MOST DEVASTATING WEAPONS, TO QUICKLY
OVERCOME THE REMAINING OBSTACLES SO THAT WE CAN SIGN AN HISTORIC

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR
mm 11/18/2015

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

START TREATY AT A SUMMIT IN MOSCOW IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

-
I AM PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN HOUSTON ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF MOBILE ICBM PRODUCTION, THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS, LIMITATIONS ON THROW-WEIGHT, CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SILOS FOR HEAVY ICBMS, AND HOW TO ATTRIBUTE WARHEADS TO NEW TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, INCLUDING THE APPLICATION OF THE SO-CALLED "40 PERCENT" RULE. IF YOU TOO ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS, THEN I BELIEVE OUR HOPES OF RESOLVING THE REMAINING START ISSUES QUICKLY CAN BE REALIZED.

-
THE REMAINING ISSUES ARE FEW IN NUMBER BUT CENTRAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY. TO ACHIEVE A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT, I PROPOSE THAT WE BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE: RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO MAXIMIZE OUR RESPECTIVE ADVANTAGES, WE SHOULD AIM TO STRENGTHEN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF -- ITS SOUNDNESS, CONFIDENCE IN ITS INTEGRITY, AND THE STABILITY IT PROVIDES. IN THIS SPIRIT, I SUGGEST WE FIND A WAY TO SOLVE THE STUBBORN PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFYING "NEW TYPES" OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, MISSILE "DOWNLOADING," AND DATA DENIAL.

-
THE ISSUE OF "NEW TYPES" ARISES BECAUSE THE TREATY APPLIES DIFFERENT SETS OF RULES TO THE TYPES OF MISSILES THAT EACH SIDE NOW HAS IN ITS ARSENAL AND THOSE THAT MAY BE FIELDIED IN THE FUTURE. THUS, THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN "EXISTING" AND "NEW" IS IMPORTANT. IF WE MAKE IT EASY MERELY TO DECLARE A MISSILE TO BE "NEW," WE WILL HAVE LEFT OPEN A CLEAR PATH TO EVADE START LIMITS. MOREOVER, IF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN "EXISTING" AND "NEW" CANNOT BE VERIFIED WITH CONFIDENCE, DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT WHETHER A MISSILE IS "NEW" WILL BECOME A CONSTANT AND POTENTIALLY SERIOUS SOURCE OF FRICTION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

-
I BELIEVE WE CAN DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM BY AGREEING ON THE FOLLOWING SIMPLE PRINCIPLE: FOR A MISSILE TO BE CONSIDERED A "NEW TYPE" IN

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

START. IT MUST BE GENUINELY NEW AND VERIFIABLY DIFFERENT FROM ANY EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILE. IF THE MISSILE IS NOT SUCH A "NEW TYPE," THEN THE START RULES FOR EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD APPLY.

I BELIEVE THAT THE CRITERIA TO WHICH THE TWO SIDES ALREADY HAVE AGREED FAITHFULLY REFLECT THIS PRINCIPLE, BUT THERE MAY BE OTHER WAYS TO ACHIEVE THE SAME OBJECTIVE. THE KEY POINT IS THAT THE CRITERIA SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE AND THE SPIRIT BEHIND IT, RATHER THAN BE DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE MISSILES UNDER DEVELOPMENT WHICH ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WOULD PREFER NOT BE TREATED AS EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES.

FOLLOWING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING NEW TYPES OF MISSILES. THE SOVIET SIDE ARGUED FORCEFULLY FOR MAKING INCREASES IN THROW-WEIGHT AN ADDITIONAL CRITERION. WE HAVE EXPLAINED IN DETAIL TO THE SOVIET SIDE OUR CONCERNS THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD NOT BE A USEFUL WAY TO IDENTIFY MISSILES THAT ARE GENUINELY NEW AND VERIFIABLY DIFFERENT. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE SPIRIT OF WORKING TOGETHER TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES TO PROMPT COMPLETION OF START, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE THAT A MISSILE WHOSE THROW-WEIGHT IS AT LEAST 30 PERCENT GREATER THAN THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ITS PREDECESSOR MISSILE AND WHOSE FIRST STAGE LENGTH DIFFERS IN REAL TERMS BY AT LEAST 5 PERCENT FROM THAT MISSILE SHOULD BE TREATED AS A NEW TYPE.

THE SECOND ISSUE CONCERNS THE "DOWNLOADING" OF WARHEADS FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES. BOTH SIDES FACE THE PRACTICAL NEED TO ADAPT THE FORCES WE EACH NOW HAVE TO FIT THE NEW STRATEGIC REALITY THAT START WILL CREATE. DOWNLOADING COULD BE A KEY ELEMENT IN MANAGING THAT TRANSITION.

THE MAJOR PROBLEM WITH DOWNLOADING IS THAT IT UNDERMINES THE STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY ABOUT EACH OTHER'S STRATEGIC FORCES THAT START IS INTENDED TO ENHANCE. WARHEADS DOWNLOADED FROM MISSILES COULD READILY BE REPLACED SO THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MISSILE WARHEADS ON A SIDE COULD CHANGE RAPIDLY AND UNPREDICTABLY,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

LEADING TO A DRAMATIC, DESTABILIZING CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC
BALANCE. THAT POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IS WHAT LAY BEHIND THE
CONCERNS WE EXPRESSED ABOUT THE WARHEAD CARRYING CAPACITY OF YOUR
#0167

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

SS-18 AND SS-N-23 MISSILES IN THE EXCHANGES THAT PRECEDED THE 1987
SUMMIT AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. I ASSUME THAT
YOUR QUESTIONS DURING THOSE EXCHANGES ABOUT THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR
PEACEKEEPER AND D-5 MISSILES REFLECTED SIMILAR CONCERNS.

THE 1987 SUMMIT AGREEMENT REPRESENTED A FAIR BALANCING OF OUR
RESPECTIVE CONCERNS. BUT IT ALSO ACCEPTED AN ELEMENT OF
UNPREDICTABILITY ABOUT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE UNDER START. ANY
CHANGES IN THE 1987 AGREEMENT, INCLUDING DOWNLOADING YOU AND I MIGHT
AGREE TO, WOULD ADD TO THAT UNCERTAINTY. THAT IS THE CORE OF THE
PROBLEM AND WHY I BELIEVE THAT DOWNLOADING MUST BE SHARPLY LIMITED.
THAT ALSO IS WHY I BELIEVE THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO TREAT THE
SS-N-18 ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL APPROACH TO DOWNLOADING.

IN MY VIEW, AN APPROACH THAT STRIKES THE BEST BALANCE BETWEEN
ACHIEVING THE STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY THAT START IS DESIGNED TO
ACHIEVE, AND AVOIDING WASTEFUL SCRAPPING OF CURRENT MISSILES, WOULD
BE TO ALLOW EACH SIDE TO EQUIP AND COUNT ONE TYPE OF EXISTING
MISSILE WITH FEWER WARHEADS THAN WAS AGREED AT THE 1987 SUMMIT.
UNDER THIS APPROACH. WE COULD REMOVE ONE OR TWO WARHEADS FROM OUR
EXISTING THREE-WARHEAD MINUTEMAN MISSILES. YOU COULD EQUIP AND
COUNT YOUR SS-N-18 MISSILES AT THREE WARHEADS EACH INSTEAD OF THE
SEVEN THAT WAS AGREED AT THE 1987 SUMMIT. THIS APPROACH WOULD ALLOW
EACH OF US TO REMOVE AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS WHILE
AVOIDING THE RISKS TO STRATEGIC STABILITY THAT MORE EXTENSIVE
DOWNLOADING WOULD POSE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE TWO SIDES MAY WELL IDENTIFY OTHER TRANSITION REQUIREMENTS THAT WE DO NOT NOW FORESEE AND NEW WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS THAT DOWNLOADING POSES. ACCORDINGLY, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE THAT THIS APPROACH SHOULD PERMIT SUCH ADDITIONAL DOWNLOADING AS THE TWO SIDES MIGHT AGREE FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE START TREATY.

THE FINAL ISSUE CONCERNS THE BAN ON DENYING PERFORMANCE DATA ABOUT BALLISTIC MISSILES. THIS PROVISION IS CRUCIAL TO THE TRANSPARENCY NEEDED TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY. IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. THAT IS WHY IT MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE TREATY CAN BE COMPLETED AND SIGNED. THE SIDES ALREADY HAVE BROADLY AGREED TO SUCH A BAN, BUT ARE BOGGED DOWN IN TRYING TO AGREE ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION. YOU AND I NOW NEED TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO COMPLETE WORK RAPIDLY ON THIS QUESTION.

AS ON THE OTHER ISSUES, IF YOU AND I CAN AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED, I AM CONFIDENT THAT A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO TRANSLATE THEM QUICKLY INTO PRACTICE. WE SHOULD AGREE THAT EACH SIDE WOULD USE PRACTICES SUCH THAT THE OTHER SIDE CAN IN FACT ACQUIRE DATA ABOUT BALLISTIC MISSILE PERFORMANCE. OTHERWISE, THE BAN ON DATA DENIAL WOULD BE MEANINGLESS. SECOND, WE SHOULD AGREE THAT EACH SIDE WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO ENSURE THE OTHER SIDE CAN INTERPRET AND UNDERSTAND THE DATA IT ACQUIRES. OTHERWISE, A GUARANTEE THAT THE DATA WILL BE RECEIVED WOULD LIKEWISE BE HOLLOW.

ON THE BASIS OF THESE TWO PRINCIPLES, MY SENIOR ADVISERS AND EXPERTS HAVE JUST COMPLETED AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THIS COMPLEX ISSUE. THE RESULTING APPROACH TAKES FULLY INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS RAISED BY THE SOVIET SIDE AND, I BELIEVE, PROVIDES A FAIR AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE PROMPTLY. WE WILL BE PRESENTING OUR NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IN LIGHT OF THE COMPLEXITY AND IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE, I PROPOSE TO SEND A SPECIAL TEAM OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO GENEVA THAT WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO WORK WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS TO REACH QUICK AGREEMENT ON THE NECESSARY DATA DENIAL

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

PROVISIONS.

-
MIKHAIL. LET ME URGE YOU TO ACCEPT THE APPROACH I HAVE LAID OUT IN THIS LETTER AS THE BASIS FOR THE TWO OF US TO DIRECT OUR NEGOTIATORS TO COMPLETE THEIR WORK PROMPTLY. IF YOU CAN DO SO, I AM PREPARED TO SEND A TEAM OF SENIOR OFFICIALS TO GENEVA IMMEDIATELY TO MEET WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING START ISSUES. ON THE SAME BASIS, I LIKEWISE AM READY TO ASK JIM BAKER TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH IN THE NEAR FUTURE SO THAT THEY CAN BREAK ANY REMAINING LOGJAMS AND CLEAR THE WAY FOR A SUMMIT THIS SUMMER AT WHICH YOU AND I CAN SIGN THE START TREATY.

-
IN SUM, WE SHOULD RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES DIRECTLY, DECISIVELY, AND IN A WAY THAT WILL PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT THAT WE TOGETHER CAN PROUDLY STATE WILL BE EFFECTIVE AND LASTING. I KNOW YOU SHARE MY COMMITMENT TO SUCH AN ACHIEVEMENT, WHICH WOULD CROWN OUR RELATIONSHIP AND SHOW THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE TO LEAD THE WAY TOWARD A SAFER WORLD. THIS HAS BECOME MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER AS WE INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO THWART THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-
I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU ON THIS AND TO EXPANDING OUR COOPERATION IN ALL AREAS.

-
END TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

#0168

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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2011-0851-MR
ES 5/1/13

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANTT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 111610Z JUN 91

<RIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY —
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE WHITE HOUSE
O 111610Z JUN 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO WHITE HOUSE
0000

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM JACK MATLOCK
I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OFFERING \$1.5 BILLION IN GRAIN
CREDITS TO CHERNYAYEV AT 3:30 P.M. TODAY. GORBACHEV, WITH WHOM I
HAD SOUGHT AN APPOINTMENT, IS OUT OF MOSCOW, APPARENTLY AT HIS
DACHA.

AS I GAVE THE LETTER TO CHERNYAYEV, I NOTED THAT IT WAS FURTHER TO
THE AGRICULTURAL DELEGATION THAT HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW VERY RECENTLY.
CHERNYAYEV, AFTER SCANNING THE LETTER, COMMENTED WITH A SMILE THAT
IT WAS A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND IT WOULD BE WELCOME. HE DID NOT
REMARK ON THE PHASED CALENDAR FOR THE CREDITS OR COMMENT FURTHER.
HE SAID HE WOULD, OF COURSE, PASS THE LETTER IMMEDIATELY TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV.

IN RESPONSE TO A GENERAL QUESTION ABOUT HOW PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IS
THINKING OF APPROACHING THE LONDON MEETING WITH THE G-7, CHERNYAYEV
SAID GORBACHEV WILL PROBABLY FOCUS ON THREE MAJOR THEMES. HE WILL
ELABORATE THE IDEAS HE PUT FORTH IN SCANDANAVIA ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF WESTERN SUPPORT FOR THE USSR'S ECONOMIC REFORM; HE WILL
DESCRIBE THE UNION TREATY AND WHERE EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE IT STAND;
AND HE WILL TALK ABOUT THE INTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET AND WORLD

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ECONOMIES, ELABORATING ON IDEAS LIKE THOSE BEING DEVELOPED BY YAVLINSKIY AND THE HARVARD GROUP. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER THEME, CHERNYAYEV SAID ONE PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV IS THE SEEMING INSISTENCE OF MANY IN THE WEST THAT SUPPORT CAN NOT BE PROVIDED UNTIL THE ECONOMY IS REFORMED. WHAT IS NEEDED, HOWEVER, HE SAID, IS A SYNCHRONIZED APPROACH IN WHICH THE WEST SUPPORTS THE REFORM PROCESS FROM THE BEGINNING. I SAID I THOUGHT THE IMPORTANT THING FOR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IS TO PROVIDE A PROGRAM THAT IS CONVINCING. I SAID I DID NOT THINK ANYONE IN THE WEST DOUBTED THAT SUPPORT FOR SOVIET REFORM IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST; WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS A PROGRAM THAT WILL PERSUADE THE WEST'S PRIVATE SECTOR THAT IT CAN INVEST PROFITABLY AND SAFELY IN THE SOVIET UNION. CHERNYAYEV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

REGARDS, JACK.

DECL: OADR

#1234

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Cable	From White House, Re: Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0851-MR(509)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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AA ZYUW VAX090

WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING EYES ONLY MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK AT OPENING OF BUSINESS, TUESDAY.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AT EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.
UPON DELIVERY, PLEASE CONTACT ED HEWETT, NSC.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MIKHAIL:

HAVING BEEN BRIEFED BY THE AGRICULTURAL MISSION MEMBERS WITH WHOM
YOU MET TEN DAYS AGO, I HAVE DECIDED TO AUTHORIZE THE \$1.5 BILLION
IN ADDITIONAL CREDIT GUARANTEES WHICH YOU REQUESTED IN YOUR LETTER
OF MARCH 20. I WANT TO SUPPORT REFORMS IN YOUR COUNTRY, AND YOUR
PERSONAL APPEAL CONVINCED ME THAT THIS CREDIT GUARANTEE WILL SERVE
THAT PURPOSE.

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE ED MADIGAN WILL FOLLOW UP IMMEDIATELY WITH
THE APPROPRIATE PEOPLE ON YOUR SIDE REGARDING THE DETAILS OF THE
GUARANTEE. DUE TO BUDGETARY LIMITATIONS WE ARE ONLY ABLE TO OFFER
\$600 MILLION IN GUARANTEES IMMEDIATELY. WE CAN OFFER AN ADDITIONAL
\$500 MILLION IN OCTOBER, AND THEN A FINAL \$400 MILLION IN FEBRUARY.
IN ORDER TO GRANT THESE GUARANTEES WE WILL NEED FIRM ASSURANCES
THAT THE IMPORTED PRODUCTS WILL BE FAIRLY DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE
SOVIET REPUBLICS.

MOREOVER, IN GRANTING THIS NEW CREDIT GUARANTEE, I ACCEPT YOUR
ASSURANCES THAT YOU ARE COMMITTED TO REFORM. I GATHER FROM MY
AGRICULTURAL TEAM THAT YOU AGREE WITH THEIR ASSESSMENT THAT YOUR
FOOD PROBLEM LIES PRIMARILY IN THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, NOT ON THE
PRODUCTION SIDE. THE SOONER YOU GIVE THAT "OXYGEN" TO MARKETS
WHICH YOU DISCUSSED IN THE MEETING WITH MY TEAM, THE QUICKER YOU
WILL BEGIN TO RESOLVE YOUR FOOD PROBLEM.


I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS BEGIN WORK SOON ON
A LONG-TERM EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN THE
USSR BY INTRODUCING MARKET MECHANISMS. THIS PROJECT, WHICH WOULD
INCLUDE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERTS FROM THE U.S., HAS MY
PERSONAL SUPPORT AND INTEREST. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH YOUR
OFFICIALS SHORTLY TO DISCUSS THIS PROJECT IN DETAIL.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT



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2011-0851-MR
9/18/2013 MM

DECL: OADR
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
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4234

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 6, 1991



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ED HEWETT *sh*
FROM: JOHN GORDON/RICH DAVIS *R*
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on START

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding the proposed letter to Gorbachev on START. It reflects changes made as result of today's NSC meeting.

Secretary Baker meets with Bessmertnykh at noon Washington time tomorrow, June 7. We need the President's final approval in time to cable it to Baker before then.

Concurrence: Art *APK* Ruehne

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I, forwarding the proposed START letter to Gorbachev for approval.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Letter to Gorbachev

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2011-0851-MR
8/21/2013 MM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on START

Purpose


To approve a letter from you to President Gorbachev on START.

Background

Your letter to Gorbachev on START has been revised to reflect discussions at the June 6 NSC meeting. Jim meets with Bessmertnykh at noon on Friday, June 7. We plan to cable the text of your letter to Jim to give to Bessmertnykh at that time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed letter to Gorbachev at Tab A.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Letter to Gorbachev


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2011-0851-MR
8/21/2013 MM

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June 5, 1991

Dear Mikhail:

I am gratified that, working together, you and I have been able to resolve all the remaining CFE issues. Building on that success, and proceeding on the same basis of cooperation and frankness, I propose that we now join forces in the same way to resolve the outstanding START issues. Let us use our close relationship, and our common commitment to reduce these most devastating weapons, to quickly overcome the remaining obstacles so that we can sign an historic START treaty at a summit in Moscow in the very near future.

I am proceeding on the basis of the agreements reached by our Foreign Ministers in Houston on the following issues: continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production, the accountability and inspections of heavy bombers, limitations on throw-weight, construction of new silos for heavy ICBMs, and how to attribute warheads to new types of ballistic missiles, including the application of the so-called "40 percent" rule. If you too are prepared to proceed on this basis, then I believe our hopes of resolving the remaining START issues quickly can be realized.

The remaining issues are few in number but central to the effectiveness of the treaty. To achieve a meaningful agreement, I propose that we be guided by the following principle: rather than attempting to maximize our respective advantages, we should aim to strengthen the agreement itself -- its soundness, confidence in its integrity, and the stability it provides. In this spirit, I suggest we find a way to solve the stubborn problems of identifying "new types" of ballistic missiles, missile "downloading," and data denial.

The issue of "new types" arises because the treaty applies different sets of rules to the types of missiles that each side now has in its arsenal and those types that may be fielded in the future. Thus, the boundary between "existing" and "new" is important. If we make it easy merely to declare a missile to be "new," we will have left open a clear path to evade START limits. Moreover, if the boundary between "existing" and "new" cannot be verified with confidence, disagreements about whether a missile is "new" will become a constant and potentially serious source of friction in our relationship.

I believe we can deal with this problem by agreeing on the following simple principle: for a missile to be considered a "new type" in START, it must be genuinely new and verifiably different from any existing ballistic missile. If the missile is not such a "new type," then the START rules for existing ballistic missiles would apply.

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2011-0851-MR
MM 11/18/2015

I believe that the criteria to which the two sides already have agreed faithfully reflect this principle, but there may be other ways to achieve the same objective. The key point is that the criteria support the principle and the spirit behind it, rather than be designed to accommodate missiles under development which one side or the other would prefer not be treated as existing ballistic missiles.

Following agreement between the two sides on the criteria for identifying new types of missiles, the Soviet side argued forcefully for making increases in throw-weight an additional criterion. We have explained in detail to the Soviet side our concerns that such an approach would not be a useful way to identify missiles that are genuinely new and verifiably different. Nevertheless, in the spirit of working together to overcome obstacles to prompt completion of START, I am prepared to agree that a missile whose throw-weight is at least 30 percent greater than the throw-weight of its predecessor missile and whose first stage length differs in real terms by at least 5 percent from that missile should be treated as a new type.

The second issue concerns the "downloading" of warheads from ballistic missiles. Both sides face the practical need to adapt the forces we each now have to fit the new strategic reality that START will create. Downloading could be a key element in managing that transition.

The major problem with downloading is that it undermines the stability and predictability about each other's strategic forces that START is intended to enhance. Warheads downloaded from missiles could readily be replaced so that the total number of missile warheads on a side could change rapidly and unpredictably, leading to a dramatic, destabilizing change in the strategic balance. That potential for instability is what lay behind the concerns we expressed about the warhead carrying capacity of your SS-18 and SS-N-23 missiles in the exchanges that preceded the 1987 Summit agreement between you and President Reagan. I assume that your questions during those exchanges about the capabilities of our Peacekeeper and D-5 missiles reflected similar concerns.

The 1987 Summit agreement represented a fair balancing of our respective concerns, but it also accepted an element of unpredictability about the strategic balance under START. Any changes in the 1987 agreement, including downloading you and I might agree to, would add to that uncertainty. That is the core of the problem and why I believe that downloading must be sharply limited. That also is why I believe that it is appropriate to treat the SS-N-18 issue in the context of an overall approach to downloading.

In my view, an approach that strikes the best balance between achieving the stability and predictability that START is designed to achieve, and avoiding wasteful scrapping of current missiles, would be to allow each side to equip and count one type of existing missile with fewer warheads than was agreed at the 1987

Summit. Under this approach, we could remove one or two warheads from our existing three-warhead Minuteman missiles. You could equip and count your SS-N-18 missiles at three warheads each instead of the seven that was agreed at the 1987 Summit. This approach would allow each of us to remove an approximately equal number of warheads while avoiding the risks to strategic stability that more extensive downloading would pose.

I recognize that the two sides may well identify other transition requirements that we do not now foresee and new ways to deal with the problems that downloading poses. Accordingly, I am prepared to agree that this approach should permit such additional downloading as the two sides might agree following entry into force of the START treaty.

The final issue concerns the ban on denying performance data about ballistic missiles. This provision is crucial to the transparency needed to build confidence and stability. It is indispensable to effective verification. That is why it must be resolved before the treaty can be completed and signed. The sides already have broadly agreed to such a ban, but are bogged down in trying to agree on its implementation. You and I now need to issue instructions to complete work rapidly on this question.

As on the other issues, if you and I can agree on the principles to be applied, I am confident that a way can be found to translate them quickly into practice. We should agree that each side would use practices such that the other side can in fact acquire data about ballistic missile performance. Otherwise, the ban on data denial would be meaningless. Second, we should agree that each side would be obligated to ensure the other side can interpret and understand the data it acquires. Otherwise, a guarantee that the data will be received would likewise be hollow.

On the basis of these two principles, my senior advisers and experts have just completed an extensive review of this complex issue. The resulting approach takes fully into account concerns raised by the Soviet side and, I believe, provides a fair and equitable basis for resolving the issue promptly. We will be presenting our new and comprehensive proposal to the Soviet delegation in Geneva within the next few days. In light of the complexity and importance of this issue, I propose to send a special team of technical experts to Geneva that would be instructed to work with their Soviet counterparts to reach quick agreement on the necessary data denial provisions.

Mikhail, let me urge you to accept the approach I have laid out in this letter as the basis for the two of us to direct our negotiators to complete their work promptly. If you can do so, I am prepared to send a team of senior officials to Geneva immediately to meet with their Soviet counterparts in order to expedite resolution of the remaining START issues. On the same basis, I likewise am ready to ask Jim Baker to meet with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in the near future so that they can break


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through any remaining logjams and clear the way for a summit this summer at which you and I can sign the START treaty.

In sum, we should resolve the outstanding issues directly, decisively, and in a way that will produce an agreement that we together can proudly state will be effective and lasting. I know you share my commitment to such an achievement, which would crown our relationship and show that the United States and the Soviet Union continue to lead the way toward a safer world. This has become more important than ever as we intensify our efforts to thwart the spread of nuclear weapons.

I look forward to hearing from you on this and to expanding our cooperation in all areas

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
Special Message Routing

☒ SCOWCROFT ☒ GATES

The National Security Advisor requests this message
also be disseminated to the individuals noted below.

☒ GOMPERT	☒ KANTER
☒ HEWETT	☐ BEERS
☒ DEAL	☐ PRYCE
☐ HAASS	☐ WORKING
☐ PAAL	☐
☐ VICE PRESIDENT	☒ CHIEF OF STAFF

Guidance:

Passed to SR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21. Cable	To White House Re: [No Subject] [redacted] (2 pp.)	5/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/6/13

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0851-MR (511)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	3/28/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GANTT SCOWCROFT TRIP
SIT: PRIVACY IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 251345Z MAY 91

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TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

FROM: JACK MATLOCK.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV TODAY AT THE CLOSE OF HIS MEETING WITH THE AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE MISSION. I NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S INTENT TO CALL HIM SHORTLY. HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD GIVE THE LETTER HIS CLOSE ATTENTION.

2. WE WILL SUBMIT A FULL REPORT ON THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV SUBSEQUENTLY. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE AWARE BEFORE HE TELEPHONES THAT GORBACHEV MADE VERY CLEAR THAT HE CONSIDERS THE REQUEST FOR AN ADDITIONAL 1.5 BILLION IN AGRICULTURAL CREDIT GUARANTEES AS PRINCIPALLY A POLITICAL DECISION AND A TEST OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE SOVIET REFORM EFFORT. WHEN THE TEAM POINTED OUT THAT ADDITIONAL DATA WOULD BE USEFUL TO SUPPORT A DECISION ON CREDIT EXPOSURE, GORBACHEV BRUSHED IT ASIDE WITH THE COMMENT THAT HE HAD MADE A PERSONAL REQUEST TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND HE EXPECTED THE QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED ON THAT BASIS. HE ADDED THAT THE USSR HAD NEVER BEEN IN ARREARS IN PAYING OFF LOANS FOR GRAIN AND THEREFORE HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THESE "TECHNICAL QUESTIONS" WERE BEING RAISED.

END OF TEXT

DECL OADR

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2000-1389-F
SCS 3/28/12

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mikhail GORBACHEV
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 11, 1991, 9:03-9:47 a.m.
AND PLACE Camp David

The President: Mikhail, this is George Bush. How are you?

President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear your voice. And I am happy that your mild condition is behind you.

The President: I'm up at Camp David and I feel good. My heart is perfect and once I get this thyroid under control I will be totally normal.

President Gorbachev: Well, George, I hope you will quit jogging several miles every morning and confine yourself to horseshoes.

The President: I wanted to talk with you today--I don't want to see our countries drift apart. I read Matlock's report and it had me concerned. And when Eduard Shevardnadze was here, he said the same thing.

President Gorbachev: My dear George, I thought since we have covered alot of ground to reach the current state of our relations, that when we reached it, it was well received. So I decided to share my immediate concerns quite sincerely so I could prevent a bad turn in the relationship.

The President: Good. First, I remain firmly committed to a strong cooperative relationship with you. I tried to make that clear in my press conference the other day. I know what you stand for. As long as you continue down the reform path with measures like the new agreement with the nine republics, you'll get nothing but praise from me. Lastly, you are correct. Some in the U.S. want us to pull back now. I don't want to do that and will not do that.

President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear that. I wish to

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AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
09/04/2007 JMM

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repeat the phrase you used--I also am firmly committed to cooperation. Acting together we have accomplished a great deal. I am quite convinced we should continue to develop our relations which is in the national interests of the U.S. and USSR. I intend to stand by that approach in the USSR. It enjoys support among people in the USSR but there are some, of course, who have doubts.

Of course, we are going through a special transition period. There are new forms of doing things and no ready-made solutions. Some advocate one thing and some another. We will have to go through this period and shape a new life drawing from the experience and support of others. One very important point to share with you is that we are faced with so many difficulties. Virtually all of the republics felt we had to stand together. We are now finishing the anti-crisis program. You know about it. People from all the republics are now in a Moscow suburb working to complete it.

So, I want you to understand that it will take an effort to make it succeed. Because there are so many things we simply didn't know before. There is no guarantee, given the size of the country and its problems, that we may not get something we didn't expect. I think the biggest mistake would be for us to stop or succumb to pressure or move in reverse. And in this type of situation, I sometimes have to take very drastic measures. So, George, this is what I wanted you to keep in mind.

In a normal situation, some of these steps would have been seen as unacceptable. But we have to make allowances for this period. And when I'm looking to you, George, for assistance, it is because I am in this kind of situation. I really need it. And I appreciate the political support and friendly feelings I've been getting. My hope is that these feelings will stay unabated. The main thing for you, George, is that you must know I've made the choice--there is no alternative for me. I am going to do everything I can to continue moving along the track of renewal.

Now this is what I wanted you to know. We are at a very important moment. The specific point is that I will take some major decisions in the next few days and weeks. Well, I've been going on for some time now but since we had not spoken in a while, I thought I would be specific about things.

The President: Mikhail, if you have time, I want to touch on arms control and economic issues.

President Gorbachev: That is what I thought we would do after discussing this general overview.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

The President: If it is okay with you, I would like to start with arms control.

The CFE problem, frankly, is putting a strain on our relationship. Our biggest concern is naval infantry. It is causing a problem not so much here in the Administration but is very difficult across our public opinion. We will see Moiseyev and hope his visit will lead to a rapid solution of this corrosive issue.

Having gotten CFE done, I believe we could then get our experts to overcome the difficulties on START. Both of us should make sure that gets done. If we can get a CFE solution, I would be anxious to have a summit this summer and make every effort to get START ready for signature. I think we have narrowed the differences but am anxious to get your views. That is about all I had to say on arms control.

President Gorbachev: Well, George, I want you to know I want to resolve quickly the first issue in the near future. Moiseyev will bring something to help push things in that direction. I also share your desire to have a treaty ready to sign. It is simply a duty for us to go ahead with the treaty on fifty percent reductions, especially since we have already accomplished alot. And, of course, if that goes well, we could have a very large-scale summit this summer.

The President: I would like to do that very much.

President Gorbachev: That is my goal too. Of course, we could have an interim meeting if there are delays, but our goal should be a large-scale meeting.

The President: I agree with that.

President Gorbachev: I also think there is a chance, George, to succeed in our cooperation in the Middle East. Alexander and Jim are moving on the same track. There is a possibility of cooperation there as in the Persian Gulf.

The President: I think it is very good that Jim and Sasha are working together. They will meet in Cairo. It is a wonderful arrangement we are talking about. I hope Israel and the Arabs will be cooperative.

President Gorbachev: I think if we act together, we can push them in the right direction.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

The President: At some point, we may have to do so publicly if the Baker-Bessmertnykh shuttle diplomacy doesn't work.

President Gorbachev: Okay, I agree to give that some thought at a later point.

Now within the next three days, I will see the leader of China in Moscow. At the conclusion of this meeting, I will brief you on the visit. Now let me give you my views. We appreciate the role of China on the Persian Gulf--its cooperation there and in other areas. China's positive decision was well thought out.

The President: Our relations with China are strained more than I want. I have the MFN question. There is big opposition in Congress. But I want to find a way to renew their MFN. I don't want to isolate China. If you can convey that, I would appreciate it. Is Li Peng or Yang Shangkun coming?

President Gorbachev: No, Jiang Zemin. I think we can proceed with what we agreed as we talked in the limosine.

The President: Right. I would like to talk about economic issues now.

President Gorbachev: Yes.

The President: One, I know you are in a difficult economic situation. You have explained that at the beginning. In the spirit of frankness, our experts don't believe Pavlov's anti-crisis program will move you fast enough to market reform. If there are more steps toward a market reform effort, then we could do more and help especially with the international financial organizations.

I think...Excuse me, go ahead.

President Gorbachev: Excuse me for interrupting.

The President: I just wanted to say that it would lead quickly to Special Associate Status in the IMF and World Bank. There is also great interest here in the emigration bill that is to be voted on. If that passes and meets internationally acceptable standards, then it would enable us to take steps to normalize the economic relationship; steps such as the trade agreement, and most favored nations status. Then we could go to Congress to repeal the legislative restrictions that make trade and finance so difficult for us.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

I have several more points but maybe I should stop there for your comments.

President Gorbachev: I would like to comment on that, George. Among our pressing problems is stabilizing the economic relationship between regions and even enterprises. There are many pitfalls here. The central and republic authorities are on to this issue and are moving to solve it. This is one of the most pressing tasks at hand. I would call it an emergency task. We have done alot on the planting campaign in the rural areas and have been rather successful at that. In April, agricultural production was up 3-4 percent compared to last year. But there are still difficulties. We are at the end of spring and summer is coming. Last year's reserves are depleted and there is still no new harvest so we have some difficulties.

On Pavlov's program, it has been very seriously changed. But, George, you must always bear in mind the realistic context of our society. The overriding focus of the Pavlov program is to fight inflation through drastic fiscal measures and at the same time stimulate entrepreneurship. You know there are many provisions in the Pavlov program for stepped-up privatization and destatization. There is more economic freedom. It is under strong fire from the trade unions and some in the party organizations. Some call it anti-people and even inhuman. And you know, George, you will reach a different conclusion depending on whether or not you look at the Pavlov program from an academic angle or from a realistic context of society. This is no longer just Pavlov's program by the way since it has been accepted by all the republics.

So much for the current situation. On your other points, I wish to propose something else. What if for the purposes of continuing this discussion, I send over Primakov and Yavlinsky to discuss the possibility of cooperation in the G-7 framework and other international organizations? I know that there is emerging cooperation at the G-7 experts level with your people and ours. But even your experts think it is time to elevate these discussions to a governmental level.

The President: We could talk about that. But I'm not sure exactly what you mean.

President Gorbachev: What I have in mind is that the G-7 will discuss cooperation with the USSR and the place and role of the G-7 in these developments. There is the possibility of Soviet participation in the IMF and participation by the head of the Soviet state in the G-7 session. I'll send Primakov. He will have a package of items to discuss in a closed session.

The President: That is a good idea and I have one to add on agriculture.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President Gorbachev: I just received your letter. I welcome the idea and am prepared to join.

The President: Would May 20 be too soon for the team to arrive?

President Gorbachev: No, it is fine. I will give the appropriate instructions tomorrow. There is much to be done to prepare for this.

The President: I think we can be very helpful. I want you to know that I want it to lead to what you need in agricultural credits.

President Gorbachev: I welcome this very much. I just got the translation of your letter before our conversation. It is a very exciting idea and very encouraging. And I will appoint tomorrow the people who will start work on this.

The President: Good. I will instruct our people to come in a positive frame of mind--to try to help and not find problems but find reasons to help. After that, Mikhail, it seems to me that at the summit we could discuss financial institutions, energy, the environment and housing. We can discuss this at our meeting.

President Gorbachev: George, these are important and encouraging subjects. I discussed some of these with Mitterrand. George, I am really happy that we had this substantive conversation. It had been some time since we had a conversation like that.

The President: Let me ask you a personal question. How is your health?

President Gorbachev: So far, I am hanging tough.

The President: That is good. You are my friend and I want to prove that and work with you. I don't like stories in our press that put you down. I hope you noticed that I took them on in public the other day.

President Gorbachev: Well, thank you for those words. I share your approach on this and other issues. I have made a choice, a serious choice on relations with the U.S., providing it is reciprocated, and will follow that course.

The President: That is wonderful. It is nice talking to you and good luck.

President Gorbachev: Thank you, George, and the same to you. Best regards to all at Camp David, especially Barbara.

The President: She just walked in the room and just walked out. She is on her way to the gym.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President Gorbachev: I am glad to hear that.

The President: Okay. Good-bye.

President Gorbachev: Good-bye.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
23. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

**DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526**

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**
 By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed: 4/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0851-MR(513)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT GANTI GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
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<PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 091247Z MAY 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

JACK:

IN REFERENCE TO YOUR LAST CABLE, THE TIMES REFERRED TO ARE
WASHINGTON (EDT) TIME.

REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0038

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR
9/18/2013 MM

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
24. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0851-MR(514)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GANNI GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

PREC. IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 091100Z MAY 91

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 091100Z MAY 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE
WHITE HOUSE.

O 091100Z APR 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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BEGIN TEXT

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

BRENT:

TODAY MAY 9 IS A HOLIDAY, AND WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REACH
ANYONE IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE TO ARRANGE FOR MY DELIVERY
OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. I WILL TRY AGAIN TOMORROW TO SEE
GORBACHEV. IN THE MEANTIME, WOULD YOU CLARIFY WHETHER THE
REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S AVAILABILITY AFTER 3:00 PM
FRIDAY REFERS TO WASHINGTON TIME OR MOSCOW TIME. I WILL
NEED TO BE PRECISE ON THIS POINT GIVEN THE SEVEN HOUR TIME
DIFFERENCE.

END OF TEXT

DECL OADR

#1235

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR

9/18/2013 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAY 8, 1991

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

Dear Mikhail:

Since receiving your letter of March 20 on grain credits, we have given serious consideration to how we might be most helpful to you. I have some ideas which, with your active cooperation, I believe can help you meet your society's continuing food needs.

Specifically, I suggest initiation of an intensive U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation program in food distribution, so that the Soviet Union's ample capacity to produce food can result in adequate supplies for your consumers. If you agree, I am prepared to send a high-level, experienced team to review the situation, assess the problem, and report urgently to you and me on near- and long-term options. This would not be an American solution, but rather a solution developed through U.S.-Soviet cooperation, which is why the mission would need your full backing.

I would propose sending Under Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister, and my Special Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Ed A. Hewett, with a high-level delegation of experts to explore with you all issues relating to your problems in food distribution and, more generally, the food market situation. I suggest they come to the USSR in mid-May for perhaps a week, and then report their views on your situation and potential solutions to both you and me. Our understanding of your situation indicates that only an effort to remedy the distribution problem by fostering effective markets will result in sustainable improvement in food availability for the Soviet people.

I think it makes sense now to address the underlying problem hand-in-hand with you before we make a final decision on further guarantees. Our discretion to offer credit guarantees for agricultural exports is severely restricted by laws requiring evaluation of a country's repayment record. Recent Soviet difficulties in repaying credits make it difficult to meet these legal requirements, particularly in light of the fact that we have already lent you \$1 billion under this program. Nevertheless I am certainly willing to work with you to try to find a creative way to meet these requirements, and also to meet your needs. Some sort of collateralization mechanism is one possibility, but there could be others.

This proposal would focus on a major problem of yours and would further demonstrate our mutual commitment to reform and cooperation. The relationship between our two countries is a very special one, as is our personal relationship. We have

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PER E.O. 13526


2011-0851-MR
SCS 5/1/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

worked well together and there is much more we should do in the months ahead. I look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'M. Gorbachev', written in a cursive style.

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAY 8, 1991

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

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Specifically, I suggest initiation of an intensive U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation program in food distribution, so that the Soviet Union's ample capacity to produce food can result in adequate supplies for your consumers. If you agree, I am prepared to send a high-level, experienced team to review the situation, assess the problem, and report urgently to you and me on near- and long-term options. This would not be an American solution, but rather a solution developed through U.S.-Soviet cooperation, which is why the mission would need your full backing.

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
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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR
SCS 5/1/13

~~SECRET~~

worked well together and there is much more we should do in the months ahead. I look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. B. Bush".

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
27. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed: 4/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0851-MR(513)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT GANTT GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY OUT SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 091247Z MAY 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

JACK:

IN REFERENCE TO YOUR LAST CABLE, THE TIMES REFERRED TO ARE
WASHINGTON (EDT) TIME.

REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0038

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0851-MR
9/18/2013 MY

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 3450
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>sk</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>IC</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS
Tab I has been dispatched via Sit Room 22:00 5/8 WWS
24 Secs office has deslble

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Phg #2988 attached

Florence - Dona spoke w/ the General
and he authorized transmittal of Tab I
to Matlock which the Sit Room has
done via back channels. (Hard copy
of msg at Tab I)

The General wants to see the package
again in the morning to make a
determination on the second
recommendation

Wendy

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0852-MR
ES 4126113

~~SECRET~~

conveying the
following thoughts
~~for~~ verbally!

DELIVER TO AMB MATLOCK
OPENING OF BUSINESS

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FROM THE PRESIDENT
VIA BACK CHANNEL

Brent Scowcroft

Jack:

1. Please deliver the attached letter personally to President Gorbachev as soon as is possible, ~~and, with the following verbal message:~~

2. I have read your account of the meeting with President Gorbachev and I am greatly concerned that he has perceived a weakening in our support for him, or for the reform process.

3. Pass on to President Gorbachev the excerpts from the transcript of my Wednesday press conference in which I reiterate my strong support for him and for reforms.

4. Tell him of my concern, and say that I would like to talk to him personally to reaffirm my strong commitment to him, and to our bilateral relationship, and to discuss how we can move to strengthen the relationship.

5. Ask him when I should call. The best times for me are from 3:00pm Friday (EST) through Sunday afternoon.

- The President received your account of your conversation with President Gorbachev just as he was dispatching the attached letter, which does not reflect that conversation.
- The President is greatly concerned at Gorbachev's perception of a weakening of the President's support for him and the reform process.
- That perception is wholly incorrect, and the President would like to call Gorbachev to discuss the issue. His commitment to Gorbachev and his reforms is undiminished and he would like to discuss lay to rest Gorbachev's misconceptions and discuss our bilateral relationships and how ~~they might~~ the two of them can move to strengthen it.
- Ask Gorbachev when the President should call. Good time for the President is after 3:00 pm Friday through Sunday afternoon.
- The President commented on Gorbachev at a press conference this morning (Wednesday). Please pass to Gorbachev the attached copy of those comments.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OPENING OF BUSINESS

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT
VIA BACK CHANNEL

Jack:

Please deliver the attached letter personally to President Gorbachev as soon as is possible, conveying the following thoughts verbally:

-- The President received your account of your conversation with President Gorbachev just as he was dispatching the attached letter, which does not reflect that conversation.

-- The President is greatly concerned at Gorbachev's perception of a weakening of the President's support for him and the reform process.

-- That perception is wholly incorrect, and the President would like to call Gorbachev to discuss the issue. His commitment to Gorbachev and his reforms is undiminished and he would like to lay to rest Gorbachev's misconceptions and discuss ^{the} ~~our~~ bilateral relationships and how the two of them can move to strengthen it.

-- ^{Please} Ask Gorbachev when the President should call. A good time for the President is ^{any time} after 3:00 p.m. Friday through Sunday afternoon.

-- The President ^{made some comments about} ~~commented on~~ Gorbachev at a press conference this morning (Wednesday). Please pass to Gorbachev the attached copy of those comments.

and the points raised by Gorbachev

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2011-0850-MR
ES 4/26/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3450

May 8, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ED A. HEWETT

SUBJECT:

Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock

At Tab I is a letter from the President to Amb Matlock via backchannel requesting that he deliver a letter to President Gorbachev. At Tab A is a memorandum to State enclosing a copy of the message with the note that it was sent via backchannel in response to Amb Matlock's letter to the President which was received backchannel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the message at Tab I to be sent to Ambassador Matlock via backchannel.

Approve *EH*

Disapprove

Request that you authorize Bill Sittmann to send the memorandum at Tab A to State.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Backchannel message to Amb Matlock
Tab A Memorandum to State

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0852-LHR
ES 4/26/13

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
28d. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed: 4/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0852-MR(518.03)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 05

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PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG 090209Z MAY 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO (b)(1) MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

-

-

JACK:

-

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED LETTER PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
AS SOON AS IS POSSIBLE, CONVEYING THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS VERBALLY:

-

-- THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED YOUR ACCOUNT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV JUST AS HE WAS DISPATCHING THE ATTACHED
LETTER, WHICH DOES NOT REFLECT THAT CONVERSATION.

-

-- THE PRESIDENT IS GREATLY CONCERNED AT GORBACHEV'S PERCEPTION
OF A WEAKENING OF THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT FOR HIM AND THE
REFORM PROCESS.

-

-- THAT PERCEPTION IS WHOLLY INCORRECT. AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD
LIKE TO CALL GORBACHEV TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE AND THE POINTS
RAISED BY GORBACHEV. HIS COMMITMENT TO GORBACHEV AND HIS
REFORMS IS UNDIMINISHED AND HE WOULD LIKE TO LAY TO REST
GORBACHEV'S MISCONCEPTIONS AND DISCUSS THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP AND HOW THE TWO OF THEM CAN MOVE TO STRENGTHEN
IT.

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2011-0852-MR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

-- PLEASE ASK GORBACHEV WHEN THE PRESIDENT SHOULD CALL. A GOOD TIME FOR THE PRESIDENT IS ANY TIME AFTER 3:00 P.M. FRIDAY THROUGH SUNDAY AFTERNOON.

-- THE PRESIDENT MADE SOME COMMENTS ABOUT GORBACHEV AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING (WEDNESDAY). PLEASE PASS TO GORBACHEV THE ATTACHED COPY OF THOSE COMMENTS.

BEGIN TEXT:

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

DEAR MIKHAIL:

SINCE RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 20 ON GRAIN CREDITS, WE HAVE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO HOW WE MIGHT BE MOST HELPFUL TO YOU. I HAVE SOME IDEAS WHICH, WITH YOUR ACTIVE COOPERATION, I BELIEVE CAN HELP YOU MEET YOUR SOCIETY'S CONTINUING FOOD NEEDS.

SPECIFICALLY, I SUGGEST INITIATION OF AN INTENSIVE U.S.-SOVIET TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM IN FOOD DISTRIBUTION, SO THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S AMPLE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE FOOD CAN RESULT IN ADEQUATE SUPPLIES FOR YOUR CONSUMERS. IF YOU AGREE, I AM PREPARED TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL, EXPERIENCED TEAM TO REVIEW THE SITUATION, ASSESS THE PROBLEM, AND REPORT URGENTLY TO YOU AND ME ON NEAR- AND LONG-TERM OPTIONS. THIS WOULD NOT BE AN AMERICAN SOLUTION. BUT RATHER A SOLUTION DEVELOPED THROUGH U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION, WHICH IS WHY THE MISSION WOULD NEED YOUR FULL BACKING.

I WOULD PROPOSE SENDING UNDER SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE RICHARD CROWDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE EUGENE MCALLISTER, AND MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SOVIET AFFAIRS, ED A. HEWETT, WITH A

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION OF EXPERTS TO EXPLORE WITH YOU ALL ISSUES RELATING TO YOUR PROBLEMS IN FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND, MORE GENERALLY, THE FOOD MARKET SITUATION. I SUGGEST THEY COME TO THE USSR IN MID-MAY FOR PERHAPS A WEEK, AND THEN REPORT THEIR VIEWS ON YOUR SITUATION AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO BOTH YOU AND ME. OUR UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR SITUATION INDICATES THAT ONLY AN EFFORT TO REMEDY THE DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM BY FOSTERING EFFECTIVE MARKETS WILL RESULT IN SUSTAINABLE IMPROVEMENT IN FOOD AVAILABILITY FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

I THINK IT MAKES SENSE NOW TO ADDRESS THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM HAND-IN-HAND WITH YOU BEFORE WE MAKE A FINAL DECISION ON FURTHER GUARANTEES. OUR DISCRETION TO OFFER CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS IS SEVERELY RESTRICTED BY LAWS REQUIRING EVALUATION OF A COUNTRY'S REPAYMENT RECORD. RECENT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES IN REPAYING CREDITS MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MEET THESE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE ALREADY LENT YOU \$1 BILLION UNDER THIS PROGRAM. NEVERTHELESS I AM CERTAINLY WILLING TO WORK WITH YOU TO TRY TO FIND A CREATIVE WAY TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND ALSO TO MEET YOUR NEEDS. SOME SORT OF COLLATERALIZATION MECHANISM IS ONE POSSIBILITY, BUT THERE COULD BE OTHERS.

THIS PROPOSAL WOULD FOCUS ON A MAJOR PROBLEM OF YOURS AND WOULD FURTHER DEMONSTRATE OUR MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND COOPERATION. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS A VERY SPECIAL ONE, AS IS OUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. WE HAVE WORKED WELL TOGETHER AND THERE IS MUCH MORE WE SHOULD DO IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT.

Q&A PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

Q. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU'VE GOT THE BALTIC LEADERS COMING IN LATER THIS MORNING. WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO TELL THEM ABOUT YOUR LEANINGS ON PROVIDING AID TO THE SOVIET UNION?

THE PRESIDENT: I'M GOING TO TELL THEM THAT WE HAVEN'T MADE A DECISION ON THAT. I'M GOING TO TELL THEM I MUST COMPLY WITH THE LAW AS IT'S WRITTEN, BUT I WILL ALSO TELL THEM THAT WE HAVE A STRONG AND, I THINK, GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. AND I WILL TELL THEM THAT I WILL BE INTERESTED IN HEARING WHAT THEIR PROBLEMS ARE. I WILL TELL THEM THAT WE HAVE NEVER, AND WILL NEVER, RECOGNIZE THE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTICS INTO THE

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~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

SOVIET UNION. BUT I WILL ENCOURAGE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THESE VERY DIFFICULT QUESTIONS.

Q. YOUR COMMENT ABOUT GORBACHEV TODAY AND A SIMILAR ONE YESTERDAY SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT YOU'D LIKE TO HELP HIM OUT, THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO WORK AROUND THE EDGES OF THAT CREDITWORTHINESS PROVISION IN THE LAW TO PROVIDE SOME KIND OF ASSISTANCE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

THE PRESIDENT: LOOK. WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV. THEY ARE ENORMOUS. AND YES THE SOVIET UNION IS FIGHTING DIFFICULT ECONOMIC TIMES. BUT I AM NOT ABOUT TO FORGET HISTORY AND WHAT HE DID IN TERMS OF EASTERN EUROPE. WHAT HE'S DONE IN TERMS OF PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST -- HAS MY RESPECT. SO WE WILL DEAL WITH THE FACTS AS THEY COME TO US. BUT I DON'T WANT TO SEE A BREACH IN A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS VERY STRONG, THAT'S SERVED US EXTRAORDINARILY WELL IN RECENT TIMES DURING THE WAR ITSELF WHERE. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WORKED IN SYNC ON THOSE MATTERS. AND I GIVE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV GREAT CREDIT FOR THAT BECAUSE HE WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURES AT HOME.

-
Q. WELL, THAT SOUNDS LIKE YOU'RE NOT GOING TO TURN DOWN HIS REQUEST FOR HELP.

-
THE PRESIDENT: WELL, WE HAVE TO -- AS I SAID THE OTHER DAY -- WE HAVE TO BE SURE THAT WE ABIDE BY THE RULES AS ESTABLISHED -- I THINK THE AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT HAS TO MAKE CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS. BUT LOOK, I'VE ALWAYS FELT THAT WHEN PEOPLE ARE HUNGRY OR NEED SUPPORT AS IT RELATES TO FOOD AND NOURISHMENT THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO HELP.

-
END CONFERENCE NOTES.

DECLAS: OADR

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DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OPENING OF BUSINESS

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT
VIA BACK CHANNEL

Jack:

Please deliver the attached letter personally to President Gorbachev as soon as is possible, conveying the following thoughts verbally:

- The President received your account of your conversation with President Gorbachev just as he was dispatching the attached letter, which does not reflect that conversation.
- The President is greatly concerned at Gorbachev's perception of a weakening of the President's support for him and the reform process.
- That perception is wholly incorrect, and the President would like to call Gorbachev to discuss the issue and the points raised by Gorbachev. His commitment to Gorbachev and his reforms is undiminished and he would like to lay to rest Gorbachev's misconceptions and discuss the bilateral relationship and how the two of them can move to strengthen it.
- Please ask Gorbachev when the President should call. A good time for the President is any time after 3:00 p.m. Friday through Sunday afternoon.
- The President made some comments about Gorbachev at a press conference this morning (Wednesday). Please pass to Gorbachev the attached copy of those comments.

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0852-MUR
ES 4/26/13

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MAY 8, 1991

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Mikhail:

Since receiving your letter of March 20 on grain credits, we have given serious consideration to how we might be most helpful to you. I have some ideas which, with your active cooperation, I believe can help you meet your society's continuing food needs.

Specifically, I suggest initiation of an intensive U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation program in food distribution, so that the Soviet Union's ample capacity to produce food can result in adequate supplies for your consumers. If you agree, I am prepared to send a high-level, experienced team to review the situation, assess the problem, and report urgently to you and me on near- and long-term options. This would not be an American solution, but rather a solution developed through U.S.-Soviet cooperation, which is why the mission would need your full backing.

I would propose sending Under Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister, and my Special Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Ed A. Hewett, with a high-level delegation of experts to explore with you all issues relating to your problems in food distribution and, more generally, the food market situation. I suggest they come to the USSR in mid-May for perhaps a week, and then report their views on your situation and potential solutions to both you and me. Our understanding of your situation indicates that only an effort to remedy the distribution problem by fostering effective markets will result in sustainable improvement in food availability for the Soviet people.

I think it makes sense now to address the underlying problem hand-in-hand with you before we make a final decision on further guarantees. Our discretion to offer credit guarantees for agricultural exports is severely restricted by laws requiring evaluation of a country's repayment record. Recent Soviet difficulties in repaying credits make it difficult to meet these legal requirements, particularly in light of the fact that we have already lent you \$1 billion under this program. Nevertheless I am certainly willing to work with you to try to find a creative way to meet these requirements, and also to meet your needs. Some sort of collateralization mechanism is one possibility, but there could be others.

This proposal would focus on a major problem of yours and would further demonstrate our mutual commitment to reform and cooperation. The relationship between our two countries is a very special one, as is our personal relationship. We have

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George Bush Handwriting


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ES 5/1/13

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worked well together and there is much more we should do in the months ahead. I look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. H. W. Bush".

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

**Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting**

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 8, 1991

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

Q Mr. President, you've got the Baltic leaders coming in later this morning. What are you going to tell them about your leanings on providing aid to the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm going to tell them that we haven't made a decision on that. I'm going to tell them I must comply with the law as it's written, but I will also tell them that we have a strong and, I think, good relationship with President Gorbachev. And I will tell them that I will be interested in hearing what their problems are. I will tell them that we have never, and will never, recognize the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union. But I will encourage peaceful resolution of these very difficult questions.

Q Your comment about Gorbachev today and a similar one yesterday seemed to indicate that you'd like to help him out, that you might want to work around the edges of that creditworthiness provision in the law to provide some kind of assistance.

THE PRESIDENT: Look, when you look at the accomplishments of Mikhail Gorbachev, they are enormous. And yes, the Soviet Union is fighting difficult economic times. But I am not about to forget history and what he did in terms of Eastern Europe, what he's done in terms of perestroika and glasnost -- has my respect. So we will deal with the facts as they come to us. But I don't want to see a breach in a relationship that is very strong, that's served us extraordinarily well in recent times during the war itself where, for the first time, the Soviet Union and the United States worked in sync on those matters. And I give President Gorbachev great credit for that because he was under some pressures at home.

Q Well, that sounds like you're not going to turn down his request for help.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have to -- as I said the other day -- we have to be sure that we abide by the rules as established -- I think the Agricultural Department has to make certain representations. But look, I've always felt that when people are hungry or need support as it relates to food and nourishment that we ought to try to help.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3450

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock (U)

We have sent the enclosed message to Ambassador Matlock.
It was necessary to use backchannel since it responds to
Ambassador Matlock's backchannel message to the President. (S)

William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Message

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Declassify on: OADR

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DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OPENING OF BUSINESS

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT
VIA BACK CHANNEL

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2011-0802-MR
ES 4/26/13

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
28i. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to General Scowcroft [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	5/9/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/17/2015

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0851-MR(514)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/18/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GANNI GATES SCOWCROFT
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PREC. IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 091100Z MAY 91

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TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 091100Z MAY 91 PRIVACY CHANNELS
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE
WHITE HOUSE.
O 091100Z APR 91 ZYH ZFF-1/4

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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BEGIN TEXT

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

BRENT:

TODAY MAY 9 IS A HOLIDAY, AND WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REACH
ANYONE IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE TO ARRANGE FOR MY DELIVERY
OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. I WILL TRY AGAIN TOMORROW TO SEE
GORBACHEV. IN THE MEANTIME, WOULD YOU CLARIFY WHETHER THE
REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S AVAILABILITY AFTER 3:00 PM
FRIDAY REFERS TO WASHINGTON TIME OR MOSCOW TIME. I WILL
NEED TO BE PRECISE ON THIS POINT GIVEN THE SEVEN HOUR TIME
DIFFERENCE.

END OF TEXT

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9/18/2013 MM

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MAY 8, 1991

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Mikhail:

Since receiving your letter of March 20 on grain credits, we have given serious consideration to how we might be most helpful to you. I have some ideas which, with your active cooperation, I believe can help you meet your society's continuing food needs.

Specifically, I suggest initiation of an intensive U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation program in food distribution, so that the Soviet Union's ample capacity to produce food can result in adequate supplies for your consumers. If you agree, I am prepared to send a high-level, experienced team to review the situation, assess the problem, and report urgently to you and me on near- and long-term options. This would not be an American solution, but rather a solution developed through U.S.-Soviet cooperation, which is why the mission would need your full backing.

I would propose sending Under Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister, and my Special Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Ed A. Hewett, with a high-level delegation of experts to explore with you all issues relating to your problems in food distribution and, more generally, the food market situation. I suggest they come to the USSR in mid-May for perhaps a week, and then report their views on your situation and potential solutions to both you and me. Our understanding of your situation indicates that only an effort to remedy the distribution problem by fostering effective markets will result in sustainable improvement in food availability for the Soviet people.

I think it makes sense now to address the underlying problem hand-in-hand with you before we make a final decision on further guarantees. Our discretion to offer credit guarantees for agricultural exports is severely restricted by laws requiring evaluation of a country's repayment record. Recent Soviet difficulties in repaying credits make it difficult to meet these legal requirements, particularly in light of the fact that we have already lent you \$1 billion under this program. Nevertheless I am certainly willing to work with you to try to find a creative way to meet these requirements, and also to meet your needs. Some sort of collateralization mechanism is one possibility, but there could be others.

This proposal would focus on a major problem of yours and would further demonstrate our mutual commitment to reform and cooperation. The relationship between our two countries is a very special one, as is our personal relationship. We have

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PER E.O. 13526


2011-0851-MR

ES 5/1/13

~~SECRET~~

worked well together and there is much more we should do in the months ahead. I look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "G." and the last name "Bush" clearly distinguishable.

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 8, 1991

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

Q Mr. President, you've got the Baltic leaders coming in later this morning. What are you going to tell them about your leanings on providing aid to the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm going to tell them that we haven't made a decision on that. I'm going to tell them I must comply with the law as it's written, but I will also tell them that we have a strong and, I think, good relationship with President Gorbachev. And I will tell them that I will be interested in hearing what their problems are. I will tell them that we have never, and will never, recognize the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union. But I will encourage peaceful resolution of these very difficult questions.

Q Your comment about Gorbachev today and a similar one yesterday seemed to indicate that you'd like to help him out, that you might want to work around the edges of that creditworthiness provision in the law to provide some kind of assistance.

THE PRESIDENT: Look, when you look at the accomplishments of Mikhail Gorbachev, they are enormous. And yes, the Soviet Union is fighting difficult economic times. But I am not about to forget history and what he did in terms of Eastern Europe, what he's done in terms of perestroika and glasnost -- has my respect. So we will deal with the facts as they come to us. But I don't want to see a breach in a relationship that is very strong, that's served us extraordinarily well in recent times during the war itself where, for the first time, the Soviet Union and the United States worked in sync on those matters. And I give President Gorbachev great credit for that because he was under some pressures at home.

Q Well, that sounds like you're not going to turn down his request for help.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have to -- as I said the other day -- we have to be sure that we abide by the rules as established -- I think the Agricultural Department has to make certain representations. But look, I've always felt that when people are hungry or need support as it relates to food and nourishment that we ought to try to help.

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PER E.O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1991

91 APR 30 PM 2:48

2011-0852-MR
ES 4/24/13

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
Responding to His Request for Additional CCC
Credits

Purpose

To respond to President Gorbachev's recent letter to you requesting an additional \$1.5 billion in credit guarantees for Soviet purchase of U.S. agricultural products.

Background

In a letter dated March 20 (Tab B) President Gorbachev wrote you requesting \$1.5 billion in credit guarantees for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products, over and above the \$1 billion in guarantees we already extended in January, and the Soviets have used, for FY 1991. Thus they are requesting a total of \$2.5 billion in CCC credits for FY 1991, about half of the total funds available in this year.

We do not know the context of this letter; it came literally attached to President Gorbachev's response to our CFE proposal. The letter probably represents an effort to line up credits and food shipments in anticipation of a possible food shortage later this year. To the extent that the problem is in the food distribution system, or in the government's unwillingness to pay farmers enough to induce them to sell their grain, our grain shipments would, at best, make little difference. They could actually retard development of a grain market.

The requested credits fall under the USDA's GSM-102 program, which offers credit guarantees in order to stimulate commercial sales of U.S. agricultural products abroad. It is a commercial program, not a food aid program. By law, USDA can only authorize loan guarantees under the program if they judge the recipient country to be credit-worthy. Foreign policy considerations cannot be taken into account. Soviet credit-worthiness was already shaky in December when the last loan was made, and it has since deteriorated.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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Based on these considerations, Secretary Madigan (Tab C) recommends against further extension of credits to the Soviets under this program. Treasury and OMB concur in that judgement. State will follow USDA's lead. Secretary Baker would be willing to defend a modest loan, but only if USDA wanted to do it. Even then State would require an EC-type monitoring mechanism to make sure the center is not cutting off some republics from access to the grain. Thus there appears to be no way for you to meet Gorbachev's request.

Gorbachev will not understand, however, if you simply turn down his request. He supported us in the Gulf; we are asking him to overrule his military on CFE; and he now faces the greatest test of his political life. For you to argue that a few provisions of the law keep you from being helpful will seem to him like a slap in the face. We need to find some way to respond which is truly helpful, within our resources, and which does not have the effect of taking sides in disagreements between the republics and the center.

USDA has devoted considerable efforts to come up with options which are responsive, yet also within their resources and the congressionally-mandated constraints under which they operate. You could, for example, offer guarantees of \$100-\$150 million by increasing the proportion of the risk which private banks would have to assume. But the amount is so small and private banks are so reluctant to do any Soviet lending, that this is not really a responsive offer. Alternatively USDA could offer to encourage private sector barter deals (grain-for-fertilizer for example), but that is a long-shot at best.

Given the constraints we face, the best option is to say no to this request, but to offer to address the underlying causes of Soviet food problems. You announced in December a Presidential initiative to assist the Soviet Union on food distribution, and Agriculture Under Secretary Crowder is scheduled to lead a government delegation to the USSR in May or June to explore what can be done to improve the food distribution system. We could augment that group by asking Ed Hewett to co-chair the delegation, and by adding prominent U.S. businessmen who are knowledgeable on food distribution. And you could ask the group to go soon, say mid-May. The group would assess the food distribution situation, and also the food situation as a whole, talking to responsible authorities at the center and the republics. The group would then report both to President Gorbachev and to you. If that group finds a real basis for a dialogue, you could later ask Secretary Madigan to involve himself in a high-level effort to address the underlying causes of the Soviet food problem.

This approach has several advantages. It addresses the underlying causes of the Soviet food problem, namely the lack of a real market, rather than the immediate symptoms. You do not come down in favor of giving credit to shore up a bankrupt central economic policy, rather you come out in support of more

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reform. Moreover, engaging the Soviets on these issues will increase our knowledge of the actual situation, which will be invaluable in the coming months as the crisis in food, and in the system as a whole, deepens. Finally, this responds to President Gorbachev's request for help. All agencies recommend this option.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message in Tab A for delivery to Gorbachev.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Gorbachev
Tab B	Letter from Gorbachev
Tab C	Recommendation from Secretary Madigan

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SIGNED LETTER BY THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

(Letter is in Package ^{#3450}~~2988~~)

~~SECRET~~

Unofficial translation

March 20, 1991

Moscow

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to note with profound satisfaction the positive development of implementing the practical arrangements between the Soviet and US sides with respect to the grain agreement of June 1, 1990, and to thank you for your personal contribution to this matter.

The current food supply situation in our country makes it possible to confirm our intentions to purchase grains in the United States in the full amount provided for by the agreement.

Taking into account the conditions required for realizing those intentions, I would be grateful to you, Mr. President, if the US side decided to increase the amount of credit extended to the USSR last January by up to 1.5 billion dollars toward payment of the purchases of wheat, corn and soy-bean meal made in the first six months of this year additional to the contracted volume.

I am counting on your understanding in this important matter, whose positive resolution would be a concrete contribution toward strengthening the relationship of cooperation and partnership between our countries and peoples.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

President of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
99-0304-F/1
SS 11/29/07

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
31. Memo	Edward Madigan to POTUS Re: Request by the Soviet Union for Additional Export Credit Guarantees (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0852-MR
ES 4/26/13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 30, 1991

*Copy for
Florence's
file*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
Responding to His Request for Additional CCC
Credits

Purpose

To respond to President Gorbachev's recent letter to you requesting an additional \$1.5 billion in credit guarantees for Soviet purchase of U.S. agricultural products.

Background

In a letter dated March 20 (Tab B) President Gorbachev wrote you requesting \$1.5 billion in credit guarantees for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products, over and above the \$1 billion in guarantees we already extended in January, and the Soviets have used, for FY 1991. Thus they are requesting a total of \$2.5 billion in CCC credits for FY 1991, about half of the total funds available in this year.

We do not know the context of this letter; it came literally attached to President Gorbachev's response to our CFE proposal. The letter probably represents an effort to line up credits and food shipments in anticipation of a possible food shortage later this year. To the extent that the problem is in the food distribution system, or in the government's unwillingness to pay farmers enough to induce them to sell their grain, our grain shipments would, at best, make little difference. They could actually retard development of a grain market.

The requested credits fall under the USDA's GSM-102 program, which offers credit guarantees in order to stimulate commercial sales of U.S. agricultural products abroad. It is a commercial program, not a food aid program. By law, USDA can only authorize loan guarantees under the program if they judge the recipient country to be credit-worthy. Foreign policy considerations cannot be taken into account. Soviet credit-worthiness was already shaky in December when the last loan was made, and it has since deteriorated.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

C. [unclear]

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Based on these considerations, Secretary Madigan (Tab C) recommends against further extension of credits to the Soviets under this program. Treasury and OMB concur in that judgement. State will follow USDA's lead. Secretary Baker would be willing to defend a modest loan, but only if USDA wanted to do it. Even then State would require an EC-type monitoring mechanism to make sure the center is not cutting off some republics from access to the grain. Thus there appears to be no way for you to meet Gorbachev's request.

Gorbachev will not understand, however, if you simply turn down his request. He supported us in the Gulf; we are asking him to overrule his military on CFE; and he now faces the greatest test of his political life. For you to argue that a few provisions of the law keep you from being helpful will seem to him like a slap in the face. We need to find some way to respond which is truly helpful, within our resources, and which does not have the effect of taking sides in disagreements between the republics and the center.

USDA has devoted considerable efforts to come up with options which are responsive, yet also within their resources and the congressionally-mandated constraints under which they operate. You could, for example, offer guarantees of \$100-\$150 million by increasing the proportion of the risk which private banks would have to assume. But the amount is so small and private banks are so reluctant to do any Soviet lending, that this is not really a responsive offer. Alternatively USDA could offer to encourage private sector barter deals (grain-for-fertilizer for example), but that is a long-shot at best.

Given the constraints we face, the best option is to say no to this request, but to offer to address the underlying causes of Soviet food problems. You announced in December a Presidential initiative to assist the Soviet Union on food distribution, and Agriculture Under Secretary Crowder is scheduled to lead a government delegation to the USSR in May or June to explore what can be done to improve the food distribution system. We could augment that group by asking Ed Hewett to co-chair the delegation, and by adding prominent U.S. businessmen who are knowledgeable on food distribution. And you could ask the group to go soon, say mid-May. The group would assess the food distribution situation, and also the food situation as a whole, talking to responsible authorities at the center and the republics. The group would then report both to President Gorbachev and to you. If that group finds a real basis for a dialogue, you could later ask Secretary Madigan to involve himself in a high-level effort to address the underlying causes of the Soviet food problem.

This approach has several advantages. It addresses the underlying causes of the Soviet food problem, namely the lack of a real market, rather than the immediate symptoms. You do not come down in favor of giving credit to shore up a bankrupt central economic policy, rather you come out in support of more

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reform. Moreover, engaging the Soviets on these issues will increase our knowledge of the actual situation, which will be invaluable in the coming months as the crisis in food, and in the system as a whole, deepens. Finally, this responds to President Gorbachev's request for help. All agencies recommend this option.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message in Tab A for delivery to Gorbachev.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev
Tab B Letter from Gorbachev
Tab C Recommendation from Secretary Madigan

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TAB A

T
A
B
A

SECRET

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Mikhail:

Since receiving your letter of March 20 on grain credits, we have given serious consideration to how we might be most helpful to you. I have some ideas which, with your active cooperation, I believe can help you meet your society's continuing food needs.

Specifically, I suggest initiation of an intensive U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation program in food distribution, so that the Soviet Union's ample capacity to produce food can result in adequate supplies for your consumers. If you agree, I am prepared to send a high-level, experienced team to review the situation, assess the problem, and report urgently to you and me on near- and long-term options. This would not be an American solution, but rather a solution developed through U.S.-Soviet cooperation, which is why the mission would need your full backing.

I would propose sending Under Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister, and my Special Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Ed A. Hewett, with a high-level delegation of experts to explore with you all issues relating to your problems in food distribution and, more generally, the food market situation. I suggest they come to the USSR in mid-May for perhaps a week, and then report their views on your situation and potential solutions to both you and me. Our understanding of your situation indicates that only an effort to remedy the distribution problem by fostering effective markets will result in sustainable improvement in food availability for the Soviet people.

I think it makes sense now to address the underlying problem hand-in-hand with you before we make a final decision on further guarantees. Our discretion to offer credit guarantees for agricultural exports is severely restricted by laws requiring evaluation of a country's repayment record. Recent Soviet difficulties in repaying credits make it difficult to meet these legal requirements, particularly in light of the fact that we have already lent you \$1 billion under this program. Nevertheless I am certainly willing to work with you to try to find a creative way to meet these requirements, and also to meet your needs. Some sort of collateralization mechanism is one possibility, but there could be others.

This proposal would focus on a major problem of yours and would further demonstrate our mutual commitment to reform and cooperation. The relationship between our two countries is a very special one, as is our personal relationship. We have

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0851-MR
ES 5/1/13

SECRET

worked well together and there is much more we should do in the months ahead. I look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

SECRET

TAB B

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Unofficial
March 20, 1991
Moscow

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to note with profound satisfaction the positive development of implementing the practical arrangements between the Soviet and US sides with respect to the grain agreement of June 1, 1990, and to thank you for your personal contribution in this matter.

The current food supply situation in our country makes it possible to confirm our intentions to purchase grains in the United States in the full amount provided for by the agreement.

Taking into account the conditions required for realizing those intentions, I would be grateful to you, Mr. President, if the US side decided to increase the amount of credit extended to the USSR last January by up to 1.5 billion dollars toward payment of the purchases of wheat, corn and soy-bean meal made in the first six months of this year additional to the contracted volume.

I am counting on your understanding in this important matter whose positive resolution would be a concrete contribution toward strengthening the relationship of cooperation and partnership between our countries and peoples.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

President of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

99-0304-F/1

SS 11/29/07

TAB C

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
35. Memo	Edward Madigan to POTUS Re: Request by the Soviet Union for Additional Export Credit Guarantees (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	4/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91129-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

SECRET

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Mikhail:

Since receiving your letter of March 20 on grain credits, we have given serious consideration to how we might be most helpful to you. I have some ideas which, with your active cooperation, I believe can help you meet your society's continuing food needs.

Specifically, I suggest initiation of an intensive U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation program in food distribution, so that the Soviet Union's ample capacity to produce food can result in adequate supplies for your consumers. If you agree, I am prepared to send a high-level, experienced team to review the situation, assess the problem, and report urgently to you and me on near- and long-term options. This would not be an American solution, but rather a solution developed through U.S.-Soviet cooperation, which is why the mission would need your full backing.

I would propose sending Under Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister, and my Special Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Ed A. Hewett, with a high-level delegation of experts to explore with you all issues relating to your problems in food distribution and, more generally, the food market situation. I suggest they come to the USSR in mid-May for perhaps a week, and then report their views on your situation and potential solutions to both you and me. Our understanding of your situation indicates that only an effort to remedy the distribution problem by fostering effective markets will result in sustainable improvement in food availability for the Soviet people.

I think it makes sense now to address the underlying problem hand-in-hand with you before we make a final decision on further credit guarantees. The legal requirements for additional credit guarantees are stringent, and we must also determine whether your country can meet those requirements.

This proposal would focus on a major problem of yours and would further demonstrate our mutual commitment to reform and cooperation. The relationship between our two countries is a very special one, as is our personal relationship. We have worked well together and there is much more we should do in the months ahead. I look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0852-142
ES 4/24/13

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 8, 1991

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT
AND CIA DIRECTOR JUDGE WILLIAM WEBSTER

The Briefing Room

8:35 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is with a great sense of pride, genuine pride in his accomplishments, and long years of dedicated service to his country, that I announce that Bill Webster has informed me of his intention to retire as the Director of Central Intelligence. Bill will be leaving federal service after 26 years on the federal bench as Director of the FBI, and as Director of the CIA. And as a former DCI, I know the complex organizations and interrelationships that comprise our intelligence community. Bill has brought an integrity and effectiveness and a insight to the many intelligence-gathering operations of this nation. He has done superb job.

A strong nation requires a strong intelligence organization. And Bill Webster has directed our efforts according to the guidelines that I set down at the beginning of this administration, that the CIA would have the single mission of providing intelligence to the policymakers of this government. And he's performed admirably -- and that is a very important point -- intelligence, not trying to shape policy.

There are those who think CIA should have a different role, but I believe Bill Webster has demonstrated the value of an intelligence organization that is professionally directed and purposely committed. It is invaluable in defending the security of America.

I noticed but one of our coalition partners said -- the dependence on United States intelligence in the recent war. In so many ways, he has performed with great distinction and the best -- the best in the sense of service to his country. And I hate to see him go. This was his choice, but I offer him my thanks and I offer him the thanks of a very grateful nation as he finishes this distinguished career in government and considers other avenues.

And he can say a few words now, and then I'll be glad to take just a few questions.

Director, we're going to miss you, pal. But you're not leaving right now. We're not going to let him go.

DIRECTOR WEBSTER: Thank you, Mr. President. I have many mixed feelings about this morning. There's never an easy time to go, especially when you are working for an organization that you believe in and for people that you believe in. It's been an extraordinary experience to have worked with you, Mr. President. I have worked with you and for you for the last 10 years, and I want to say before I comment further, that I know a good thyroid when I see one. (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: Swallow gently.

DIRECTOR WEBSTER: I think I'm leaving you -- I know I'm leaving you a healthy organization. One that has had, during the last four years, I think, a good track record for its accountability.

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely.

DIRECTOR WEBSTER: So far as it's possible to be accountable. We have positioned ourselves for the challenges of the '90s, which are different than the challenges of the '80s. And I'm very proud of the performance that the entire community rendered during the Persian Gulf.

I realized a couple of months ago that I had finished 20 years of service -- consecutive service and that I was approaching the end of a four-year term -- not term but four-year period. My commission says to serve at the pleasure of the President for the time-being. And this has been a four-year time-being that I've been very proud of and privileged to have served, not only with the President but with his national security advisors. But it seemed to me that this was a good window. You hate to leave, but something tells you that it's a good time to leave. I still have my roots in the law, and this gives me an opportunity to pursue other avenues in the private sector.

So there you are.

THE PRESIDENT: When is the four years up?

DIRECTOR WEBSTER: May 26th.

THE PRESIDENT: May 26th -- but we've got to be flexible on all of that. Now, either the Director or I will be glad to take questions.

Q Did this come as a surprise? Do you have a successor in mind?

THE PRESIDENT: We haven't talked successor. Haven't gotten anyone in mind. But it did come as a surprise when Bill brought this up to me. He told me this several days ago, and it was his decision. I told him that -- what I've said, essentially said here publicly. And he called in yesterday evening and said he thought we ought to go with announcement.

Q Bob Gates had been nominated once before; would he be a candidate?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I said, I haven't considered successors yet, but a worthy man, Gates. We all have great respect for him.

Q Mr. President, speaking of -- early on during the war with Iran, the CIA came under some criticism for not being as informative, not being as informed, perhaps, as it should have been. Was that a factor in this at all?

THE PRESIDENT: We all came under criticism early on, and all I say is look at the results. And in my view, the intelligence was superb. I would call your attention to what the French commander -- who was it yesterday -- commenting on the intelligence that they had to depend on. So we all got criticism. CIA got a little, Defense Department got a little, we took on some water over here. But the result was superb and the intelligence was outstanding, and the community performed fantastically. I had a chance to mention that out at NSA, which is a part of the intelligence community. I hope I'll have a chance to go out to CIA again and say this. But I have no complaints, whatsoever, about the quality of our intelligence.

Q Mr. President, you were described yesterday as elated when you got the news that it was your thyroid, not your heart, that was out of kilter. Do you have any plans to adjust your schedule which we all know is rather grueling for anyone, let alone a 66-year-old?

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: Almost 67. (Laughter.) No. They've said that with the thyroid thing that I might not get into as active an athletic regime as I'd like to. And they told me that this morning when I took this -- did this test. But they're elated that they know what caused this fibrillation and that's it's curable and will be cured very soon. But they've asked me just for the next few days to check it a little bit in terms of athletics, not in terms of my schedule here.

Q But beyond the next few days, will you be scaling back?

THE PRESIDENT: I think -- no, I don't think so. That's the good news, is that once the thyroid is corrected, that means there's no problem on the heart -- thyroid connected to the heart bone, you know. And I think it's going to be all right, and they've assured me that it can be okay, yes.

Q Mr. President, the House will begin voting today on the Brady bill or the Staggers bill. Is there any scenario under which you would find yourself being able to support the Brady bill if in fact it is attached to your comprehensive crime legislation?

THE PRESIDENT: What we've said is we will consider it if it is attached to the comprehensive crime bill. The important legislation, the priority legislation, should be the comprehensive crime bill. And I'm a little discouraged that it has not moved faster. And so I will just stay with that position that we're opposed to them alone, we'll consider them as part of the comprehensive crime bill.

Q What is wrong with waiting seven days, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Our position on this is so well-known I don't want to take up your time going into any more.

Q Mr. President, you've got the Baltic leaders coming in later this morning. What are you going to tell them about your leanings on providing aid to the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm going to tell them that we haven't made a decision on that. I'm going to tell them I must comply with the law as it's written, but I will also tell them that we have a strong and, I think, good relationship with President Gorbachev. And I will tell them that I will be interested in hearing what their problems are. I will tell them that we have never, and will never, recognize the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union. But I will encourage peaceful resolution of these very difficult questions.

Q Your comment about Gorbachev today and a similar one yesterday seemed to indicate that you'd like to help him out, that you might want to work around the edges of that creditworthiness provision in the law to provide some kind of assistance.

THE PRESIDENT: Look, when you look at the accomplishments of Mikhail Gorbachev, they are enormous. And yes, the Soviet Union is fighting difficult economic times. But I am not about to forget history and what he did in terms of Eastern Europe, what he's done in terms of perestroika and glasnost -- has my respect. So we will deal with the facts as they come to us. But I don't want to see a breach in a relationship that is very strong, that's served us extraordinarily well in recent times during the war itself where, for the first time, the Soviet Union and the United States worked in sync on those matters. And I give President Gorbachev great credit for that because he was under some pressures at home.

Q Well, that sounds like you're not going to turn down his request for help.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have to -- as I said the other day -- we have to be sure that we abide by the rules as established -- I think the Agricultural Department has to make certain representations. But look, I've always felt that when people are hungry or need support as it relates to food and nourishment that we ought to try to help.

Q Mr. President, could you give us an update on your review of the White House travel policy, and are you still absolutely firmly convinced that Governor Sununu did not abuse it in any way?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am convinced of that and I'm going to have some changes and I'll announce some soon -- perhaps the next 48 hours.

Q Were the travels that were made that he took -- be permitted under the revisions?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, why don't you wait and see because I don't want to give -- preview it. We pulled one off here with Bill Webster, and it's so much more exciting when you get it when the time is right. So we'll approach it in that open manner.

Q Mr. President, what do you say to the pundits who have suggested that as a result of your health scare over the weekend you might reconsider keeping Dan Quayle on the ticket next year?

THE PRESIDENT: You want that by hand or do you want it by word? (Laughter.)

Q Hand.

Q Hand.

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. I'm no Nelson Rockefeller. (Laughter.) No, I've expressed my support for Dan Quayle. I think he's getting a bum rap in the press -- pounding on him when he's doing a first-class job. And I don't know how many times I have to say it, but I'm not about to change my mind when I see his performance and know what he does. I think it's probably been quite hurtful to him, but he's a man -- strong one and -- in fact, we talked about it a little bit yesterday and I said, look, keep your head up; you're talking to a guy who went through something like this for about eight years -- maybe not quite as intense, but that goes with the territory. And it's unfair and it is piling on and it is beneath the critics to do that at this time, I think. But anyway that's -- it's a question I can't lay to rest.

Q Some Republicans --

THE PRESIDENT: Sure, the critics, any critics. But I'm just telling you how I feel.

Q Mr. President, lately we've been hearing a resurgence of questions and increasing credence to these allegations that the Reagan-Bush campaign in 1980 was involved in a political deal to hold off on hostage releases until after the election. And even President Carter, who hadn't said this before, thinks that there should be at least some investigation. Don't you think that with all of these allegations coming from so many different continents and so many questions being raised that at least an investigation would be warranted to lay some of these issues to rest?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Congress -- some Democratic members are looking at it right now and that's fine. I can only say categorically that the allegations about me are grossly untrue, factually incorrect, bald-faced lies. And I have my schedule out there -- I think it was in -- put in the days in question was in detail in the paper. And those critics -- those who continue to pass this little word-of-mouth ugly rumor ought to have the decency and the honor to say this takes care of this question. I'm talking about myself. And I can categorically deny any contact with the Iranians

or anything having to do with it. And to assign -- let me give you a little more lecture on this, Rita -- to assign a motive to a person that he'd want to keep an American in prison one day longer I think is vicious. And I really am turned off by this -- and I am disappointed in this Mr. Sick, whoever he is.

Q But, Mr. President, you wouldn't object then to Congress to -- if there wasn't --

THE PRESIDENT: They can do whatever they want. It's been looked at exhaustively. But all I'm talking about -- all I can speak for is my own participation or lack thereof. And I think the people that are making these insidious insinuations ought to have the honor to say this takes care of it. But that's not the way the rumor mill works.

Q Mr. President, I just wanted to follow up on the question about the Vice President. The confidence you've expressed in him is buttressed by those around the White House here who say that he's very much a player. There is strong evidence, apart from what the media may or may not write, that that confidence is not widely shared among people in the general public. And I wonder, sir, if you have contemplated altering his role, giving him more of a chance to be seen, or anything that might allow him to shake this image that he seems to have acquired.

THE PRESIDENT: I'd love to be helpful to him in any way I could in that regard. In my view, he is doing his assignments very well -- Competitive Council, Space Council. He's done a lot of very important foreign travel for me, particularly as it relates to South America. And so I can think of a lot of things that maybe I could emphasize more because I want to help. I don't like to see somebody unfairly criticized. To me, it's a question of -- again, a question of honor. I just don't -- I don't like it. I see him in action, I know what he's doing. He's been extraordinarily helpful. And I can't ask any more of him. But, Brit, if there was something I could do to help, I'd want very much to do it, because I have great respect for him.

MR. FITZWATER: Final question.

Q The Iraqis this morning tried to shoot down an American plane. What will be the United States' reaction?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we're looking into that. Fortunately it didn't hit anybody. And I gathered from the Pentagon they're not particularly concerned. But we have to look into that.

Q It seems that more and more the U.S. is going deeper in northern Iraq. Aren't you entering the quagmire that you tried so hard to avoid?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as you know, I expressed my concern early on that I did not want to get bogged down. But what we're doing is humanitarian. We're getting enormous credit, finally -- not that we're in there for credit -- for saving lives and helping innocent victims of Saddam Hussein's brutality. And so you raise a very good question because I don't want to see us get into a quagmire or get further militarily involved with some permanent presence required. I will be talking to the Secretary General of the U.N., I think it's tomorrow, and I would hope that the U.N. could do in the north that which they're doing in the south.

This is the last one, then I really do have to go.

Q Mr. President, can you tell us your feelings now towards the Middle East? You've got Secretary Baker heading back for yet another trip. The Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh is going to be there at the same time. Does this signal some sort of breakthrough in the offing? Is there something that gives you cause for optimism?

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't say breakthrough -- I wouldn't say breakthrough. But cause for optimism? I think there's reason to be optimistic. I won't go into the details right now because when you're dealing with a situation of this complexity and of this endurance, you have to use some quiet diplomacy, which Secretary Baker is very effectively using. But I saw after his last trip some very, quite negative reports. And I don't think it's negative. I think there's still a real opportunity here. And I don't say that just wishfully, I say it after talking to him and talking to some leaders around the world. So it's -- I'd like to say optimism, but I don't want to go overboard on it because there's still a complex problem.

Q But there are some who think that you may be being misled in a sight or proof of that that action such as the Israelis continuing to establish settlements that people may be telling the Secretary one thing but unable to -- either unable to deliver or actually not telling the truth about their intentions.

THE PRESIDENT: As we know, these differences have gone on for a long, long time. And I don't think that's the case -- that somebody's saying one thing and then going off and just doing something behind his back. But, no, it's complex. But I wouldn't -- I don't accept that criticism. There's plenty of room to critique this and to wish for more progress from one country or another. But there's a lot going on. And I want to stay involved myself. I want to be a part of this because I think we have an opportunity now. And I think countries that the United States have helped recognize that. And I think Israel understands that. I think the Saudis understand that. I think the Egyptians understand that. And so I want to use that goodwill to further peace in the Middle East. And so I'm -- put it this way -- moderately optimistic.

Thank you all very much.

END

8:54 A.M. EDT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3450

May 8, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ED A. HEWETT

SUBJECT:

Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock

At Tab I is a letter from the President to Amb Matlock via backchannel requesting that he deliver a letter to President Gorbachev. At Tab A is a memorandum to State enclosing a copy of the message with the note that it was sent via backchannel in response to Amb Matlock's letter to the President which was received backchannel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the message at Tab I to be sent to Ambassador Matlock via backchannel.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Request that you authorize Bill Sittmann to send the memorandum at Tab A to State.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Backchannel message to Amb Matlock

Tab A Memorandum to State

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0852-112
ES 4/26/13

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TO AMB MATLOCK
DELIVER 1 OPENING OF BUSINESS

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FROM THE PRESIDENT
VIA BACK CHANNEL

1. Please deliver the attached letter personally to President Gorbachev as soon as is possible.
2. I have read your account of the meeting with President Gorbachev and I am greatly concerned that he has perceived a weakening in our support for him, or for the reform process.
3. Pass on to President Gorbachev the excerpts from the transcript of my Wednesday press conference in which I reiterate my strong support for him and for reforms.
4. Tell him of my concern, and say that I would like to talk to him personally to reaffirm my strong commitment to him, and to our bilateral relationship, and to discuss how we can move to strengthen the relationship.
5. Ask him when I should call. The best times for me are from 3:00pm Friday (EST) through Sunday afternoon.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0852-MR
ES 4/26/13

SIGNED LETTER BY THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

(Letter is in Package 2988)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 8, 1991

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

Q Mr. President, you've got the Baltic leaders coming in later this morning. What are you going to tell them about your leanings on providing aid to the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm going to tell them that we haven't made a decision on that. I'm going to tell them I must comply with the law as it's written, but I will also tell them that we have a strong and, I think, good relationship with President Gorbachev. And I will tell them that I will be interested in hearing what their problems are. I will tell them that we have never, and will never, recognize the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union. But I will encourage peaceful resolution of these very difficult questions.

Q Your comment about Gorbachev today and a similar one yesterday seemed to indicate that you'd like to help him out, that you might want to work around the edges of that creditworthiness provision in the law to provide some kind of assistance.

THE PRESIDENT: Look, when you look at the accomplishments of Mikhail Gorbachev, they are enormous. And yes, the Soviet Union is fighting difficult economic times. But I am not about to forget history and what he did in terms of Eastern Europe, what he's done in terms of perestroika and glasnost -- has my respect. So we will deal with the facts as they come to us. But I don't want to see a breach in a relationship that is very strong, that's served us extraordinarily well in recent times during the war itself where, for the first time, the Soviet Union and the United States worked in sync on those matters. And I give President Gorbachev great credit for that because he was under some pressures at home.

Q Well, that sounds like you're not going to turn down his request for help.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have to -- as I said the other day -- we have to be sure that we abide by the rules as established -- I think the Agricultural Department has to make certain representations. But look, I've always felt that when people are hungry or need support as it relates to food and nourishment that we ought to try to help.

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3450

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Backchannel Message to Ambassador Matlock (U)

We have sent the enclosed message to Ambassador Matlock.
It was necessary to use backchannel since it responds to
Ambassador Matlock's backchannel message to the President. (S)

William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Message

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0852-MR
ES 4/26/13

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MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear Mikhail:

Since receiving your letter of March 20 on grain credits, we have given serious consideration to how we might be most helpful to you. I have some ideas which, with your active cooperation, I believe can help you meet your society's continuing food needs.

Specifically, I suggest initiation of an intensive U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation program in food distribution, so that the Soviet Union's ample capacity to produce food can result in adequate supplies for your consumers. If you agree, I am prepared to send a high-level, experienced team to review the situation, assess the problem, and report urgently to you and me on near- and long-term options. This would not be an American solution, but rather a solution developed through U.S.-Soviet cooperation, which is why the mission would need your full backing.

I would propose sending Under Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder, Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister, and my Special Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Ed A. Hewett, with a high-level delegation of experts to explore with you all issues relating to your problems in food distribution and, more generally, the food market situation. I suggest they come to the USSR in mid-May for perhaps a week, and then report their views on your situation and potential solutions to both you and me. Our understanding of your situation indicates that only an effort to remedy the distribution problem by fostering effective markets will result in sustainable improvement in food availability for the Soviet people.

I think it makes sense now to address the underlying problem hand-in-hand with you before we make a final decision on further guarantees. Our discretion to offer credit guarantees for agricultural exports is severely restricted by laws requiring evaluation of a country's repayment record. Recent Soviet difficulties in repaying credits make it difficult to meet these legal requirements, particularly in light of the fact that we have already lent you \$1 billion under this program. Nevertheless I am certainly willing to work with you to try to find a creative way to meet these requirements, and also to meet your needs. Some sort of collateralization mechanism is one possibility, but there could be others.

This proposal would focus on a major problem of yours and would further demonstrate our mutual commitment to reform and cooperation. The relationship between our two countries is a very special one, as is our personal relationship. We have

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worked well together and there is much more we should do in the months ahead. I look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 8, 1991

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

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