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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91129
Folder ID Number: 91129-001

Folder Title:
Gorbachev -Sensitive January - June 1991 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Luncheon Meeting Between the President and Yevgeniy Primakov, Member of the USSR Security Council (3 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1)	S
02a. Report	Re: Steps being taken in the Soviet Union to implement the disarmament intiative (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02b. Report	Re: [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02c. Report	Re: Steps being taken in the Soviet Union to implement the disarmament intiative (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02d. Report	Re: [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev [Meeting Notes] (11 pp.)	10/29/91	(b)(1)	
04. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	
05. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	
06. Cable	To White House, Re: Message for General Scowcroft from Jim Collins [261600Z Sep 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1084
OA/ID Number: 91129-001
Date Closed: 4/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Cable	To White House, Re: Message for General Scowcroft from Jim Collins [261600Z Sep 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S
08a. Cable	To White House, Re: Message for Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08b. Cable	Re: Message to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday's Meeting in Moscow (4 pp.)	9/11/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Checklist	Re: Checklist: Actions After Baltics Announcement (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11a. Report	Re: [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11b. Report	Re: [Russian] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12a. Note	Re: Arnie Kanter to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	S
12b. Outline	Re: U.S.-Soviet Summit in Moscow (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12c. Schedule	Re: Notional Schedule (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12d. List	Re: Treaties/Agreements to be Signed (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12e. Message	Re: Oral Message from A. Bessmertnykh to Secretary J. Baker [English] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
12f. Message	Re: Oral Message from A. Bessmertnykh to Secretary J. Baker [Russian] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
13. Aide Memoire	Re: We would like to express.. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14a. Letter	Re: Letter of Application [English] (1 pp.)	7/15/91	(b)(1)	
14b. Letter	Re: Letter of Application [Russian] (1 pp.)	7/15/91	(b)(1)	
15. Letter	Viktor G. Komplektov to James A. Baker, III (1 pp.)	6/15/91	(b)(1)	
16a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Soviet Embassy Translation] (5 pp.)	6/15/91	(b)(1)	
16b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (8 pp.)	6/15/91	(b)(1)	
16c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (8 pp.)	6/15/91	(b)(1)	
16d. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	6/15/91	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
16e. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	6/15/91	(b)(1)	
17. Report	Re: Gorbachev's Future [FOIA exemptions redacted] (16 pp.)	5/23/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

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~~SECRET~~ 4283

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting Between the President and Yevgeniy Primakov, Member of the USSR Security Council

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Yevgeniy Primakov, Member of the USSR Security Council

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 31, 1991, 12 - 1:00pm
Oval Office

Yevgeniy Primakov: The situation is truly critical. Gorbachev has reaffirmed his dedication to economic reform. Do not underestimate Pavlov. He is trying very hard, but he is not a politician, and sometimes he makes ill-considered statements. (S)

The Moiseyev visit was well received. He is not sophisticated, but he understood you. (S)

What we need now is large-scale assistance. The issue is taking on strategic importance. Mikhail Gorbachev has named me as the coordinator of the assistance. Yavlinskiy is able, but he wasn't involved at the beginning. He works for me. Don't overestimate him -- he is a bit immature. He works on instructions he got from Gorbachev. (S)

We (Yavlinskiy and Primakov) must get together, and not have competing plans. We will use the results of Yavlinskiy's work in Boston as an "overlay" on our basic plan. (S)

We want you to come to a summit. (U)

The President: We want to if we can only hammer out our differences on arms control. (S)

The Economic Summit is a more complicated issue. We have to work it out so that Gorbachev doesn't ask, then go away empty-handed. (S)

Yeltsin says what many want to hear. (S)

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The question is which comes first: reform or aid. We are broke right now, more or less. I have to be able to go to our Treasury and the IMF and present something which is economically feasible. (S)

We will also have a big problem with your defense spending. That will be a big issue with our conservatives. (He mentions a chart used at Malta). (S)

(The President then describes the views on defense budget by the U.S. and by the Soviet Military).

You get great credit for Eastern Europe, etc., and for the historic and dramatic changes you have undertaken. (U)

Yevgeniy Primakov: Yeltsin is not a serious political figure, but he is a fact. We are trying hard to work with him. (S)

We need to stop aid to Cuba, but it would be a disaster to associate it with Western aid. (S)

The President: Who would it be a disaster for? (S)

Yevgeniy Primakov: How much of a disaster will depend on how well the economy is doing. Now people are saying we have gotten nothing from the West, or internally, from our new course. For example we walked away from a hugh infrastructure we built in East Germany. (S)

For us the Baltics are a problem. Gorbachev rejects the use of force. (S)

Those who don't accept 9+1 must accept five principles:

-- A single monetary unit
-- Fixed contributions to the center
-- A single ??? system
-- No internal customs
-- Single price for fixed-price products

If they won't play by these rules, we would have to try to find something else, for example trading at world prices. There also may be a reward for ?????

Gorbachev has said that relations with the U.S. are a #1 priority, so your respect has great importance for us. (S)

The Balts must understand they have no economic niche in Europe. They also want to cut their economic ties as if nothing much changed. The borders of Lithuania, for example, are now an issue. (S)

So this is a complicated issue. We fell some in the U.S. are turning their backs on us. (S)

The President: (Discussed the ????? of Yeltsin vs. Gorbachev. (S)

Yevgeniy Primakov: We are now doing things right. We are now following the law. The basic contradiction between us and the U.S. is we right now cannot fully abandon all administrative methods. We need to move to a market economy, but our transition requires some levers. Our people won't use initiative -- they wait to be told. (S)

The President: There is a perception here that the military establishment are pressuring Gorbachev to ????

Yevgeniy Primakov: The reality is more complex. At the last (Communist Party) Plenum the conservatives wanted to take over. They were defeated in their efforts. As an institution, the military supports Gorbachev, but not Yeltsin. If the military and conservative establishments combine, then that is a problem. (S)

Gorbachev will not come to London and ask for $100 billion. (S)

The President: I have a question on CFE. Gorbachev signed a treaty. Then we think the military made Gorbachev pull back from the treaty, and are resisting it. (S)

Yevgeniy Primakov: They couldn't openly be against a treaty, no. The militaries talk much about asymmetries: NATO, but no Warsaw Pact, etc. But nobody wants to stop arms control and reductions. We will reduce our military expenditures. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

ORIG
cy provided by John Gordon

Handed to me by Gorbachev 10-29 at dinner given by King of Spain

Steps being taken in the Soviet Union to implement the disarmament initiative

503 ICBMs, with the aggregate of II54 warheads, have been taken off alert.

6 submarines with 92 SLBM launchers have been made non-operational.

All heavy bombers have been taken off alert.

All 36 rail-mobile ICBM launchers have been made stationary in their permanent basing locations.

The programs of the development of a small mobile ICBM, modified short-range nuclear missile for heavy bombers, and modernization of ICBMs for rail-mobile missile systems have been terminated.

The schedule of START reductions has been adjusted to reach the aggregate level of 5000 warheads (instead of 6000 under the Treaty).

We have started the withdrawal from permanent locations of nuclear artillery warheads, nuclear warheads for ground-based tactical missiles, nuclear high explosives and nuclear warheads of anti-aircraft missiles.

Tactical nuclear weapons are being removed from ships and multi-purpose submarines, and from land-based naval aircraft, to be placed in central storage locations. As in the U.S., the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Navy will take eight to nine months.

The following dates have been set for the completion of the elimination of weapons to be destroyed:

- naval tactical nuclear weapons, 1995;
- nuclear warheads of anti-aircraft missiles, 1996;
- nuclear mines, 1998;
- nuclear warheads of tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells, 2000.

It should be noted that the scale of the work involved is greater than in the United States.

As of October 5 a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing is in effect.

A schedule of reductions of the USSR armed forces by 700 thousand persons over 5 years has been established.

A special coordinating commission has been set up, with representatives of government agencies and of the republics (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus), to oversee the implementation of the program of unilateral steps and develop positions for negotiations and consultations.

The program has been approved by the State Council.

- Сняты с боевого дежурства 503 МБР, оснащенных в общей сложности 1154 боеголовками.

- Выведены из боевого состава 6 ПЛАРБ, 92 ПУ БРПЛ.

- Сняты с боевого дежурства все тяжелые бомбардировщики.

- Поставлены в места постоянного размещения все 36 ПУ МБР железнодорожного базирования.

- Прекращены программы разработки мобильной малогабаритной МБР, модифицированной ядерной ракеты малой дальности для советских ТБ, модернизации МБР для железнодорожных ракетных комплексов.

- Скорректирован график сокращения СНВ до суммарного уровня ядерных боезарядов в 5000 единиц (вместо 6000 ед. по Договору).

- Начат вывод из мест постоянного размещения ядерных боеприпасов атомной артиллерии, ядерных боеголовок тактических ракет наземного базирования, ядерных фугасов и ядерных боеголовок зенитных ракет.

- Снимается тактическое ядерное оружие с кораблей и многоцелевых подводных лодок, а также авиации ВМФ наземного базирования для размещения в местах централизованного хранения. Как и в США, вывод ТЯО с флота займет у нас примерно 8-9 месяцев.

- Установлены следующие сроки завершения ликвидации: ТЯО ВМФ - 1995 год, ядерные боеголовки зенитных ракет - 1996 год, ядерные мины - 1998 год, ядерные боеголовки тактических ракет и ядерные артснаряды - 2000 г. Следует отметить, что масштабы соответствующих работ у нас превосходят американские.

- Объявлен мораторий на один год (с 5 октября с.г.) на проведение ядерных испытаний.

- Разработан график сокращения численности ВС СССР на 700 тыс.человек в течение 5 лет.

- Приступили к созданию специальной координационной комиссии с участием ведомств и республик (РСФСР, Украина, Казахстан и Беларусь) для наблюдения за выполнением программы односторонних мер и разработки позиций для переговоров и консультаций.

Программа одобрена Государственным Советом.

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- Скорректирован график сокращения СНВ до суммарного уровня ядерных боезарядов в 5000 единиц (вместо 6000 ед. по Договору).

- Начат вывод из мест постоянного размещения ядерных боеприпасов атомной артиллерии, ядерных боеголовок тактических ракет наземного базирования, ядерных фугасов и ядерных боеголовок зенитных ракет.

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Программа одобрена Государственным Советом.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ed Hewett
has transcribed
& will send
Dave a copy.

P/Corrections
10/29/91

G Let's spend couple of evenings here to organize this Tabbs. I have 2 or 3 dup cards I'll pull as do 2.

P

G Suggest a couple of words 1st on MIDEast Conf. Discuss a couple of probs. Need to talk in detail on our intended sit. Not all, but what we are doing now.

P That is fine. We can't cover everything but why don't you start.

G One Conf, I will be brief. It poses again a kind of coop we have been close to achieving past couple of years. Some ask whether it works now coop or I & C & what Gorb represents. I must note here your balanced attitude on this question. I think we still have much work to do together. The aspects we have played together over past period such as coop project like Asian Conf, our efforts, esp Baker, we now beginning this unprecedented Conf. My impression is we must be cautious & participants will look for cues to time & need to continue. Not that we should work instead of them but we are facilitators of process. We should give them a chance to work

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for themselves. Yesterday I spoke w/ PS Cyprus. He hopes you + Denn find a way to devote. That Cyprus part can be solved. This way / at early. He seems a serious man.

P Very good news. We hoped for progress but then Turks pulled back.

G He said that now we working together, we should remember Cyprus issue was created by force & should be solved not by force but negot. On other sits we have not put up force. On Cyprus sit is of great concern. They seem unable to launch a pol. process, despite assis. by all. Don't know if you have considered raising this in UNSC. Maybe we should think about it.

P Some claim this is internal matter + UN should stay out.

G External intervention is inadmissible but taking a principled stand would be useful

P The SC did pass a resolution not Too long ago.

B Now there is an effective central govt

P We open minded. Let's keep talking. Did you talk w/ Greek leaders after my trip?

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G They meet Lebanon w/ promises of close ties & good offices

B The USSC dislikes sessions embargo. It seems specious.

G Bad precedent this happening after Paris CSCE conf.

B The EC is not united on this issue.

G Yes. Some were hasty in saying there no more Yalta. Not helpful. Maybe we should have addit. exchanges on this. CSCE must continue (review) if we can't deal w/ this.

P Thing I say a word on conf. We appreciate your role - esp w/ Syria & Poles. We must continue to work together - Soviets TO attend multi conf & Poles not TO miss things esp. If conf to succeed, we must stay together

G Dagen. Should we react to terrorist act? We'll get questions.

S We have considered it.

G So we could do that & say it in attempt to pacify conf.

B Two probs. Encourage Syria to participate in conf of multi meeting. Other is site of follow-on conf. Arabs want Madrid, Israel wants everything in a region. We need a compromise formulation.

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look at statement for Lies.

G Today we can focus on it is Talk w/ Soviets. We should not focus exclusively on Lie or multi. We need a balance.

B But Lie need to start in 4 days or might not at all. Rhetoric in this corp will be extreme.

G Meeting of Cabinet, 242, & settlements.

P Tonight is only all. Don't say all about think center

G Nothing new in my remarks.
2nd Topic is . . . —

P coming to Reagan library opening Sunday. Chairman

T G Got a letter from Lin Ce Channing crow. Was about our domestic probs & where we are. Our purpose much is happening. Question is how to end a crisis. Only way is to accelerate reform — market oriented Pol & econ reforms. Must be single market. Awareness of this is growing. Central question is future of our state. After August there is running debate & statements by reports declaring update — which didn't change anything. Just a prelude from which to take steps to voluntary assoc. Some related to Russian statements about frontiers. That spurred Soviet separatist move & talk about

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launched

Russian Empire. It was bitter despite. Dif to reach phase of joint statement by 10 but a process is now launched. Treaty rejected in form never. by Yavlinsky Gen said in rep. return of USSR center, but cop requires some sort of all-Union. Ukraine said it will shortly sign econ treaty. We worked w/ Yeltsin on draft union treaty & have sent it to reps. Central point is it will be union state, but a free ~~for~~ confederation. It will have central inst. & powers. Will have control over energy, transp communications, R+D. We have responses from most of reps. Nazar. suggests clarifies be stronger & other reps. Yeltsin has comments but process slow on way. State Council will meet on Nov 11 to discuss. But Yeltsin under severe pressure by those who support dif concept. People who think Russia should shed other reps & go ahead alone. Yeltsin understands what that would mean. Russia then would be in period of unpleasant & other reps would be in state of chaos. Other regimes could rise - even Yeltsin could be jettisoned. He understands but he is

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Miscellaneous Handwriting

easily swayed. His speech had 2 parts. On economy he stuck to conservative approach tho in some questions he was a bit rash. That not too dangerous because he needs a push to be conservative. So that a positive part of speech. It was a dramatic & brave decision - not his usual position. It dispersion but he did it. I spoke to him yesterday & said I & we would support that positive part of a speech using union words. But rest of speech worrisome. Tho he requires support of union, he retreated on some issues in union treaty. Also made some rash statements on issues of great importance. Still & it my duty to give him support because he is pushing reform.

P Dobrynin - Russia - want to [illegible] a center. We can't see over a horizon

G That a direct question. That was happening. Shevardnadze returned from Crimea. That would require a demarcation. It took big effort on my part to hold line. That process was stopped. I helped Yeltsin to get out of his box by accepting decisions he made during a coup. His present sit not entirely adequate.

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Miscellaneous Handwriting

Today - for Russia - a new version
gets given to Russian leadership
& reporters. They can't accept direct
Russian direction - most reporters
support a center. He & I had good
weekend working about this. Don't
like speech scheduled Sat morning.
Should be going to ~~the~~ separation that could
be disaster for all. My view is we
need find optimum solution for econ
& pol treaties. I working w/ each republic
on this. Crucial time for us &
West as is approaching. What sort
of SC is needed. You need to take a
clear stand & proof of support. We expect
final credits connecting to S.S. Pub
& payments. Yeltsin working called last night.
Told me G-7 had done excellent work
& up to their heads to make final
decision. I request you to take
initiative & accept that decision.
What is it? $370 mil in cuts needed
Today. I will personally explain upon
SA & Korea. Finally 2.5 bil needed
for flexibility in case of mil & domestic
& dangers in critical yet. You all
understand what happening & the
implications. Best voice Christ seems
to be drawing a blank. Yesterday

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Miscellaneous Handwriting

they ~~big~~ did sign MOU on prej. debt. Some at special summit.

P Let me be very frank. Urge you base my position this time support for entire - not exclusively - and you Kim Dynes can speak to that effect which was sharply critiqued.

7. I assume I am not (Nicholas national's reaction) We maintain contact w/ Yeltsin & others - not behind your back. Many wonder what Yeltsin speech meant & how good a credit. Our law requires cert. of creditworthiness. The G-7 have good regime of content to agree, reports on creditworthiness are dispositive. How we get past our law & best brains yet. If can review we can do something - not all. We need reports to participate - they have assets. Even for something less we have to deal w/ G-7 experts who may or may not be more than expected. So we want to go ahead but need addit assurance reports are unrevised.

6 The MOU is just that. Reports - recognize debt & release resp for it. They authorize central bank to act in their behalf & all will provide for servicing debt & its obligations.

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Miscellaneous Handwriting

Let me be very frank. 10-15 bil cut would force us to ~~go~~ repayment cut expenditures part. If we have this deadline we - you & me - will pay much more later. You mention demands of Congress. The routine approach that recommends. But in this crisis pt, routine decisions not possible. Political decisions required.

P That why I asked you about possibility of reactivating corps. Another new element is very pt at home. Not like yours, for which I grateful. But demands to forget foreign affairs & focus on Chicago, etc. Can you help here & can you certify credit? We must put it on desk and get credit. I can't say what you need is - only you can. But I can tell you what I can do now 1.5 bil for 6 months while you ~~get~~ get out emission republic pt. If that insufficient to your needs go back & consult & see what might be done. But if you want something now I can do this for 2 reasons: it avoids [illegible] & it would be credit is better.

now mailed

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if something we can start w/ now?
B-S if that puts you in trouble at home, may be best to depart. Best I can do since night crosses.

G. We have 2 probs - just credits & our hope for 3.5 before new harvest. 2nd one need decision confirmed by G-7 experts.

P What is a 2nd?

G. G-7 agreed about current debt payment rel. 370 will come to continue Foster action by SA Fund for 1 bil. Host 2.5 bil standby. One food credits one invite IMF & WBank experts to supervise our activities. G-7 reps handle necessary data. Main G-7 worry was need for IMF & quantification percents to do resp. for foreign debt, That has been done.

B P is talking about 1.5 - 165 mil is grant 250 in credit now & 1 bil in 60 days. P says that what US can do now. Doesn't get into project aid like food processing, etc. People can't eat projects. This is really all we can do now.

We request flexibility. You remember am telling you in June of possible Pentagon comp. We heard disturbing

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reports of this speech last Friday (describes). We went to Russian minds + questioned this. We think we took some effect. Some doing what we can. If we know where speech doesn't accord w/ your Union agreement maybe we could help more.

7 G They all want to show they can handle world
7 with contacts w/ US. It may not.
7 I think we can handle. I am confident but it won't be easy. That why I so insistent in raising c and cosmos now.

P We will talk to one G-7 man when I get back.

G On AC we can say we discussed ours.

On dis why don't we say we had a full discussion of all aspects of the Iran sit & we will continue after we have heard a report from our G-7 deputies.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

For Immediate Release January 29 1991

JOINT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ALEXANDER BESSMERTNYKH

JANUARY 29, 1991

In the course of the discussions held in Washington on January 26-29, 1991, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Bessmertnykh and US Secretary of State James Baker devoted considerable attention to the situation in the Persian Gulf.

The Ministers reiterated the commitment of their countries to the UN Security Council resolutions adopted in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. They expressed regret that numerous efforts of the United Nations, other international organizations, individual countries, and envoys were all rebuffed by Iraq. The military actions authorized by the United Nations have been provoked by the refusal of the Iraqi leadership to comply with the clear and lawful demands of the international community for withdrawal from Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker emphasized that the United States and its coalition partners are seeking the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. He stressed that the United States has no quarrel with the people of Iraq, and poses no threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. Secretary Baker reiterated that the United States is doing its utmost to avoid casualties among the civilian population, and is not interested in expanding the conflict. Minister of Foreign Affairs Bessmertnykh took note of the American position and agreed that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait must remain the goal of the international community. Both sides believe that everything possible should be done to avoid further escalation of the war and expansion of its scale.

The Ministers continue to believe that a cessation of hostilities would be possible if Iraq would make an unequivocal commitment to withdraw from Kuwait. They also believe that such a commitment must be backed by immediate, concrete steps leading to full compliance with the Security Council resolutions.

The Iraqi leadership has to respect the will of the international community. By doing so, it has it within its power to stop the violence and bloodshed.

The Ministers agreed that establishing enduring stability and peace in the region after the conflict, on the basis of effective security arrangements, will be a high priority of our two governments. Working to reduce the risk of war and miscalculation will be essential, particularly because a spiralling arms race in this volatile region can only generate greater violence and extremism. In addition, dealing with the causes of instability and the sources of conflict, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, will be especially important. Indeed, both Ministers agreed that without a meaningful peace process -- one which promotes a just peace, security, and real reconciliation for Israel, Arab states, and Palestinians -- it will not be possible to deal with the sources of conflict and instability in the region. Both Ministers, therefore, agreed that in the aftermath of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, mutual US-Soviet efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace and regional stability, in consultation with other parties in the region, will be greatly facilitated and enhanced.

The two Ministers are confident that the United States and the Soviet Union, as demonstrated in various other regional conflicts, can make a substantial contribution to the the achievement of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

###

Unofficial translation

Moscow

September 26, 1991

The President of the
United States of America
George BUSH

Dear George,

I have just got word from you about your call to Boris Yeltsin and your conversation with Leonid Kravchuk. I believe these contacts of yours are going to be useful for our common cause.

Even before that I was going to send you today a short letter advising you that tomorrow I am dispatching Grigory Yavlinskiy to London for a meeting with John Major.

He will inform John that probably in early October a special association agreement will be signed with the IMF, and in early November - with the World Bank Group. They have agreed to provide an input into completing the economic union treaty which the Republics said they will be ready to sign soon; they will also be taking part in developing concrete inter-Republic agreements on the basis of that treaty. We shall draw on their expertise in working out new steps to implement the economic reform.

Grigory Yavlinskiy will also be informing John about our critical foreign debt servicing problems that you are aware of and will provide data on our debt payments and credit status. John will then convey this information to you on a very confidential basis.

Boris Pankin has reported to me in detail about your meeting with him. I am very pleased with it. I am happy to see this profound understanding on your part of the urgent

need to support us now, and I really appreciate the willingness of the administration to do everything in its power to have our agreements realized.

Please convey best regards to Barbara from myself and Raisa. My best to Jim.

I remain

Sincerely yours,

M.GORBACHEV

Президенту
Соединенных Штатов Америки
Джорджу БУШУ

Москва,
26 сентября 1991 года

Дорогой Джордж,

Я только что получил от тебя уведомление о звонке Б.Н.Ельцину и о твоем разговоре с Л.Кравчуком. Думаю, что такие твои контакты будут полезны для нашего общего дела.

Еще до этого я собирался послать тебе именно сегодня краткое письмо, сообщить о том, что завтра я направляю Григория Явлинского в Лондон для встречи с Джоном Мейджором.

Он информирует Джона о том, что в начале октября, наверно, будет подписано соглашение о специальной ассоциации с МВФ, а в начале ноября - с группой организаций Мирового банка. У нас есть с ними договоренность о привлечении их к доработке договора об экономическом союзе, который республики выразили готовность подписать в ближайшее время: они примут участие и в разработке конкретных межреспубликанских соглашений на основе договора. Будем пользоваться их консультациями при разработке новых шагов по осуществлению экономической реформы.

Г.Явлинский информирует Джона об известных тебе критических наших проблемах по обслуживанию внешнего долга, сообщит данные о нашем платежном и кредитном состоянии. Джон потом передаст их тебе в сугубо конфиденциальном порядке.

Б.Панкин подробно доложил мне о твоей встрече с ним. Я очень удовлетворен ею. Рад, что с твоей стороны встречаю такое глубокое понимание неотложной необходимости поддержать нас сейчас, признателен за готовность сделать все от администрации зависящее, чтобы наши договоренности состоялись.

Прошу передать от меня и от Раисы Максимовны самые добрые пожелания Барбаре. Мой привет Джиму.

Остаюсь искренне твой

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Cable	To White House, Re: Message for General Scowcroft from Jim Collins [261600Z Sep 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2011-0850-MR(505)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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~~SECRET~~

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1.4(c); 3.3(b)(6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0850-MR
7/31/2014 MM

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARGE JIM COLLINS
BEGIN TEXT
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON SEPTEMBER 26 CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER ON THE YELTSIN PHONE CALL TO GORBACHEV AIDE ANATOLIY CHERNYAYEV. CHERNYAYEV. WHO SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD THE NEWS REPORTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S CALL. READ THE LETTER WITHOUT COMMENT.
3. AFTER THANKING CHARGE FOR THE LETTER CHERNYAYEV TURNED TO ECONOMICS. HE SAID HE WANTED TO INFORM US THAT ECONOMIC ADVISOR GRIGORIY YAVLINSKIY WILL VISIT BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR SEPTEMBER 27 IN MAJOR'S CAPACITY AS G-7 CHAIRMAN. YAVLINSKIY WILL ALSO VISIT FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL SEPTEMBER 28 OR 30 IN BONN. IN BOTH CAPITALS YAVLINSKIY INTENDS TO DISCUSS HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
4. CHERNYAYEV WAS UPBEAT ON THE PROSPECT FOR AN ECONOMIC UNION ACCORD. WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE CONCLUDED NEXT WEEK. CHERNYAYEV ALSO SAID THAT IMF DIRECTOR CAMDESEUSS MIGHT VISIT MOSCOW NEXT WEEK TO SIGN AN IMF AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR. SUBSEQUENTLY, IMF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD SIT IN ON THE IMPLEMENTING NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD BE HELD WITH REPUBLICS TO FLESH OUT A DRAFT ECONOMIC ACCORD.
5. CHERNYAYEV THOUGHT THAT REPUBLICAN DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE WOULD NOT DERAIL THE ECONOMIC ACCORD. HE SAID THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE A SOBERING UP PERIOD LATER THIS YEAR AS REPUBLICS WERE FORCED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH HOW TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC

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DISLOCATIONS. ACCORDING TO CHERNYAYEV, YAVLINSKIY BELIEVES THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE AN ECONOMIC UNION EVEN IF SOME REPUBLICS INTRODUCE THEIR OWN CURRENCY.

6. CHERNYAYEV SAID GORBACHEV IS WORKING NOW ON A LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT THE INFORMATION THAT YAVLINSKIY IS PASSING ON TO MAJOR AND KOHL. THE GORBACHEV LETTER WILL ALSO STATE THAT YAVLINSKIY AND ALEKSANDR YAKOVLEV HAVE BEEN FORMALLY ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATING WITH THE G-7 ON ECONOMIC AND ASSISTANCE MATTERS.

END TEXT:

DECLAS: OADR

#0056

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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07. Cable	To White House, Re: Message for General Scowcroft from Jim Collins [261600Z Sep 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2011-0850-MR(505)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	7/31/2014

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1.4(c); 3.3(b)(6)

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0850-MR
7/31/2014 MM

TO WHITE HOUSE

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END TEXT:

DECLAS: OADR

#0056

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Cable	To White House, Re: Message for Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev - Sensitive January - June 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91129-001
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2011-0850-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	7/31/2014

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WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c); 3.3(b)(6)

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR CHARGE JIM COLLINS FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

-

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AT OOB SEPTEMBER 26. MESSAGE SHOULD BE DELIVERED ONLY PRESIDENT GORBACHEV OR HIS ADVISOR CHERNYAYEV.

-

BEGIN TEXT:

-

-

DEAR MIKHAIL:

-

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I CALLED BORIS YEL'TSIN SEPTEMBER 25 TO INQUIRE ABOUT HIS HEALTH, AND TO OFFER HELP ON HIS ILLNESS IF HE FELT THAT WAS APPROPRIATE. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT REST AND THE MEDICAL TREATMENT HE WAS RECEIVING WOULD QUICKLY RESTORE HIS HEALTH. HE ALSO MENTIONED HOW WELL YOU AND HE ARE WORKING TOGETHER.

-

I ALSO HAD A VERY INFORMATIVE MEETING TODAY AT THE WHITE HOUSE WITH LEONID KRAVCHUK, WHO IS VISITING THE US IN CONNECTION WITH HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. CHAIRMAN KRAVCHUK OUTLINED FOR ME HIS VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF UKRAINE IN THE NEW UNION. I EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR UKRAINE TO WORK OUT WITH THE CENTER, AND THAT WE HOPED THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED SOON SO THAT ECONOMIC REFORM COULD MOVE AHEAD.

-

BARBARA AND I SEND OUR BEST WISHES TO YOU AND RAISA.

-

SINCERELY,

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

-

END TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

#0000

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2011-0850-MR
7/31/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

For Charge Jim Collins from General Scowcroft

Please deliver the following message from the President to President Gorbachev at OOB September 26. Message should be delivered only to President Gorbachev or his advisor Chernyayev.

Dear Mikhail:

I wanted you to know that I called Boris Yel'tsin September 25 to enquire about his health, and to offer help on his illness if he felt that was appropriate. He said he hoped that rest and the medical treatment he was receiving would quickly restore his health. He also mentioned how well you and he are working together.

I also had a very informative meeting today at the White House with Leonid Kravchuk, who is visiting the US in connection with his attendance at the United Nations General Assembly. Chairman Kravchuk outlined for me his views on the role of Ukraine in the new union. I emphasized that this was a matter for Ukraine to work out with the center, and that we hoped the outstanding issues would be resolved soon so that economic reform could move ahead.

Barbara and I send our best wishes to you and Raisa.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
MOSCOW

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7/31/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James A. Baker, III

Subject: Wednesday's Meetings in Moscow

As I mentioned to you on the phone, my first day here was an extraordinary one. I met with Gorbachev for nearly three hours and then with Yeltsin for three hours. I went from meeting with Yeltsin to the CSCE Conference where I witnessed the Lithuanian Foreign Minister giving his speech to those assembled. If two months ago, someone had told us an independent Lithuanian Foreign Minister would be making a very positive speech to a CSCE meeting in Moscow in September, we would have asked what he was smoking. That typifies the enormous changes that have taken place here.

President Gorbachev praised you privately and publicly for your personal role in this transformation. He thanked me, with some emotion, for your support during the coup. He believes your support led world opinion. He said he really learned who his friends are. At our press conference, Gorbachev asked me to give you one of the four video tapes he prepared in the Crimea during his darkest hour. Yeltsin was also highly appreciative.

This is not their only point of common agreement -- far from it, at least for now. One thing that came through very clearly in both of my meetings with them is that they are absolutely determined to cooperate with each other. They each see that as essential to managing change now. I was frankly surprised by the extent of their coordination and agreement which runs across the spectrum of issues. For example, they agreed totally on the need to preserve a new Capital Center. They agree that the Center must be in control of all nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical). They agree that there should be only one currency in a new economic union. They agree that an economic union, properly forged through an "Economic Treaty" that Yavlinskiy is now drafting with the Republics, is critical for governing what emerges in what they call "the common economic base." They agree that what is needed now is practical action, not talk -- and that what is required is a credible program for moving to a market-based economy that is worked out with the IMF and the World Bank. (And that program needs to be worked out in weeks not months). They agree also that they need help from the outside and they're worried about what will happen this winter.

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What comes through unmistakably is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin are convinced that they need each other -- Gorbachev because of Yeltsin's broader legitimacy, Yeltsin because of Gorbachev's experience and his help with the other Republics, who fear the Russians in general and Yeltsin in particular. Their common stake in preventing disintegration and promoting transformation of the country is a very strong bond. I don't know how long it will last, but they clearly each see that it is in their interest now, and both made a strong and very conscious pitch to me that they were cooperating with the other.

(Gorbachev emphasized Yeltsin's courage, Yeltsin spoke of Gorbachev as a changed man and said that he and Gorbachev were on the phone all the time with each other.) It's interesting that the decision on Afghanistan that I called you about came only after a meeting that I'd had with Yeltsin and he called me after that meeting to let me know that he'd talked with Gorbachev and they had agreed on it.

Both of them look to us for ideas, support, and in time, I suspect, leadership in mobilizing real assistance. I don't think it's an accident that they're each very eager to close out our old agenda -- e.g., Cuba, Afghanistan, and possibly the Northern Territories.

On Cuba, following our meeting, Gorbachev announced that there would shortly be a discussion with Cuba on removing their training brigade. But when citing a figure for those who would be affected by that discussion, he referred to a number that was the equivalent of their whole military intelligence presence in Cuba, not simply their training brigade. Later Yeltsin told me that all military and economic assistance to Cuba would be cut off by January 1, 1992, and that all Soviet military personnel in Cuba will be out of Cuba by the same date. It's clear to me that a key motivation behind this step, which will not go down well in numerous quarters here, is to clear the way for our stronger support. They have recognized your political constraints and are seeking to remove them.

I suspect, over time, we may be able to manage the question of the Northern Territories as well, particularly because I think they will look to us to help broker a process with the Japanese. They don't find it easy to deal with the Japanese, who they believe want everything up front, without a process that eases the adjustment and offers their public an explanation. In particular, the Soviets will want any movement on this issue to look like they are closing the book on World War II and the Stalinist legacy, not simply trading away Russian territory for money.

In addition, my discussions today leave little doubt that they want to be very responsive to us on the Middle East peace process and I think they are also anxious to cooperate with us on new agenda items like proliferation. In short, we're very important to them and that's all to the good.

But as we look at what's good and helpful in the current situation, the dangers also stand out plainly to any visitor here. Their needs are immense. People are sullen. Our anecdotal talks with the average person here reveal a sense that all they hear is talk and meanwhile food and other basic goods are harder and harder to get -- much more so than five years ago. One old acquaintance of Margaret Tutwiler's said that the first person who puts vodka on the shelves will walk away with the prize.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin are trying very hard to get their political and economic act together, but it won't be easy and they have to deliver on more than merely promises. What's more, they know they do. Gorbachev said that very clearly to me. He clearly wants to move now and is worried that if he and the democrats do not deliver soon they will be discredited.

Gorbachev emphasized that in defeating the coup, the democrats had been successful in cutting off the "head" of the reactionaries behind it. Implicit in what he was saying was that there was a lot of latent support for anyone who could promise order. Others we know well have been more explicit: they say seven are gone, but thousands more are still out there. A feeling is that if they have their chance, the next round won't be an amateur act.

The simple fact is that we have a tremendous stake in the success of the democrats here. Their success will change the world in a way that reflects both our values and our hopes. What may be at stake is the equivalent of the postwar recovery of Germany and Japan as democratic allies, only this time after a long cold war rather than a short one. Their failure would produce a world that is far more threatening and dangerous, and I have little doubt that if they are unable to begin to deliver the goods, they will be supplanted by authoritarian leaders of the xenophobic right wing. (I suspect I will hear such a scenario from Shevardnadze in very explicit terms tomorrow.) Given the long odds, I think we need to be realistic in recognizing that success might amount to simply holding off a counter-reaction and giving the democrats the space and time to keep at what will be a long journey. But that in itself could be an historic legacy.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin know -- and I made it extremely clear -- that they have got to produce a credible plan for getting to a market-based economy, in league with the IMF and World Bank. They can't just talk about this; they have to do it. But if they do it, they will be looking to us, and you in particular, to mobilize a major international effort to help them through what will be a very difficult transition. Frankly, they trust and respect you -- and believe the U.S. is the only nation in the world that can pull together the West to match their efforts.

(Gorbachev clearly sees the Gulf coalition as a model here, and drew attention to that in our meeting.) This effort would start on the humanitarian side, as you have spoken of, to lead the process of securing support for a radical market reform drive.

At this point, the onus is still on them to step up to the plate and prove that they are prepared to carry out an economic revolution that matches their political revolution. But if they do that -- indeed, if they really do want both the IMF and the World Bank to shape a very credible program for moving to a market economy, the onus will be on us, especially if we hang back. Notwithstanding everything they are up against, I don't think we should assume that they are going to shy away from the task of carrying out an economic revolution. We should begin to position ourselves to deal with that possibility.

Handwritten note from Secretary Baker:

POTUS: I'd like to discuss this note with you after you and Brent have had a chance to focus on it. JAB III 9/12/91

~~SECRET~~

CHECKLIST: ACTIONS AFTER BALTICS ANNOUNCEMENT

1. Legal Steps: Diplomatic relations must be established by mutual consent. Such agreement can be reached orally; if the President were to state that we were prepared to establish diplomatic relations, positive responses from the Baltic presidents would suffice to establish relations. We recommend, however, exchanging notes to formalize the establishment of relations. Following the establishment of relations, it would be desirable to negotiate memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the Baltic governments regarding such issues as the provision of diplomatic privileges and immunities. State-L/EUR and EUR/EEY action.

2. Presidential Telephone Calls to Baltic Presidents. This would have great symbolic value. If during such calls the Baltic presidents responded definitively to our offer, the conversations would complete the requirements for establishing diplomatic relations. This could also be the channel in which we ask the Baltic governments whether they will designate their current legations in the U.S. as their new representatives. State-EUR/EEY and NSCS action.

~~3.~~ ~~Presidential message to Gorbachev explaining the U.S. action and our intentions. Chargé in Moscow to deliver. NSCS action with contribution from State-EUR/SOV.~~

~~4.~~ ~~Presidential message to Yeltsin (informal) explaining our action. Chargé in Moscow to deliver. State-EUR/SOV action.~~

5. Message to allies and CSCE members (and other governments as appropriate) with talking points on our decision to establish relations with the Baltic states and to establish an official presence in all three countries. Also consultations with CSCE members on how to respond to Baltic requests to join CSCE, which are likely to come as early as next week. State-EUR/EEY action.

6. Presidential messages to Baltic leaders following up on telephone calls. Formal letters. State-EUR/EEY action.

7. Letters from Secretary Baker to the Baltic Foreign Ministers. State-EUR/EEY action.

8. Embassy Moscow demarche to Soviet MFA to explain our decision and what it will mean in practical terms. Also to request Soviet cooperation in establishment of new U.S. posts in the Baltics (no hindrance to personnel from Leningrad, no interference with supplies shipped through USSR, etc.). State-EUR/SOV action.

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9. Dispatch of an envoy to the Baltic capitals. Deputy Assistant Secretary Curtis W. Kamman is available to travel immediately after the announcement and could carry Presidential letters as well as participate in preparing a written statement affirming relations (not necessary, but symbolically useful) and possibly a memorandum of understanding clarifying privileges and immunities. State/EUR action.

10. Dispatch of advance teams to each Baltic capital. Teams would leave within the week following the announcement and could be pre-positioned in Scandinavia if desired. Teams would include about four officers each and would be headed by a senior Foreign Service officer with expertise in the region. An officer from Consulate General Leningrad would assist each of the teams in setting up operations. State-EUR/EEY and EUR/EX action.

11. Consider sponsoring or co-sponsoring Baltic U.N. membership. Would require consultations with all five Security Council permanent members. NSCS action.

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Unofficial translation

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The Soviet side has carefully analysed the views set forth in the letter by the President of the United States dated April 9 regarding the subject of conventional weapons.

By and large, we find the approach by United States to be constructive. A number of proposals contained in the letter by President Bush can be accepted. The principal remaining difference in the two sides' positions concerns the armaments of the Soviet naval infantry (120 tanks, 753 armored fighting vehicles, and 234 artillery systems).

Given the progress in narrowing the differences, which has been possible on the basis of the exchange of messages between President Gorbachev and President Bush, and taking into account the brief discussion of this question in Kislovodsk, we propose to hold a high-level expert meeting in Geneva beginning on May 15 for the purpose of working out a definitive comprehensive solution of this problem. On the Soviet side the group of experts could be led by the Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, General of the Army, Mikhail A.Moiseyev.

The results of the work of the group of experts would be reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Secretary of State, who would submit possible agreements to the Presidents of the USSR and of the United States for their approval. Then, the results of the bilateral discussions would be turned over for consideration to other states participating in the Vienna talks.

We hope for a prompt reply of the US side.

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Советская сторона тщательно проанализировала соображения, изложенные в письме президента США от 9 апреля с.г. по обычным вооружениям.

Мы находим американский подход в целом конструктивным. Ряд предложений, содержащихся в письме Дж.Буша, может быть принят. Главное остающееся расхождение в позициях сторон касается вооружений советской морской пехоты (120 танков, 753 ББМ, 234 артсистемы).

С учетом продвижения в сближении позиций, которого удалось добиться на основе обмена посланиями по обычным вооружениям между М.С.Горбачевым и Дж.Бушем, а также принимая во внимание краткое обсуждение этого вопроса на встрече министров в Кисловодске, предлагаем американской стороне провести в Женеве, начиная с 15 мая, встречу экспертов на высоком уровне для выработки окончательного комплексного решения этой проблемы. С советской стороны группу экспертов мог бы возглавить начальник ГШ ВС СССР генерал армии М.А.Моисеев.

Результаты работы группы экспертов были бы доложены министрам, которые представили бы возможные договоренности на одобрение президентам СССР и США. Затем итоги двусторонних обсуждений были бы переданы на рассмотрение других государств-участников переговоров в Вене.

Надеемся на быстрый ответ американской стороны.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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9/24/2013 MM

June 12, 1991

Brent,

The text of an oral message from Bessmertnykh to Baker on the President's START letter is attached. It confirms that we should expect a response from Gorbachev by the end of the week. It also implies that the Bartholomew Working Group should not go to Geneva until we have received the GorbaIt hev reply and the Soviets tell us that Obukov has received new instructions. (It is noteworthy -- and probably unfortunate -- that Obukov, rather than Moiseyev, seems to have been annointed as Reg Bartholomew's counterpart for this round of START talks.)

On data denial, the Soviets already should have our proposal. We will be sending our own team of technical experts to meet with theirs as soon as the Soviets have had an opportunity to digest our approach.

Arnie Kanter

cc: Bob Gates
Dave Gompert
Ed Hewett

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U.S.-Soviet Summit in Moscow

Administration Objectives

The Moscow summit is an opportunity for the President to demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to reform in the USSR and to highlight the advantage of an evolving, positive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

-- The President should signal strong support for Gorbachev's attempt to promote economic and political reform, and U.S. willingness to support that process.

-- He must also emphasize a new and vigorous U.S. commitment to close relationships with reformers at all levels that does not detract from our relationship with the center.

-- While START will be a major demonstrable achievement of the summit, arms control should not be the overriding focus. This is the first post Cold-War summit.

-- The focus should be on how the U.S. will relate to a vastly changed and changing USSR. Since the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the near future is likely to revolve around the question of the future of the USSR itself -- the U.S. role in promoting economic reform and democratization will be key.

The President should also frame, in his public remarks and in meetings with Gorbachev, problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship which could limit U.S. support -- Soviet policy in the Baltics, the pace and nature of economic reform, Soviet military spending.

Themes:

In the President's speeches and statements and in our backgrounding of the press, we would stress a few major themes:

-- The New Partnership in World Affairs

- Emphasize U.S.-Soviet cooperation since the June 1990 Summit in helping to define the concept of the new world order. Examples:

  - U.S.-Soviet cooperation that helped achieve German unification
  - Gulf War cooperation
  - Regional Issues, such as Angola and Central America

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- Current efforts to promote stability in Middle East -- Peace process effort and Middle East arms initiative

-- U.S. Support for Market Economic Reform

The Soviets will not have ready by the summit a market-oriented economic reform plan which the West can fully support. We should therefore downplay the talk of a "Grand Bargain" and should instead place the spotlight on an enhanced U.S.-Soviet economic relationship. The President could offer to Gorbachev in their meetings and could present in a major speech several concrete offers to make this happen.

- The President should announce a package of initiatives to normalize the economic relationship after 73 years of abnormality. Grouping these options in one package will send a strong and visible message of our support for reforms in the USSR.

  1) Announce he will send Trade Agreement to Congress, seek MFN and repeal legislative restrictions.

  2) Announce his intention to work with allies to create by September 1 Special Associate Status in the IMF and World Bank for the USSR.

  3) Announce his intention to request from Congress funds ($20 million) for a U.S.-Soviet technical assistance program beginning in FY-92 (for benefit of center and republic reform efforts).

  4) Reconfirm the U.S. commitment to promoting market reforms in food distribution.

  5) Announce his intention to create a Peace Corps program in the USSR specializing in agriculture and the environment.

  6) Announce his goal of signing new Bilateral Investment and Tax Treaties by October 1991.

  7) Announce U.S. willingness to negotiate satisfactory Claims and Lend-Lease repayment agreements by October 1991.

  8) Call for U.S.-Soviet meetings by September on Energy Cooperation and Defense Conversion.

  9) Finally, the President should indicate his interest in developing with his EC and other colleagues a Stabilization Fund for Soviet use should they embark on a true market reform effort. This is a carrot which will demonstrate the benefits of cooperating with U.S. if the Soviets commit to market reform.

In addition, the President should signal our interest in providing direct support to the growing entrepreneurial movement in the USSR. He could:

1) Announce his intention to work with the G-7 allies to create an Enterprise Fund for private Soviet entrepreneurs.

2) President could meet with advocates of a free market system including entrepreneurs or visit a private manufacturing firm to symbolize our interest in assisting creation of a free market economy.

-- U.S. Support for Democratization and Political Pluralism

The President should also demonstrate unequivocally the U.S. commitment to furthering democratization in the USSR.

1) The President should meet with leading democratic reformers. He could offer to meet with the RFSFR leadership, including Yeltsin.

Alternatively, he could meet with the Russian leaders and a larger group of reformers at Spaso House. We would include in this meeting reform Mayors such as Popov and Sobchak, Democratic Russia leaders and other prominent spokesman.

2) The President could also announce new programs on the Rule of Law and U.S. commitment to greater exchange of American state and local leaders with Soviet reform politicians.

-- U.S. Interest in Expanding Ties With Republic Leaders

The President should also use the Moscow summit to demonstrate the U.S. interest in good relations with other, non-Russian republics. He could:

1) Host a Moscow meeting with a group of influential republic leaders in Moscow (other than Russians and Ukrainians) such as Nazarbaev and Ter-Petrosian.

2) The President should also make a one day Trip to Kiev. This would highlight U.S. interest in the second most important republic and in the non-Russian republics in general.

- The President could meet separately with Ukrainian government (Kravchuck and Fokin) and opposition leaders (Rukh).

- Good venue for events with religious freedom and human rights message - visit to Babi Yar and Pecharsky Lavra Monastery.

- Visit to WWII War Memorial would be appropriate gesture for all groups.

- The President could give speech to Ukrainian Parliament presenting U.S. views on democratic change in the USSR.

-- Other Events

- The President should deliver a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations to the Supreme Soviet or to a University audience.

  - Another option would be to address a group organized by Shevardnadze's think tank.

- A short one half day trip to Leningrad is an option that would permit the President to visit the USSR's second largest city for the first time.

  - Could tour city with Sobchak
  - Could meet with Len Soviet
  - Meet with business community

  We suggest the President only choose a trip to Leningrad if it is followed by a trip to Kiev.

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NOTIONAL SCHEDULE

Day One

Meeting One with Gorbachev (2 hours)

- Economic Cooperation and Soviet Economy

Stroll in Gorky Park/Red Square/Arbat

Possible Meeting with Entrepreneurs/Visit to Private Firm

Soviet State Dinner for President

Day Two

Meeting Two with Gorbachev (2 hours)

- Arms Control/Regional Issues

Lunch Meeting with Democratic Reformers

Meeting Three with Gorbachev (2 hours)

- European Security Bilateral Issues

Greet American Embassy Employees at Embassy

- Present Award to Ambassador Matlock

Return Dinner Hosted by President at Spaso House

Day Three

Signing Ceremony with Gorbachev

Speech to Supreme Soviet (future of U.S.-Soviet relations)

Lunch with Republic Leaders

Visit to a Private Business

Evening: Visit a Muscovite family
Tour of Moscow by night with Popov
Dinner at a cooperative restaurant

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Day Four

Kiev

- Visit to War Memorial
- Visit to Saint Sophia Cathedral or Pecharsky Lavra
- Meeting with Kravchuk and Ukrainian government leadership
- Lunch given by Ukrainian Parliament at Mariinsky Palace followed by possible address to the Parliament
- Visit to Babi Yar
- Dinner for Rukh-Ukrainian opposition

Treaties/Agreements to be Signed

-- START Treaty or Declaration (GB)

-- Disaster Assistance Cooperation (GB)

-- Space (GB)

-- Counter-Terrorism (JAB)

-- Tourism (JAB)

-- Exchange of Consulates (JAB)

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Oral message from A. Bessmertnykh to Secretary J. Baker

Pursuant to the agreement reached in Geneva we are making vigorous efforts on our part to intensify the process of completing the START Treaty. President Bush's message has been reported to President Gorbachev, and intensive work is now under way to prepare our response. We expect that President Gorbachev's message shall be ready by the end of the week. With this in mind, we shall be promptly notifying the Secretary of State as to when Mr. Obukhov shall be ready, on the basis of US and our own ideas, to have a discussion with R.Bartholomew - and let me note that the Minister strongly supports the idea of Mr. Bartholomew's coming to Geneva on an urgent basis.

As early as tomorrow we shall be sending a group of our experts to Geneva to discuss telemetry issues. In this connection, we expect to receive shortly relevant detailed US proposals.

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В соответствии с договоренностью, достигнутой в Женеве, мы предпринимаем энергичные встречные усилия по активизации процесса завершения работы над Договором по СНВ. Послание Дж.Буша доложено М.С.Горбачеву и сейчас идет интенсивная проработка ответных позиций. Ожидаем, что Послание М.С.Горбачева будет готово к концу недели. С учетом этого оперативно известим государственного секретаря, когда т.Обухов А.А. будет готов на базе американских и наших разработок провести обсуждение с Р.Бартоломью, идею срочного приезда которого в Женеве министр активно поддерживает.

Уже в эту среду, 12 июня, имеем в виду направить в Женеву группу наших экспертов для обсуждения вопросов телеметрии. В этой связи рассчитываем на скорое получение соответствующих развернутых предложений американской стороны.

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FROM: W R Pearson (Officer name) | S/S (Office symbol) | 647-5301 (Extension) | 7224 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Aide Memoire provided by Soviet EmbOff

~~NODIS~~

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
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		HAASS	
	~~EYES ONLY~~	HOWLETT	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE SHARE WITH RICHARD HAASS.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cof NARA, Date 4/13/09

S/S Officer: BP

FORM 7-77 DS-1760

7/8/91 aide memoire provided to NEA DAS Mack by Soviet Embassy Matveev

cc: P NEA EUR IO PM

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We would like to express our concern over the recent official US statements which suggest a possibility of the use of force against Iraq.

We in the USSR take an unequivocally negative view of Bagdad's actions that interfere with inspections by the special commission on the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and by the IAEA conducted under Resulution 678 of the Security Council. We firmly support the use of the UN mechanism and diplomatic and political efforts in order to ensure scrupulous and complete compliance by Bagdad with the UN decisions. For our part, we are working with the Iraqi government, categorically demanding that it fulfil the obligations it has assumed. We are convinced that it is these coordinated actions by the international community that are most effective and that will produce the results we all seek.

At the same time, a unilateral military action by the US against Iraq may lead to a serious international crisis and will be perceived in the world with grave concern. It will undoubtedly deadlock the steps seeking to create a strong security system in the Persian Gulf and could erode the positive groundwork achieved i launching the Middle East peace process.

It must be said with all frankness that such unilateral US action would not fail to also affect the great potential for interaction and cooperation that was built at the time of the Persian Gulf crisis and afterwards.

We expect that our views expressed in the spirit of trust shal be received and taken into account by the US side accordingly.

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Letter to Fund is the same

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LETTER OF APPLICATION

pretty straightforward

July 15, 1991

Sir,

I have the honor to request that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics be admitted to membership in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.

I, the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, authorize Mr. V.E.Orlov, USSR Minister of Finance and Mr. V.V.Geraschenko, President of the USSR Gosbank to conduct, on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the negotiations with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency regarding this application and transmit to you any information which you may require in the consideration of this request.

I also inform you that on July 15th, 1991 I have also filed an application for membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the International Monetary Fund.

Yours sincerely,

M.GORBACHEV
President of the USSR

The President
International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Washington, D.C. 20433

Theoretically before Economic Summit but meeting with Barber Conable was After. Soviets advised not to send ~~final~~ FINAL BUT Did Yossum

З А Я В К А

15 июля 1991 г.

Сэр,

имею честь просить Вас о приеме Союза Советских Социалистических Республик в члены Международного банка реконструкции и развития, Международной финансовой корпорации, Международной ассоциации развития и Многостороннего агентства по гарантированию инвестиций.

Я, Президент Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, уполномочиваю Министра финансов СССР В.Е.Орлова и Председателя Государственного банка СССР В.В.Геращенко провести от имени Союза Советских Социалистических Республик переговоры с Международным банком реконструкции и развития, Международной финансовой корпорацией, Международной ассоциацией развития и Многосторонним агентством по гарантированию инвестиций относительно настоящей заявки и направить Вам любую информацию, которая могла бы Вам потребоваться при рассмотрении этой просьбы.

Для Вашего сведения дополнительно сообщаю, что 15 июля 1991 г. я также представил заявку на членство Союза Советских Социалистических Республик в Международном валютном фонде.

Искренне Ваш

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ
Президент СССР

Президенту Мирового банка
Вашингтон, округ Колумбия, 20433

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



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MESSAGE NO. 60 CLASSIFICATION ~~Secret~~ PAGES 26

FROM WHSR (Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Msgs from President Gorbachev

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CA	General Scowcroft		

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cnp NARA, Date 4/13/09

REMARKS

Deliver Immed Pls!

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

C

068140

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 25

FROM: JOHN W. SHEARBURN S/S-O _____
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
WHSR	SDO	Scowcroft, Gates	
	URGENT	Kanter, Compert	
		Deal, Hewett	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: JWS

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/13/09

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

June 15, 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary,

According to the instruction from Moscow I would like to convey to you two messages from President Mikhail Gorbachev to President George Bush: the first one is on the START issue, the second relates to the grain credits.

Sincerely,

V. Komplektov

Viktor G.KOMPLEKTOV

The Honorable
James A.BAKER III
The Secretary of State

UNOFFICIAL SOVIET EMBASSY TRANSLATION
(corrected by EUR/SOV)

NSA Has Seen

June 15, 1991

Dear George,

I fully share your point of view that, thanks to our joint efforts, it has been possible to reach final agreement on the issues concerning the CFE Treaty. The agreements achieved on conventional forces in Europe are not only an example of cooperation between our two countries, but they are also testimony to our dedication to the cause of limiting and reducing various types of weapons.

I agree with your idea that our next and most important task in the area of arms reduction should be the prompt completion of work on the START Treaty. Its signing at our forthcoming meeting in Moscow would be an event of truly historic magnitude.

Your readiness to contribute personally to finding mutually acceptable solutions for the remaining unresolved START issues now, at the final stage of work in Geneva is, indeed, extremely important. Like you, I am prepared to spare no effort in order to remove the last obstacles standing in the way of signing an agreement in the area of strategic weapons.

I have already instructed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Bessmertnykh, to do everything incumbent on us in order to finalize the START Treaty as soon as possible.

Like you, I am guided by the need to comply with all the agreements, as they were worked out in Houston by our foreign ministers. The Houston package is a balanced, carefully coordinated solution to the major remaining START Treaty problems. Therefore, our task now is to implement this solution as quickly as possible in the texts of the START Treaty and its accompanying documents.

I am ready to regard as a fundamental reference point in our joint effort the principle outlined in your letter -- for each side to avoid as much as possible the pursuit of unilateral advantage, and to try to strengthen the agreement itself: its durability, confidence in its integrity, the stability it provides, and predictability. This relates equally to all components of the strategic forces of our two sided, both to ballistic missiles and to heavy bombers.

His Excellency
George Bush,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

Acting on this basis, we must decide the disputed START issues mentioned in your letter, which are essential for both sides and on whose resolution strategic stability and predictability depend. Certainly, it is on precisely these issues -- agreeing on the definition of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, downloading the accountable number of warheads on ballistic missiles, and access to telemetric information -- that fundamental difficulties have emerged recently at the negotiations.

First of all, I would like to underscore that I share your approach regarding the importance of a just solution to the problem of defining "new types" of ballistic missiles. Our proposal to include throw weight in the criteria determining such a new type it prompted by a desire to avoid a situation whereby a new ballistic missile would not be considered as such only because its size, type of fuel and number of stages would not differ from already existing missiles. In fact, it is possible that a new missile could be developed to be deployed on existing launchers, which would not differ from its predecessor in any of the criteria which determine a "new type" except for the throw weight.

Lately it has been possible through joint efforts to bring our positions significantly closer. The U.S. side, as shown by your letter, has acknowledged the throw weight of a ballistic missile as a full-fledged criterion and we, in turn, have taken into account the U.S. concern as regard verification by agreeing that in addition to throw weight, a change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of 5 percent or more be included. Thus, it now remains to agree upon the concrete value of the increase in throw weight which would make it possible to regard an ICBM or SLBM as a new type of missile.

Our experts believe that the numeric value of 30 percent which you cited in your letter for increasing throw weight is unjustifiably large exactly for the reasons given in the letter. In this case, there would occur exactly that which you warned against: the criterion would not reinforce the principle and its spirit.

The possibility of increasing the throw weight approximately by one third in the process of modernizing an existing missile would result in making this missile potentially capable of carrying one-third more warheads than it would be accounted for in the Treaty. Besides, for such a missile it would not be possible to apply the "forty percent rule," as it is envisage for new types of ballistic missiles. In my opinion, such a situation would truly open wide the "window of instability" and would increase unpredictability and mistrust.

The parameters within which, as I think, we must seek a mutually acceptable figure should be between ten and thirty percent. Therefore, I would propose here the following compromise: a new type of missile would be a missile whose throw weight exceeds by at least fifteen percent, and the length of whose first stage differs by at least five percent, from the characteristic of the corresponding earlier missile.

First of all, the fifteen percent increase in throw weight is sufficiently large to differentiate a new type of missile from an existing one and, besides, it can be effectively verified with the assistance of NTM.

Now, on the matter of downloading the accountable number of warheads on existing types of existing missiles.

This issue has its own history. Initially, it was the U.S. side which put forward the proposal to permit change in the earlier stated number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Based on the need to bring current weaponry into line with new strategic realities which will be established by the START Treaty, we agreed with such an approach.

The possibility of altering the number of warheads on ballistic missiles was also recognized in the Soviet-U.S. statement of summit results in December 1987. In addition, in June 1990 you and I agreed that one of the main guidelines for subsequent negotiations on nuclear and space weapons would be "reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles." If we are guided by the desirability of promptly achieving this future agreement, then sooner or later we will have to address the issue of reducing the number of warheads on existing types of missiles. It would make sense to take measures now in that direction and by all means not to batten down doors which will have to open tomorrow anyway.

Also, establishing a ban on downloading the accountable number of warheads in the START Treaty can lead to a situation in the future when instead of re-equipping existing missiles there will be a need to manufacture new ones with smaller concentrations of warheads. That would not be justifiable from the economic viewpoint, and ultimately would promote continuation of the arms race.

As regards your concern about the possibility of "restoring the initial number" of warheads on those missiles once their number had been cut, this could by avoided by way of changing the platform for the warheads for a new one, which by design would make it impossible to equip a missile with the previous

number of warheads. By the way, this is precisely how the number of warheads on the Soviet SLBM "SS-N-18" was reduced. At the same time, even if one side were to decide to mount on its missiles previously removed warheads, this would require more time and work than the U.S. side would need to equip all its B-1B heavy bombers with long-range nuclear cruise missiles. Nevertheless, in the framework of the comprehensive agreement reached in Houston we agreed that 95 B-1B heavy bombers, each of them being capable of carrying up to 20 nuclear ALCMs (1900 ALCMs total), currently are not accountable as carriers of such missiles.

However, I do not think that we should pursue polemics on this matter any further.

I have a concrete proposal. We would be prepared to update the Houston agreement on the right of each side to download the accountable number of warheads on not more than two types of ballistic missiles, and by not more than five warheads on each type, with a total ceiling for downloading of 1250 warheads. We can agree that for the purposes of the Treaty, downloading of the accountable number of warheads would be allowed for each side on two existing types of ballistic missiles, by not more than four warheads on each type, with total downloading not to exceed 750 warheads. In order to ensure this procedure is irreversible, the warhead platform would have to be changed when downloading more than two warheads on a missile.

In the context of such a solution to the problem, we could confirm our other headway which takes into account the specific manner of deployment of U.S. missiles and stipulates that the criteria for accounting for downloading ICBM warheads are missile bases, and for SLBMs, by ocean.

As far as the Soviet "SS-N-18" missiles are concerned, all such missiles in reality have been equipped for a long time with front ends of a new design capable of carrying only three warheads each. The previously designed front ends capable of carrying seven warheads have been destroyed. This is why the question dealing with the "SS-N-18" missile was discussed separately in Houston, outside the right to be established by the Treaty to download the accountable number of warheads on not more than two types of ballistic missiles. the decision on the "SS-N-18" missile is an integral part of the Houston package and it is only necessary to fix in the Treaty the existing state of affairs.

At the same time, as a goodwill expression and provided that our compromise proposal with regard to the downloading of the accountable number of ballistic missiles is accepted, I

careful working out of provisions dealing with telemetrics. We must achieve the most substantive, mutually acceptable solutions possible by the time of signing the Treaty.

As we agree, I have given instructions to send authoritative specialists on telemetric information to Geneva for intensive work on this issue at the expert level together with their American colleagues.

George, I believe we have begun a good, substantive discussion on the problems of START. I would like to express my confidence that this will lead to success.

In particular, I like the idea of holding a special meeting (and, possible, several meetings) between Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Bessmertnykh and Secretary of State J. Baker with a view to clearing all the remaining obstacles to the Treaty.

It is clear that the meeting of the ministers should be preceded by an exchange of opinions between experts in Geneva, including those at a higher level, with a view to accelerating the solution of the issues related to the START Treaty.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my deep commitment to the course of further strengthening relations of partnership between our countries, including in such an important sphere as limitation and reduction of armaments, and to express confidence that our forthcoming meeting in Moscow, and the signing of the START Treaty there, will turn a new page in Soviet-American interaction.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

1193

Unofficial translation

June 15, 1991

Dear George,

I fully share your point of view that due to our joint efforts it has been possible to reach final agreement on issues concerning CFE Treaty. The achieved agreements on conventional forces in Europe are not only an example of cooperation between our two countries, but they are also an evidence of our adherence to the cause of limiting and cutting various types of weapons.

I agree with your idea that our nearest and most important task in the area of arms reduction should be prompt completion of work on START Treaty.

Its signing at our forthcoming meeting in Moscow would be really an event of historic magnitude.

Your readiness to personally promote finding mutually acceptable solutions for remaining and outstanding problems dealing with START at this time, at the final stage of work being done in Geneva, is, indeed, extremely important.

Myself, as much as you, I am also prepared to spare no effort in order to remove the last obstacles, staying in the way of signing the START Treaty.

I have already instructed Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A.Bessmertnykh to do everything we can with a view to finalizing START Treaty as soon as possible.

As much as you are, I am guided by the need to comply with all the agreements as reached in Houston by our foreign ministers. The Houston package is a balanced thoroughly coordinated solution of major remaining START Treaty

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

problems. Therefore, our task is to give this solution a prompt materialization in the texts of the START Treaty and its accompanying instruments.

I am ready to regard it as a fundamental reference point that in our joint effort we should use the principle outlayed in your letter, not to try to realize to the maximum the advantages of each side, but to seek enhancement of the agreement, of its durability, confidence in its integrity, stability it provides, and predictability. It relates equally to all components of the strategic forces of our two sides, both to ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

Acting from this presumption, you and we should take decision on the controversial issues mentioned in your letter and are essential for both sides, on the proper resolution of which strategic stability and predictability depend. True, it is on these issues - agreeing on definition of the new type of intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile, reducing accounted number of warheads on ballistic missiles (downloading) and access to telemetric information, that main difficulties have recently emerged at the negotiations.

First of all, I would like to underscore that I share your approach as regards the importance of a just solution to the problem of defining the "new type" of a ballistic missile. Our proposal to include a notion of throw weight in the criteria identifying this new type, is prompted by desire to prevent a situation whereby a new ballistic missile would not be considered as such only because its size, type of fuel and number of stages would not be different from existing older missiles. In fact, it is possible that a new missile could be developed to be deployed on the existing launcher, which would be no different from its predecessor by all the criteria except for the amount of the throw weight composing definition of the "new type".

Lately it has been possible through joint effort to bring our positions significantly closer. The US side, which is

evidenced by your letter, has acknowledged the throw weight of a ballistic missile as a full-fledged criterium, and we, in turn, have taken into account the US concern as regards verification by agreeing that in addition to the indicator of throw weight, a change in the length of the first stages of IBM and SLBM not less than by 5 percent, be included. Thus, as of now it remains to agree upon the concrete value of the increase of throw weight, which would make it possible to regard an IBM or SLMB as a new type missile.

Our experts believe that the numeric value of 30 percent which you cited in the letter, for increasing throw weight is unwarrantly big exactly on the grounds of reasons given in that letter.

This would make the case specifically to what you have been warning of - this criterium would not reinforce the principle and the spirit.

The possibility to augment the amount of the throw weight approximately by one third, in the process of modernizing of the existing missile would result in making this missile potentially capable of carrying more warheads by one third, than it would be accounted for by the Treaty. Besides, for such a missile it would not be possible to apply the "forty percent rule", as it is envisaged for new type of ballistic missiles. In my opinion, such a situation would open the "window of instability" real wide, unpredictability and mistrust would grow.

The parameters within which, as I think, the mutually acceptable figure should be - between ten to thirty percent. Therefore, I would propose here a following compromise: a new type missile would be a missile whose throw weight exceeds at least by fifteen percent, and first stage differs at least by five percent from such characteristic of its predecessor.

First of all, the 15 percent increase in the throw weight is big enough to differentiate the new type of the missile from the existing one and, besides, it can be effectively verified by the national technical means.

Now, on the matter of reduction of the accounted number of warheads at the existing types of ballistic missiles. This issue has its own history. Initially, it was the US side who put forward the proposal on a possibility to change the earlier stated number of warheads on IBMs and SLBMs. Following the requirement to bring today's weaponry in line with new strategic realities, which will be set by the START Treaty, we agreed with such an approach.

The possibility of altering the number of warheads on ballistic missiles was also recognized in the final Soviet-US summit statement of December 1987. Besides, in June 1990 we agreed with you that one of the basic guidelines for the subsequent negotiations on nuclear and space weapons would be "reduction of concentration of charges on strategic carriers". If we are guided by the desirability of promptly achieving this future agreement, then sooner or later we will have to address the issue of reducing the number of warheads on the existing types of missiles. It would make sense to take measures right now in that direction and by all means not to batten down the doors which will have to open tomorrow anyway.

Also, setting a ban on reduction of accounted number of warheads in START Treaty can result in a situation in future when instead of reconstruetion of existing missiles there will be a need to manufacture new ones with smaller concentration of charges. That would not be justifiable from the economic viewpoint, and ultimately would promote continuation of arms race.

As to your apprehensions of a possibility to "restore initial number" of warheads on those missiles, where their number had been cut, this could be avoided through change of the warheads platforms by the new ones, which by design would make it impossible to arm a missile with a previous number of warheads. By the way, this is how the number of warheads on the Soviet SLBM "SS-N-18" was cut. At the same time, if any side were to decide to mount on its missiles previously removed warheads, this would require more time

and workload than the US side would need to arm all their heavy bombers "B-1B" with long-range nuclear cruise missiles. Nevertheless, in the frameworks of a comprehensive agreement reached in Houston, we agreed that 95 heavy bombers "B-1B", each of them being capable of carrying 20 nuclear ALCMs (1900 ALCMs total), at this time are not accounted for as carriers of such missiles.

However, I don't think that we should pursue polemics on this matter any further.

I have a concrete proposal. We would be prepared to update the Houston agreement on the right of each side to reduce the accounted number of warheads not more than on two types of ballistic missiles and not more than by five warheads for each type with a total ceiling for reduced number of charges being 1250 units. We can agree that for the purposes of the Treaty, the reduction of accounted number of warheads would be allowed for each side, for the two existing types of ballistic missiles, not more than by four warheads for each type with the total reduction of not more than by 750 warheads.

While reducing the number of warheads at a missile by more than two units, in order to secure irreversibility of this procedure, it would be required to change the warheads platform.

In the frameworks of such a solution to the problem we could confirm our other headway which takes into account the specific manner of deployment of US missiles and stipulates that the criteria for accounting for reduction of IBM warheads are missile bases, and for SLBM - oceans aquatoriums.

As far as the Soviet "SS-N-18" missiles are concerned, all such missiles in reality have been equipped for a long time with reentry vehicles of new design capable to carry only three warheads each. Previously designed reentry vehicles capable of carrying seven warheads, were destroyed. This is why the question dealing with the "SSN-18" missile was discussed separately in Houston, outside the right to be established by the Treaty, to reduce accounted number of warheads for

not more than two types of ballistic missiles. The decision on the "SS-N-18" missile is an integral part of the Houston package and it is only necessary to fix in the Treaty the existing state of affairs.

Meanwhile, as a goodwill expression and provided that our compromise proposal with regard to the reduction of the accounted number of ballistic missiles is accepted, I would be ready to exercise here additional flexibility. We are prepared to agree that the United States, before the START Treaty comes into force, would reduce the number of warheads at all their "Minitman-3" IBMs from three to two or one at their own discretion. Similarly as the warheads platforms had been replaced at our "SS-N-18" SLBMs, at the aforementioned IBMs such warheads platforms would be mounted which would allow to place only one or two warheads, and the former platforms would be destroyed. Hereby, the reduction of number of warheads at the "SS-N-18" SLBM and "Minitman-3" IBM would not be regarded as covered by the corresponding provisions of the START Treaty.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the total reduction of the number of warheads on the "SS-N-18" missiles already carried out by the Soviet side, before the exchange of data for the Memorandum on the Agreement, has comprised only 256 units (which includes 64 missiles with seven warheads, while other missiles had been earlier equipped with three warheads each), and potential reduction of the number of warheads on your "Minitman-3" missiles can comprise in this case up to 1000 units.

If we can resolve all the above mentioned questions to mutual acceptance than, at last, it would be possible to engage to full measure the entire package of interrelated arrangements reached by our foreign ministers in Houston, including inter alia such problems as definition of new types of ballistic missiles and reduction of the accounted number of warheads at the ballistic missiles of the existing types.

Incidentally, in our work on the Houston package as far as in January we made a serious headway towards the US side

as relates, particularly, to the accounting and inspection of heavy bombers. Our agreement with such a decision was given with the understanding that the US side would take into account our concerns, primarily, in regard to the problems mentioned in your letter.

As to your proposals in the field of unobstructed access to telemetric information, I can assure you that we shall study most attentively the extensive proposals of the US side and will strive to achieve here full mutual understanding.

I share your opinion on the importance of this problem which is directly linked with ensuring strict regime of verification over compliance with Treaty limitations.

Though the START Treaty will contain other guarantees of in-depth verification, this doesn't remove the need for thorough elaboration of provisions dealing with telemetrics. We should achieve maximum possible as regards substantive and mutually acceptable solutions by the time of signing the Treaty.

As we agreed, I have given instructions to send authoritative specialists on telemetric information to Geneva for an intensive work on this issue at the expert level together with US colleagues.

George, I believe, we have begun a good, concrete conversation on the START subject. I would like to express confidence that it would result in success.

In particular, I like the idea of holding a special meeting (and, possibly, few meetings) between Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A.Bessmertnykh and Secretary of State J.Baker with a view to clearing all the remaining obstacles toward the Treaty.

It is clear that the meeting of the ministers should be preceeded by an exchange of opinions between experts in Geneva, including those at a higher level, with a view to expediting solution of issues related to the START Treaty.

In conclusion I would like to reiterate my deep adherence to the course aimed at further strengthening relations of partnership between our countries, including in such an important sphere as limitation and reduction of armaments, and to express confidence that our forthcoming meeting in Moscow, the signing of the START Treaty there will turn a new page in Soviet-American interaction.

Sincerely yours,

M.GORBACHEV

15 июня 1991 года

Дорогой Джордж,

В полной мере разделяю Вашу точку зрения, что, благодаря нашим совместным усилиям, удалось прийти к окончательной договоренности по вопросам, касающимся Договора об СБСЕ. Достигнутые договоренности по обычным вооружениям в Европе - не только пример сотрудничества между нашими странами, но и свидетельство нашей приверженности делу ограничения и сокращения различных видов вооружений.

Согласен с Вашей мыслью о том, что нашей ближайшей и наиболее важной задачей в области сокращения вооружений должно стать скорейшее завершение работы над Договором по СНВ. Его подписание на нашей предстоящей встрече в Москве стало бы событием действительно исторического значения.

Ваша готовность лично содействовать нахождению взаимоприемлемых развязок по остающимся нерешенным вопросам СНВ сейчас - на заключительном этапе работы в Женеве - представляется крайне важной. Я так же, как и Вы, готов приложить все усилия для того, чтобы снять последние препятствия, стоящие на пути к подписанию договора в области стратегических наступательных вооружений.

Я уже дал указание министру иностранных дел А.А.Бессмертных сделать все от нас зависящее для того, чтобы выработка Договора по СНВ была завершена в кратчайшие сроки.

Так же, как и Вы, я исхожу из необходимости соблюдения всех договоренностей, как они были выработаны нашими министрами иностранных дел в Хьюстоне. Хьюстонский пакет - это сбалансированное, тщательно выверенное решение наиболее крупных из остающихся проблем Договора по СНВ. Поэтому задача сейчас

Его Превосходительству
Джорджу БУШУ
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

состоит в том, чтобы как можно скорее воплотить это решение в текстах Договора по СНВ и прилегающих к нему документов.

Готов считать основополагающим ориентиром в нашей совместной работе предложенный в Вашем письме принцип - не пытаться в максимальной степени реализовать преимущества каждой из сторон, а добиваться укрепления самого соглашения - его прочности, уверенности в его целостности, обеспечиваемой им стабильности и предсказуемости. Он в равной мере относится ко всем компонентам стратегических сил друг друга - как к баллистическим ракетам, так и к тяжелым бомбардировщикам.

Исходя из этого, нам с Вами необходимо определиться по упомянутым в Вашем письме и имеющим существенное значение для обеих сторон разногласным вопросам Договора по СНВ, от решения которых зависят стратегическая стабильность и предсказуемость. Действительно, именно здесь - при согласовании определения нового типа МБР и БРПЛ, снижения засчитываемого количества боеголовок на баллистических ракетах и доступа к телеметрической информации - в последнее время возникли основные трудности на переговорах.

Прежде всего хотел бы подчеркнуть, что разделяю Ваш подход к вопросу о важности справедливого решения проблемы определения "нового типа" баллистической ракеты. Наше предложение о включении показателя забрасываемого веса в число критериев, определяющих такой новый тип, вызвано стремлением исключить ситуацию, при которой новая баллистическая ракета не рассматривалась бы в качестве таковой только потому, что ее размеры, вид топлива и количество ступеней не отличаются от уже существующих ракет. Ведь могла бы быть создана новая ракета для развертывания в существующей пусковой установке, которая по всем другим критериям, входящим в определение "нового типа", кроме величины забрасываемого веса, не отличалась бы от ее предшественницы.

В последнее время по этому вопросу совместными усилиями удалось значительно сблизить позиции. Американская сторона, как об этом свидетельствует Ваше письмо, признала забрасываемы

вес БР в качестве равноправного критерия, а мы в свою очередь учли озабоченность США в плане контроля - пошли на то, чтобы показатель забрасываемого веса был дополнен условием изменения длины первой ступени МБР и БРПЛ не менее чем на 5 процентов. Теперь, таким образом, остается согласовать конкретное значение превышения величины забрасываемого веса, которое позволяло бы считать МБР или БРПЛ баллистической ракетой нового типа.

Наши специалисты полагают, что названное в Вашем письме цифровое значение для увеличения забрасываемого веса ракеты - 30 процентов - неоправданно велико по изложенным в Вашем же письме соображениям. В этом случае произошло бы как раз то, от чего Вы сами предостерегаете: критерий не подкреплял бы принцип и его дух.

Возможность увеличения примерно на одну треть величины забрасываемого веса в процессе совершенствования существующей ракеты приводила бы к тому, что потенциально такая ракета была бы способна нести на треть больше боеголовок, чем за ней числилось бы по договору. При этом к такой ракете нельзя было бы применить "правило 40 процентов", как это предусмотрено для новых типов БР. На мой взгляд, в такой ситуации действительно открывалось бы настежь "окно нестабильности", усиливались непредсказуемость и недоверие.

Параметры, в пределах которых, насколько я понимаю, надо искать взаимоприемлемую цифру - от десяти до тридцати процентов. Я предложил бы здесь поэтому следующий компромисс: ракетой нового типа считалась бы ракета, чей забрасываемый вес по меньшей мере на 15 процентов превышает, а длина ее первой ступени по меньшей мере на 5 процентов отличается от соответствующих характеристик ракеты-предшественницы.

Прежде всего, 15-процентное увеличение забрасываемого веса является достаточно большим для того, чтобы отделить новый тип ракеты от существующего, и, кроме того, оно могло бы быть эффективно проконтролировано с помощью НТСК.

Теперь о понижении засчитываемого количества боеголовок на существующих типах баллистических ракет.

Этот вопрос имеет свою историю. Первоначально с предложением о возможности перезаявления количества боеголовок на МБР и БРПЛ выступила американская сторона. Исходя из необходимости приведения нынешних вооружений в соответствие с новыми стратегическими реалиями, которые создаст Договор по СНВ, мы согласились с таким подходом.

Возможность изменения числа боеголовок на баллистических ракетах признавалась и в советско-американском заявлении по итогам "саммита" в декабре 1987 года. Помимо этого, в июне 1990 года мы с Вами условились о том, что одним из главных ориентиров на будущих переговорах по ядерным и космическим вооружениям будет "понижение концентрации боезарядов на стратегических носителях". Если мы исходим из желательности скорейшего достижения этой будущей договоренности, то нам рано или поздно придется заниматься снижением количества боеголовок на существующих типах ракет. Было бы разумно уже сейчас предпринимать меры в этом направлении, и уж конечно не задраивать дверь, которую завтра нам все равно придется открыть.

К тому же установление в Договоре по СНВ запрета на понижение засчитываемого количества боеголовок может привести к тому, что в дальнейшем вместо переоборудования существующих ракет потребуется производить новые - с меньшей концентрацией боезарядов, что не было бы оправдано с экономической точки зрения и в конечном счете стимулировало бы продолжение гонки вооружений.

Что же касается Ваших опасений в связи с возможностью "восстановления первоначального количества" боеголовок на тех ракетах, где их число было снижено, то этого можно было бы избежать путем замены на новые платформ для боеголовок, которые по своей конструкции исключали бы возможность оснащения ракеты прежним числом боеголовок. Кстати, именно таким образом было произведено снижение количества боеголовок на советской БРПЛ "СС-Н-18". Кроме того, если бы какая-либо из сторон даже решила установить на ракеты снятые ранее

боеголовки, то для этого ей потребовалось бы больше времени и объема работ, чем американской стороне на оснащение всех своих ТБ "Б-1Б" ядерными крылатыми ракетами большой дальности. И тем не менее в рамках комплексной договоренности в Хьюстоне мы согласились с тем, что 95 тяжелых бомбардировщиков "Б-1Б", каждый из которых может нести по 20 ядерных КРВБ (всего 1900 КРВБ), в настоящее время не засчитываются как носители таких ракет.

Не думаю, однако, что нам следует и дальше углубляться в полемику по этому вопросу.

У меня есть конкретное предложение. Мы были бы готовы пойти на корректировку достигнутой в Хьюстоне договоренности о праве каждой из сторон осуществлять понижение засчитываемого количества боеголовок не более чем на двух типах баллистических ракет и не более чем на пять боеголовок на каждом типе с общим потолком на понижаемое количество боезарядов в 1250 единиц. Можно условиться о том, чтобы для целей Договора понижение засчитываемого количества боеголовок допускалось для каждой из сторон на двух существующих типах БР, не более чем на 4 боеголовки на каждом, при суммарном понижении не более чем на 750 боеголовок. При понижении количества боеголовок на ракете свыше двух единиц - в целях обеспечения необратимости этой процедуры - требовалось бы производить замену платформы для боеголовок.

В контексте такого решения проблемы, мы могли бы подтвердить и другую нашу подвижку, учитывающую особенности развертывания американских ракет - о том, чтобы засчет понижения боеголовок на МБР производился по ракетным базам, а для БРПЛ - по акваториям океанов.

Что касается советской ракеты "СС-Н-18", то все ракеты этого типа в реальности давно уже оснащены головными частями новой конструкции, способными нести лишь по три боеголовки. Причем головные части прежней конструкции, предназначенной для семи боеголовок, ликвидированы. Именно поэтому вопрос о ракете "СС-Н-18" обсуждался в Хьюстоне отдельно - вне рамок устанавливаемого по договору права на понижение засчитываемого

количества боеголовок не более чем на двух типах БР. Решение по ракете "СС-Н-I8" является неотъемлемой частью хьюстонского пакета, и надо лишь закрепить в договоре существующее положение дел.

Вместе с тем, в порядке доброй воли и при условии принятия нашего компромиссного предложения по вопросу о понижении засчитываемого количества боеголовок на баллистических ракетах я готов проявить здесь дополнительную гибкость. Мы готовы пойти на то, чтобы США до вступления Договора по СНВ в силу понизили на всех своих МБР "Минитмен-3" количество боеголовок с трех до одной-двух по своему выбору. По аналогии с тем, как были заменены платформы для боеголовок на нашей БРПЛ "СС-Н-I8", на указанных МБР были бы установлены платформы ГЧ, позволяющие разместить на них только одну или две боеголовки, а старые платформы - ликвидированы. При этом понижение боеголовок на БРПЛ "СС-Н-I8" и МБР "Минитмен-3" не рассматривалось бы как подпадающее под соответствующие положения Договора по СНВ.

Хотел бы обратить Ваше внимание на то, что уже произведенное советской стороной до обмена исходными данными для Меморандума о договоренности суммарное понижение количества боеголовок на ракете "СС-Н-I8" составило всего 256 единиц (на 64 ракетах с семью боеголовками, остальные ракеты и ранее были оснащены для трех боеголовок), а возможное понижение количества боеголовок на ваших ракетах "Минитмен-3" может составить в этом случае до I000 единиц.

Если нам удастся взаимоприемлемым образом решить все вышеупомянутые вопросы, то в полном объеме заработал бы наконец весь пакет взаимосвязанных договоренностей, достигнутых нашими министрами иностранных дел в Хьюстоне и включающих, в том числе, такие проблемы, как определение новых типов БР и понижение засчитываемого количества боеголовок на БР существующих типов. Кстати говоря, в рамках работы над хьюстонским пакетом мы еще в январе пошли на серьезные подвижки американской стороне в том, что касается, в частности, засчета и

инспекций тяжелых бомбардировщиков. Наше согласие с этими решениями было дано при том понимании, что американская сторона учтет и наши озабоченности, прежде всего по упомянутым в Вашем письме вопросам.

Что касается Ваших предложений в отношении непрепятствования доступу к телеметрической информации, то могу заверить Вас, что мы самым внимательным образом изучим "развернутые" предложения американской стороны и будем стремиться к достижению здесь полного взаимопонимания.

Я разделяю Ваше мнение о важности этого вопроса, непосредственно связанного с обеспечением строгого режима контроля за соблюдением договорных ограничений.

Хотя Договор по СНВ будет содержать и другие гарантии доскональной проверки, это не снимает необходимости тщательной отработки положений, касающихся телеметрии. Надо добиться максимально возможного в смысле существенных и взаимоустраивающих развязок к моменту подписания договора.

Я, как мы условились, дал указания направить в Женеву авторитетных специалистов по телеметрической информации для интенсивной проработки этого вопроса на уровне экспертов с американскими коллегами.

Джордж, полагаю, у нас завязался хороший предметный разговор по проблематике СНВ. Хочу выразить уверенность, что он приведет к успеху.

В частности, мне импонирует мысль о проведении специальной встречи (а, может быть, и нескольких встреч) между министром иностранных дел А.А.Бессмертных и государственным секретарем Дж.Бейкером с целью расчистки всех остающихся препятствий к договору.

Понятно, что встрече министров должен предшествовать обмен мнениями в Женеве между экспертами, в том числе более высокого уровня, в целях ускоренного решения вопросов, связанных с Договором по СНВ.

В заключение, хотел бы вновь подтвердить свою твердую приверженность курсу на дальнейшее укрепление отношений партнерства между нашими странами, в том числе применительно к

такой важнейшей области, как ограничение и сокращение вооружений, и выразить уверенность в том, что наша предстоящая встреча в Москве, подписание на ней Договора по СНВ откроют новую страницу в советско-американском взаимодействии.

Искренне Ваш,

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

Unofficial translation

June 15, 1991

Dear George,

I have received your letter, dated June 10, where you inform me on the positive resolve of the question of agricultural credits.

I highly appreciate this step of yours.

In it I can see not only an impetus to preserve and develop mutually advantageous US-Soviet grains trade, but also, which is even more important, expression of solidarity during this hard period for my country. I am sure these are good investments oriented towards future, towards our common cause of building a new peaceful international order.

I have instructed that credits which we shall receive in part during this year, and in part during the next year under the guarantees of the US Government, should give maximum results in stabilizing food situation and radicalizing transition to the market.

Naturally, in doing so, measures will be taken to provide for newly bought food stuff being justly distributed among Union republics.

I welcome your interest in promoting improvement of our system of food distribution with the use of US experience. I intend to supervise it personally.

Dear George, your decision is a good sign of immense opportunities for mutually advantageous economic cooperation which, indeed, requires new bold approaches.

I hope to discuss with you in detail this and other major issues at our personal meeting.

Sincerely yours,

M.GORBACHEV

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Дорогой Джордж,

Получил Ваше письмо от 10 июня, в котором Вы сообщаете о положительном решении вопроса о сельскохозяйственном кредите. Высоко ценю этот Ваш шаг. Вижу в нем не только импульс для сохранения и развития взаимовыгодной советско-американской зерновой торговли, а и - что еще важнее - проявление солидарности в нелегкий для моей страны момент. Это, убежден, - хорошие инвестиции в будущее, в общее дело строительства нового, мирного порядка.

Я распорядился, чтобы кредиты, которые мы получим частично в этом, а частично - в следующем году под гарантии американского правительства, дали максимальную отдачу в деле стабилизации продовольственного положения и для радикализации перехода к рынку. При этом, разумеется, будут приняты меры, чтобы закупленное продовольствие справедливо распределялось между входящими в Союз республиками.

Приветствую Вашу заинтересованность в содействии улучшению нашей системы распределения продовольствия с использованием американского опыта. Имею в виду взять это под особый контроль.

Ваше решение, дорогой Джордж, - добрый знак огромных возможностей взаимовыгодного экономического сотрудничества, которое нуждается действительно в новых, смелых подходах.

Надеюсь подробно обсудить с Вами этот и другие большие вопросы при нашей личной встрече.

С уважением,

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

15 июня 1991 года

Его Превосходительству
Джорджу БУШУ
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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Directorate of Intelligence
23 May 1991

Gorbachev's Future

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Summary

Gorbachev remains an important player on the Soviet political scene, especially in foreign and defense policy, but his domination of it has ended and will not be restored. Whether or not he is still in office a year from now, a major shift of power to the republics will have occurred unless it has been blocked by a traditionalist coup. Gorbachev can play a decisive role in determining which way things go, and his cooperation is critical to a smooth transition of power to the republics. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

In order to survive politically, Gorbachev has recently been trying to shift his political base, which has been steadily eroding over the past year. He has been unwilling to go as far as the hardliners have been demanding in using force to restore the center's power, so his alliance with them is foundering. He has now signed an agreement with Yel'tsin and eight other republic leaders that improved the political atmosphere and gained him some breathing space from the recent drive to remove him by promising to shift considerable power to the republics. For the accord to hold up, however, Gorbachev will need to preside over the demise of the political system he now heads. If Gorbachev backs away from the accord, the drive by reformers to remove him will again pick up steam. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Should he be forced out in the near term, it most likely would be by hardliners who would rule through a weak front man or some sort of National Salvation Committee. Without any action by the traditionalists, however, the political reliability of the security services will continue to deteriorate and the influence of reformers will continue to grow, so as time goes on the odds

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

increase that the democrats will come to power. Any succession to Gorbachev is not likely to be smooth, however, and there could be a period of transition with an intense power struggle and no one clearly in charge. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The fate of the political system is directly linked to the current struggle for power. If traditionalists prevail they would seek to preserve the empire and autocratic rule through tougher means. They would move quickly to suppress the opposition, arresting or conceivably even executing its leaders starting with Yel'tsin, and to roll back newly won freedoms. They would adopt a more truculent public posture toward the United States and seek opportunities to assert their influence abroad. Even if they were willing to rely on a massive use of force and repression, traditionalists would have difficulty maintaining power because they lack a credible program to address the country's mounting problems and would have difficulty overcoming internal divisions. Under such a regime the economy would continue to deteriorate and social alienation would increase sharply, ensuring that eventually democratic and nationalist movements would reemerge. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

If reformers gain the upper hand, they would devolve power to the republics and allow them to pursue more independent paths even if they remained in a reconstituted union. Many republics, including Russia, would move quickly ahead with democratic and market reforms, but some would likely be subject to some new forms of authoritarianism. Although the much weaker center that remained would retain authority over the military and could probably meet most of the Soviet Union's current international commitments, each republic would quickly develop its own independent foreign policy and take over internal security responsibilities from the KGB. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

In short, the Soviet Union is now in a revolutionary situation in the sense that it is in a transition from the old order to an as yet undefined new order. Although the transition might occur peaceably, the current center-dominated political system is doomed. As happened in Eastern Europe over the past two years, the ingredients are now present in the USSR that could lead not only to a rapid change in the regime, but in the political system as well. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Moving Toward a Transition

The political crisis building in the USSR in recent months was defused, at least temporarily, by President Gorbachev's April accord with Yel'tsin and eight other republic leaders. Gorbachev agreed to this political detente because he realized that he was rapidly losing control of events and could not regain it without the support of republic leaders. Reformers went along out of fear that hardliners would use the growing crisis and the threat of social explosion to seize power. With the agreement Gorbachev has bought a political respite, but it will soon run out unless he is willing to cede to the republics much more of the center's and his own authority than he has shown any inclination to do so far. Already, Gorbachev and Yel'tsin have voiced sharply different interpretations of the accord--the President has been touting it primarily as an effort to help stabilize the economy, while the Russian leader claims it signifies a cession of major power by the center to the republics. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The traditionalists on whom Gorbachev has been politically dependent--primarily the security services and the government bureaucracy--are alarmed at the prospect of a transfer of power to the republics and are bewildered and angered by Gorbachev's policies. The leadership of the KGB, the military, and the CPSU blame Gorbachev for the current crisis as well as for undermining their institutions. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

In addition, the "black colonels" who have been leading the drive to replace Gorbachev with a more hardline regime claim they have tacit approval for their tough line from Yazov. Although Gorbachev turned back a drive to unseat him as General Secretary at the April Central Committee plenum, he still faces a growing and increasingly threatening rebellion in the party and can no longer rely on it to implement his policies. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Gorbachev's political position deteriorated so sharply over the past year because his policies were generally blamed for the disaster in the country:

- Most Soviets hold him responsible for the country's rapidly mounting economic problems and not offering a credible way out. His new "anti-crisis program" is a hybrid of old methods of top down control and some market oriented reforms that is unlikely to halt the current economic slide.

- Traditionalists criticize him for destroying the old Leninist political system and not creating viable new political structures to replace it.

- The workers no longer trust his government because it has not lived up to past promises.

- Reformers see his determination to hold a center-dominated union together as a principal factor leading to the current political crisis. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Gorbachev agreed to the April accord in part to try to stem his political decline, but it will not bring about a reversal of his political fortunes. Popularly elected republic leaders and legislatures enjoy much greater legitimacy than the central leadership and have made implementation of Gorbachev's policies almost impossible without their cooperation. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The key to resolving the current crisis lies with Russia and Yel'tsin. He seems almost certain to succeed in his effort to create a strong popularly elected Russian presidency and win the election planned for June. This will strengthen his hand in challenging the center, while underscoring the illegitimacy of Gorbachev's position. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

While Gorbachev will continue to have his political ups and downs and could survive for some time, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to recoup his declining political influence and regain the political initiative. Even with the accord, he appears to be primarily reacting to events without any longterm gameplan. Last fall he willingly entered into alliance with leaders of the KGB, the military, and the CPSU, but he has been unwilling to go as far as the hardliners have been demanding in using force to restore the center's power, so his alliance with them is foundering. But, as a result of his turn to the traditionalists, most reformers no longer trust Gorbachev. Yel'tsin for now is still willing to work with him for tactical reasons, but many other reformers refuse to cooperate with Gorbachev and are criticizing Yel'tsin for doing so. Their cooperation will only last if Gorbachev is prepared to dismantle the political system he now heads. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

No Muddling Through

The essence of the current crisis is that neither the existing political system Gorbachev is attempting to preserve nor the partially emerging new system is able to cope effectively with newly mobilized popular demands and the deepening economic crisis. In short, the Soviet Union is now in a revolutionary situation, in the sense that it is in a transition from the old order to an as yet undefined new order. As happened in Eastern Europe over the past two years, the ingredients are now present in the USSR--hatred of the old political order, divisions in the political elite and its lack of firm resolve, uncertainty over the reliability of the security services, an increasingly mobilized and organized political opposition--that could quickly sweep away the current political system and leadership. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The reformers' and traditionalists' basic goals for the future of the union are diametrically opposed, so there is little prospect that Gorbachev's so called centrist course can defuse the crisis. For the reformers, especially in Russia, power resides with the people, who can freely chose to participate in a new union, and on what terms. To traditionalists such thinking is revolutionary

and they continue to insist that the center dominated system be basically preserved. Although some moderates on each side are willing to compromise on this fundamental issue, those with the political clout to make it work--the security services and the CPSU for the traditionalists, popularly elected leaders and legislators for the pluralists--are not willing to share real power with the other side. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

There can be no muddling through on this fundamental question because in the absence of the use of broad coercion by the hardliners, power will continue shifting toward the republics. Tactical compromises between both sides could make the shift evolutionary, however, preventing a zero-sum crisis or the ouster of Gorbachev. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The Key Players

Gorbachev. Gorbachev is not likely to regain his former position of power, but he still has an important role to play. Most importantly, his cooperation with the pluralists will be essential to a smooth transition of power to the republics and minimizing the possibility of a violent effort to reverse that process by the hardliners. If he participates in the transfer of power, he should be able to help protect some key concerns of the traditionalists--such as preserving the military and insuring their pensions. In addition, during the transition period Gorbachev would still play a leading role in shaping the center's policies, especially on foreign and defense issues. If he does not cooperate, the political situation will continue to deteriorate and Gorbachev will become even more politically isolated and vulnerable to the political forces demanding his ouster. He would have little recourse but to step down or rely on the traditionalists to use coercive measures to try to stabilize the situation, becoming even more politically dependent on them. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Despite this danger, Gorbachev's past record suggests that he will again shy away from decisive action and try to get as much authority for the center as possible. His inability to break away mentally from the old order--paternalistic rather than repressive in his mindset--has been a major factor contributing to the current crisis because it has prevented realistic actions from being taken to address the country's mounting problems. If he equivocates in an attempt to preserve the essence of the old system, the political and economic situation will only deteriorate and the longer this goes on, the greater the chances are that the current political system will be suddenly swept away. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Gorbachev's recent statements and actions suggest that he desperately wants to hold on to power and will be extremely reluctant to step aside voluntarily. He and his advisors appear to be minimizing his problems and he may still believe he can turn things around soon. It cannot be ruled out, however, that as his frustrations continue to grow Gorbachev would voluntarily step aside if he believed his position was irrevocably weakened. Recent interlocutors who have seen him over the years find him increasingly

discouraged and despondent and it is possible he may be beginning to lose his political will. His continuing health problems might also influence his thinking on retirement. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]


The Traditionalists. The kinds of steps Gorbachev will need to take to make the April accord work are anathema to most traditionalists. Mindful of the fate of their counterparts in Eastern Europe--the execution of Ceausescu in Romania, Zhivkov's trial in Bulgaria, and Honecker's similar fate if he had not been smuggled out by the Soviets--they are no doubt aware of the deep hatred of the CPSU and KGB in the USSR and some have privately indicated they fear for their lives. While they want to return to a center dominated system, at least some of them--particularly those near retirement age--may be willing to settle for a solution that protects their lives and pensions. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The traditionalists who now dominate the top level leadership have been trying to get Gorbachev to go along on the issues they consider most critical. Having him as president, actively or tacitly leading a creeping crackdown, avoids the risks that an outright play for power would entail. There is no love lost between Gorbachev and his traditionalists allies and they could still try to dump him if they believe he is selling out their interests to the republics. Although all share common goals, the traditionalists are divided on the critical question of making broad use of force to achieve them, and many share Gorbachev's aversion to using widespread violence and bloodshed. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

With the changes that have taken place in the top Soviet leadership in recent months, traditionalists hold all of the key positions of power and repression:

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]



The Pluralists. The primary goal of most pluralists is not to replace Gorbachev, but to transfer power to the republics. Beyond this, however, many of them have sharply different goals. Russia's leaders, who will be the key to shaping a new political system, want a weak center and would transfer power to the republics in a European Community type arrangement dominated by Russia. Central Asian leaders would prefer a stronger center that would allow their republics to continue to receive subsidies from more affluent regions. Most Russian and Ukrainian reformers have genuinely

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

democratic goals, but in Georgia and Central Asia indigenous forms of authoritarianism are already replacing communist totalitarianism. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

With the recent miners strikes, Soviet workers have emerged as a powerful independent political force pushing the country in a democratic direction. They have only weak ties to the newly emerging political parties, and many no longer trust Yel'tsin because he is cooperating with Gorbachev. Soviet labor is becoming increasingly restive and as the wave of strikes in sympathy with the miners demonstrated, unrest can spread quickly throughout the country. Although these strikes were brought to an end by the joint efforts of Yel'tsin and the center, the promises they made are unlikely to be fulfilled. This will only further fuel workers' growing alienation and frustration, increasing the prospects that the next round of strikes could paralyze the country and create a political crisis. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Aside from Yel'tsin, there is no other figure among the reformers who is currently in a position to assume a broad leadership role. People like Shevardnadze and Yakovlev are too closely associated with Gorbachev, although they could emerge as important figures if there were a search for compromise candidates for leadership positions acceptable to both reformers and traditionalists. If the reformers prevail, republic leaders will have become the key players:

- Yel'tsin has said he does not want to become USSR president and given the weakness of the office and the unsolvable problems that go with it, he would be unlikely to change his mind unless he saw it as the only way to prevent it from falling into the hands of someone who might be able to use the office against him. In that case he would probably also hold on to the Russian presidency. Yel'tsin has talked about the need for a well organized opposition party, but so far he has not taken steps to join forces with other reformers, some of whom distrust him and see him as an opportunist.

- The other leading republic-level players are Presidents Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Kravchuk of the Ukraine. Both want a new type of union, but are concerned that their interests not be overwhelmed by those of Russia and Yel'tsin. Nazarbayev appears to aspire to a national level role and could be a candidate for a weakened technocratic presidency. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The Reliability of the Instruments of Repression

The ability of the traditionalists to act will depend largely on the reliability of their instruments of repression–the KGB, the military, and the MVD Internal Troops. Although the security services certainly have enough loyal troops to execute a coup, imposing martial law throughout the country would be difficult. To undermine this ability further, the opposition has been working with some success to deepen fissures in the military and to a lesser extent in the KGB. There are reports that some soldiers or military

units balked at orders to use force in the Baltic republics and Caucasus. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g] (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The reliability of military forces for internal use is a critical and growing concern for the leadership and it is taking steps to address it:

- The CPSU has launched a new drive to reassert its influence in the military and propagandize traditionalist values.
- A campaign is under way to purge the armed forces of reformist officers or at least move them out of sensitive positions.

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The central leadership already has doubts about the reliability of the security services and the democrats are becoming more confident that they will not be used against them. If the opposition can be sure that the center would not make broad use of force against it, the breakdown of the center dominated union and the demise of the regime would accelerate. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Gorbachev's Fate

At the moment Gorbachev's current terms as president and general secretary do not expire until 1995. As a result of changes he initiated in the Constitution and the party rules, he can no longer easily be dumped by other members of the leadership the way Khrushchev was in 1964. Legally removing Gorbachev against his will would be a difficult and cumbersome process:

- He can only be removed as president if he is impeached for violating the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of the Congress of Peoples Deputies.
- Only a CPSU Congress can replace him as party leader, and that would require a long process of electing about 6,000 delegates. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

A Transition Based on the April Accord. The April accord could pave the way for Gorbachev's removal within about a year and for a smooth transition of power to the republics. If the serious obstacles that lie ahead can be overcome, the accord would lead to a reconstituted union more or less along the following lines:

- The USSR presidency would be eliminated or stripped of most authority, in effect becoming little more than the coordinator of the

republics' policies. If the presidency continued to exist it would either be an appointed position or there would be a popular election. For Gorbachev to have any chance of winning an election he would need the support of key republic leaders.

- The executive authority of the center would be exercised collectively by the republics. The center would probably have control of foreign, defense, and some areas of broad economic policy. If the republics participate in all key decisions by the center, there is a danger that central decisionmaking could become an extremely complex and difficult process, similar to that in Yugoslavia.

- The Supreme Soviet and Congress of Peoples Deputies would be abolished and possibly replaced by a new legislature, elected on a regional basis.

- The current ministerial system, along with much of the central bureaucracy, would be drastically reduced and reorganized, with many of its functions transferred to the republics. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

If the Accord Fails. As Gorbachev and the nine republic leaders try to negotiate the details of a new union treaty over the next several months and then a new constitution, this coalition could easily break down. The accord leaves most issues very vague and Gorbachev has yet to demonstrate he is ready to make the kinds of concessions that will be needed to make it work. It may be another case of him offering too little too late. Moreover, there are significant reservations about the accord in some republics, including the Ukraine, because it does not go far enough. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

If the April accord falls apart, particularly if it is because Gorbachev continues to jealously guard the center's prerogatives, the pre-April struggle for power would intensify and lead to a new crisis. Political and economic deterioration would accelerate, with the almost certain resumption of strikes and massive political protest and as the war of laws between the center and the republics resumed. Gorbachev would be even more discredited in the eyes of the reformers and would have no choice but to try to rely on the traditionalists, who would no doubt press him to crack down on the opposition and the republics. With Yel'tsin's election as Russian president and the continued shift in power to the republics, the pluralists would be in a stronger position. The political situation would be highly volatile and could quickly move in a number of different directions. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Reformers would renew their drive to force Gorbachev from office and take power themselves. They could succeed in a number of ways, which are not mutually exclusive:

- Gorbachev could be forced out by an ultimatum from the unified leadership of the key republics. For such a move to succeed, it would be important to gain the support of the security forces, probably by

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

offering assurances that the military would remain intact and there would not be any retribution against the KGB. Some military leaders might even welcome a reduced union built around the Slavic core because it would keep the bulk of Soviet forces intact, while helping defuse some of its key problems, such as ethnic tensions.

- Gorbachev might also be forced out through a roundtable process. In a desperate effort to try to defuse rising tensions, Gorbachev could agree to roundtable talks being demanded by the opposition. Such a move would probably be a miscalculation, and Gorbachev would likely find himself confronted with an opposition united in its demands that he step down or effectively give up power. Having agreed to share power, he might not be able to ignore such demands without provoking massive national unrest and strikes.

- Massive ongoing national strikes and demonstrations could topple the government. Reformers have demonstrated the ability to mobilize the population and call out huge crowds in their support in Moscow and other major cities. Despite an official ban and threats of police actions, over 200,000 people turned out in a pro-Yel'tsin demonstration in March. Yel'tsin could hasten this process if he began to encourage such actions actively. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The failure of the accord could also lead to a situation of dual power, with neither the traditionalists nor the reformers firmly in control. This would be most likely to come about if both sides are unsure of their strength and are therefore willing to compromise. Such a situation could unfold along the following lines, but it would be highly unstable and would not last long:

- Frustrated by Gorbachev's intransigence, key republics could go ahead and form a reconstituted union without him--based either on the accord or the negotiations taking place independently of the center among Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan--and claim the authority now exercised by the center.

- Under intense political pressure, Gorbachev could agree to a transition that leaves him in office for a specified period, perhaps playing for time and still hoping to stay.

- Gorbachev could remain as General Secretary but be forced out as president by the democrats. Even then he might retain the loyalty of the leadership of the KGB, military, and MVD. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

A Hardline Coup. To take the tough steps they believe are necessary to forestall a reformist victory, at any point hardliners may try to remove Gorbachev and install their own regime. The danger would be greatest if they believe Gorbachev is selling out their interests to the republics. A move by hardliners would be conspiratorial and could unfold in several ways:

- They would prefer to oust Gorbachev with a legal veneer by getting him to agree to step down and installing their own candidate. Most likely they would present Gorbachev with an ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death. Yanayev would initially take over as president and Ivashko as general secretary. The traditionalist Congress of Peoples Deputies would then be used to install the hardliners' preferred candidate--this was the way Gorbachev was elected to the post--using the vagueness of the Constitution to postpone a popular election until 1995.

- They could bypass established procedures and use the crisis situation to justify the Congress of Peoples Deputies and Central Committee removing Gorbachev and installing hardline leaders previously agreed on. Given the traditionalist majority in both institutions, they would almost certainly endorse the choice of a united leadership, although there would be loud protests from the reformers in those bodies.

- They could move decisively to regain control by declaring a state of emergency throughout the country, installing some sort of National Salvation Committee, likely dominated by security officials, and moving forcefully against the opposition.

- They could arrange an accident for Gorbachev and replace him by one of the procedures above. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Spontaneous Uprisings. Even if progress is made on the basis of the accord, deteriorating economic and social conditions could lead to sudden outbursts of popular discontent that rapidly grow in intensity and spread throughout the country. The increasingly politicized workforce has become a wildcard in Soviet politics that neither the traditionalists nor reformers might be able to control. Although the miners strike has been suspended, the Soviet labor movement is emerging from the strikes stronger, better organized, and increasingly politicized, and has become a major independent political force. The recent strikes in the Belorussian capital of Minsk demonstrated that even normally quiescent areas can suddenly explode. Although workers view Yel'tsin much more favorably than Gorbachev, the most radical workers do not trust him either. Now that Russia has assumed responsibility for the mines, Yel'tsin will increasingly become a target if the miners' economic demands are not met. The first test is likely to come in July, when miners are threatening a broader general strike if promises made by the center and republics are not fulfilled. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

As economic conditions further deteriorate and workers increasingly feel the effect of recent price increases, Soviet labor is almost certain to be an increasing challenge for the regime as well as republic leaders. If coercive steps are not taken against them, it appears to be only a matter of time before Soviet workers will be able to paralyze the country and force major political concessions, possibly including Gorbachev's resignation. They would be particularly threatening to the regime if they continue to gain force

in major urban areas. Widespread workers strikes and protests, independent of Yel'tsin and other political leaders, could lead to a highly unstable situation--not unlike that at the time of the 1917 Revolution--that could sweep away the current political leadership at all levels. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

For a popular upheaval to sweep the regime away, it would have to develop and spread in Russia. While outbursts and major strikes have occurred there, such an upheaval has not taken place to date probably because popular reformist leaders have not sought it and have acted to contain local actions having explosive potential, and the security forces have refrained from major use of brutal force in Slavic areas. Yel'tsin and other reformist leaders have not been physically harmed by the regime, and food shortages in critical areas have been only temporary so far. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Indicators and Triggers

The current political situation is highly volatile and could quickly unravel and throw the country into a succession crisis with little warning. The security services are feeling increasingly desperate and there is a possibility that they could act against Gorbachev at any time. It is also possible that a spark could ignited massive protests and strikes by an increasingly frustrated Soviet population that could topple the government. While the reformers' drive for power will continue to be fairly public, a traditionalist initiative would be a secret conspiracy executed suddenly. Military activity would no doubt be associated with it, and while preparations for a nationwide state of emergency could probably be detected, the moves preceding a coup probably would not and even if they were their intent would not be clear. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Any of the following developments could precipitate a crisis that could bring the leadership situation to an immediate head:

- Gorbachev's death or sudden incapacitation would give the traditionalists some advantages if they were able to keep the information secret and then tried to present the succession as a fait accompli.

- Labor unrest could quickly escalate into a national general strike aimed at bringing down the government.

- The death of Yel'tsin, whether or not by natural causes, would spark massive demonstrations against the regime if it is attributed to the KGB, as it most likely would.

- The belief by traditionalists that their days are quickly coming to an end could prompt them to make a preemptive move.

- After he wins the Russian presidency, Yel'tsin and reformers could mobilize the populace to press for the removal of Gorbachev.

- Another confrontation between security forces and civilians resulting in civilian deaths, especially if it is much more violent and in a Slavic region, could spark widespread protests. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Implications for Soviet Policy

No matter what type of transition takes place, initially the new political arrangements will not be stable. At a minimum, elements of the losing side are unlikely to relinquish power smoothly, so there could be a period of intensified struggle that could escalate into widespread upheaval. Under such unstable conditions, a reformist or traditionalist regime would focus on consolidating power and put other issues on the back burner. Nevertheless, there would quickly be some distinct differences between how each would deal with the most pressing domestic and foreign policy issues. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The Reformers. The exact course of events if reformers gain the upper hand, whether or not Gorbachev is still in office, would depend on circumstances and who the new leaders would be. With the myriad of problems they will inherit, their internal divisions, and the initial need to rely on elements of the old power structure, at first they will find it difficult to govern and implement sweeping new policies. Nonetheless, there would be a more or less rapid devolution of power to the republics:

- For at least a transition period a reconstituted center would exist, but its policies would be set by collective decisions of the participating republics. This would likely be an unwieldy arrangement, dominated by Russia. They would insist on dismantling the repressive capabilities of the KGB and MVD.

- The military would be under the joint control of a weak center in which Russia would have the predominant role. While the Slavic core might agree to support a common military effort, each republic would probably develop some of its own forces, possibly allowing for some centralized command. Most importantly, Soviet nuclear capabilities would remain under a single command.

- Although a reconstituted center would probably retain an overall coordinating role in foreign policy, it would be difficult for it to conclude international negotiations without active republic participation. The republics would probably uphold existing international obligations and treaties, although the dispersion of authority could make implementation and enforcement difficult. The republics would also quickly begin to pursue independent foreign policies and would be particularly anxious to move ahead in establishing foreign economic relations as well as in some cases defense agreements with their neighbors.

(b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

- Authority over most domestic matters would be transferred to the republics and different policies would quickly emerge. In most of the European parts of the USSR, including Russia, democratic institutions would develop and there would be new impetus for economic reforms in a market direction, but progress on both fronts would be slow. In Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus authoritarian regimes would likely emerge.

- The republics not wanting to be part of a reconstituted union would be able to leave much more easily than under the current secession law, but they would still need to negotiate an exit that takes account of the other republics' concerns about their defense requirements, financial obligations, minorities (especially Russians), and border issues. Of the six republics not participating in the union treaty negotiations, Moldova and Armenia might be induced to stay in a reconstituted union, but the Baltics and Georgia almost certainly would not. Republics not participating in a new union would raise their own small armies with small conventional arms, but some might maintain some sort of bilateral defense arrangements with the Slavic core that could allow bases to continue to operate on their soil. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

The Traditionalists. Traditionalists would try to move quickly to clamp down on the opposition:

- They would arrest and conceivably even execute key leaders of the opposition, including Yel'tsin; reimpose strict media censorship; ban activities by opposition political groups; and revert to tight central control over the economy.

- Although there would be severe economic constraints, there would be less of a decline in defense spending.

- While the main focus would be on reestablishing control at home, foreign policy would become less flexible. Progress on arms control would be extremely difficult, but existing agreements probably would be observed. Soviet active measures would increase and if the domestic situation were temporarily stabilized the leadership would probably look for targets of opportunity to reassert Soviet influence abroad, provided the political and economic costs were not too high.

- The regime would adopt a much more truculent public posture toward the West and there would be an internal campaign blaming the country's problems on Western subversion. Although the regime would still be interested in pursuing economic cooperation, its policies would create a very unfavorable climate for joint economic ventures and other cooperative efforts. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Prospects: A Messy Transition

No matter what happens, the current political system in the Soviet Union is doomed. If traditionalists seize power, with massive use of force and repression they might temporarily reestablish control of most of the country, but they would not provide a longterm solution, particularly for the economy. Under such a regime political and social alienation would increase sharply; almost certainly democratic and nationalist movements would reemerge. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Time is working against the traditionalists, however. The longer force is not used, the weaker their position will become. The security services are continuing to fracture, while democratic and republic forces continue to gain strength and organize. Moreover, as the economy continues its downward spiral, labor unrest is almost certain to become more serious, fueling pressures for systemic change. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]

Even if Gorbachev manages to remain, his domination of the Soviet political system has ended and will not be resurrected. The sharp decline in his power will be almost impossible to reverse. If he is still in office a year from now a de facto transfer of power will likely have taken place to the traditionalists or more likely to the reformers. The longer the transition is delayed, the more difficult the political and economic situation will become, and the greater the danger of violent upheavals and the harder it will be for anyone to rule effectively. (b)(1); (b)(3) [50 USC 403g]