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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91128
Folder ID Number: 91128-009

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	8/29/90	(b)(1)	
01b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	8/29/90	(b)(1)	
01c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	8/29/90	(b)(1)	
02. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	8/20/90	(b)(1)	
03. Cable	James A. Baker, III to Eduard Shevardnadze (4 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Cable Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce Re: Your July 6 Message to Ambassador Matlock (5 pp.)	7/7/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Cable	General Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA Exemptions Redacted] (1 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Cable Memo	General Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S
05c. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	General Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA Exemptions Redacted] (2 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1083
OA/ID Number: 91128-009
Date Closed: 4/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Cable Memo	Ambassador Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] [FOIA Exemptions Redacted] (1 pp.)	7/12/90	(b)(1)	S
08a. Memo	General Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S
08b. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	7/4/90	(b)(1)	
09c. Message	Re: Text of a Message from the Prime Minister to the President (3 pp.)	7/4/90	(b)(1)	C
10a. Cable Memo	Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your July 6 Message to Ambassador Matlock (5 pp.)	7/7/90	(b)(1)	S
10b. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev (4 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	S
11a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1)	S
11b. Handwritten Notes	Re: One-on-One (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12a. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (13 pp.)	2/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files

Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12b. List	Re: Persons Listed Above... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
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*Orig given to Sec
Baker to hand to
Soviet Ambassador
8/29/90*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

I have been thinking a lot lately about U.S.-Soviet relations. I am very pleased with the way in which we have been able to work together at the U.N. in the face of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. I truly believe that the actions taken by the United Nations will not only revitalize that organization, but will be recorded as truly historic and meaningful.

I remember our meeting at Camp David. We talked there about getting together more frequently and about talking informally without an agenda.

With those conversations in mind, I am wondering if you would be able to meet me in Switzerland or possibly Finland for one day of talks. I am very anxious to discuss the Middle East crisis with you, and, of course we can discuss many other subjects as well.

I think such a meeting, showing the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. staying in touch, working together on a major problem sends a very good signal around the globe.

For your very private information, I am planning a speech to the American people early in the week of September 10th. In that speech I will discuss the Persian Gulf crisis. Our meeting should come before that speech, so I can report to the American people on our meeting and on U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

Thus, I propose that we meet on either Friday, September 7th or Saturday, September 8th.

Regrettably, I would not be able to meet later on in September due to our domestic budget matters. In fact, I had to cancel a long scheduled South American trip planned for mid-September.

I would suggest small meetings (similar to Camp David format). A proposed schedule might look like the following:

9:00 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. - Meeting
(3 or 4 on each side)

1:30 p.m. - Lunch
(8 or 9 on each side)

2:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. - Meeting
(3 or 4 on each side)

5:00 p.m. - Joint Press Conference and Departure

I have been staying in close personal touch with world leaders over the first two weeks of the Gulf crisis. I feel it is important that the two of us are seen, hopefully, in agreement on the major question of the Persian Gulf, but in any event having frank and serious personal contact. Perhaps it is better, given the short time span of the meetings, that the wives not accompany us; but if Raisa wishes to be there, I am confident Barbara will enthusiastically attend. Either way is fine with me.

As to location -- our mutual friend Sadruddin Khan once offered his lovely home on Lake Geneva as a meeting place. From a security standpoint, it would be perfect, and I am sure he would agree to letting us meet there. He knows nothing of this proposal, however. If Finland were preferable to you, I expect their President would be most agreeable to providing a good place to meet.

I realize that this is very short notice, but that, too, has great appeal to me. As things dramatically change around the world, we should now, more than ever, be in close contact.

I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as possible if this idea of a meeting in early September has appeal to you.

Sincerely yours, *with personal*

best wishes - *Ag Bush*

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Moscow

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His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 20, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letter which I read with great interest. Before turning to the many issues that you raised, I want to note my satisfaction that we have been able to cooperate effectively, both bilaterally and especially in execution of our duties as members of the United Nations Security Council, at this difficult time in the Persian Gulf. I believe that our joint statement was a significant step forward in the development of a productive U.S.-Soviet relationship. I am hopeful that we can continue to work together to do all that is needed to repel Iraq's aggression and achieve the objectives laid out by the United Nations.

I took note of your strong words condemning the Iraqi action in your August 17 speech at Odessa. We now must all do our part -- having worked together to secure their passage -- to ensure the strictest observance of the U.N. resolutions, particularly UNSC Resolution 661. In that regard, Jim Baker is discussing with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze Soviet participation in a multinational naval force to enforce the UN-mandated economic sanctions levied against Iraq and Kuwait. I hope too that your government will join with others in collective efforts to secure the safe passage of the innocent nationals of several countries who are still inside Kuwait and Iraq. This, and the protection of the lives of the diplomats serving in the region, are high priorities for the United States. We are coordinating our efforts with the European Community and hope that you will be willing to do the same.

Turning to our economic relationship, I am pleased that you found the decisions taken by the United States and its G-7 partners at Houston to be helpful. As you know, the G-7 countries agreed to study closely how best to contribute to effective economic reform in the

Soviet Union. The study that the international economic organizations have launched, at the request of the G-7, should help us all to understand better the problems that you face and what can be done to address them. As you know, Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher will bring a delegation of senior businessmen with them to Moscow in September. I believe that this initiative, coupled with my recent decision to remove the ceiling on the number of Soviet business people who are permitted to live and work in the U.S., will serve to strengthen and expand commercial relations between our two countries.

My Administration is also currently examining ways to expand and focus our technical cooperation projects in a few key areas, for example food processing and distribution, energy exploration, and the development of the financial sector. We will continue to look for areas of common interest, including perhaps housing. I also believe that cooperation in the field of economic education will have considerable pay-offs, particularly in the long-term. Jim Baker will have some further ideas on this when he comes to Moscow in September, and we would look forward as well to hearing your views.

I continue to watch closely the exciting changes taking place in your country. Our experience here has taught us that pluralism is nothing to fear, but rather to foster and embrace. Our contacts with democratic forces outside of Moscow should be interpreted as an effort to understand better the entire range of opinion in your country.

We have accomplished a great deal in the past year, and I look forward to the remaining tasks. I fully agree with your assessment that we have laid the foundations for further mutual cooperation, and am confident that a new era of peaceful relations lies ahead.

Sincerely,



His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Handwritten notes at top of page:
Mrs. Bush
File in the
...
APNSA Has Seen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1990

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Mrs. Bush has written the attached handwritten letter to Mrs. Gorbachev. We would be very grateful if you would see that Mrs. Gorbachev personally receives this.

With appreciation and all best wishes,

Sincerely,

Susan Porter Rose

Susan Porter Rose
Chief of Staff to Mrs. Bush

His Excellency Alexander A. Bessmertnykh
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 16th Street
Washington, D.C. 20036

cc: General Scowcroft

THE WHITE HOUSE

June 14th 1990

Dear Raisa,

I was so pleased to receive
your nice letter. I cannot
tell you how much all of
America enjoyed your visit....
especially me. I feel that you
and I are friends. Thank
you for going to Boston with
me. The women at Wellesley
will never forget it. Your speech
was just right. Thank you
so much. You saw how much

THE WHITE HOUSE

The people of Boston loved you.
It would have been that
way all over the country.

So many many thanks for
your visit. I will look
forward to our next meeting.

Thank you for your letter.

My best to your courageous
husband - Warmly -

Seibers

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0842-MR
ES 4112113

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: BLACKWILL FILE RICE SIT WHSR-OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 110250Z JUL 90

FM THE WHITE HOUSE//AIR FORCE ONE//

TO STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER

~~SECRET~~

NOTE: WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER PLEASE RELAY TO THE STATE
DEPARTMENT

OPERATIONS CENTER: FOR TRANSMISSION ~~SECRET~~/INDIS TO MOSCOW

DEAR EDUARD:

AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT BUSH HAS WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
TWICE IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS TO INFORM HIM OF THE RESULTS OF THE
NATO SUMMIT IN LONDON AND OF THE HOUSTON ECONOMIC SUMMIT. I WANT TO
FOLLOW UP AND SHARE SOME OF MY IMPRESSIONS WITH YOU AS WELL BEFORE
WE MEET IN PARIS.

YOU MADE VERY CLEAR TO ME IN BERLIN HOW IMPORTANT THE NATO
SUMMIT WAS FOR YOUR ABILITY TO BE RESPONSIVE ON THE GERMAN
ISSUE AND TO ANSWER YOUR DOMESTIC CRITICS, ESPECIALLY DURING
THE PARTY CONGRESS. IT WAS WITH THOSE CONCERNS IN MIND THAT WE
PUT TOGETHER THE LONDON DECLARATION -- A DOCUMENT WHICH
UNDERScores NATO'S DETERMINATION TO ADAPT TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
AND UNDERScores NATO'S DETERMINATION TO ADAPT TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
AND WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO BUILD A NEW EUROPE
CHARACTERIZED BY PEACEFUL COOPERATION, NOT MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

THE LONDON DECLARATION INCLUDES A NUMBER OF STEPS DESIGNED
TO SIGNAL THAT DETERMINATION. IN LONDON, WE PLEDGED NEVER IN
ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE THE FIRST TO USE FORCE. RESPONDING TO
YOUR PROPOSAL, WE SUGGESTED A JOINT DECLARATION BY THE MEMBER
STATES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION STATING WE
ARE NO LONGER ADVERSARIES AND MAKING A SOLEMN COMMITMENT TO
NON-AGGRESSION. MOREOVER, TO BREAK DOWN THE BARRIERS OF
SUSPICION AND ENMITY, AND ALSO TO REACH OUT TO THE SOVIET UNION

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE. THE ALLIANCE DECIDED TO INVITE THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND ROMANIA TO ESTABLISH REGULAR DIPLOMATIC LIAISON MISSIONS WITH NATO. WE HAVE ALSO INVITED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO ADDRESS THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. WE HOPE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL OUTLINE HIS VISION FOR EUROPE TO THE COUNCIL, AND IN DOING SO WILL LAY A FURTHER BASIS FOR OUR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS.

TO ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS AND THOSE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF A UNITED GERMANY, OUR ALLIANCE INDICATED THAT A COMMITMENT WILL BE GIVEN AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE CFE TREATY CONCERNING GERMAN MANPOWER LEVELS. IN ADDITION, WE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO PURSUE FURTHER FAR-REACHING MEASURES IN THE 1990'S TO LIMIT THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE. NATO ALSO TOOK SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARD REDUCING SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE ANNOUNCED OUR READINESS TO ELIMINATE ALL U.S. NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS FROM EUROPE IF YOU AGREE TO RECIPROCATATE, AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN SNF NEGOTIATIONS SHORTLY AFTER A CFE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.

THE LONDON DECLARATION PROVIDED GUIDELINES FOR A FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY. OUR STRATEGY AND DOCTRINES ARE GOING TO CHANGE. WE MADE CLEAR OUR INTEREST IN MOVING FROM "FORWARD DEFENSE" AND MODIFYING "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" TO REFLECT A REDUCED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS ALL SOVIET STATIONED FORCES WITHDRAW AND THE CFE TREATY IS IMPLEMENTED, NATO WILL ADOPT A NEW STRATEGY MAKING ITS NUCLEAR FORCES TRULY WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT.

THE LONDON SUMMIT ALSO OUTLINED NATO'S AMBITIOUS GOALS FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING CSCE, BASED ON THE IDEAS I DISCUSSED WITH YOU IN BERLIN. WE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING NATO'S SUPPORT FOR MORE REGULAR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS; A SMALL SECRETARIAT; A CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT, AS YOU PROPOSED; AND A CSCE PARLIAMENT. YOU TOLD ME IN BERLIN THAT YOU REGARDED THESE PROPOSALS AS VERY SIGNIFICANT AND WE HAVE RESPONDED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE LONDON DECLARATION EMBODIES OUR COMMITMENT TO ADAPT NATO TO THE ENORMOUSLY POSITIVE CHANGES UNFOLDING IN EUROPE. CHANGES DUE IN NO SMALL PART TO YOUR VISION AND DETERMINATION.

EDUARD. YOU'VE TOLD ME SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST THAT NOT RECOGNIZING THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH YOU MUST OPERATE WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE. THE LONDON DECLARATION WAS DRAWN UP WITH THOSE NEEDS VERY MUCH IN MIND. AND I REMINDED MY COLLEAGUES OF THEM FORCEFULLY DURING OUR LENGTHY NEGOTIATION OF THE DRAFT TEXT. MEETING YOUR NEEDS WAS THE REASON WE DEVELOPED THE NINE POINTS SOME TIME AGO; IT WAS THE REASON WE WERE FLEXIBLE ON THE COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT HERE AT THE SUMMIT; AND IT WAS THE SAME REASON WE ADVANCED THE NINE POINTS -- AND EVEN WENT WELL BEYOND THEM -- IN THE LONDON DECLARATION.

I KNOW THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES YOU FACE. AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I VERY MUCH ADMIRE THE SKILL AND ELOQUENCE WITH WHICH YOU HAVE RESPONDED TO YOUR CRITICS AT THE PARTY CONGRESS, AND HOW QUICKLY YOU EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NATO DECLARATION. WE, TOO, HAVE POLITICAL CONCERNS. AND I MUST TELL YOU THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO US TO MOVE QUICKLY NOW TO RESOLVE THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION AND ALLOW A UNITED GERMANY TO EXERCISE ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO REMAIN A FULL MEMBER OF NATO -- A NATO WHICH IS RAPIDLY TRANSFORMING ITSELF TO FIT NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. YOU TOLD ME THAT THE VERY DISAPPOINTING PAPER YOU TABLED AT THE LAST TWO PLUS FOUR MEETING IN BERLIN WAS NOT THE FINAL SOVIET WORD, THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE. I KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN ABSORBED BY THE PARTY CONGRESS, BUT I'M HOPEFUL THAT WHEN WE GET TOGETHER IN PARIS THAT WE WILL BEGIN TO MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS ON GERMANY. I ALSO HOPE AND EXPECT THAT WE CAN MOVE FORWARD AND RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN US ON CFE. PROMPT AGREEMENT ON CFE IS THE PREREQUISITE FOR ALTERING THE MILITARY REALITIES IN EUROPE AND CREATING THE BASIS FOR A NEW ARCHITECTURE. WITHOUT A CFE AGREEMENT, WE WON'T BE ABLE TO MOVE ON TO THE CSCE SUMMIT AND SNF NEGOTIATIONS. CFE IS THE KEY TO THE NEW EUROPE WE BOTH SEEK. SO I HOPE WE CAN REMOVE THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

BETWEEN US.

I AM SENDING THIS MESSAGE FROM AIR FORCE ONE FLYING BACK TO WASHINGTON WITH THE PRESIDENT FROM THE HOUSTON SUMMIT. I WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN DEPTH IN PARIS THE G-7 DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING AID TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT SUFFICE IT TO SAY HERE THAT ALL THE WESTERN LEADERS IN HOUSTON AGREED WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT THE REFORMS THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IS UNDERTAKING MUST SUCCEED. AND THAT THE NATIONS REPRESENTED IN HOUSTON SHOULD EACH DO THE BEST POSSIBLE TO ENSURE YOUR SUCCESS.

EDUARD, WHEN WE LAST TALKED IN BERLIN YOU TOLD ME HOW IMPORTANT THE LONDON SUMMIT WAS TO THE SOVIET EVALUATION OF THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TO THE NEW EUROPE. CAN I TELL YOU THAT I BELIEVE THE WEST, UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S LEADERSHIP, HAS DEMONSTRATED BEYOND DOUBT NOT ONLY IN LONDON BUT ALSO IN HOUSTON THAT THE POST-WAR CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE IS OVER. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WHEN THE TWO PLUS FOUR MEET IN PARIS NEXT WEEK, WE WILL BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE TWO SUMMITS AS WE MOVE TOWARD GERMAN SOVERIGNTY SIMULTANEOUS WITH UNITY. IF WE ARE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PACE OF EVENTS, WE MUST MOVE QUICKLY FOR WE ARE RUNNING OUT OF TIME.

WE HAVE MUCH TO TALK ABOUT AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN PARIS.

SINCERELY YOURS,
JAMES A. BAKER, III

QQQQ

BT

#0003

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Cabe Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce Re: Your July 6 Message to Ambassador Matlock (5 pp.)	7/7/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Cabe	General Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA Exemptions Redacted] (1 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 4/23/15

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0849-MR (504)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

01 01

00 00 SSSS

AA ZYUW VAX616

WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

FROM: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV DIRECTLY TO CHERNIAEV.

BEGIN TEXT:

JULY 11, 1990

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

FIRST, LET ME CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUCCESS AT YOUR PARTY
CONGRESS. ALL THE LEADERS HERE IN HOUSTON STRESSED HOW MUCH THEY
ADMIRE YOUR DETERMINATION TO PUSH PERESTROIKA AHEAD AND TO MOVE
TOWARD A FREE MARKET ECONOMY. I WILL BE CALLING YOU OVER THE
NEXT DAY OR SO TO GIVE YOU A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE NATO SUMMIT,
AND THE LENGTHY AND POSITIVE DISCUSSIONS AT THE HOUSTON ECONOMIC
SUMMIT CONCERNING ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

FOR NOW, LET ME ONLY SAY THAT, AS WE DISCUSSED AT CAMP
DAVID, THE HOUSTON MEETING HAS IN MY VIEW INDEED GIVEN IMPORTANT
MOMENTUM TO WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND, I HOPE,
TO YOUR OWN REFORM EFFORTS. I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING WITH YOU
LATER THIS WEEK.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0000



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0842-MR

SCS 9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

VIA BACK CHANNEL

July 11, 1990

FROM: General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: Ambassador Jack Matlock
AmEmbassy Moscow

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Please deliver the following letter from President Bush to
President Gorbachev directly to Cherniaev.

Begin Text.

Copy

End Text.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0842-MR
ES 4/12/13

~~SECRET~~

July 11, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

First, let me congratulate you on your success at your Party Congress. All the leaders here in Houston stressed how much they admire your determination to push perestroika ahead and to move toward a free market economy. I will be calling you ^{OVER THE} ~~the~~ next ~~few~~ days, ~~so~~ ^{so} to give you a detailed account of the NATO Summit, and the lengthy and positive discussions at the Houston Economic Summit concerning economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

For now, let me only say that, as we discussed at Camp David, the Houston meeting has in my view indeed given important momentum to Western assistance to the Soviet Union and, I hope, to your own reform efforts. I look forward to talking with you later this week.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0842-MR
SCS 9/17/13

CLASSIFICATION

PAGES 2

DTG 112210Z

RELEASER 

CLASSIFICATION

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Cable	General Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA Exemptions Redacted] (2 pp.)	7/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SS on 4/13/15

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0849-MR (505)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT: BLACKWILL FILE PRIVACY OUT SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 112127Z JUL 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

-
FROM: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

-
FOR: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

-
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV DIRECTLY TO CHERNIAEV.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
JULY 11, 1990

-
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

-
FIRST, LET ME CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUCCESS AT YOUR PARTY
CONGRESS. ALL THE LEADERS HERE IN HOUSTON STRESSED HOW MUCH THEY
ADMIRE YOUR DETERMINATION TO PUSH PERESTROIKA AHEAD AND TO MOVE
TOWARD A FREE MARKET ECONOMY. I WILL BE CALLING YOU OVER THE
NEXT DAY OR SO TO GIVE YOU A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE NATO SUMMIT,

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0842-MR
SCS 9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

AND THE LENGTHY AND POSITIVE DISCUSSIONS AT THE HOUSTON ECONOMIC SUMMIT CONCERNING ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

FOR NOW. LET ME ONLY SAY THAT, AS WE DISCUSSED AT CAMP DAVID, THE HOUSTON MEETING HAS IN MY VIEW INDEED GIVEN IMPORTANT MOMENTUM TO WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND, I HOPE, TO YOUR OWN REFORM EFFORTS. I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING WITH YOU LATER THIS WEEK.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

*0021

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Cable Memo	Ambassador Jack Matlock to General Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] [FOIA Exemptions Redacted] (1 pp.)	7/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SSS on 4/13/15

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0849-MR (506)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*Conk
will call
Matlock
re
Phone call*

PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN

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PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~

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(b)(1)



TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

FROM: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

BEGIN TEXT:

CHERNYAYEV IS TIED UP IN THE CONGRESS AND WILL SEE ME ON
FRIDAY -- TIME NOT YET CERTAIN -- TO RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER. IF A CALL IS PLANNED BEFORE FRIDAY AFTERNOON MOSCOW
TIME, PLEASE LET ME KNOW SO I CAN WARN APPROPRIATE PEOPLE THAT
IT IS COMING.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0254

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0842-MR

SCS 9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

VIA BACK CHANNEL

July 11, 1990

FROM: General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: Ambassador Jack Matlock
AmEmbassy Moscow

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Please deliver the following letter from President Bush to
President Gorbachev directly to Cherniaev.

Begin Text.

Copy

End Text.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0849-MR
ES 4/12/13

~~SECRET~~

July 11, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

First, let me congratulate you on your success at your Party Congress. All the leaders here in Houston stressed how much they admire your determination to push perestroika ahead and to move toward a free market economy. I will be calling you ~~next few~~ ^{OVER THE} day, ~~OR~~ ^{OR} so ~~to~~ give you a detailed account of the NATO Summit, and the lengthy and positive discussions at the Houston Economic Summit concerning economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

For now, let me only say that, as we discussed at Camp David, the Houston meeting has in my view indeed given important momentum to Western assistance to the Soviet Union and, I hope, to your own reform efforts. I look forward to talking with you later this week.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0842-MR
SCS 9/17/13

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
The President of the United
States of America

Dear Mr. President,

Addressing this message to you as Chairman of the Sixteenth Economic Summit of the Seven's leaders due to be held in Houston, and through you, to its other participants, I wish to continue the discussion of the general problems of the world's development and of ways of getting our economies closer together.

The time which has elapsed since the Paris summit has been filled with developments of truly historic proportions. At the political level, a great deal has been done in terms of overcoming the divisions in the world. The division of Europe is becoming a thing of the past. The antagonism between the blocs and the superpowers is giving way to relations of partnership and cooperation.

Disarmament processes are gaining strength, which not only makes the world safer, but is creating a solid foundation for a sustained development of the world economy.

Overcoming the economic division of the world is now the order of the day. What needs to be done is achieving compatibility between different economic mechanisms and creating new cooperative structures. The decisions of the Bonn conference on economic cooperation and the establishment of the European bank for reconstruction and development are going in this direction.

*received 4 July 90
at 1315*

*by Gates
for Sergey Lavrov*

*Filed to Secwcraft
4 July*

The granting to the Soviet Union of the observer status in GATT is cause for satisfaction. It is a real step toward economic openness. The Soviet contacts with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development are on the increase. The agreement between the USSR and the European communities on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, concluded last December, has begun to operate. The recent US-Soviet summit in Washington saw a genuine "breakthrough" in economic matters.

It is important that the rapprochement between East and West is not taking place in isolation from the rest of the world and that it is contributing to shaping universal principles of economic comity of all states, including developing countries, which was stipulated in the decisions of the Eighteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

Looking back at the year past, we believe that the Soviet leadership has been doing everything in its power in order to buttress its new policies with concrete actions both at home and abroad.

Today, the USSR is going through a most critical stage in perestroika. It involves breaking the obsolete economic structures and a transition to market economy. Without these radical steps, further renewal of our society will be impossible.

At present, the Soviet leadership is looking for ways of supplementing the internal transformations with outside financial and economic support. These efforts are directed toward securing credit assistance, attraction of foreign capital, transfer of managerial experience, personnel training, and include other measures conducive to creating a competitive economy.

The first contacts in this regard have taken place, and by and large we are finding understanding.

Perhaps, it would be possible to talk about working out long-term agreements on large-scale credit and investment cooperation which in effect would be a serious factor of

stabilization and a transition to the market economy in the USSR. Establishment of a specific program of cooperation - eventually mutually beneficial cooperation - would best serve this objective.

I feel that a sustained economic dialogue between the USSR and the Seven would contribute to that as well.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin

July 4, 1990



BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

4 July 1990

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House G/WW
Washington DC 20503

Dear Brent,

I enclose a message from the Prime Minister to President Bush. I would be grateful for your help in transmitting it to the President.

Sincerely

Antony

Antony Acland

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09c. Message	Re: Text of a Message from the Prime Minister to the President (3 pp.)	7/4/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Date Closed: 4/13/2009	OA/ID Number: 91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10a. Cable Memo	Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your July 6 Message to Ambassador Matlock (5 pp.)	7/7/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: Letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev (4 pp.)	7/6/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ES 4/18/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Gorbachev

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

President Gorbachev
Anatoliy Chernyayev, Aide to the President

DATE, TIME June 1, 1990, 11:00-11:48 a.m.
AND PLACE Oval Office

President Gorbachev: This visit is a major event. The atmosphere is important. The meeting with Congressional leaders led me to believe there is now a new atmosphere. My contacts with ordinary people show a real change for the better. Thanks for your cooperation--you can count on mine. (S)

I told Congressional leaders we were worried about the trade agreement. We looked on it as an organic part of the summit--equal with START. These two were the principal pillars of the summit. Business people have been visiting--they now feel they have a chance. In practical terms, an agreement would not cause much of an increase in real trade for years. But an agreement would let a serious business effort begin. The Japanese and Germans, who are everywhere, would not have a monopoly. Of course, we could say that since we are working well with the Europeans, why worry about a trade agreement with the U.S. I am looking to the long term. Our long-term relations cannot thrive without a trade underpinning. (S)

The President: I agree. (S)

President Gorbachev: Moreover, we are moving to a market economy, closer to the U.S. If this visit included an agreement, this would be an important political signal. I wanted to emphasize these points. (S)

The President: What you said last night made a real impression on me. Here is my letter to you (President read the letter). The letter has never been made public. I wanted to explain to you how our political process works. You think Lithuania is an internal matter, but it has a real impact on my political situation. We want a trade agreement. It is in the U.S., and I hope, in the Soviet, interest. If not for Lithuania we wouldn't be discussing this issue at all. I was hopeful when you sat down with Mrs. Prunskiene. You heard Mitchell and his linking it with the People's Republic of China. What you saw was political

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linkage. How do we get out of it? (S)

President Gorbachev: I didn't feel Congress had a real cerebral problem with it. I talked with Bentsen also who was positive. (S)

The President: If a dialogue went on, and the blockade were lifted, the agreement would go through in a minute. The only hangup is Soviet economic might being used against Lithuania and the absence of dialogue. I understand why you can't have us in your internal affairs and I don't want to. But it is a dilemma. I know Congress. I know I can't get it through Congress with the present situation. (S)

President Gorbachev: We have each made our points. I can't force you to agree with my points. You have chosen the Baltics over me and let's leave it at that. (S)

The President: But what are the chances of getting talks going? You have said you would do that. (S)

President Gorbachev: As I told Congress, I favor a dialogue within a constitutional framework, but I won't talk outside of that framework. I want to return to the original situation and proceed toward discussing proceedings. I have some more words. Lithuania is progressing toward some kind of dialogue when I return. (S)

The President: Maybe we can discuss this tomorrow. Because of history, we have a special problem with Lithuania. We want a trade deal. I don't want to publicize any conditions because that makes it look like I am dictating to you. But there is no point in sending up legislation and having the hell kicked out of it. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK. I see you have given thought to this. I see no way to work harder. We are without a trade deal today and have been without a trade deal for many years. This is not a life and death issue. But everyone knows a trade deal was part of our summit. So we have some explaining to do. (S)

The President: I know. They were yelling at me yesterday. It troubles me because I want this summit to be a success. Let's try to work it out. (S)

President Gorbachev: It is more my problem. I have explained it to you and know it is in your hands. (S)

The President: Let me ask about my April 27 letter. I wonder whether you actually saw that letter. Our bureaucracy..... (S)

President Gorbachev: Mr. President, I read everything. (S)

The President: OK. Last night, you didn't seem to be familiar with it. (S)

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President Gorbachev: It can't happen that a letter from the President of the United States wouldn't be shown to me. They would not last on my staff if that happened. Let us say our concerns about the Baltics are as deep as yours. We want to find a solution because otherwise it would be a blow to Perestroika. But life is not always under our own control. (§)

The President: Let me give it some more thought and we will discuss it again tomorrow. (§)

- End of Conversation -

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 2, 1990

Note for Florence Gantt

I have attached General Scowcroft's notes from the June 1 one-on-one with Gorbachev for your files.

I gave you the finished memcon on this meeting last week.

Nick Burns NB

G This visit a major event. Atmos is important & Cong. raty led me to believe there is a new atmos. ~~Yancy~~^{My} contacts w/ ordinary people show a real change for better. Thanks for your esp - you can count on mine.

I worried about trade agreement - Told Cong leaders. We looked at it as organic part of a summit - equal w/ S. T. These 2 were principal pillars of a summit. Business people have been waiting - they now feel they have a chance. On practical terms a agreement ^{real} would not mean much ~~cause~~ ^{no} trade for years. But agreement would let a common business effort begin. w/ Germans who are everywhere - won't have a monopoly. Of course, we could say I'm working well w/ S. now, why worry about a agreement. I looking long term - our long term relations ~~won't~~ can't thrive w/o a trade underpinning.

P I agree

G Moreover, we are working to establish economy & ∴ closer to US. If this visit included agreement, this would

be an important political signal. I wanted to emphasize these points.

P What you said last night made a real impression. Here is my letter to you (Reals). Letter would have been made public. Wanted to explain to you how our political process works - you think it's an internal matter - but it has real impact on my politics. We want a trade agreement. It is in US + I hope Sov interest. If not for Leth we would have been discussing this issue at all. I was hopeful when you sat down w/ Premakhin. You heard Mitchell + looking at us / PRC. What you saw was political language. Have to get out of it.

G I didn't feel a Cong had real cerebral prob w/ it. I talked w/ Bandolter also who was positive.

P If dialogue went on + blockade lifted, a agreement would go thru in a minute. Only hangup is Sov even might be, need any sort of tech, + understanding. I understand why you can't hear us in your internal affairs & I don't want to. But it's a dilemma. I know a Cong. I know I can't get it thru - Cong w/ a present situation.

G We agree each make our points. I can't ^{force you to agree w/ my points} ~~convince you~~. You have chosen a Battles over me & let's leave it at that.

P But what are the chances of getting talks going. You have said you would do that

G As I told Larry, I was developing in a loose framework but I won't talk outside that framework. I want to return to original set & proceed toward direct proceeding. There are some words. With is progress for some kind of dialog when I return.

P Maybe we can discuss tomorrow. Because of history we have a special prob w/ with. We want a trade deal. I don't want to publicize conditions here that makes it look like dictating to you & not no point to sending legs up & having a hell kicked out of it.

G OK. I see you have given that to this.

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P I know. They were yelling at me yesterday. It troubles me because I want this summit to succeed. Let's try to work it out.

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P Let me ask about my Apr 27 letter. I wonder whether you actually sent that letter. Our correspondence

G Mr. P. I read everything.

P OK. Last night your letter seem to be fiction w/it.

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But life is not always under our own control.

P Let me give it some more thought & we will discuss it again tomorrow.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs

V.I. Kryuchkov, Chairman, State Committee
for Security (USSR)

PLACE and TIME: KGB Headquarters (New Building)
Dzerzhinskaya Square, Moscow
1500 - 1715, 9 February 1990

Kryuchkov received Gates in his office in the New KGB Building. After exchanging greetings, Gates informed Kryuchkov that he had just left the meeting between Gorbachev and Secretary Baker, which was still underway after more than three hours. Gates said that Gorbachev had been explaining what had taken place during the just concluded Central Committee plenum, joking that the latter had been so eventful that it would take all day for Gorbachev to finish.

Kryuchkov said that the plenum had been heated and had accomplished a great deal. It had not, he added, satisfied those who had hoped to see a change of leadership, or some kind of scandal. There had of course been sharp discussion, even between members of the Politburo. This was not the first time that had happened, of course, but never before had the details of such disagreements been published in the press. Kryuchkov continued that he had just come from a Politburo meeting, and knew from many such meetings that discussions there were often sharp over interpretations of law, personnel changes, and so on. He assumed that such things happened in the U.S. as well.

Kryuchkov continued that all of the materials of the plenum would be published. Hundreds of suggestions had been submitted

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for changes to the political platform, and they would be published as well, though in the Izvestiya of the Council of Ministers, not in the daily press. Everything, he grimaced, was now published. He said this made things easier for the US "Services" and therefore hoped they had a proper understanding of developments in the USSR.

Gates said that this public debate made it more difficult for foreign analysts to understand what was happening, because there are now several versions of events available. In the old days it was simpler -- only one version.

Kryuchkov thanked Gates for that idea, and said he would use it next time he had to justify a request for personnel or budget increases -- the more information was available, the harder it was to understand. Gates said this was especially the case now in the Soviet Union, with so many important events taking place all over the country.

Kryuchkov said "of course, perestroyka is encountering problems," and that had been reflected in the debates at the plenum. We should have planned for the changes to take place over a longer period of time, he said, because the hardest thing of all to change is the way people think. It takes time, especially to bring about substantial changes. We had hoped to bring about large-scale change quickly, but it was more than our people could take. Change should be applied gradually, like oxygen. Too much too quickly could make one dizzy. Nevertheless, he continued, there is no way back now. We must push ahead. We will make adjustments as we go, making sure we remain in touch with the people, checking their views and attitudes. We had to do this so the leadership would not go one way, the people the other.

Kryuchkov argued that Article Six of the constitution, which gave the party the leading role in the society, need not be "eternal." It had been inserted in the new constitution in 1977, but no longer corresponded to reality. It should be either changed or omitted entirely. Doing so would present no big problem. Its presence had spoiled the party. Party decisions were too easily turned into law. The party was not then or now equivalent to society as a whole, and neither was the Central Committee. Since the article no longer corresponded to reality, if it remained in force it could cause philosophical and practical problems.

As for establishment of a multi-party system, he said, many informal organizations already exist which function like parties. Nevertheless, a multi-party structure should be introduced gradually. Standards and regulations should be established

concerning registration, minimum requirements for membership, etc. A monarchist "party" now exists which wants to restore a monarchy. That obviously is not in keeping with the times, and such a party is out of place. Nevertheless, all such groups have a right to exist. There are some quite extreme groupings -- anarchists, for example. Formal requirements should be put into place governing their activity. They are not, he continued, like companies. The U.S. had many companies -- 15 to 18 million, he understood, some of which lasted only a few days, some for decades. But parties should not be such temporary phenomena....

Kryuchkov said that the plenum had also decided to move the party congress forward, from fall to summer. This was done because of the heightened political activity of the people. Moreover, the role of the party is changing, so party statutes and basic documents should change as well.

Kryuchkov said that of course there had been disagreement at the plenum on perestroyka, but only one delegate had spoken out against perestroyka itself. But others criticized or doubted one aspect or the other -- certain policies, or the pace of change. My own attitude, he continued, was made clear in my presentation, which was printed in the press. "I argued that we should take stock, see exactly where we were in the process of change so we could be very careful in the further steps we took." I said also that while we were creating a state in which law ruled, we had to develop means within the law to deal with violence. We had laws, but they were not sufficiently specific. We should especially strengthen our criminal law.

For many years we should have been paying more attention to interethnic disputes. But we had this idea that everything was developing without a problem. We were wrong. In regard to Eastern Europe, we should let things take their own course, give them a chance to develop normally. But of course we could not "forget the results and costs of the war." Kryuchkov noted that that had been a brief outline of his thinking and his presentation. He assumed that U.S. analysts would take a closer look at the latter and the results of the plenum.

Kryuchkov added that Gates should know that this plenum would continue to work for a few more months in its present composition, but with the report/election campaigns and the congress coming up, a new central committee would soon be in place. What would it be like? That's a valid question for both Soviet and U.S. analysts. There are many variables. If U.S.-Soviet relations improved, and we concluded agreements, that would present good prospects for the future, and would help those who support new thinking. If, on the other hand, the U.S. "tried to corner us, to exploit our current difficulties, or put us in

awkward situations," that would influence the attitude not only of the party but also the people.

The economic situation is also important, of course, and would influence the make-up of the committee. The Soviet government, and its intelligence services, are studying the experience of the West in extricating itself from difficult economic situations. And despite our problems, the Soviet leadership believes that we could find ways to resolve our economic problems fairly quickly. Not all problems, of course, but enough to begin the economy moving. "We will soon engage these problems in a big way."

In response to the notion of the U.S. exploiting Soviet problems, Gates replied that Kryuchkov should know that the President had spoken the truth when he had said that he supported perestroika. The President's attitude was clear. He has handled problems and challenges in the relationship with caution and prudence, and had not attempted to take advantage of Soviet domestic troubles. Gates said he could assure Kryuchkov that no element of the U.S. government is engaged in activities in the USSR harmful to perestroika or to cause difficulty for reform. He continued that the possibility of real instability in the Soviet Union is frightening, and the U.S. would do nothing to encourage it. The President supports perestroika because it is in our mutual interest, and because it serves peace in the world in general.

Gates said he would like to outline briefly for Kryuchkov three general problems he sees the USSR facing now. The first concerns interethnic relations. Gorbachev had inherited the problems of an Empire in this regard. Many of the regions that now made up the USSR had not joined the Empire voluntarily, but by force of arms. Many now want independence, and want it quickly. The time needed to work out a form of voluntary federation thus might not be available.

Second, political developments are outrunning economic developments in the society. And the problem is that many of these economic problems need to be tackled at the same time. Moreover, many of these changes are such that they require painful adjustments by the people. Thus, this process of change is indeed difficult.

Third, reform is weakening the old institutions before new institutions can be put in place. The society's ability to implement necessary change is thereby also weakened.

Gates said one thing is difficult to understand, however. What has caused the recent, sharp increase in crime, especially

large-scale, organized crime? There have even been reports of hijacking of trains.

Kryuchkov said that Gates' observations deserve serious study. But they represent a view from the outside. And for all of us, our analysis is supplemented by our emotional reactions. History has it uses. Gates is correct when he says that not all of the regions had incorporated themselves voluntarily. There are perhaps no parallels easily drawn between the U.S. and the USSR, but the Civil War in the U.S. indicated that not all of the fifty states had agreed to their incorporation either. History was history, but it could not by itself be allowed to be a determining factor. History could not be ignored, but "if it is put up front, it just complicates our life." New factors always arose.

In the case of the USSR, over the past seventy years, growing interdependence among the republics had increasingly tied them together, especially economically. The Baltic states, for example, got more from the rest of the Soviet Union than they gave. Estonia got cotton, oil, energy, grain, forage, non-ferrous metals, and so on. Of course it also contributed to the rest of the USSR, but not as much. The most dependent of all of the republics was Lithuania, which was paradoxical, for it is exactly there that the drive for independence is most developed. But the interdependence of all of the republics is now very strong. It had developed because of an intentional policy, the result of a conscious effort by the center to develop the outer periphery of the country. No republic can leave tomorrow without feeling this interconnection. Interdependence painfully affects the Union. Armenia now wants to shut down a plant that is polluting the area. But the plant produces something on which seven hundred fifty other plants depend.

Nevertheless, there is much in what Gates had to say. Much effort has to be devoted toward developing a new federation as soon as possible. Some areas want political independence, with continuing economic interdependence. Even that possibility cannot be rejected out of hand.

Concerning shortages in goods, Kryuchkov said, we in fact have increased the number of goods considerably in the past five years. The problem is the enormous increase of money in people's hands, plus our "atrocious" pricing system. Wage and pension increases have contributed to the problem of the ruble overhang, but the main culprit is conversion of very large amounts of what in the past had been non-liquid funds -- columns of figures in accounting books -- to cash. In the old days if an enterprise had 50 million rubles, 40 million would have been non-liquid. Under the new system much more of it was available in cash. So

now we have hundreds of billions of rubles of "bad money" -- money not backed up by goods -- circulating in the system.

The FRG after the war had had a similar problem, and had carried out a money reform which left each person only forty marks in his pocket. If we could do the same, we could return to the situation as it was in 1987, when we were not managing badly. But such a reform would not be popular. Another source of excess money is of course the cooperatives. They take one billion worth of products and sell it for ten billion. For this reason everyone hates the coops. Kryuchkov said he personally supports the concept of coops, but they must be closely regulated. But some say that we should let them operate like in the West, without regulation. He added with a smile that while we were breaking our heads here over how to make firms operate with less regulation, in the West the governments are trying to increase public regulation of business.

Gates said that in fact most states in the West are now concerned with reducing state involvement in their economies. France, the UK, Mexico, and others are selling state enterprises.

Our price system, Kryuchkov continued, is terrible. A foreigner had told him that the Soviet Union would never get rich with such a pricing system. Bread cost nothing. The poorest person could buy a kilo of bread and throw it away.

Kryuchkov said that these economic anomalies coupled with democratization, taken together, have brought about a sharp increase in crime. Nevertheless, while the Soviet Union wished to overtake the U.S. in some indicators, it did not want to do so in all -- especially in crime. And so far it was still lagging behind. The KGB is now engaged against large-scale crime. Gates had mentioned a train hijacking in the Soviet Union? Kryuchkov said he had not heard of such an incident. If it had happened, it would have been publicized, because everything was these days.

Kryuchkov related that a foreigner had recently been apprehended with three million dollars in contraband. Had he been able to sell it here, he would have realized twelve to fourteen million rubles. If he had then converted that back into goods, and smuggled it into the U.S., he could have ended up with twelve to fourteen million dollars. The U.S. and Soviet Union should work together against such traffic in contraband. Perhaps we should consider an agreement regarding national treasures -- if when stolen they ended up here we would return them, and you would do the same for us. It would be worth considering.

Kryuchkov said that frenetically active rumor mills are characteristic of our situation here now. We are hearing about

alleged pogroms. An official report is under preparation in the KGB denying that such pogroms would take place. In the past such rumors had been short-lived. Now, because of instability in the society, they fall on fertile soil and prosper. In the U.S. rumors are confined to stock markets. Now, the entire Soviet Union is a stock market.

Gates asked how Kryuchkov personally viewed prospects for reestablishing order, putting the economy on the right track, and resolving the interethnic problems. Is he a pessimist or an optimist?

Kryuchkov replied that the German philosopher Berghoff had discussed the problem of pessimism and optimism in a treatise. He had concluded that a pessimist lost nothing, for if he was wrong, he simply shrugged his shoulders and no one paid attention to him. An optimist, however, staked everything on his bet, and stood to lose it all. Nevertheless, Kryuchkov continued, I am an optimist. We have no choice but to change the system, because other kinds of change in the USSR and around its borders make change in the system inevitable. It was unfortunate that some of this change had come about only after loss of life. But we should strengthen our laws to avoid such loss. And we had to continue with politization of the people to create the need for enterprise among the people, and to transfer power to individual enterprises and local councils in order to develop responsibility at those levels. With increasing frequency this was now happening. In a number of areas around the country local citizenry or local party members have risen up against inefficient or corrupt party organs and booted the rascals out. That is encouraging, and a sign that what we want to happen is happening.

In the past, all decisions and political power flowed from the top down. Now it is beginning to flow in the other direction. Most elections are now multi-candidate. A process of democratic education is underway. It would take time to reach the level of the U.S. But once it reached a certain level, the situation here would stabilize. When we met last May, I asked you how officials in the U.S. could respond to insults in the press. You told me they could do nothing, not even sue for libel. Here it should be different. Take those two crooks, Gdlyan and Ivanov, two prosecuting attorneys who used demagoguery to assure their political success. In the old days it would have been different. There would have been no publication of their remarks, no slander, and they would simply have been fired. Now we could not do that "because Mr. Gates tells us not to."

Gates asked Kryuchkov what would happen if an election were held in the Soviet Union in which the communists lost -- as had happened in Eastern Europe.

Kryuchkov (misunderstanding the question) responded that as for Eastern Europe, "the changes are not agitating the public here." The people there would decide their own fate. But we should not be passive. We are not making use of our influence and capabilities. It is important that there be no revenge, no persecution of communists. If they are jailed or otherwise harassed (as the Romanians had almost done), that would be the best way to compromise the new democratic movements from the outset. If that happened, the time could come "when all of the political movement in Eastern Europe would go backward."

As far as we are concerned, he continued, the situation in Eastern Europe is not destabilizing. Our people are concerned, but willing to let events take their normal course. But they should not be determined by people in the streets.

Kryuchkov went on, it is the case here, and probably elsewhere as well, that very active, sometime extreme minorities establish the course for a society, because the majority is passive. These extremist groups could cause authorities to react against them. Sometimes it is forgotten that the years of socialism had done much good for Eastern Europe -- they had done away with unemployment, provided free medical care, jobs, etc. Moreover, people had had no fear of the future. Now change is unsettling these people, making them uncertain. The best course is simply to be patient with them, let events proceed. That had proven the best course on Afghanistan. Events eventually forced a solution. But we would maintain a wide range of economic ties with Eastern Europe. What did Mr. Gates think, should we sell them our goods cheaply or go to world prices? The USSR sold them cotton, oil, timber, non-ferrous metals, and so on cheaply. If we charged more it would cost them billions of dollars. Perhaps the U.S. could help them in that case.

Gates replied that we are already helping. Kryuchkov said "not very much." Gates responded that we are a rich society, but our government resources are limited.

Gates asked again, what would happen if many communists in the USSR were to lose in free elections. Kryuchkov responded that most candidates for elections in the USSR were now members of the party. Actually, fewer non-party members were now being elected than in the past -- only about 10% now compared to 27% in the past. But that of course was no accident. "Not the worst people go into the party," pointing to himself and the KGB interpreter. But the proportions different among the republics.

In the Baltic states people often had party cards, but could not be considered communists. The same in Azerbaydzhan. But even the non-party people were for the present order. Few were against perestroyka, though they might have a different understanding of it.

But what would happen to communists in a full-scale, multi-party election? Good question. Communists had no experience in political campaigns. They are not skilled at persuading people. But they are learning fast -- even the KGB. We have found that with our new open attitude toward the public we gained from the 90% of the material we made public, while losing only 10% of the time.

Perhaps, jibed Kryuchkov, we should divide the party into two parties with identical platforms. Then we would be like the U.S., where nobody could tell the difference between the two parties. Gates asked whether one of the parties could be capitalist.

Kryuchkov said that there was already much socialism in Western parties. He had always thought that private property in the West was sacred, untouchable. But he was learning that relatively little property was indeed held "privately" -- much is held collectively -- stock in companies, for example. Moreover, there is state provided insurance, law-enforcement (sic), and so on. You in the West would reach socialism faster than we in the Soviet Union.

Gates asked if the Soviet Union would permit private property -- the large scale ownership of land and equity. Would peasants be able to pass land on to their children?

Kryuchkov said that cooperative land-holding is now possible, and groups of 15-20 people in essence control the land they farmed. But we wish to protect our people from exploitation in the Marxist sense, when people could enrich themselves purely from the labor of others. Your political systems in the West are more sophisticated. In most countries there are two parties, liberal and conservative. After several years of moving toward the left under liberal democrats, the conservatives were voted in to provide the people a rest. A great system. Thatcher had now been in power for what -- thirteen years? It was time for a change.

Kryuchkov said that the question of selling land is not yet decided. There are two points of view -- one for, one opposed. Peasants could not be given the land free of charge. But if they were asked to pay for it they would reply that they should not pay for something they -- "the people" -- already owned. The new

laws on land and on property would include provision for leases unlimited in time. But people would be reluctant to leave the kolkhozes, especially the more economically stable. In Eastern Europe they would not dissolve the kolkhozes, especially in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, where there was an ideal proportion of collective and individually-owned land.

Gates said he would like to pursue that issue further, but knew that Kryuchkov was busy, and would like to move on to two other subjects. First, the German question. Events are moving faster than anticipated. We might see some GDR initiative after the 18 March elections. Under these circumstances, we support the Kohl-Genscher idea of a united Germany belonging to NATO but with no expansion of military presence to the GDR. This would be in the context of continuing force reductions in Europe. What did Kryuchkov think of the Kohl/Genscher proposal under which a united Germany would be associated with NATO, but in which NATO troops would move no further east than they now were? It seems to us to be a sound proposal. There are in any case only three options for a unified Germany: either it would be a member of NATO, neutral, or a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Gates said that alignment with the Warsaw Pact clearly was not possible in terms of present realities. A neutral Germany would suffer from the same insecurities and uncertainties regarding its security that Germany had experienced before World War I. In an effort to assure its security it would be tempted to develop nuclear weapons and turn in different directions, seeking reassurance. A large, economically powerful Germany just could not be neutral. The third option, membership in NATO, would provide for a secure Germany integrated in Western Europe which the Soviet Union would have no reason to fear. It would anchor Germany in a way that would leave it secure, able to exercise a positive economic influence (including in the East), and without being a security problem for the USSR.

Kryuchkov replied that as Gates should know, the events in the GDR concern the Soviet people. The other countries are different. But the USSR had paid a terrible price in World War II -- 20 million killed. "We can't exclude that a reborn, united Germany might become a threat to Europe. We would hate to see the US and USSR have to become allies again against a resurgent Germany."

"Germany's technical possibilities and intellectual potential are well known. It is difficult to predict what directions its military and technology might take." That is no idle question, for "influential forces in the FRG do not wish to recognize the results of the War or to accept the post-World War II borders." The Poles are also concerned. We never said that

Germany could never reunite -- but the basis on which reunification took place was always important to us. Trust between the US and USSR is growing, true, but that trust still had to be "materialized." The Soviet Union, under present circumstances, could have "no enthusiasm" about a united Germany in NATO. We should look for other options. You, Great Britain, and France would develop a common view, and we in the Warsaw Pact would do so, and we would discuss them. We need not hurry so much. Kohl and Genscher had interesting ideas -- but even those points in their proposals with which we agree would have to have guarantees. We learned from the Americans in arms control negotiations the importance of verification, and we would have to be sure.

The U.S. had to participate in World War II even though it had been protected by oceans. Now the oceans were meaningless. An interdependent world would not allow any great power to escape involvement in a new war. "People here say that we have had peace for forty-five years because Germany is divided." And of course Japan did not become a military superpower. But the question of German unity is a very serious one, and requires far-reaching, frank exchanges of opinions between the US and USSR.

Gates said he had two points to make on professional matters.

First, Kryuchkov would have noted that Vladimir Apinidze had returned to the USSR, without any publicity. Kryuchkov nodded assent.

Second, could Kryuchkov frankly state what had happened to Major General Dimitry Polyakov ("Donald")? Kryuchkov replied that he had been shot in 1988. He added that Polyakov had "told all." "We know everything, and you know everything."

Gates said that Kryuchkov occupied an especially responsible position at this time of momentous happenings. It was very important that our foreign ministers and heads of state met to discuss matters of mutual concern. It was also important that he and Kryuchkov be able to discuss matters in this channel. Gates said that if ever Kryuchkov believed that a special meeting was necessary, that could be arranged through existing channels. We preferred not to use the intelligence channel for political issues. And, of course, we should not meet without the knowledge of our foreign ministers. Kryuchkov nodded assent.

Kryuchkov thanked Gates for his observations, which were useful, whether or not one necessarily agreed with them all. Though he was an optimist, he continued, that does not mean that he is not aware of the many problems the country faced. There is

a struggle underway between those who want change and those who do not. Each side might have to make concessions. "A political climate is being formed in which on occasion certain actions might have to be taken. The external reaction would be important. It would be one thing to understand our actions, perhaps even to support us. It would be another to attempt to take advantage of our problems." We heard nice words from you, but if there were no corresponding action -- for example, development of good trade relations -- your intentions would be interpreted differently. We are not asking for material assistance, "for anything free." Our resources are such that we do not need that. Our increasing contacts with the U.S. had helped us increasingly to understand the U.S. and its foreign policy, though we could not approve of Panama, where you invaded a small country in order to try one possible criminal. Noriega may be a very evil fellow, but that was too much. On the other hand, we understand and support your struggle against narcotics trafficking.

Kryuchkov then handed Gates a list of names prepared by the KGB which he said were persons engaged in drug running operations in Europe and the U.S. They happened to be members of the Afghan opposition. He added with a smile that it was a rare opportunity in which he could kill two birds with one stone -- promote the struggle against drugs and show the U.S. the true face of its alleged friends. He asked that Gates not reveal the source of this information. How Gates used it was of course up to him. If the U.S. did nothing more than end that supply channel that would be enough.

Gates said he would quickly respond to four points Kryuchkov had made. First, he noted that twice in the discussion Kryuchkov had made reference to the possibility that the U.S. would be tempted to take advantage of Soviet domestic troubles for its own ends. He said he wished to repeat with all seriousness that the President did not want to cause problems for Gorbachev or perestroika. He supports perestroika as something very much in our mutual interest. Gates added with a smile that sometimes he thought Gorbachev regarded him as a "bad influence" in Washington. Gates continued that that was not the case. He supported the President's view on perestroika fully.

Second, as the President had made clear in Malta, we are prepared to move ahead in some areas of trade. He recalled the Presidents' comments on MFN, the Stevenson amendment and a new Trade Agreement.

Third, he also wanted to emphasize that the U.S. was aware of Soviet security concerns about a reunified Germany, and understood that they must be treated seriously.

Fourth, on Panama, the U.S. had Treaty arrangements authorizing our presence and that, in violation of those rights, Americans had been harassed and even killed. We had intervened to protect our citizens, our Treaty rights, and to remove an indicted drug dealer who had thwarted a free election. The Panamanians received us as liberators. Our troops would be out by the end of February.

Kryuchkov said he would pass all of these messages to Gorbachev without fail.

Kryuchkov noted that it was a sign of the times that 24 years ago his predecessor, Semichastnyy, had harshly criticized Pasternak. Tonight, he, Kryuchkov, was attending a gala at the Bolshoi in celebration of the centenary of Pasternak's birth.

In parting Kryuchkov asked Gates to pass his greetings to "Mr. Powell," and, if possible, to the President.

Attachment:
As Stated

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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12b. List	Re: Persons Listed Above... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
By ES on 11/30/14

Date Closed:	4/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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
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(b)(6)

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An Afghan emigrant, resides in Peshawar

17.

An Afghan emigrant, resides in Peshawar

18.

An Afghan emigrant, resides in Peshawar

Persons listed above are involved in manufacture of narcotics and their trafficking within the region as well as to the U.S.A. and Europe.