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OA/ID Number: 91128
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Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (13 pp.)	6/2/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (15 pp.)	6/2/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Handwritten Notes	Re: Camp David [Meeting Notes] (21 pp.)	6/2/90	(b)(1)	
02. Cable	White House for Governor Sununu Re: Governor Sununu Meeting with Presidential Council Member Primakov (10 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable	White House for Governor Sununu Re: Meeting Between Governor Sununu and RFSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Yeltsin (8 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	S

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SCS 8/5/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Sergei Akhromeyev, Advisor to President Gorbachev

DATE, TIME June 2, 1990, 11:15 a.m. - 12:59 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Gorbachev: In this setting, maybe we can think of some good things to do. But first let me take one step back. Yesterday was an important day. My main thought is that it is good to make good statements and declarations but yesterday, in addition to philosophizing, the right decisions were made. I am pleased with the way we are working on the right actions. Without this, nothing is possible. I promise you my constructive efforts. Naturally, we will not always agree. Optimum solutions are difficult. (S)

I would like Camp David to be a place where we repeat what we said yesterday and reaffirm the kind of relationship we want. We should reaffirm that relationship from Camp David, including regular meetings, and a regular secure phone link so that we can exchange views frequently. (S)

The President: Do you want to say all this at our press conference? (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (S)

The President: I agree. So far, I think our meeting is being portrayed this way. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, even the pictures now are showing the closeness -- ourselves, the Ministers, the two ladies, all

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showing closeness. (S)

The President: We will keep it going. We will take some hits on trade and arms control from the Right, but I think we can manage it. We talked last night about trying for meetings without all the trappings. (S)

President Gorbachev: I have been told the Supreme Soviet has three pages of questions for me. I said I will answer more than that when I get back. I included two Committee Chairmen in my delegation for this reason. One represents our military-industrial complex, and I also brought the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now they are not on the sidelines and it is important that they see how these things work. Soon I will have a Warsaw Pact meeting, and it will be a new Warsaw Pact. Only Shevardnadze and myself and Jaruzelski are old members -- all the others are new. I will report the results to you. (S)

The President: Just a technical point. We will have a secure line in a year and a direct line this fall. (Description of secure line.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Shall we go through our points? (S)

The President: Fine. There are points I must raise: human rights, refuseniks, immigration, and human rights in general. You want us to take more Jews. We are taking more -- about all we can. (S)

There are many vestiges of anti-Semitism. We have skinheads and you have a problem too, and to the degree you could speak out publicly: that would help. It helps me. We would encourage direct flights to Israel. You should know that I am in a big fight with Shamir over settling immigrants in the occupied territories. My administration is seen as anti-Israel. It stems from my saying no settlements in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem. This caused a firestorm here and on the Right in Israel. (Described what Netanyahu had said.) We are a true friend of Israel. In our new relationship I hope that you can take account of anti-Semitism, direct flights to Israel, refuseniks, and keep up human rights progress. It would help me a lot. If we can separate anti-Semitism from policy it would help. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We will seek to cooperate on the full spectrum of human rights. On immigration, here is information on refuseniks. There are twenty on the list. We have given exit visas for five, a temporary departure for one, a temporary visit for one to Great Britain (probably with relatives), one is dead, and there is nothing on the other eleven. We will have more movement but that is my report for now. I agree that we do have to take a stand against anti-Semitism. I have spoken out in general and I will find a way to speak out specifically. (S)

The President: That would help. It is a world-wide problem and if we are seen cooperating on it that would help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We do have a problem between the Russian and Jewish intelligentsia. We will speak out but I don't want to take sides; here we have to find a way. There are many organizations, some even Fascist which say ugly things. Israel, in letting that settlement go on in Jerusalem has caused an outcry in the Arab press. Even Mubarak said he would have to protest in our press that we are settling the West Bank and replenishing the Israeli army. They are trying to put us against each other. Maybe Israel should be told that if they settle in the occupied territories I will have to stop immigration. (S)

The President: It sounds easy, but it is complicated. Individual settlers make it hard to be clear on it. (S)

President Gorbachev: Our Ministers could consult on the language. We must try to figure out a solution. (S)

The President: Saying no more than this to Israel would get world Jewry up in arms. We could not sign up to that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Maybe Baker and Shevardnadze can work something out. (S)

The President: It is a risky issue for a joint statement. (S)

President Gorbachev: I am not thinking of a joint statement but just getting our policies coordinated. (S)

Secretary Baker: I just wanted to say that in 1988 we started a dialogue that let us talk to both parties and move forward on a peace process. It would be helpful if you could let Arafat know that our dialogue can continue only if he speaks out on Abu Abbas. Otherwise, we cannot continue the dialogue. (S)

President Gorbachev: He has disassociated himself, but not condemned the attack. (S)

Secretary Baker: That is right, but the basis for our dialogue is that there must be no terrorism. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We got a telegram from Arafat which says: "Violence is getting out of control. Close to explosion. Exacerbated by US veto." I don't know why you had to do that -- it (the UN resolution) would have pacified the situation. (S)

Secretary Baker: (Describes U.S. actions.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's think about this. There is a lot of truth to what Arafat says. If there is an explosion, he will be totally isolated. We have worked hard to get Assad and Arafat to work together. Mubarak is easier and so is Benjedid. Qadhafi is a problem. But maybe we can work on sending Goulding. We will work on Arafat to clam things down. (S)

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The President: I am having lunch with Perez de Cuellar on Monday. I will tell him this. We will do it even against Israel if necessary. (S)

Secretary Baker: And remember, we cannot continue the dialogue if he is tied to terrorism. (S)

President Gorbachev: But Arafat thinks this is patriotic resistance. It is tough for him to speak out. (S)

Secretary Baker: But he disassociated himself from it. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Shamir is more difficult. (S)

The President: (Describes U.S. problems with Shamir over settlements.) (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Maybe this is a time to mention the idea of an international conference. We support your idea of a dialogue but we should think of a conference also. (S)

President Gorbachev: Everyone but Shamir supports a conference. If we started preparations for a conference we could recognize Israel immediately.

Secretary Baker: As Eduard knows, we don't reject a conference but for now I would not appear at a conference. Under the right circumstances we could go along with one, however. Right now the circumstances are not right. Back to Arafat. The timing of that attack was terrible. We want to keep the pressure on for the dialogue, and this gives Israel a way out. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Israel would go along with a conference? (S)

Secretary Baker: No. (Describes situation). (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's have Eduard and Jim talk about it. Maybe we can get Israel to take the first step towards a conference. We could jointly guarantee Israel's existence as a state. We could establish immediate diplomatic relations; then we could be helpful. The bigger Arab nations could make statements recognizing the realities and the Israeli situation. We have contact with Jewish organizations. Eduard has met Peres and Shamir. We could establish consulates.

The President: You have gained much by your immigration policy. (Talks about Max Fisher comment.) (S)

Secretary Baker: One thing you said is interesting. Israel complains that among the Arabs no one but Egypt recognizes Israeli's right to exist. That could help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We have worked with Arafat to bring him around. (S)

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Secretary Baker: We will talk. (S)

President Gorbachev: When Mubarak came to Moscow he spoke of a free zone without nuclear or chemical weapons (jokes, toes curling up). Maybe we could look at it and support Mubarak. There are too many weapons there. They are different from the Europeans; they get all fired up. We really should think about it, because the region is so heavily armed. (S)

The President: Israel would resist that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let Eduard and Jim think about it. (S)

The President: Let's move to other regional issues, starting with India and Pakistan. We are concerned about a war. Bob Gates came back with negative assessment. We should stay in touch. Everyone would be a loser in such a war. In the 1970's we tilted toward Pakistan and you tilted toward India. The situation is different now. We won't try to take advantage of you. We don't have a dog in that fight, even though we like Bhutto. We would encourage an immediate cease fire. We are open to suggestions. If the situation heats up I hope we can work together. Maybe not, but I don't want it to disrupt us. (S)

President Gorbachev: I had a call from Singh -- the morning I was coming here. He wanted me to know that he would do his best to calm things down. I responded that I would welcome a solution to this old problem. I want good relations with both India and Pakistan. We never broke with Pakistan, even in the worst days of Afghanistan. It is therefore in our interest that the situation not become more acute. Let's keep in touch. (S)

The President: I understand that you have a problem with making a joint statement, but maybe we could deal with this at the press conference. (S)

President Gorbachev: It might be sensitive for India and Pakistan if we were concerting on them, but at the press conference would be a good way to do it. (Discussion on what is going on.) Let's stay in close touch, and let's do the press conference thing (i.e., deal with the issue by responding to press questions). (S)

The President: My other regional items include Africa, Ethiopia, etc., but I need to register a point on Cuba. Jim and Eduard have talked about Afghanistan. On Cuba, we think Castro is swimming against the tide; he is unreconstructed. Many think we are picking on him, but he is an outcast. If you changed your economic relationship with Cuba, that would push him. He won't take the Ortega route. (S)

President Gorbachev: Castro supported the Nicaragua solution. (S)

The President: That was because he thought that Ortega would win the election. But maybe we could use that as a model. (S)

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Secretary Baker: As in the case of Nicaragua, if Castro were to change we would change our policy. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me say a few words on this. I agree that there can be no peace in Central America if Cuba is isolated. We are not doing that, but we see that you have that syndrome. I spoke about it to the Vice President. He said he had gone to the Caribbean six times, and I said "you did not stop in Cuba." (S)

We should analyze Castro. He is criticizing us more than you. In the Cuban missile crisis, he kept Mikoyan running around the island for a week. Teaching lessons to Castro is useless. When I was there, I could see they were tense. I told him I was not trying to change the way he does things, but let me do things my way as well. Then they relaxed and it went alright. If you got in touch with him I think he would respond, but trying to force him to change would be useless. He has told me, "I will not take U.S. dictation, but if they will sit and talk" Maybe we could set something up that is not bilateral. He is ready to hear you out -- to talk at any level. It is better if he hears from you rather than from us. A change in our economic relations is coming. It will be based on buying the things we need, although I realize it will not be at market prices. It can be sold for dollars on the world market. Also, we buy citrus and nonferrous metals. We are beginning to put our economic relations on a realistic relations. Before, no one even thought about the economic aspects of our relations. The Latin Americans show more understanding of the role of Cuba, so it is not that simple. (S)

There is a remaining problem to discuss: the Contras. (S)

The President: I think that is back on track. (S)

General Akhromeyev: I have a personal relationship with Castro, and he says he is prepared to go very far. He understands the problem. (S)

The President: Let me tell you about the U.S.-Cuban problem. (He describes the Cuban-American patriotic community.) Therefore there is a lot of emotion in this issue for the Americans. (Hands him a Congressional letter on Cuba). I hear what you have said on Castro and I hope you understand our feelings on the issue. Let's keep it on the table. (S)

Secretary Baker: We haven't asked Castro to give us something before we sit down to talk, only that he cease subversion in El Salvador and Latin America -- that is all. (S)

President Gorbachev: Do you want us to convey this to him? (S)

The President: It would be helpful. (S)

President Gorbachev: If El Salvador improved visibly there would

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be a change by you? (S)

The President: Yes, but I won't give him a State Dinner! (S)

Secretary Baker: El Salvador has a freely elected government, and he is subverting it. (S)

The President: I don't like seeing Umberto Ortega as head of the army in Nicaragua because the armed forces were a Party. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Just a word on Cuba. We are having some discussions with the US on Cuba in quest of some imaginative solutions. If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal, things might work -- as in the case of Angola, where we made it work after they got treated like equal partners. On El Salvador, I think that Castro may undertake a serious discussion. (S)

President Gorbachev: What do you want us to do? (S)

Secretary Baker: Here is a wild suggestion: that you tell him the President said that there will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency to Central America. (S)

The President: That only deals with a small part of the problem. For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights, like letting people out of jail, etc. For normal relations, Castro cannot be the only one out of step in the hemisphere. (S)

President Gorbachev: For now we will convey to him suggestions that will permit the dialogue to begin. Then it can progress. (S)

The President: I must tell you that the Soviet relationship to Cuba sours the US view of you. (S)

Secretary Baker: The MIG-29 is a big issue for us psychologically. (S)

The President: Why don't we break for lunch then we can rest and get back together at 3 p.m. (U)

(Lunch break)

President Gorbachev: (Begins with a discussion of the differences between the Soviet and US federations, emphasizing the nationalities aspect of the Soviet federation. Describes the fight between Stalin and Lenin on the nature of the federation, saying that after Lenin died Stalin left the law the same but ruthlessly created a military state. Then Stalin said that the nationalities problem no longer existed; there was a "Soviet" nationality. So once the dam burst, the nationalities issues burst out into the open. The Byelorussian language had almost died out.) (S)

The President: Shall we return to our agenda? I dominated the discussion with my subjects this morning, although we didn't raise Afghanistan. (S)

President Gorbachev: I would be happy to discuss Afghanistan. (S)

The President: On Afghanistan, we would really like to be disengaged. We would like to cut loose, and we have no interest in a radical, and Muslim administration. We are also worried about the radicals, and we are not trying to install and anti-Soviet fundamentalist regime. (Described the political arrangements that the U.S. seeks.) If they got underway, we would stop our aid to the Mujahedin. If we could both state that no party would be able to subvert the process and state that a neutral body would arrange the elections, we would have a good outcome. Najibullah could participate but not as head of government. Hebmaytyar is an undesirable conservative. I asked whether you can live with a short supervised period where Najibullah could participate but step aside from government.

President Gorbachev: There is mutual understanding for a neutral period plus a mechanism for conducting an election leading to a broad-based government; also, for a UN role for a transition period and in the conduct of elections. Do we understand that neither the government nor the opposition would transfer the government to a neutral authority. So the only hope is elections on the basis of the status quo. Let them conduct their elections in their own way. We can't remove Najibullah or Hekmaytyar from the scene. Najibullah is beginning to put more strings on us. (S)

The President: He thinks he is getting stronger. (S)

President Gorbachev: He thinks he is getting more support. Some former opposition members are managing local government under the general supervision of government forces. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We need a new approach, because neither side has the leverage to achieve a solution. (S)

The President: How does Najilbah feel about elections? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: I have talked to him. He favors a Nicaragua-type solution, with a group charged with developing elections. (S)

President Gorbachev: Would Najilbah be willing to step aside as part of a normal process, but not be kicked out? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, but not as a withdrawal. Then a conference could set up an election process. Our differences are not great. We can't get Najibullah out. Actually, this process is getting under way. He is inviting Zahir Shah to take the highest position. (S)

President Gorbachev: We would like a neutral regime, not one hostile to the U.S. (S)

The President: We can't argue against Najibullah staying in power, a la Nicaragua, but the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in. (S)

President Gorbachev: Neither the Mujahedin nor Najibullah will conduct the elections. The UN or the OIC will do it. Najibullah does not want to be kicked out. That is his minimum condition. (S)

Secretary Baker: It is difficult for us to argue against the Nicaraguan model. Our problem is with the Resistance. We need something for them to show that elections would be fair, that supervision would be neutral, and that the outcome would be observed. What about Najibullah taking a head of state role during this period to demonstrate that a transition authority would conduct the election and provide security. (S)

President Gorbachev: Najibullah would be a kind of interim acting president during the election? (S)

Secretary Baker: Yes, but with something less than full authority. (S)

President Gorbachev: We must think about it. (S)

The President: Let's have Jim and Eduard talk some more about this. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, let's, because there are lots of areas of agreement. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We could try to formulate three or four points on which the Afghans could agree: on the transition period for elections and the conduct thereof, on the role of the UN, etc. We would agree that Afghanistan would be unified, neutral, and demilitarized. (S)

President Gorbachev: And the only solution to Afghanistan is a political solution. The two sides should recognize each other. There would be four or five principles on which we could agree. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: This would be similar to Nicaragua and to what we are trying to do in Angola, etc. It is a tested process. (S)

The President: How about Ethiopia? (S)

President Gorbachev: We have an appeal from Mengistu. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: The essence of his letter is that he would agree to the UN as observers in his talks with Eritrea.

They were opposed to any outside body until now. One other element: they agree to Massawa for humanitarian relief, subject to the sovereignty of Ethiopia. The Eritreans must agree. The US and the Soviet Union should suggest an international conference for an overall settlement in the horn of Africa. That should come from us, not them. Our two groups have been working on language. Another issue was our cargo planes for relief -- we agree, on condition that the Eritreans don't shoot them down.

(S)

Secretary Baker: How about a joint appeal that the Eritreans should not shoot, on the basis that people will starve if they do. (S)

The President: This is about all we can do today. (S)

President Gorbachev: If we can issue a joint appeal, let's conclude and let our experts work on it. (Dennis brings a paper that is given to Obukov and it is read to Gorbachev.) (S)

Secretary Baker: I think that a joint statement on aid involving Soviet planes and US food would look good. (S)

President Gorbachev: On Southern Africa, we don't have a big disagreement on what is happening in South Africa. In Southern Africa we are already working together. We will be flexible toward changes in South Africa, supporting those people who are working peacefully to abolish apartheid. We would encourage a joint statement here. (S)

The President: Mandela is a hopeful person to conduct a dialogue with de Klerk. Both of them are coming here. The Europeans may ease sanctions, but we will not do that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: A unique situation may be emerging with both sides urging a peaceful solution. We should stimulate this process. (S)

Secretary Baker: On Angola, we would like to pursue the election route. You say that Dos Santos is not quite ready. But we should push in that direction. The two sides are talking and we have offered talks under our joint sponsorship. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: One new element: Savimbi offered to meet with us. Dos Santos does not object and we will do it privately. (S)

The President: What shall we discuss next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Korea -- a lot of things worry us on the peninsula. I think we agree the two sides should engage in dialogue. A small step was taken in the release of U.S. troops. Politically, that is an important gesture. We are worried there is no agreement between North Korea and the IAEA, and they are very touchy about any contacts we have with South Korea. Those contacts are economic, and they are good. South Korea would like Siberian resources, and we are willing. Roh asked for a contract

and we agreed, thinking it would be kept quiet. I am worried about the reaction of the North. We have told Kim there is no change in our policy, no recognition. We have said were just meeting with the South Koreans to make their acquaintance and to promote Korean dialogue. We don't know what will come of it. Once again, we may be accused of betrayal. (S)

The President: We think it is a good thing you are seeing Roh. Our concern is Kim and his blocking of the IAEA agreement and the lack of moderating behavior. South Korea's reaching out is good. If Kim could accept safeguards, it would help. We are worried about instability on the peninsula. Earlier, we would have been upset about your talking to the South Koreans. This is no longer the case.

President Gorbachev: We will try to explain ourselves. (S)

The President: North Korea made one positive move: their return of the remains of five US soldiers. (S)

President Gorbachev: We did our bit on that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: The Koreans asked if the US would provide them with non-nuclear guarantees. Then maybe they will sign on with the IAEA. (S)

The President: Will there be a more moderate government in Korea? We don't know much about it. (S)

President Gorbachev: These Eastern systems are hard to figure out. The way is being paved to transfer power to the son. They have swallowed Hungary's establishment of relations with South Korea, but it will be different when we make contact. Think about nuclear guarantees. (S)

General Scowcroft: If they would guarantee not to attack South Korea. (S)

President Gorbachev: Why not? (S)

General Scowcroft: We have tried formulations before but we can look at it again. (S)

The President: Let's talk about Japan. It can be helpful; they can help with economic assistance, as they have in Eastern Europe. Kaifu is stronger now, and we are working pragmatically on trade. Many feel Japan is buying up the U.S., but I don't worry about that. Japan might be helpful if you could deal with the Territories. It is your business, but I think you would find it beneficial. I commend Kaifu to you -- and hope he is still in power when you go there. (S)

President Gorbachev: We decided it was worthwhile for me to visit next year. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and Yeltsin will visit this fall. The Japanese know in principle that the Territories issue is clear, but their involvement in our Eastern

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Territories has been unsatisfactory thus far. For a long time they resisted any economic discussions, and they still think the economic relationship benefits us more than them. Their Foreign Ministry is conservative through and through. There is people contact, but no real business being conducted. When we move to a market system and open up to foreign firms, I think they will change. But 97% of the Soviet people oppose any movement on the Islands. (S)

The President: Let's move on to Cambodia. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think there is some hope there. I am slightly optimistic. Our common task is to solidify the agreements that the four sides made, and to help set up the supervisory organization. I have statements from Sihanouk and from Hun Sen which are very similar. There is some convergence emerging. (S)

The President: We have little influence, but we will urge cooperation. We will talk to the PRC even though we are without much influence with them. We hope that you will also do so. (S)

President Gorbachev: My impression is that the Chinese are acting more positively. Shevardnadze discussed the issue with Li Peng and they are now normalizing relations with Vietnam. The fact that China and Vietnam are talking is sending a signal to Phnom Penh. (There was a humorous discussion of Cuba, sugar and moonshine. The President described the US sugar problem and Central American sales of coffee and sugar to the US.) (S)

Secretary Baker: (Renews our proposal for the Soviet Union to join the G-24 in helping Central America.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Our cooperation with Nicaragua in the past will continue. We are considering it (the proposal regarding the G-24). (S)

The President: What is next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Cyprus. Vassilliou has written to both of us. He wants us to support a UN mission to Cyprus to break the deadlock. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: In order not to antagonize Greece or Turkey, the best way is for each side to support UN efforts. (S)

The President: What is left? (S)

General Scowcroft: We need to discuss coordination for the press conference on Germany and Lithuanian. (S)

President Gorbachev: We could say we had a good exchange, that both sides presented their arguments and made their case, and that it is not just a question between the two of us. As a result we decided that these consultations should continue. That is the shortest formula. (S)

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The President: They will press me on trade, that I said Lithuania complicated the situation. I will say that the trade agreement is in the best interest of both sides. The next step is emigration legislation and that is where it stands. They will ask how about Lithuania. I will say I expressed myself fully on Lithuania but the next step is emigration legislation. (S)

Secretary Baker: They will ask whether there is a side deal. When I was asked, I said I could not talk about private conversations. The President said it will be difficult to get trade legislation through Congress and that is true, but that issue does not arise now because the next step is Soviet emigration legislation. (S)

President Gorbachev: The rest of it I will say. We have to bear in mind that rigid linkage should be avoided. We had a direct discussion of Lithuania. I discussed the situation and the prospects. We are looking for, and I expect I will find a solution within the framework of our Federation. Each Republic can withdraw or change the form of its relationship, but this must be in the established framework. (S)

The President: The more you can explain that to the US, the better. I will just stay away from linkage. (S)

President Gorbachev: And we will point out that it is not just one agreement, we have agreements on grain, aviation, etc. I will say that we cannot take away the right of self-determination, but since it is a constitutional right it must be done constitutionally. (S)

The President: The press is now more positive. Time and Newsweek said you were in trouble. That created a tough environment, but you have shown yourself completely in charge. (S)

President Gorbachev: It is a complex period, but we have to accept a pluralism of views. Not every one will agree with us, or we wouldn't have pluralism. (S)

Secretary Baker: (AFL and Donets Conference) (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

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Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Akhromeyev ~~(or Obruchov)~~

DATE, TIME June 2, 1990, 11:15-12:59
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Gorbachev: In this setting, maybe we can think of some good things to do. But first let me take one step back. Yesterday was an important day. My main thought is that it is good to make good statements and declarations but yesterday, in addition to philosophizing, the right decisions were made. I am pleased with the way we are working on the right actions. Without this, nothing is possible. I promise you my constructive efforts. Naturally, we will not always agree. Optimum solutions are difficult. (S)

I would like Camp David to be a place where we repeat what we said yesterday and reaffirm the kind of relationship we want. We should reaffirm that relationship from Camp David, including regular meetings, and a regular secure phone link so that we can exchange views frequently. (S)

The President: Do you want to say all this at our press conference? (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (S)

The President: I agree. So far, I think our meeting is being portrayed this way. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, even the pictures now are showing the closeness -- ourselves, the Ministers, the two ladies, all

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showing closeness. (§)

The President: We will keep it going. We will take some hits on trade and arms control from the Right, but I think we can manage it. We talked last night about trying for meetings without all the trappings. (§)

President Gorbachev: I have been told the Supreme Soviet has three pages of questions for me. I said I will answer more than that when I get back. I included two Committee Chairmen in my delegation for this reason. One represents our military-industrial complex, and I also brought the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now they are not on the sidelines and it is important that they see how these things work. Soon I will have a Warsaw Pact meeting, and it will be a new Warsaw Pact. Only Shevardnadze and myself and Jaruzelski are old members -- all the others are new. I will report the results to you. (§) *a year on line*

The President: Just a technical point. We will have a secure line in ~~operation~~ and direct this fall. (Description of secure line.) (§) *a* ✓

President Gorbachev: Shall we go through our points? (§)

The President: Fine. There are points I must raise: human rights, refuseniks, immigration, and human rights in general. You want us to take more Jews. We are taking more -- about all we can. (§)

There are many vestiges of anti-Semitism. We have skinheads and you have a problem too, and to the degree you could speak out publicly: that would help. It helps me. We would encourage direct flights to Israel. You should know that I am in a big fight with Shamir over settling immigrants in the occupied territories. My administration is seen as anti-Israel. *it stems from my* saying no settlements in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem. *(3)* This caused a firestorm here and on the Right in Israel. *✓* We are a true friend of Israel. In our new relationship I hope that you can take account of anti-Semitism, direct flights to Israel, refuseniks, and keep up human rights progress. It would help me a lot. If we can separate anti-Semitism from policy it would help. (§) *✓*

information President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We will seek to cooperate on the full spectrum of human rights. On immigration, here is *the readout* on refuseniks. There are twenty on the list. We have given exit visas for five, a temporary departure for one, a temporary visit for one to Great Britain (probably with relatives), one is dead, and there is nothing on the other *✓*

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(Described what Netanyahu had said)
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for more movement
eleven. We will have ³an announcement but that is my report for now. I agree that we do have to take a stand against anti-Semitism. I have spoken out in general and I will find a way to speak out specifically. (S)

The President: That would help. It is a world-wide problem and if we are seen cooperating on it that would help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We do have a problem between the Russian and Jewish intelligentsia. We will speak out but I don't want to take sides; here we have to find a way. There are many organizations, some even Fascist which say ugly things. Israel, in letting that settlement go on in Jerusalem has caused an outcry in the Arab press. Even Mubarak said he would have to protest in our press that we are settling the West Bank and replenishing the Israeli army. They are trying to put us against each other. Maybe Israel should be told that if they settle in the occupied territories I will have to stop immigration. (S)

settlers The President: It sounds easy, but it is complicated. *Individual*
~~settlements~~ make it hard to be clear on it. (S)

President Gorbachev: Our Ministers could consult on the language. We must try to figure out a solution. (S)

The President: Saying no more than this to Israel would get world Jewry up in arms. We could not sign up to that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Maybe Baker and Shevardnadze can work something out. (S)

The President: It is a risky issue for a joint statement. (S)

President Gorbachev: I am not thinking of a joint statement but just getting our policies coordinated. (S)

Secretary Baker: I just wanted to say that in 1988 we started a dialogue that let us talk to both parties and move forward on a peace process. It would be helpful if you could let Arafat know that our dialogue can continue only if he speaks out on Abu Abbas. Otherwise, we cannot continue the dialogue. (S)

President Gorbachev: He has disassociated himself, but not condemned the attack. (S)

Secretary Baker: That is right, but the basis for our dialogue is that there must be no terrorism. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We got a telegram from Arafat which says: "Violence is getting out of control. Close to explosion."

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exacerbated by US veto." I don't know why you had to do that -- it (the UN resolution) would have pacified the situation. (S)

Secretary Baker: (Describes U.S. actions.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's think about this. There is a lot of truth to what Arafat says. If there is an explosion, he will be totally isolated. We have worked hard to get Assad and Arafat to work together, ~~as well as Benjedid, and especially Mubarak~~ *is easier*. Qadhafi is a problem. But maybe we can work on sending Goulding. We will work on Arafat to clam things down. *I am having lunch with Perez de Cuellar on Monday. I will tell him this. We will do it even against Israel if necessary.* (S)

Secretary Baker: And remember, we cannot continue the dialogue if he is tied to terrorism. (S)

President Gorbachev: But Arafat thinks this is patriotic resistance. It is tough for him to speak out. (S)

Secretary Baker: But he disassociated himself from it. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Shamir is more difficult. (S)

The President: (Describes U.S. problems with Shamir over settlements.) (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Maybe this is a time to mention the idea of an international conference. We support your idea of a dialogue but we should think of a conference also. (S)

President Gorbachev: Everyone but Shamir supports a conference. If we started preparations for a conference we could ~~to~~ *recognize Israel immediately.*

Secretary Baker: As Eduard knows, we don't reject a conference but for now I would not appear at a conference. Under the right circumstances we could go along with one, however. Right now the circumstances are not right. Back to Arafat. The timing of that attack was terrible. We want to keep the pressure on for the dialogue, and this gives Israel a way out. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Israel would go along with a conference? (S)

Secretary Baker: No. (Describes situation). (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's have Eduard and Jim talk about it. Maybe we can get Israel to take the first step towards a conference. We could jointly guarantee Israel's existence as a state. We could establish immediate diplomatic relations; then

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we could be helpful. The bigger Arab nations could make statements recognizing the realities and the Israeli situation. We have contact with Jewish organizations. Eduard has met Peres and Shamir. We could establish consulates.

The President: You have gained much by your immigration policy. (Talks about Max Fisher comment.) (S)

Secretary Baker: One thing you said is interesting. Israel complains that among the Arabs no one but Egypt recognizes Israeli's right to exist. That could help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We have worked with Arafat to bring him around. (S)

Secretary Baker: We will talk. (S)

President Gorbachev: When Mubarak came to Moscow he spoke of a *free zone* ~~freeze~~, one without nuclear or chemical weapons (jokes, toes curling up). Maybe we could look at it and support Mubarak. There are too many ~~capabilities~~ ^{weapons} there. They are different from the Europeans; they get all fired up. We really should think about it, because the region is so heavily armed. (S)

The President: ~~Israel~~ ^{Israel} would resist that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let Eduard and Jim think about it. (S)

The President: Let's move to other regional issues, starting with India and Pakistan. We are concerned about a war. Bob Gates came back with negative assessment. We should stay in touch. Everyone would be a loser in such a war. In the 1970's we tilted toward Pakistan and you tilted toward India. The situation is different now. We won't try to take advantage of you. We don't have a dog in that fight, even though we like Bhutto. We would encourage an immediate cease fire. We are open to suggestions. If the situation heats up I hope we can work together. Maybe not, but I don't want it to disrupt us. (S)

President Gorbachev: I had a call from Singh -- the morning I was coming here. He wanted me to know that he would do his best to calm things down. I responded that I would welcome a solution to this old problem. I want good relations with both India and Pakistan. We never broke with Pakistan, even in the worst days of Afghanistan. It is therefore in our interest that the situation not become more acute. Let's keep in touch. (S)

The President: I understand that you have a problem with making a joint statement, but maybe we could deal with this at the press conference. (S)

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issue
President Gorbachev: It might be sensitive for India and Pakistan if we were concerting on them, but at the press conference would be a good way to do it. (Discussion on what is going on.) Let's stay in close touch, and let's do the press conference thing *(let's deal with the problem by responding to press questions)* ✓

The President: My other regional items include Africa, Ethiopia, etc., but I need to register a point on Cuba. Jim and Eduard have talked about Afghanistan. On Cuba, we think Castro is swimming against the tide; he is unreconstructed. Many think we are picking on him, but he is an outcast. If you changed your economic relationship with Cuba, that would push him. He won't take the Ortega route. (S)

President Gorbachev: Castro supported the Nicaragua solution. (S)

The President: That was because he thought that Ortega would win the election. But maybe we could use that as a model. (S)

Secretary Baker: As in the case of Nicaragua, if Castro were to change we would change our policy. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me say a few words on this. I agree that there can be no peace in Central America if Cuba is isolated. We are not doing that, but we see that you have that syndrome. I spoke about it to the Vice President. He said he had gone to the Caribbean six times, and I said "you did not stop in Cuba." (S)

We should analyze Castro. He is criticizing us more than you. In the Cuban missile crisis, he kept Mikoyan running around the island for a week. Teaching lessons to Castro is useless. When I was there, I could see they were tense. I told him I was not trying to change the way he does things, but let me do things my way as well. Then they relaxed and it went alright. If you got in touch with him I think he would respond, but trying to force him to change would be useless. He has told me, "I will not take U.S. dictation, but if they will sit and talk" Maybe we could set something up that is not bilateral. He is ready to hear you out -- to talk at any level. It is better if he hears from you rather than from us. A change in our economic relations is coming. It will be based on buying the things we need, although I realize it will not be at market prices. It can be sold for dollars on the world market. Also, we buy citrus and nonferrous metals. We are beginning to put our economic relations on a realistic relations. Before, no one even thought about the economic aspects of our relations. The Latin Americans show more understanding of the role of Cuba, so it is not that

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simple. (S)

There is a remaining problem to discuss: the Contras. (S)

The President: I think that is back on track. (S)

General Akhromeyev: I have a personal relationship with Castro, and he says he is prepared to go very far. He understands the problem. (S)

The President: Let me tell you about the U.S.-Cuban problem. (He describes the Cuban-American patriotic community.) Therefore there is a lot of emotion in this issue for ^{Americans} ~~the Cubans~~. (Hands him a Congressional letter on Cuba). I hear what you have said on Castro and I hope you understand our feelings on the issue. Let's keep it on the table. (S)

Secretary Baker: We haven't asked Castro to give us something before we sit down to talk, only that he cease subversion in El Salvador and Latin America -- that is all. (S)

President Gorbachev: Do you want us to convey this to him? (S)

The President: It would be helpful. (S)

President Gorbachev: If El Salvador improved visibly there would be a change by you? (S)

The President: Yes, but I won't give him a State Dinner! (S)

Secretary Baker: El Salvador has a freely elected government, and he is subverting it. (S)

The President: I don't like seeing Umberto Ortega as head of the army in Nicaragua because the armed forces were a Party. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Just a word on Cuba. We are having some discussions with the US on Cuba in quest of some imaginative solutions. If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal, things might work -- as in the case of Angola, where we made it work after they got treated like equal partners. On El Salvador, I think that Castro may undertake a serious discussion. (S)

President Gorbachev: What do you want us to do? (S)

Secretary Baker: Here is a wild suggestion: that you tell him the President said that there will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency to Central America. (S)

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The President: That only deals with a small part of the problem. For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights, like letting people out of jail, etc. For normal relations, Castro cannot be the only one out of step in the hemisphere. (S)

President Gorbachev: For now we will convey to him suggestions that will permit the dialogue to begin. Then it can progress. (S)

The President: I must tell you that the Soviet relationship to Cuba sours the US view of you. (S)

Secretary Baker: The MIG-29 is a big issue for us psychologically. (S)

The President: Why don't we break for lunch then we can rest and get back together at 3 p.m. (U)

(Lunch break)

President Gorbachev: (Begins with a discussion of the differences between the Soviet and US federations, emphasizing the nationalities aspect of the Soviet federation. Describes the fight between Stalin and Lenin on the nature of the federation, saying that after Lenin died Stalin left the law the same but ruthlessly created a military state. Then Stalin said that the nationalities problem no longer existed; there was a "Soviet" nationality. So once the dam burst, the nationalities issues burst out into the open. The Byelorussian language had almost died out.) (S)

The President: Shall we return to our agenda? I dominated the discussion with my subjects this morning, although we didn't raise Afghanistan. (S)

President Gorbachev: I would be happy to discuss Afghanistan. (S)

The President: On Afghanistan, we would really like to be disengaged. We would like to cut loose, and we have no interest in a radical, and Muslim administration. We are also worried about the radicals, and we are not trying to install and anti-Soviet fundamentalist regime. (Described the political arrangements that the U.S. seeks.) If they got underway, we would stop our aid to the Mujahedin. If we could both state that no party would be able to subvert the process and state that a neutral body would arrange the elections, we would have a good outcome. Najibullah could participate but not as head of

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government. Hebmaytyar is an undesirable conservative. I asked whether you can live with a short supervised period where Najibullah could participate but step aside from government.

President Gorbachev: There is mutual understanding for a neutral period plus a mechanism for conducting an election leading to a broad-based government; also, for a UN role for a transition period and in the conduct of elections. Do we understand that neither the government nor the opposition would transfer the government to a neutral authority. So the only hope is elections on the basis of the status quo. Let them conduct their elections in their own way. We can't remove Najibullah or Hekmaytyar from the scene. Najibullah is beginning to put more strings on us. (S)

The President: He thinks he is getting stronger. (S)

President Gorbachev: He thinks he is getting more support. Some former opposition members are managing local government under the general supervision of government forces. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We need a new approach, because neither side has the leverage to achieve a solution. (S)

The President: How does Najilbah feel about elections? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: I have talked to him. He favors a Nicaragua-type solution, with a group charged with developing elections. (S)

President Gorbachev: Would Najilbah be willing to step aside as part of a normal process, but not be kicked out? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, but not as a withdrawal. Then a conference could set up an election process. Our differences are not great. We can't get Najibullah out. Actually, this process is getting under way. He is inviting Zahir to take the highest position. (S) *Shah* ✓

President Gorbachev: We would like a neutral regime, not one hostile to the U.S. (S)

The President: We can't argue against Najibullah staying in power, a la Nicaragua, but the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in. (S)

President Gorbachev: Neither the Mujahedin nor Najibullah will conduct the elections. The UN or the OIC will do it. Najibullah does not want to be kicked out. That is his minimum condition. (S)

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Secretary Baker: It is difficult for us to argue against the Nicaraguan model. Our problem is with the Resistance. We need something for them to show that elections would be fair, that supervision would be neutral, and that the outcome would be observed. What about Najibullah taking a head of state role during this period to demonstrate that a transition authority would conduct the election and provide security. (S)

President Gorbachev: Najibullah would be a kind of interim acting president during the election? (S)

Secretary Baker: Yes, but with something less than full authority. (S)

President Gorbachev: We must think about it. (S)

The President: Let's have Jim and Eduard talk some more about this. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, let's, because there are lots of areas of agreement. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We could try to formulate three or four points on which the Afghans could agree: on the transition period for elections and the conduct thereof, on the role of the UN, etc. We would agree that Afghanistan would be unified, neutral, and demilitarized. (S)

President Gorbachev: And the only solution to Afghanistan is a political solution. The two sides should recognize each other. There would be four or five principles on which we could agree. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: This would be similar to Nicaragua and to what we are trying to do in Angola, etc. It is a tested process. (S)

The President: How about Ethiopia? (S)

President Gorbachev: We have an appeal from Mengistu. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: ^{Massawa} The essence of his letter is that he would agree to the UN as observers in his talks with Eritrea. They were opposed to any outside body until now. One other element: they agree to for humanitarian relief, subject to the sovereignty of Ethiopia. The Eritreans must agree. The US and the Soviet Union should suggest an international conference for an overall settlement in the horn of Africa. That should come from us, not them. Our two groups have been working on

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language. Another issue was our cargo planes for relief -- we agree, on condition that the Eritreans don't shoot them down. (S)

Secretary Baker: How about a joint appeal that the Eritreans should not shoot, on the basis that people will starve if they do. (S)

The President: This is about all we can do today. (S)

President Gorbachev: If we can issue a joint appeal, let's conclude and let our experts work on it. (Dennis brings a paper that is given to Obukov and it is read to Gorbachev.) (S) ✓

Secretary Baker: I think that a joint statement on aid involving Soviet planes and US food would look good. (S)

President Gorbachev: On Southern Africa, we don't have a big disagreement on what is happening in South Africa. In Southern Africa we are already working together. We will be flexible toward changes in South Africa, supporting those people who are working peacefully to abolish apartheid. We would encourage a joint statement here. (S)

The President: Mandela is a hopeful person to conduct a dialogue with de Klerk. Both of them are coming here. The Europeans may ease sanctions, but we will not do that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: A unique situation may be emerging with both sides urging a peaceful solution. We should stimulate this process. (S)

Secretary Baker: On Angola, we would like to pursue the election route. You say that Dos Santos is not quite ready. But we should push in that direction. The two sides are talking and we have offered talks under our joint sponsorship. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: One new element: Savimbi offered to meet with us. Dos Santos does not object and we will do it privately. (S)

The President: What shall we discuss next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Korea -- a lot of things worry us on the peninsula. I think we agree the two sides should engage in dialogue. A small step was taken in the release of U.S. troops. Politically, that is an important gesture. We are worried there is no agreement between North Korea and the IAEA, and they are very touchy about any contacts we have with South Korea. Those contacts are economic, and they are good. South Korea would like Siberian resources, and we are willing. Roh asked for a contract

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and we agreed, thinking it would be kept quiet. I am worried about the reaction of the North. We have told Kim there is no change in our policy, no recognition. We have said we're just meeting with the South Koreans to make their acquaintance and to promote Korean dialogue. We don't know what will come of it. Once again, we may be accused of betrayal. (S)

The President: We think it is a good thing you are seeing Roh. Our concern is Kim and his blocking of the IAEA agreement and the lack of moderating behavior. South Korea's reaching out is good. If Kim could accept safeguards, it would help. We are worried about instability on the peninsula. Earlier, we would have been upset about your talking to the South Koreans. This is no longer the case.

President Gorbachev: We will try to explain ourselves. (S)

The President: North Korea made one positive move: their return of the remains of five US soldiers. (S)

President Gorbachev: We did our bit on that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: The Koreans asked if the US would provide them with non-nuclear generators. Then maybe they will sign on with the IAEA. (S) *guarantees.* ✓

The President: Will there be a more moderate government in Korea? We don't know much about it. (S)

President Gorbachev: These Eastern systems are hard to figure out. The way is being paved to transfer power to the son. They have swallowed Hungary's establishment of relations with South Korea, but it will be different when we make contact. ~~We should think about more guarantees~~ (S) ✓
nuclear

General Scowcroft: If they would guarantee not to attack South Korea. (S)

President Gorbachev: Why not? (S)

General Scowcroft: We have tried formulations before but we can look at it again. (S)

The President: Let's talk about Japan. It can be helpful; they can help with economic assistance, as they have in Eastern Europe. Kaifu is stronger now, and we are working pragmatically on trade. Many feel Japan is buying up the U.S., but I don't worry about that. Japan might be helpful if you could deal with the Territories. It is your business, but I think you would find it beneficial. I commend Kaifu to you -- and hope he is still in

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power when you go there. (S)

President Gorbachev: We decided it was worthwhile for me to visit next year. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and Yeltsin will visit this fall. The Japanese know in principle that the Territories issue is clear, but their involvement in our Eastern Territories has been unsatisfactory thus far. For a long time they resisted any economic discussions, and they still think the economic relationship benefits us more than them. Their Foreign Ministry is conservative through and through. There is people contact, but no real business being conducted. When we move to a market system and open up to foreign firms, I think they will change. But 97% of the Soviet people oppose any movement on the Islands. (S)

The President: Let's move on to Cambodia. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think there is some hope there. I am slightly optimistic. Our common task is to solidify the agreements that the four sides made, and to help set up the supervisory organization. I have statements from Sihanouk and from Hun Sen which are very similar. There is some convergence emerging. (S)

The President: We have little influence, but we will urge cooperation. We will talk to the PRC even though we are without much influence with them. We hope that you will also do so. (S)

President Gorbachev: My impression is that the Chinese are acting more positively. Shevardnadze discussed the issue with Li Peng and they are now normalizing relations with Vietnam. The fact that China and Vietnam are talking is sending a signal to Phnom Penh. (There was a humorous discussion of Cuba, sugar and moonshine. The President described the US sugar problem and Central American sales of coffee and sugar to the US.) (S)

Secretary Baker: (Renews our proposal for the Soviet Union to join the G-24 in helping Central America.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Our cooperation with Nicaragua in the past will continue. We are considering it (the proposal regarding the G-24). (S)

The President: What is next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Cyprus. Vassilliou has written to both of us. He wants us to support a UN mission to Cyprus to break the deadlock. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: In order not to antagonize Greece or

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Turkey, the best way is for each side to support UN efforts. (S)

The President: What is left? (S)

General Scowcroft: We need to discuss coordination for the press conference on Germany and Lithuanian. (S)

President Gorbachev: We could say we had a good exchange, that both sides presented their arguments and made their case, and that it is not just a question between the two of us. As a result we decided that these consultations should continue. That is the shortest formula. (S)

The President: They will press me on trade, that I said Lithuania *complicated the situation*. I will say that the trade agreement is in the best interest of both sides. The next step is *early legislation* *on immigration* and that is where it stands. They will ask how about Lithuania. I will say I expressed myself fully on Lithuania but the next step is *early legislation*. (S) *immigration*

Secretary Baker: They will ask whether there is a side deal. When I was asked, I said I could not talk about private conversations. The President said it will be difficult to get trade legislation through Congress and that *is true*, but that issue does not arise now because the next step is Soviet emigration legislation. (S) ✓

President Gorbachev: The rest of it I will say. We have to bear in mind that rigid linkage should be avoided. We had a direct discussion of Lithuania. I discussed the situation and the prospects. We are looking for, and I expect I will find a solution within the framework of our Federation. Each Republic can withdraw or change the form of its relationship, but this must be in the established framework. (S)

The President: The more you can explain that to the US, the better. I will just stay away from linkage. (S)

President Gorbachev: And we will point out that it is not just one agreement, we have agreements on grain, aviation, etc. I will say that we cannot take away the right of self-determination, but since it is a constitutional right it must be done constitutionally. (S)

The President: The press is now more positive. Time and Newsweek said you were in trouble. That created a tough environment, but you have shown yourself completely in charge. (S)

President Gorbachev: It is a complex period, but we have to

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accept a pluralism of views. Not every one will agree with us,
or we wouldn't have pluralism. (S)

Secretary Baker: (AFL and

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Conference (S)

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James

morning

Camp David
June 2, 1970 ①

G In this setting maybe we can think of some good things to do. One step back (press comment) yesterday was important day. My main thing is it is good to make good statements & declarations. But yesterday, in addition to philo. & right decisions were made. I pleased w/ a way we are working - a right action. w/o this nothing is possible. I promise you my editorial efforts. Naturally we would agree & agree. Optimum resolutions are dif. I would like CD to be place where we report what we said yesterday - reaffirm a kind of relationship ship we want. Reaffirm from CD that relationship - regular act, regular ^{sense} phone link so we can exchange views frequently.

P Say all this at press conf?

G Yes

P Say yes. So far I think our work is being portrayed this way

G Yes. Even a picture now is showing a closeness. Us, a number, & 2 ladies all showing closeness.

P Well keep it going. we will see

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some lists on Trade & ¹ AC ² same report,
but I think we can manage it.
We talked last night about trying for
rmtgs w/o all c. trappings.

G I have told Sagg. Saw has 3 pages of
questions for me. I said I will answer
more than that when I get back. I
included 2 auth. Churn in my
delegation for this season. Rg -
represents our mil - mils complex
& also I brought Churn of FR auth.

②

Now they are in the selection it ②
important they see how these things
work. Soon I will have a 60 p
rmtg - a new W.P. O. only I have
me, & Jan are old members - all
others are new. I will report to you
just a tech. point. we will have
secure line in up & down this fall.

③

(Discussion of secure line)

G Shall we go thru our points?

P Fine. There are points I want raise
H-R. Representatives, evangelism, H-R in
genl. we want to take
more jobs. We are taking more -
about all we can.

There are many vestiges of anti-semitism.
We have stereotypes - you have
a prob too, & to a degree you could

2
3 speak out publicly, that would help.
It helps me. We would encourage
direct flights to I. You should know
I in big flight w/ Sharon over
settling endpoints in O.T. My admin
is severe anti-I. Stems from long 3

4 saying no settlement in O.T. (and
F Jerusalem. Created a freestom here
& in right in I. (retary admin). We 4
are a true friend of F. In new
new relationship, I would hope your
can take account of anti-S, direct
flights, refusals, keep up H.R. prep.
It ~~will~~ ^{would} help me a lot. If we can
separate anti S from policy it would
help.

5 G Let me respond. We would refer to
5 ever on full spectrum of H.R. On
immigration - here is up on refusals
20 on list; exit for S, temporary for 1,
temp to GB for 1 (prob w/ relatives), one dead
nothing on 11. We will have covered
6 nothing but that is report for error.

I agree we do have to take stand
against anti-S. I have spoken out
the past + will find a way to speak
specificaly.

P That would help. It is a worldwide
prob + if we are seen cooperating on it,

that would help.

G We do have a prob (let) Russian + Jewish
intelligensia. We will speak out but
don't want to take sides here we have to
find a way. There are many arguments
some even fascist, who say everything
Israel letting that settlement in Jeru
has exceeded everything in Arab press. Even
Nimrouk said he would have to protest
in our press that we settling a WB
& ~~also~~ replenishing a I Army. They
are trying to put us against each other.
Maybe I should say if they settle
in O.T. I will stop immigration.

P Sounds easy, but it is complicated.
(N. 7) Juddal settlements much at hand
to be clear on it.

G Our ministers could consult on a
language. Try to figure out a solution.

P Saying no more to I would get world
jeering up in arms. We couldn't sign
on to that.

G Maybe B + S can work something out.

P It is a risky move for a joint statement.

G Not thinking for joint statement, but
just getting our policies clear.


(B) I just wanted to say in 88 we started
a dialog which let us talk to both parties
& move forward on a peace process.

would be happy if you could let Arafat know that our dialog can continue only if he speaks out on Abu Abbas. Otherwise we can't continue a dialog.

G He was dissociated but not condemned

B That's right. But basis for our dialog is no terrorism

G we got a telegram from Arafat (reads "Violence is getting out of control. Close to explosion. Exacerbated by US veto. Don't know why you had to do that - it would have paralyzed a situation.



B (Described what we did)

G Let's think about this. A lot of truth in what Arafat says. If explosion, he will be totally isolated. We have worked hard to get Assad + Arafat to work together.

Murdoch the asshole and Bergerlid.

Kadafi is a prob. But maybe we

(8) ? work on seeing something we will work on Arafat to calm things down

P & traveling w P de C Monday. I will tell him. We will do it even against I if necessary

B And remember, we can't continue dialog if he tied to terrorism

G But Arafat thinks this is patriotic resistance. Tough for him to speak out

B But he dissociated from it.

S Shannon swore day.

P (Describes past w/ Shannon as settlement)

S Maybe this is a time to mention intl conf. We support your idea of ~~conf~~ ^{dialog}, but we should think of conf also.

G Everyone but Shannon supports conf. If we started prep for conf, we could

⑨ recog mirrored.

B As Edward knows, we don't reject conf. But now, I wouldn't appear at a conf. etc. right circumstances, we could go along. Right now isn't a
Back to draft. Turning of that attack is terrible. We want to keep ^{pressure} on a dialog + this gives I a way out

S I would go along w/ prep for conf?

B No. (Describes sit)

G Lets have E + J to talk about it. Maybe get I to take 1st step toward Conf. ~~Guarantee~~
I witnessed as a state jointly. I would like dip relations, then we could be helped. The bigger the nations, could work the statements recog realities + I sit.

We have contact w/ Jewish orgs. E has met Pines + Shannon. We could establish committees.

P You have gained much by your emigration policy. (Talked about Max Fishbein's comment)

Having intercourse w/ condom

(7)

B One thing you said is interesting. I
complain no ^{and} best Egypt ~~ready~~ I
right to exist. That could help

G we worked w/ Anapat to bring him around

B We will talk

G When Mulanah came he spoke of a
free zone w/o ~~severe~~ a ~~Chlor~~

(Jokes. Toes curling up)

Maybe we could look at it & support
Mulanah. There are two many capas
there. Our will disarm all capas he
in NE. They did join our - they get
all fired up. We really should think
of it because it is so heavily armed.

P I would resist

G Let E & Jim think about it.

P Other regional issues, I / Pakistan.
We concluded about a war. Gates came
back negative. We should stay in
touch. Every one a loser in such a war
In 71 we tilted toward Pak & you
toward I. Got deep mixed. We won't
try to take advantage of you. We don't
have dog in that fight tho we like
Bhutto. We would encourage imme-
diate fire, etc. We open to suggestions.
If it heats up I hope we can work
together. Maybe not but I don't want
it to disrespect us.

Moving & coming are

G I had call from Singa - she wanted me to know he would do his best to calm things down. I responded that I would welcome solutions to this I'd prob. I want good relations w/ both F + P. We never broke w/ P in worst days of Afghan. It is in our interest that it not become an acute, lets keep in touch.

P I understand you have prob w/ joint statement, but maybe at a press conf...

G It might be sensitive to F + P if we commenting on them, but at press conf would be a good way to do it.

(Discussion on what going on)

G lets stay in close touch - and lets do a press conf thing.

*

P May other items: Africa, E. Europe, etc. But I want to register on Cuba. Jim & F have talked a lot on Afghan.

Cuba. We think Castro swimming against a tide. He is untrusted. Many think we picking on him. But he is an outcast. If you change your own relationship that would push him. He would take a Ortega route.

G Castro supported a Nicar solution.

P Cause he that Ortega would win

(11)

But maybe we could use that as work

B like Nicaragua, if Castro would change, we could change our policy

G let us say a few words. Agree no peace in C. A. if Cuba isolated, we not doing that but we see you know that kind of squashdown. I spoke w/VP.

(12) He said would to Cuba 6 times. I said you didn't stop in Cuba.

We should analyze Castro. He extremely criticizing us more than you. In Cuban missile crisis he kept Imbrogno running around island for weeks. Teaching lessons to Castro is useless. When I was there I could see they were terrible. I told him I wasn't trying to change his way of doing things but let us do things my way as well. Then they related to it went OK.

(13) If you got in touch w/him I think he would respond, but trying to force him would be useless. He has told me "I won't take US dictation but if they will sit & talk..."

Maybe we could set something up which not bilateral. He really to hear you out - to talk at any level. Better to hear from you, not us. A change in our own relations is coming. It based on denying

thing we need - the 2 realize not at market prices. It can be sold for dollars on world market. Also we buy citrus + iron - ferrous materials. We are beginning to put ^{even} relations on a realistic basis. Before, now even that about a ^{cost} econ aspects of our relations. Latins show more understanding of a role of Cuba, so it not that simple. There is problem remaining of describing a country.

P I think that is back out there.

A & I have personal relationship w/ Castro + he says he prepared to go very far. He ~~knows~~ understands a prob.

P let me tell you a US Cuban prob.
(Describes Cuban American patriotic community)

(14) ? ... there is an ambition in this issue for thurs (Reads long letter on Cuba)
I hear what you have said on Castro + I hope you understand our feelings on a issue. Let's keep it on table.

B We haven't asked Castro to give us something before we sit down - only to cease subversion in E.S. + LA. That's all

C You want us to convey this to him.

P Would be helpful

B ~~If that~~

- G If ES improved visibly, there would be a change by you.
- P Yes, but I won't give him a State Dinner.
- B ES has just elected Govt & he subverting it.
- P I don't like H. Ortega as head of Army because Army was a Party Army.
- S Just a word on Cuba. We having some discussions w/US on Cuba for some imaginative solutions. If US treats Cuba as equal... like Angola, we would sit with them after they got treated like equal partners.
On ES I think Castro may take a serious decision.
- G What do you want us to do.
- B Here a wild sug. Tell him P said improvement & dialog if you will firmly sign on & support the principles which binds X of emergency to C.A.
- P That only deals w/ a small part of prob. For full relations - people must be able to elect, H.R. like people out of jail, etc. For normal relations Castro can't be - only one out of step in a series.
- G For now we will convey to him sug. which will allow dialog to begin. Then it can progress.
- P I must tell you a Sov relationship to Cuba occurs - US view of you.

B The MIG 29 is a big issue for us, psychologically.

P Why don't we break for lunch. Then rest + look at 3.

- Lunch break -

G Discussion of a diff bet Sov & US Federation (natl character of Sov federation). Fight bet Stalin & Lenin on Nature of Fed. After Lenin died, Stalin left a law - same but he created a unitary state - ruthlessly. Then he said nationality prob no longer existed - there was instead a "Soviet" ^{nationality} ~~nationality~~. So once a law burst, nationality burst out into open.

Byelorussian lang almost died out.

P Shall we return to agenda. I ~~dominate~~ ^{dominate} w/ my subjects this morning. We didn't raise Afghan

G I be happy to discuss Afghan

P On Afghan, we would really like to ^{engage} ~~dis-~~ ~~engage~~ ~~engage~~. We would like to get close + have no interest in a radical Muslim ~~abuse~~. We also worried about a radical we not trying to ~~offer~~ install anti-Sov fundamental regime. (Describes political arrangements we seek.) If they got under way we would stop aid to Muj. If we could both state that no party would be allowed to subvert a process, & state that

a neutral body would arrange - otherwise we would have ~~an~~ a good outcome. Naj could participate but not as head of govt. He is way too much of a conservative. I ask whether you can line up short sequences ~~per~~ period where Naj could participate but step aside from govt.

G There is mutual understanding for neutral period + week for conducting election for broad based govt. also for VHA role for transition period + conducting elections. Do we understand that neither govt nor opposition would transfer power or govt to neutral authority. So only hope is elections on basis of status quo. Let them conduct their elections in their own way. Can't remove Naj or Hehriety from scene Naj is beginning to put some things on us.

P He thinks he getting stronger

G He thinks he getting more support. Some former opposition members are winning local govt under good supervision of ~~current~~ govt press.

S We need new approach cause neither side has leverage to get a solution

P How does Naj ~~to~~ feel about elections

- S I have talked to him - He favors a Myanmar solution, w/a group charged w/ organizing election.
- G Would Naj be ready to step aside as part of normal process, but not kicked out.
- S Yes, but not as a w/ demand. There is a conf. could set up an election process. Our dig is not great. We can't get Naj out. Actually this process is getting under way. He is inviting Zin Shan to take a highest position.
- G Would like neutral regime, not one host to US.
- P We can't argue against Naj staying in a la Myanmar, but how to get resistance plugged.
- G Whether Naj or Nay will conduct elections. UN or OIC will do it. Naj don't want to be kicked out. That is his minimum.
- B Did for us to argue against Myanmar model. Our prob is w/c resistance. We need something for them to show, election would be fair, supervision neutral, + outcome observed. What ^{about} if Naj taking a "head of state" role during this period, to demon. that a ~~transition~~ ^{transition} authority would conduct election + provide security.
- G Naj would be a kind of interim acting

Press during election.

B Something less than full authority

G We must think about it

P Let J & E take some more

G Yes, because there are lots of areas of agreement

S We can try to promulgate 3 or 4 points on which Afghans could agree ^{for} transition period ~~the~~ election & conduct thereof, role of UN etc. Agree Afghan would be empowered, retrained & demilitarized.

G And a only solution to Afghan is political solution. The 2 sides should reach each other. 4 or 5 principles on which we could both agree

S This would be similar to Nicaragua, what we trying in Angola, etc. It's tested process

P How about Ethiopia

G We have appeal from Mengistu

S Essence of his letter is agree to UN as observers in talks w/ Eritrea. They were opposed to any outside body til now. Other element: they agree to cessation for humanitarian relief subject to security of Eth. Eritreans must agree. US + SU should suggest with conf for overall settlement in Horn of Africa. That should come from us, not them. Our 2 groups have been working on language,

Another issue was an cargo plane for relief - we agree that if Eritreans don't shoot them down

B How about joint appeal to Eritreans not to shoot. People will starve.

P This is about all we can do today

C If we can issue a joint appeal, let's conclude & let our experts work on it.
(Dennis brings paper given to O'Brien & O'Brien it is read to Gorb)

B I think a joint statement on aid w/ Sov planes & US food would look good.

C On southern Africa, we don't have big disagreement on what happening in S. Africa. In Southern Af. we are already working together. We wish for flex toward change in S.A. supporting those working peacefully to abolish apartheid. We would encourage joint statement here.

P Mandela a hopeful person to talk w/ de Klerk. Both coming here. E sees way to ease sanctions we would do that.

S Unique set way for emerging, w/ both seeking peaceful solution. We should stimulate this process. ~~finished~~

B On Angola we would like to pursue a election route. You say dos Santos not yet ready, but we should push in that direction. The 2 are talking & we have offers

Talks under our joint sponsorship

S One new element, Sawinski offered to meet w/ us. Dos Santos doesn't object & we will do it privately.

P Next?

G Korea. A lot of things carry us in peninsula & I think we agree to a series of small steps. Small step taken to reduce US troops. That ~~politically~~ is important gesture. We are worried there is no agreement with HK & IAEA & they really don't want any contacts we have w/ SK. Those contacts are economic & they are good. SK would like S. Korean resources & we are willing. Roh asked for contact & we agree. Thinking it would be quiet. I worried about reaction of a North. We have told Kim no change, no revoc. Just inty to make a c. & promote Korean dialog. Don't know what will come of it. Once again we may be accused of betrayal.

P We think it goes again seeing Roh. Our concern is Kim & blocking IAEA & lack of moderating behavior. SK reaching out is good. If Kim can't accept safeguards it would help. We worried about instability on peninsula. Earlier we would have been upset w/ your talking to SK, no more.

- G Will try to explain ourselves.
- P NK made one positive move. Return remains of 5 soldiers.
- G We did our bit on that.
- S Koreans ask if US will provide them ^{non} opium smugglers. Then maybe they will sign YAEA.
- P Will there ~~will~~ be a more moderate gov't in NK. We don't know much about it.
- G These Eastern Systems are hard to figure out. The comm is being paid to transfer power to the south. They have several new Hungary estab soo relations w/ SK, but it will be diff when we reach contact.
Think about our guarantee.
- BS If they would guarantee not to attack SK?
- G Why not
- BS We have tried formulations before, but we can look at it.
- P Japan. It can be helped. They can help w/ aid - like E Eur. Kaifu stronger now & we working prog on trade. Many fear for buying US, but I don't worry about that. Japan might be helped if you could deal w/ territories. If your business lost I think you would find it beneficial. I commend Kaifu to you - and then hope he is still in power when you go there.
- G We decided it was worthwhile for me to visit

next year. Meanwhile prep. are going on
 + S, Yakut, + Yelton will visit this
 fall. The Japs know in principle a
 territorial issue is clear, but their
 involvement in our eastern territories
 has been enabled just by this far. They
 for long time resisted any real issues
 + still think even benefits no more
 than them. Their F.R. policy is conservative
 thru + thru. There is people contact but
 no real business. When we come to
 markets + open up to foreign firms I think
 they will change.

97% of Sars oppose any movement on
 Islands.

P Cambodia

G I think there is some hope here. I slightly
 optimistic. Our common task is to solidify
 agreements + 4 files ^{made} agreed and help set
 up a supervisory organ. I have statements
 from Sihanouk + Hun Sen which are very
 similar. There is convergence emerging.

P we have little influence but we will urge
 coop. we will talk to PRC, w/o much
 influence. Hope you will also.

G My impression is a Chinese now are acting
 more positively. I discussed w/ Li Peng +
 they now normalizing w/ ^{VN} Phnom. Fact
 that China + VN are talking sends signal to P.R.

we were sick

20

(Cuba / sugar / rumouring)

(P describes US sugar prob to C.A. selling sugar / coffee to us)

B (Renews proposal for SUT to join G-24 in helping C.A.)

G Our coop w/ Nicaragua part with continue. We are considering a proposal

P what is next

G Cyprus. Vasilis has written both of us. Wants us to support UN mission to Cyprus to break deadlock.

S In order not to antagonize GUT, a best way is each to support UN efforts.

P what's left.

BS Look on press conf. on Gen + Lith

G We could say we had good exchange, both sides presented their arguments & made their case. As result we decided these consultations should continue. That a short text provide. They will pressure on trade that I said

?? Lith camp

I will say trade agree is in interests of both. Next step is early legis & that is when it stands. They will ask how about Lith. I will say I expressed myself fully on Lith, but next step is early legis

B They will ask is there a side deal

I said I don't talk about private conversation

just
action
c 2
nos

- ? P said try to get Trade thru long + that True but that issue doesn't arise now because next step is env'y legis
- G The rest of it I will say. We have to bear in mind that rigid linkage should be avoided. We had direct discussion of hith. I discussed a sit + a prop'ts. We looking for + I expect we will find a solution w/in a framework of our federation. Each Apart. can w/stand or change form of relationship, but must be w/in estab framework
- P The more you can explain that to US a letter, I will just stay away from linkage.
- G And we print out it not just one agreement - grain, aviation, etc. I will say we can't take away right of self deter but since it is correct right it must be done constitutionally
- P The Press is over more positive. Time + Newsweek said you were in trouble that created tough environment but you have shown yourself completely in charge
- G It is a complex period, but we have to accept pluralism of views. Certainly we will agree w/us or we wouldn't have pluralism
- ? B (AFK + Donats coref)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 10

PRT: GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN SUNUNU
SIT: BENKO BURNS FILE SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 301519Z AUG 90

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4508
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 30530

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL. US. UR.

SUBJECT: GOVERNOR SUNUNU MEETING WITH
PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBER PRIMAKOV

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY.

PRIMAKOV STRESSED THE STILL INCOMPLETE STRUCTURE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL AND THE FACT THAT ITS FUNCTIONS ARE STILL EVOLVING. GENERALLY, THE COUNCIL DOES NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN MINISTRIES, WHICH ARE HANDLED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. IT CONSIDERS FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY ISSUES, AS WELL AS "STATE"-LEVEL PROBLEMS.

ESSENTIALLY, IT IS GORBACHEV WHO DECIDES WHAT IS A STATE-LEVEL PROBLEM. THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL AND ITS STAFF IN HELPING MANAGE THE PRESIDENT'S TIME IS LIMITED. ACCORDING TO PRIMAKOV, GORBACHEV SETS HIS OWN SCHEDULE AND DECIDES WHO AND WHAT HE WILL SEE. SINCE HE ALSO WEARS THE HAT OF PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL, HE UNDERTAKES ACTIVITIES IN THAT ROLE OF WHICH THE COUNCIL MAY ONLY BE INFORMED BELATEDLY, IF AT ALL. AFTER WHATEVER CONSULTATIONS HE CONSIDERS NECESSARY, GORBACHEV DECIDES. END SUMMARY.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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3. WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF JOHN SUNUNU AND HIS DELEGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, MET AUGUST 29 WITH PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBER YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV IN PRIMAKOV'S KREMLIN OFFICE. PRIMAKOV OPENED THE MEETING BY SAYING HE HAD THOUGHT A GREAT DEAL ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH SUNUNU AT CAMP DAVID. THE IDEAS SUNUNU HAD EXPRESSED WERE FINDING PRACTICAL APPLICATION IN THE USSR. ALTHOUGH PRIMAKOV HASTENED TO ADD GOOD HUMOREDLY THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT SUNUNU'S IDEAS DETERMINED THE DECISIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL.

4. SUNUNU SAID HIS DELEGATION WAS HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY IN GETTING A PRECISE IDEA OF THE STRUCTURE AND STAFFING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL AND OF HOW THE COUNCIL WILL INTERACT WITH THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. THE DELEGATION WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW INFORMATION WILL FLOW FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE PRESIDENT AND HOW THE PRESIDENT WILL ESTABLISH HIS PRIORITIES.

5. IN RESPONDING, PRIMAKOV SAID HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL HAD NOT YET BEEN CREATED AND ITS PLACE IN PRESIDENTIAL POWERS NOT YET DETERMINED. THE FIRST

100 DAYS OF THE GORBACHEV PRESIDENCY WERE NOT LIKE THOSE OF A U.S. PRESIDENT, WHERE 200 YEARS OF TRADITION LAY BEHIND THE OFFICE. PRIMAKOV CHARACTERIZED THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL AS A CONSULTATIVE BODY, ALBEIT A VERY IMPORTANT ONE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COUNCIL HAD DISCUSSED THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE PROGRAM FOR TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY AND RETURNED IT TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR REVISIONS BASED ON THE COUNCIL'S RECOMMENDATIONS. PRIMAKOV SAID IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL WERE NOT LIMITED TO ACTIONS SUCH AS THIS.

6. PRIMAKOV REMARKED THAT THERE WERE SOME MEMBERS OF

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE COUNCIL WHO HELD NO OTHER POSITIONS, INCLUDING HIMSELF, SINCE HE HAD GIVEN UP HIS POSITION IN THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. OTHERS INCLUDE YAKOVLEV, BOLDIN, REVENKO AND, RIGHT NOW, MEDVEDEV. PART OF THEIR JOB IS TO THINK ABOUT HOW PROPOSALS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED, OR NOT BE, IN PRACTICAL TERMS. PRIMAKOV SAID HE BELIEVED THAT A SHARE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IS ALREADY COMING TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THAT THIS SHARE WILL INCREASE. A TIME WILL COME, HE THOUGHT, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT (I.E., THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) WILL FOCUS MAINLY ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS.

7. ALSO INCLUDED AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE THE MINISTERS OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KGB. THIS DEMONSTRATES, HE SAID, THAT ISSUES UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THESE MINISTRIES ARE HANDLED MAINLY IN THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. THE COUNCIL'S STAFF IS STILL BEING ORGANIZED. HE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES, WITH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, WITH THE PRESS. THERE IS A STAFF AVAILABLE TO ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS. IT DEALS WITH SOCIOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION

BT

#0530

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 30530

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR,

SUBJECT: GOVERNOR SUNUNU MEETING WITH SERVICES AND WITH "SITUATION ANALYSIS".

8. IN ADDITION, PRIMAKOV HAS ESTABLISHED A SMALL PERSONAL STAFF COMPRISING EIGHT CONSULTANTS AND TWO ASSISTANTS. ONE OF THE CONSULTANTS DEALS WITH THE SUPREME SOVIET, ANOTHER WITH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ETC. PRIMAKOV SAID HE WANTS IDEAS

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FROM THESE PEOPLE. HE DOES NOT WANT THEM TIED TO THEIR DESKS. WHILE HIS ASSISTANTS ARE WITH HIM EACH DAY, HIS CONSULTANTS NEED TO ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AND COME UP WITH GOOD IDEAS. THEY NEED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH SITUATIONS AND MAKE PROPOSALS ON THEM. HE CONSIDERS THIS THE OPTIMUM ARRANGEMENT, BUT SAYS HE'LL SEE, EXPERIENCE WILL TELL.

9. PRIMAKOV SAID AMONG HIS CHIEF DIFFICULTIES WAS IN FINDING YOUNG PEOPLE FOR HIS STAFF. "WE DID NOT PAY ENOUGH ATTENTION TO THEM." HE SAID HE COULD NOT JUST TAKE POST-GRADUATES AS THE WHITE HOUSE HAD. (AT THIS POINT, PRIMAKOV CONGRATULATED DOCTOR RICE ON HER

RECENT PROMOTION.) AT PRESENT, PRIMAKOV TAKES PEOPLE HE AND HIS ASSISTANTS KNOW, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHERE THEY PREVIOUSLY WORKED. ONE, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS A CENTRAL COMMITTEE STAFFER WHOSE BACKGROUND, THINKING AND WORK PRIMAKOV KNOWS. "HE WILL NOT BE A FRAGMENT OF THAT ORGANIZATION".

10. SUNUNU JOCULARLY REMARKED THAT PERHAPS WE COULD MOVE FROM NEW THINKING TO NEW, NEW THINKING AND LET PRIMAKOV HAVE DOCTOR RICE FOR A YEAR. PRIMAKOV WELCOMED THE IDEA, SAYING HER FIRST TASK WOULD BE TO GIVE HIM PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, WITH PRIORITY TO OUR (I.E., SOVIET) INTERESTS. SUNUNU RIPOSTED THAT "OUR" INTERESTS WERE REALLY "OUR" (JOINT) INTERESTS.

11. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF INFORMATION FLOW, PRIMAKOV SAID THAT INFORMATION CAME TO THE PRESIDENT FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, IT WAS NOT CENTRALIZED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A SWITCH TO THAT PRACTICE WHEN THE STAFF PREPARATIONS WERE COMPLETED. NOW, INFORMATION "JUST FLOWS" TO GORBACHEV. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO READ ALL OF THE INFORMATION. GORBACHEV'S ASSISTANTS SELECT IT IN SOME CASES; IN OTHERS, IT JUST GOES STRAIGHT

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FORWARD. PRIMAKOV THOUGHT IN THE FUTURE INFORMATION WOULD BE PREPARED FOR GORBACHEV BY A NUCLEUS WITHIN THE STAFF OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. CHERNYAYEV HANDLES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; SHAKNAZAROV DOMESTIC AFFAIRS; IGNATENKO PRESS RELATIONS; AND PETRAKOV ECONOMIC MATTERS.

12. PRIMAKOV REMARKED THAT IGNATENKO, WHO HAD JUST BEEN NAMED TO HEAD THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS OFFICE, WAS HOLDING HIS FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE THAT VERY DAY. ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IGNATENKO'S WORK OVERLAPS WITH HIS, PRIMAKOV SAID HE WANTS IGNATENKO TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE PRESIDENT. OTHERWISE, IGNATENKO WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTIES.

13. PRIMAKOV SAID GORBACHEV HAD SEVERAL ADVISORS AND NAMED AKHROMEYEV AND ZAGLADIN. HE THOUGHT THE NUMBER MIGHT GROW. THE PRESIDENT CHOOSES HIS OWN ADVISORS AND ASSISTANTS. HE MAY SELECT SOMEONE FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL STAFF, BUT NOT NECESSARILY.

14. SUNUNU DESCRIBED A MAJOR PROBLEM OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF AS ENSURING THAT THE PRESIDENT SEES ALL OF THE PEOPLE AND INFORMATION THAT HE NEEDS TO WITHOUT BEING OVERWHELMED. PEOPLE HAVE VERY CLEVER WAYS OF GOING AROUND THE PROCESS TO REACH THE PRESIDENT. HE ASKED WHETHER PRIMAKOV BELIEVED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT DURING THE SOVIET TRANSITION TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE PRESIDENT THOSE WELL MEANING PERSONS WHO WANT TO HELP.

15. PRIMAKOV REMARKED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MUCH LESS EXPERIENCE IN CONTAINING THE PRESIDENT. HE IS PRETTY HARD TO TAME. SUNUNU REMARKED THAT THE SYSTEM SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO AS TO HELP THE PRESIDENT TO SAY NO, OR TO BE ABLE TO DO IT FOR HIM. PRIMAKOV POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET PRESIDENT IS ALSO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTY. YESTERDAY, THE PRESIDENT TOLD

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 30530

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL. US. UR.

SUBJECT: GOVERNOR SUNUNU MEETING WITH
PRIMAKOV THAT HE WAS RECEIVING A GROUP OF WORKERS.
PRIMAKOV HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF IT BECAUSE IT HAD NOT
COME THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. THERE ARE
COMPLICATIONS THAT CAUSE THINGS LIKE THIS TO GO ALONG
THE PARTY TRACK. BUT, PRIMAKOV ADDED, HE UNDERSTOOD
NEVERTHELESS, THE NEED FOR A FILTER AND FOR PEOPLE TO
SAY NO. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT ALWAYS
WANT TO HAVE HIS HANDS TIED, EVEN IF YOU TELL HIM
THIS IS THE RATIONAL WAY.

16. SUNUNU REMARKED THAT THE KEY TO MAKING THIS WORK
IS CONSTANT COMMUNICATION, SO THAT IT IS THE
PRESIDENT WHO SAYS WHAT HE WANTS. THE FREQUENCY OF
THIS COMMUNICATION WILL DEPEND ON THE PERSONAL STYLE
OF THE PRESIDENT. PRIMAKOV SAID THE INITIATIVE ON
THIS WAS IN THE PRESIDENT'S HANDS. THE COUNCIL COULD
NOT DRAW UP A SCHEDULE FOR HIM, ONLY PUT FORWARD
PROPOSALS. HE PERSONALLY MAKES THE CHOICES,
SOMETIMES ASKING ADVICE, SOMETIMES NOT. HE WORKS OUT
HIS DAY-TO-DAY SCHEDULE FOR HIMSELF.

17. IN RESPONSE TO SUNUNU'S QUESTION ABOUT THE
PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL ADVISORS, PRIMAKOV SAID
YAKOVLEV AND PRIMAKOV HIMSELF DEALT WITH POLICY
MATTERS, BUT GORBACHEV ALSO HAD ASSISTANTS WHO DEALT
WITH THESE ISSUES. AND OF COURSE HE HAS THE FOREIGN
MINISTER AND OTHERS ON THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL AS
WELL. PRIMAKOV THOUGHT THAT IN 2-3 MONTHS THE FIRST
MODEL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF WOULD BE FULLY
FUNCTIONING. HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO POSITION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THAT FULLY REFLECTED SUNUNU'S. THE HEAD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF IS BOLDIN. WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. HE HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHOOSING AND ESTABLISHING THE COUNCIL'S STAFF, BUT NOT THE PERSONAL STAFF OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS.

18. PRIMAKOV SAID THERE WERE NO SPECIAL TIMES SET ASIDE FOR COUNCIL MEETINGS. IT MEETS AS THE NEED ARISES, RATHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, REGULARLY ONCE OR TWICE A WEEK. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THERE WOULD BE A JOINT MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF FEDERATION TO TAKE STOCK OF THE PREPARATION OF A NEW UNION TREATY. THE COUNCIL NEVER MEETS WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT PRESENT. ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS MEET WITH ONE ANOTHER ALL THE TIME.

19. PRIMAKOV SAID THERE WERE NO SUBCOMMITTEES WITHIN THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL ITSELF, BUT THERE WERE SUB-UNITS OF THE APPARATUS. THERE WILL BE A STAFF DEPARTMENT TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND IT WILL INCLUDE A YIYBZTION ONBZYD

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THE PRESIDENT MEETS WITH VARIOUS GROUPS FROM WITHIN THE COUNCIL ON VIRTUALLY A DAILY BASIS. IN MOST CASES, HE PERSONALLY INITIATES SUCH MEETINGS, AS WELL AS MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. MN A CRISIS, HE TELEPHONES WHOMEVER HE NEEDS TO TALK TO OR

ASKS HIM TO COME TO HIS OFFICE.

20. USING THE UPCOMING JOINT MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF FEDERATION AS AN EXAMPLE, PRIMAKOV SAID THE AGENDA WILL HAVE ON IT ISSUES AND DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY GROUPS THAT ARE WORKING UNDER THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. ONE SUCH GROUP IS COMPRISED OF ECONOMISTS WHO ARE MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENT, WORKING UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE RSFSR, ALTHOUGHT THAT GROUP ALSO CONTAINS SOME GOVERNMENT

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ECONOMISTS. IT IS HEADED BY PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBER SHATALIN AND THE DOCUMENTS THEY ARE PRODUCING ARE BEING PREPARED AND DISTRIBUTED BY BOLDIN'S STAFF. A SECOND GROUP, WORKING UNDER THE GOVERNMENT (I.E., THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS), IS PREPARING AND DISTRIBUTING ITS DOCUMENTS. SO, THE FLOW OF PAPER DEPENDS A GREAT DEAL ON THE PARTICULAR GROUP WORKING ON THE ISSUE. ALTHOUGH CONFIDENTIALITY ALSO IS A DETERMINING FACTOR. (COMMENT. PRIMAKOV'S REMARKS SUGGEST THAT AT THIS POINT THE ISSUE OF A NEW UNION TREATY IS BEING APPROACHED PRIMARILY IN THE CONTEXT OF SEEKING AGREEMENT ON THE ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN. YELTSIN'S REMARKS TO SUNUNU ON THE YELTSIN/GORBACHEV MEETING AUGUST 29 (SEPTEL) INDICATE THIS AS WELL.)

21. RESPONDING TO SUNUNU'S QUESTION, PRIMAKOV SAID THERE WAS NO EXPECTATION THAT THE WORK OF THE VARIOUS
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WHITE HOUSE FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR,

SUBJECT: GOVERNOR SUNUNU MEETING WITH

MINISTERS WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER THE PRESIDENT. IF IT CAME UNDER THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL, THERE WOULD IN EFFECT BE TWO GOVERNMENTS. CONFLICTS BETWEEN MINISTRIES ARE NORMALLY HANDLED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. BUT IF AN ISSUE IS AT THE LEVEL OF A STATE (GOSUDARSTVENIE) PROBLEM, IT CAN BE HANDLED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. SUNUNU CITED A TYPICAL AMERICAN EXAMPLE, IN WHICH ONE DEPARTMENT WANTS TO AUTHORIZE OIL DRILLING, WHILE ANOTHER SAYS NO FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS. PRIMAKOV SAID THIS WAS COMMON IN THE USSR AS WELL. IF, IN A PARTICULAR

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REGION. THE MINISTRY OF OIL PRODUCTION WANTS TO DRILL AND THE STATE COMMITTEE ON ECOLOGY SAYS NO. THIS CONFLICT IS IN THE PURVIEW OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL DOES NOT DEAL WITH OPERATIONAL ISSUES.

22. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE POPULACE IS AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY BECAUSE OF CHERNOBYL AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP THE INDUSTRY EVEN IF IT IS ECOLOGICALLY SAFE. THIS IS AN ISSUE OF STATE IMPORTANCE. IT MAY BE DISCUSSED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL, WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSIONS.

23. IT IS THE PRESIDENT WHO DECIDES WHAT ISSUES COME BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL. HE IS NOT A NOMINAL HEAD OF STATE. A PERSON FOR WHOM PEOPLE PREPARE

PAPERS. HE IS THE KEY FIGURE. AFTER CONSULTATIONS AND THE ELABORATION OF POSITIONS, HE DECIDES. IN RESPONSE TO SUNUNU'S QUERY ABOUT HOW THE PRESIDENT DECIDES WHAT IS A STATE PROBLEM, PRIMAKOV CITED THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CRIME AS ONE OF THE MAJOR ISSUES IN THE USSR. THE PRESIDENT IS WELL INFORMED. HE MEETS REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE PUBLIC, RECEIVES TENS OF THOUSANDS OF LETTERS MONTHLY.

24. PRIMAKOV REMARKED THAT HE HAD READ THAT THE SAUDIS BELIEVE SADDAM HUSSAYN IS NOT WELL INFORMED BECAUSE PEOPLE ARE AFRAID TO TELL HIM THE REAL SITUATION. THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE SOVIET UNION UNDER THIS PRESIDENT. HE READS A LOT. PRIMAKOV DID NOT KNOW WHERE HE GOT THE TIME. GORBACHEV HAD JUST ADVISED PRIMAKOV TO READ AN INTERESTING ARTICLE FROM A NEW PUBLICATION, STOLITSA, THAT PRIMAKOV HAD NOT EVEN HEARD EXISTED. (COMMENT. THE PUBLICATION IS THE RECENTLY-CREATED NEWSPAPER OF THE MOSCOW CITY COUNCIL.)

25. PRIMAKOV SAID THERE WAS NO MATRIX TO DESCRIBE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAY INTO WHICH HIS SCHEDULE COULD BE PUT. SUNUNU. HE THOUGHT, HAD AN ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A REGULARLY SCHEDULED 30 MINUTE MEETING EACH DAY WITH THE PRESIDENT. SUNUNU REMARKED THAT HE MET WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR AN HOUR AND A QUARTER EACH MORNING, THIRTY MINUTES LATER IN THE DAY AND PERHAPS FIFTEEN TIMES A DAY BRIEFLY. PRIMAKOV SAID HE MIGHT SEE GORBACHEV TWENTY TIMES A DAY, BUT HAD NO OBLIGATORY MORNING MEETING. SUNUNU REMARKED THAT ULTIMATELY THIS WAS A QUESTION OF THE STYLE AND CHOICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

26. AS THE MEETING ENDED. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN THE U.S. IN NOVEMBER, SPEAKING NOVEMBER 15 AT A LUNCHEON ARRANGED BY THE CITIZENS EXCHANGE COUNCIL IN NEW YORK FOR THE AWARDING OF THE KENNAN PRIZE. SUNUNU EXPRESSED THE HOPE PRIMAKOV WOULD SAVE SOME TIME FOR MEETINGS WITH HIM.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 30524

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL. US. UR.

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN GOVERNOR SUNUNU AND
RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN YELTSIN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. YELTSIN DESCRIBED HIS FIVE-HOUR
MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AUGUST 29 IN FAVORABLE TERMS,
SAYING THE TWO HAD AGREED TO TRY TO AVOID SITUATIONS
WHICH BROUGHT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLIC
INTO PUBLIC CONFLICT AND WERE EMBARRASSING TO BOTH.
HE ASSERTED RUSSIA'S DESIRE TO REMAIN WITHIN A STRONG
UNION, BUT ALSO SAID THAT RUSSIA WOULD CONTROL ITS
OWN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THAT NO FURTHER AGREEMENTS
WOULD BE MADE BY OTHERS ON HOW THOSE RESOURCES WOULD
BE USED. HE CLAIMED HIS JUST-COMPLETED TRIP AROUND
RUSSIA HAD SHOWN HIM THAT HE HAD PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
HIS THREE-YEAR REFORM PROGRAM, A SUPPORT HE SAID THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LACKS. HE AND GORBACHEV AGREED IN
PRINCIPLE, HE SAID, THAT THE APPROACH TO A UNION
TREATY SHOULD BE INITIALLY VIA ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN THE VARIOUS REPUBLICS AND THE CENTER. HE
BELIEVES THERE IS AGREEMENT ON A REFORM PACKAGE BASED
ON HIS "500 DAY" PROGRAM AND THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL

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BE SIGNED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. END SUMMARY.

3. WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF JOHN SUNUNU AND HIS DELEGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, MET AUGUST 30 WITH RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN BORIS YELTSIN AT YELTSIN'S REQUEST. YELTSIN, WHOSE SPACIOUS OFFICE IN THE RSFSR BUILDING IS EQUIPPED WITH SUCH CONTEMPORARY (FOR THE SOVIET UNION) DEVICES AS A TELEPHONE ANSWERING MACHINE, MET WITH THE DELEGATION WITH ONLY ONE AIDE, SUKHANOV, IN ATTENDANCE. GOVERNOR SUNUNU OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING ABOUT THE PRIOR DAY'S MEETING BETWEEN YELTSIN AND GORBACHEV. YELTSIN SAID GORBACHEV HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE DATE OF THE MEETING, AUGUST 29, WAS ONE THAT NEEDED TO BE REMEMBERED. THE FIVE HOUR MEETING, YELTSIN SAID, REPRESENTED AS MUCH TIME AS THE TWO MEN HAD TALKED OVER THE PRECEEDING 5-6 YEARS. THEY DISCUSSED A VARIETY OF QUESTIONS: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF RUSSIA, THE SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS REPUBLICS, THEIR RELATION TO THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE NEW PROGRAM FOR STABILIZING THE ECONOMY DURING THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY.

4. THE TWO, YELTSIN SAID, HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO

AN APPROACH INVOLVING THE SIGNING OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS REPUBLICS AND THE CENTER. THIS WAS A REALISTIC STEP AT THIS STAGE OF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT A UNION TREATY. SOME OF THE OTHER QUESTIONS CONNECTED TO A UNION TREATY ARE MORE COMPLICATED AND WILL NOT BE RESOLVED SO QUICKLY: FOR EXAMPLE, CURRENCY, GOLD RESERVES AND WHO THEY BELONG TO. WE ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A MECHANISM, YELTSIN CONTINUED, SUCH THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER PUBLIC QUARRELS BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO PUT OUT SPECIAL DECREES ON THESE MATTERS.

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5. YELTSIN SAID THE TWO WERE TRYING TO AVOID SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS PUT IN AN EMBARRASSING SITUATION BY DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLIC. IT IS EMBARRASSING WHEN A REPUBLIC LAW IS ADOPTED AND THEN THREE DAYS LATER A DIFFERENT DECREE IS ISSUED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. EVERYONE IS PUT IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION.

6. THE DISCUSSION ALSO COVERED THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY. ITS RIGHT TO CONCLUDE TREATIES WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS JAPAN. THE U.S., ITALY, KOREA AND OTHERS. THEY HAD TALKED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC COULD PARTICIPATE. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, YELTSIN SAID, NEEDS TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY TRANSFORMED, TO HAVE LESS POWER AND NOT TO IMPINGE ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC. AT THE SAME TIME, THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IS TAKING PLACE ON A NATIONAL LEVEL AND WOULD BE DIFFICULT WITH DIFFERENCES IN CURRENCY AND BANKING. "WE DON'T WANT TO BE THE INSTIGATORS OF THE COMPLETE BREAK-UP OF THE SOVIET UNION," HE STATED.

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EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR,

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN GOVERNOR SUNUNU AND

7. YELTSIN SAID HE IS ASSERTING THAT A NEW STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IS ALSO NEEDED AT THE CENTER. IF THE UNION GOVERNMENT DOES NOT RESPOND TO THIS, HE WOULD LIKE THE SUPREME SOVIET TO DISCUSS IT. IT IS NOT THE RIGHT OF THE UNION GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT SOMEONE

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ELSE'S PROGRAM FOR STABILIZING THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY. HE IS NOW WAITING TO SEE HOW THINGS GO. HE WANTS THE PROGRAM SIGNED AND IMPLEMENTATION BEGUN OVER THE NEXT TEN DAYS.

8. GOVERNOR SUNUNU SAID THE U.S. WAS WATCHING THE EVOLUTION OF THE USSR, THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT A NEW STRUCTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLICS. HE SAID IT WAS ANALOGOUS TO WATCHING A FRIEND GIVE BIRTH. THE U.S. DOES NOT FAVOR ANY PARTICULAR STRUCTURE, BUT WANTS TO SEE THIS PROCESS SUCCEED. A STABLE TRANSITION OF SOVIET SOCIETY IS IMPORTANT FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD.

9. YELTSIN CALLED THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO A MARKET A DIFFICULT ONE. SUPPORT WAS NEEDED TO CREATE A MORE DEMOCRATIC LIFE. THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC WANTED TO GO SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER THAN THE USSR ON QUESTIONS SUCH AS PRIVATE PROPERTY, THE DEMOCRACY OF THE SYSTEM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WILL ADOPT A NEW CONSTITUTION BASED ON THESE NEW PRINCIPLES. A PLENARY SESSION OF THE RSFSR COMMISSION WORKING ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL BE HELD TOMORROW. "YOU CAN BE SURE OF THESE THINGS INSOFAR AS RUSSIA IS CONCERNED, BUT, AS YESTERDAY'S MEETING SHOWS, THE INTENT IS NOT TO WEAKEN THE UNION. WE WANT RUSSIA TO EXIST IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A STRONG UNION. THE MEETING YESTERDAY SHOWED THAT WE WILL ACT IN CONCERT," HE ASSERTED.

10. IN THE PAST, YELTSIN ACKNOWLEDGED, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME NEGATIVE ELEMENTS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN HIM AND GORBACHEV. THESE WOULD BE DISPENSED WITH. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD THINK ONLY ABOUT MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE, BUT WITHOUT INFRINGING ON RUSSIA'S SOVEREIGNTY. COMMENTING FURTHER ON OUTSIDE CONCERNS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS, YELTSIN SAID: "I REALIZE YOU MAY SEE POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION AMONG US, THE POSSIBILITY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THAT WE MAY PART WAYS. THE SITUATION IS NOW BECOMING CLEARER. IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE HELP TO THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC WITHOUT IT BEING TAKEN BADLY BY GORBACHEV. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERNS BECAUSE WE ALSO HAVE THEM. WE UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD, BUT WE MUST NOT BE FRIGHTENED OFF BY THEM. THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC IS RICH. IT HAS CREDIT, NATURAL RESOURCES, 150 MILLION PEOPLE, VAST TERRITORY. IT WILL REALIZE MY PROGRAM. THERE WILL BE A TWO YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY. IN THE THIRD YEAR, WE WILL BEGIN TO RAISE LIVING STANDARDS."

11. YELTSIN NOTED THAT HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A 22 DAY TRIP AROUND RUSSIA, FROM KARELIA TO KAMCHATKA. HE IS CONFIDENT BECAUSE EVERYWHERE HE HAD FOUND THAT THE PEOPLE SUPPORT HIS PROGRAM AND ARE WILLING TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT THEIR CONFIDENCE FOR THE THREE YEAR PERIOD. HOWEVER, THEY NO LONGER HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

12. SUNUNU ASKED WHETHER YELTSIN EXPECTED THIS REFORM TIMETABLE TO BE CONFIRMED IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. YELTSIN SAID YES, IT WILL BE CONFIRMED AND PUBLISHED. THE FIRST 100 DAYS ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT. IN THAT PERIOD, WE WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE STABILIZATION OF THE RUBLE AND OF THE CIRCULATION OF MONEY. IT IS A STRINGENT PROGRAM, REQUIRING THE ADOPTION OF FIFTEEN TOUGH LAWS. DURING THIS 100 DAYS, THE LAWS WILL HAVE TO BE ADOPTED WHILE MOVING TOWARD MARKET RELATIONSHIPS. AT THE END OF 500 DAYS, THE MOVE TO A STABLE MARKET ECONOMY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE.

13. YELTSIN SAID HE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, MEETING HIM FREQUENTLY IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS AND THE TWO KEEP EACH OTHER UP
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EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL. US. UR.

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN GOVERNOR SUNUNU AND
TO DATE. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER YELTSIN AGREED
WITH THE COUNSEL THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN GIVING
AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN INTERESTED IN LARGE ENERGY
PROJECTS THAT THEY SHOULD WAIT FOUR TO SIX WEEKS TO
SEE WHO IN THE RSFSR GOVERNMENT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR NEGOTIATING. YELTSIN AGREED WITH THE ADVICE. BUT
SAID THAT BUSINESSMEN SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR
PREPARATORY WORK. AS THE DECLARATION OF THE RSFSR
SUPREME SOVIET HAD INDICATED, THESE RIGHTS WOULD BE
RESERVED TO THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC. THE TIME HAD COME
TO AN END WHEN SOMEONE ELSE, BEHIND RUSSIA'S BACK,
COULD SIGN AGREEMENTS GIVING AWAY RESOURCES THAT
BELONG TO RUSSIA.

14. YELTSIN THEN REFERRED TO THE U.S./SOVIET
MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH
DECISIONS, NOTING THAT IT HAD TAKEN FROM RUSSIA
RIGHTS TO SOME IMPORTANT FISHING AREAS IN THE REGION
OF SAKHALIN AND KAMCHATKA. THE AMBASSADOR REMARKED
THAT HE BELIEVED THIS HAD BEEN A FAIR AGREEMENT AND
WOULD SEND YELTSIN A LETTER LAYING OUT THE REASONS IN
MORE DETAIL. YELTSIN NOTED THAT HE WAS NOT
QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT RUSSIA
IN THE FUTURE DID NOT INTEND TO ALLOW SUCH AGREEMENTS
TO BE SIGNED "BEHIND ITS BACK." THE 200 MILE SHELF
IS RUSSIA'S AND NO ONE ELSE WILL BE NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENTS TO GIVE IT AWAY.

15. GOVERNOR SUNUNU NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN
DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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STATES ABOUT JURISDICTION OVER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. HE NOTED MORE GENERALLY THAT MANY OF THE ISSUES OF CENTER/PERIPHERY RELATIONS NOW BEING DISCUSSED IN THE USSR HAD ALSO BEEN MAJOR ISSUES IN THE U.S. IN A SIMPLER TIME, SOME 200 YEARS AGO. YELTSIN REMARKED THAT THE USSR WAS, THEN, ONLY 200 YEARS BEHIND. BEFORE INTEGRATING, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FIRST TO LOOSEN TIES, TO SEPARATE OUT THE WEALTH, AND THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO COME BACK TOGETHER. HE CALLED THE CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING PROCESS IN THE REPUBLICS A RATIONAL ONE. PART OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE SOCIETY. THINGS WOULD FINALLY SETTLE DOWN.

16. SUNUNU COMMENTED THAT HE FOUND IT IMPORTANT IN WHAT YELTSIN HAD SAID THAT THE PARTIES WERE NOT RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS ISSUES WITH ONE ANOTHER AND REACH AGREEMENT. YELTSIN SUGGESTED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SERIES OF PROJECTS. PERHAPS THEY WOULD NOT BE ALL-ENCOMPASSING, BUT BRINGING A FEW TO FRUITION WOULD HELP BRING ABOUT THE REBIRTH OF RUSSIA. SUNUNU EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT A GOOD BIT WOULD OCCUR WHEN THE CONCERNS THE AMBASSADOR HAD RAISED WERE CLEARED UP, WHICH YELTSIN'S SCHEDULE SUGGESTED COULD OCCUR IN A MATTER OF WEEKS.

17. YELTSIN RESPONDED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON A PROGRAM OF ACTION WOULD BE SIGNED IN TWO WEEKS. THE PROGRAM

WOULD BE CONFIRMED BY THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET. ITS SESSION BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 3 WOULD BE DEDICATED TO THE PROGRAM. HE CONCLUDED BY THANKING SUNUNU FOR THE MEETING AND EXTENDING HIS BEST WISHES TO PRESIDENT BUSH.

18. GOVERNOR SUNUNU DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THIS CABLE BEFORE DEPARTING POST.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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