

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:  
2009-0275-S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an  
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential  
Library Staff.**

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Special Separate USSR Notes Files  
**Subseries:** Gorbachev Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 91128  
**Folder ID Number:** 91128-007

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**Folder Title:**  
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]

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| Stack: | Row: | Section: | Shelf: | Position: |
|--------|------|----------|--------|-----------|
| G      | 34   | 3        | 4      | 7         |

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                                                                       | Date     | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| 01. Letter      | President Gorbachev to President Bush<br>[Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)                                                           | 11/6/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 02. Cable       | To White House, Re: Message for Brent Scowcroft from<br>Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS<br>REDACTED] (2 pp.) | 11/13/90 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03a. Cable      | From White House , Re: Message from President to President<br>Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)                          | 11/12/90 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03b. Memo       | Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock<br>Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)                                                              | 11/90    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 03c. Letter     | President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)                                                                                       | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04a. Memo       | Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President (1<br>pp.)                        | 11/7/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04b. Memo       | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President (2<br>pp.)                                 | n.d.     | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04c. Letter     | President Gorbachev to President Bush<br>[Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)                                                           | 11/6/90  | (b)(1)      |                |

Page 1 of 3

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Special Separate USSR Notes Files  
**Subseries:** Gorbachev Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1081  
**OA/ID Number:** 91128-007  
**Date Closed:** 4/13/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type   | Subject/Title                                                                                         | Date     | Restriction | Classification |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| 05a. Draft Letter | President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)                                                         | 11/11/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 05b. Draft Letter | President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)                                                         | 11/11/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 06. Letter        | President Gorbachev to President Bush (5 pp.)                                                         | 11/6/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 07. Message       | Re: Gulf: Message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev (2 pp.)                                    | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 08a. Cable        | Moscow to White House, Re: Letter from President Bush to Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.) | 10/20/90 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 08b. Cable        | White House to Moscow<br>Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)               | 10/20/90 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 08c. Cable        | White House to Moscow<br>Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)               | 10/20/90 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 09a. Memo         | Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock<br>Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)                                           | 10/19/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 09b. Letter       | President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)                                                         | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 09c. Draft Letter | President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)                                                         | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 10a. Memo         | Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock<br>Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)                                           | 10/19/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

Page 2 of 3

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**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

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|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| 10b. Letter     | President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)                                                 | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 11. Memo        | Re: The Secretary's Telephone Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (2 pp.)  | 8/7/90   | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 12a. Memo       | J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Correspondence from President Gorbachev (1 pp.)    | 10/12/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 12b. Letter     | President Gorbachev to President Bush<br>[English] (2 pp.)                                    | 10/90    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 12c. Letter     | President Gorbachev to President Bush<br>[Russian] (2 pp.)                                    | 10/90    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 13. Letter      | E. A. Shevardnadze to James A. Baker, III<br>[Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)                 | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 14a. Letter     | President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)                                                 | 9/17/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 14b. Memo       | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Arms Control Talks in Moscow (2 pp.)                          | 9/15/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 14c. Memo       | Arnold Kanter/Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Arms Control Talks in Moscow (3 pp.) | 9/14/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

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Nov 6, 1990 - 4:00 pm

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality with which you related your impressions from your discussions with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly that it was precisely this kind of reaction - consistent with the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the state level - that I was counting on.

This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to fully understand one's partner that has developed between ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually, the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain and France.

It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika? Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps no other leader in the world, understand the special responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.

His Excellency

Mr. George BUSH

President of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting the official results - you no doubt know them.

Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation. But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break into the open field of free democratic development and take a worthy place in the international community, was very important.

All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal couple who played such an important rôle in the critical period of Spain's transition to democracy.

As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon - our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured prospect.

Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the other, which is the development of the bilateral relations. And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to consider each other as enemies.

A major place in the talks in both capitals was given to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to help.

In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time, we were able to touch upon all the main European and world problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the Persian Gulf crisis.

The mission of my special representative, E.M.Primakov, continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked you and other Security Council members to postpone a little bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.

Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad, as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly. Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region. I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by the UN Security Council".

At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow, we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor. I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki, that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the



US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".

Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions about E.M.Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time, but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results. In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward", albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible", "unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is "undesirable".)

In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the "let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem mantle.



There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among them. You understand that given our present situation at home, this is of particular importance. After the meetings with my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure should be intensified in this area as well.

In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe, put off the more general problem of the future of that region, including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.

I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian) with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression. But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within their field of vision and shall promptly address it after Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.

Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                                                     | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 02. Cable                | To White House, Re: Message for Brent Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.) | 11/13/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

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**File Location:** Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]

Document Partially Declassified  
(Copy of Document Follows)  
By MM on 5/27/2016

|                               |             |                             |                   |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 4/13/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91128-007         |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |                   |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |                   |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           | 2011-0847-MR(501) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      | Released in Part  |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> | 2/25/2014         |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 131339Z NOV 90

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0845-MR

2/25/2014 MM

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY SENSITIVE  
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY  
FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.

DEAR BRENT:

I DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENTIAL  
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ANATOL' IY CHERNYAEV, WHO PROMISED TO GET  
IT TO GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY.

I REVIEWED FOR CHERNYAEV THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE RESOLUTION. IN  
RESPONSE, CHERNYAEV DID NOT SAY WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO  
THE COURSE WE ARE PROPOSING, BUT NOTED THAT:

-- GORBACHEV WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY  
BAKER, AND WITH THE CONVERSATIONS THAT BAKER HAD WITH SHEVARDNADZE  
ON THE PERSIAN GULF;

-- GORBACHEV REALIZES HOW IMPORTANT OUR COOPERATION IS IN THIS AREA,  
AND AGREES THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER.

CHERNAYEV TOOK NOTE OF THE P.S., AND SAID GORBACHEV WILL BE HAPPY TO  
SEE IT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE SOONER WE HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE KIND  
OF HELP THAT IS NEEDED, THE BETTER WE CAN CONSIDER HOW TO ADDRESS IT.  
IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE TWO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS  
THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE ANY REQUEST COULD BE SERIOUSLY  
CONSIDERED: (1) THE PRACTICAL MEANS TO DELIVER FOOD TO WHERE IT IS  
NEEDED AND (2) A MECHANISM TO PREVENT DIVERSION TO THE BLACK MARKET.  
CHERNAYEV AGREED AND SAID THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO  
DO. HE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT IF THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT SATISFACTOR

~~SECRET~~



IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ILY

RESOLVED THE AID WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE AND WOULD, MOREOVER, DISCREDIT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. AND WOULD GET BACK TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DECL: OADR.

~~SECRET~~

#0963

~~SECRET~~

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**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 2/13/2013

|                               |             |                             |                   |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 4/13/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91128-007         |
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| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |                   |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           | 2011-0844-MR(506) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      | Released in Part  |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> | 11/25/2013        |

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Phg # 8851

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 122212Z NOV 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE


(b)(1)

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA (b)(1)

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02



PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.

JACK:

PLEASE DELIVER TO CHERNYAYEV THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED AT THE EARLIEST CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY.

WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0844-MR  
11/25/2013 MM

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

JIM BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME IN DEPTH ON HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. ONCE AGAIN I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY HOW MUCH OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS CHANGED FOR THE GOOD. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE EVEN IN THE VERY RECENT PAST TO ENVISION THE KIND OF DISCUSSIONS YOU AND YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE JUST HAD WITH AN AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE.

WE NOW CAN TRULY HAVE HONEST DIALOGUE WHERE EACH OF US LEARNS FROM THE OTHER -- WHERE EACH OF US GENUINELY SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND THE OTHER'S VIEWPOINT AND CONCERNS -- AND RESPOND TO THE OTHER'S SUGGESTIONS AND NEEDS. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE ARE DEVELOPING A REAL PARTNERSHIP, AND THAT PARTNERSHIP IS SERVING NOT ONLY OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERESTS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

NOWHERE HAS THAT PARTNERSHIP BEEN DEMONSTRATED MORE CLEARLY THAN IN THE GULF. THAT PARTNERSHIP HAS BOTH LED AND CEMENTED THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION CONFRONTING SADDAM HUSSEIN. I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW GRATIFYING IT WAS FOR ME TO RECEIVE YOUR RECENT LETTER AND HAVE YOU EMPHASIZE YOUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING ABSOLUTE UNITY BETWEEN US ON THE GULF. I KNOW YOU MADE THAT POINT WITH GREAT CONVICTION TO JIM, AND MADE IT CLEAR AS WELL THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP SHAPES YOUR APPROACH ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES.

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THAT. AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I SHARE YOUR VIEWS. IN THAT SPIRIT, I HAVE THOUGHT CAREFULLY ABOUT YOUR SUGGESTION FOR TWO UNSC RESOLUTIONS -- THE FIRST TO ISSUE A WARNING THAT IF SADDAM FAILS TO WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN TIME THERE WOULD BE A SECOND RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF ALL



NECESSARY MEANS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WANT TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON, BUT FEEL THE NEED TO HIGHLIGHT THAT WE HAVE EXHAUSTED ALL OPTIONS BEFORE LAYING DOWN WHAT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS AN ULTIMATUM.

I AGREE THAT WE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT WE HAVE EXPLORED FULLY OUR NON-MILITARY OPTIONS AND THAT WE HAVE GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR CHANCE TO WORK. I THINK THE TYPE OF RESOLUTION WE ARE CONSIDERING -- ONE WHICH WOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH BUT ONLY BECOME OPERATIVE AT SOME POINT AROUND THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR -- DOES JUST THAT. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN SANCTIONS FIVE TO SIX MONTHS TO WORK. WE WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO POINT TO TEN PREVIOUS UNSC RESOLUTIONS -- ALL REJECTED. WE ONLY WEAKEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A MECHANISM FOR PREEMPTING, MANAGING AND SETTLING CONFLICTS IF RESOLUTIONS SUCH AS THESE CAN BE REJECTED. WE RISK MUCH WITH ANOTHER RESOLUTION THAT, IN EFFECT, ASSUMES A FAILURE WITHOUT GUARANTEEING A SPECIFIC CONCRETE ACTION.

IN MY OPINION WE SHOULD FOCUS ON A RESOLUTION THAT OFFERS SOME PROSPECT OF MOVING SADDAM. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE OUR ENDS PEACEFULLY IS, IRONICALLY, TO CONVINCE SADDAM THAT MILITARY ACTION IS IMMINENT. A RESOLUTION OF THE SORT WE ARE SUGGESTING, WITH A SPECIFIC TIMEFRAME FOR WHEN IT BECOMES OPERATIVE, WOULD HAVE THIS EFFECT. IT WOULD ALSO SIGNAL SADDAM THAT WE ARE UNIFIED, DETERMINED TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NEEDED TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION, AND THAT WE WILL NOT BE DIVIDED. IN EFFECT, IT DOES THE SAME THING AS YOUR PROPOSED TWO RESOLUTIONS, BUT COMBINING THEM INTO A SINGLE RESOLUTION MAKES THE EFFECT MUCH MORE COMPELLING.

I FEAR THAT A PROPOSAL FOR TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE A RETREAT FROM OUR INITIAL RESOLUTION (UNSC 660) CALLING FOR (BEGIN UNDERLINE) IMMEDIATE (END UNDERLINE) WITHDRAWAL. WE CAN'T STEP BACK FROM THAT. IN ADDITION, WHILE WE CAN TALK OF TWO RESOLUTIONS, WE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF ONLY GETTING THE FIRST AND NOT THE SECOND, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE BY THE TIME WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GO FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION WE WILL NO LONGER BE IN THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC. WE COULD BE TIED IN PROCEDURAL KNOTS BY OUR SUCCESSORS IN THE CHAIR -- YEMEN, ZAIRE, AND ZIMBABWE.

ASIDE FROM THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEM, WE WOULD ALSO RUN THE RISK THAT SADDAM MIGHT OFFER A REAL, BUT UNACCEPTABLE, PARTIAL SOLUTION OR ALTERNATIVELY PULL BACK PARTIALLY AS A WAY OF UNDERCUTTING THE CONSENSUS FOR USING FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS, SADDAM MIGHT WELL BE ABLE TO MANIPULATE THE ENVIRONMENT TO ENSURE WE COULDN'T GET A SECOND RESOLUTION. AND THE IMAGERY OF A LONG DRAWN OUT PUBLIC EFFORT TRYING TO GET A SECOND RESOLUTION WILL MISLEAD SADDAM INTO THINKING THE COALITION AGAINST HIM COULD BREAK.

I HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO WRITE YOU IN THIS DETAIL BECAUSE YOUR IDEA WAS PRESENTED IN A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT AND DESERVED A #0014

ZEM

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

(b)(1)

SERIOUS, CONSIDERED RESPONSE. I BELIEVE IT IS CRUCIAL TO COMBINE BOTH THOUGHTS INTO A SINGLE RESOLUTION TO BE MOVED WHILE WE ARE CHAIRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

MIKHAIL, I THINK THERE IS A CHANCE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE PEACEFULLY, IF WE STAY TOGETHER AND IF WE LEAD THE WAY ONCE AGAIN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP MAKES THAT POSSIBLE, AND OFFERS US GREAT HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.

I KNOW YOU KNOW HOW VERY IMPORTANT I THINK THIS MATTER IS AND HOW VERY MUCH I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN WITH US, WITH FRANCE AND WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN SUPPORTING THIS APPROACH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NOVEMBER. AS JIM BAKER TOLD YOU IN MOSCOW AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER, WE ARE ALSO HOPEFUL THE CHINESE WILL GO ALONG -- A POSSIBILITY THAT WILL BE EVEN MORE LIKELY, AS OUR EXPERIENCE ON UNSC RESOLUTION 665 SUGGESTS, IF YOU JOIN WITH US.

LET'S STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU SOON AND SEEING YOU IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

PS: JIM BAKER HAS TOLD ME THAT YOU MAY HAVE SOME EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS THIS WINTER. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WISH TO BE AS HELPFUL AS I CAN BE IN THIS REGARD.

HIS EXCELLENCY  
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
MOSCOW

END TEXT

DECL: OADR  
#0015

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0014 <TOR> 901112171511 MSG000279738911  
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0015 <TOR> 901112171636 MSG000279738996

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

November \_\_, 1990

TO: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK  
AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE WHITE HOUSE

DELIVER IN A SEALED ENVELOPE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT; NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.

Jack:

Please deliver to Chernyayev the following message from President Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered at the earliest convenient opportunity.

Warm regards, Brent.

BEGIN TEXT:

(copy attached)

END TEXT.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0844-MR  
ES 5/23/13



Dear Mr. President:

Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had with an American Secretary of State.

We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us learns from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to understand the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to the other's suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt that we are developing a real partnership, and that partnership is serving not only our respective interests, but the interests of the entire world.

Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly than in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't tell you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent letter and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining absolute unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that point with great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well that the fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your approach on this and other issues.

I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I share your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully about your suggestion for two UNSC resolutions -- the first to issue a warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain time there would be a second resolution to authorize the use of all necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.

I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel the need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.

I agree that we must demonstrate that we have explored fully our non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are considering -- one which would be passed this month but only become operative at some point around the beginning of the year -- does just that. In this circumstance, we would have given sanctions five to six months to work. We would also be able to point to ten previous UNSC resolutions -- all rejected. We only weaken the Security Council as a mechanism for preempting, managing and settling conflicts if resolutions such as these can be rejected. We risk much with another resolution that, in effect, assumes a failure without guaranteeing a specific concrete action.

In my opinion we should focus on a resolution that offers some prospect of moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only way to achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince Saddam that military action is imminent. A resolution of the sort we are suggesting, with a specific timeframe for when it becomes operative, would have this effect. It would also signal Saddam that we are unified, determined to take whatever steps are needed to reverse his aggression, and that we will not be divided. In effect, it does the same thing as your proposed two resolutions, but combining them into a single resolution makes the effect much more compelling.

I fear that a proposal for two Security Council resolutions would constitute a retreat from our initial resolution (UNSC 660) calling for immediate withdrawal. We can't step back from that. In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would run the risk of only getting the first and not the second, particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our successors in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.

Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the risk that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words,



Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to ensure we couldn't get a second resolution. And the imagery of a long drawn out public effort trying to get a second resolution will mislead Saddam into thinking the coalition against him could break.

I have taken the time to write you in this detail because your idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and deserved a serious, considered response. I believe it is crucial to combine both thoughts into a single resolution to be moved while we are chairing the Security Council.

Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective peacefully, if we stay together and if we lead the way once again in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that possible, and offers us great hope for the future.

I know you know how very important I think this matter is and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be even more likely, as our experience on UNSC Resolution 665 suggests, if you join with us.

Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing from you soon and seeing you in Paris.

Sincerely,

George Bush

PS: Jim Baker has told me that you may have some emergency food needs this winter. I want you to know that I wish to be as helpful as I can be in this regard.

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev

President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8851

November 7, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*  
FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*  
SUBJECT: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President

Attached, per your request, is a summary of Gorbachev's November 6, 1990, letter to the President. We have also highlighted the most important passages on a copy of the letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Summary of Gorbachev letter  
Tab A Gorbachev letter to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

8011-0845 MR  
ES 5/23/13



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

8851

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0847-MR

SCS 5/31/12

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President

Gorbachev's November 6 letter responds to your October 20 letter on the Primakov trip to the U.S. and the situation in the Gulf.

Gorbachev begins by describing his recent visits to Spain and France. He was impressed in Spain by that country's transition from dictatorship to democracy, implying that it held lessons for the USSR. In France, he had a productive meeting with Mitterrand, highlighted by signing of a treaty on concord and cooperation. Gorbachev says he was particularly satisfied by his talks on economic relations with both countries.

Gorbachev's thinking on the Gulf crisis dominates the remainder of the letter. He reviews the basis for Primakov's recent trip by stating the Soviets "wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Baghdad." He specifies that he remains committed to the agreements reached at Helsinki, and that the USSR will continue to hold firmly to the position that Iraq's aggression must be reversed, and that we should abide by the UNSC decisions. Gorbachev claims that his statement on the "unacceptability" of military force was mistranslated. The Russian word, he says, is "undesirable."

Reviewing the Primakov trip, Gorbachev states that Saddam appears to be more aware of the gravity of his situation, although it is too early to tell if he will act accordingly. He says that Primakov told Saddam that if he didn't leave Kuwait, a military strike might be inevitable. Gorbachev suggests the utility of involving the Arab countries more closely to make it easier for Saddam to agree to a potential solution.

Gorbachev closes with two suggestions. The first is that we maintain pressure on Iraq to free the hostages. The second is for the U.S. and USSR to let the Arab world know that while we could not directly link the Gulf crisis to the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, we could address those issues after the conflict has been resolved.

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In sum, it appears that the purpose of this letter is to reassure you of Gorbachev's commitment to full compliance with the UN resolutions. He clearly wishes to dispel your discomfort with his recent statements concerning the "unacceptability" of the military option and the need for an Arab solution.

Attachment

Tab A      Gorbachev letter

~~SECRET~~

THU 6, 1990 - 4:00 PM

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality with which you related your impressions from your discussions with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly that it was precisely this kind of reaction - consistent with the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the state level - that I was counting on.

This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to fully understand one's partner that has developed between ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually, the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain and France.

It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika? Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps no other leader in the world, understand the special responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.

His Excellency

Mr. George BUSH

President of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.



First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting the official results - you no doubt know them.

Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation. But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break into the open field of free democratic development and take a worthy place in the international community, was very important.

All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal couple who played such an important role in the critical period of Spain's transition to democracy.

As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon - our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured prospect.

Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the other, which is the development of the bilateral relations. And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to consider each other as enemies.

A major place in the talks in both capitals was given to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to help.

In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time, we were able to touch upon all the main European and world problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the Persian Gulf crisis.

The mission of my special representative, E.M.Primakov, continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked you and other Security Council members to postpone a little bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.

Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad, as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly. Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region. I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by the UN Security Council".

At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow, we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor. I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki, that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the



US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".

Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions about E.M.Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time, but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results. In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward", albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible", "unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is "undesirable".)

In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the "let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem mantle.



There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among them. You understand that given our present situation at home, this is of particular importance. After the meetings with my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure should be intensified in this area as well.

In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe, put off the more general problem of the future of that region, including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.

I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian) with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression. But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within their field of vision and shall promptly address it after Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.

Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had with an American Secretary of State.

We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us learns from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to understand the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to the other's suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt that we are developing a real partnership, and that partnership is serving not only our respective interests, but the interests of the entire world.

Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly than in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't tell you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent letter and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining absolute unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that point with great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well that the fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your approach on this and other issues.

I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I share your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully about your suggestion for two UNSC resolutions -- the first to issue a warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain time there would be a second resolution to authorize the use of all necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.

I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel the need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.

I agree that we must demonstrate that we have <sup>explored fully</sup> ~~exhausted~~ our non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are considering -- one which would be passed this month but only <sup>at some point around</sup> become operative <sup>(after)</sup> the beginning of the year -- does just that. In this circumstance, we would have given sanctions five to six months to work. We would also be able to point to ten previous UNSC resolutions -- all rejected. We only weaken the ~~Security Council~~ <sup>UNSC</sup> as a mechanism for preempting, managing and settling conflicts if resolutions such as these can be rejected. We <sup>risk much with</sup> ~~don't need~~ another resolution that, in effect, assumes a failure without guaranteeing a specific concrete action.



*In my opinion we should focus on*

[Rather, we need] a resolution that offers some prospect of moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only way to achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince Saddam that military action is imminent. A resolution of the sort we are suggesting, with a <sup>specific</sup> timeframe for when it becomes operative, would have this effect. It would also signal Saddam that we are unified, determined to take whatever steps are needed to reverse his aggression, and that we will not be divided. *In effect, it*

*does the same thing as your proposed two resolutions, but combining them into a single resolution makes the effect much more compelling.*

I know that's important to you as well as me. I know also that we both share the conviction that we must not suggest any weakening of our position to Saddam. To the contrary, we want to signal unmistakably that our position is becoming stronger and tougher.

*Security Council*  
I fear that a proposal for two ~~UNSC~~ resolutions ~~will send~~ the opposite message. ~~It will~~ <sup>would</sup> constitute a retreat from our initial resolution (UNSC 660) calling for immediate withdrawal. We can't step back from that.

(In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would run the risk of only getting the first and not the second, particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our successors in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.

And the imagery of a long drawn out public effort trying to get a second resolution will mislead Saddam into thinking the coalition against him could break.

Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the risk that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words, Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to ensure we couldn't get a second resolution. ↑

Further, if we fail to produce a second resolution after issuing the warning in the first resolution, we will have ended any possibility of using the UNSC to resolve the crisis. And if the UNSC is seen as having failed in this crisis -- the first test of the post Cold War era -- it will have very little future. That will frustrate our mutual hopes and aspirations for a very different international order.

Finally, let me make one last point. I believe the concept we have for the resolution -- namely, that it is adopted now but isn't operative until after the beginning of the year -- really should get at your concerns. It permits us to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein has been given every opportunity to withdraw peacefully. If, after this additional period of time, he still

my proposal  
on P. 3  
is better.  
agreed

won't do so, he is telling the world that there is no peaceful way to implement the prior Security Council resolutions fully. And we both agree that these resolutions must be implemented fully.

I have taken the time to write you in this detail because your idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and deserved a serious, considered response. *I believe it is crucial to combine both thoughts into a single resolution alternative to moving for the kind of resolution Jim Baker described to you while we're in the chair of the Security Council!*  
~~I don't see any good alternative to moving for the kind of resolution Jim Baker described to you while we're in the chair of the Security Council.~~

Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective peacefully, ~~but only~~ <sup>if we</sup> if we stay together and lead the way once again in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that possible, and offers us great hope for the future.

I know you know how very important I think this matter is and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be even more likely, as our experience on UNSC resolution 665 suggests, if you join with us.

Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing from you soon and seeing you in Paris.



Dear Mikhail:

10:30 Am , 11-11-90

Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had with an American Secretary of State.

We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us learns from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to understand the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to the other's suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt that we are developing a real partnership, and that partnership is serving not only our respective interests, but the interests of the entire world.

Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly than in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't tell you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent letter and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining absolute unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that point with great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well that the fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your approach on this and other issues.

I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I share your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully about your suggestion for two UNSC resolutions -- the first to issue a warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain time there would be a second resolution to authorize the use of all necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.

I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel the need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.

I agree that we must demonstrate that we have exhausted our non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are considering -- one which would be passed this month but only become operative <sup>around</sup> ~~after~~ the beginning of the year -- does just that. In this circumstance, we would have given sanctions five to six months to work. We would also be able to point to ten previous UNSC resolutions -- all rejected. We only weaken the UNSC as a mechanism for preempting, managing and settling conflicts if resolutions such as these can be rejected. We <sup>risk</sup> ~~much with~~ <sup>don't need</sup> another resolution that, in effect, assumes a failure without guaranteeing a specific concrete action.

*In my opinion we should focus on*

[Rather, we need] a resolution that offers some prospect of moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only way to achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince Saddam that military action is imminent. A resolution of the sort we are suggesting, with a timeframe for when it becomes operative, would have this effect. It would also signal Saddam that we are unified, determined to take whatever steps are needed to reverse his aggression, and that we will not be divided. *In effect, it*

*does the same thing as your proposed two resolutions, but combining them into a single resolution makes the effect much more compelling*  
I know that's important to you as well as me. I know also that we both share the conviction that we must not suggest any weakening of our position to Saddam. To the contrary, we want to signal unmistakably that our position is becoming stronger and tougher.

I fear that a proposal for two UNSC resolutions will send the opposite message. It will constitute a retreat from our initial resolution (UNSC 660) calling for immediate withdrawal. We can't step back from that.

In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would run the risk of only getting the first and not the second, particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our successors in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.



And the imagery of a long drawn out public effort trying to get a second resolution will mislead Saddam into thinking the coalition against him could break.

Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the risk that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words, Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to ensure we couldn't get a second resolution.

Further, if we fail to produce a second resolution after issuing the warning in the first resolution, we will have ended any possibility of using the UNSC to resolve the crisis. And if the UNSC is seen as having failed in this crisis -- the first test of the post Cold War era -- it will have very little future. That will frustrate our mutual hopes and aspirations for a very different international order.

*my proposal  
on p. 3 makes  
this point  
better.* Finally, let me make one last point. I believe the concept we have for the resolution -- namely, that it is adopted now but isn't operative until after the beginning of the year -- really should get at your concerns. It permits us to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein has been given every opportunity to withdraw peacefully. If, after this additional period of time, he still

won't do so, he is telling the world that there is no peaceful way to implement the prior Security Council resolutions fully. And we both agree that these resolutions must be implemented fully.

I have taken the time to write you in this detail because your idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and deserved a serious, considered response. *I believe it is criminal to combine both thoughts into a single resolution alternative to moving for the kind of resolution Jim Baker described to you while we're in the chair of the Security Council!*

Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective peacefully, ~~but only~~ if we stay together and lead the way once again in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that possible, and offers us great hope for the future.

I know you know how very important I think this matter is and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be even more likely, as our experience on UNSC resolution 665 suggests, if you join with us.

Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing from you soon and seeing you in Paris.

11/11/90 ~

BS gave Larry Eagleburger  
a copy (directly to him)

11/6 ~

Flouner -

Attached is "original"  
Condi Rice has copy.

General Scowcroft has  
copy. No other copies.

Wia

Document Originally  
Attached to  
Following Page



OCT 6, 1990 - 4:00 PM

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality with which you related your impressions from your discussions with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly that it was precisely this kind of reaction - consistent with the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the state level - that I was counting on.

This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to fully understand one's partner that has developed between ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually, the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain and France.

It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika? Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps no other leader in the world, understand the special responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.

His Excellency

Mr. George BUSH

President of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting the official results - you no doubt know them.

Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation. But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break into the open field of free democratic development and take a worthy place in the international community, was very important.

All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal couple who played such an important role in the critical period of Spain's transition to democracy.

As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon - our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured prospect.

Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the other, which is the development of the bilateral relations. And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to consider each other as enemies.

A major place in the talks in both capitals was given to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to help.

In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time, we were able to touch upon all the main European and world problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the Persian Gulf crisis.

The mission of my special representative, E.M.Primakov, continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked you and other Security Council members to postpone a little bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.

Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad, as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly. Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region. I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by the UN Security Council".

At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow, we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor. I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki, that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the



US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".

Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions about E.M.Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time, but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results. In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward", albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible", "unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is "undesirable".)

In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the "let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem mantle.

There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among them. You understand that given our present situation at home, this is of particular importance. After the meetings with my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure should be intensified in this area as well.

In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe, put off the more general problem of the future of that region, including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.

I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian) with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression. But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within their field of vision and shall promptly address it after Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.

Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

"Eyes Only"

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

**IMMEDIATE**

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 58

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 3

DTG 272353Z

RELEASER JD

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GENERAL SCOWCROFT/ Honolulu

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

5. \_\_\_\_\_

6. \_\_\_\_\_

7. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Deliver Immediately Upon Receipt!  
- Honolulu Please Advise Situation Room Upon the General receipt.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 4/13/09



British Embassy  
Washington DC.

27 October 90

The Embassy has been asked by Mr Powell (10 Downing Street) to give to General Scowcroft a copy of the attached message from the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev.

Edmund Hosker  
Embassy DM Officer

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                          | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 07. Message              | Re: Gulf: Message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Special Separate USSR Notes Files  
**Subseries:** Gorbachev Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 4/13/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91128-007 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                             | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 08a. Cable               | Moscow to White House, Re: Letter from President Bush to Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.) | 10/20/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Special Separate USSR Notes Files  
**Subseries:** Gorbachev Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 2/13/2015

|                               |             |                             |                   |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 4/13/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91128-007         |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |                   |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |                   |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           | 2011-0844-MR(502) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      | Released in Part  |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> | 11/25/2013        |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN  
SIT. FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM



Sent to Camp  
Dowd  
20 Oct/1030  
per BS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 201220Z OCT 90

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

0000

PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: CHARGE HULINGS, EMBASSY MOSCOW  
TEXT:

I DELIVERED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO GORBACHEV TO  
CHERNIAEV AT 12:30 P.M. (LOCAL) OCTOBER 20. CHERNIAEV SAID  
GORBACHEV WAS IN THE BUILDING AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE HIM THE  
LETTER IMMEDIATELY. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE QUICK  
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH IN REACTION TO THE PRIMAKOV  
VISIT, SAYING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS KIND OF FREQUENT, PERSONAL  
COMMUNICATION WAS ONE OF THE BEST ACHIEVEMENTS IN OUR IMPROVED  
RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO SAID SADDAM SHOULD NOT GET ANYTHING OUT  
OF HIS INVASION OF KUWAIT.

END TEXT.

DECL OADR.

#0387

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0844-MR

11/25/2013 MM

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                               | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 08b. Cable               | White House to Moscow<br>Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.) | 10/20/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Special Separate USSR Notes Files  
**Subseries:** Gorbachev Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 4/13/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91128-007 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                               | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 08c. Cable               | White House to Moscow<br>Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.) | 10/20/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Special Separate USSR Notes Files  
**Subseries:** Gorbachev Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [2]

|                                     |                                |
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| <b>Date Closed:</b> 4/13/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91128-007 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
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| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

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VIA BACK CHANNEL

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT   
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR  
MOSCOW

DELIVER FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S EYES ONLY

Dear Jack:

Please deliver to Cherniaev the following message from President Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered before Primakov returns to Moscow, Saturday evening, October 20.

BEGIN TEXT (Copy attached)

END TEXT

Warm regards,

Brent

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0844 MR  
ES 0123/13

Dear Mr. President:

I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just how much the relationship between our two countries has developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful. I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki. Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would inevitably present as a "reward."

In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era, we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from

aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the 1930's.

Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an approach of this kind would probably convince him that the coalition against him is beginning to unravel.

I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke -- result from the real pressure of the whole world being against him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new international order where aggression has no place.

Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent men, women and children. As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am now more convinced than ever that we must succeed in this matter because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in Kuwait and because <sup>of</sup> the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the Arab League.

I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common front or the messages we send, Mikhail.

Sincerely,

George Bush

(more) ✓



His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev  
President of the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics  
Moscow

Dear Mr. President:

I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just how much the relationship between our two countries has developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful. I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki. Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would inevitably present as a "reward."

In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era, we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from

aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the 1930's.

Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an approach of this kind would probably convince him that the coalition against him is beginning to unravel.

I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke -- result from the real pressure of the whole world being against him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new international order where aggression has no place.

Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent men, women and children. ↗

I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common front or the messages we send, Mikhail.

Sincerely,

front or the messages we send, Mikhail.

Sincerely,

As I explained to Mr Primakov, <sup>because</sup>  
I am now more concerned <sup>about</sup> ~~even~~ <sup>about</sup>  
SIT's <sup>brutal</sup> treatment of <sup>on</sup> ~~the~~ Embassy people in  
Kuwait and <sup>because</sup> ~~about~~ the systematic dismantling  
of Kuwait, a member of the UN & the Arab League



*that we must  
succeed in this  
matter*

As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am now more convinced than ever X  
because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in  
Kuwait and because the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of  
Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the  
Arab League

VIA BACK CHANNEL

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR  
MOSCOW

DELIVER FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S EYES ONLY

Dear Jack:

Please deliver to Cherniaev the following message from President Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered before Primakov returns to Moscow, Saturday evening, October 20.

BEGIN TEXT (Copy attached)

END TEXT

Warm regards,

Brent

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0814-MR  
ES 5/23/13

Dear Mr. President:

I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just how much the relationship between our two countries has developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful. I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki. Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would inevitably present as a "reward."

In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era, we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from



aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the 1930's.

Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an approach of this kind would probably convince him that the coalition against him is beginning to unravel.

I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke -- result from the real pressure of the whole world being against him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new international order where aggression has no place.

Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent men, women and children. As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am now more convinced than ever that we must succeed in this matter because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in Kuwait and because <sup>of</sup> the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the Arab League.

I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common front or the messages we send, Mikhail.

Sincerely,

George Bush

(M...)

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev  
President of the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics  
Moscow

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 18

Florence:

I spoke with Susan Porter Rose today about the attached and told her NSC approved.

She had, as you suspected, already sent the cable to Moscow.

She said she had also run into the President and General Scowcroft and briefed them.

Case closed. Sculpture will probably be dedicated by the First Ladies at the next Summit in the USSR.

B. NB



IMMEDIATE

FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY,      FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. JACK MATLOCK  
FROM: SUSAN PORTER ROSE, Chief of Staff to Mrs. Bush  
SUBJECT: "Make Way for Ducklings" Statue

During the spring Bush-Gorbachev Summit, on Friday, June 1, 1990, Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev made a visit to Boston after Wellesley College. They made a stop in the Boston Public Garden and visited the "Make Way for Ducklings Statue" with a group of elementary school children from the Mather School in the Boston area (which happens to be the oldest elementary school in the United States). The Make Way for Ducklings Statue was designed by Nancy Schon and is based on the famous American children's book by Robert McCloskey, Make Way for Ducklings. The statue truly is lovely, and although universal in its appeal, it is first and foremost designed to be loved and climbed upon by children.

Following the visit of Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev to the duckling statue, we received a wonderful letter from Nancy Schon, the sculptress, offering to replicate the same statue at a park in Moscow. She proposed this as a gift to the Soviet people and the Soviet children from the United States. Mrs. Bush very much liked the idea and raised the question with Mrs. Gorbachev at their Sunday, September 9, 1990 meeting in Helsinki. Mrs. Gorbachev said she would look for a park. Mrs. Bush also apprised Mrs. Matlock of this.

I have had several phone conversations with Nancy Schon, the sculptress, and she has said that the placement of the statue

will be very important. It will need to be in a location easily accessible to children; preferably, there would be a pond toward which the ducklings could be headed; and if possible, it should be located near some trees. Ideally the statue should be created, prepared, and installed before a meeting/summit in Moscow (whenever such a meeting might take place) with the hope that on such a trip Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush, accompanied by Soviet school children, could visit and perhaps dedicate the completed statue.

We also believe it may be possible to have the children's story on which the statue is based, Make Way for Ducklings, translated into Russian for Mrs. Bush to bring copies with her to Moscow. In my conversations with Nancy Schon, she has indicated that she has been in touch with the author, Robert McCloskey, and that he is very enthusiastic about this possibility.

Mrs. Gorbachev is looking for a park where the statue would fit and be appropriate. In the event there should be a U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow in the next few months, we need to move along rapidly as it will take time to lay the groundwork and put the statue in place once a site has been determined. I have been working closely with the Soviet Embassy here in Washington.

Would you please telephone me upon receipt of this cable. The phone number is: (202) 456-2957 or (202) 456-1414. I can be reached at home through the 456-1414 number.

Thank you so much.

bcc: ✓General Scowcroft

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

8/7/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

The attached memos are FYI  
for you and the President.

JABIII

APNSA Has Seen



Date: August 7, 1990

Time: 1329 EDT

~~SECRET~~

From: A. Mann, S/S-O

SK  
8/7

To: S; S/S

Subject: The Secretary's Telephone Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

The Secretary wanted to make sure Shevardnadze had received the message Ambassador Matlock had delivered earlier in the day. He stressed that the actions described in the message were taken purely for Saudi Arabia's defensive needs. The Secretary said he was leaving on Wednesday (8/8) for Ankara at the President's request to consult with the Government of Turkey. On Friday, the Secretary will be in Brussels for a NATO meeting. He said he would welcome the opportunity to meet with the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels to brief him. The Secretary also raised the possibility of a multinational naval force to prevent the export of Iraq and Kuwait oil if the UN resolution on sanctions is not effective. He asked if the Soviets would have an interest in participating in such an effort.

Shevardnadze asked if a decision on the matters raised in the message had already been taken. The Secretary said the President had reached the decision yesterday evening (8/6). Shevardnadze then wondered what he was being consulted about. He reminded the Secretary of their airport conversation in which he had asked the Secretary not to rely on military force. He stressed that the Soviet approach had not changed. He said that after the second UN resolution on sanctions Iraq should have been given the opportunity to tell the world its attitude on the document.

Shevardnadze said it is very difficult to say what the consequences of the American action will be. The Soviet Union would consider this action exceptional, extraordinary and temporary and any military forces should leave as quickly as possible. He added that the Soviets are prepared to discuss any future plans and ideas, and suggested the military staff committee of the UN Security Council as a possible forum. He also noted that the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels would be prepared to meet with the Secretary in Brussels.

The Secretary replied that only one thing had been decided and there are still many other multilateral efforts to contain Saddam Hussein's aggression which have not been decided. He said no offensive actions were planned - it was strictly to deter; the decision was taken at the request of the Saudis; the U.S. considered this an extraordinary matter; and the assistance would remain only as long as the Saudis wanted it. In keeping with their airport conversation, the Secretary assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. does not intend to strike at Iraq, but the U.S. reserves the right to protect its citizens, and to defend Saudi Arabia and the free flow of oil.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2011-0843 MR  
ES 6/6/13



~~SECRET~~

Date: August 7, 1990

Time: 1453 EDT

From: S.D. Mull, S/S-0 <sup>AN</sup>

To: S; S/S <sup>8/8/7</sup>

Subject: The Secretary's Follow-up Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

The Secretary said the President asked him to call Shevardnadze to underscore that the action the US is about to take in Saudi Arabia is temporary, extraordinary, and in response to a Saudi request. It is also only defensive -- the US has no intention to take any offensive action against Iraq.

He said the President also wants to convey to President Gorbachev that the US would be pleased if the Soviet Union would participate with the US as part of a multinational force in Saudi Arabia. He said the US is willing to explore that with the Soviet Union bilaterally or multilaterally through the UN. The Secretary said the Saudis would have to agree to such an arrangement, but that he expects they would have no problem.

Time is of the essence, said the Secretary. As long as the current situation exists, there is no impediment to further Iraqi aggression moving all the way down the Arabian peninsula.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for this information and said he would discuss it with Gorbachev and get back to him.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

October 15, 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union has been a courageous force for peaceful change in the world. I want to offer my congratulations on behalf of the American people for his selection to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. He has brought historically significant change, both political and economic, to the Soviet Union and to Eastern Europe. East-West relations hold greater promise for peace and world stability today than at any time in the last 45 years. The United States continues to work with the Soviet Union to promote regional and international peace. Barbara and I send our warmest regards to President and Mrs. Gorbachev in receiving this international honor.

# # #

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

8177

ACTION OFFICER:

Rice / Haass

DUE:

10/17/90

☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates

☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi

☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

☐ Prepare Memo \_\_\_\_\_

to \_\_\_\_\_

**CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\***

PHONE\* to action officer at ext. \_\_\_\_\_

FYI

☐ ☐ Basora

☐ ☐ Beers

☐ ☐ Blackwill

☐ ☐ Charles

☐ ☐ Coulson

☐ ☐ Davis

☐ ☐ Deal

☐ ☐ Dorminey

☐ ☐ Dyke

☐ ☐ Gordon

☐ ☐ Grimes

☒ ☐ Haass

☐ ☐ Hayden

☐ ☐ Hutchings

☐ ☐ Jackson

☐ ☐ Kanter

☐ ☐ Kitchen

☐ ☐ LaMagna

FYI

☐ ☐ Lampley

☐ ☐ Levin

☐ ☐ Mahley

☐ ☐ Mandel

☐ ☐ Melby

☐ ☐ Menan

☐ ☐ Merchant

☐ ☐ Miller

☐ ☐ Needels

☐ ☐ Paal

☐ ☐ Pacelli

☐ ☐ Passage

☐ ☐ Pilling

☐ ☐ Popadiuk

☐ ☐ Pryce

☐ ☐ Rademaker

☐ ☐ Rice

☐ ☐ Rodman

FYI

☐ ☐ Rostow

☐ ☐ Salvetti

☐ ☐ Tilley

☐ ☐ Tobey

☐ ☐ Van Eron

☐ ☐ Watson

☐ ☐ Welch

☐ ☐ Whitley

☐ ☐ Wilson

☐ ☐ Working

☐ ☐ Zelikow

☐ ☒ Gompert

☐ ☒ Salvetti, L (for the summary)

INFORMATION ☐           

☒ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Sittmann > fill

☒ Gates (advance)

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

☐ Secretariat

COMMENTS

Logged By \_\_\_\_\_

Return to Secretariat



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


OCT 12 1990

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Correspondence from President Gorbachev

The attached letter from President Gorbachev to President Bush was delivered to Secretary Baker by Ambassador Bessmertnykh on October 12.

  
J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED  
1998-0099-F/3  
07/28/2003 MM



Dear Mr. President,

A few days ago, Yevgeniy Primakov, member of the Presidential Council, returned from Baghdad, where he had been as my personal envoy. We discussed such a possibility in Helsinki. You supported the idea, saying that you do not have direct access to Hussein. Ye.M.Primakov was the right man to go also because he has personally known Saddam Hussein for a long time.

The talks were difficult but candid. Primakov tried to show the Iraqi leader an extremely objective picture of the consequences for his own country and for the entire region, should things come to war.

Naturally, he set forth the Soviet position strictly in accordance with the obligations which we had assumed by endorsing the UN Security Council Resolutions, ruling out any doubts whatsoever regarding that in the mind of his interlocutor.

As had been expected, S.Hussein began by taking a hard line, trying to justify the occupation and annexation of Kuwait by considerations of Iraq's national security. Nevertheless, along with militant rhetoric his remarks also contained references to a political settlement of the Gulf crisis involving the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. And, our envoy feels, the most important thing for S.Hussein now is to save face.

Eduard Shevardnadze has sent Secretary Baker a detailed account of Ye.M.Primakov's talks with the Iraqis. Let me just once again reaffirm my approach, which you and I discussed in Helsinki. We should not retreat from the positions agreed upon at the United Nations, we should toughen sanctions where appropriate, strictly monitor their implementation, continue by political and diplomatic means the course of isolating S.Hussein, particularly in the Arab world, and activate the Arab factor. At the same time we should not miss any opportunity or ignore any possible signal from Baghdad in order to look for a non-military solution to the crisis. The situation is not hopeless so far as a political solution is concerned.

In this sense, I regard Yevgeny Primakov's mission as useful. He also had the task of raising in sharp terms the issue of all "hostages", whatever their nationality. He was able to make some progress as regards Soviet specialists.

Taking into account our many recent contacts we are exploring possible options for a solution leading subsequently to an overall Middle East settlement. If we are able to come up with anything commensurate with the realities and the risks involved in this problem we shall of course first consult with you.

Thank you for the note you sent to me with Vitaliy Ignatenko.

Sincerely,

M.GORBACHEV

October , 1990

Уважаемый господин Президент,

На днях из Багдада вернулся Е.М.Примаков, который находился там в качестве моего личного представителя, он член Президентского Совета. О такой возможности мы с Вами говорили в Хельсинки. Вы поддержали эту идею, сославшись на то, что у Вас прямого выхода на Хусейна нет. Е.М.Примаков подходил также и потому, что он давно знаком с С.Хусейном лично.

Разговор был трудный, но откровенный. Примаков постарался предельно объективно обрисовать иракскому лидеру последствия для его страны, для всего региона, если дело дойдет до войны.

И, естественно, позицию СССР излагал в строгом соответствии с обязательствами, которые мы взяли на себя, подписав резолюции Совета Безопасности ООН, исключая какие бы то ни было сомнения на этот счет у своего собеседника.

Как и предполагалось, поначалу С.Хусейн держался жестко, пытался оправдывать захват и аннексию Кувейта соображениями национальной безопасности Ирака. Тем не менее, наряду с воинственной риторикой в его высказываниях появились и слова о политической развязке кризиса в Заливе с уходом иракских войск из Кувейта. При этом, по наблюдению нашего представителя, главное для С.Хусейна сейчас - "спасти лицо".

Подробно о содержании бесед Е.М.Примакова с иракцами Э.А.Шеварднадзе информировал Госсекретаря Дж.Бейкера. Хотел бы только еще раз подтвердить свой подход, о котором мы с Вами говорили в Хельсинки. Не отступать от согласованных в ООН позиций, ужесточать, где нужно, санкции, строго контролировать их исполнение, политически, дипломатически продолжать линию на изоляцию С.Хусейна, особенно - в арабском мире, активизировать арабский фактор. И вместе с тем не упускать ни одного шанса, ни одного возможного сигнала из Багдада, для того чтобы искать невоенной развязки кризиса. Ситуация для политического решения не безнадежна.

В этом смысле считаю миссию Е.М.Примакова полезной. В его задачу входило также остро поставить вопрос о всех "заложниках", любой национальности. Определенного сдвига удалось добиться в отношении советских специалистов.

С учетом многочисленных контактов за последнее время мы прорабатываем возможные варианты развязок с выходом затем на общее урегулирование на Ближнем Востоке. Если получится что-то адекватное реальностям и опасности проблемы, мы, разумеется, прежде всего проконсультируемся с Вами.

Спасибо за записочку, которую привез мне от Вас Виталий Игнатенко.

С уважением



М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

октября 1990 года



*Document given to ...  
at ...  
by ...*  
Unofficial translation

James,

As a follow-up on our telephone conversation of October 7, I wish to inform you in more detail on the substance of the discussions of Presidential Council member E.M.Primakov with Iraqi leaders and with the PLO Executive Committee Chairman Y.Arafat.

As I told you before, E.Primakov was sent to Bagdad as a special representative of the USSR President in order to resolve the matter of bringing back to the Soviet Union those our specialists who thus far have not been able to leave Iraq because of the virtually open opposition on the part of that country's authorities. This is causing a lot of problems to us, since of the five thousand people who remain in Iraq about two thousand insist that their return to the home country be arranged as soon as possible. The issue disturbs our country's public opinion as well.

The discussion of this matter with President Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership proved rather difficult, because the Iraqi side, using formal pretexts, kept saying that a departure of such a large number of Soviet specialists would only be possible if they could be replaced by those from among local residents, which would, allegedly, take some time. As a result of an intense argument, we succeeded in reaching agreement with Saddam Hussein that 1,500 of our people would leave within one month.

We were also quite emphatic in insisting before the Iraqi leaders on the inadmissibility of keeping citizens from other, first of all, Western countries, as a "human shield". It was emphasized that such actions by Bagdad are being extremely strongly condemned all over the world, that they discredit Iraqi leaders in the eyes of the world public opinion and will not prevent a large-scale military action against Iraq, if things come to that. From the remarks by Foreign Minister T.Aziz one

could form the impression that on this matter there are certain differences of opinion in Bagdad.

Another objective of E.M.Primakov's trip to Iraq, no less important, was to explore, and even to strongly press for, the possibility of S.Hussein fundamentally changing his position, above all on the issue of Iraqis' withdrawal from Kuwait.

During his meeting with the Iraqi President, E.M.Primakov, pursuing an energetic and convincing line of reasoning, strongly urged him to display a sense of realism, emphasizing that the Soviet Union and the international community as a whole would never accept the annexation of Kuwait.

Although to justify his Kuwaiti adventure S.Hussein advanced the largely well-known set of arguments, our representative still had the impression that there emerged some new nuances in the Iraqi position. S.Hussein was no longer saying that the annexation of Kuwait's was "final and irrevocable", and in the course of the conversation several times stated his readiness to look for a political solution to the crisis, and did not reject, in principle, the possibility of pulling out the Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

In a one-on-one meeting S.Hussein finally conceded that withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait would be possible - but not in conditions of the ultimatum: either a withdrawal, or a military strike on Iraq. In this case, said the Iraqi President, Bagdad refuses to change anything in its current position, and a military action against it would entail large-scale actions by Iraq that would be devastating for many countries. E.M.Primakov understood the Iraqi President to primarily imply a simultaneous destruction of all oil fields on the Arabian peninsula.

At the same time, S.Hussein was quite clear and unambiguous in saying that a political solution of the Kuwaiti crisis must be a "package" one, that is, must include not only Iraqi "concessions", but such "meet-you-half-way" elements that would

enable the Iraqi leader to save face before his own people and in the Arab world at large. From S.Hussein's remarks one could conclude that, in specific terms, he was referring to real progress in achieving the settlement of the Palestinian problem and giving Iraq secure access to the Persian Gulf.

As the discussions suggested, S.Hussein fears that even after getting out of Kuwait Iraq will remain blockaded in some way, while the Iraqi President himself will never again be an acceptable figure in Western eyes. This definitely makes the choice in favor of a political solution more difficult for him.

The subject of terrorism was raised before the Iraqis, and particularly before Y.Arafat, with utmost frankness. The Soviet representative stressed that carrying out terrorist actions against the United States and other countries would spell disaster for Iraq and the Palestinian cause. The PLO Executive Committee Chairman showed full understanding of our arguments and gave relevant assurances.

By and large, from a preliminary analysis of E.M.Primakov's discussions in Bagdad the impression is that the clear and unequivocal refusal of the international community to accept the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, the adoption of energetic Security Council resolutions to this effect are resulting in an appreciable, if slow, sobering of S.Hussein. Our representative even had the impression that people in the immediate entourage of the Iraqi President are afraid to report to him the true situation obtaining around Iraq. Observations suggest that the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council's decisions against Iraq are beginning to have their effect as well.

Those are our general impressions from E.M.Primakov's discussions in Bagdad. We intend to discuss the results of his trip in detail, and if we have some additional considerations with respect to the future course of action about the situation in the Persian Gulf, I shall be ready to share them with you.

Sincerely,

E.A.SHEVARDNADZE



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 17, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

When you and I met in Helsinki, we reaffirmed our goal of completing the CFE and START treaties this year. I have now received a report of the just completed Bartholomew-Karpov meetings in Moscow that were intended to accelerate progress toward that goal.

I must tell you frankly that the results were very disappointing. No major issues were resolved and few differences were narrowed. Indeed, on some questions, the sides moved further apart. Put simply, we are not now on a track that will lead to the completion of either treaty this year.

As we have discussed, these agreements are keys to putting the relationship between our two countries on a new footing and building the new world order we both seek.

The START agreement will codify and regulate a more stable US-Soviet strategic nuclear balance and will provide a solid basis on which to pursue -- as we also agreed at Washington -- further stabilizing measures. The CFE agreement will provide the framework for the new security structure in Europe. Circumstances in Europe are, of course, changing rapidly, but I am convinced that the CFE framework can be adapted to these and other changes in follow-on negotiations. Conversely, it will be extremely difficult to manage the military aspects of those changes without the CFE framework in place. Convocation of the CSCE Summit and talks about shorter-range nuclear forces both depend on completion of CFE.



You and I must take a direct role if we are to ensure that the START and CFE agreements are completed this year. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be in the United States for several days within the next two weeks. I am now persuaded that unless all the remaining substantive issues are resolved during the Shevardnadze visit, it will literally be impossible to complete START or CFE this year. Accordingly, we must commit ourselves to use this time intensively and wisely.

Here is what I propose. I will ensure that the U.S. side will be ready. As I told you in Helsinki, I will give Secretary Baker the flexibility he needs to reach mutually satisfactory solutions and the authority to take necessary decisions. I ask that you give Foreign Minister Shevardnadze the same flexibility and authority so that they can make best use of this last opportunity to achieve the goal we set for ourselves.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "G" and a stylized "Bush".

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev  
President of the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics  
Moscow

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
21049 9-17-90  
LIMITED ACCESS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

90 SEP 17 P4:08  
September 15, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT   
SUBJECT: Arms Control Talks in Moscow

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0843-MR  
8/20/2013 MM

Purpose

This memorandum recommends that you send the letter at Tab A to President Gorbachev urging his personal involvement to conclude START and CFE by the end of the year.

Background

As Jim Baker agreed with Shevardnadze in Irkutsk, Reg Bartholomew led an interagency team for September 9-13 talks in Moscow to resolve remaining differences in START and CFE. These talks were a bust. No progress was made on any of the major issues. If anything, we lost ground on CFE. Absent dramatic changes in the way both sides do business and interact, I am convinced we will not be able to sign either treaty this year.

Despite the fact that we are well into the end game, the Soviets were not ready to do business during the Moscow meetings. Some of their hard line may have been tactical, and there are also indications that the Soviets are having real second thoughts about CFE as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates around them. But it was clear both from the low-level composition of the Soviet team (which was heavily populated by General Staff colonels and Foreign Ministry notetakers), and from their unwillingness to engage in a substantive give-and-take, that the top Soviet leadership was not engaged. This must change if we are going to wrap up these treaties.

The week of September 23 will be critical to the resolution of the remaining issues. Shevardnadze will be in the U.S. for about ten days, beginning with the U.N. and ending with the CSCE Foreign Ministers' Conference on October 1-2. Jim is scheduled to meet with him on September 26 and will be seeing him again during the CSCE conference. If necessary, Jim probably could

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

engage Shevardnadze by phone, if not in person, at other times during the week. You also will be seeing Shevardnadze some time that week.

We must also find a way to engage Gorbachev personally, if only because Shevardnadze probably cannot overcome the bureaucratic inertia and General Staff footdragging by himself. To that end, the proposed letter at Tab A to Gorbachev tells him that completion of START and CFE this year is in serious jeopardy and urges him to become directly involved.

We also need to make final decisions ourselves on the major remaining START and CFE issues so that Jim has the authority he needs to close the deal if and when the Soviets get ready to engage us seriously. I will be asking you to address these during the coming week.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you send the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A      Letter to President Gorbachev



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21049  
LIMITED ACCESS

September 14, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLLEEZZA RICE *he* *CR*

SUBJECT: Arms Control Talks in Moscow

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0843-MR  
8/20/2013 JAM

The four days of talks were a waste of time or worse. We made no progress on START and literally lost ground on CFE. If the U.S. side was not prepared to do end-game hard bargaining, the Soviets were barely ready to meet. Karpov was not well prepared. The General Staff was represented by colonels. Aside from a last-minute (if fascinating) appearance by Akhromeyev on CFE, there were no signs that anyone among the senior Soviet leadership was engaged or that the Soviet positions being articulated were serious.

In brief, neither side -- but particularly the Soviets -- behaved as though there was any intention of signing CFE on November 19 or START by the end of the year. Unless both sides change the way they do business rapidly and radically, there is no possibility that we will be able to achieve the goal that the President and Gorbachev reaffirmed in Helsinki: completion of both treaties this year. Even then, making the end-of-the-year target will be a long shot.

We thus have two problems: engaging the top Soviet leadership -- including Gorbachev -- and getting our own house in order.

To address the first, we have drafted a memo to the President (attached at Tab I) recommending that he send a letter to Gorbachev (which we believe would have greater impact than a phone call). To address the second, achieving rapid U.S. consensus on the major remaining issues, we propose that they be addressed next week at your level and decided by the President. In that way, the President could give Baker the authority to close the deal (if and when the Soviets are ready), while accepting the responsibility himself for the bottom-line U.S. positions.

The Talks in Moscow

START. Except for closing on two secondary matters, the Soviets simply went through the motions on START, confining themselves to reiterating familiar positions and reciting well known arguments. They did not respond to a new U.S. proposal on Backfire which,

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while modest on its face, was unmistakably an invitation to deal. They also did not engage us on heavy ICBMs, not even to repeat their insistence that the issue was closed for the remainder of the current START talks. Overall, the Soviets did little more than propose that issues be deferred to Geneva or offer to return to them when we meet in Washington next week.

CFE. The problems in CFE are more serious and raise the real possibility that the Soviets may be re-evaluating their stake in a CFE treaty. The Soviets introduced two new positions -- one on zones and one on the "sufficiency rule" -- that dramatically widen the gap between the sides. They indicated that both changes were required by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the resulting need for the Soviets to single-handedly balance the collective military forces of all the NATO allies.

Akhromeyev also said that there was no way the Soviets could include limits on land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) in CFE. Drawing an explicit analogy between LBNA in CFE and ALCMs in START, he said that refusing LBNA limits was a matter of "national dignity," and that any Soviet government that accepted such limits would be forced to resign.

If the Soviets are serious about these new positions -- and their candid assessment of their new strategic situation gives every indication that they are -- the prospects for wrapping up CFE soon have become extraordinarily bleak. It might be possible to work out a compromise on zones, and we might decide in the end to side-step the LBNA issue by dropping aircraft limits from CFE. But the Soviet effort to increase their share of equipment permitted under CFE limits -- a reflection of their go-it-alone approach to the European military balance -- will rightly be strongly resisted by the Eastern Europeans as well as by most of the NATO allies.

#### Next Steps

If we do not complete the treaties by the end of the year, there is a real chance that both will slip away as the political consensus grows that they no longer are worth the trouble. From one perspective, that would not be a calamity: both treaties were conceived in (and for) another era and arms control has gone from being the centerpiece to just one more element in superpower relationship. But the political costs to the President of what would undoubtedly be viewed by arms control aficionados -- particularly on the Hill -- could be significant. Our European allies would also be alarmed, particularly by the failure to complete CFE, which they (and we) have promoted as a cornerstone of the new Europe. If we want the benefits of these treaties and (at least as important) avoid these costs, we may be in a "now or never" situation.

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Shevardnadze will be in the U.S. for about ten days beginning around September 23. He will be preceded by Karpov to resume the "working group" discussions with Reg Bartholomew. That ten-day period will be critical in determining whether we get one or both treaties this year. The proposed letter to Gorbachev is intended to increase the chances that Shevardnadze comes prepared and empowered to do business.

Baker will meet with Shevardnadze around September 26. They agreed in Moscow that arms control will be the major subject. Baker will be seeing Shevardnadze again in New York at the CSCE Foreign Ministers' Conference on October 1-2. (A Shevardnadze meeting with the President also is likely during that week, but that should not become a negotiating session.) A meeting of NATO foreign ministers and/or a meeting at the 23 immediately prior to the October 1-2 conference to address CFE also is a distinct possibility.

We need to use the coming week to ensure that we too are ready. Because the remaining START issues are largely political, the bureaucracy cannot solve them and should stop trying. The new Soviet positions in CFE post fundamental questions about that negotiation that likewise should be addressed at your level. Accordingly, you should be prepared to have one or perhaps two meetings with your counterparts on the major remaining issues and then take them to the President for decision. You also will need to address whether we can agree at the October 1-2 CSCE Foreign Ministers' Conference to set a November 19 date for the CSCE summit and signing the CFE treaty. (Substantively, it is very hard to imagine how we could agree. Politically, it will be enormously difficult, but probably necessary, not to.) Recognizing the risks of leaks, you also may want to have an NSC meeting both to put a formal stamp on the process and to signal clearly -- including to the Soviets -- that we are fully ready for the end game.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memo at Tab I to the President.

#### Attachments

Tab I      Memo to the President  
Tab A      Letter to President Gorbachev

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