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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91128
Folder ID Number: 91128-006

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	12/27	(b)(1)	
02a. Report	Re: Information on Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [030132Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/3/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Handwritten Notes	President/Bessmertnykh [Meeting Notes] (3 pp.)	12/27/90	(b)(1)	
04. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05. Message	Re: Sent to Acting Secretary Bartholomew by Soviet Embassy Minister Counselor Chetverikov (2 pp.)	12/29/90	(b)(1)	
06. Memcon	Re: To Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	6/1990	(b)(1)	S
07a. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Section 1 of 3 [201635Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

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WHORM Cat.:
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Pinksheet Number: cap1080
OA/ID Number: 91128-006
Date Closed: 4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07b. Cable	To the White House, Re: Section 2 of 3 [201539Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S
07c. Cable	To the White House, Re: Section 3 of 3 [201655Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Cable Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Day in Moscow, November 8, 1990 (7 pp.)	11/9/90	(b)(1)	S
09. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	S
10a. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (11 pp.)	9/9/90	(b)(1)	S
10b. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev [Meeting Notes] (24 pp.)	9/9/90	(b)(1)	
10c. Draft Memcon	Re: President/Gorbachev (19 pp.)	9/9/90	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 2

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by And Beemantogh.
12/27

Unofficial translation

Mr. George BUSH
The President of the
United States of America

Dear George,

In the spirit of the friendly and trusting relationship that has developed between ourselves, I consider it to be my duty to convey to you some explanations concerning Eduard's resignation.

It has caused great agitation within the world public opinion and in the political quarters, a lot of guesses and, frankly, speculations that go far beyond this truly unfortunate episode. I said right there at the Congress - and you are aware of it - that to me his statement was totally unexpected. This is really so and this is what was particularly upsetting - not only because of his act of disloyalty to the President - the fact that he did so without consulting and without telling me in advance, his old friend and comrade, has no justification. That he was extremely tired, that the terrible workload had worn him out, that he, as we say, was giving it his damndest without sparing one bit of himself and at some point broke down - all that is true, and therefore one would like to be sympathetic to what he did, but there is no way I can approve of it. Whatever criticism there had been voiced against the Foreign Minister regarding the policies for which he had, after the President, the foremost responsibility, be that the criticism from Parliamentarians or from socio-political groups, and still less by certain media organs and all kinds of extremists and demagogues did not justify such a reaction on the part of Eduard.

Criticism, including unjustified, unfair criticism, even one that hurts, is something which is inevitable in a democratic society to which we have resolved to aspire. You, George, know this better than I, and if everyone is going to resign in response to criticism no serious policy, especially at a crucial, extremely difficult and turbulent stage in a society's development, will actually be possible to pursue. I talked with Eduard, even though I realized that he would not be able to go back on his resignation, for it would be a loss of face for him, an impossible thing to do, given his sense of honor and dignity. I value very highly his contribution to our new foreign policy, to working out and implementing cardinal decisions, above all those concerning US-Soviet relationship, thanks to which you and I were able, within a short period of time, to change the very nature of world politics, the entire international atmosphere - both in Europe and in other major parts of the world. I believe those have been historic accomplishments on the path toward a peaceful period of our civilization, and I hope they are irreversible. I also greatly appreciate Eduard's role as a man of initiative and courage and as a consistent advocate of a profound internal perestroika which is proceeding with such difficulties at home. In both of those roles I shall be missing him very much, although I don't believe he is going to leave the political scene altogether but, rather, will assume a position of authority within those new government structures which are now being considered by the Congress of People's Deputies. I cannot as yet tell you who the new Foreign Minister will be. Haven't decided myself yet. But of one thing you can be absolutely firmly assured - our policy course, the new

thinking policy course toward strengthening trust and cooperation between the leadership of both our countries shall remain unchanged in terms of substance as in form. This goes for our bilateral relations. This goes for the European process. This goes for all the arms control and security issues. This goes for the Persian Gulf and all other things on which you and I have both understanding and agreement. Everything stands unchanged. I would have no objection, if you thought you could tell Jim about my letter. Give him my kindest regards.

Taking this opportunity, I am sending you and all your wonderful family my sincere greetings for the New Year and, as I think I can now also add, Christmas greetings. I hope we shall exchange our televised New Year messages to each other's people.

All the scheduling concerning preparations for our meeting in Moscow remains without change. I will be happy to give you here a friendly welcome.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

APNSA Has Seen

Information on Deputy
Chairman of the Council Of Ministers
I.BELOUSOV'S trip to Bagdad

Chairman Belousov's discussions with Saddam Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership focused on securing an earliest possible departure from Iraq of the remaining Soviet specialists (as of December 24 there still were nearly 1700 of them).

As a result of those talks the Iraqis confirmed that they would not place any obstacles to the Soviets' leaving Iraq, including the military specialists. An evacuation schedule was agreed upon which provides for the evacuation completion by January 10, 1991. Following that date a small number (about 150 people) of Soviet specialists would remain in Iraq to supervise the equipment and other property remaining at a number of major facilities (worth several hundred million dollars).

The Iraqi leadership assured us of their readiness to provide the necessary assistance in all matters relating to our people's departure. We hope that in this particular case the Iraqis will live up to their pledges and that we will have no further problems with them in this regard.

Another question, also very important to us, was resolved positively as well, that of temporarily suspending the works

at the Soviet-Iraqi cooperative projects without stating in the final document the Soviet Government's responsibility for failing to implement contractual obligations.

In the course of Chairman Belousov's meeting with Saddam Hussein a great deal of attention was given to the military and political situation in which Iraq found itself as a result of its Kuwaiti adventure.

The Iraqi President presented the familiar set of arguments to justify his decision to invade Kuwait. He asserted, in particular, that the threats and intimidation campaign against Iraq allegedly started long before August 2, and that the anti-Iraqi course pursued by the US and Israel was supposedly joined by some of the Arabs, including Kuwait. Under those circumstances, he claimed, the introduction of the Iraqi troops into Kuwait was all but a gesture of self-defense, something Iraq was compelled to do.

Saddam Hussein was again strongly dwelling on the notion that links the resolution of the Kuwaiti crisis with the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He characterized the Security Council decisions on the Gulf situation as "unbalanced" and based on applying different standards to the problems which require the same approach.

He reiterated his readiness for a direct dialogue with the US administration, but stressed that this dialogue should be conducted on "an equal footing" and without "arms twisting". Responding to the straightforward question about how Bagdad

was going to settle the problem of the dates of the US and Iraqi foreign ministers' visits, S.Hussein implied that if the Soviet Union proposed some new, compromise dates, the Iraqi side would positively consider such a proposal. At the same time he once again made a reservation that the new dates should not exclude January 10.

During the discussions with S.Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership the Soviet side presented our well-known assessment of the situation in the Persian Gulf area, stressing the need for political wisdom and flexibility on the part of the Iraqi leadership. We noted that without such flexibility the risk of an escalation of the political and military confrontation into a large-scale armed conflict was growing by the day. We clearly and unambiguously argued for an earliest resolution of the problem of a direct dialogue between the US and Iraq.

Unfortunately, no substantial change could be seen from S.Hussein's remarks as regards his position on the Iraqi troops withdrawal from Kuwait. Nevertheless, the Soviet side is determined to continue its efforts in this matter. In the final analysis, using every available opportunity and all the time provided for by the Security Council for finding a political, non-military solution to the Kuwaiti crisis is what the "goodwill pause" is all about.

We hope the US government shares this attitude.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [030132Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/3/91	(b)(1)	S

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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0846-MR(501.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
 gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 030132Z JAN 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

JACK,

I AM GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOU WILL BE SEEING KRYUCHKOV AND CHERNAYEV.
WE ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY CONCERNED ABOUT KRYUCHKOV'S ANTI-WESTERN
COMMENTS, EVEN THOUGH HE SEEMED TO RETRACT THEM IN PART LATER.

THERE WAS NOTHING EXTRAORDINARY IN THE MESSAGE THAT BESSMERTNYKH
DELIVERED. GORBACHEV STATED AGAIN, FORCEFULLY AND CATEGORICALLY,
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED
STATES, DESPITE SHEVARDNADZE'S RESIGNATION.

HE THEN WENT TO SOME LENGTHS TO "EXPLAIN" SHEVARDNADZE'S
RESIGNATION -- THOUGH, IN REALITY, THE LETTER CASTS LITTLE LIGHT ON
THE EPISODE. THE LETTER REVEALS GORBACHEV'S CONSIDERABLE
FRUSTRATION AND DISPLEASURE WITH SHEVARDNADZE'S DECISION TO LEAVE
AT THIS TIME. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED SHEVARDNADZE WOULD REMAIN IN
THE GOVERNMENT. GORBACHEV ALSO SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S DECISION
WAS AN EMOTIONAL OVERREACTION TO THE CUMULATIVE CRITICISM OF
SHEVARDNADZE PERSONALLY AND OF HIS POLICIES. GORBACHEV MADE NO
REFERENCE AT ALL TO SHEVARDNADZE'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE RISE OF
DICTATORSHIP.

THE PRESIDENT USED THE OCCASION OF BESSMERTNYKH'S VISIT TO
REITERATE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE AND TO SAY THAT SUCH
A DEVELOPMENT WOULD MOST ASSUREDLY HARM U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL WITH GORBACHEV WAS UNEVENTFUL.
GORBACHEV DID SAY THAT IT HAD BEEN A "HOT FEW DAYS" IN THE SOVIET
UNION AND THAT HE HAD A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TO DO AT HOME.

I HOPE THAT THESE NOTES ARE HELPFUL. WE, OF COURSE, LOOK FORWARD
TO A READOUT OF YOUR IMPORTANT MEETINGS.


BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0091

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0091 <TOR> 910102203817 MSG000284157497



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0845-MR

2/25/2014 MM

T/Besomerbykh
12/27/90

B Duty to carry - carrying of -
resig. Does so in a spirit
of a relationship which has
evolved

Resig was totally unexpected.
Very upsetting to Corb - esp because
his close friend didn't tell him.
Thinks Sheward extremely tired
& overworked & at some point broke
down.

Corb wants to ~~say~~ be symp.
but no way he could approve.
(Reads from document)

Corb valued him both for new
F# & internal perspective
Corb doesn't think he will leave
pub affairs. May be in some
of new Govt structures, but not then.

UP
HSC
Council
of F&E
Cabinet

Everything ~~stays~~ unchanged.

P There is talk in Wash that I have
personalized our relations w/ SC &
rely too much on Corb. I reject that
because of what Corb has done
done in past 5 yrs.

But I would like you to pass
to Corb our concerns about case
of force - it would inevitably complicate

a relationship. That could be a tragedy. J-U name went well in this country. I don't know what it means that we deal more w/ a reputation

B Yes, I see that in your press as well. About a use of force. What Cuba needs is 1-2 yrs of stability. Law & order is necessary but w/ in but not outside a control.

P He told me in Paris he had to go home to be tough. I know there was a way to ~~see~~ separate out a Baltics - from a US point of view. Cuba told me there was a way but it had to be done constitutionally.

B One prob is a Army units in Baltics are being badly provoked

P You might tell Cuba our thinking on Gulf hasn't changed. We were 15th very seriously, we plan to do our part to implement UNSC resolutions. I haven't changed my mind that force might have to be used. Would like to see all Sov citizens out. Tell him there has been no help on SA part regarding Kuwait. This will

Using this up to date since no
FNV + Baker don't keep shared
posted. Mtg appears unlikely &
seems to me less & less important.
There is no hidden agenda &
no private mtgs going on.
I think S H still thinks force won't
be used or if it were it would
be a stand off.

B Our sense is he thinks no
force will be used. He sees
what happening in SC w/ shared
& what happening in US & he thinks
force will be used.

P Please thank P for this comment
& value his willingness to share

Dear Brent:

This is the original of
the letter I have delivered
to the President. ~~in the~~

Thank you again

1/12/91

M. S. S. S. S.

ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

господину Джорджу БУШУ

Дорогой Джордж!

В духе дружеских и доверительных отношений, которые сложились между нами, считаю своим долгом сообщить Вам некоторые пояснения в связи с отставкой Эдуарда.

В мировом общественном мнении, в политических кругах она вызвала большое волнение, массу догадок и, прямо скажу, домыслов, далеко выходящих за пределы самого этого действительно неприятного эпизода. Я сказал тут же на Съезде - и Вы об этом знаете, - что для меня его заявление было полной неожиданностью. Это действительно так и особенно меня огорчило - не только потому, что была нарушена лояльность по отношению к Президенту. То, что он так поступил, не посоветовавшись и не предупредив меня, своего давнего друга и товарища, не имеет никаких оправданий.

Что он безмерно устал, что невероятные перегрузки измотали его, что он, как у нас говорят, не жалея себя, выкладывался и вот в определенный момент сорвался - все это так. И поэтому хотелось бы отнестись с пониманием к его поступку. Но одобрить его я никак не могу.

Какая бы критика ни раздавалась лично в адрес министра, по поводу политики, за которую после Президента он нес наибольшую ответственность, будь то критика со стороны парламентариев или

общественно-политических группировок, тем более - со стороны некоторых органов печати, разного рода экстремистов и демагогов, - она не оправдывает такой реакции со стороны Эдуарда.

Критика, в том числе и необоснованная, несправедливая, даже обидная - дело неизбежное в демократическом обществе, к которому мы решились идти. Вам, Джордж, это известно лучше меня. И если в ответ на нее каждый будет подавать в отставку, то никакую серьезную политику, особенно на переломном, крайне сложном, бурном этапе в развитии общества, практически проводить будет невозможно.

Я говорил с Эдуардом, хотя и понимал, что отозвать свое заявление он уже не сможет. Это было бы потерей лица. При его чувстве достоинства это невозможно.

Я очень высоко ценю его вклад в нашу новую внешнюю политику, в подготовку и в осуществление кардинальных решений, прежде всего, на советско-американском направлении, благодаря чему нам с Вами удалось за короткий срок изменить сам характер мировой политики, всю международную атмосферу - и в Европе, и в других важных пунктах. Я считаю, что это исторические завоевания на пути к мирному периоду цивилизации. И, надеюсь, они необратимы. Я также очень ценю роль Эдуарда как одного из инициативных, смелых и последовательных деятелей глубокой внутренней перестройки, которая идет у нас с такими трудностями. И в том, и в другом мне его будет очень не хватать. Хотя, думаю, он не уйдет совсем из политической жизни, займет авторитетное место в новых государственных структурах, которые сейчас рассматриваются Съездом народных депутатов.

Кто будет министром иностранных дел, я не могу Вам пока сказать. Сам еще не решил. Но прошу принять мои совершенно твердые заверения: курс нашей политики - политики нового мышления - на укрепление доверия и взаимодействия между руководством наших стран останется неизменным, как по содержанию, так и по форме. Это касается двусторонних отношений. Это касается европейского процесса. Это касается всех проблем разоружения и безопасности. Это относится к Персидскому заливу и всем другим моментам, по которым у нас с Вами есть и взаимопонимание, и договоренность. Все остается в силе.

Я не возражал бы, если бы Вы сочли возможным рассказать о моем письме Джиму. Передайте ему мои самые добрые пожелания.

Пользуясь случаем, шлю Вам и всей Вашей прекрасной семье искренние поздравления с наступающим Новым годом, а теперь позволю себе сказать - и с Рождеством.

Надеюсь, что мы на днях обменяемся телевизионными новогодним посланиями к нашим народам.

Все графики подготовки к нашей с Вами встрече в Москве остаются без изменений. Буду рад дружески приветствовать Вас здесь.

Искренне



М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 060617 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/NODIS~~ No. Pages 2

FROM: Liz McKune S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Message from the Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor
To Acting Secretary Bartholomew

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>W. Sittmann, Hill</u>	<u>456-2224</u>	
	<u>Scowcroft</u>		
	<u>Gates</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Please pass this message to General Scowcroft - EYES ONLY.

S/S Officer: Liz McKune

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By Cop NARA, Date 4/10/09

Being naturally concerned with the deadlock in the US-Iraqi dialogue we used a visit to Baghdad of our representatives from Moscow in order to probe very informally and strictly confidentially into the position of Iraq. In a conversation with Aziz our representatives asked about the timeframe of his visit to Washington and a visit of the US Secretary of State to Baghdad. Tentatively, we referred to January 6 as the date for receiving the Secretary of State in Iraq on the assumption that Aziz might come to the United States prior to that.

It is our impression that the Iraqi minister reacted to this idea of a compromise solution with interest though his response was worded in rather cautious terms. He said that the Iraqi side would be ready to examine in a constructive way the new dates for an exchange of visits. If we make specific proposals on both dates the Iraqis will not insist on January 12 as the date for Secretary Baker's visit to Baghdad. However, on the other hand, the new options must not exclude January 10.

Aziz avoided a clear answer to our repeated questions about Iraqi leadership's reaction to the date of January 6 noting, in particular, that a decision on that score can be taken only by President Hussein himself.

At the final stage of the conversation the minister reiterated that the Iraqi side was ready to consider new options for the dates to exchange visits. On the whole, it followed from the logics of what he said during the conversation that these new dates must be first appropriately worked out with Washington and after that suggested to Iraqis.

If the US side wishes to seek out a solution to the issue of dates for these visits with our assistance we would be willing to transmit to Baghdad its respective ideas (also as if they come from us provided it is more convenient to US colleagues).

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Brent,

Last night, you asked about the exchange with Akhromeyev on next steps. I will do full notes over the weekend but I sensed that you wanted to know about this as soon as possible. The exchange went as follows:

Akhromeyev: You should not think of the Gorbachev response as a negative answer. It is an invitation to a deeper dialogue. We should find a channel to look into the problem. This couldn't be resolved in a few weeks. The decision of the U.S. side not to publicly discuss this problem was a wise one. It would have made a cardinal difference had it broken into the press.

We should find some discrete forum for looking into to it then later move it to more formal channels.

Gorbachev said that he continues to be interested in problems of nuclear weapons in general and in all categories. He wanted only to invite the U.S. side to continue discussions on the question.

Scowcroft: That's helpful. I am pleased. My disappointment had two elements. It was difficult getting agreement within our government. I must tell you that those who opposed it -- when they see this initial response -- will say "I told you so." Secondly, we are on the verge of major expenditures on a MX mobile system like your SS-24. I wanted to do something before Congress started that because once it starts we will have another cycle of deployments.

Akhromeyev: Last summer when we talked, we talked about the SS-24 and MX and we touched upon a possible solution the SS-24; MX; and SLCM linked somehow to take account of the interrelationship between them. That was productive. I think we should study that particular option.

But then we got off track at Malta because we raised the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons deployed at sea and the response was completely negative. It was not unexpected but we did not get enough explanation for why the response was negative. There needed to be deeper meaning given to why it was rejected. When I approached the political leadership about long-range SLCM; SS-24; and MX and said they should be posed for discussion. They asked "is it worth it?"

I believe that the idea relating to the problem of mobile MIRVed ICBMs is not a dead idea and might be entertained. Concerning your disappointment -- what we want is to engage in a deeper dialogue on the problem. We are prepared to heed the interests of the U.S. but Soviet interests should be taken into account.

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As far as the MX and SS-24 deployments it is difficult to solve this in a narrow context but if we expand the framework it might be more resolvable.

Scowcroft: We might have some mutual misperception operating here. I would have welcomed an answer such as you just gave. "You rely on ICBM forces -- your principal concern is naval tactical nuclear forces." That would have given me material to work with. It's too hard for me to advance both demilitarizing of the ICBMs and a proposal on SLCMs.

At Malta, the unfortunate thing was that the SLCM proposal was made in the general framework of naval arms control and you know how sensitive that is for us. Had the question been posed narrowly in the form of SLCMs -- which present a problem for you like the SS-18 is a problem for us -- that would have been different. Maybe we have some specific elements that would allow us to make progress. I don't know that for sure because it's very difficult for our Navy to come to terms with that.

Akhromeyev: Would it be useful to have a letter from our President saying that MX and SS-24 could be looked at in some context where long-range SLCMs on both sides would be eliminated. I am only asking if it would be useful?

Scowcroft: It would give us something concrete and specific to analyze. The answer that you sent is so general that opponents of intellectually attractive ideas will just take it as a no.

Akhromeyev: Maybe the U.S. President could write to Gorbachev saying that in principle the sides were now exchanging ideas and now approaches could be made more specific. It would be useful if you mentioned the Malta exchange too and why you rejected our ideas.

We could then write and the Soviet President would be more specific saying SS-24; MX and SLCM. The exchange should take place very fast and perhaps something could be done by the time of the June Summit -- before Gorbachev comes.

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Section 1 of 3 [201635Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

Document Partially Declassified
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 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0846-MR(506)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PAGE 1 MLN=22885
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SECTION 01 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: AMBASSADOR MATLOCK


FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ON DECEMBER 20, BEFORE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESIGNATION ANNOUNCEMENT,
MARSHAL SERGEY AKHROMEYEV PROVIDED HIS RESPONSE TO YOUR DECEMBER
5 LETTER ON CFE PROBLEMS. AKHROMEYEV STRESSED THAT HE HAD ENDEAVORED
TO ANSWER CLEARLY TO THE TWO QUESTIONS WHICH YOU RAISED, APOLOGIZING
FOR THE DELAY IN GETTING BACK TO YOU. HE ADDED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE'S PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY HAD SLOWED
DOWN HIS RESPONSE.

AKHROMEYEV SAID HE EXAMINED THE PRECISE DATA REGARDING THE EQUIPMENT
CONCERNS WHICH YOU RAISED AND WAS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION IN HIS
LETTER. HE THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT FIND ANY ERRORS IN THIS
DATA AND BELIEVED THAT NO ADDITIONAL MAJOR PROBLEMS SHOULD ARISE
REGARDING THE TREATY. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT SUFFICIENT TIME

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REMAINED TO SORT OUT MINOR TREATY DISPUTES IN VIENNA (BEFORE THE DEADLINE FOR DATA REVISIONS).

RESPONDING TO A QUESTION, AKHROMEYEV SAID THAT CFE RATIFICATION WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE WERE EXAMINING THE TREATY AND WOULD MAKE THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS.

AKHROMEYEV STRESSED THAT THERE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM AS REGARDS NAVAL FORCES, UNDERSCORING THAT FOR HIM PERSONALLY THIS WAS A KEY ISSUE. HE SAID THAT HE FOUND IT VERY HARD TO PUSH FOR RATIFICATION OF A CFE TREATY

WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE NAVAL FORCES. THIS, HE INSISTED, IN PRINCIPLE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN PART OF THE AGREEMENT. AKHROMEYEV PREDICTED THAT THERE

WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STRUGGLE IN THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET OVER TREATY RATIFICATION, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE ACHIEVED. HE OPINED THAT CFE RATIFICATION COULD COME ABOUT IN FEBRUARY, ONCE THE SUPREME SOVIET HAD COMPLETED WORK ON THE BUDGET.

BEGIN EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

MOSCOW, 20 DECEMBER 1990

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL B. SCOWCROFT
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE US PRESIDENT

DEAR GENERAL SCOWCROFT,

I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5 DECEMBER 1990, IN WHICH YOU REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S UNDERSTANDING AND POSITION ON TWO QUESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SIGNING ON 19 NOVEMBER 1990 IN PARIS BY THE HEADS OF WARSAW TREATY AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

STATES OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE.

1. ON THE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

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OF THE USSR (GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCE) DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS AT THE MOMENT OF SIGNING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TREATY.

2. ON THE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT (AGAIN, OF GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCE) REDEPLOYED BY THE SOVIET UNION FROM EUROPE BEYOND THE URALS TO THE ASIAN PART OF THE COUNTRY, AND OUR FURTHER INTENTIONS REGARDING THIS EQUIPMENT.

AFTER THE APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR AND OTHER INTERESTED DEPARTMENTS (WHICH SOMEWHAT DELAYED A RESPONSE),

I INVESTIGATED BOTH PROBLEMS WHICH YOU RAISE IN YOUR LETTER, AND WILL TRY TO GIVE YOU FRANK, EXHAUSTIVE CLARIFICATIONS, WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE NEW RELATIONS WHICH HAVE FORMED BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA.

1. THE SOVIET UNION, IN SIGNING THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, SUBMITTED NECESSARY INFORMATION ON ARMS OF GROUND FORCES AND THE AIR FORCE DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. THIS INFORMATION CORRESPONDS TO REALITY. NATURALLY, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS, BOTH ON A MULTILATERAL AND ON A BILATERAL BASIS, ALL UNCLEAR OR DISPUTED QUESTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL DETAILS, THE MORE SO SINCE WE HAVE QUESTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE.

AS WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD FROM YOUR LETTER AND INFORMATION GIVEN TO US BY THE LEADER OF THE AMERICAN GROUP OF EXPERTS, AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY, DURING HIS STAY IN MOSCOW IN EARLY DECEMBER 1990, THE USA IS MAKING CLAIMS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH THE FACT THAT IT HAS NOT INCLUDED TANKS, ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SYSTEMS OF NAVAL INFANTRY AND DIVISIONS OF THE NAVY COAST GUARD IN THE OVERALL NUMBER OF ARMS OF GROUND FORCES LIMITED BY THE TREATY.

IT IS, HOWEVER, THE CASE THAT THE NAVAL INFANTRY AND UNITS OF THE COAST GUARD, BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES, DO NOT COMPRISE PART OF THE GROUND FORCES, BUT ARE PART OF THE NAVY, WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF NEGOTIATIONS, IS NOT ONE OF THEIR SUBJECTS. THEREFORE, TO INCLUDE THEIR ARMS IN THE COUNT IS INCORRECT. IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT A DECISION ON GROUND-BASED NAVAL AVIATION WAS

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MADE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY.
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07b. Cable	To the White House, Re: Section 2 of 3 [201539Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

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SECTION 02 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER EYES ONLY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SECTION 02 OF 03

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT EXISTING FORMATIONS OF THE COAST GUARD DEPLOYED IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE COUNTRY WERE CREATED DURING THE REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, BEGUN LONG BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. THE OVERALL LEVELS OF ARMS OF NAVAL INFANTRY AND UNITS OF THE COAST GUARD (927 TANKS, 1725 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, 1020 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS) WERE REACHED IN OCTOBER 1989.

2. REGARDING OUR REDEPLOYMENT OF ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR TO THE ASIAN PART, BEYOND THE URALS, APPARENTLY MORE DETAILED CLARIFICATIONS ARE NECESSARY, WHICH I WILL TRY TO SET FORTH IN THIS LETTER.

REGARDING TANKS. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 41,500 TANKS, AND AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990, APPROXIMATELY 21,000 TANKS. THUS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES IS APPROXIMATELY 20,500 TANKS. OF THIS NUMBER, 4,100 TANKS WERE WRITTEN OFF (TURNED INTO SCRAP METAL OR RE-EQUIPPED), AND 16,400 TANKS, MAINLY MORE MODERN MODELS, WERE TRANSFERRED BEYOND THE URALS. OF THEM, 8,000 TANKS WERE TRANSFERRED TO FORCES IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY FOR REINFORCEMENT OF SHORTAGES AND REPLACEMENT OF OLD-MODEL

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TANKS, AND 8,400 TANKS WERE DELIVERED TO STORAGE BASES. IT IS PLANNED IN 1991-1995 TO REMOVE FROM FORCES IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY 6,000 OBSOLETE TANKS, WHICH WILL BE ELIMINATED THROUGH EITHER TRANSFORMATION INTO SCRAP METAL OR RE-EQUIPPING AS EQUIPMENT FOR THE ECONOMY.

REGARDING ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 57,800 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES.

DURING NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE REACHING OF AGREEMENTS ON TYPES OF VEHICLES,

ABOVE ALL ON MTLB, UNARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER TRACTORS OF ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, 8,900 UNITS OF THIS NUMBER WERE EXCLUDED AS NOT BELONGING TO THE CATEGORY OF ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. THAT IS, AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THERE WERE IN FACT 48,900 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990, THERE WERE 29,600 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. THUS, THE DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES IS 19,200 VEHICLES. 3,400 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES WERE WRITTEN OFF (TURNED INTO SCRAP METAL, RE-EQUIPPED, DELIVERED FOR EXPORT). OF THE REMAINING 15,500 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES,

11,200 VEHICLES WERE SENT FOR RE-ARMING AND MAKING UP DEFICIENCIES OF UNITS IN THE EAST, SINCE A LARGE PART OF MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENTS BEYOND

THE URALS WERE FORMERLY ARMED NOT WITH ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, BUT WITH AUTOMOBILES. 4,700 VEHICLES WERE DELIVERED TO STORAGE BASES IN THE

EAST OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS PLANNED IN 1991-1995 TO REMOVE FROM FORCES IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY APPROXIMATELY 1,500 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES,

WHICH WILL BE ELIMINATED THROUGH EITHER TRANSFORMATION INTO SCRAP METAL OR RE-EQUIPPING FOR ECONOMIC PURPOSES.

REGARDING ARTILLERY SYSTEMS. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 42,400 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, AND AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990, APPROXIMATELY 14,000 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES IS APPROXIMATELY 28,400 SYSTEMS. OF THESE, 3,400 HAVE BEEN WRITTEN OFF (TRANSFORMED INTO SCRAP METAL, SENT FOR EXPORT), AND 25,000 SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED BEYOND THE URALS. 1,600 WERE USED FOR RE-ARMING FORCES IN THE EASTERN REGION. OF THE REMAINING 23,400 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS SENT BEYOND THE URALS, 16,400 UNITS

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WERE DELIVERED TO STORAGE BASES FOR SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT IN FORCES OF OBSOLETE SYSTEMS AS PART OF THE DEVELOPMENT BY THEM OF AN ESTABLISHED

RESOURCE AND 7,000 UNITS ARE USED AS A REPLACEMENT AND REPAIR SUPPLY FUND. IN 1991-1995, AS PART OF THE RELEASE FROM FORCES OF OBSOLETE MODELS, 7,000 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS WILL BE ELIMINATED.

REGARDING AVIATION. RECENTLY THE AMERICAN SIDE WAS INFORMED OF SOME DATA ON AIRCRAFT, REFLECTING MAINLY THE SITUATION FOR THE CURRENT YEAR. I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE BROADER INFORMATION. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE AIR FORCE OF THE USSR IN EUROPE CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 8,400 MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF AIR FORCE AVIATION AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE FORCES, AND AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990, APPROXIMATELY 6,450 AIRCRAFT (THE EXACT NUMBER IS 6,445 AIRCRAFT). THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES IS APPROXIMATELY 1,950 AIRCRAFT. OF THESE, APPROXIMATELY 1,200 AIRCRAFT WERE USED FOR MAKING UP DEFICIENCIES IN AIR FORCE UNITS, NAVAL AVIATION UNITS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE UNITS OR TRANSFERRED TO AVIATION STORAGE

BASES BEYOND THE URALS, 430 AIRCRAFT WERE WRITTEN OFF AND TRANSFORMED INTO SCRAP METAL, 120 AIRCRAFT WERE RE-EQUIPPED AS TARGETS, AND APPROXIMATELY 200 AIRCRAFT WERE EXPORTED.

OUR REDEPLOYMENT OF A QUITE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF GROUND FORCES AND A CERTAIN NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BEYOND THE URALS IS EXPLAINED BY SEVERAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

FIRST, DURING 1988-1990, THE SOVIET UNION, ON A UNILATERAL BASIS, CONDUCTED MEASURES TO REDUCE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES, THE NUMBER OF ARMS IN EUROPE, BY AMOUNTS INCLUDING 10,000 TANKS, 8,500 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, 820 AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL MEASURES CONNECTED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND THE ASSIGNMENT TO GROUPINGS OF GROUND FORCES OF A GREATER DEFENSIVE ORIENTATION.

UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE SHORT SPACE OF TIME FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE LACK OF THE NECESSARY MATERIAL BASE FOR THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE, WE WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW PART OF THE FORCES AND ARMS BEYOND THE URALS.

SECOND, BEGINNING IN 1991, MASS DELIVERIES OF TANKS, ARMORED FIGHTING

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VEHICLES, ARTILLERY SYSTEMS AND AIRCRAFT BY INDUSTRY TO GROUND FORCES
AND THE AIR FORCE HAVE DROPPED CONSIDERABLY.

CAPABILITIES FOR REPLACING COMBAT EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS SERVED OUT ITS
ESTABLISHED TERMS AND RESOURCES FROM DELIVERIES FROM INDUSTRY WILL
BE INSUFFICIENT. THE CREATION OF A RESERVE OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT AT
BASES IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY WILL TO AT LEAST SOME EXTENT SOLVE THIS

PROBLEM, IF ONLY FOR THREE OR FOUR YEARS. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU
THAT THE USSR DOES NOT PLAN TO DEPLOY ANY GROUPINGS BEYOND THE URALS
ON THE BASIS OF REDEPLOYED ARMS.

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 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0845-MR(505.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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HANDLE VIA
PRIVACY
CHANNELS ONLY

PAGE 1 MLN=22879
DAN=402-170107 ICDSN=EIA086

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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SECTION 3 OF 3

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

FINAL SECTION OF 03
THIRD, CAPACITIES FOR ELIMINATING SOVIET COMBAT EQUIPMENT IN EUROPE
ARE INSUFFICIENT. TRANSFER OF PART OF THE ARMS TO THE EAST OF
THE COUNTRY WILL ALLOW US TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR MORE
SYSTEMATIC ELIMINATION.

THE SOVIET UNION VALUES THE NEW POLITICAL CHANGE IN WHICH WE ARE
WORKING IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL. WE HAVE SET OUT FIRMLY ON
THE PATH TO IMPROVING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. WE HOPE FOR AN
ADEQUATE ATTITUDE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

THEREFORE, IN THE SPIRIT OF FULL FRANKNESS, I HAVE SET FORTH TO
YOU THE SITUATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED AND THE REASONS THAT HAVE
BROUGHT US TO THE NECESSITY OF REDEPLOYING A CERTAIN QUANTITY OF
COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM THE EUROPEAN PART TO THE EASTERN PART OF
THE COUNTRY, AS WELL AS OUR INTENTIONS IN REGARD TO THIS EQUIPMENT
IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

RESPECTFULLY,

S. AKHROMEYEV.

* * * * *
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CHANNELS ONLY



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0845-MR
2/25/2014 MM

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HANDLE VIA
PRIVACY
CHANNELS ONLY

PAGE 2 MLN=22879
DAN=402-170107 ICDSN=EIA086

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

END TEXT OF LETTER TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

ORIGINAL LETTER WILL BE POUCHED TO WHITE HOUSE.

DECL: OADR.
#0341

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HANDLE VIA
PRIVACY
CHANNELS ONLY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 07

PRT: SCOWCROFT SECTO

SIT: PRES MSGS FILE SIT

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<DTG> 090945Z NOV 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5118

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 24037

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FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY DAY IN MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8, 1990

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAVE HAD LONG AND RATHER EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TODAY. I'LL GIVE YOU THE FULL BLOW-BY-BLOW WHEN I GET BACK. FOR NOW, LET ME PASS ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DAY AND OUR DISCUSSIONS. WE TALKED ABOUT THE GULF FOR NEARLY SIX HOURS (FOUR WITH SHEVARDNADZE, TWO WITH GORBACHEV). EACH LISTENED, EXPLAINED THEIR CONCERNS, AND NOTICEABLY MOVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE, IN PARTICULAR, CAME CLOSE TO OUR POSITION THAT A UNSC RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING FORCE SHOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH AND BECOME OPERATIVE SIX-EIGHT WEEKS LATER. HE ACTUALLY CALLED GORBACHEV ON THE PHONE AND PUSHED HARD TO HAVE HIM GO ALONG WITH OUR APPROACH. HE WENT OUT TO GORBACHEV'S DACHA TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE ME TO LOBBY HIM FURTHER. GORBACHEV IS CLOSE BUT NOT THERE YET.

2. IN GENERAL, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO BE ACTING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 07

ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS:

A) THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST STAY TOGETHER ON THE GULF.

THEY BOTH SAID IT'S ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF TH POLICY, AND IS REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT OUR MUTUAL WELL-BEING, AND FUTURES ARE LINKED. (SHEVARDNADZE WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT A FAILURE BY US IN THE GULF WOULD DAMAGE PERESTROIKA. OUR SUCCESS WOULD BE A SUCCESS FOR THEM -- AND OUR FAILURE WOULD BE A REAL BLOW TO THEM. GORBACHEV SAID MUCH THE SAME THING.)

B) SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST CLEARLY UNMISTAKEABLY FAIL. THEY

EMPHASIZED THAT HIS AGGRESSION MUST BE REVERSED. ANY HOPE FOR A NEW PEACEFUL ERA DEPENDED ON THIS, AND ON DENYING HIM ANY VICTORY -- NO MATTER HOW SMALL. TO THIS END, WE COULD NOT STAND STILL. WE HAD TO BE ACTIVE NOW IN PURSUING FURTHER STEPS TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION. (ACTIVITY THAT DID NOT APPEAR TO MEAN PEACE MISSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS CRITICAL OF THE NAKASONE, BRANDT, AND, YES, PRIMAKOV MISSIONS. FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV'S MISSION AND SAID HE, TOO, HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.)

C. GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE FELT SANCTIONS MIGHT YET WORK AND

IT'S PREMATURE TO PLAY OUR LAST DIPLOMATIC CARD -- A CARD THAT

LEAVES US NO CHOICE BUT TO USE FORCE IF IT FAILS. WHILE PREPARED TO BE ACTIVE IN PURSUING MORE STEPS IN THE UNSC TO BUILD THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE (CERTAINLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY) WERE AMBIVALENT ABOUT A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT AUTHORIZES FORCE OR "ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION 660." IT'S NOT THAT THEY REJECT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DEADLINE OR EVEN POSING AN ULTIMATUM. IT'S THAT THEY STILL FEEL IT'S TOO EARLY TO DO THAT.

3. I EXPLAINED LONG AND HARD WHY TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT BE ON OUR SIDE. INDEED, I OUTLINED WHY IF WE COULDN'T PASS SUCH A RESOLUTION THIS MONTH WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO FOR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 07

SEVERAL MONTHS -- SOMETHING THAT COULD GET US INTO THE RAINY SEASON, RAMADAN, THE HAJJ, AND ALL THE WAY TO NEXT SUMMER BEFORE THE USE OF FORCE COULD BE CONTEMPLATED.

4. SHEVARDNADZE FOUND THIS ARGUMENT COMPELLING, BECAUSE HE SAW HOW THIS MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES IN THE AREA. I EMPHASIZED THIS POINT AND ALSO SAID IF WE COULDN'T SUSTAIN OUR FORCES OR HAD TO REDUCE THEM IT WOULD CONVINCE SADDAM THAT HE COULD PREVAIL.

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5. AS A RESULT, SHEVARDNADZE BEGAN TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, A POSITION THAT WAS PREMISED ON FURTHER UNSC RESOLUTIONS THAT WOULD SHOW INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, HEIGHTEN PRESSURE ON SADDAM AND BASICALLY EXHAUST ALL DIPLOMATIC, NON-MILITARY OPTIONS OVER TIME.

6. TO A LESSER EXTENT GORBACHEV BOUGHT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT BUT I FOUND HIM TORN MORE ABOUT HAVING TO USE FORCE AT ALL. (WHILE I THINK SHEVARDNADZE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT USING FORCE, HE IS MORE INCLINED TO THINK IT WILL HAVE TO BE USED EVENTUALLY.) FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV'S IMAGE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS SUCH THAT HE HAS A HARD TIME RECONCILING THE FACT THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO USE FORCE IN THIS INITIAL TEST. HE REFLECTED THAT SENTIMENT IN HIS LETTER TO YOU AND HE SAID AS MUCH TO ME TODAY, OBSERVING THAT WE WANT THIS ERA TO BE DIFFERENT FROM THE COLD WAR AND BASED ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF NORMS.

7. I ANSWERED HIM IN TWO WAYS: FIRST, IT'S HARD TO ESTABLISH RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CIVILIZED AND PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR IF A BRUTAL AGGRESSOR WHO QUITE SIMPLY REJECTS THESE NORMS IS ALLOWED TO SUCCEED BECAUSE THE WILL TO USE FORCE IS ABSENT. SECOND, THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PRODUCE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME -- OUR CLEAR PREFERENCE -- WAS TO CONVINCE SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT MILITARILY. ONLY WHEN SADDAM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BECOMES CONVINCED THAT A MASSIVE MILITARY RESPONSE WAS IMMINENT WOULD A PEACEFUL OUTCOME BECOME POSSIBLE.

8. THAT WAS THE PARADOX. THAT WAS THE REASON THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD GIVE US A CHANCE TO RESOLVE THIS PEACEFULLY -- I.E., SADDAM WOULD REALIZE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD SUPPORT THE USE OF FORCE AND HE WOULD HAVE ONLY A LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME TO AVERT A CERTAIN DEFEAT. NOTHING ELSE WOULD SIGNAL HIM SO STARKLY AND CREDIBLY. AND YET A RESOLUTION PASSED NOW, BUT OPERATIVE ONLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, WOULD ALSO SHOW THAT WE HAD GIVEN HIM EVERY CHANCE TO WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY. AND, INDEED, THAT WE HAD GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME (FIVE AND ONE-HALF TO SIX MONTHS) TO WORK.

9. SHEVARDNADZE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SAW THE LOGIC OF MY ARGUMENTS, AND I FELT GORBACHEV, TOO, WAS BEING PERSUADED BY THEM. BUT HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE PUSHED INTO MAKING A DECISION TODAY, AND CLEARLY A PART OF HIM WOULD STILL LIKE TO DELAY GOING DOWN SUCH A DEFINITIVE PATH. I THINK THAT'S WHY HE SUGGESTED A KIND OF INTERIM STEP: PASS TWO RESOLUTIONS. THE FIRST WOULD WARN SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN DATE, WE'D PASS A SECOND ONE THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY AUTHORIZE THE USE OF FORCE.

10. WHILE NOTING THAT HE WAS CLEARLY TRYING TO BE RESPONSIVE, I SAID I SAW SEVERAL PROBLEMS:

-- OUR ORIGINAL UNSC RESOLUTION 660 CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. NOW WE'D BE PASSING A RESOLUTION THT GAVE HIM SOME TIME TO DO SO. THIS WOULD ACTUALLY LOOK LIKE A RETREAT FROM OUR EARLIER POSITION.

-- HAVING PASSED THE FIRST RESOLUTION, WHAT IF WE COULDN'T GET THE SECOND RESOLUTION. PROCEDURALLY, WE PROBABLY COULDN'T GET BOTH RESOLUTIONS THROUGH THIS MONTH AND WE MIGHT HAVE REAL PROBLEMS ONCE YEMEN WAS IN THE CHAIR. SUBSTANTIVELY, SADDAM MIGHT PULL BACK PARTIALLY OR FOR THE FIRST TIME OFFER A REALISTIC, IF UNACCEPTABLE, PARTIAL DEAL AS A WAY OF UNDERCUTTING CONSENSUS BEHIND THE USE OF FORCE.

-- IF WE NEVER GOT TO THE SECOND RESOLUTION, WE WOULD HAVE SHOT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OUR WAD AND BE FINISHED TRYING TO WORK THROUGH THE UNSC. THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DESTROYING THE UNSC AS A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR PRE-EMPTING, MANAGING, OR SETTLING CONFLICTS IN THIS NEW ERA.

11. GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE WAS TO SAY, WELL IT WAS JUST A THOUGHT, AND HE NEEDED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS. SHEVARDNADZE LATER TRIED TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT FORMALLY LINK THE TWO RESOLUTIONS, MAKING THE SECOND ONE "PREDETERMINED" IF SADDAM HAD NOT PULLED OUT BY A CERTAIN DATE. INTERESTINGLY, TARASENKO ARGUED AGAINST HIS BOSS SAYING YOU COULDN'T GUARANTEE SUCH A LINKAGE, YOU'D LOOK FECKLESS IF YOU COULDN'T DELIVER THE SECOND RESOLUTION, AND THIS WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ENSURE A MOVE AWAY FROM THE UNSC AND TO THE USE OF ARTICLE 51 TO LIBERATE KUWAIT.

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12. THE UPSHOT: THEY WANT TO LOOK AT OPTIONS AND GET BACK TO US BEFORE PARIS. I EMPHASIZED WE DIDN'T WANT TO PUSH THEM BUT WE NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO ACT WHILE WE HAD THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC AND IF NO DECISION WERE MADE UNTIL PARIS WE MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME AFTERWARDS.

13. MY OWN SENSE IS THAT IN THE END THEY WILL GO ALONG WITH US. GORBACHEV MADE A REAL POINT OF SAYING THEY'D STICK WITH US. AND HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTING UNDER UNSC AUTHORIZATION, NOT ARTICLE 51, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT WOULD ENSURE OUR CONTINUED UNITY. AS I SAID SEVERAL TIMES, WE SAW THE EXTRAORDINARY VALUE OF THEM PARTICIPATING WITH US IF FORCE WAS NEEDED, BUT UNDERSTOOD THEIR PROBLEMS (INTERNAL PREOCCUPATION, AFGHAN SYNDROME) WITH NOT DOING SO. IT WOULD BE FAR HARDER FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THEIR BLOCKING US FROM THE CLEARLY PREFERRED OPTION OF A UNSC RESOLUTION. THEY GOT THE POINT, AND I BELIEVE THEIR STAKE IN GOOD RELATIONS AND DESIRE FOR PARTNERSHIP WITH US WILL LEAD THEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME AND EFFORT TO GET THERE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 07

OTHER ISSUES AND IMPRESSIONS

14. GORBACHEV AND THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY. GORBACHEV SEEMED

BUOYED BY THE LACK OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE OR COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS YESTERDAY. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE INCIDENT ON RED SQUARE AND SHEVARDNADZE DOWNPLAYED IT. GORBACHEV FELT THAT THE REAL "SILENT MAJORITY" (HIS WORDS) HAD SPOKEN YESTERDAY BY NOT HEEDING THE CALLS FOR COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS. I WONDER IF THIS IS WISHFUL THINKING OR AN ACCURATE READING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE I HAD THE SENSE THAT THE THREAT OF CRACKDOWNS AND VIOLENCE MIGHT HAVE DIMINISHED THE CROWDS.

15. GORBACHEV'S HINTS AT THE NEED TO IMPOSE ORDER. GORBACHEV

SPOKE OF THE NEED TO CREATE TOLERANCE AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE KEY TO ACHIEVING A MARKET ECONOMY. HOWEVER, HE ALSO SAID THERE WAS A YEARNING FOR ORDER AND STABILITY AND SAID SOME "TOUGH STEPS MIGHT BE NEEDED. WE COULDN'T SACRIFICE THE REFORM PROCESS FOR THE SAKE OF SOMEONE'S AMBITIONS OR ACCEPT THE DISINTEGRATION OF OUR SOCIETY." HE SAID A FINE LINE HAD TO BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN MOVING FORWARD AND PRESERVING STABILITY. I NOTED THAT WAS A LINE THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN. WHILE HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REJECT THE CONSERVATIVE ABILITY TO EXPLOIT THE DESIRE FOR STABILITY, I WAS UNEASY ABOUT THE TONE AND DIRECTION OF THESE COMMENTS. I DON'T KNOW IF THEY PRESAGE SOME KIND OF CRACKDOWN, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY.

16. GETTING FOOD FROM THE OUTSIDE FOR THE WINTER. GORBACHEV

NOTED A PARADOX: MOVING TOWARD THE MARKET HAD LED COLLECTIVE FARMERS TO WITHHOLD THEIR PRODUCE FROM CERTAIN AREAS AND CITIES, REQUIRING THE CENTER TO HOLD FOOD RESERVES AS A KIND OF INSURANCE POLICY. HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE GERMANS AND OTHER EUROPEANS FOR EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPLIES ON A CREDIT OR GRANT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 07

BASIS FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE SAID HE MIGHT BE COMING TO US ONCE HE KNEW HIS NEEDS BETTER. HE'D BE INTERESTED IN SOYBEANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS. AND WE MAY WANT TO LOOK AT WHAT WE COULD DO IF WE DECIDE TO BE RESPONSIVE.

17. ARMS CONTROL. I THINK WE'VE FINALLY CLOSED OUT THE

NETTLESOME CFE ISSUES. BUT EVERY TIME YOU THINK YOU'VE SETTLED EVERYTHING, SOMETHING ELSE CROPS UP. IN ANY CASE, I THINK -- AND HOPE -- WE'VE FINALLY DONE IT. ON START, WE CLOSED OUT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE, AND MAY, WITH SOME EFFORT, BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES IN OUR NEXT MINISTERIAL. THAT WOULD PUT US ON TRACK FOR A JANUARY SUMMIT. (GORBACHEV IS EAGER TO NAIL DOWN THE SUMMIT DATE, BUT JOKED THAT A MID-JANUARY SUMMIT MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTING GIVEN WHAT WE MIGHT BE DOING IN THE GULF AT THAT TIME.)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/27/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0845-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0845-MR

2/25/2014 MM

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY SENSITIVE
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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.

DEAR BRENT:

I DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ANATOL' IY CHERNYAEV, WHO PROMISED TO GET
IT TO GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY.

I REVIEWED FOR CHERNYAEV THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE RESOLUTION. IN
RESPONSE, CHERNYAEV DID NOT SAY WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO
THE COURSE WE ARE PROPOSING, BUT NOTED THAT:

-- GORBACHEV WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY
BAKER, AND WITH THE CONVERSATIONS THAT BAKER HAD WITH SHEVARDNADZE
ON THE PERSIAN GULF;

-- GORBACHEV REALIZES HOW IMPORTANT OUR COOPERATION IS IN THIS AREA,
AND AGREES THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER.

CHERNAYEV TOOK NOTE OF THE P.S., AND SAID GORBACHEV WILL BE HAPPY TO
SEE IT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE SOONER WE HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE KIND
OF HELP THAT IS NEEDED, THE BETTER WE CAN CONSIDER HOW TO ADDRESS IT.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE TWO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE ANY REQUEST COULD BE SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED: (1) THE PRACTICAL MEANS TO DELIVER FOOD TO WHERE IT IS
NEEDED AND (2) A MECHANISM TO PREVENT DIVERSION TO THE BLACK MARKET.
CHERNAYEV AGREED AND SAID THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO
DO. HE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT IF THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT SATISFACTOR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

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RESOLVED THE AID WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE AND WOULD, MOREOVER, DISCREDIT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. AND WOULD GET BACK TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DECL: OADR.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Anatoliy Chernyayev, Aide to CPSU General Secretary

DATE, TIME September 9, 1990, 1000 - 1245
AND PLACE: Helsinki, Finland

The President: Good to see you again.

President Gorbachev: Despite the fact that we are all here through difficult circumstances, I am glad to see you.

The President: I think that our agreement at Camp David for this kind of meeting is good and public opinion is playing this meeting well.

President Gorbachev: I have said at the airport that we are in constant touch but sometimes personal contact is necessary.

The President: I agree. I don't know how you want to proceed. I think it is wonderful signal to the world that the US and the Soviet Union have been proceeding in concert on the Gulf. Do you want to start -- or I would be happy to proceed.

President Gorbachev: I accept your proposal to proceed. See how easy I am.

The President: So far we have had good cooperation. I know it is not easy for you because of your long standing relations with Iraq. But I think there is an opportunity to have develop out of this tragedy a new world order. But the bottom line for a new world order must be that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to profit from his aggression. I am not sure he yet knows that the

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0843-MR
ES 6/6/13

US is determined to prevail. I hope you will get word to him that we can't afford to fail in implementing the resolutions of the UN. We have a strategy in place that has a good chance of working. Sanctions are our preferred way of inducing him to withdraw and allow the return of Kuwait's leaders. I do not want this to escalate and I do not want to use force. I know you agree. But if he does not withdraw, he must know the status quo is unacceptable. He is dismantling Kuwait right now. In this the Congress and our people will support me. What he is doing to innocent civilians--perhaps not Soviet--is unconscionable. You should tell him I will not deviate because of people forced to stay in target installations. That is Nuremburg Trial material. I would like to feel you and I can discuss this matter so fully that if in the end 23 countries are forced to move on to other measures that you would support them. That may be difficult for you but I would hope that you could do that. I want to tell you I am worried about our people in Kuwait too. But let me make just a couple more observations. The press asked me if I would ask you to send forces. I said I had no such plans, but I tell you if you so decide, I have no problem with that. Let me tell you, I have no plans to leave US forces in the Gulf. I don't want a military presence in the Gulf. There is no plan direct or indirect to keep our forces there. Any residual security presence to keep Saddam Hussein under control should be multilateral. Our people wouldn't support huge permanent presence. Lets get the difficult issues out on the table. US people wonder about Soviet advisors in Iraq. You would benefit hugely in the US by taking those advisors out. I'm getting all my cards on the table, one more point. US tradition is to say the Soviets have no role to play in the Middle East. The Soviet Union obviously disagreed with that. I think Saddam Hussein would have a clear victory if he could mix in the Arab-Israeli issue to his aggression. I assure you this traditional US policy has changed. The world order I see coming out of this is US and Soviet cooperation to solve not only this but other problems in the Middle East. And --I promise this is my last point--

President Gorbachev: Good, this is my last piece of paper.
(Laughter)

The President: The closer we can be together today, the closer the new world order, the closer the US-Soviet relationship, the closer to a solution to the Gulf crisis. I want to work with you as equal partners in dealing with this. I want to go to the American people tomorrow night to close the book on the Cold War and offer them the vision of this new world order in which we will cooperate. [cartoon showing the President and President Gorbachev smashing the Cold War]

President Gorbachev: I've written my notes over my typed notes. Here is a text of Saddam Hussein's appeal to both of us. He believes he is guided by Allah and the US by the devil. I value very much the trust I feel in your initial remarks. Indeed, I think this crisis is a test of the process we are going through in world affairs and of a new US-Soviet Union relationship. Without forgetting the scale of this conflict, I am thinking if we can't cope with this conflict, a new order can't come in. It may be that this crisis will be the stone on which we will stumble. Question is can we act and think in a new way. If not, the results are serious -- without the meeting in Malta, without the new relationship, Eastern Europe and German unification could have been much worse. It could have turned into a horrible mess. We now find ourselves with a new problem no less difficult. Let me say on Eastern Europe and Germany the main burden was on us. We had to make a major effort to end old thinking, to step over the old order and recognize new realities. I continue to explain to the Soviet people what is happening in the world and what the new thinking is all about. It is not easy for us -- some analysts in the West make things more difficult for us in the way they put things. But the bulk of Soviet people have accepted the new way of thinking. In the Gulf, the US is in a more difficult position. I understand that, perhaps more than our people, I understand something about US. Your people expect you to act decisively and win. Both our peoples expect quick results. So I understand the situation you face. But let me emphasize that in this new world US-Soviet Union cooperation is essential. We see your difficulty and let me say we sympathize and respect your thinking. This is important. That is, zero-sum thinking is over. I've said to Dole that what we are doing in the Soviet Union is for us but also good for the US, because for a new world the US needs a strong confident Soviet Union. You should not doubt our position is firm. We have condemned Iraqi aggression and supported the UN. We are as one here. But it was difficult for us at first because you first decided to send forces and then told us. That made it difficult. Perhaps it happened that way because this process is new.

The President: I can accept that as constructive criticism. We weren't trying to do it behind your back, but I can accept I should have called you and told you I was going to do it.

President Gorbachev: But later on, we were able to act shoulder to shoulder to mobilize the world community and that's a big achievement. That has given very different appearance to the forces and that is good. But there must be some kind of arrangements to manage this new order. But you have taken the -- main burden of dealing with Iraqi aggression. Here is the core of my thinking. The danger to Saudi Arabia is passed. The world community has condemned Iraq aggression. Structure of world oil

has been protected. These are strategic goals which have been achieved. Things are now functioning normally but problem of Kuwait hasn't been solved. It must be solved. We--like you--have given a lot of thought to this. From your comments I get three main points:

1. Kuwait problem must be solved.
2. You want US forces withdrawn.
3. You prefer non-military solution.

I think we all -- especially you -- are under great pressure to be decisive. I agree, but if that means military action -- therein lies danger. We have put big intelligence effort -- we decided military option unacceptable and should be to you as well. But that is insufficient. Let me explain. If Iraq doesn't attack Saudi Arabia or Israel, the US would be the initiator of war, if Iraq doesn't attack further.

The President: You mean if hostilities are launched without provocation?

President Gorbachev: Yes. His main forces -- as Akromeyev has shown me -- are not facing Saudi Arabia. If you must defeat his main forces -- in Iraq -- that's an enormous conflict, like Afghanistan and Vietnam. People in both our countries would begin to say President has gotten entangled in a mess, since oil is flowing -- there should have been a better way. Many casualties. If the region ceases to function the economic consequences could be enormous. Saudi oil income is greater than before the crisis, though it is having trouble finding dollars for your troops. But if the region is destroyed, we would be in hell, all of us. And also, Saddam Hussein has some sympathy in the Arab world. Man in the street thinks he is a man not afraid of US. If the region is destroyed, the heartland of Arab world, they will turn against you. Also we, you and the Europeans have mentality different from Muslims. We can't appear to desecrate their shrines without terrible results. As an aside, it is good that both you and us have recognized Islam fundamentalism is a problem which must be dealt with sensitively.

The President: You assume Saddam Hussein has Arab world with him. He is trying, but I think, with one-half Arab world in Egypt, he is failing in those attempts.

President Gorbachev: I think it is not quite so. Recent meetings have shown criticism of Saddam Hussein in Arab meetings have lessened. In Govts, yes, but in public opinion it is less so. Mubarak and Assad could find themselves in difficult positions. Great forces could be set in motion from beneath. Let me be frank. Even in West there is some weariness. If

things get difficult, even they may want to distance themselves. Now there is unity in Security Council but it could be broken. China, for example, won't join us. US will greatly suffer if things go that way -- so for all these reasons we must look for a different way. Of course, Saddam Hussein will not just leave Kuwait. In our recent contacts, all have spoken of necessity for strict observance of embargo. Situation in Iraq changing too, despite Saddam Hussein comments. He will have to take more sober look at situation. Our experts -- we have many on Iraq -- say that only one option accepts the use of force; that is, if he attacks Saudi Arabia or Jordan.

The President: Suppose he lobbs SCUD into Israel.

President Gorbachev: That would be very difficult situation. I don't think he will do that. But we can't leave the situation as is. Primakov knows Saddam Hussein personally. All believe backing Saddam Hussein into a corner is wrong. He must be allowed to save face. Morally it is complex situation. So what is possible as an option? We have been thinking about mutually interconnected measures. First, Iraq withdraws and frees foreign citizens, and at same time all (anti-Iraq governments with force contributions) say to UNSC that they would not attack Iraq. If things go by these two declarations, withdrawal would take place under UN, with peacekeeping force to replace Iraqi troops. US could begin, symbolically, (i.e., only a small number) to reduce its forces in Saudi Arabia, to be replaced by Arab forces -- just as Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait. UN would suspend enforcement resolutions and when Iraqi forces withdrawn would cancel them. The essence of this plan is that if Saddam Hussein rejects it he will unmask himself and prevent rising sympathy for him in Arab world. There is this problem. Saddam Hussein wants to link all the Middle East problems -- Gulf, Israel, Lebanon. He is gaining in this effort; exploiting this he appears as champion of Arab against Israel. We should try to turn the tables on him and play this card ourselves. There was support for an international conference which you made, attended by all Arab states. This would make it possible to discuss, first the problem of Kuwait, then Israel and Lebanon and finally a security system for the region. In some European capitals there is interest in this kind of solution. If Israel would agree to such a conference as a second stage we would rapidly establish diplomatic relations with them. Of course Saddam Hussein could reject this plan. But since this plan also includes the Palestinian issue, he would be rejecting the West Bank issue and unmask himself as being just selfish, not as an Arab protector. If this plan is adopted or sanctions enforced, Saddam Hussein source for maneuver would be constricted. We have discussed the issue of a blockade -- that impossible to maintain without the threat of force. That a necessary problem but we think the

blockade can be made more strict. So far Saddam Hussein has exploited claim US and Soviet Union trying to starve Iraq women and children, etc., and this getting more sympathy in Arab world. In this plan, we could provide for discussions between, Kuwait and Iraq -- some kind of elections and perhaps payment. This would prevent him from exploiting the present situation. Saddam Hussein may reject this plan. But if something like this is proposed, it would show us in joint action, giving peace a chance and prevent him from taking advantage of it. Wouldn't have to be this precise plan. Let me say the Soviet advisors are not military specialists. They are being reduced from 193 to 150. These specialists are there under contract.

The President: We had people -- like Bechtel -- there under contract, but under UN resolutions we consider those contracts void.

President Gorbachev: We are reducing the number, and by scaling down contracts we will have loss of \$1.2 billion. To conclude, let me say we are acting in pursuit of our joint objectives and on basis of the joint decision we have taken together. We are completely with you on this. You have made a number of interesting points in your remarks and we will be responding to them. I agree with you we should go out of these talks showing our joint commitment to a common cause and our determination to resolve this situation. In his speech, Saddam Hussein says he hasn't attacked either of our countries and it was British colonialists who separated Kuwait from Iraq. He also says Panama was invaded without the UN taking action. Why are you ganging up on us. (Reads more of the speech.)

The President: Bullshit. He also says I am pork-eater. He's right. A couple of comments. I think Saddam Hussein would jump at your plan and I think the world would take it as a big defeat for the world. He is trying to link his actions to the intractable problem of Arabs-Israelis and he can't use this to cover his own aggression. There is one place I differ with your experts. I don't think he stands as a symbol of Arab vs infidel. His aggression is obvious and he hasn't been able to coopt Assad, Mubarak or even a majority of the Arab league. These people tell me he doesn't speak for the Arab World. I don't think he is 20 feet tall. Any agreement on a plan which left Kuwait issue open would be a major defeat for the collective action which has gotten us so far.

President Gorbachev: But -- central point is he must leave Kuwait. But we think he would reject it.

The President: Why. He gets what he wants. Still has nuclear program and can return to aggression as soon as US leaves.

President Gorbachev: No. Arab peacekeeping, he leaves Kuwait, recognizes Kuwaiti leaders.

The President: Those are positives. The Kuwaiti leaders are preserved, in your plans?

President Gorbachev: It reestablishes Kuwaiti regime. Further is up to Kuwaiti people.

The President: But the leadership is restored?

President Gorbachev: Yes.

The President: Then maybe he wouldn't reject. We'd love to find a peaceful solution.

President Gorbachev: Let us try to tinker with some such plans. It suggested by some Arabs like Maghreb and if we can get something are better off. Nothing happening now and military action would appear as aggression.

The President: He is now dismantling Kuwait.

President Gorbachev: I think this is why we should act quickly. Force would destroy what we have achieved. If current situation drags on without steps we will have lost initiative. Here we could say we are acting in responsible way by suggesting ways to solve the problem. (Discussion on the point about the return of Kuwaiti regime.)

President Gorbachev: Kuwaiti rulers would return and begin negotiations. That's why he will reject the plan.

The President: Let's assume he rejects the plan. What next?

President Gorbachev: Then we would continue the political and economic pressure but he couldn't appear as the leader of the Arabs. He would then be isolated.

The President: If he accepts the plan, he withdraws from Kuwait, the leaders return and he gets a conference on Israel and US troops out of Saudi Arabia.

President Gorbachev: US troops would all leave only after international guarantees are in place.

The President: I have one more worry. Whatever comes out of our meetings can't be a US-Soviet Union plan. That would look like condominium of just the two of us trying to find a solution. But

the idea is interesting and we must do some thinking. One more worry. He is corruptible and likely to do something -- like terrorist act. He could guarantee US response if he determined to do so. My Arab friends say he is vicious, unpredictable and I am worried he might do something.

President Gorbachev: We can't act as if US-Soviet Union solving the problem. But if we can do nothing why do we meet.

The President: I agree.

President Gorbachev: If we devise some idea we both like we can figure out how to get it introduced.

The President: I agree. I just wanted to point out we must be sensitive to this point. But I totally agree with what you said and the advantages if we can get together on something.

President Gorbachev: I think today we could say we had wide ranging discussion and that we think it possible to find solution which would prevent even worse developments.

The President: I agree except we should say "look for." I not sure we can find such a plan.

President Gorbachev: Now, what kind of a man he is. Your characterization of Saddam Hussein is identical to ours. But these personality characteristics will be most realized if he is backed into a corner. If we give him some window to climb out we have a chance. If he sees such a chance he won't act in a provocative manner. Instead he will seize that chance, so we could show two sides of some coin -- show our joint action and decisiveness in this crisis but leave public opinion with realization we are trying to find a way out without military action, casualties, etc.

The President: I would like to go the extra mile for peace but we must not undermine the UN collective action. For example, some Americans propose elections in Kuwait. If we have that as a condition we diminish the collective decision we have already taken. If Kuwaiti people subsequently decide something different, that is something else. This aggression so clear that if he is rewarded it will set a terrible precedent for the future. He cannot be allowed to proceed.

President Gorbachev: But if he gets nothing at all, if he is backed into a corner, it will be more costly for us all. We need to give him some daylight. Let's give the impression that he not on his knees -- though he would be because he would not succeed.

The President: If we had offered Hitler way out, would it have succeeded?

President Gorbachev: Not the same situation.

The President: Only in personality.

President Gorbachev: We have to choose. We don't have many options. I believe that you who have achieved so much here, avoid a costly conflict with possible destruction of oil, that would be tremendous victory. We could throw our weight around, but we must choose. If we throw him a carrot, we will win, establish the role of international law (UN), our cooperation and avoid serious conflict.

The President: I agree completely. We must though have a way in which does not incite future aggression. Much of what you propose does that. Only problem is if Israel part appears like a victory for aggression.

President Gorbachev: No. This is not a carrot. The carrot is engaging him in a political process. This is a carrot. We would recognize him as a partner. If we don't include Israel, he could say he proposed a comprehensive plan and we rejected it. If we propose it and he rejects it, he will unmask himself. If he accepts, we will solve the Gulf problem, take steps to resolve Arab-Israel issue and Soviet Union will immediately recognize Israel.

The President: There is already a conference in being on Kuwait -- the UNSC, which has behaved magnificently.

President Gorbachev: This too would be in the UN format. Participation would include UNSC and the Arabs -- very strong participation. If he rejects he isolates himself and we gain time. He loses in the eyes of the world -- looks like a maniac with whom the world can't deal. Of course, before we discuss plan with others we could probe him -- don't present plan but probe to see what leverage exists.

The President: That could be useful in any course. Mubarak will tell you Saddam can't withdraw.

President Gorbachev: Assad will say the same.

The President: He says if he withdraws he is finished. Where we may differ is I don't think we need further evidence of unreasonableness. You assume he will turn it down and prove unreasonableness.

President Gorbachev: But if he accepts, the process would begin.

The President: You see the withdrawals being completed and then a conference on Middle East, right?

President Gorbachev: There will be agreement on Conference and format and based on that the process will begin. We tie this in at initial stage -- release civilians and announce withdrawal and US announces it will not attack Iraq. US force withdrawal would be token, while Iraqi withdrawal takes place complete with replacement by Arab forces. US withdrawal would take place only when security situation is in place.

The President: We will look at this carefully. Brent have I left anything out.

Brent Scowcroft: If he rejects the plan can we just continue a stalemate indefinitely.

President Gorbachev: We would have shifted opinion and internal processes I think would remove him.

The President: What about claims we starving women and children.

President Gorbachev: We must look at that and medicine.

The President: But it should be done under international processes so he couldn't profit by it. How we doing on time for this meeting.

President Gorbachev: Badly.

The President: One unrelated point. Kohl asked me to come to the unification ceremony on October 3. That is very tough for me. Elections coming and I already cancelled a trip to Latin America. What is your view on the importance of the event? If I don't go is that a problem for you?

President Gorbachev: No, I don't think so. I too am extremely busy. I'm in domestic battle in moving to market economy and union treaty. Difficult for me to get there. I also told Kohl I recognize the importance and would consult with you.

The President: Unless you or Kohl makes really strong appeal I will tell him I cannot attend.

President Gorbachev: If you can't go, I won't.

The President: Our position on this should not be different. Are you going to Children's Conference?

President Gorbachev: No. We must think about your visit to the Soviet Union. On START and CFE I think we can conclude OK. We might say to press we have problems but we feel we can have positive outcome by end of year.

The President: I would like to tell Baker to get the bureaucrats moving.

President Gorbachev: You use the term "bureaucrats." I say "experts."

The President: I suspect we both mean the same thing.

K/Corbachow 9/9/90

- P. Good to see you again
- G. Despite just how far here
thru big circus, I glad
to see you
- P. I think that once agreement
at CD for this kind of reality
is gone & public opinion is
plugging this very well
- G. I have said it is not that
we are in constant contact but
sometimes personal contact
is necessary
- P. I agree. Don't know how you
want to proceed. I think it
is wonderful sign to be aware
that US & SU ~~at~~ have been
proceeding in concert on a Gulf
Do you want to start - or I would
be happy to proceed
- G. I accept your proposal to ^{proceed} ~~proceed~~
see how easy it is
- P. So far we have had good crops
I know it not easy for you
because space big & land
relations w/ Iraq. But I think
there is opportunity to handle
disputes of this type in
new world order. But
let's live for new world

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this is last point

C Good, this is my last point
of paper

D The closer we can be together
today, a closer & new world
order, a closer US-SU relations
a closer to solution to conflicts
I want to work w/ you as an
equal partner in dealing
w/ this. I want to go
to an people transaction target
to close a book on Cold War
+ offer them a revision of
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which we will cooperate.

Cartoon showing P46 smushing
cold war

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my typed notes, here is a text
of what happened to both of us. He
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From your comments I get 3
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this getting more sympathy in Arab
world. In this plan, we could
provide for desamoyon out, Kuwait
& Iraq - some kind of elections &
perhaps payment. This would
~~prevent~~ prevent him from exploiting

a present set. \$N may reject this plan. But if something like this is proposed, it would show us in joint action, giving peace a chance and prevent him from taking advantage of it. Wouldn't have to be this precise plan.

Let me say a few admissions are not military specialists. They are being reduced: from 193 to 130. These specialists are there under contract.

P We had people - like Bechtel - there under contract, but under US we consider those contracts void.

G We are reducing a #, and by scaling down contracts we will have less of 1.2 bil dollars.

To conclude, let me say we are acting in pursuit of our joint objectives & on basis of a joint decision we have taken together. We are completely w/you on this. You have made a # of interesting points in your remarks & we will be responding to them. I agree w/you we should go out of these talks showing our joint commitment to a common cause &

our determination to resolve this
nit.

In his speech, SA^H says he
hasn't attacked either of our
countries & it was GB colonialists
who separated Kuwait from Iraq.
He also says Panama invaded w/o
UN action, why you ganging up
on us. (Reels were spoken)

P Bullshit. He also says I am
pariah state. He's right.

12? C caught comments. I think SA^H
would jump at your plan & I
think world would take it as being
defeat for a world. He is trying
to link his actions to a withdrawal
prob of A-I & he can't use this
to cover his own aggression.

One place I differ w/ your
expect. I don't think he stands
as symbol of Arab unified.
His aggression is divided & he
hasn't been able to coopt Assad,
Mubarak or even majority of
Arab League. These people tell
me he doesn't speak for Arab
world. I don't think he 20'
Tall. Any agreement or plan
which left Kuwait covered

open could be a major threat
for a collective action which
has gotten us so far.

G But - central point is he
must leave Kuwait. But
we think he would reject it.

P Why. He gets what he wants.
Still has nuclear & can return
to aggression as soon as US leave

G No. Only peacekeeping, he
leaves Kuwait, leaving K leaders

P There are positives. Kuwait
leaders are preserved, in your
plan?

G It reestablishes K regime. Further
is up to K people

P But K leadership is restored?

G Yes

P Then maybe he would not agree.
We'd love to find a peaceful
solution.

G Let us try to think w/ some
new plan. It suggested by
some UNs like Dag Hammarskjöld
if we can get something as better
off. Nothing happening now &
no action would appear as
aggression

P He was documenting Kuwait

G I think this is why we should act forcefully. Force would destroy what we have achieved. If current sit down w/o steps we will have lost initiative. Here we could say we are acting in very way by suggesting comp to solve a prob.

(Discussion on period of return of K. regime)

G Kuwait rulers would return & begin negot. But why he will reject a plan.

P lets assume he rejects a plan. What next?

G Then we would continue a political & economic pressure that he couldn't appear as a leader of a Arabs. He would then be isolated.

P If he accepts a plan, he withdraws from Kuwait, & leaders return & he gets a conf on I deal & US troops out of SA.

G US troops would all leave only after with guarantees are in place

P I have one more worry. Whatever comes out of our mtg could be a US-SU plan. That would look like condemnation of just a 2 yr try to find a solution. But a

idea is interesting & we must
do some thinking.

One more worry. He is unstable
& likely to do something - like
Terrorist act. He could guarantee
US response if he determined to
do so. My Arab friends say
he is vicious, unpredictable & I
wondered he might do something

G We can't act as if US-SU solving
a prob. But if we can do within
why do we wait

P I agree

G If we devise some idea we both
like we can figure out how
to get it introduced

P I agree. I just wanted to point out
we must be sensitive to this point
But I totally agree w/ what you
said & advantages if we can
get together on something.

G I think today we could say
we had wide ranging discussion
& that we think it possible to
find solution which would
prevent even worse delays

P I agree except we should
say "look for". I don't see
why we can find a solution

G Now, what kind of man he is.
Your characterization of SH is identical
to ours. But this personality will
be most realized if he be pushed
into a corner. If a guy like him
somehow to climb out we
have a chance. If he sees such
a chance he won't act in provoked
manner. Instead he will seize
that chance. So we could show
a little of same coin - show some
joint action & decisions in
this crisis but leave part of him
w/ realization we trying to find
a way out w/o military action,
casualties, etc.

P I don't go for extra rule for
peace but we must not
undermine a UN collective
action. For example, some
Americans propose ~~decisions~~
in Kuwait. If we have that as
a condition we diminish a
collective decision we have
already taken. If K people
subsequently decide something
diff, that something else. Thus
a suggestion to clear that if
he is rewarded it will

- set a terrible ^{precedent} ~~precedent~~ for a future.
He cannot be allowed to prevail.
- G But if he gets nothing at all, if
he backed into corner, it will
be more costly for us all. We need
to give him some daylight. Let's
give impression he got on his
knees - tho he would be because
he would not succeed.
- P If we had offered Hitler a way
out would it have succeeded?
- G Not a chance
- P Only in personality.
- G We have to choose. We don't have
many options. I believe that you
who have achieved so much here
avoid a costly conflict or possible
destruction of all, that would be tremendous
reversal. We could throw our weight
around, but we must choose. If
we throw him a carrot, we
will win, estab a role of int'l
law (UN), our coop, & avoid
serious conflict.
- P I agree completely. We must tho
have a way which does not
invite future aggression. Even
if what you propose does that.
Only prob is if Israel part.

appears like a rusty dagger in
G the. This is not a carrot. The carrot
is engaging him in a political
process. This is a carrot. We
would recognize him as a partner. If we
don't include I, he could say he
proposed comprehensive plan & we
rejected it. If we propose it & he
rejects it, he will embarrass him-
self. If he accepts, we will solve
a huge prob, take steps to resolve
A-D issues & we will immediately
recognize it as real.

P There is already a conf in being
on Kuwait - & UN^{SC}, which has
behaved magnificently

G This too would be in CUN format
Participation would include UNSC
& a draft - very strong participation
If he rejects he isolates himself
& not gain time. He loses in
eyes of a world - looks like a maniac
w/ whom a world can't deal. Of course
before we discuss plan w/ others
we could probe him - don't
present plan but probe to see
what leverage exists

P That would be useful in any
course. Ambassador will tell you

can't w/draw

G Assad will say a word.

P If he w/draws he is finished.
Where we may differ is I don't
think we need further
evidence of reasonableness.
You assume he will turn it
down + more unreasonable.

G But if he accepts, a process would
begin.

P You see a w/drawals being
completed + then a conf on N.E.,
right?

G Then will be agreement on conf
+ permit + based on that a process
will begin. We tie this in at
initial stage - release civilians +
announce w/drawal + US announces
it will not attack Iraq. US force
w/drawal would be taken, while
Iraqi w/drawal complete w/replace-
ment by Arab force. US w/drawal
would take place only when security
situation is in place.

P Best, have I left out? We will look
at this carefully. Best have I left
anything out?

S If he rejects a plan can we just
continue a stalemate indefinitely?

G we would have shifted opinion
& internal processes & I think would
remove him

P What about claims re starving
women & children

G we must look at that & medicine

P But it should be done under intl
processes so he couldn't profit
by it.

How's our doing out there

G Badly

P Our unrelated point. Kohl
asked me to come on Oct 3. This
very tough. Elections coming &
already can't trip to ~~USA~~ H.A.
What is your view on im-
portance? If I don't go is that
a prob for you

G No, I don't think so. I'm ~~am~~
extremely busy. I'm democratic
bottle is moving to - which
everybody & serious treaty. Diff
for me to get there. I also told
Kohl I really can't go & work
on consult w/ you

P Unless you or Kohl makes real
strong appeal I will tell him
I can't attend

G If you can't go I won't.

Our position on this should not
be diff.

Are you going to Children's Care?
G No. We must think about
a year more to a S.C. On
start + C.F.E. I think we can
conclude it. We might say
to pass we have provided. I feel
we can have positive outcomes
by next year.

P I should like to tell Bob to
get a bureaucracy, naming

G ~~to~~ You use a term "bureaucrats."
~~to~~ I say "experts."

P I suspect we both mean a same
thing.

P/Gorbachev -- 9/9/90

P: Good to see you again.

G: Despite the fact that we are all here through difficult circumstances, I am glad to see you.

P: I think that our agreement at Camp David for this kind of meeting is good and public opinion is playing this meeting well.

G: I have said *at the airport* ----- that we are in constant touch but sometimes personal contact is necessary.

P: I agree. I don't know how you want to proceed. I think it is wonderful signal to the world that the US and the Soviet Union have been proceeding *in concert* on the Gulf. Do you want to start -- or I would be happy to proceed.

G: I accept your proposal to proceed. See how easy I am.

P: So far we have had good cooperation. I know it is not easy for you because of your long standing relations with Iraq. But I think there is an opportunity to have *develop* ... out of this *tragedy* ... *the new* world order. But the bottom line for a new world order must be that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to profit from his aggression. I am not sure he yet knows that the US is determined to prevail. I hope you will get word to him that we can't afford

in
 to fail, implementing the resolutions of the UN. We have a strategy in place that has a good chance of working. Sanctions are our preferred way of inducing him to withdraw and allow the return of Kuwait's leaders. I do not want this to escalate and I do not want to use force. I know you agree. But if he does not withdraw, he must know the status quo is unacceptable. He is dismantling Kuwait right now. In this the Congress and our people will support me. What he is doing to innocent civilians--perhaps not Soviet--is unconscionable. You should tell him I will not deviate because of people force to *stay in target installations--* that is Nuremburg Trial material. I would like to feel you and I can discuss this matter so fully that if in the end 23 countries are forced to move on to other measures that you would support them. That may be difficult for you but I would hope that you could do that. I want to tell you I am worried about our people in Kuwait too. But let me make just a couple more observations. The press asked me if I would ask you to send forces. I said I had no such plans, but I tell you if you so decide, I have no problem with that. Let me tell you, I have no plans to leave US forces in the Gulf. I don't want a military presence in the Gulf. There is no plan direct or indirect to keep our forces there. *residual* Any security presence to keep Saddam Hussein under control should be *multilateral* ~~unilateral~~. Our people wouldn't support huge permanent presence. Lets get the difficult issues out on the table. US people wonder about Soviet advisors in Iraq. You would benefit hugely in the US by taking those advisors out. I'm getting all my cards on the

table, ~~-----~~ *one more point.* US tradition is to say the Soviets have no role to play in the Middle East. The Soviet Union obviously disagreed with that. I think Saddam Hussein would have a ^{clear} ~~chance~~ victory if he could mix in ^{the} Arab-Israel issue to his aggression. I assure you this traditional US policy has changed. The world order I see coming out of this is ~~X~~ US and Soviet cooperation to solve not only this but other problems in the Middle East. And --I promise this is my last point--

G: Good, this is my last piece of paper. *(Laughter)*

P: The closer we can be together today, the closer the new world order, the closer the US-Soviet relationship, the closer to a solution to the Gulf crisis. I want to work with you as equal partners in dealing with this. I want to go to the American people tomorrow night to close the book on the Cold War and offer them the vision of this new world order in which we will cooperate. [cartoon showing the President and President Gorbachev smashing the Cold War]

G: I've written my notes over my typed notes. Here is a text of Saddam Hussein's appeal to both of us. He believes he is guided by Allah and the US by the devil. I value very much the trust I feel in your initial remarks. Indeed, I think this crisis is a test of the process we are going through in world affairs and of a new US-Soviet Union relationship.

Without forgetting the scale of this conflict, I am thinking if we can't cope with this conflict, a new order can't come in. It may be that this crisis will be the stone on which we will stumble. Question is can we ^{act and} ~~actually~~ ⁱⁿ think there is a new way. If not, the results are serious -- without the meeting in Malta, without the new relationship, Eastern Europe and German unification could have been much worse. It could have turned into a horrible mess. We now find ^{ourselves} with a new problem no less ^{difficult,} ~~different~~. Let me say on Eastern Europe and Germany the main burden was on us. We had to make a major effort to end old thinking, to step over the old order and recognize new realities. I continue to explain to the Soviet people what is happening in the world and what the new thinking is all about. It is not easy for us -- some ^{analysts} ~~-----~~ in the West make things more difficult for us in the way they put things. But the bulk of Soviet people have accepted the new way of thinking. In the Gulf, the US is in a more difficult position. I understand that, perhaps more than our people, I understand something about US. Your people expect you to act decisively and win. Both our peoples expect quick results. So I understand the situation you face. But let me emphasize that in this new world US-Soviet Union cooperation is essential. We see your difficulty and let me say we sympathize and respect your thinking. This is important. That is, zero-sum thinking is over. I've said to Dole that what we are doing in the

Soviet Union is for us but also good for the US, because for a new world the US needs a strong confident Soviet Union. You should not doubt our position is ^{firm.} ~~fierce.~~ We have condemned Iraqi aggression and supported the UN. We are as one here. But it ^{was} ~~is~~ difficult for us at first because you first decided to send forces and then told us. That made it difficult. Perhaps it happened that way because this process is new.

P: I can accept that as constructive criticism. We weren't trying to do it behind your back, but I can accept I should have called you and told you I was going to do it.

G: But later on, we were able to act ^{shoulder to shoulder} ~~to~~ mobilize the world community and that's a big achievement. That has given very different appearance to the forces and that is good. But there must be some kind of arrangements to manage this new order. But you have taken the ^{main} ~~-----~~ burden of dealing with Iraqi aggression. Here is the core of my thinking. ^{The} Danger to Saudi Arabia is passed. The world community has condemned Iraq aggression. Structure of world oil has been protected. These are strategic goals which have been achieved. Things are now functioning normally but problem of Kuwait hasn't been solved. It must be solved. We -- like you -- have given a lot of thought to this. From your comments I get three main points:

1. Kuwait problem must be solved.
2. You want US forces withdrawn.
3. You prefer ~~-----~~ ^{non-military} solution.

I think we all -- especially you -- are under great pressure to be decisive. I agree, but if that means ~~militarism~~ ^{military action} -- therein lies ~~the~~ danger. We have put big intelligence effort -- we decided military option unacceptable and should be to you as well. But that is insufficient. Let me explain. If Iraq doesn't attack Saudi Arabia or Israel, the US would be the initiator of war, -- if Iraq doesn't attack further.

P: You mean if hostilities are launched without provocation?

G: Yes. His main forces -- as ^{Abromeyer} ----- has shown me -- are not facing Saudi Arabia. If you must defeat his main forces -- in Iraq -- that's an enormous conflict, like Afghanistan and Vietnam. People in both our countries would begin to say President has gotten entangled in a mess, since oil is flowing -- there should have been a better way. Many casualties. If the region ceases to function the ~~enormous~~ ^{economic} consequences could be enormous. Saudi oil income is greater than before the crisis, though it is having trouble ^{funding} ~~funding~~ dollars for your troops. But if the region is destroyed, we

would be in hell, all of us. And also, Saddam Hussein has some sympathy in the Arab world. Man in the street thinks he is a man not afraid of US. If the region is destroyed, the heartland of Arab world, they will turn against you. Also we, you and ^{the} Europeans have mentality different from Muslims. We can't ^{appear to} desecrate their shrines without terrible results. As an aside, it is good that both you and us have recognized Islam fundamentalism is a problem which must be dealt with sensitively.

P: You assume Saddam Hussein has Arab world with him. He is trying, but I think, with 1/2 Arab world in Egypt, he is failing in those attempts.

G: I think it is not quite so. Recent meetings have shown criticism of Saddam Hussein in Arab meetings have lessened. In Govts, yes, but in public opinion it is less so. Mubarak and Assad could ^{find themselves} ~~first ch-----~~ ^{difficult} in different positions. Great forces could be set in motion from beneath. Let me be frank. Even in West there is some weariness. If things get difficult, even they may want to distance themselves. Now there is unity in Security Council but it could be broken. China, for example, won't join us. US will greatly suffer if things go that way -- so for all these reasons we must look for a different way. Of course, Saddam Hussein will not just leave Kuwait. In our recent contacts, all have

spoken of necessity for strict observance of embargo. Situation in Iraq changing too, despite Saddam Hussein comments. He will have to take more sober look at situation. Our experts -- we have many on Iraq -- ^{say that} only one option accepts the use of force; ^{that is,} if he attacks Saudi Arabia or Jordan.

P: Suppose he lobbs SCUD into Israel.

G: That would be very difficult situation. I don't think he will do that. But we can't leave the situation as is.

Primakov knows Saddam Hussein personally. All believe ~~to~~ ^{backing} bring Saddam Hussein into a corner is wrong. He must be allowed to save face. Morally it is complex situation. So what is possible as an option? We have been thinking about ^{mutually interconnected measures. First,} ----- ~~-----~~. ~~If~~ Iraq withdraws and frees foreign citizens, and at same time all, ^(anti-Iraq but with force contributions) say to UNSC that they would not attack Iraq. If things go by these two declarations, withdrawal would take place under UN, with peacekeeping ^{To replace Iraqi troops,} force, ^(i.e., only a small number) US could begin, symbolically, ~~would begin~~ to reduce its forces in Saudi Arabia, to be replaced by Arab forces -- just as Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait. UN would suspend ^{enforcement} ~~resolutions~~ and when ^{Iraqi} forces withdrawn would ^{cancel} ~~control~~ them.

The essence of this plan is that if Saddam Hussein rejects it he will unmask himself and prevent rising sympathy for him in Arab world. There is this ^{problem,} ~~probability~~ Saddam Hussein

wants *the Middle East*
consorts to link all problems -- Gulf, Israel, Lebanon. He
is gaining in this *effort*, exploiting this he appears as champion
of Arabs against Israel. We should try to turn the tables
on him and play this card ourselves. There was support for
an international
a conference which you made, attended by all Arab states.
This would make it possible to discuss, first the problem of
Kuwait, then Israel and Lebanon and finally a security
system for the region. In some European capitals there is
interest in this kind of solution. *Israel*
If *it* would agree to such
a conference as *a second* stage we would rapidly establish *diplomatic*
relations with them. Of course Saddam Hussein could reject
this plan. But since this plan also includes the
Palestinian issue, he *would* ~~could~~ be rejecting the West Bank issue
and unmask himself as being just selfish, not as an Arab
protector. If this plan is adopted or sanctions enforced,
Saddam Hussein's source for maneuver would be constricted. We
have discussed the issue of a blockade -- that impossible *to maintain*
without the threat of force. That a necessary problem but
we think the blockade can be made more strict. So far
Saddam Hussein has exploited claim US and Soviet Union
trying to starve Iraq women and children, etc., and this
getting more sympathy in Arab world. In this plan, we could
provide for *discussions between* -----, Kuwait and Iraq -- some kind of
elections and perhaps payment. This would prevent him from
exploiting the present situation. Saddam Hussein may reject
this plan. But if something like this is proposed, it would

G: We are reducing the number, and by scaling down contracts we will have loss of \$1.2 billion. To conclude, let me say we are acting in pursuit of our joint objectives and on basis of the joint decision we have taken together. We are completely with you on this. You have made a number of interesting points in your remarks and we will be responding to them. I agree with you we should go out of these talks showing our joint ~~contract~~ ^{commitment} to a common cause and our determination to resolve this situation. In his speech, Saddam Hussein says he hasn't attacked either of our countries and it was ~~George Bush~~ ^{British} colonialists who separated Kuwait from Iraq. He also says Panama ~~involved with UN~~ ^{was invaded without} action. Why ^{are} you ^{of the} ganging up on us. (Reads more speech.)

P: Bullshit. He also says I am pork-eater. He's right. A couple of comments. I think Saddam Hussein would jump at your plan and I think the world would take it as ~~being a~~

big
 ^ defeat for the world. He is trying to link his actions to the intractable problem of Arabs-Israelis and he can't use this to cover his own aggression. *There is* One place I differ with your experts. I don't think he stands as a symbol of Arab vs *infidel* ----- . His aggression is obvious and he hasn't been able to coopt Assad, Mubarak or even a majority of *the* Arab league. These people tell me he doesn't speak for the Arab World. I don't think he is 20 feet tall. Any agreement *on a* ~~once~~ planned which left Kuwait issue open would be a major defeat for *the* a collective action which has gotten us so far.

G: But -- central point is he must leave Kuwait. But we think he would reject it.

P: Why. He gets what he wants. Still has *nuclear program* ~~wishes~~ and can return to aggression as soon as US leaves.

G: No. Arab peacekeeping, he leaves Kuwait, recognizes Kuwaiti leaders.

P: Those are positives. *The* ^ Kuwaiti leaders are preserved, in your plans?

G: It reestablishes Kuwaiti regime. Further is up to Kuwaiti people.

P: But the leadership is restored?

G: Yes.

P: Then maybe he wouldn't reject. We'd love to find a peaceful solution.

G: Let us try to tinker with some such plans. It suggested by some Arabs like Maghreb and if we can get something are better off. Nothing happening now and military action would appear as aggression.

P: He ^{is now} ~~seems~~ dismantling Kuwait.

G: I think this is why we should act quickly. Force would destroy what we have achieved. If current situation drags on without steps we will have lost initiative. Here we could say we are acting in responsible way by suggesting ways to solve the problem. (Discussion on ^{the point about the} ~~possibility of~~ return of Kuwaiti regime.)

G: Kuwaiti rulers would return and begin ^{negotiations.} -----. That's why he will reject the plan.

P: Let's assume he rejects the plan. What next?

G: Then we would continue the political and economic pressure but he couldn't appear as the leader of the Arabs. He would then be isolated.

P: If he accepts the plan, he withdraws from Kuwait, the leaders return and he gets a conference on Israel and US troops out of Saudi Arabia.

G: US troops would all leave only after *international* ----- guarantees are in place.

P: I have one more worry. Whatever comes out of our meetings can't be a US-Soviet Union plan. That would look like condominium of just the two of us trying to find a solution. But the idea is interesting and we must do some thinking. One more worry. He is corruptible and likely to do something -- like terrorist act. He could guarantee US response if he determined to do so. My Arab friends say he is vicious, unpredictable and I am worried he might do something.

G: We can't act as if US-Soviet Union solving the problem. But if we can do nothing why do we meet.

P: I agree.

G: If we devise some idea we both like we can figure out how to get it introduced.

P: I agree. I just wanted to point out we must be sensitive to this point. But I totally agree with what you said and the advantages if we can get together on something.

G: I think today we could say we had wide ranging discussion and that we think it possible to find solution which would prevent even worse developments.

P: I agree except we should say "look for." I not sure we can find such a plan.

G: Now, what kind of a man he is. Your characterization of Saddam Hussein is identical to ours. But ^{these} ~~this~~ personality ^{characteristics} will be most realized if he is backed into a corner. If we give him some window to climb out we have a chance. If he sees such a chance he won't act in a provocative manner. Instead he will seize that chance, so we could show two sides of some coin -- show our joint action and decisiveness in this crisis but ^{leave} ~~have~~ public opinion with realization ^{we are} ~~as~~ trying to find a way out without military action, casualties, etc.

would
P: I like to go the extra mile for peace but we must not undermine the UN collective action. For example, some Americans propose elections in Kuwait. If we have that as a condition we diminish the collective decision we have already taken. If Kuwaiti people subsequently decide something different, that is something else. This aggression so clear that if he is rewarded it will set a terrible precedent for the future. He cannot be allowed to proceed.

G: But if he gets nothing at all, if he is backed into a corner, it will be more costly for us all. We need to give him some daylight. Let's give the impression that he not on his knees -- though he would be because he would not succeed.

P: If we had offered Hitler way out, would it have succeeded?

G: Not the same *situation*.

P: Only in personality.

G: We have to choose. We don't have many options. I believe that you who have achieved so much here, avoid a costly conflict with possible destruction of oil, that would be tremendous victory. We could throw our weight around, but

we must choose. If we throw him a carrot, we will win, establish the role of international law (UN), our cooperation and avoid serious conflict.

P: I agree completely. We must though have a way in which does not incite future aggression. Much of what you propose does that. Only problem is if Israel part appears like a victory for aggression.

G: No. This is not a carrot. The carrot is engaging him in a political process. This is a carrot. We would recognize him as a partner. If we don't include Israel, he could say he proposed a comprehensive plan and we rejected it. If we propose it and he rejects it, he will unmask himself. If he accepts, we will solve the Gulf problem, take steps to resolve Arab-Israel issue and Soviet Union will immediately recognize Israel.

P: There is already a conference *in being* ----- on Kuwait -- the UNSC, which has behaved magnificently.

G: This too would be in the UN format. Participation would include UNSC and the Arabs -- very strong participation. If he rejects he isolates himself and we gain time. He loses in the eyes of the world -- looks like a maniac with whom the world can't deal. Of course, before we discuss plan

with others we could probe him -- don't present plan but probe to see what leverage exists.

P: That could be useful in any course. Mubarak will tell you *Saddam* can't withdraw.

G: Assad will say the same.

P: *he says* If he withdraws he is finished. Where we may differ is I don't think we need further evidence of unreasonableness. You assume he will turn it down and prove unreasonableness.

G: But if he accepts, the process would begin.

P: You see the withdrawals being completed and then a conference on Middle East, right?

G: There will be agreement on Conference and format and based on that the process will begin. We tie this in at initial stage -- release civilians and announce withdrawal and US announces it will not attack Iraq. US force withdrawal would be *taken*, while Iraqi withdrawal *takes place* complete with replacement by Arab forces. US withdrawal would take place only when security situation is in place.

P: We will look at this carefully. Brent have I left anything out.

S: If he rejects the plan can we just continue a stalemate indefinitely.

G: We would have shifted opinion and internal processes I think would remove him.

P: What about claims we starving women and children.

G: We must look at that and medicine.

P: But it should be done under international processes so he couldn't profit by it. How we doing on time *for this meeting*.

G: Badly.

P: One unrelated point. Kohl asked me to come, *to the unification ceremony* on October 3. That ^{is} very tough ^{for me} Elections coming and I already cancelled a trip to ~~LA~~ Latin America ~~at~~. What is your view on ^{of the event?} the importance? If I don't go is that a problem for you?

G: No, I don't think so. I too am extremely busy. I'm in domestic battle in moving to market economy and ^{union} environ

treaty. Difficult for me to get there. I also told Kohl I recognize the importance and would consult with you.

P: Unless you or Kohl makes really strong appeal I will tell him I cannot attend.

G: If you can't go, I won't.

P: Our position on this should not be different. Are you going to Children's Conference?

G: No. We must think about your visit to the Soviet Union. On START and CFE I think we can conclude ^{OK}. We might say to press we have problems ^{but} we feel we can have positive outcome by end ^{of year} ~~of year~~.

^{I would}
P: ~~Should~~ like to tell Baker to get the bureaucrats moving.

G: You use the term "bureaucrats." I say "experts."

P: I suspect we both mean the same thing.