

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91128
Folder ID Number: 91128-005

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President (1 pp.)	11/7/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)	11/6/90	(b)(1)	
02. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)	11/6/90	(b)(1)	
03. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Ambassador Matlock [131339Z Nov 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Day in Moscow, November 8, 1990 (7 pp.)	11/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

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Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Pinksheet Number: cap1079
OA/ID Number: 91128-005
Date Closed: 4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft [201539Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Section 2 of 3 [201539Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S
06c. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Section 3 of 3 [201655Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Message	Re: Sent to Acting Secretary Bartholomew by Soviet Embassy Minister Counselor Chetverikov (2 pp.)	12/29/90	(b)(1)	
08. Memcon	To Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	6/1990	(b)(1)	S
09. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
10. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Bessmertnykh [Meeting Notes] (3 pp.)	12/27/90	(b)(1)	
11. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12a. Report	Re: Information on Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [030132Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/3/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 3 of 3

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8851

November 7, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President

Attached, per your request, is a summary of Gorbachev's November 6, 1990, letter to the President. We have also highlighted the most important passages on a copy of the letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Summary of Gorbachev letter

Tab A Gorbachev letter to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0845-MR
ES 5/23/13

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8851

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0840-MR
SCS 5/31/12

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President

Gorbachev's November 6 letter responds to your October 20 letter on the Primakov trip to the U.S. and the situation in the Gulf.

Gorbachev begins by describing his recent visits to Spain and France. He was impressed in Spain by that country's transition from dictatorship to democracy, implying that it held lessons for the USSR. In France, he had a productive meeting with Mitterrand, highlighted by signing of a treaty on concord and cooperation. Gorbachev says he was particularly satisfied by his talks on economic relations with both countries.

Gorbachev's thinking on the Gulf crisis dominates the remainder of the letter. He reviews the basis for Primakov's recent trip by stating the Soviets "wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Baghdad." He specifies that he remains committed to the agreements reached at Helsinki, and that the USSR will continue to hold firmly to the position that Iraq's aggression must be reversed, and that we should abide by the UNSC decisions. Gorbachev claims that his statement on the "unacceptability" of military force was mistranslated. The Russian word, he says, is "undesirable."

Reviewing the Primakov trip, Gorbachev states that Saddam appears to be more aware of the gravity of his situation, although it is too early to tell if he will act accordingly. He says that Primakov told Saddam that if he didn't leave Kuwait, a military strike might be inevitable. Gorbachev suggests the utility of involving the Arab countries more closely to make it easier for Saddam to agree to a potential solution.

Gorbachev closes with two suggestions. The first is that we maintain pressure on Iraq to free the hostages. The second is for the U.S. and USSR to let the Arab world know that while we could not directly link the Gulf crisis to the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, we could address those issues after the conflict has been resolved.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 2

In sum, it appears that the purpose of this letter is to reassure you of Gorbachev's commitment to full compliance with the UN resolutions. He clearly wishes to dispel your discomfort with his recent statements concerning the "unacceptability" of the military option and the need for an Arab solution.

Attachment

Tab A Gorbachev letter

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET AMB BESSMERTNYH
HAND-DELIVERED
Nov 6, 1990 - 4:00 PM

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality with which you related your impressions from your discussions with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly that it was precisely this kind of reaction - consistent with the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the state level - that I was counting on.

This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to fully understand one's partner that has developed between ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually, the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain and France.

It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika? Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps no other leader in the world, understand the special responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting the official results - you no doubt know them.

Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation. But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break into the open field of free democratic development and take a worthy place in the international community, was very important.

All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal couple who played such an important role in the critical period of Spain's transition to democracy.

As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon - our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured prospect.

Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the other, which is the development of the bilateral relations. And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to consider each other as enemies.

A major place in the talks in both capitals was given to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to help.

In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time, we were able to touch upon all the main European and world problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the Persian Gulf crisis.

The mission of my special representative, E.M.Primakov, continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked you and other Security Council members to postpone a little bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.

Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad, as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly. Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region. I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by the UN Security Council".

At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow, we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor. I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki, that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the

US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".

Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions about E.M.Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time, but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results. In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward", albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible", "unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is "undesirable".)

In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the "let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem mantle.

There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among them. You understand that given our present situation at home, this is of particular importance. After the meetings with my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure should be intensified in this area as well.

In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe, put off the more general problem of the future of that region, including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.

I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian) with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression. But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within their field of vision and shall promptly address it after Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.

Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.

Sincerely,

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M. GORBACHEV

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Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/26/2016

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0845-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 131339Z NOV 90

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0845-MR
2/25/2014 MM

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY SENSITIVE
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.
DEAR BRENT:

I DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ANATOL' IY CHERNYAEV, WHO PROMISED TO GET
IT TO GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY.

I REVIEWED FOR CHERNYAEV THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE RESOLUTION. IN
RESPONSE, CHERNYAEV DID NOT SAY WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO
THE COURSE WE ARE PROPOSING, BUT NOTED THAT:

-- GORBACHEV WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY
BAKER, AND WITH THE CONVERSATIONS THAT BAKER HAD WITH SHEVARDNADZE
ON THE PERSIAN GULF;

-- GORBACHEV REALIZES HOW IMPORTANT OUR COOPERATION IS IN THIS AREA,
AND AGREES THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER.

CHERNAYEV TOOK NOTE OF THE P.S., AND SAID GORBACHEV WILL BE HAPPY TO
SEE IT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE SOONER WE HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE KIND
OF HELP THAT IS NEEDED, THE BETTER WE CAN CONSIDER HOW TO ADDRESS IT.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE TWO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE ANY REQUEST COULD BE SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED: (1) THE PRACTICAL MEANS TO DELIVER FOOD TO WHERE IT IS
NEEDED AND (2) A MECHANISM TO PREVENT DIVERSION TO THE BLACK MARKET.
CHERNAYEV AGREED AND SAID THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO
DO. HE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT IF THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT SATISFACTOR

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ILY

RESOLVED THE AID WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE AND WOULD, MOREOVER, DISCREDIT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. AND WOULD GET BACK TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DECL: OADR.

~~SECRET~~

#0963

~~SECRET~~

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/26/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0845-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

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<DTG> 131339Z NOV 90

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0845-MR

2/25/2014 MM

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY SENSITIVE
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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.

DEAR BRENT:

I DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ANATOL' IY CHERNYAEV, WHO PROMISED TO GET
IT TO GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY.

I REVIEWED FOR CHERNYAEV THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE RESOLUTION. IN
RESPONSE, CHERNYAEV DID NOT SAY WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO
THE COURSE WE ARE PROPOSING, BUT NOTED THAT:

-- GORBACHEV WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY
BAKER, AND WITH THE CONVERSATIONS THAT BAKER HAD WITH SHEVARDNADZE
ON THE PERSIAN GULF;

-- GORBACHEV REALIZES HOW IMPORTANT OUR COOPERATION IS IN THIS AREA,
AND AGREES THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER.

CHERNAYEV TOOK NOTE OF THE P.S., AND SAID GORBACHEV WILL BE HAPPY TO
SEE IT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE SOONER WE HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE KIND
OF HELP THAT IS NEEDED, THE BETTER WE CAN CONSIDER HOW TO ADDRESS IT.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE TWO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE ANY REQUEST COULD BE SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED: (1) THE PRACTICAL MEANS TO DELIVER FOOD TO WHERE IT IS
NEEDED AND (2) A MECHANISM TO PREVENT DIVERSION TO THE BLACK MARKET.
CHERNAYEV AGREED AND SAID THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO
DO. HE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT IF THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT SATISFACTOR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

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RESOLVED THE AID WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE AND WOULD, MOREOVER, DISCREDIT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. AND WOULD GET BACK TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DECL: OADR.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Special Message Routing

☒	SCOWCROFT	☒	GATES
The National Security Advisor requests this message also be disseminated to the individuals noted below.			
☒	GOMPERT	☒	KANTER
☒	RICE		MILLER
☒	DEAL		PRYCE
☒	HAASS		WORKING
☒	JACKSON		
☒	VICE PRESIDENT		CHIEF OF STAFF

Guidance:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 07

PRT: SCOWCROFT SECTO

SIT: PRES^MSGS FILE SIT

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<DTG> 090945Z NOV 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5118

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 24037

NODIS

FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY DAY IN MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8, 1990

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAVE HAD LONG AND RATHER EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TODAY. I'LL GIVE YOU THE FULL BLOW-BY-BLOW WHEN I GET BACK. FOR NOW, LET ME PASS ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DAY AND OUR DISCUSSIONS. WE TALKED ABOUT THE GULF FOR NEARLY SIX HOURS (FOUR WITH SHEVARDNADZE, TWO WITH GORBACHEV). EACH LISTENED, EXPLAINED THEIR CONCERNS, AND NOTICEABLY MOVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE, IN PARTICULAR, CAME CLOSE TO OUR POSITION THAT A UNSC RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING FORCE SHOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH AND BECOME OPERATIVE SIX-EIGHT WEEKS LATER. HE ACTUALLY CALLED GORBACHEV ON THE PHONE AND PUSHED HARD TO HAVE HIM GO ALONG WITH OUR APPROACH. HE WENT OUT TO GORBACHEV'S DACHA TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE ME TO LOBBY HIM FURTHER. GORBACHEV IS CLOSE BUT NOT THERE YET.

2. IN GENERAL, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO BE ACTING

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AS AMENDED

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08/16/1999 MM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 07

ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS:

A) THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST STAY TOGETHER ON THE GULF.

THEY BOTH SAID IT'S ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF TH POLICY, AND IS REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT OUR MUTUAL WELL-BEING, AND FUTURES ARE LINKED. (SHEVARDNADZE WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT A FAILURE BY US IN THE GULF WOULD DAMAGE PERESTROIKA. OUR SUCCESS WOULD BE A SUCCESS FOR THEM -- AND OUR FAILURE WOULD BE A REAL BLOW TO THEM. GORBACHEV SAID MUCH THE SAME THING.)

B) SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST CLEARLY UNMISTAKEABLY FAIL. THEY

EMPHASIZED THAT HIS AGGRESSION MUST BE REVERSED. ANY HOPE FOR A NEW PEACEFUL ERA DEPENDED ON THIS, AND ON DENYING HIM ANY VICTORY -- NO MATTER HOW SMALL. TO THIS END, WE COULD NOT STAND STILL. WE HAD TO BE ACTIVE NOW IN PURSUING FURTHER STEPS TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION. (ACTIVITY THAT DID NOT APPEAR TO MEAN PEACE MISSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS CRITICAL OF THE NAKASONE, BRANDT, AND, YES, PRIMAKOV MISSIONS. FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV'S MISSION AND SAID HE, TOO, HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.)

C. GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE FELT SANCTIONS MIGHT YET WORK AND

IT'S PREMATURE TO PLAY OUR LAST DIPLOMATIC CARD -- A CARD THAT

LEAVES US NO CHOICE BUT TO USE FORCE IF IT FAILS. WHILE PREPARED TO BE ACTIVE IN PURSUING MORE STEPS IN THE UNSC TO BUILD THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE (CERTAINLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY) WERE AMBIVALENT ABOUT A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT AUTHORIZES FORCE OR "ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION 660." IT'S NOT THAT THEY REJECT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DEADLINE OR EVEN POSING AN ULTIMATUM. IT'S THAT THEY STILL FEEL IT'S TOO EARLY TO DO THAT.

3. I EXPLAINED LONG AND HARD WHY TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT BE ON OUR SIDE. INDEED, I OUTLINED WHY IF WE COULDN'T PASS SUCH A RESOLUTION THIS MONTH WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO FOR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 07

SEVERAL MONTHS -- SOMETHING THAT COULD GET US INTO THE RAINY SEASON, RAMADAN, THE HAJJ, AND ALL THE WAY TO NEXT SUMMER BEFORE THE USE OF FORCE COULD BE CONTEMPLATED.

4. SHEVARDNADZE FOUND THIS ARGUMENT COMPELLING, BECAUSE HE SAW HOW THIS MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES IN THE AREA. I EMPHASIZED THIS POINT AND ALSO SAID IF WE COULDN'T SUSTAIN OUR FORCES OR HAD TO REDUCE THEM IT WOULD CONVINCE SADDAM THAT HE COULD PREVAIL.

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5. AS A RESULT, SHEVARDNADZE BEGAN TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, A POSITION THAT WAS PREMISED ON FURTHER UNSC RESOLUTIONS THAT WOULD SHOW INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, HEIGHTEN PRESSURE ON SADDAM AND BASICALLY EXHAUST ALL DIPLOMATIC, NON-MILITARY OPTIONS OVER TIME.

6. TO A LESSER EXTENT GORBACHEV BOUGHT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT BUT I FOUND HIM TORN MORE ABOUT HAVING TO USE FORCE AT ALL. (WHILE I THINK SHEVARDNADZE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT USING FORCE, HE IS MORE INCLINED TO THINK IT WILL HAVE TO BE USED EVENTUALLY.) FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV'S IMAGE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS SUCH THAT HE HAS A HARD TIME RECONCILING THE FACT THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO USE FORCE IN THIS INITIAL TEST. HE REFLECTED THAT SENTIMENT IN HIS LETTER TO YOU AND HE SAID AS MUCH TO ME TODAY, OBSERVING THAT WE WANT THIS ERA TO BE DIFFERENT FROM THE COLD WAR AND BASED ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF NORMS.

7. I ANSWERED HIM IN TWO WAYS: FIRST, IT'S HARD TO ESTABLISH RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CIVILIZED AND PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR IF A BRUTAL AGGRESSOR WHO QUITE SIMPLY REJECTS THESE NORMS IS ALLOWED TO SUCCEED BECAUSE THE WILL TO USE FORCE IS ABSENT. SECOND, THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PRODUCE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME -- OUR CLEAR PREFERENCE -- WAS TO CONVINCE SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT MILITARILY. ONLY WHEN SADDAM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BECOMES CONVINCED THAT A MASSIVE MILITARY RESPONSE WAS IMMINENT WOULD A PEACEFUL OUTCOME BECOME POSSIBLE.

8. THAT WAS THE PARADOX. THAT WAS THE REASON THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD GIVE US A CHANCE TO RESOLVE THIS PEACEFULLY -- I.E., SADDAM WOULD REALIZE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD SUPPORT THE USE OF FORCE AND HE WOULD HAVE ONLY A LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME TO AVERT A CERTAIN DEFEAT. NOTHING ELSE WOULD SIGNAL HIM SO STARKLY AND CREDIBLY. AND YET A RESOLUTION PASSED NOW, BUT OPERATIVE ONLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, WOULD ALSO SHOW THAT WE HAD GIVEN HIM EVERY CHANCE TO WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY. AND, INDEED, THAT WE HAD GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME (FIVE AND ONE-HALF TO SIX MONTHS) TO WORK.

9. SHEVARDNADZE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SAW THE LOGIC OF MY ARGUMENTS, AND I FELT GORBACHEV, TOO, WAS BEING PERSUADED BY THEM. BUT HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE PUSHED INTO MAKING A DECISION TODAY, AND CLEARLY A PART OF HIM WOULD STILL LIKE TO DELAY GOING DOWN SUCH A DEFINITIVE PATH. I THINK THAT'S WHY HE SUGGESTED A KIND OF INTERIM STEP: PASS TWO RESOLUTIONS. THE FIRST WOULD WARN SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN DATE, WE'D PASS A SECOND ONE THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY AUTHORIZE THE USE OF FORCE.

10. WHILE NOTING THAT HE WAS CLEARLY TRYING TO BE RESPONSIVE, I SAID I SAW SEVERAL PROBLEMS:

-- OUR ORIGINAL UNSC RESOLUTION 660 CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. NOW WE'D BE PASSING A RESOLUTION THT GAVE HIM SOME TIME TO DO SO. THIS WOULD ACTUALLY LOOK LIKE A RETREAT FROM OUR EARLIER POSITION.

-- HAVING PASSED THE FIRST RESOLUTION, WHAT IF WE COULDN'T GET THE SECOND RESOLUTION. PROCEDURALLY, WE PROBABLY COULDN'T GET BOTH RESOLUTIONS THROUGH THIS MONTH AND WE MIGHT HAVE REAL PROBLEMS ONCE YEMEN WAS IN THE CHAIR. SUBSTANTIVELY, SADDAM MIGHT PULL BACK PARTIALLY OR FOR THE FIRST TIME OFFER A REALISTIC, IF UNACCEPTABLE, PARTIAL DEAL AS A WAY OF UNDERCUTTING CONSENSUS BEHIND THE USE OF FORCE.

-- IF WE NEVER GOT TO THE SECOND RESOLUTION, WE WOULD HAVE SHOT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OUR WAD AND BE FINISHED TRYING TO WORK THROUGH THE UNSC. THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DESTROYING THE UNSC AS A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR PRE-EMPTING, MANAGING, OR SETTLING CONFLICTS IN THIS NEW ERA.

11. GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE WAS TO SAY, WELL IT WAS JUST A THOUGHT, AND HE NEEDED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS. SHEVARDNADZE LATER TRIED TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT FORMALLY LINK THE TWO RESOLUTIONS, MAKING THE SECOND ONE "PREDETERMINED" IF SADDAM HAD NOT PULLED OUT BY A CERTAIN DATE. INTERESTINGLY, TARASENKO ARGUED AGAINST HIS BOSS SAYING YOU COULDN'T GUARANTEE SUCH A LINKAGE, YOU'D LOOK FECKLESS IF YOU COULDN'T DELIVER THE SECOND RESOLUTION, AND THIS WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ENSURE A MOVE AWAY FROM THE UNSC AND TO THE USE OF ARTICLE 51 TO LIBERATE KUWAIT.

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12. THE UPSHOT: THEY WANT TO LOOK AT OPTIONS AND GET BACK TO US BEFORE PARIS. I EMPHASIZED WE DIDN'T WANT TO PUSH THEM BUT WE NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO ACT WHILE WE HAD THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC AND IF NO DECISION WERE MADE UNTIL PARIS WE MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME AFTERWARDS.

13. MY OWN SENSE IS THAT IN THE END THEY WILL GO ALONG WITH US. GORBACHEV MADE A REAL POINT OF SAYING THEY'D STICK WITH US. AND HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTING UNDER UNSC AUTHORIZATION, NOT ARTICLE 51, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT WOULD ENSURE OUR CONTINUED UNITY. AS I SAID SEVERAL TIMES, WE SAW THE EXTRAORDINARY VALUE OF THEM PARTICIPATING WITH US IF FORCE WAS NEEDED, BUT UNDERSTOOD THEIR PROBLEMS (INTERNAL PREOCCUPATION, AFGHAN SYNDROME) WITH NOT DOING SO. IT WOULD BE FAR HARDER FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THEIR BLOCKING US FROM THE CLEARLY PREFERRED OPTION OF A UNSC RESOLUTION. THEY GOT THE POINT, AND I BELIEVE THEIR STAKE IN GOOD RELATIONS AND DESIRE FOR PARTNERSHIP WITH US WILL LEAD THEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME AND EFFORT TO GET THERE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OTHER ISSUES AND IMPRESSIONS

14. GORBACHEV AND THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY. GORBACHEV SEEMED

BUOYED BY THE LACK OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE OR
COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS YESTERDAY. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE
INCIDENT ON RED SQUARE AND SHEVARDNADZE DOWNPLAYED IT.
GORBACHEV FELT THAT THE REAL "SILENT MAJORITY" (HIS WORDS) HAD
SPOKEN YESTERDAY BY NOT HEEDING THE CALLS FOR
COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS. I WONDER IF THIS IS WISHFUL THINKING
OR AN ACCURATE READING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE I HAD THE SENSE
THAT THE THREAT OF CRACKDOWNS AND VIOLENCE MIGHT HAVE
DIMINISHED THE CROWDS.

15. GORBACHEV'S HINTS AT THE NEED TO IMPOSE ORDER. GORBACHEV

SPOKE OF THE NEED TO CREATE TOLERANCE AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE
THE KEY TO ACHIEVING A MARKET ECONOMY. HOWEVER, HE ALSO SAID
THERE WAS A YEARNING FOR ORDER AND STABILITY AND SAID SOME
"TOUGH STEPS MIGHT BE NEEDED. WE COULDN'T SACRIFICE THE REFORM
PROCESS FOR THE SAKE OF SOMEONE'S AMBITIONS OR ACCEPT THE
DISINTEGRATION OF OUR SOCIETY." HE SAID A FINE LINE HAD TO BE
MAINTAINED BETWEEN MOVING FORWARD AND PRESERVING STABILITY. I
NOTED THAT WAS A LINE THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN.
WHILE HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REJECT THE CONSERVATIVE
ABILITY TO EXPLOIT THE DESIRE FOR STABILITY, I WAS UNEASY ABOUT
THE TONE AND DIRECTION OF THESE COMMENTS. I DON'T KNOW IF THEY
PRESAGE SOME KIND OF CRACKDOWN, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE
SITUATION CLOSELY.

16. GETTING FOOD FROM THE OUTSIDE FOR THE WINTER. GORBACHEV

NOTED A PARADOX: MOVING TOWARD THE MARKET HAD LED COLLECTIVE
FARMERS TO WITHHOLD THEIR PRODUCE FROM CERTAIN AREAS AND
CITIES, REQUIRING THE CENTER TO HOLD FOOD RESERVES AS A KIND OF
INSURANCE POLICY. HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE GERMANS AND OTHER
EUROPEANS FOR EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPLIES ON A CREDIT OR GRANT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 07

BASIS FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE SAID HE MIGHT BE COMING TO US ONCE HE KNEW HIS NEEDS BETTER. HE'D BE INTERESTED IN SOYBEANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AND WE MAY WANT TO LOOK AT WHAT WE COULD DO IF WE DECIDE TO BE RESPONSIVE.

17. ARMS CONTROL. I THINK WE'VE FINALLY CLOSED OUT THE

NETTLESOME CFE ISSUES. BUT EVERY TIME YOU THINK YOU'VE SETTLED EVERYTHING, SOMETHING ELSE CROPS UP. IN ANY CASE, I THINK -- AND HOPE -- WE'VE FINALLY DONE IT. ON START, WE CLOSED OUT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE, AND MAY, WITH SOME EFFORT, BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES IN OUR NEXT MINISTERIAL. THAT WOULD PUT US ON TRACK FOR A JANUARY SUMMIT. (GORBACHEV IS EAGER TO NAIL DOWN THE SUMMIT DATE, BUT JOKED THAT A MID-JANUARY SUMMIT MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTING GIVEN WHAT WE MIGHT BE DOING IN THE GULF AT THAT TIME.)

BAKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft [201539Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/25/2014

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HANDLE VIA
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CHANNELS ONLY

PAGE 1 MLN=22885
DAN=402-170175 ICDSN=EIA088

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TOR = 201753Z DEC 90

ACTION = [SVC]+WHSR(-)
INFO = [SVC]TCHIEF(1)

[SVC]TOTAL COPIES = 00001 MDC = MCELHANY

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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SECTION 01 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

BEGIN TEXT

FROM: AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ON DECEMBER 20, BEFORE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESIGNATION ANNOUNCEMENT,
MARSHAL SERGEY AKHROMEYEV PROVIDED HIS RESPONSE TO YOUR DECEMBER
5 LETTER ON CFE PROBLEMS. AKHROMEYEV STRESSED THAT HE HAD ENDEAVORED
TO ANSWER CLEARLY TO THE TWO QUESTIONS WHICH YOU RAISED, APOLOGIZING
FOR THE DELAY IN GETTING BACK TO YOU. HE ADDED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE'S PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY HAD SLOWED
DOWN HIS RESPONSE.

AKHROMEYEV SAID HE EXAMINED THE PRECISE DATA REGARDING THE EQUIPMENT
CONCERNS WHICH YOU RAISED AND WAS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION IN HIS
LETTER. HE THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT FIND ANY ERRORS IN THIS
DATA AND BELIEVED THAT NO ADDITIONAL MAJOR PROBLEMS SHOULD ARISE
REGARDING THE TREATY. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT SUFFICIENT TIME

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PAGE 2 MLN=22885
DAN=402-170175 ICDSN=EIA088

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

REMAINED TO SORT OUT MINOR TREATY DISPUTES IN VIENNA (BEFORE THE DEADLINE FOR DATA REVISIONS).

RESPONDING TO A QUESTION, AKHROMEYEV SAID THAT CFE RATIFICATION WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE WERE EXAMINING THE TREATY AND WOULD MAKE THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS.

AKHROMEYEV STRESSED THAT THERE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM AS REGARDS NAVAL FORCES, UNDERSCORING THAT FOR HIM PERSONALLY THIS WAS A KEY ISSUE. HE SAID THAT HE FOUND IT VERY HARD TO PUSH FOR RATIFICATION OF A CFE TREATY

WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE NAVAL FORCES. THIS, HE INSISTED, IN PRINCIPLE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN PART OF THE AGREEMENT. AKHROMEYEV PREDICTED THAT THERE

WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STRUGGLE IN THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET OVER TREATY RATIFICATION, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE ACHIEVED. HE OPINED THAT CFE RATIFICATION COULD COME ABOUT IN FEBRUARY, ONCE THE SUPREME SOVIET HAD COMPLETED WORK ON THE BUDGET.

BEGIN EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

MOSCOW, 20 DECEMBER 1990

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL B. SCOWCROFT
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE US PRESIDENT

DEAR GENERAL SCOWCROFT,

I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5 DECEMBER 1990, IN WHICH YOU REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S UNDERSTANDING AND POSITION ON TWO QUESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SIGNING ON 19 NOVEMBER 1990 IN PARIS BY THE HEADS OF WARSAW TREATY AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

STATES OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE.

1. ON THE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

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PAGE 3 MLN=22885
DAN=402-170175 ICDSN=EIA088

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

OF THE USSR (GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCE) DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS AT THE MOMENT OF SIGNING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TREATY.

2. ON THE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT (AGAIN, OF GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCE) REDEPLOYED BY THE SOVIET UNION FROM EUROPE BEYOND THE URALS TO THE ASIAN PART OF THE COUNTRY, AND OUR FURTHER INTENTIONS REGARDING THIS EQUIPMENT.

AFTER THE APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR AND OTHER INTERESTED DEPARTMENTS (WHICH SOMEWHAT DELAYED A RESPONSE),

I INVESTIGATED BOTH PROBLEMS WHICH YOU RAISE IN YOUR LETTER, AND WILL TRY TO GIVE YOU FRANK, EXHAUSTIVE CLARIFICATIONS, WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE NEW RELATIONS WHICH HAVE FORMED BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA.

1. THE SOVIET UNION, IN SIGNING THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, SUBMITTED NECESSARY INFORMATION ON ARMS OF GROUND FORCES AND THE AIR FORCE DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. THIS INFORMATION CORRESPONDS TO REALITY. NATURALLY, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS, BOTH ON A MULTILATERAL AND ON A BILATERAL BASIS, ALL UNCLEAR OR DISPUTED QUESTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL DETAILS, THE MORE SO SINCE WE HAVE QUESTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE.

AS WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD FROM YOUR LETTER AND INFORMATION GIVEN TO US BY THE LEADER OF THE AMERICAN GROUP OF EXPERTS, AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY, DURING HIS STAY IN MOSCOW IN EARLY DECEMBER 1990, THE USA IS MAKING CLAIMS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH THE FACT THAT IT HAS NOT INCLUDED TANKS, ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SYSTEMS OF NAVAL INFANTRY AND DIVISIONS OF THE NAVY COAST GUARD IN THE OVERALL NUMBER OF ARMS OF GROUND FORCES LIMITED BY THE TREATY.

IT IS, HOWEVER, THE CASE THAT THE NAVAL INFANTRY AND UNITS OF THE COAST GUARD, BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES, DO NOT COMPRISE PART OF THE GROUND FORCES, BUT ARE PART OF THE NAVY, WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF DEGOTIATIONS, IS NOT ONE OF THEIR SUBJECTS. THEREFORE, TO INCLUDE THEIR ARMS IN THE COUNT IS INCORRECT. IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT A DECISION ON GROUND-BASED NAVAL AVIATION WAS

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MADE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY.
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Section 2 of 3 [201539Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/26/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0845-MR(505.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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SECTION 02 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER EYES ONLY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SECTION 02 OF 03

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT EXISTING
FORMATIONS OF THE COAST GUARD DEPLOYED IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE
COUNTRY WERE CREATED DURING THE REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR,
BEGUN LONG BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. THE OVERALL LEVELS OF
ARMS OF NAVAL INFANTRY AND UNITS OF THE COAST GUARD (927 TANKS, 1725
ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, 1020 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS) WERE REACHED IN
OCTOBER 1989.

2. REGARDING OUR REDEPLOYMENT OF ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM THE
EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR TO THE ASIAN PART, BEYOND THE URALS,
APPARENTLY MORE DETAILED CLARIFICATIONS ARE NECESSARY, WHICH I WILL TRY
TO SET FORTH IN THIS LETTER.

REGARDING TANKS. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE
CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 41,500 TANKS, AND AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990,
APPROXIMATELY 21,000 TANKS. THUS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO
FIGURES IS APPROXIMATELY 20,500 TANKS. OF THIS NUMBER, 4,100 TANKS
WERE WRITTEN OFF (TURNED INTO SCRAP METAL OR RE-EQUIPPED), AND 16,400
TANKS, MAINLY MORE MODERN MODELS, WERE TRANSFERRED BEYOND THE URALS.
OF THEM, 8,000 TANKS WERE TRANSFERRED TO FORCES IN THE EAST OF THE
COUNTRY FOR REINFORCEMENT OF SHORTAGES AND REPLACEMENT OF OLD-MODEL

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TANKS, AND 8,400 TANKS WERE DELIVERED TO STORAGE BASES. IT IS PLANNED IN 1991-1995 TO REMOVE FROM FORCES IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY 6,000 OBSOLETE TANKS, WHICH WILL BE ELIMINATED THROUGH EITHER TRANSFORMATION INTO SCRAP METAL OR RE-EQUIPPING AS EQUIPMENT FOR THE ECONOMY.

REGARDING ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 57,800 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES.

DURING NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE REACHING OF AGREEMENTS ON TYPES OF VEHICLES,

ABOVE ALL ON MTLB, UNARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER TRACTORS OF ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, 8,900 UNITS OF THIS NUMBER WERE EXCLUDED AS NOT BELONGING TO THE CATEGORY OF ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. THAT IS, AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THERE WERE IN FACT 48,900 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990, THERE WERE 29,600 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES. THUS, THE DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES IS 19,200 VEHICLES. 3,400 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES WERE WRITTEN OFF (TURNED INTO SCRAP METAL, RE-EQUIPPED, DELIVERED FOR EXPORT). OF THE REMAINING 15,500 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES,

11,200 VEHICLES WERE SENT FOR RE-ARMING AND MAKING UP DEFICIENCIES OF UNITS IN THE EAST, SINCE A LARGE PART OF MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENTS BEYOND

THE URALS WERE FORMERLY ARMED NOT WITH ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, BUT WITH AUTOMOBILES. 4,700 VEHICLES WERE DELIVERED TO STORAGE BASES IN THE

EAST OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS PLANNED IN 1991-1995 TO REMOVE FROM FORCES IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY APPROXIMATELY 1,500 ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES,

WHICH WILL BE ELIMINATED THROUGH EITHER TRANSFORMATION INTO SCRAP METAL OR RE-EQUIPPING FOR ECONOMIC PURPOSES.

REGARDING ARTILLERY SYSTEMS. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 42,400 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, AND AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990, APPROXIMATELY 14,000 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES IS APPROXIMATELY 28,400 SYSTEMS. OF THESE, 3,400 HAVE BEEN WRITTEN OFF (TRANSFORMED INTO SCRAP METAL, SENT FOR EXPORT), AND 25,000 SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED BEYOND THE URALS. 1,600 WERE USED FOR RE-ARMING FORCES IN THE EASTERN REGION. OF THE REMAINING 23,400 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS SENT BEYOND THE URALS, 16,400 UNITS

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WERE DELIVERED TO STORAGE BASES FOR SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT IN FORCES OF OBSOLETE SYSTEMS AS PART OF THE DEVELOPMENT BY THEM OF AN ESTABLISHED

RESOURCE AND 7,000 UNITS ARE USED AS A REPLACEMENT AND REPAIR SUPPLY FUND. IN 1991-1995, AS PART OF THE RELEASE FROM FORCES OF OBSOLETE MODELS, 7,000 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS WILL BE ELIMINATED.

REGARDING AVIATION. RECENTLY THE AMERICAN SIDE WAS INFORMED OF SOME DATA ON AIRCRAFT, REFLECTING MAINLY THE SITUATION FOR THE CURRENT YEAR. I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE BROADER INFORMATION. AS OF 1 JULY 1988, THE AIR FORCE OF THE USSR IN EUROPE CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 8,400 MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF AIR FORCE AVIATION AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE FORCES, AND AS OF 19 NOVEMBER 1990, APPROXIMATELY 6,450 AIRCRAFT (THE EXACT NUMBER IS 6,445 AIRCRAFT). THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO FIGURES IS APPROXIMATELY 1,950 AIRCRAFT. OF THESE, APPROXIMATELY 1,200 AIRCRAFT WERE USED FOR MAKING UP DEFICIENCIES IN AIR FORCE UNITS, NAVAL AVIATION UNITS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE UNITS OR TRANSFERRED TO AVIATION STORAGE

BASES BEYOND THE URALS, 430 AIRCRAFT WERE WRITTEN OFF AND TRANSFORMED INTO SCRAP METAL, 120 AIRCRAFT WERE RE-EQUIPPED AS TARGETS, AND APPROXIMATELY 200 AIRCRAFT WERE EXPORTED.

OUR REDEPLOYMENT OF A QUITE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF GROUND FORCES AND A CERTAIN NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BEYOND THE URALS IS EXPLAINED BY SEVERAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

FIRST, DURING 1988-1990, THE SOVIET UNION, ON A UNILATERAL BASIS, CONDUCTED MEASURES TO REDUCE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES, THE NUMBER OF ARMS IN EUROPE, BY AMOUNTS INCLUDING 10,000 TANKS, 8,500 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, 820 AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL MEASURES CONNECTED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND THE ASSIGNMENT TO GROUPINGS OF GROUND FORCES OF A GREATER DEFENSIVE ORIENTATION.

UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE SHORT SPACE OF TIME FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE LACK OF THE NECESSARY MATERIAL BASE FOR THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE, WE WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW PART OF THE FORCES AND ARMS BEYOND THE URALS.

SECOND, BEGINNING IN 1991, MASS DELIVERIES OF TANKS, ARMORED FIGHTING

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VEHICLES, ARTILLERY SYSTEMS AND AIRCRAFT BY INDUSTRY TO GROUND FORCES
AND THE AIR FORCE HAVE DROPPED CONSIDERABLY.

CAPABILITIES FOR REPLACING COMBAT EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS SERVED OUT ITS
ESTABLISHED TERMS AND RESOURCES FROM DELIVERIES FROM INDUSTRY WILL
BE INSUFFICIENT. THE CREATION OF A RESERVE OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT AT
BASES IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY WILL TO AT LEAST SOME EXTENT SOLVE THIS

PROBLEM, IF ONLY FOR THREE OR FOUR YEARS. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU
THAT THE USSR DOES NOT PLAN TO DEPLOY ANY GROUPINGS BEYOND THE URALS
ON THE BASIS OF REDEPLOYED ARMS.

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Cable	From Ambassador Matlock to General Scowcroft, Re: Section 3 of 3 [201655Z Dec 90] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
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 By MM on 5/26/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0845-MR(505.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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SECTION 3 OF 3

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

FINAL SECTION OF 03
THIRD, CAPACITIES FOR ELIMINATING SOVIET COMBAT EQUIPMENT IN EUROPE
ARE INSUFFICIENT. TRANSFER OF PART OF THE ARMS TO THE EAST OF
THE COUNTRY WILL ALLOW US TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR MORE
SYSTEMATIC ELIMINATION.

THE SOVIET UNION VALUES THE NEW POLITICAL CHANGE IN WHICH WE ARE
WORKING IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL. WE HAVE SET OUT FIRMLY ON
THE PATH TO IMPROVING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. WE HOPE FOR AN
ADEQUATE ATTITUDE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

THEREFORE, IN THE SPIRIT OF FULL FRANKNESS, I HAVE SET FORTH TO
YOU THE SITUATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED AND THE REASONS THAT HAVE
BROUGHT US TO THE NECESSITY OF REDEPLOYING A CERTAIN QUANTITY OF
COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM THE EUROPEAN PART TO THE EASTERN PART OF
THE COUNTRY, AS WELL AS OUR INTENTIONS IN REGARD TO THIS EQUIPMENT
IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

RESPECTFULLY,

S. AKHROMEYEV.

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END TEXT OF LETTER TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

ORIGINAL LETTER WILL BE POUCHED TO WHITE HOUSE.

DECL: OADR.
#0341

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 060617 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NODIS No. Pages 2

FROM: Liz McKune S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Message from the Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor
To Acting Secretary Bartholomew

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>W. Sittmann, Hill</u>	<u>456-2224</u>	
	<u>Scowcroft</u>		
	<u>Gates</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Please pass this message to General Scowcroft - EYES ONLY.

S/S Officer: Liz McKune

SENT TO ACTING SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW BY SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER-
COUNSELOR CHETVERIKOV AT 11:40 a.m. DECEMBER 29, 1990

Being naturally concerned with the deadlock in the US-Iraqi dialogue we used a visit to Baghdad of our representatives from Moscow in order to probe very informally and strictly confidentially into the position of Iraq. In a conversation with Aziz our representatives asked about the timeframe of his visit to Washington and a visit of the US Secretary of State to Baghdad. Tentatively, we referred to January 6 as the date for receiving the Secretary of State in Iraq on the assumption that Aziz might come to the United States prior to that.

It is our impression that the Iraqi minister reacted to this idea of a compromise solution with interest though his response was worded in rather cautious terms. He said that the Iraqi side would be ready to examine in a constructive way the new dates for an exchange of visits. If we make specific proposals on both dates the Iraqis will not insist on January 12 as the date for Secretary Baker's visit to Baghdad. However, on the other hand, the new options must not exclude January 10.

Aziz avoided a clear answer to our repeated questions about Iraqi leadership's reaction to the date of January 6 noting, in particular, that a decision on that score can be taken only by President Hussein himself.

At the final stage of the conversation the minister reiterated that the Iraqi side was ready to consider new options for the dates to exchange visits. On the whole, it followed from the logics of what he said during the conversation that these new dates must be first appropriately worked out with Washington and after that suggested to Iraqis.

If the US side wishes to seek out a solution to the issue of dates for these visits with our assistance we would be willing to transmit to Baghdad its respective ideas (also as if they come from us provided it is more convenient to US colleagues).

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2011-0845-MR
ES 5/23/13

June 1990

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Brent,

Last night, you asked about the exchange with Akhromeyev on next steps. I will do full notes over the weekend but I sensed that you wanted to know about this as soon as possible. The exchange went as follows:

Akhromeyev: You should not think of the Gorbachev response as a negative answer. It is an invitation to a deeper dialogue. We should find a channel to look into the problem. This couldn't be resolved in a few weeks. The decision of the U.S. side not to publicly discuss this problem was a wise one. It would have made a cardinal difference had it broken into the press.

We should find some discrete forum for looking into to it then later move it to more formal channels.

Gorbachev said that he continues to be interested in problems of nuclear weapons in general and in all categories. He wanted only to invite the U.S. side to continue discussions on the question.

Scowcroft: That's helpful. I am pleased. My disappointment had two elements. It was difficult getting agreement within our government. I must tell you that those who opposed it -- when they see this initial response -- will say "I told you so." Secondly, we are on the verge of major expenditures on a MX mobile system like your SS-24. I wanted to do something before Congress started that because once it starts we will have another cycle of deployments.

Akhromeyev: Last summer when we talked, we talked about the SS-24 and MX and we touched upon a possible solution the SS-24; MX; and SLCM linked somehow to take account of the interrelationship between them. That was productive. I think we should study that particular option.

But then we got off track at Malta because we raised the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons deployed at sea and the response was completely negative. It was not unexpected but we did not get enough explanation for why the response was negative. There needed to be deeper meaning given to why it was rejected. When I approached the political leadership about long-range SLCM; SS-24; and MX and said they should be posed for discussion. They asked "is it worth it?"

I believe that the idea relating to the problem of mobile MIRVed ICBMs is not a dead idea and might be entertained. Concerning your disappointment -- what we want is to engage in a deeper dialogue on the problem. We are prepared to heed the interests of the U.S. but Soviet interests should be taken into account.

As far as the MX and SS-24 deployments it is difficult to solve this in a narrow context but if we expand the framework it might be more resolvable.

Scowcroft: We might have some mutual misperception operating here. I would have welcomed an answer such as you just gave. "You rely on ICBM forces -- your principal concern is naval tactical nuclear forces." That would have given me material to work with. It's too hard for me to advance both demilitarizing of the ICBMs and a proposal on SLCMs

At Malta, the unfortunate thing was that the SLCM proposal was made in the general framework of naval arms control and you know how sensitive that is for us. Had the question been posed narrowly in the form of SLCMs -- which present a problem for you like the SS-18 is a problem for us -- that would have been different. Maybe we have some specific elements that would allow us to make progress. I don't know that for sure because it's very difficult for our Navy to come to terms with that.

Akhromeyev: Would it be useful to have a letter from our President saying that MX and SS-24 could be looked at in some context where long-range SLCMs on both sides would be eliminated. I am only asking if it would be useful?

Scowcroft: It would give us something concrete and specific to analyze. The answer that you sent is so general that opponents of intellectually attractive ideas will just take it as a no.

Akhromeyev: Maybe the U.S. President could write to Gorbachev saying that in principle the sides were now exchanging ideas and now approaches could be made more specific. It would be useful if you mentioned the Malta exchange too and why you rejected our ideas.

We could then write and the Soviet President would be more specific saying SS-24; MX and SLCM. The exchange should take place very fast and perhaps something could be done by the time of the June Summit -- before Gorbachev comes.

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

Dear Brent:
This is the original of
the letter I have delivered
to the President. ~~in the~~

Thank you again

1/12/91 M. S. Woodward

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Miscellaneous Handwriting

Unofficial
translation
delivered
on 12/27

ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

господину Джорджу БУШУ

Дорогой Джордж!

В духе дружеских и доверительных отношений, которые сложились между нами, считаю своим долгом сообщить Вам некоторые пояснения в связи с отставкой Эдуарда.

В мировом общественном мнении, в политических кругах она вызвала большое волнение, массу догадок и, прямо скажу, домыслов, далеко выходящих за пределы самого этого действительно неприятного эпизода. Я сказал тут же на Съезде - и Вы об этом знаете, - что для меня его заявление было полной неожиданностью. Это действительно так и особенно меня огорчило - не только потому, что была нарушена лояльность по отношению к Президенту. То, что он так поступил, не посоветовавшись и не предупредив меня, своего давнего друга и товарища, не имеет никаких оправданий.

Что он безмерно устал, что невероятные перегрузки измотали его, что он, как у нас говорят, не жалея себя, выкладывался и вот в определенный момент сорвался - все это так. И поэтому хотелось бы отнестись с пониманием к его поступку. Но одобрить его я никак не могу.

Какая бы критика ни раздавалась лично в адрес министра, по поводу политики, за которую после Президента он нес наибольшую ответственность, будь то критика со стороны парламентариев или

общественно-политических группировок, тем более – со стороны некоторых органов печати, разного рода экстремистов и демагогов, – она не оправдывает такой реакции со стороны Эдуарда.

Критика, в том числе и необоснованная, несправедливая, даже обидная – дело неизбежное в демократическом обществе, к которому мы решились идти. Вам, Джордж, это известно лучше меня. И если в ответ на нее каждый будет подавать в отставку, то никакую серьезную политику, особенно на переломном, крайне сложном, бурном этапе в развитии общества, практически проводить будет невозможно.

Я говорил с Эдуардом, хотя и понимал, что отозвать свое заявление он уже не сможет. Это было бы потерей лица. При его чувстве достоинства это невозможно.

Я очень высоко ценю его вклад в нашу новую внешнюю политику, в подготовку и в осуществление кардинальных решений, прежде всего, на советско-американском направлении, благодаря чему нам с Вами удалось за короткий срок изменить сам характер мировой политики, всю международную атмосферу – и в Европе, и в других важных пунктах. Я считаю, что это исторические завоевания на пути к мирному периоду цивилизации. И, надеюсь, они необратимы. Я также очень ценю роль Эдуарда как одного из инициативных, смелых и последовательных деятелей глубокой внутренней перестройки, которая идет у нас с такими трудностями. И в том, и в другом мне его будет очень не хватать. Хотя, думаю, он не уйдет совсем из политической жизни, займет авторитетное место в новых государственных структурах, которые сейчас рассматриваются Съездом народных депутатов.

Кто будет министром иностранных дел, я не могу Вам пока сказать. Сам еще не решил. Но прошу принять мои совершенно твердые заверения: курс нашей политики - политики нового мышления - на укрепление доверия и взаимодействия между руководством наших стран останется неизменным, как по содержанию, так и по форме. Это касается двусторонних отношений. Это касается европейского процесса. Это касается всех проблем разоружения и безопасности. Это относится к Персидскому заливу и всем другим моментам, по которым у нас с Вами есть и взаимопонимание, и договоренность. Все остается в силе.


Я не возражал бы, если бы Вы сочли возможным рассказать о моем письме Джиму. Передайте ему мои самые добрые пожелания.

Пользуясь случаем, шлю Вам и всей Вашей прекрасной семье искренние поздравления с наступающим Новым годом, а теперь позволю себе сказать - и с Рождеством.

Надеюсь, что мы на днях обменяемся телевизионными новогодними посланиями к нашим народам.

Все графики подготовки к нашей с Вами встрече в Москве остаются без изменений. Буду рад дружески приветствовать Вас здесь.

Искренне



М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

Personal and Confidential

To His Great Secrecy
The White House

Waverley



P/Besomertuykh
12/27/90

B Duty to carry - carrying of a
resig. Does so in a spirit
of a relationship which has
evolved

Resig was totally unexpected.

Very upsetting to Corb - esp because
his close friend didn't tell him.
Thinks Sheward extremely tired
& worn out & at some point broke
down.

Corb wants to ~~keep~~ be symp.
but no way he could approve.

(Reads from document)

Corb valued him both for new
FP & internal perspective

Corb doesn't think he will leave
pub affairs. May be in some
of new Govt structure, but not in

Everything ~~stays~~ unchanged

P There is talk in Wash that I have
personalized our relations w/ SC &
rely too much on Corb. I reject that
because of what Corb has done
done in past 5 yrs.

But I would like you to pass
to Corb our concerns about case
of force - it would inevitably complicate

UP
NSC
Council
of
EER
Cabinet

a relationship. That would be a tragedy.
J-V union went well in this
country. I don't know what it
means that we deal more w/ a
republicans

B Yes, I see that in your press
as well. About a use of force. What
Cob needs is 1-2 yrs of stability.
Law & order is necessary but w/
in but not outside a const.

P He told me in Paris he had
to go home to be tough. I know
there was a way to ~~see~~ separate
out a Baltics - from a US point
of view. Cob told me there ~~was~~
a way but it had to be done
constitutionally.

B One prob is a Army units in
Baltics are being badly provoked.

P You might tell Cob our thinking
on Gulf hasn't changed. We
view 15th very seriously, we
plan to do our part to implement
UNSC resolutions. I haven't changed
my mind that force might have
to be used. Would like to see all
Sov citizens out. Tell him there
has been no flx on SA part
regarding Kuwait. This will

bring him up to date since no
FNV + Baker hasn't been shared
posted. Intg appears unlikely &
seems to me less & less important.
There is no hidden agenda &
no private intgs going on.
I think S + H still thinks force won't
be used or if it were it would
be a stand off.

B Our sense is he thinks no
force will be used. He sees
what's happening in SC w/ Sheward
& what's happening in VS & he thinks
force will be used.

P Please thank P for this communique.
I value his willingness to share

*Delivered to Mrs
by Amb. Besenmuth
12/27*

Unofficial translation

Mr. George BUSH
The President of the
United States of America

Dear George,

In the spirit of the friendly and trusting relationship that has developed between ourselves, I consider it to be my duty to convey to you some explanations concerning Eduard's resignation.

It has caused great agitation within the world public opinion and in the political quarters, a lot of guesses and, frankly, speculations that go far beyond this truly unfortunate episode. I said right there at the Congress - and you are aware of it - that to me his statement was totally unexpected. This is really so and this is what was particularly upsetting - not only because of his act of disloyalty to the President - the fact that he did so without consulting and without telling me in advance, his old friend and comrade, has no justification. That he was extremely tired, that the terrible workload had worn him out, that he, as we say, was giving it his damndest without sparing one bit of himself and at some point broke down - all that is true, and therefore one would like to be sympathetic to what he did, but there is no way I can approve of it. Whatever criticism there had been voiced against the Foreign Minister regarding the policies for which he had, after the President, the foremost responsibility, be that the criticism from Parliamentarians or from socio-political groups, and still less by certain media organs and all kinds of extremists and demagogues, did not justify such a reaction on the part of Eduard.

Criticism, including unjustified, unfair criticism, even one that hurts, is something which is inevitable in a democratic society to which we have resolved to aspire. You, George, know this better than I, and if everyone is going to resign in response to criticism, no serious policy, especially at a crucial, extremely difficult and turbulent stage in a society's development, will actually be possible to pursue. I talked with Eduard, even though I realized that he would not be able to go back on his resignation, for it would be a loss of face for him, an impossible thing to do, given his sense of honor and dignity. I value very highly his contribution to our new foreign policy, to working out and implementing cardinal decisions, above all those concerning US-Soviet relationship, thanks to which you and I were able, within a short period of time, to change the very nature of world politics, the entire international atmosphere - both in Europe and in other major parts of the world. I believe those have been historic accomplishments on the path toward a peaceful period of our civilization, and I hope they are irreversible. I also greatly appreciate Eduard's role as a man of initiative and courage and as a consistent advocate of a profound internal perestroika which is proceeding with such difficulties at home. In both of those roles I shall be missing him very much, although I don't believe he is going to leave the political scene altogether, but, rather, will assume a position of authority within those new government structures which are now being considered by the Congress of People's Deputies. I cannot as yet tell you who the new Foreign Minister will be. Haven't decided myself yet. But of one thing you can be absolutely firmly assured - our policy course, the new

thinking policy course toward strengthening trust and cooperation between the leadership of both our countries shall remain unchanged, in terms of substance as in form. This goes for our bilateral relations. This goes for the European process. This goes for all the arms control and security issues. This goes for the Persian Gulf and all other things on which you and I have both understanding and agreement. Everything stands unchanged. I would have no objection, if you thought you could tell Jim about my letter. Give him my kindest regards.

Taking this opportunity, I am sending you and all your wonderful family my sincere greetings for the New Year and, as I think I can now also add, Christmas greetings. I hope we shall exchange our televised New Year messages to each other's people.

All the scheduling concerning preparations for our meeting in Moscow remains without change. I will be happy to give you here a friendly welcome.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

APNSA Has Seen

For General Scowcroft

Delivered by
Soviet Embassy
12/31/90

Information on Deputy
Chairman of the Council Of Ministers
I.BELOUSOV'S trip to Bagdad

file/history??

Chairman Belousov's discussions with Saddam Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership focused on securing an earliest possible departure from Iraq of the remaining Soviet specialists (as of December 24 there still were nearly 1700 of them).

As a result of those talks the Iraqis confirmed that they would not place any obstacles to the Soviets' leaving Iraq, including the military specialists. An evacuation schedule was agreed upon which provides for the evacuation completion by January 10, 1991. Following that date a small number (about 150 people) of Soviet specialists would remain in Iraq to supervise the equipment and other property remaining at a number of major facilities (worth several hundred million dollars).

The Iraqi leadership assured us of their readiness to provide the necessary assistance in all matters relating to our people's departure. We hope that in this particular case the Iraqis will live up to their pledges and that we will have no further problems with them in this regard.

Another question, also very important to us, was resolved positively as well, that of temporarily suspending the works

at the Soviet-Iraqi cooperative projects without stating in the final document the Soviet Government's responsibility for failing to implement contractual obligations.

In the course of Chairman Belousov's meeting with Saddam Hussein a great deal of attention was given to the military and political situation in which Iraq found itself as a result of its Kuwaiti adventure.

The Iraqi President presented the familiar set of arguments to justify his decision to invade Kuwait. He asserted, in particular, that the threats and intimidation campaign against Iraq allegedly started long before August 2, and that the anti-Iraqi course pursued by the US and Israel was supposedly joined by some of the Arabs, including Kuwait. Under those circumstances, he claimed, the introduction of the Iraqi troops into Kuwait was all but a gesture of self-defense, something Iraq was compelled to do.

Saddam Hussein was again strongly dwelling on the notion that links the resolution of the Kuwaiti crisis with the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He characterized the Security Council decisions on the Gulf situation as "unbalanced" and based on applying different standards to the problems which require the same approach.

He reiterated his readiness for a direct dialogue with the US administration, but stressed that this dialogue should be conducted on "an equal footing" and without "arms twisting". Responding to the straightforward question about how Bagdad

was going to settle the problem of the dates of the US and Iraqi foreign ministers' visits, S.Hussein implied that if the Soviet Union proposed some new, compromise dates, the Iraqi side would positively consider such a proposal. At the same time he once again made a reservation that the new dates should not exclude January 10.

During the discussions with S.Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership the Soviet side presented our well-known assessment of the situation in the Persian Gulf area, stressing the need for political wisdom and flexibility on the part of the Iraqi leadership. We noted that without such flexibility the risk of an escalation of the political and military confrontation into a large-scale armed conflict was growing by the day. We clearly and unambiguously argued for an earliest resolution of the problem of a direct dialogue between the US and Iraq.

Unfortunately, no substantial change could be seen from S.Hussein's remarks as regards his position on the Iraqi troops withdrawal from Kuwait. Nevertheless, the Soviet side is determined to continue its efforts in this matter. In the final analysis, using every available opportunity and all the time provided for by the Security Council for finding a political, non-military solution to the Kuwaiti crisis is what the "goodwill pause" is all about.

We hope the US government shares this attitude.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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12b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock from General Scowcroft [030132Z Jan 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/3/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/26/2016

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-005
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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0845-MR(511.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

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QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

JACK,

I AM GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOU WILL BE SEEING KRYUCHKOV AND CHERNAYEV.
WE ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY CONCERNED ABOUT KRYUCHKOV'S ANTI-WESTERN
COMMENTS, EVEN THOUGH HE SEEMED TO RETRACT THEM IN PART LATER.

THERE WAS NOTHING EXTRAORDINARY IN THE MESSAGE THAT BESSMERTNYKH
DELIVERED. GORBACHEV STATED AGAIN, FORCEFULLY AND CATEGORICALLY,
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED
STATES, DESPITE SHEVARDNADZE'S RESIGNATION.

HE THEN WENT TO SOME LENGTHS TO "EXPLAIN" SHEVARDNADZE'S
RESIGNATION -- THOUGH, IN REALITY, THE LETTER CASTS LITTLE LIGHT ON
THE EPISODE. THE LETTER REVEALS GORBACHEV'S CONSIDERABLE
FRUSTRATION AND DISPLEASURE WITH SHEVARDNADZE'S DECISION TO LEAVE
AT THIS TIME. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED SHEVARDNADZE WOULD REMAIN IN
THE GOVERNMENT. GORBACHEV ALSO SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S DECISION
WAS AN EMOTIONAL OVERREACTION TO THE CUMULATIVE CRITICISM OF
SHEVARDNADZE PERSONALLY AND OF HIS POLICIES. GORBACHEV MADE NO
REFERENCE AT ALL TO SHEVARDNADZE'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE RISE OF
DICTATORSHIP.

THE PRESIDENT USED THE OCCASION OF BESSMERTNYKH'S VISIT TO
REITERATE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE AND TO SAY THAT SUCH
A DEVELOPMENT WOULD MOST ASSUREDLY HARM U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL WITH GORBACHEV WAS UNEVENTFUL.
GORBACHEV DID SAY THAT IT HAD BEEN A "HOT FEW DAYS" IN THE SOVIET
UNION AND THAT HE HAD A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TO DO AT HOME.

I HOPE THAT THESE NOTES ARE HELPFUL. WE, OF COURSE, LOOK FORWARD
TO A READOUT OF YOUR IMPORTANT MEETINGS.

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0091

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0091 <TOR> 910102203817 MSG000284157497



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