

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91128
Folder ID Number: 91128-004

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02c. Draft	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03a. Cable	Charge Hullings to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [200110Z Oct 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S
03c. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Message	Re: Message from the Prime Minister to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1078
OA/ID Number: 91128-004
Date Closed: 4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)	11/6/90	(b)(1)	
06a. Draft	Re: State Draft Letter to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)	11/11/90	(b)(1)	
06b. Draft	Re: State Draft Letter to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)	11/11/90	(b)(1)	
07a. Cable	From White House , Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	11/12/90	(b)(1)	S
07b. Draft	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	11/1990	(b)(1)	S
07c. Draft	President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [4]

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OA/ID Number: 91128-004
Date Closed: 4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

VIA BACK CHANNEL

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
MOSCOW

DELIVER FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S EYES ONLY

Dear Jack:

Please deliver to Cherniaev the following message from
President Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered
before Primakov returns to Moscow, Saturday evening, October 20.

BEGIN TEXT (Copy attached)

END TEXT

Warm regards,

Brent

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0844-MR
ES 5/23/13

Dear Mr. President:

I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just how much the relationship between our two countries has developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful. I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki. Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would inevitably present as a "reward."

In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era, we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from

aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the 1930's.

Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an approach of this kind would probably convince him that the coalition against him is beginning to unravel.

I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke -- result from the real pressure of the whole world being against him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new international order where aggression has no place.

Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent men, women and children. As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am now more convinced than ever that we must succeed in this matter because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in Kuwait and because ^{of} the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the Arab League.

I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common front or the messages we send, Mikhail.

Sincerely,

George Bush

(more) ↓

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

VIA BACK CHANNEL

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1990

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George Bush

(more) ✓

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President of the Union of Soviet
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Sincerely,

As I explained to Mr Primakov, I am now more concerned than ever about the treatment of the Kuwaiti people in Kuwait and about the systematic dismantling of Kuwait, a member of the UN & the Arab League

brutalizing and

because

that we must
succeed in this
matter

As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am now more convinced than ever ~~X~~
because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in
Kuwait and because the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of
Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the
Arab League.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Cable	Charge Hullings to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [No Subject] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/13/2015

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [4]

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0844-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	11/25/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information


IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMMANN
SIT. FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM



Sent to Camp
Dowd
20 Oct/1030
per BS

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 201220Z OCT 90

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

0000

PLEASE PASS TO BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: CHARGE HULINGS, EMBASSY MOSCOW
TEXT:

I DELIVERED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO GORBACHEV TO
CHERNIAEV AT 12:30 P.M. (LOCAL) OCTOBER 20. CHERNIAEV SAID
GORBACHEV WAS IN THE BUILDING AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE HIM THE
LETTER IMMEDIATELY. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE QUICK
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH IN REACTION TO THE PRIMAKOV
VISIT, SAYING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS KIND OF FREQUENT, PERSONAL
COMMUNICATION WAS ONE OF THE BEST ACHIEVEMENTS IN OUR IMPROVED
RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO SAID SADDAM SHOULD NOT GET ANYTHING OUT
OF HIS INVASION OF KUWAIT.

END TEXT.

DECL OADR.

#0387

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0844-MR

11/25/2013 AM

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [200110Z Oct 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By mu on 6/12/2023

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0844-MR(502.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/8/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HAASS PRIVACY OUT RICE SIT SUM


*Revised 2130
found misspells
will send corrected
copy (com)*

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 200110Z OCT 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c)



~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
0000

1.4(c)

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK.

FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S EYES ONLY.

DEAR JACK:

PLEASE DELIVER TO CHERNIAEV THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED BEFORE
PRIMAKOV RETURNS TO MOSCOW, SATURDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 20.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE JUST SEEN YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV AND HEARD HIS REPORT ON HIS
MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. AT THE OUTSET, LET ME SAY HOW MUCH
I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT YOU SENT MR. PRIMAKOV HERE AND THE
SPIRIT OF HIS VISIT. IT IS YET ANOTHER INDICATION OF JUST HOW
MUCH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAS DEVELOPED. I
WELCOMED HIS OBSERVATIONS BASED ON HIS LONG ACQUAINTANCE WITH
SADDAM HUSSEIN. OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE USEFUL. I KNOW THAT YOU
WILL HEAR FIRST-HAND FROM MR. PRIMAKOV ABOUT OUR DISCUSSION. BUT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0844-MR
MM 7/8/2016

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

I WANTED TO WRITE TO YOU RIGHT AWAY IN ORDER TO UNDERScore SEVERAL OF MY CONCERNS ABOUT SOME ELEMENTS OF OUR CONVERSATION. I AM AFRAID THAT GOING TO SADDAM WITH A PROPOSAL DETAILING WHAT WE ARE WILLING TO DO AFTER HE WITHDRAWS WOULD VIOLATE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES YOU AND I EMBRACED IN HELSINKI. RATHER THAN INSISTING ON SADDAM'S UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL, THIS APPROACH WOULD OFFER HIM SIGNIFICANT "FACE-SAVERS" THAT HE WOULD INEVITABLY PRESENT AS A "REWARD".

IN OTHER WORDS, HE WOULD PROFIT FROM HIS INVASION, AND IN DOING SO, HE WOULD LIKELY ACQUIRE A STANDING OF HEROIC PROPORTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE WOULD BE SEEN AS SOMEONE WHO CAN OVERCOME ALL ODDS, AND HIS WAY OF DOING BUSINESS WOULD BECOME THE NORM IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT WOULD ELIMINATE ANY CHANCE WE HAVE OF BROKERING PEACE TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. THAT IS NOT A PRESCRIPTION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE VIEW I KNOW WE SHARE THAT IN DEALING WITH THIS FIRST REAL CRISIS OF THE POST COLD WAR ERA, WE CANNOT PERMIT AN AGGRESSOR TO PROFIT IN ANY WAY FROM AGGRESSION. ANYTHING LESS WOULD REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF THE 1930'S.

INDEED, SADDAM WOULD MISREAD THIS AND SEE IT AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. RATHER THAN PAVING THE WAY TO HIS WITHDRAWAL, AN

APPROACH OF THIS KIND WOULD PROBABLY CONVINCE HIM THAT THE COALITION AGAINST HIM IS BEGINNING TO UNRAVEL.

I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE SIGNS OF SADDAM'S RECOGNITION OF HIS REAL SITUATION -- SOMETHING ABOUT WHICH MR. PRIMAKOV SPOKE -- RESULT FROM THE REAL PRESSURE OF THE WHOLE WORLD BEING AGAINST HIM. THE TWO OF US -- THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR -- HAVE LED THE WAY. OUR COOPERATION HAS CEMENTED THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS. IT REFLECTS OUR NEW AND GROWING PARTNERSHIP AND IT ALSO REFLECTS OUR JOINT RESPONSIBILITY IN SHAPING A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER WHERE AGGRESSION HAS NO PLACE.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

OUR COOPERATION, OUR RESOLVE, AND OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN ARE THE ONLY WAY TO SETTLE THIS CRISIS PEACEFULLY. HE MUST COME TO SEE THAT THERE IS NO PLACE IN THE WORLD FOR HIS AGGRESSION, NO EXCUSE FOR HIS BRUTAL DESTRUCTION OF A COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE, AND NO TOLERANCE WHATSOEVER FOR HIS INJUMANE AND UNCIVILIZED TREATMENT OF INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. AS I EXPLAINED TO MR. PRIMAKOV, I AM NOW MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAT WE MUST SUCCEED IN THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TREATMENT OF OUR EMBASSY'S PEOPLE IN KUWAIT AND BECAUSE OF THE SYSTEMATIC BRUTALIZING AND DISMANTLING OF KUWAIT, A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARAB LEAGUE.

I BELIEVE SADDAM IS SLOWLY GETTING THE MESSAGE; THAT IS WHY HE IS PREPARED TO PROBE NOW. WE SHOULD NOT WEAKEN OUR COMMON FRONT OR THE MESSAGES WE SEND, MIKHAIL.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT

BEST REGARDS, BRENT

*0027

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

"Eyes Only"

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 58

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 3

DTG 272353Z

RELEASER JD

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GENERAL SCOWCROFT/ Honolulu

2. _____

3. _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Col NARA, Date 4/10/09

4. _____

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INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Deliver Immediately Upon Receipt!
- Honolulu Please Advise Situation Room Upon the General receipt.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

British Embassy
Washington DC.

~~27 October 90~~

The Embassy has been asked by Mr Powell (10 Downing Street) to give to General Scowcroft a copy of the attached message from the Prime Minister to Mr Gorbachev.

Edmund Hosker
Embassy DM Officer

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Message	Re: Message from the Prime Minister to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [4]

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality with which you related your impressions from your discussions with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly that it was precisely this kind of reaction - consistent with the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the state level - that I was counting on.

This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to fully understand one's partner that has developed between ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually, the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain and France.

It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika? Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps no other leader in the world, understand the special responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.

His Excellency

Mr. George BUSH

President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting the official results - you no doubt know them.

Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation. But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break into the open field of free democratic development and take a worthy place in the international community, was very important.

All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal couple who played such an important role in the critical period of Spain's transition to democracy.

As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon - our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured prospect.

Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the other, which is the development of the bilateral relations. And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to consider each other as enemies.

A major place in the talks in both capitals was given to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to help.

In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time, we were able to touch upon all the main European and world problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the Persian Gulf crisis.

The mission of my special representative, E.M.Primakov, continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked you and other Security Council members to postpone a little bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.

Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad, as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly. Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region. I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by the UN Security Council".

At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow, we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor. I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki, that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the

US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".

Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions about E.M.Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time, but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results. In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward", albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible", "unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is "undesirable".)

In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the "let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem mantle.

There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among them. You understand that given our present situation at home, this is of particular importance. After the meetings with my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure should be intensified in this area as well.

In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe, put off the more general problem of the future of that region, including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.

I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian) with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression. But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world that you and I, and the Security Council, keep all this within their field of vision and shall promptly address it after Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.

Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had with an American Secretary of State.

We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us learns from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to understand the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to the other's suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt that we are developing a real partnership, and that partnership is serving not only our respective interests, but the interests of the entire world.

Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly than in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't tell you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent letter and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining absolute unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that point with great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well that the fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your approach on this and other issues.

I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I share your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully about your suggestion for two UNSC resolutions -- the first to issue a warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain time there would be a second resolution to authorize the use of all necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.

I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel the need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.

I agree that we must demonstrate that we have ^{explored fully} ~~exhausted~~ our non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are considering -- one which would be passed this month but only become operative ^{at some point around} ~~after~~ the beginning of the year -- does just that. In this circumstance, we would have given sanctions five to six months to work. We would also be able to point to ten previous UNSC resolutions -- all rejected. We only weaken the ~~Security Council~~ ^{UNSC} as a mechanism for preempting, managing and settling conflicts if resolutions such as these can be rejected. We ^{risk} ~~much with~~ ^{don't need} another resolution that, in effect, assumes a failure without guaranteeing a specific concrete action.

In my opinion we should focus on

[Rather, we need] a resolution that offers some prospect of moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only way to achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince Saddam that military action is imminent. A resolution of the sort we are suggesting, with a ^{specific} timeframe for when it becomes operative, would have this effect. It would also signal Saddam that we are unified, determined to take whatever steps are needed to reverse his aggression, and that we will not be divided.

In effect, it does the same thing as your proposed two resolutions, but combining them into a single resolution makes the effect much more compelling.

I know that's important to you as well as me. I know also that we both share the conviction that we must not suggest any weakening of our position to Saddam. To the contrary, we want to signal unmistakably that our position is becoming stronger and tougher.

Security Council
I fear that a proposal for two ~~UNSC~~ resolutions ~~will send~~ the opposite message. ~~It will~~ ^{word} constitute a retreat from our initial resolution (UNSC 660) calling for immediate withdrawal. We can't step back from that.

(In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would run the risk of only getting the first and not the second, particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our successors in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.

And the imagery of a long drawn out public effort trying to get a second resolution will mislead Saddam into thinking the coalition against him could break.

Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the risk that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words, Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to ensure we couldn't get a second resolution. ↗

Further, if we fail to produce a second resolution after issuing the warning in the first resolution, we will have ended any possibility of using the UNSC to resolve the crisis. And if the UNSC is seen as having failed in this crisis -- the first test of the post Cold War era -- it will have very little future. That will frustrate our mutual hopes and aspirations for a very different international order.

Finally, let me make one last point. I believe the concept we have for the resolution -- namely, that it is adopted now but isn't operative until after the beginning of the year -- really should get at your concerns. It permits us to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein has been given every opportunity to withdraw peacefully. If, after this additional period of time, he still

*My proposal
on P-3 numbers
is better.
Agreed*

won't do so, he is telling the world that there is no peaceful way to implement the prior Security Council resolutions fully. And we both agree that these resolutions must be implemented fully.

I have taken the time to write you in this detail because your idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and deserved a serious, considered response. *I believe it is crucial to combine both thoughts into a single resolution* ~~I don't see any good alternative to moving for the kind of resolution Jim Baker described to you while we're in the chair of the Security Council.~~ *to be moved while we are chairing the Security Council!*

Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective peacefully, ~~but only~~ ^{if we} if we stay together and lead the way once again in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that possible, and offers us great hope for the future.

I know you know how very important I think this matter is and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be even more likely, as our experience on UNSC resolution 665 suggests, if you join with us.

Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing from you soon and seeing you in Paris.

Dear Mikhail:

Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had with an American Secretary of State.

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*my proposal
on p. 3 makes
this point
better.*

won't do so, he is telling the world that there is no peaceful way to implement the prior Security Council resolutions fully. And we both agree that these resolutions must be implemented fully.

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~~I don't see any good alternative to moving for the kind of resolution Jim Baker described to you while we're in the chair of the Security Council.~~

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I know you know how very important I think this matter is and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be even more likely, as our experience on UNSC resolution 665 suggests, if you join with us.

Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing from you soon and seeing you in Paris.

12 Nov 95

Florence,

Here is the draft and
comeback copy of the message
sent to Moscow this afternoon.
No copies have been given
to the staff.

Charles

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Cable	From White House , Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	11/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/13/2015

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0844-MR(506)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	11/25/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Phg # 8851

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 122212Z NOV 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

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~~SECRET~~ VIA

(b)(1)

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02



PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.

JACK:

PLEASE DELIVER TO CHERNYAYEV THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED AT THE EARLIEST CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY.

WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

JIM BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME IN DEPTH ON HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. ONCE AGAIN I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY HOW MUCH OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS CHANGED FOR THE GOOD. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE EVEN IN THE VERY RECENT PAST TO ENVISION THE KIND OF DISCUSSIONS YOU AND YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE JUST HAD WITH AN AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE.

WE NOW CAN TRULY HAVE HONEST DIALOGUE WHERE EACH OF US LEARNS FROM THE OTHER -- WHERE EACH OF US GENUINELY SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND THE OTHER'S VIEWPOINT AND CONCERNS -- AND RESPOND TO THE OTHER'S SUGGESTIONS AND NEEDS. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE ARE DEVELOPING A REAL PARTNERSHIP, AND THAT PARTNERSHIP IS SERVING NOT ONLY OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERESTS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

NOWHERE HAS THAT PARTNERSHIP BEEN DEMONSTRATED MORE CLEARLY THAN IN THE GULF. THAT PARTNERSHIP HAS BOTH LED AND CEMENTED THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION CONFRONTING SADDAM HUSSEIN. I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW GRATIFYING IT WAS FOR ME TO RECEIVE YOUR RECENT LETTER AND HAVE YOU EMPHASIZE YOUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING ABSOLUTE UNITY BETWEEN US ON THE GULF. I KNOW YOU MADE THAT POINT WITH GREAT CONVICTION TO JIM, AND MADE IT CLEAR AS WELL THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP SHAPES YOUR APPROACH ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES.

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE THAT. AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I SHARE YOUR VIEWS. IN THAT SPIRIT, I HAVE THOUGHT CAREFULLY ABOUT YOUR SUGGESTION FOR TWO UNSC RESOLUTIONS -- THE FIRST TO ISSUE A WARNING THAT IF SADDAM FAILS TO WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN TIME THERE WOULD BE A SECOND RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF ALL

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0844-MR

11/25/2013 MM

NECESSARY MEANS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WANT TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON, BUT FEEL THE NEED TO HIGHLIGHT THAT WE HAVE EXHAUSTED ALL OPTIONS BEFORE LAYING DOWN WHAT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS AN ULTIMATUM.

I AGREE THAT WE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT WE HAVE EXPLORED FULLY OUR NON-MILITARY OPTIONS AND THAT WE HAVE GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR CHANCE TO WORK. I THINK THE TYPE OF RESOLUTION WE ARE CONSIDERING -- ONE WHICH WOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH BUT ONLY BECOME OPERATIVE AT SOME POINT AROUND THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR -- DOES JUST THAT. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN SANCTIONS FIVE TO SIX MONTHS TO WORK. WE WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO POINT TO TEN PREVIOUS UNSC RESOLUTIONS -- ALL REJECTED. WE ONLY WEAKEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A MECHANISM FOR PREEMPTING, MANAGING AND SETTLING CONFLICTS IF RESOLUTIONS SUCH AS THESE CAN BE REJECTED. WE RISK MUCH WITH ANOTHER RESOLUTION THAT, IN EFFECT, ASSUMES A FAILURE WITHOUT GUARANTEEING A SPECIFIC CONCRETE ACTION.

IN MY OPINION WE SHOULD FOCUS ON A RESOLUTION THAT OFFERS SOME PROSPECT OF MOVING SADDAM. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE OUR ENDS PEACEFULLY IS, IRONICALLY, TO CONVINCE SADDAM THAT MILITARY ACTION IS IMMINENT. A RESOLUTION OF THE SORT WE ARE SUGGESTING, WITH A SPECIFIC TIMEFRAME FOR WHEN IT BECOMES OPERATIVE, WOULD HAVE THIS EFFECT. IT WOULD ALSO SIGNAL SADDAM THAT WE ARE UNIFIED, DETERMINED TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NEEDED TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION, AND THAT WE WILL NOT BE DIVIDED. IN EFFECT, IT DOES THE SAME THING AS YOUR PROPOSED TWO RESOLUTIONS, BUT COMBINING THEM INTO A SINGLE RESOLUTION MAKES THE EFFECT MUCH MORE COMPELLING.

I FEAR THAT A PROPOSAL FOR TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE A RETREAT FROM OUR INITIAL RESOLUTION (UNSC 660) CALLING FOR (BEGIN UNDERLINE) IMMEDIATE (END UNDERLINE) WITHDRAWAL. WE CAN'T STEP BACK FROM THAT. IN ADDITION, WHILE WE CAN TALK OF TWO RESOLUTIONS, WE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF ONLY GETTING THE FIRST AND NOT THE SECOND, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE BY THE TIME WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO GO FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION WE WILL NO LONGER BE IN THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC. WE COULD BE TIED IN PROCEDURAL KNOTS BY OUR SUCCESSORS IN THE CHAIR -- YEMEN, ZAIRE, AND ZIMBABWE.

ASIDE FROM THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEM, WE WOULD ALSO RUN THE RISK THAT SADDAM MIGHT OFFER A REAL, BUT UNACCEPTABLE, PARTIAL SOLUTION OR ALTERNATIVELY PULL BACK PARTIALLY AS A WAY OF UNDERCUTTING THE CONSENSUS FOR USING FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS, SADDAM MIGHT WELL BE ABLE TO MANIPULATE THE ENVIRONMENT TO ENSURE WE COULDN'T GET A SECOND RESOLUTION. AND THE IMAGERY OF A LONG DRAWN OUT PUBLIC EFFORT TRYING TO GET A SECOND RESOLUTION WILL MISLEAD SADDAM INTO THINKING THE COALITION AGAINST HIM COULD BREAK.

I HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO WRITE YOU IN THIS DETAIL BECAUSE YOUR IDEA WAS PRESENTED IN A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT AND DESERVED A

#0014

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

SERIOUS, CONSIDERED RESPONSE. I BELIEVE IT IS CRUCIAL TO COMBINE BOTH THOUGHTS INTO A SINGLE RESOLUTION TO BE MOVED WHILE WE ARE CHAIRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

MIKHAIL, I THINK THERE IS A CHANCE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE PEACEFULLY, IF WE STAY TOGETHER AND IF WE LEAD THE WAY ONCE AGAIN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP MAKES THAT POSSIBLE, AND OFFERS US GREAT HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.

I KNOW YOU KNOW HOW VERY IMPORTANT I THINK THIS MATTER IS AND HOW VERY MUCH I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN WITH US, WITH FRANCE AND WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN SUPPORTING THIS APPROACH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NOVEMBER. AS JIM BAKER TOLD YOU IN MOSCOW AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER, WE ARE ALSO HOPEFUL THE CHINESE WILL GO ALONG -- A POSSIBILITY THAT WILL BE EVEN MORE LIKELY, AS OUR EXPERIENCE ON UNSC RESOLUTION 665 SUGGESTS, IF YOU JOIN WITH US.

LET'S STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU SOON AND SEEING YOU IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

PS: JIM BAKER HAS TOLD ME THAT YOU MAY HAVE SOME EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS THIS WINTER. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WISH TO BE AS HELPFUL AS I CAN BE IN THIS REGARD.

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0015

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0014 <TOR> 901112171511 MSG000279738911
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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

November __, 1990

TO: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK
AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

DELIVER IN A SEALED ENVELOPE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT; NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.

Jack:

Please deliver to Chernyayev the following message from President
Bush to President Gorbachev. It should be delivered at the
earliest convenient opportunity.

Warm regards, Brent.

BEGIN TEXT:

(copy attached)

END TEXT.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0844-NR
ES 923110

Dear Mr. President:

Jim Baker has reported to me in depth on his talks with you and Minister Shevardnadze. Once again I have been struck by how much our relationship has changed for the good. It would have been unthinkable even in the very recent past to envision the kind of discussions you and your Foreign Minister have just had with an American Secretary of State.

We now can truly have honest dialogue where each of us learns from the other -- where each of us genuinely seeks to understand the other's viewpoint and concerns -- and respond to the other's suggestions and needs. There can be little doubt that we are developing a real partnership, and that partnership is serving not only our respective interests, but the interests of the entire world.

Nowhere has that partnership been demonstrated more clearly than in the Gulf. That partnership has both led and cemented the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. I can't tell you how gratifying it was for me to receive your recent letter and have you emphasize your commitment to maintaining absolute unity between us on the Gulf. I know you made that point with great conviction to Jim, and made it clear as well that the fundamental importance of our relationship shapes your approach on this and other issues.

I very much appreciate that. And I want you to know that I share your views. In that spirit, I have thought carefully about your suggestion for two UNSC resolutions -- the first to issue a warning that if Saddam fails to withdraw by a certain time there would be a second resolution to authorize the use of all necessary means to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.

I understand that you want to keep the pressure on, but feel the need to highlight that we have exhausted all options before laying down what will be interpreted as an ultimatum.

I agree that we must demonstrate that we have explored fully our non-military options and that we have given sanctions a fair chance to work. I think the type of resolution we are considering -- one which would be passed this month but only become operative at some point around the beginning of the year -- does just that. In this circumstance, we would have given sanctions five to six months to work. We would also be able to point to ten previous UNSC resolutions -- all rejected. We only weaken the Security Council as a mechanism for preempting, managing and settling conflicts if resolutions such as these can be rejected. We risk much with another resolution that, in effect, assumes a failure without guaranteeing a specific concrete action.

In my opinion we should focus on a resolution that offers some prospect of moving Saddam. I am firmly convinced that the only way to achieve our ends peacefully is, ironically, to convince Saddam that military action is imminent. A resolution of the sort we are suggesting, with a specific timeframe for when it becomes operative, would have this effect. It would also signal Saddam that we are unified, determined to take whatever steps are needed to reverse his aggression, and that we will not be divided. In effect, it does the same thing as your proposed two resolutions, but combining them into a single resolution makes the effect much more compelling.

I fear that a proposal for two Security Council resolutions would constitute a retreat from our initial resolution (UNSC 660) calling for immediate withdrawal. We can't step back from that. In addition, while we can talk of two resolutions, we would run the risk of only getting the first and not the second, particularly because by the time we would be in a position to go for the second resolution we will no longer be in the chair at the UNSC. We could be tied in procedural knots by our successors in the chair -- Yemen, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.

Aside from the procedural problem, we would also run the risk that Saddam might offer a real, but unacceptable, partial solution or alternatively pull back partially as a way of undercutting the consensus for using force. In other words,

Saddam might well be able to manipulate the environment to ensure we couldn't get a second resolution. And the imagery of a long drawn out public effort trying to get a second resolution will mislead Saddam into thinking the coalition against him could break.

I have taken the time to write you in this detail because your idea was presented in a very constructive spirit and deserved a serious, considered response. I believe it is crucial to combine both thoughts into a single resolution to be moved while we are chairing the Security Council.

Mikhail, I think there is a chance to achieve our objective peacefully, if we stay together and if we lead the way once again in the Security Council. Our new relationship makes that possible, and offers us great hope for the future.

I know you know how very important I think this matter is and how very much I hope you will join with us, with France and with the United Kingdom in supporting this approach in the Security Council in November. As Jim Baker told you in Moscow after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, we are also hopeful the Chinese will go along -- a possibility that will be even more likely, as our experience on UNSC Resolution 665 suggests, if you join with us.

Let's stay in close touch, and I look forward to hearing from you soon and seeing you in Paris.

Sincerely,

George Bush

PS: Jim Baker has told me that you may have some emergency food needs this winter. I want you to know that I wish to be as helpful as I can be in this regard.

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev

President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow