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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91128
Folder ID Number: 91128-003

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [3]

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G	34	3	4	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Draft Memcon	Re: President/Gorbachev (19 pp.)	9/9/90	(b)(1)	
01b. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (11 pp.)	9/9/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev [Meeting Notes] (24 pp.)	9/9/90	(b)(1)	
02. Memo	Re: The Secretary's Telephone Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Shecardnadze (2 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Correspondence from President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	10/1990	(b)(1)	
03c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	10/1990	(b)(1)	
04. Letter	E.A. Shevardnadze to James A. Baker, III [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05a. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (2 pp.)	9/17/90	(b)(1)	

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1077
OA/ID Number: 91128-003
Date Closed: 4/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Arms Control Talks in Moscow (2 pp.)	9/15/90	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Arnold Kanter/Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Arms Control Talks in Moscow (3 pp.)	9/14/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable Memo	Susan Porter Rose to Ambassador and Mrs. Jack Matlock Re: "Make Way for Ducklings" Statue [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

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P/Gorbachev -- 9/9/90

P: Good to see you again.

G: Despite the fact that we are all here through difficult circumstances, I am glad to see you.

P: I think that our agreement at Camp David for this kind of meeting is good and public opinion is playing this meeting well.

G: I have said *at the airport* ----- that we are in constant touch but sometimes personal contact is necessary.

P: I agree. I don't know how you want to proceed. I think it is wonderful signal to the world that the US and the Soviet Union have been proceeding *in concert* on the Gulf. Do you want to start -- or I would be happy to proceed.

G: I accept your ^rproposal to proceed. See how easy I am.

P: So far we have had good cooperation. I know it is not easy for you because of your long standing relations with Iraq. But I think there is an opportunity to have *develop* ... out of this *tragedy* ... *the new* world order. But the bottom line for a new world order must be that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to profit from his aggression. I am not sure he yet knows that the US is determined to prevail. I hope you will get word to him that we can't afford

ⁱⁿ
 to fail₁ implementing the resolutions of the UN. We have a
 strategy in place that has a good chance of working. Sanctions
 are our preferred way of inducing him to withdraw and allow the
 return of Kuwait's leaders. I do not want this to escalate and I
 do not want to use force. I know you agree. But if he does not
 withdraw, he must know the status quo is unacceptable. He is
 dismantling Kuwait right now. In this the Congress and our
 people will support me. What he is doing to innocent civilians--
 perhaps not Soviet--is unconscionable. You should tell him I
 will not deviate because of people force to ~~-----~~ ^{stay in target installations--} that is
 Nuremburg Trial material. I would like to feel you and I can
 discuss this matter so fully that if in the end 23 countries are
 forced to move on to other measures that you would support them.
 That may be difficult for you but I would hope that you could do
 that. I want to tell you I am worried about our people in Kuwait
 too. But let me make just a couple more observations. The press
 asked me if I would ask you to send forces. I said I had no such
 plans, but I tell you if you so decide, I have no problem with
 that. Let me tell you, I have no plans to leave US forces in the
 Gulf. I don't want a military presence in the Gulf. There is no
 plan direct or indirect to keep our forces there. ^{residual} Any₁ security
 presence to keep Saddam Hussein under control should be
^{multilateral}
~~unilateral~~. Our people wouldn't support huge permanent presence.
 Lets get the difficult issues out on the table. US people wonder
 about Soviet advisors in Iraq. You would benefit hugely in the
 US by taking those advisors out. I'm getting all my cards on the

table, ~~-----~~ *one more point.* US tradition is to say the Soviets have no role to play in the Middle East. The Soviet Union obviously disagreed with that. I think Saddam Hussein would have a ^{clear} ~~chance~~ victory if he could mix in ^{the} Arab-Israel issue to his aggression. I assure you this traditional US policy has changed. The world order I see coming out of this is ~~the~~ US and Soviet cooperation to solve not only this but other problems in the Middle East. And --I promise this is my last point--

G: Good, this is my last piece of paper. *(Laughter)*

P: The closer we can be together today, the closer the new world order, the closer the US-Soviet relationship, the closer to a solution to the Gulf crisis. I want to work with you as equal partners in dealing with this. I want to go to the American people tomorrow night to close the book on the Cold War and offer them the vision of this new world order in which we will cooperate. [cartoon showing the President and President Gorbachev smashing the Cold War]

G: I've written my notes over my typed notes. Here is a text of Saddam Hussein's appeal to both of us. He believes he is guided by Allah and the US by the devil. I value very much the trust I feel in your initial remarks. Indeed, I think this crisis is a test of the process we are going through in world affairs and of a new US-Soviet Union relationship.

Without forgetting the scale of this conflict, I am thinking if we can't cope with this conflict, a new order can't come in. It may be that this crisis will be the stone on which we will stumble. Question is can we ~~actually~~ ^{act and} think ~~there is~~ ⁱⁿ a new way. If not, the results are serious -- without the meeting in Malta, without the new relationship, Eastern Europe and German unification could have been much worse. It could have turned into a horrible mess. We now find ^{ourselves} with a new problem no less ~~different~~ ^{difficult}. Let me say on Eastern Europe and Germany the main burden was on us. We had to make a major effort to end old thinking, to step over the old order and recognize new realities. I continue to explain to the Soviet people what is happening in the world and what the new thinking is all about. It is not easy for us -- some ~~-----~~ ^{analysts} in the West make things more difficult for us in the way they put things. But the bulk of Soviet people have accepted the new way of thinking. In the Gulf, the US is in a more difficult position. I understand that, perhaps more than our people, I understand something about US. Your people expect you to act decisively and win. Both our peoples expect quick results. So I understand the situation you face. But let me emphasize that in this new world US-Soviet Union cooperation is essential. We see your difficulty and let me say we sympathize and respect your thinking. This is important. That is, zero-sum thinking is over. I've said to Dole that what we are doing in the

Soviet Union is for us but also good for the US, because for a new world the US needs a strong confident Soviet Union. You should not doubt our position is ^{firm.} ~~fierce~~. We have condemned Iraqi aggression and supported the UN. We are as one here. But it ^{was} ~~is~~ difficult for us at first because you first decided to send forces and then told us. That made it difficult. Perhaps it happened that way because this process is new.

P: I can accept that as constructive criticism. We weren't trying to do it behind your back, but I can accept I should have called you and told you I was going to do it.

G: But later on, we were able to act ^{shoulder to shoulder} _A to mobilize the world community and that's a big achievement. That has given very different appearance to the forces and that is good. But there must be some kind of arrangements to manage this new order. But you have taken the ^{main} ~~-----~~ burden of dealing with Iraqi aggression. Here is the core of my thinking. ^{The} _A Danger to Saudi Arabia is passed. The world community has condemned Iraq aggression. Structure of world oil has been protected. These are strategic goals which have been achieved. Things are now functioning normally but problem of Kuwait hasn't been solved. It must be solved. We -- like you -- have given a lot of thought to this. From your comments I get three main points:

1. Kuwait problem must be solved.
2. You want US forces withdrawn.
3. You prefer ~~-----~~ *non-military* solution.

I think we all -- especially you -- are under great pressure to be decisive. I agree, but if that means ~~militarism~~ *military action* -- therein lies ~~the~~ danger. We have put big intelligence effort -- we decided military option unacceptable and should be to you as well. But that is insufficient. Let me explain. If Iraq doesn't attack Saudi Arabia or Israel, the US would be the initiator of war, if Iraq doesn't attack further.

P: You mean if hostilities are launched without provocation?

G: Yes. His main forces -- as *Abromeyer* ----- has shown me -- are not facing Saudi Arabia. If you must defeat his main forces -- in Iraq -- that's an enormous conflict, like Afghanistan and Vietnam. People in both our countries would begin to say President has gotten entangled in a mess, since oil is flowing -- there should have been a better way. Many casualties. If the region ceases to function the ~~enormous~~ *economic* consequences could be enormous. Saudi oil income is greater than before the crisis, though it is having trouble ~~funding~~ *finding* dollars for your troops. But if the region is destroyed, we

would be in hell, all of us. And also, Saddam Hussein has some sympathy in the Arab world. Man in the street thinks he is a man not afraid of US. If the region is destroyed, the heartland of Arab world, they will turn against you. Also we, you and ^{the} Europeans have mentality different from Muslims. We can't ^{appear to} desecrate their shrines without terrible results. As an aside, it is good that both you and us have recognized Islam fundamentalism is a problem which must be dealt with sensitively.

P: You assume Saddam Hussein has Arab world with him. He is trying, but I think, with 1/2 Arab world in Egypt, he is failing in those attempts.

G: I think it is not quite so. Recent meetings have shown criticism of Saddam Hussein in Arab meetings have lessened. In Govts, yes, but in public opinion it is less so. Mubarak and Assad could ^{find themselves} ~~first ch-----~~ ^{difficult} in different positions. Great forces could be set in motion from beneath. Let me be frank. Even in West there is some weariness. If things get difficult, even they may want to distance themselves. Now there is unity in Security Council but it could be broken. China, for example, won't join us. US will greatly suffer if things go that way -- so for all these reasons we must look for a different way. Of course, Saddam Hussein will not just leave Kuwait. In our recent contacts, all have

spoken of necessity for strict observance of embargo.
 Situation in Iraq changing too, despite Saddam Hussein
 comments. He will have to take more sober look at
 situation. Our experts -- we have many on Iraq -- ^{say that} only one
 option accepts the use of force, ^{that is,} if he attacks Saudi Arabia
 or Jordan.

P: Suppose he lobbs SCUD into Israel.

G: That would be very difficult situation. I don't think he
 will do that. But we can't leave the situation as is.

Primakov knows Saddam Hussein personally. All believe ~~to~~
^{backing} bring Saddam Hussein into a corner is wrong. He must be
 allowed to save face. Morally it is complex situation. So
 what is possible as an option? We have been thinking about
^{mutually interconnected measures. First,}
 ----- ~~If~~ Iraq withdraws and frees foreign
 citizens, and at same time all, ^(anti-Iraq cuts with force contributions) say to UNSC that they would
 not attack Iraq. If things go by these two declarations,
 withdrawal would take place under UN, with peacekeeping
^{To replace Iraqi troops,} force, ^(i.e., only a small number) US could begin, symbolically, ~~would begin~~ to reduce
 its forces in Saudi Arabia, to be replaced by Arab forces --
 just as Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait. UN would suspend
^{enforcement} ~~and~~ ^{Iraqi} resolutions and when ^{cancel} forces withdrawn would ~~control~~ them.

The essence of this plan is that if Saddam Hussein rejects
 it he will unmask himself and prevent rising sympathy for
 him in Arab world. There is this ^{problem,} ~~probability~~ Saddam Hussein

unwants *the Middle East*
consorts to link all problems -- Gulf, Israel, Lebanon. He
is gaining in this *effort*, exploiting this he appears as champion
of Arabs against Israel. We should try to turn the tables
on him and play this card ourselves. There was support for
an international
a conference which you made, attended by all Arab states.
This would make it possible to discuss, first the problem of
Kuwait, then Israel and Lebanon and finally a security
system for the region. In some European capitals there is
interest in this kind of solution. *Israel* If *I* would agree to such
a conference as *a second* ----- stage we would rapidly establish *diplomatic*
relations with them. Of course Saddam Hussein could reject
this plan. But since this plan also includes the
Palestinian issue, he *would* ~~could~~ be rejecting the West Bank issue
and unmask himself as being just selfish, not as an Arab
protector. If this plan is adopted or sanctions enforced,
Saddam Hussein's source for maneuver would be constricted. We
have discussed the issue of a blockade -- that impossible *to maintain*
without the threat of force. That a necessary problem but
we think the blockade can be made more strict. So far
Saddam Hussein has exploited claim US and Soviet Union
trying to starve Iraq women and children, etc., and this
getting more sympathy in Arab world. In this plan, we could
provide for *discussions between* -----, Kuwait and Iraq -- some kind of
elections and perhaps payment. This would prevent him from
exploiting the present situation. Saddam Hussein may reject
this plan. But if something like this is proposed, it would

show us in joint action, giving peace a chance and prevent him from taking advantage of it. Wouldn't have to be this precise plan. Let me say the Soviet advisors are not military specialists. They are being reduced from 193 to ⁵120. These specialists are there under contract.

P: We had people -- like Bechtel -- ^{there} these under contract, but under UN ^{resolutions} ₁ we consider those contracts void.

G: We are reducing the number, and by scaling down contracts we will have loss of \$1.2 billion. To conclude, let me say we are acting in pursuit of our joint objectives and on basis of the joint decision we have taken together. We are completely with you on this. You have made a number of interesting points in your remarks and we will be responding to them. I agree with you we should go out of these talks showing our joint ^{commitment} ~~contract~~ to a common cause and our determination to resolve this situation. In his speech, Saddam Hussein says he hasn't attacked either of our countries and it was ^{British} George Bush colonialists who separated Kuwait from Iraq. He also says Panama ^{was invaded without the} ~~involved with~~ UN ^{of the} ~~speech~~ ₁ action. Why ^{are} you ~~are~~ ganging up on us. (Reads more ^{of the} ~~speech~~ ₁.)

P: Bullshit. He also says I am pork-eater. He's right. A couple of comments. I think Saddam Hussein would jump at your plan and I think the world would take it as ~~being~~ a

big

^ defeat for the world. He is trying to link his actions to the intractable problem of Arabs-Israelis and he can't use this to cover his own aggression. *There is* One place I differ with your experts. I don't think he stands as a symbol of Arab vs *infidel*. His aggression is obvious and he hasn't been able to coopt Assad, Mubarak or even a majority of *the* Arab league. These people tell me he doesn't speak for the Arab World. I don't think he is 20 feet tall. Any agreement *on a* ~~once~~ planned which left Kuwait issue open would be a major defeat for *the* ~~a~~ collective action which has gotten us so far.

G: But -- central point is he must leave Kuwait. But we think he would reject it.

P: Why. He gets what he wants. Still has *nuclear program* ~~wishes~~ and can return to aggression as soon as US leaves.

G: No. Arab peacekeeping, he leaves Kuwait, recognizes Kuwaiti leaders.

P: Those are positives. *the* ^ Kuwaiti leaders are preserved, in your plans?

G: It reestablishes Kuwaiti regime. Further is up to Kuwaiti people.

P: But the leadership is restored?

G: Yes.

P: Then maybe he wouldn't reject. We'd love to find a peaceful solution.

G: Let us try to tinker with some such plans. It suggested by some Arabs like Maghreb and if we can get something are better off. Nothing happening now and military action would appear as aggression.

P: He ^{is now} ~~seems~~ dismantling Kuwait.

G: I think this is why we should act quickly. Force would destroy what we have achieved. If current situation drags on without steps we will have lost initiative. Here we could say we are acting in responsible way by suggesting ways to solve the problem. (Discussion on ^{the point about the} ~~possibility of~~ return of Kuwaiti regime.)

G: Kuwaiti rulers would return and begin ^{negotiations.} -----. That's why he will reject the plan.

P: Let's assume he rejects the plan. What next?

G: Then we would continue the political and economic pressure but he couldn't appear as the leader of the Arabs. He would then be isolated.

P: If he accepts the plan, he withdraws from Kuwait, the leaders return and he gets a conference on Israel and US troops out of Saudi Arabia.

G: US troops would all leave only after ^{*international*} ----- guarantees are in place.

P: I have one more worry. Whatever comes out of our meetings can't be a US-Soviet Union plan. That would look like condominium of just the two of us trying to find a solution. But the idea is interesting and we must do some thinking. One more worry. He is corruptible and likely to do something -- like terrorist act. He could guarantee US response if he determined to do so. My Arab friends say he is vicious, unpredictable and I am worried he might do something.

G: We can't act as if US-Soviet Union solving the problem. But if we can do nothing why do we meet.

P: I agree.

G: If we devise some idea we both like we can figure out how to get it introduced.

P: I agree. I just wanted to point out we must be sensitive to this point. But I totally agree with what you said and the advantages if we can get together on something.

G: I think today we could say we had wide ranging discussion and that we think it possible to find solution which would prevent even worse developments.

P: I agree except we should say "look for." I not sure we can find such a plan.

G: Now, what kind of a man he is. Your characterization of Saddam Hussein is identical to ours. But ^{these} ~~this~~ personality ^{Characteristics} will be most realized if he is backed into a corner. If we give him some window to climb out we have a chance. If he sees such a chance he won't act in a provocative manner. Instead he will seize that chance, so we could show two sides of some coin -- show our joint action and decisiveness in this crisis but ^{leave} ~~have~~ public opinion with realization ^{we are} ~~as~~ trying to find a way out without military action, casualties, etc.

would
P: I like to go the extra mile for peace but we must not undermine the UN collective action. For example, some Americans propose elections in Kuwait. If we have that as a condition we diminish the collective decision we have already taken. If Kuwaiti people subsequently decide something different, that is something else. This aggression so clear that if he is rewarded it will set a terrible precedent for the future. He cannot be allowed to proceed.

G: But if he gets nothing at all, if he is backed into a corner, it will be more costly for us all. We need to give him some daylight. Let's give the impression that he not on his knees -- though he would be because he would not succeed.

P: If we had offered Hitler way out, would it have succeeded?

G: Not the same *situation*.

P: Only in personality.

G: We have to choose. We don't have many options. I believe that you who have achieved so much here, avoid a costly conflict with possible destruction of oil, that would be tremendous victory. We could throw our weight around, but

we must choose. If we throw him a carrot, we will win, establish the role of international law (UN), our cooperation and avoid serious conflict.

P: I agree completely. We must though have a way in which does not incite future aggression. Much of what you propose does that. Only problem is if Israel part appears like a victory for aggression.

G: No. This is not a carrot. The carrot is engaging him in a political process. This is a carrot. We would recognize him as a partner. If we don't include Israel, he could say he proposed a comprehensive plan and we rejected it. If we propose it and he rejects it, he will unmask himself. If he accepts, we will solve the Gulf problem, take steps to resolve Arab-Israel issue and Soviet Union will immediately recognize Israel.

P: There is already a conference ~~-----~~ *in being* on Kuwait -- the UNSC, which has behaved magnificently.

G: This too would be in the UN format. Participation would include UNSC and the Arabs -- very strong participation. If he rejects he isolates himself and we gain time. He loses in the eyes of the world -- looks like a maniac with whom the world can't deal. Of course, before we discuss plan

with others we could probe him -- don't present plan but probe to see what leverage exists.

P: That could be useful in any course. Mubarak will tell you *Saddam* can't withdraw.

G: Assad will say the same.

P: *He says* If he withdraws he is finished. Where we may differ is I don't think we need further evidence of unreasonableness. You assume he will turn it down and prove unreasonableness.

G: But if he accepts, the process would begin.

P: You see the withdrawals being completed and then a conference on Middle East, right?

G: There will be agreement on Conference and format and based on that the process will begin. We tie this in at initial stage -- release civilians and announce withdrawal and US announces it will not attack Iraq. US force withdrawal would be *taken*, while Iraqi withdrawal *takes place* complete with replacement by Arab forces. US withdrawal would take place only when security situation is in place.

P: We will look at this carefully. Brent have I left anything out.

S: If he rejects the plan can we just continue a stalemate indefinitely.

G: We would have shifted opinion and internal processes I think would remove him.

P: What about claims we starving women and children.

G: We must look at that and medicine.

P: But it should be done under international processes so he couldn't profit by it. How we doing on time *for this meeting*.

G: Badly.

P: One unrelated point. Kohl asked me to come *to the unification ceremony* on October 3. That ^{is} very tough ^{for me} Elections coming and I already cancelled a trip to ~~L.A.~~ *Latin America*. What is your view on ^{of the event?} the importance? If I don't go is that a problem for you?

G: No, I don't think so. I too am extremely busy. I'm in domestic battle in moving to market economy and ^{union} environ

treaty. Difficult for me to get there. I also told Kohl I recognize the importance and would consult with you.

P: Unless you or Kohl makes really strong appeal I will tell him I cannot attend.

G: If you can't go, I won't.

P Our position on this should not be different. Are you going to Children's Conference?

G: No. We must think about your visit to the Soviet Union. On START and CFE I think we can conclude ^{OK}. We might say to press we have problems ^{but} we feel we can have positive outcome by end ^{of year} ~~fy~~ end.

^{I would}
P: ~~Should~~ like to tell Baker to get the bureaucrats moving.

G: You use the term "bureaucrats." I say "experts."

P: I suspect we both mean the same thing.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President
Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Anatoliy Chernyayev, Aide to CPSU General
Secretary

DATE, TIME September 9, 1990, 1000 - 1245
AND PLACE: Helsinki, Finland

The President: Good to see you again.

President Gorbachev: Despite the fact that we are all here through difficult circumstances, I am glad to see you.

The President: I think that our agreement at Camp David for this kind of meeting is good and public opinion is playing this meeting well.

President Gorbachev: I have said at the airport that we are in constant touch but sometimes personal contact is necessary.

The President: I agree. I don't know how you want to proceed. I think it is wonderful signal to the world that the US and the Soviet Union have been proceeding in concert on the Gulf. Do you want to start -- or I would be happy to proceed.

President Gorbachev: I accept your proposal to proceed. See how easy I am.

The President: So far we have had good cooperation. I know it is not easy for you because of your long standing relations with Iraq. But I think there is an opportunity to have develop out of this tragedy a new world order. But the bottom line for a new world order must be that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to profit from his aggression. I am not sure he yet knows that the

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0843-MR
ES 6/6/13

US is determined to prevail. I hope you will get word to him that we can't afford to fail in implementing the resolutions of the UN. We have a strategy in place that has a good chance of working. Sanctions are our preferred way of inducing him to withdraw and allow the return of Kuwait's leaders. I do not want this to escalate and I do not want to use force. I know you agree. But if he does not withdraw, he must know the status quo is unacceptable. He is dismantling Kuwait right now. In this the Congress and our people will support me. What he is doing to innocent civilians--perhaps not Soviet--is unconscionable. You should tell him I will not deviate because of people forced to stay in target installations. That is Nuremburg Trial material. I would like to feel you and I can discuss this matter so fully that if in the end 23 countries are forced to move on to other measures that you would support them. That may be difficult for you but I would hope that you could do that. I want to tell you I am worried about our people in Kuwait too. But let me make just a couple more observations. The press asked me if I would ask you to send forces. I said I had no such plans, but I tell you if you so decide, I have no problem with that. Let me tell you, I have no plans to leave US forces in the Gulf. I don't want a military presence in the Gulf. There is no plan direct or indirect to keep our forces there. Any residual security presence to keep Saddam Hussein under control should be multilateral. Our people wouldn't support huge permanent presence. Lets get the difficult issues out on the table. US people wonder about Soviet advisors in Iraq. You would benefit hugely in the US by taking those advisors out. I'm getting all my cards on the table, one more point. US tradition is to say the Soviets have no role to play in the Middle East. The Soviet Union obviously disagreed with that. I think Saddam Hussein would have a clear victory if he could mix in the Arab-Israeli issue to his aggression. I assure you this traditional US policy has changed. The world order I see coming out of this is US and Soviet cooperation to solve not only this but other problems in the Middle East. And --I promise this is my last point--

President Gorbachev: Good, this is my last piece of paper.
(Laughter)

The President: The closer we can be together today, the closer the new world order, the closer the US-Soviet relationship, the closer to a solution to the Gulf crisis. I want to work with you as equal partners in dealing with this. I want to go to the American people tomorrow night to close the book on the Cold War and offer them the vision of this new world order in which we will cooperate. [cartoon showing the President and President Gorbachev smashing the Cold War]

President Gorbachev: I've written my notes over my typed notes. Here is a text of Saddam Hussein's appeal to both of us. He believes he is guided by Allah and the US by the devil. I value very much the trust I feel in your initial remarks. Indeed, I think this crisis is a test of the process we are going through in world affairs and of a new US-Soviet Union relationship. Without forgetting the scale of this conflict, I am thinking if we can't cope with this conflict, a new order can't come in. It may be that this crisis will be the stone on which we will stumble. Question is can we act and think in a new way. If not, the results are serious -- without the meeting in Malta, without the new relationship, Eastern Europe and German unification could have been much worse. It could have turned into a horrible mess. We now find ourselves with a new problem no less difficult. Let me say on Eastern Europe and Germany the main burden was on us. We had to make a major effort to end old thinking, to step over the old order and recognize new realities. I continue to explain to the Soviet people what is happening in the world and what the new thinking is all about. It is not easy for us -- some analysts in the West make things more difficult for us in the way they put things. But the bulk of Soviet people have accepted the new way of thinking. In the Gulf, the US is in a more difficult position. I understand that, perhaps more than our people, I understand something about US. Your people expect you to act decisively and win. Both our peoples expect quick results. So I understand the situation you face. But let me emphasize that in this new world US-Soviet Union cooperation is essential. We see your difficulty and let me say we sympathize and respect your thinking. This is important. That is, zero-sum thinking is over. I've said to Dole that what we are doing in the Soviet Union is for us but also good for the US, because for a new world the US needs a strong confident Soviet Union. You should not doubt our position is firm. We have condemned Iraqi aggression and supported the UN. We are as one here. But it was difficult for us at first because you first decided to send forces and then told us. That made it difficult. Perhaps it happened that way because this process is new.

The President: I can accept that as constructive criticism. We weren't trying to do it behind your back, but I can accept I should have called you and told you I was going to do it.

President Gorbachev: But later on, we were able to act shoulder to shoulder to mobilize the world community and that's a big achievement. That has given very different appearance to the forces and that is good. But there must be some kind of arrangements to manage this new order. But you have taken the -- main burden of dealing with Iraqi aggression. Here is the core of my thinking. The danger to Saudi Arabia is passed. The world community has condemned Iraq aggression. Structure of world oil

has been protected. These are strategic goals which have been achieved. Things are now functioning normally but problem of Kuwait hasn't been solved. It must be solved. We--like you-- have given a lot of thought to this. From your comments I get three main points:

1. Kuwait problem must be solved.
2. You want US forces withdrawn.
3. You prefer non-military solution.

I think we all -- especially you -- are under great pressure to be decisive. I agree, but if that means military action -- therein lies danger. We have put big intelligence effort -- we decided military option unacceptable and should be to you as well. But that is insufficient. Let me explain. If Iraq doesn't attack Saudi Arabia or Israel, the US would be the initiator of war, if Iraq doesn't attack further.

The President: You mean if hostilities are launched without provocation?

President Gorbachev: Yes. His main forces -- as Akromeyev has shown me -- are not facing Saudi Arabia. If you must defeat his main forces -- in Iraq -- that's an enormous conflict, like Afghanistan and Vietnam. People in both our countries would begin to say President has gotten entangled in a mess, since oil is flowing -- there should have been a better way. Many casualties. If the region ceases to function the economic consequences could be enormous. Saudi oil income is greater than before the crisis, though it is having trouble finding dollars for your troops. But if the region is destroyed, we would be in hell, all of us. And also, Saddam Hussein has some sympathy in the Arab world. Man in the street thinks he is a man not afraid of US. If the region is destroyed, the heartland of Arab world, they will turn against you. Also we, you and the Europeans have mentality different from Muslims. We can't appear to desecrate their shrines without terrible results. As an aside, it is good that both you and us have recognized Islam fundamentalism is a problem which must be dealt with sensitively.

The President: You assume Saddam Hussein has Arab world with him. He is trying, but I think, with one-half Arab world in Egypt, he is failing in those attempts.

President Gorbachev: I think it is not quite so. Recent meetings have shown criticism of Saddam Hussein in Arab meetings have lessened. In Govts, yes, but in public opinion it is less so. Mubarak and Assad could find themselves in difficult positions. Great forces could be set in motion from beneath. Let me be frank. Even in West there is some weariness. If

things get difficult, even they may want to distance themselves. Now there is unity in Security Council but it could be broken. China, for example, won't join us. US will greatly suffer if things go that way -- so for all these reasons we must look for a different way. Of course, Saddam Hussein will not just leave Kuwait. In our recent contacts, all have spoken of necessity for strict observance of embargo. Situation in Iraq changing too, despite Saddam Hussein comments. He will have to take more sober look at situation. Our experts -- we have many on Iraq -- say that only one option accepts the use of force; that is, if he attacks Saudi Arabia or Jordan.

The President: Suppose he lobbs SCUD into Israel.

President Gorbachev: That would be very difficult situation. I don't think he will do that. But we can't leave the situation as is. Primakov knows Saddam Hussein personally. All believe backing Saddam Hussein into a corner is wrong. He must be allowed to save face. Morally it is complex situation. So what is possible as an option? We have been thinking about mutually interconnected measures. First, Iraq withdraws and frees foreign citizens, and at same time all (anti-Iraq governments with force contributions) say to UNSC that they would not attack Iraq. If things go by these two declarations, withdrawal would take place under UN, with peacekeeping force to replace Iraqi troops. US could begin, symbolically, (i.e., only a small number) to reduce its forces in Saudi Arabia, to be replaced by Arab forces -- just as Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait. UN would suspend enforcement resolutions and when Iraqi forces withdrawn would cancel them. The essence of this plan is that if Saddam Hussein rejects it he will unmask himself and prevent rising sympathy for him in Arab world. There is this problem. Saddam Hussein wants to link all the Middle East problems -- Gulf, Israel, Lebanon. He is gaining in this effort; exploiting this he appears as champion of Arab against Israel. We should try to turn the tables on him and play this card ourselves. There was support for an international conference which you made, attended by all Arab states. This would make it possible to discuss, first the problem of Kuwait, then Israel and Lebanon and finally a security system for the region. In some European capitals there is interest in this kind of solution. If Israel would agree to such a conference as a second stage we would rapidly establish diplomatic relations with them. Of course Saddam Hussein could reject this plan. But since this plan also includes the Palestinian issue, he would be rejecting the West Bank issue and unmask himself as being just selfish, not as an Arab protector. If this plan is adopted or sanctions enforced, Saddam Hussein source for maneuver would be constricted. We have discussed the issue of a blockade -- that impossible to maintain without the threat of force. That a necessary problem but we think the

blockade can be made more strict. So far Saddam Hussein has exploited claim US and Soviet Union trying to starve Iraq women and children, etc., and this getting more sympathy in Arab world. In this plan, we could provide for discussions between, Kuwait and Iraq -- some kind of elections and perhaps payment. This would prevent him from exploiting the present situation. Saddam Hussein may reject this plan. But if something like this is proposed, it would show us in joint action, giving peace a chance and prevent him from taking advantage of it. Wouldn't have to be this precise plan. Let me say the Soviet advisors are not military specialists. They are being reduced from 193 to 150. These specialists are there under contract.

The President: We had people -- like Bechtel -- there under contract, but under UN resolutions we consider those contracts void.

President Gorbachev: We are reducing the number, and by scaling down contracts we will have loss of \$1.2 billion. To conclude, let me say we are acting in pursuit of our joint objectives and on basis of the joint decision we have taken together. We are completely with you on this. You have made a number of interesting points in your remarks and we will be responding to them. I agree with you we should go out of these talks showing our joint commitment to a common cause and our determination to resolve this situation. In his speech, Saddam Hussein says he hasn't attacked either of our countries and it was British colonialists who separated Kuwait from Iraq. He also says Panama was invaded without the UN taking action. Why are you ganging up on us. (Reads more of the speech.)

The President: Bullshit. He also says I am pork-eater. He's right. A couple of comments. I think Saddam Hussein would jump at your plan and I think the world would take it as a big defeat for the world. He is trying to link his actions to the intractable problem of Arabs-Israelis and he can't use this to cover his own aggression. There is one place I differ with your experts. I don't think he stands as a symbol of Arab vs infidel. His aggression is obvious and he hasn't been able to coopt Assad, Mubarak or even a majority of the Arab league. These people tell me he doesn't speak for the Arab World. I don't think he is 20 feet tall. Any agreement on a plan which left Kuwait issue open would be a major defeat for the collective action which has gotten us so far.

President Gorbachev: But -- central point is he must leave Kuwait. But we think he would reject it.

The President: Why. He gets what he wants. Still has nuclear program and can return to aggression as soon as US leaves.

President Gorbachev: No. Arab peacekeeping, he leaves Kuwait, recognizes Kuwaiti leaders.

The President: Those are positives. The Kuwaiti leaders are preserved, in your plans?

President Gorbachev: It reestablishes Kuwaiti regime. Further is up to Kuwaiti people.

The President: But the leadership is restored?

President Gorbachev: Yes.

The President: Then maybe he wouldn't reject. We'd love to find a peaceful solution.

President Gorbachev: Let us try to tinker with some such plans. It suggested by some Arabs like Maghreb and if we can get something are better off. Nothing happening now and military action would appear as aggression.

The President: He is now dismantling Kuwait.

President Gorbachev: I think this is why we should act quickly. Force would destroy what we have achieved. If current situation drags on without steps we will have lost initiative. Here we could say we are acting in responsible way by suggesting ways to solve the problem. (Discussion on the point about the return of Kuwaiti regime.)

President Gorbachev: Kuwaiti rulers would return and begin negotiations. That's why he will reject the plan.

The President: Let's assume he rejects the plan. What next?

President Gorbachev: Then we would continue the political and economic pressure but he couldn't appear as the leader of the Arabs. He would then be isolated.

The President: If he accepts the plan, he withdraws from Kuwait, the leaders return and he gets a conference on Israel and US troops out of Saudi Arabia.

President Gorbachev: US troops would all leave only after international guarantees are in place.

The President: I have one more worry. Whatever comes out of our meetings can't be a US-Soviet Union plan. That would look like condominium of just the two of us trying to find a solution. But

the idea is interesting and we must do some thinking. One more worry. He is corruptible and likely to do something -- like terrorist act. He could guarantee US response if he determined to do so. My Arab friends say he is vicious, unpredictable and I am worried he might do something.

President Gorbachev: We can't act as if US-Soviet Union solving the problem. But if we can do nothing why do we meet.

The President: I agree.

President Gorbachev: If we devise some idea we both like we can figure out how to get it introduced.

The President: I agree. I just wanted to point out we must be sensitive to this point. But I totally agree with what you said and the advantages if we can get together on something.

President Gorbachev: I think today we could say we had wide ranging discussion and that we think it possible to find solution which would prevent even worse developments.

The President: I agree except we should say "look for." I not sure we can find such a plan.

President Gorbachev: Now, what kind of a man he is. Your characterization of Saddam Hussein is identical to ours. But these personality characteristics will be most realized if he is backed into a corner. If we give him some window to climb out we have a chance. If he sees such a chance he won't act in a provocative manner. Instead he will seize that chance, so we could show two sides of some coin -- show our joint action and decisiveness in this crisis but leave public opinion with realization we are trying to find a way out without military action, casualties, etc.

The President: I would like to go the extra mile for peace but we must not undermine the UN collective action. For example, some Americans propose elections in Kuwait. If we have that as a condition we diminish the collective decision we have already taken. If Kuwaiti people subsequently decide something different, that is something else. This aggression so clear that if he is rewarded it will set a terrible precedent for the future. He cannot be allowed to proceed.

President Gorbachev: But if he gets nothing at all, if he is backed into a corner, it will be more costly for us all. We need to give him some daylight. Let's give the impression that he not on his knees -- though he would be because he would not succeed.

The President: If we had offered Hitler way out, would it have succeeded?

President Gorbachev: Not the same situation.

The President: Only in personality.

President Gorbachev: We have to choose. We don't have many options. I believe that you who have achieved so much here, avoid a costly conflict with possible destruction of oil, that would be tremendous victory. We could throw our weight around, but we must choose. If we throw him a carrot, we will win, establish the role of international law (UN), our cooperation and avoid serious conflict.

The President: I agree completely. We must though have a way in which does not incite future aggression. Much of what you propose does that. Only problem is if Israel part appears like a victory for aggression.

President Gorbachev: No. This is not a carrot. The carrot is engaging him in a political process. This is a carrot. We would recognize him as a partner. If we don't include Israel, he could say he proposed a comprehensive plan and we rejected it. If we propose it and he rejects it, he will unmask himself. If he accepts, we will solve the Gulf problem, take steps to resolve Arab-Israel issue and Soviet Union will immediately recognize Israel.

The President: There is already a conference in being on Kuwait -- the UNSC, which has behaved magnificently.

President Gorbachev: This too would be in the UN format. Participation would include UNSC and the Arabs -- very strong participation. If he rejects he isolates himself and we gain time. He loses in the eyes of the world -- looks like a maniac with whom the world can't deal. Of course, before we discuss plan with others we could probe him -- don't present plan but probe to see what leverage exists.

The President: That could be useful in any course. Mubarak will tell you Saddam can't withdraw.

President Gorbachev: Assad will say the same.

The President: He says if he withdraws he is finished. Where we may differ is I don't think we need further evidence of unreasonableness. You assume he will turn it down and prove unreasonableness.

President Gorbachev: But if he accepts, the process would begin.

The President: You see the withdrawals being completed and then a conference on Middle East, right?

President Gorbachev: There will be agreement on Conference and format and based on that the process will begin. We tie this in at initial stage -- release civilians and announce withdrawal and US announces it will not attack Iraq. US force withdrawal would be token, while Iraqi withdrawal takes place complete with replacement by Arab forces. US withdrawal would take place only when security situation is in place.

The President: We will look at this carefully. Brent have I left anything out.

Brent Scowcroft: If he rejects the plan can we just continue a stalemate indefinitely.

President Gorbachev: We would have shifted opinion and internal processes I think would remove him.

The President: What about claims we starving women and children.

President Gorbachev: We must look at that and medicine.

The President: But it should be done under international processes so he couldn't profit by it. How we doing on time for this meeting.

President Gorbachev: Badly.

The President: One unrelated point. Kohl asked me to come to the unification ceremony on October 3. That is very tough for me. Elections coming and I already cancelled a trip to Latin America. What is your view on the importance of the event? If I don't go is that a problem for you?

President Gorbachev: No, I don't think so. I too am extremely busy. I'm in domestic battle in moving to market economy and union treaty. Difficult for me to get there. I also told Kohl I recognize the importance and would consult with you.

The President: Unless you or Kohl makes really strong appeal I will tell him I cannot attend.

President Gorbachev: If you can't go, I won't.

The President: Our position on this should not be different. Are you going to Children's Conference?

President Gorbachev: No. We must think about your visit to the Soviet Union. On START and CFE I think we can conclude OK. We might say to press we have problems but we feel we can have positive outcome by end of year.

The President: I would like to tell Baker to get the bureaucrats moving.

President Gorbachev: You use the term "bureaucrats." I say "experts."

The President: I suspect we both mean the same thing.

P/Barbachw 9/9/90

- P. Good to see you again
- G. Despite fact we've been here thru big circus, I'm glad to see you
- P. I think that once agreement at CD for this kind of reality is gone & pub-opinion is plunging this reality well
- G. I have said it's crisp that we are in constant contact but sometimes personal contact is necessary
- P. I agree. Don't know how you want to proceed. I think it is wonderful sign to cover that US & SU ~~at~~ have been proceeding in concert on a Gulf. Do you want to start - or I would be happy to proceed
- G. I accept your proposal to ~~proceed~~ ^{proceed} see how easy it is
- P. So far we have had good coop. I know it's not easy for you because of your long standing relations w/ Iraq. But I think there is opportunity to have disposal of this tragedy in new world order. But unless line for new world

order must be that SH can't
be allowed to profit from his
aggression. I don't see he
yet knows that US is determined
to prevail. I hope you will
get word to him that we expect
before too long implementing
resolutions of the UN.
We have strategy in place
& it has a good chance of
working. Sanctions are our
preferred way of inducing him
to withdraw & allow return
of Kuwait leaders. I do not
want this to escalate & I
do not want to use force. I
know you agree. But if
he does not withdraw, he must
know status quo is un-
acceptable. He is doing nothing
Kuwait except war. In this
a couple of our people will
suffer - one. That he doing
of innocent civilians - perhaps
and Soviets - is unconscionable.
You should tell him I will
not desist because of people
forced to evacuation - that
is humiliating. I had no other

I would like to feel you & I can
discuss this matter so fully that
if in a end a 23 countries are
forced to move on to other
measures that you would
support them. That may be
diff in your heart I would hope
you could do that. I must
tell you I worried about some
people in Kuwait too. But let
me make just a couple
more observations. Press asked
me if I would ask you to send
forces. I said I had no such
plans, but I tell you if you so
decide, I have no problem with it.
Let me tell you I have no
plans to launch US forces in Gulf.
I don't want a military presence
in Gulf. There is no plan direct
or indirect to keep US forces there.
My respected security presence
to keep SA under control should
be untitled. Ungrateful would
support huge permanent presence.
Let's get a dip issues out on
table. US people wonder about
gov advisors in Iraq. You want
benefit huge in US by getting

those advisors are. Cutting all
my card on table, one more point.
US tradition is to say we have
no role to play in M.E. SU
drumily disagreed w/ that. I
think \$H would have also
in trying if he could mix in
Arabian - I send issue to his
expression. I assure you this
traditional policy has changed.
The new order I see coming
and if this is a US + SU coop to
solve not only this but other
problems in M.E. Well - I perceive
this is last point

Good, this is my last point
proper

D The closer we can be together
today, a closer a new world
order, a closer US-SU relations,
a closer to solution to - Gulf crisis.
I want to work w/ you as an
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Cartoon showing P & G smushing
cold war

→ G Due written my notes even my
my typed notes. Here is a text
of S. Happel to both of us. He
believes he is quoted by Allen
& US by a secret.

I value very much & trust I feel
in your initial remarks.

Indeed I think this crisis is a test
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of this conflict, & thinking of our
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me he doesn't speak for Arab
world. I don't think he is
Tall. Any agreement on a plan
which left Kuwait covered

opra could be a major effort
for a collective action which
has gotten us so far.

G But - central point is he
must leave Kuwait. But
we think he would reject it.

P Why. He gets what he wants.
Still has riches & can return
to aggression as soon as US leaves.

G No. Only peacekeeping, he
leaves Kuwait, leaving it leaderless

P There are positives. Kuwait
leaders are preserved, in your
plan?

G It reestablishes a regime. Further
is up to K people

P But leadership is restored?

G Yes

P Then maybe he would not agree.
We'd love to find a peaceful
solution.

G Let us try to think w/ some
new plans. It suggested by
some Arabs like Maghribi &
if we can get something out better
off. Nothing happening now &
no action would appear as
aggression

P He was discouraging Kuwait

G I think this is why we should act
firmly. Force would destroy what
we have achieved. If current
situation w/o steps we will
have lost initiative. Here we
could say we are acting in very
way by suggesting comp to solve
a prob.

(Discussion on point of return
of K regime)

G Kuwait rulers would return
& begin negot. But why he
will reject a plan.

P lets assume he rejects a plan. What
next?

G Then we would continue a political
& economic pressure that he couldn't
appeal as a leader of a Arabs.
He would then be isolated.

P If he accepts a plan, he w/draw
from Kuwait, a leader's return
& he gets a conf on Israeli & US
troops out of SA.

G US troops would all leave only after
with guarantees are in place.

P I have one more query. Whatever
comes out of our mtg could be a
US-Sov plan. That would look
like condominium of just a 2 of us
try to find a solution. But a

idea is interesting & we must
do some thinking.

One more worry. He is unstable
& likely to do something - like
Terrorist act. He could guarantee
US response if he determined to
do so. My Arab friends say
he is vicious, unpredictable & I
worried he might do something

G We can't act as if US-SU solving
a prob. But if we can do nothing
why do we meet

P I agree

G If we devise some idea we both
like we can figure out how
to get it introduced

P I agree. I just wanted to point out
we must be sensitive to this point.
But I totally agree w/ what you
said & advantages if we can
get together on something.

G I think today we could say
we had wide ranging discussion
& that we think it possible to
find solution which would
prevent even worse days to

P I agree except we should
say "look for". I don't see
we can find a solution

G Now, what kind of man he is.
Your characterization of SH is identical
to ours. But this personality will
be most realized if he be put
into a corner. I'd give him
some reason to climb out & we
have a chance. If he sees such
a chance he won't act in provocative
manner. Instead he will seize
that chance. So we could show
2 sides of same coin - show our
joint actions & decisions in
this crisis but leave put opinion
w/ realization we trying to find
a way out w/o military action,
casualties, etc.

P I don't go for extra rule for
peace but not must not
undermine a UN collective
action. For example, some
Americans propose ~~decisions~~
in Kuwait. If we have that as
a condition we diminish a
collective decision we have
already taken. If K people
subsequently decide something
diff, that something else. Thus
aggression to clear that of
he is rewarded it will

set a terrible precedent for a future.
He cannot be allowed to prevail.

G But if he gets nothing at all, if
he backed into corner, it will
be more costly for us all. We need
to give him some daylight. Let
give impression he is not in his
hands - tho he would be because
he would not succeed.

P If not had offered Hitler a way
out would it have succeeded

G Not a second

P Only in personality.

G We have to choose. We don't have
many options. I believe that goes
what have achieved so much here,
avoid a costly conflict or possible
destruction of it, that would be tomorrow
today. We could throw our weight
around, but we must choose. If
we throw him a carrot, we
will win, estab a role of intl
law (UN), our coop, & avoid
serious conflict.

P I agree completely. We must tho
have a way which does not
invite future aggression. Much
of what you propose does that.
Only prob is if Israel part.

appears like a rational negotiation
G No. This is not a carrot. The carrot
is engaging him in a political
process. This is a carrot. We
would recognize him as a partner. If we
don't include I, he could only be
proposed comprehensive plan & we
rejected it. If we propose it & he
rejects it, he will embarrass him-
self. If he accepts, we will solve
a big prob, take steps to resolve
A-I issues & we will immediately
recognize it as real.

P There is already a conflict in being
on Kuwait - & UN^{SC}, which has
behaved magnificently

G This too would be in a CN format.
Participation would include UNSC
& a draft - very strong participation
If he rejects he isolates himself
& not gain time. He loses in
eyes of a world - looks like a maniac
w/ whom a world can't deal. Of course
before we discuss plan w/ others
we could probe him - don't
present plan but probe to see
what leverage exists

P That would be useful in any
course. Ambassador will tell you

can't w/draw

G Assad will say a same.

P If he w/draws he is punished.
Where we may differ is I don't
don't think we need further
evidence of reasonableness.
You assume he will turn it
down + move unreasonable.

G But if he accepts, a process would
begin.

P You see a w/drawals being
completed + then a conf on N.E.,
right?

G Then will be agreement on Conf
+ format + based on that a process
will begin. We tie this in at
initial stage - release civilians +
announce w/drawal + US announces
it will not attack Iraq. US force
w/drawal would be taken, while
Iraqi w/drawal complete w/replace-
ment by Arab force. US w/drawal
would take place only when security
situation is in place.

P Best, have I left in We will look
at this carefully. Best have I left
anything out?

S If he rejects a plan, can we just
continue a stalemate indefinitely

G we would have shifted opinion
& internal processes & think would
remove him

P What about claims re starving
women + children

G we must look at that + medicine

P But it should be done under intl
processes so he can't profit
by it.

Have we doing entire

G Badly

P One unrelated point. Kohl
asked me to come on Oct 3. That
very tough. Elections coming &
already can't trip to ~~USA~~ H.A.
What is your view on im-
portance? If I don't go is that
a prob for you

G No, I don't think so. I'm ~~very~~
extremely busy. I'm demister
bottle is moving to - Nicht
erasing + serious treaty. Diff
for me to get there. I also told
Kohl I really can't go + would
app. consult w/ you

P Unless you or Kohl makes really
strong appeal I will tell him
I can't attend

G If you have to go I won't.

Our position on this should not
be diff.

G Are you going to Children's Care
No. We must think about
a year more to a S.C. On
start + C.F.E. I think we can
conclude it. We might say
to press us have proven. I feel
we can have positive outcome
by next year.

P I should like to tell Bob to
get a benevolent, moving

G ~~to~~ You use a term "benevolence."
~~to~~ I say "experts."

P I suspect we both mean a same
thing.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

8/7/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

The attached memos are FYI
for you and the President.

JABIII

APNSA Has Seen

Date: August 7, 1990

Time: 1329 EDT

From: A. Mann, S/S-O

To: S; S/S

~~SECRET~~

sl
8/7

Subject: The Secretary's Telephone Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

The Secretary wanted to make sure Shevardnadze had received the message Ambassador Matlock had delivered earlier in the day. He stressed that the actions described in the message were taken purely for Saudi Arabia's defensive needs. The Secretary said he was leaving on Wednesday (8/8) for Ankara at the President's request to consult with the Government of Turkey. On Friday, the Secretary will be in Brussels for a NATO meeting. He said he would welcome the opportunity to meet with the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels to brief him. The Secretary also raised the possibility of a multinational naval force to prevent the export of Iraq and Kuwait oil if the UN resolution on sanctions is not effective. He asked if the Soviets would have an interest in participating in such an effort.

Shevardnadze asked if a decision on the matters raised in the message had already been taken. The Secretary said the President had reached the decision yesterday evening (8/6). Shevardnadze then wondered what he was being consulted about. He reminded the Secretary of their airport conversation in which he had asked the Secretary not to rely on military force. He stressed that the Soviet approach had not changed. He said that after the second UN resolution on sanctions Iraq should have been given the opportunity to tell the world its attitude on the document.

Shevardnadze said it is very difficult to say what the consequences of the American action will be. The Soviet Union would consider this action exceptional, extraordinary and temporary and any military forces should leave as quickly as possible. He added that the Soviets are prepared to discuss any future plans and ideas, and suggested the military staff committee of the UN Security Council as a possible forum. He also noted that the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels would be prepared to meet with the Secretary in Brussels.

The Secretary replied that only one thing had been decided and there are still many other multilateral efforts to contain Saddam Hussein's aggression which have not been decided. He said no offensive actions were planned - it was strictly to deter; the decision was taken at the request of the Saudis; the U.S. considered this an extraordinary matter; and the assistance would remain only as long as the Saudis wanted it. In keeping with their airport conversation, the Secretary assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. does not intend to strike at Iraq, but the U.S. reserves the right to protect its citizens, and to defend Saudi Arabia and the free flow of oil.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0843-MR
ES 6/6/13

~~SECRET~~

Date: August 7, 1990

Time: 1453 EDT

From: S.D. Mull, S/S-O *SM*

To: S; S/S *SH/1*

Subject: The Secretary's Follow-up Conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

The Secretary said the President asked him to call Shevardnadze to underscore that the action the US is about to take in Saudi Arabia is temporary, extraordinary, and in response to a Saudi request. It is also only defensive -- the US has no intention to take any offensive action against Iraq.

He said the President also wants to convey to President Gorbachev that the US would be pleased if the Soviet Union would participate with the US as part of a multinational force in Saudi Arabia. He said the US is willing to explore that with the Soviet Union bilaterally or multilaterally through the UN. The Secretary said the Saudis would have to agree to such an arrangement, but that he expects they would have no problem.

Time is of the essence, said the Secretary. As long as the current situation exists, there is no impediment to further Iraqi aggression moving all the way down the Arabian peninsula.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for this information and said he would discuss it with Gorbachev and get back to him.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 15, 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union has been a courageous force for peaceful change in the world. I want to offer my congratulations on behalf of the American people for his selection to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. He has brought historically significant change, both political and economic, to the Soviet Union and to Eastern Europe. East-West relations hold greater promise for peace and world stability today than at any time in the last 45 years. The United States continues to work with the Soviet Union to promote regional and international peace. Barbara and I send our warmest regards to President and Mrs. Gorbachev in receiving this international honor.

#

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 8177

ACTION OFFICER: Rice / Haass DUE: 10/17/90

- | | |
|--|--|
| ☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates | ☐ Appropriate Action |
| ☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi | ☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes |
| ☐ Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

FYI

- ☐ Basora
- ☐ Beers
- ☐ Blackwill
- ☐ Charles
- ☐ Coulson
- ☐ Davis
- ☐ Deal
- ☐ Dorminey
- ☐ Dyke
- ☐ Gordon
- ☐ Grimes
- ☒ Haass
- ☐ Hayden
- ☐ Hutchings
- ☐ Jackson
- ☐ Kanter
- ☐ Kitchen
- ☐ LaMagna

FYI

- ☐ Lampley
- ☐ Levin
- ☐ Mahley
- ☐ Mandel
- ☐ Melby
- ☐ Menan
- ☐ Merchant
- ☐ Miller
- ☐ Needels
- ☐ Paal
- ☐ Pacelli
- ☐ Passage
- ☐ Pilling
- ☐ Popadiuk
- ☐ Pryce
- ☐ Rademaker
- ☐ Rice
- ☐ Rodman

FYI

- ☐ Rostow
- ☐ Salvetti
- ☐ Tilley
- ☐ Tobey
- ☐ Van Eron
- ☐ Watson
- ☐ Welch
- ☐ Whitley
- ☐ Wilson
- ☐ Working
- ☐ Zelikow
- ☒ Gompert
- ☒ Salvetti, L (for the summary)
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____

INFORMATION ☐ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Sittmann fill
☒ Gates (advance)

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
☐ Secretariat

COMMENTS

Logged By _____

Return to Secretariat



8177
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


OCT 12 1990

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Correspondence from President Gorbachev

The attached letter from President Gorbachev to President Bush was delivered to Secretary Baker by Ambassador Bessmertnykh on October 12.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

98-0099-F/3

07/28/2003 MM

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL: OADR

Dear Mr. President,

A few days ago, Yevgeniy Primakov, member of the Presidential Council, returned from Baghdad, where he had been as my personal envoy. We discussed such a possibility in Helsinki. You supported the idea, saying that you do not have direct access to Hussein. Ye.M.Primakov was the right man to go also because he has personally known Saddam Hussein for a long time.

The talks were difficult but candid. Primakov tried to show the Iraqi leader an extremely objective picture of the consequences for his own country and for the entire region, should things come to war.

Naturally, he set forth the Soviet position strictly in accordance with the obligations which we had assumed by endorsing the UN Security Council Resolutions, ruling out any doubts whatsoever regarding that in the mind of his interlocutor.

As had been expected, S.Hussein began by taking a hard line, trying to justify the occupation and annexation of Kuwait by considerations of Iraq's national security. Nevertheless, along with militant rhetoric his remarks also contained references to a political settlement of the Gulf crisis involving the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. And, our envoy feels, the most important thing for S.Hussein now is to save face.

Eduard Shevardnadze has sent Secretary Baker a detailed account of Ye.M.Primakov's talks with the Iraqis. Let me just once again reaffirm my approach, which you and I discussed in Helsinki. We should not retreat from the positions agreed upon at the United Nations, we should toughen sanctions where appropriate, strictly monitor their implementation, continue by political and diplomatic means the course of isolating S.Hussein, particularly in the Arab world, and activate the Arab factor. At the same time we should not miss any opportunity or ignore any possible signal from Baghdad in order to look for a non-military solution to the crisis. The situation is not hopeless so far as a political solution is concerned.

In this sense, I regard Yevgeny Primakov's mission as useful. He also had the task of raising in sharp terms the issue of all "hostages", whatever their nationality. He was able to make some progress as regards Soviet specialists.

Taking into account our many recent contacts we are exploring possible options for a solution leading subsequently to an overall Middle East settlement. If we are able to come up with anything commensurate with the realities and the risks involved in this problem we shall of course first consult with you.

Thank you for the note you sent to me with Vitaliy Ignatenko.

Sincerely,

M.GORBACHEV

October , 1990

Уважаемый господин Президент,

На днях из Багдада вернулся Е.М.Примаков, который находился там в качестве моего личного представителя, он член Президентского Совета. О такой возможности мы с Вами говорили в Хельсинки. Вы поддержали эту идею, сославшись на то, что у Вас прямого выхода на Хусейна нет. Е.М.Примаков подходил также и потому, что он давно знаком с С.Хусейном лично.

Разговор был трудный, но откровенный. Примаков постарался предельно объективно обрисовать иракскому лидеру последствия для его страны, для всего региона, если дело дойдет до войны.

И, естественно, позицию СССР излагал в строгом соответствии с обязательствами, которые мы взяли на себя, подписав резолюции Совета Безопасности ООН, исключая какие бы то ни было сомнения на этот счет у своего собеседника.

Как и предполагалось, поначалу С.Хусейн держался жестко, пытался оправдывать захват и аннексию Кувейта соображениями национальной безопасности Ирака. Тем не менее, наряду с воинственной риторикой в его высказываниях появились и слова о политической развязке кризиса в Заливе с уходом иракских войск из Кувейта. При этом, по наблюдению нашего представителя, главное для С.Хусейна сейчас - "спасти лицо".


Подробно о содержании бесед Е.М.Примакова с иракцами Э.А.Шеварднадзе информировал Госсекретаря Дж.Бейкера. Хотел бы только еще раз подтвердить свой подход, о котором мы с Вами говорили в Хельсинки. Не отступать от согласованных в ООН позиций, ужесточать, где нужно, санкции, строго контролировать их исполнение, политически, дипломатически продолжать линию на изоляцию С.Хусейна, особенно - в арабском мире, активизировать арабский фактор. И вместе с тем не упускать ни одного шанса, ни одного возможного сигнала из Багдада, для того чтобы искать невоенной развязки кризиса. Ситуация для политического решения не безнадежна.

В этом смысле считаю миссию Е.М.Примакова полезной. В его задачу входило также остро поставить вопрос о всех "заложниках", любой национальности. Определенного сдвига удалось добиться в отношении советских специалистов.

С учетом многочисленных контактов за последнее время мы прорабатываем возможные варианты развязок с выходом затем на общее урегулирование на Ближнем Востоке. Если получится что-то адекватное реальностям и опасности проблемы, мы, разумеется, прежде всего проконсультируемся с Вами.

Спасибо за записочку, которую привез мне от Вас Виталий Игнатенко.

С уважением



М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

октября 1990 года

*Baker gave to General
at Breakfast 10/10
by to Cordis*

Unofficial translation

James,

As a follow-up on our telephone conversation of October 7, I wish to inform you in more detail on the substance of the discussions of Presidential Council member E.M.Primakov with Iraqi leaders and with the PLO Executive Committee Chairman Y.Arafat.

As I told you before, E.Primakov was sent to Bagdad as a special representative of the USSR President in order to resolve the matter of bringing back to the Soviet Union those our specialists who thus far have not been able to leave Iraq because of the virtually open opposition on the part of that ^{local} country's authorities. This is causing a lot of problems to us, since of the five thousand people who remain in Iraq about two thousand insist that their return to the home country be arranged as soon as possible. The issue disturbs our country's public opinion as well.

The discussion of this matter with President Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership proved rather difficult, because the Iraqi side, using formal pretexts, kept saying that a departure of such a large number of Soviet specialists would only be possible if they could be replaced by those from among local residents, which would, allegedly, take some time. As a result of an intense argument, we succeeded in reaching agreement with Saddam Hussein that 1,500 of our people would leave within one month.

We were also quite emphatic in insisting before the Iraqi leaders on the inadmissibility of keeping citizens from other, first of all, Western countries, as a "human shield". It was emphasized that such actions by Bagdad are being extremely strongly condemned all over the world, that they discredit Iraqi leaders in the eyes of the world public opinion and will not prevent a large-scale military action against Iraq, if things come to that. From the remarks by Foreign Minister T.Aziz one

could form the impression that on this matter there are certain differences of opinion in Bagdad.

Another objective of E.M.Primakov's trip to Iraq, no less important, was to explore, and even to strongly press for, the possibility of S.Hussein fundamentally changing his position, above all on the issue of Iraqis' withdrawal from Kuwait.

During his meeting with the Iraqi President, E.M.Primakov, pursuing an energetic and convincing line of reasoning, strongly urged him to display a sense of realism, emphasizing that the Soviet Union and the international community as a whole would never accept the annexation of Kuwait.

Although to justify his Kuwaiti adventure S.Hussein advanced the largely well-known set of arguments, our representative still had the impression that there emerged some new nuances in the Iraqi position. S.Hussein was no longer saying that the annexation of Kuwait's was "final and irrevocable", and in the course of the conversation several times stated his readiness to look for a political solution to the crisis, and did not reject, in principle, the possibility of pulling out the Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

In a one-on-one meeting S.Hussein finally conceded that withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait would be possible - but not in conditions of the ultimatum: either a withdrawal, or a military strike on Iraq. In this case, said the Iraqi President, Bagdad refuses to change anything in its current position, and a military action against it would entail large-scale actions by Iraq that would be devastating for many countries. E.M.Primakov understood the Iraqi President to primarily imply a simultaneous destruction of all oil fields on the Arabian peninsula.

At the same time, S.Hussein was quite clear and unambiguous in saying that a political solution of the Kuwaiti crisis must be a "package" one, that is, must include not only Iraqi "concessions", but such "meet-you-half-way" elements that would

enable the Iraqi leader to save face before his own people and in the Arab world at large. From S.Hussein's remarks one could conclude that, in specific terms, he was referring to real progress in achieving the settlement of the Palestinian problem and giving Iraq secure access to the Persian Gulf.

As the discussions suggested, S.Hussein fears that even after getting out of Kuwait Iraq will remain blockaded in some way, while the Iraqi President himself will never again be an acceptable figure in Western eyes. This definitely makes the choice in favor of a political solution more difficult for him.

The subject of terrorism was raised before the Iraqis, and particularly before Y.Arafat, with utmost frankness. The Soviet representative stressed that carrying out terrorist actions against the United States and other countries would spell disaster for Iraq and the Palestinian cause. The PLO Executive Committee Chairman showed full understanding of our arguments and gave relevant assurances.

By and large, from a preliminary analysis of E.M.Primakov's discussions in Bagdad the impression is that the clear and unequivocal refusal of the international community to accept the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, the adoption of energetic Security Council resolutions to this effect are resulting in an appreciable, if slow, sobering of S.Hussein. Our representative even had the impression that people in the immediate entourage of the Iraqi President are afraid to report to him the true situation obtaining around Iraq. Observations suggest that the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council's decisions against Iraq are beginning to have their effect as well.

Those are our general impressions from E.M.Primakov's discussions in Bagdad. We intend to discuss the results of his trip in detail, and if we have some additional considerations with respect to the future course of action about the situation in the Persian Gulf, I shall be ready to share them with you.

Sincerely,

E.A.SHEVARDNADZE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 17, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

When you and I met in Helsinki, we reaffirmed our goal of completing the CFE and START treaties this year. I have now received a report of the just completed Bartholomew-Karpov meetings in Moscow that were intended to accelerate progress toward that goal.

I must tell you frankly that the results were very disappointing. No major issues were resolved and few differences were narrowed. Indeed, on some questions, the sides moved further apart. Put simply, we are not now on a track that will lead to the completion of either treaty this year.

As we have discussed, these agreements are keys to putting the relationship between our two countries on a new footing and building the new world order we both seek.

The START agreement will codify and regulate a more stable US-Soviet strategic nuclear balance and will provide a solid basis on which to pursue -- as we also agreed at Washington -- further stabilizing measures. The CFE agreement will provide the framework for the new security structure in Europe. Circumstances in Europe are, of course, changing rapidly, but I am convinced that the CFE framework can be adapted to these and other changes in follow-on negotiations. Conversely, it will be extremely difficult to manage the military aspects of those changes without the CFE framework in place. Convocation of the CSCE Summit and talks about shorter-range nuclear forces both depend on completion of CFE.

You and I must take a direct role if we are to ensure that the START and CFE agreements are completed this year. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be in the United States for several days within the next two weeks. I am now persuaded that unless all the remaining substantive issues are resolved during the Shevardnadze visit, it will literally be impossible to complete START or CFE this year. Accordingly, we must commit ourselves to use this time intensively and wisely.

Here is what I propose. I will ensure that the U.S. side will be ready. As I told you in Helsinki, I will give Secretary Baker the flexibility he needs to reach mutually satisfactory solutions and the authority to take necessary decisions. I ask that you give Foreign Minister Shevardnadze the same flexibility and authority so that they can make best use of this last opportunity to achieve the goal we set for ourselves.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping "G" and a stylized "Bush".

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7380
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
21049 9-17-90
LIMITED ACCESS

CHRON FILE

90 SEP 17 P4:08
September 15, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Arms Control Talks in Moscow

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0843-MR
8/20/2013 MM

Purpose

This memorandum recommends that you send the letter at Tab A to President Gorbachev urging his personal involvement to conclude START and CFE by the end of the year.

Background

As Jim Baker agreed with Shevardnadze in Irkutsk, Reg Bartholomew led an interagency team for September 9-13 talks in Moscow to resolve remaining differences in START and CFE. These talks were a bust. No progress was made on any of the major issues. If anything, we lost ground on CFE. Absent dramatic changes in the way both sides do business and interact, I am convinced we will not be able to sign either treaty this year.

Despite the fact that we are well into the end game, the Soviets were not ready to do business during the Moscow meetings. Some of their hard line may have been tactical, and there are also indications that the Soviets are having real second thoughts about CFE as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates around them. But it was clear both from the low-level composition of the Soviet team (which was heavily populated by General Staff colonels and Foreign Ministry notetakers), and from their unwillingness to engage in a substantive give-and-take, that the top Soviet leadership was not engaged. This must change if we are going to wrap up these treaties.

The week of September 23 will be critical to the resolution of the remaining issues. Shevardnadze will be in the U.S. for about ten days, beginning with the U.N. and ending with the CSCE Foreign Ministers' Conference on October 1-2. Jim is scheduled to meet with him on September 26 and will be seeing him again during the CSCE conference. If necessary, Jim probably could

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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engage Shevardnadze by phone, if not in person, at other times during the week. You also will be seeing Shevardnadze some time that week.

We must also find a way to engage Gorbachev personally, if only because Shevardnadze probably cannot overcome the bureaucratic inertia and General Staff footdragging by himself. To that end, the proposed letter at Tab A to Gorbachev tells him that completion of START and CFE this year is in serious jeopardy and urges him to become directly involved.

We also need to make final decisions ourselves on the major remaining START and CFE issues so that Jim has the authority he needs to close the deal if and when the Soviets get ready to engage us seriously. I will be asking you to address these during the coming week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the letter to President Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to President Gorbachev

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21049
LIMITED ACCESS

September 14, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLLEEZZA RICE *he* *cr*

SUBJECT: Arms Control Talks in Moscow

The four days of talks were a waste of time or worse. We made no progress on START and literally lost ground on CFE. If the U.S. side was not prepared to do end-game hard bargaining, the Soviets were barely ready to meet. Karpov was not well prepared. The General Staff was represented by colonels. Aside from a last-minute (if fascinating) appearance by Akhromeyev on CFE, there were no signs that anyone among the senior Soviet leadership was engaged or that the Soviet positions being articulated were serious.

In brief, neither side -- but particularly the Soviets -- behaved as though there was any intention of signing CFE on November 19 or START by the end of the year. Unless both sides change the way they do business rapidly and radically, there is no possibility that we will be able to achieve the goal that the President and Gorbachev reaffirmed in Helsinki: completion of both treaties this year. Even then, making the end-of-the-year target will be a long shot.

We thus have two problems: engaging the top Soviet leadership -- including Gorbachev -- and getting our own house in order.

To address the first, we have drafted a memo to the President (attached at Tab I) recommending that he send a letter to Gorbachev (which we believe would have greater impact than a phone call). To address the second, achieving rapid U.S. consensus on the major remaining issues, we propose that they be addressed next week at your level and decided by the President. In that way, the President could give Baker the authority to close the deal (if and when the Soviets are ready), while accepting the responsibility himself for the bottom-line U.S. positions.

The Talks in Moscow

START. Except for closing on two secondary matters, the Soviets simply went through the motions on START, confining themselves to reiterating familiar positions and reciting well known arguments. They did not respond to a new U.S. proposal on Backfire which,

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while modest on its face, was unmistakably an invitation to deal. They also did not engage us on heavy ICBMs, not even to repeat their insistence that the issue was closed for the remainder of the current START talks. Overall, the Soviets did little more than propose that issues be deferred to Geneva or offer to return to them when we meet in Washington next week.

CFE. The problems in CFE are more serious and raise the real possibility that the Soviets may be re-evaluating their stake in a CFE treaty. The Soviets introduced two new positions -- one on zones and one on the "sufficiency rule" -- that dramatically widen the gap between the sides. They indicated that both changes were required by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the resulting need for the Soviets to single-handedly balance the collective military forces of all the NATO allies.

Akhromeyev also said that there was no way the Soviets could include limits on land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) in CFE. Drawing an explicit analogy between LBNA in CFE and ALCMs in START, he said that refusing LBNA limits was a matter of "national dignity," and that any Soviet government that accepted such limits would be forced to resign.

If the Soviets are serious about these new positions -- and their candid assessment of their new strategic situation gives every indication that they are -- the prospects for wrapping up CFE soon have become extraordinarily bleak. It might be possible to work out a compromise on zones, and we might decide in the end to side-step the LBNA issue by dropping aircraft limits from CFE. But the Soviet effort to increase their share of equipment permitted under CFE limits -- a reflection of their go-it-alone approach to the European military balance -- will rightly be strongly resisted by the Eastern Europeans as well as by most of the NATO allies.

Next Steps

If we do not complete the treaties by the end of the year, there is a real chance that both will slip away as the political consensus grows that they no longer are worth the trouble. From one perspective, that would not be a calamity: both treaties were conceived in (and for) another era and arms control has gone from being the centerpiece to just one more element in superpower relationship. But the political costs to the President of what would undoubtedly be viewed by arms control aficionados -- particularly on the Hill -- could be significant. Our European allies would also be alarmed, particularly by the failure to complete CFE, which they (and we) have promoted as a cornerstone of the new Europe. If we want the benefits of these treaties and (at least as important) avoid these costs, we may be in a "now or never" situation.

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Shevardnadze will be in the U.S. for about ten days beginning around September 23. He will be preceded by Karpov to resume the "working group" discussions with Reg Bartholomew. That ten-day period will be critical in determining whether we get one or both treaties this year. The proposed letter to Gorbachev is intended to increase the chances that Shevardnadze comes prepared and empowered to do business.

Baker will meet with Shevardnadze around September 26. They agreed in Moscow that arms control will be the major subject. Baker will be seeing Shevardnadze again in New York at the CSCE Foreign Ministers' Conference on October 1-2. (A Shevardnadze meeting with the President also is likely during that week, but that should not become a negotiating session.) A meeting of NATO foreign ministers and/or a meeting at the 23 immediately prior to the October 1-2 conference to address CFE also is a distinct possibility.

We need to use the coming week to ensure that we too are ready. Because the remaining START issues are largely political, the bureaucracy cannot solve them and should stop trying. The new Soviet positions in CFE pose fundamental questions about that negotiation that likewise should be addressed at your level. Accordingly, you should be prepared to have one or perhaps two meetings with your counterparts on the major remaining issues and then take them to the President for decision. You also will need to address whether we can agree at the October 1-2 CSCE Foreign Ministers' Conference to set a November 19 date for the CSCE summit and signing the CFE treaty. (Substantively, it is very hard to imagine how we could agree. Politically, it will be enormously difficult, but probably necessary, not to.) Recognizing the risks of leaks, you also may want to have an NSC meeting both to put a formal stamp on the process and to signal clearly -- including to the Soviets -- that we are fully ready for the end game.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memo at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letter to President Gorbachev

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 18

Florence:

I spoke with Susan Porter Rose today about the attached and told her NSC approved.

She had, as you suspected, already sent the cable to Moscow.

She said she had also run into the President and General Scowcroft and briefed them.

Case closed. Sculpture will probably be dedicated by the First Ladies at the next Summit in the USSR.

B. NB

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Cable Memo	Susan Porter Rose to Ambassador and Mrs. Jack Matlock Re: "Make Way for Ducklings" Statue [Personal Informant Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91128-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY, FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. JACK MATLOCK
FROM: SUSAN PORTER ROSE, Chief of Staff to Mrs. Bush
SUBJECT: "Make Way for Ducklings" Statue

During the spring Bush-Gorbachev Summit, on Friday, June 1, 1990, Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev made a visit to Boston after Wellesley College. They made a stop in the Boston Public Garden and visited the "Make Way for Ducklings Statue" with a group of elementary school children from the Mather School in the Boston area (which happens to be the oldest elementary school in the United States). The Make Way for Ducklings Statue was designed by Nancy Schon and is based on the famous American children's book by Robert McCloskey, Make Way for Ducklings. The statue truly is lovely, and although universal in its appeal, it is first and foremost designed to be loved and climbed upon by children.

Following the visit of Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev to the duckling statue, we received a wonderful letter from Nancy Schon, the sculptress, offering to replicate the same statue at a park in Moscow. She proposed this as a gift to the Soviet people and the Soviet children from the United States. Mrs. Bush very much liked the idea and raised the question with Mrs. Gorbachev at their Sunday, September 9, 1990 meeting in Helsinki. Mrs. Gorbachev said she would look for a park. Mrs. Bush also apprised Mrs. Matlock of this.

I have had several phone conversations with Nancy Schon, the sculptress, and she has said that the placement of the statue

will be very important. It will need to be in a location easily accessible to children; preferably, there would be a pond toward which the ducklings could be headed; and if possible, it should be located near some trees. Ideally the statue should be created, prepared, and installed before a meeting/summit in Moscow (whenever such a meeting might take place) with the hope that on such a trip Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush, accompanied by Soviet school children, could visit and perhaps dedicate the completed statue.

We also believe it may be possible to have the children's story on which the statue is based, Make Way for Ducklings, translated into Russian for Mrs. Bush to bring copies with her to Moscow. In my conversations with Nancy Schon, she has indicated that she has been in touch with the author, Robert McCloskey, and that he is very enthusiastic about this possibility.

Mrs. Gorbachev is looking for a park where the statue would fit and be appropriate. In the event there should be a U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow in the next few months, we need to move along rapidly as it will take time to lay the groundwork and put the statue in place once a site has been determined. I have been working closely with the Soviet Embassy here in Washington.

Would you please telephone me upon receipt of this cable. The phone number is: (202) 456-2957 or [REDACTED] C I can be reached at home through the [REDACTED] C number.

Thank you so much.

bcc: ✓ General Scowcroft