Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91127
Folder ID Number: 91127-005

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	
01b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8	(b)(1)	
02a. Cable	White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	12/8/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock (1 pp.)	12/7/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Memo	Robert Gates to General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	12/7/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Letter	Re: In view of the… [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to Vice President Bush [Translation] (1 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
04b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to Vice President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
05a. Letter	Re: The Soviet Leadership… [English] (3 pp.)	8/25/89	(b)(1)	
05b. Letter	Re: [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Pinksheet Number: cap1074
OA/ID Number: 91127-005
Date Closed: 4/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Message	Re: Informal Messge from President Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	
06b. Message	Re: Informal Messge from President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (7 pp.)	1989	(b)(1)	
09. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	7/21/89	(b)(1)	
10a. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (4 pp.)	6/20/89	(b)(1)	
10b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: President's Letter to Gorbachev (2 pp.)	6/18/89	(b)(1)	S
10c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Eve of the Resumption of the START Talks (2 pp.)	6/16/89	(b)(1)	S
11a. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Yuriy V. Dubinin (1 pp.)	5/25/89	(b)(1)	

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Date Closed: 4/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11b. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	
11c. Cable	Re: Delivery of Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
11d. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
11e. Draft Letter	The President to Gorbachev President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/18	(b)(1)	
12. Draft Letter	President Bush to Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
13a. Draft Letter	To Mr. Secretary General (1 pp.)	8/30	(b)(1)	S
13b. Draft Letter	To Mr. Secretary General (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
13c. Handwritten Draft Letter	Re: Your Message (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
13d. Draft Letter	To Mr. Secretary General (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14a. Draft Letter	To Mr. Chairman (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14b. Cable	Re: Reply to Gorbachev Message on Berlin (3 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	S
15. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (4 pp.)	11/22/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
16. Memo	General Scowcroft to Michael Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	8/31	(b)(1)	
17. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/7/89	(b)(1)	
18a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in 1990 (3 pp.)	1/13/90	(b)(1)	S
18b. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in 1990 (1 pp.)	1/9/90	(b)(1)	S
19. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Robert Gates Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	5/10/89	(b)(1)	S
20a. Handwritten Notes	Re: Dobrynin (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(6)	
20b. Handwritten Notes	Re: Scowcroft Very Personal (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(6)	
20c. Handwritten Notes	Re: Home in Moscow (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(6)	
20d. Handwritten Notes	Re: 12:10 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(6)	

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Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Cable	White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	12/8/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock (1 pp.)	12/7/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Memo	Robert Gates to General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	12/7/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1989

Message delivered by
Soviet Amb Yuriy Dubinin
in meeting with General Scowcroft
on Friday, November 10, 1989.

Per Gen Scowcroft's request,
copy faxed to Bob Gates and
copy given to Blackwill/Rice.

Wilma

Unofficial translation

In view of the rather extreme situation obtaining at this point in connection with the events in the GDR, its capital and West Berlin, and noting a cardinal and, in my view, a correct and promising nature of the decisions being taken by the new GDR leadership, I have just sent a verbal message to Chancellor Kohl of the FRG about whose contents I deem it necessary to inform you as well.

According to the reports that are reaching us, a rally is going to take place today in West Berlin with the participation of officials from the FRG and West Berlin. Concurrently, another rally is scheduled to be held in the GDR capital. Given the present virtual openness and mass flows of people in both directions, there is a possibility that a chaotic situation may emerge with unforeseeable consequences.

I have urged Chancellor Kohl to take the necessary and most urgent measures to prevent a complication and a destabilization of the situation.

Our Ambassador in Berlin has been instructed to immediately contact representatives of the three powers' administration in West Berlin. I hope that you, for your part, will also issue appropriate instructions to your representative so that developments do not take an undesirable turn.

On the whole, I believe it useful to emphasize the depth and seriousness of the changes presently taking place in the GDR. But when statements are made in the FRG designed to stir up emotions, in the spirit of implacable rejection of the post-war realities, that is, the existence of two German states, then such manifestations of political extremism can only be seen as aimed at undermining the current dynamic processes of democratization and renewal of all aspects of the society's life. And, looking ahead, this can bring about a destabilization of the situation not only in Central Europe, but on a larger scale.

I wish to express the hope for the understanding of all this on your part.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to Vice President Bush [Translation] (1 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to Vice President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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November 22, 1989

General --

When I was straightening up your desk, I found the attached note, "VP wants Gorb corres." Is this something that I need to do for you? Please advise.

Florence

VP wants
Gorb corres

January 21, 1989

General Scowcroft:

I have received the materials from Dr. Kissinger.

Please indicate what classification you would like placed on these documents.

Confidential _____ Secret _____ Top Secret _____

Senstive _____ Other _____

WARNING: You can't just check other -- you must write in the block!!!!!!

No other copies have been made of this correspondence. Please advise how you wish to handle. Are we going to maintain this file in our office or will it eventually go into the system?

We'll maintain here ✓

We will put into system. I will advise when _____

I am attaching a copy of the the letter that Dr. Kissinger carried to Gorbachev from President-elect Bush dated 1/13/89.

Florence

Brent

Enclosed are 4 documents

A - Memcon with Dobrynin January 16

B - Memcon with G Jan 17

C - Memcon with Dobrynin January

D - Document in Russian

H. KISSINGER

SUMMIT/RAISA (Moscow/Reuter) -- Raisa Gorbachev, watching the Revolution Day parade on Moscow's Red Square Tuesday, said she will go to the Mediterranean for the superpower summit next month if her husband allows.... Asked whether she would accompany [her husband] to his December 2-3 meeting with President Bush..., she replied: "If my husband takes me." She indicated, however, that she did plan to make an official visit to Italy with Gorbachev on November 29-December 1.

IRANIAN ASSETS/STATE DEPT. (UPI) -- The U.S. has agreed to give Iran a portion of that country's assets frozen since the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was overrun by an Iranian mob in 1979, a White House official said Tuesday. The official said an agreement was reached last Friday in The Hague, Netherlands, but he could not say how much was involved.... State Department spokesman Deva Denny said Tuesday the U.S. is "making no deals with anyone about hostages."

ISRAELI ATTACKS/HEZBOLLAH (Jerusalem/AP) -- Israeli air force jets bombed a base of the Shiite Moslem guerrilla group Hezbollah in southeastern Lebanon this morning, the military command announced. "All targets were hit and our planes returned safely to base," the army communique said, saying the targets struck were in Mazraat Ayn Busiwar, 14 miles north of the Israeli border.... An army spokesman, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said several targets were struck in the base.... No reason for the raid was given.

MARCOS PROTESTS (Manila/UPI) -- About 150 supporters of the late Ferdinand Marcos burned a U.S. flag Tuesday during a rally at the American Embassy and demanded the return of the former president's corpse to his homeland. "To the ugly Americans: you kidnapped Marcos alive, bring him back now that he's dead or all Filipinos will curse all Americans," said a placard at the three-hour protest.... The protesters trampled a U.S. flag before setting it ablaze.

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Brent - Did we get our Raisa-gram out? GB 5 37

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Letter	Re: The Soviet Leadership… [English] (3 pp.)	8/25/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Letter	Re: [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Message	Re: Informal Messge from President Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Message	Re: Informal Messge from President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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9/21

Flo,

The President would like to keep the attached original in his personal files -- if o.k. w/ the General, please return to me.

Patty Presock

Done 11/9

Document Originally Attached to Following Page

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr.President,

I think that the letter you sent me on June 20 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international securit

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union believe--and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this--that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. I a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.

At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.

In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.

One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we mus of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic a would result in strengthening strategic stability.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.

You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptue gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of th situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approachec more pragmatically.

The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.

I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talk by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.

We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.

The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.

As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision--to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related t the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trad off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointl once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.

A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with the Secretary of Sta And you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at ou upcoming meeting.

The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last roun It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bomber must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important no to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warhead I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.

Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms wi be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.

Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arm and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.

We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.

I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.

It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.

I wish now to address two more problems that deal with the set of nuclear issues.

The first one concerns our nuclear testing talks. It seems to me that our acceptance, at the latest round of the talks, of using the CORRTEX method to monitor all nuclear tests above the agreed yield threshold, as the US side had insisted, makes it possible to bring the first stage of these talks to the concluding phase. I hope that our US partners will now look in the same unbiased way at the verification procedures that we propose. If during the ministerial meeting the two sides

recorded their fundamental understanding regarding the verification mechanism, instructions could then be given to our respective delegations at the Geneva talks to complete as soon as possible--in any case before the end of the year--work on the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and to prepare them for signing at our meeting. I also think that it is time for us to give general consideratio to the guidelines for further restrictions on the yield and number of tests, which we are going to set for our delegations as their goal for the second stage of the talks.

The other problem to which I would like to call your attention has to do with the possibility of starting talks to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Today, as we see it, we have a favorable situation--the United States has actually ceased the production of fresh weapon-grade plutonium while the Soviet Union has adopted a program for phasing out before the year 2000 all the industrial reactors used to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Eduard Shevardnadze will inform the US side about the specific details of the program. I want to point out that we are ready to speed up its implementation in the event of matching reciprocal steps on your part.

In these circumstances our two countries could address in practical terms the problem of a verifiable cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. As a first step we could even now instruct our experts to consider jointly the issues related to the mechanism of mutual verivica of such a measure. It is our view that the reciprocal cessatio of the production of fissionable material not only would help to strengthen predictability in the strategic field, but would also make it possible for both sides to solve--at a much lower cost--a large number of environmental problems involved in the operation of nuclear production complexes.

Another priority issue--and we seem to be of one mind on this-- is the conclusion of a global and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapo We welcome your statement that every effort must be made to achieve such a prohibition. In this, our approaches coincide.

I also wish to note with satisfaction that during the last two rounds of bilateral consultations progress was made toward achieving this goal. I hope that our ministers will be able during their current meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding on a bilateral verification experiment.

We have also decided to take an additional step to accomodate the US position by agreeing to the inclusion of saxitoxin and ricin into the relevant list under the convention.

The multilateral talks on the convention have now entered a crucial phase. At the same time they still seem to lack a sense of purpose. Perhaps this is due to some extent to the fact that there is no agreed date by which the negotiators would seek to complete the preparation of the convention. Why shouldn't our two countries take an ininiative here by issuing a joint appeal to conclude the convention as early as 1990 or 1991? Such a time limit seems to be quite realistic

Mr.President, there is another issue which calls for the personal efforts of the two of us. I am referring to the reduction of conventional armed forces. Actually, both you and I took these talks into our own hands when we proposed the initiatives which are now paving the way to resolving the problems which for decades have poisoned East-West relations. It is precisely those political decisions taken at the highest level that have made it possible for the Vienna talks to take an unprecedented start and make very good headway.

You took a bold step, Mr. President, by proposing that the talks be completed within six to twelve months, which is an unheard-of challenge. Well, we accept it, even though I will say frankly that it will not be easy to do it.

But if you and I want to give effect to those commitments we must work out a kind of strategy for speeding up the Vienna talks. We could perhaps agree between ourselves and with the other participants from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to convene in the second half of 1990 a summit meeting in order to sign the agreement on conventional arms, to be attended by all the leaders of the European states. I am confident that such a European conference would be unprecedented as regards its results.

To that end we should instruct our foreign ministers to intensify work to find solutions to outstanding issues. Perhaps it will take two or three meetings between our ministers and the ministers from other states concerned which participate in the Vienna talks; meetings not for making speeches but to find solutions to outstanding issues.

For example, why not hold the first such meeting in Vienna early next year to review the principal difficulties holding up the talks?

We have duly appreciated agreement by the United States and other NATO countries to reduce combat aircraft. This is an important step toward accomodating the position of the Warsaw Treaty. But let me say frankly that it fails to address our serious concern regarding air defense aircraft based in the European territory of the Soviet Union and intended only to protect vital facilities against possible air strikes from various directions. They do not have the capability to strike ground targets. Those aircraft are not part of the surprise attack capability. We are prepared to give American experts an opportunity to see for themselves that that is precisely the case. In order to resolve this issue we could agree to set a certain limit for such aircraft, which would not include frontline fighters. Of course, we expect that there should not be any buildup of systems which these aircraft are intended to counter.

In the context of the likely breakthrough at the Vienna talks we believe it is possible even now to begin discussing the question of a gradual removal of the tactical nuclear component from the European military equation. All the more so since we understand that in Brussels the NATO countries gave their agreement in principle to such discussions. I would like to inform you that with due regard for this evolution in NATO's

position, the Soviet Union, as I already said in Strassbourg, is considering the possibility of further major unilateral reductions in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

And now the last point. We welcome your proposal concerning an "open skies" regime which would provide for mutual overflights by unarmed aircraft over the territories of the USSR and the United States and their Warsaw Treaty and NATO allies for the purpose of monitoring their military activities, and we agree to take part in an international conference to discuss issues involved in establishing such a regime.

I think that we are now on the threshold of mutually acceptable agreement. But you and I together will have to cross that threshold. And we can do so if we take into account each other's fundamental concerns.

In closing, Mr.President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

M.Gorbachev

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Письмо, которое Вы направили мне 20 июня, на мой взгляд, открывает новый важный этап нашего доверительного диалога. Я разделяю Вашу точку зрения о незаменимости прямых контактов между нами, особенно в том, что касается обмена мнениями по существу наиболее важных проблем, решение которых способствовало бы развитию отношений между нашими странами, укреплению международной безопасности.

Переговоры по ядерным и космическим вооружениям, которым посвящено Ваше послание, безусловно, требуют нашего первоочередного внимания. И как важнейший компонент усилий по уменьшению опасности войны в целом, и как осуществление преемственности исторического процесса реального ядерного разоружения, начало которому мы положили, подписав рубежный Договор по РСМД.

В Советском Союзе считают - и закончившийся в августе раунд женевских переговоров подтвердил это, - что достигнутое продвижение представляет собой хороший фундамент для продолжения работы. В наших подходах есть довольно много общего, что уже зафиксировано в совместных документах встреч на высшем уровне, а также в разрабатываемых на переговорах документах. Одним словом, как Вы пишите, достигнутое к настоящему времени обеспечивает твердую основу для заключения соглашения. Это - очень важная, обязывающая обе Стороны политическая констатация.

Вместе с тем есть вопросы, причем принципиального характера, нерешенность которых препятствует заключению договора о 50-процентном сокращении СНВ. Я призываю Вас сосредоточиться на их решении. Сейчас переговоры, я думаю, подошли к такому рубежу, который требует принятия смелых политических решений, которые вывели бы их на скорейшее успешное завершение.

В своем послании Вы затрагиваете принципы стратегической стабильности. Конечно, устранение стимулов для нанесения первого удара, уменьшение концентрации боезарядов на стратегических носителях, оказание предпочтения средствам, обладающим повышенной выживаемостью, - это важные ориентиры на переговорах по ЯКВ. Я убежден, что мы должны их

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придерживаться - как в ходе переговоров о 50-процентных сокращениях СНВ, так и на тех переговорах, которые должны за ними последовать и на которых речь пойдет о еще более глубоких и радикальных сокращениях в контексте стратегической стабильности.

И еще одно соображение общего характера. Стратегические вооруженные силы наших двух стран в течение длительного времени развивались под воздействием географических и иных факторов, которые приводили к появлению заметных отличий в их структуре. Договариваясь о сокращении СНВ, мы, конечно, должны с пониманием относиться к этим особенностям друг друга. Нужно находить общие знаменатели, которые, учитывая различия в структуре наших стратегических вооружений, вели бы к укреплению стратегической стабильности.

Теперь о некоторых конкретных вопросах переговоров по ЯКВ.

В своем послании Вы отмечаете, что в вопросах ПРО и космоса нас разделяет концептуальный разрыв. Есть ли выход из этого положения? Думаю, что его можно найти, если подойти к проблеме более прагматически.

Главное здесь - продолжать придерживаться той договоренности относительно Договора по ПРО, которая была достигнута в декабре 1987 года на встрече в Вашингтоне, - соблюдать этот Договор в том виде, как он был подписан в 1972 году.

Я хочу предложить следующее: оставим временно наш концептуальный спор о том, приведут ли вывод оружия в космос, развертывание систем противоракетной обороны к укреплению стратегической стабильности или вызовут обратный эффект. Давайте не будем сейчас осложнять этим вопросом ход и без того сложных переговоров по ЯКВ, вернемся к нему на переговорах по стратегической стабильности - сразу же после подписания договора по СНВ, - о проведении которых мы уже договорились.

Остается у нас расхождение и в отношении того, как понимать то, что запрещается Договором по ПРО и что им разрешается. Несмотря на то, что я убежден в правильности нашего толкования, мы, очевидно, не продвинемся вперед, если будем продолжать спорить в прежней плоскости. Выход нам видится в том, чтобы попытаться конкретно определить, что можно делать в рамках Договора по ПРО.

Характер концептуальной дискуссии приобрело и обсуждение вопроса о фиксации срока невыхода из Договора по ПРО. В целях облегчения решения других вопросов на переговорах мы могли бы не настаивать на нашем предложении о таком фиксированном сроке невыхода.

Министр иностранных дел СССР и Государственный секретарь США могли бы, если изложенные выше соображения окажутся подходящими, разработать на их основе соответствующие инструкции для наших делегаций на переговорах по ЯКВ.

Остаются, как мы понимаем, трудности в связи с так называемым вопросом о Красноярской РЛС. Я уже неоднократно предлагал различные варианты, которые, с нашей точки зрения, могли бы устранить озабоченности Американской Стороны. К сожалению, они не достигли своей цели. Чтобы полностью расчистить путь к скорейшему заключению договора по СНВ, мы приняли радикальное решение - полностью ликвидировать этот объект. Хотелось бы рассчитывать, что и Американская Сторона предпримет соответствующие шаги, с тем чтобы устранить наши озабоченности, связанные с американскими РЛС в Гренландии и Великобритании.

Из вопросов, касающихся непосредственно СНВ, наибольшие трудности существуют в отношении КРМБ большой дальности. Эту проблему давно пора вывести из тупика. Для этого, как мне представляется, требуется принятие крупного политического решения в плане размена взаимных озабоченностей. Нужно бы еще раз проанализировать совместно данную проблему, в том числе и с точки зрения более широкого подхода к проблеме морских вооружений.

Нужно начать наконец продуктивный диалог по этой проблеме на переговорах по ЯКВ. Ваша Сторона ссылается на трудности контроля. Почему бы нам на этих переговорах не сосредоточиться на проблеме контроля в отношении ядерных КРМБ, а вопрос об их ограничениях мог бы быть решен с учетом результатов работы в отношении контроля. Э.А.Шеварднадзе готов подробнее переговорить по этому вопросу с Госсекретарем. А мы с Вами, если потребуется, вернулись бы к этому вопросу на нашей предстоящей встреч

Нерешенной остается и проблема КРВБ, хотя в ходе последнего раунда какие-то подходы к ее решению стали нащупываться. Очевидно, что вопросы, связанные с КРВБ и ТБ, должны решаться в комплексе. При этом важно исключить возможность размывания установленного предела в 6000 боезарядов. Думаю, этот узел мог бы быть развязан уже в ходе нынешней встречи наших министров.

Наконец, вопросы контроля. Видимо, мы можем констатировать наше общее стремление обеспечить максимальную уверенность Сторон в соблюдении будущего договора по СНВ. Ваша идея опробования до его заключения методики контроля представляется нам полезной. Вместе с тем эффективно такая задача вряд ли может быть решена выборочным методом, согласно которому установление наблюдения за объектами по производству СНВ касалось бы только мобильных МБР.

Ясно, что в самом договоре контроль будет охватывать все вооружения, подпадающие под договор по СНВ, а обязательства по контролю должны иметь равноправный характер, при котором исключался бы односторонний подход. Поэтому "пробные" меры контроля следовало бы отрабатывать применительно к любым видам СНВ, которые должен охватывать будущий договор, что обеспечивало бы надежные гарантии его соблюдения.

Мы за аналогичный подход и к вопросу об обмене данными по СНВ; готовы договариваться также и об ознакомительных поездках на взаимной основе.

Считаю возможным, чтобы между нашими странами на уровне министров иностранных дел была достигнута принципиальная договоренность о подготовке пробных мер контроля и мер стабильности и их осуществления по мере готовности. А в ходе предстоящего раунда переговоров по ЯКВ были бы согласованы конкретные параметры и процедуры осуществления таких пробных мер.

Видимо, уже в ходе нынешней встречи министров можно было бы подписать соглашение об уведомлениях относительно крупных учений стратегических сил, которое практически готово.

Хочу затронуть еще две проблемы, относящиеся к ядерному комплексу вопросов.

Первая касается наших переговоров по ядерным испытаниям. Мне представляется, что выраженное нами на прошедшем раунде переговоров согласие с применением метода КОРРТЕКС для контроля за всеми ядерными испытаниями сверх согласованного порога мощности, как на том настаивала Американская Сторона, позволяет вывести первый этап этих переговоров на завершающую фазу. Надеюсь, что наши американские партнеры теперь столь же непредвзято рассмотрят процедуры контроля, предлагаемые нами. Если бы в ходе встречи министров Стороны зафиксировали принципиальное понимание по механизму контроля за испытаниями, можно было бы дать указание делегациям на переговорах в Женеве в сжатые сроки - во всяком случае до конца текущего года - завершить работу над контрольными протоколами к договорам 1974 и 1976 годов и подготовить их к подписанию на нашей с Вами встрече. Думаю также, что уже пора нам подумать в принципиальном плане, какие ориентиры по дальнейшим ограничениям на мощность и количество испытаний мы поставим перед нашими делегациями в качестве цели второго этапа переговоров.

Другая проблема, к которой хотелось бы привлечь Ваше внимание, - это возможность начать переговоры по запрещению производства расщепляющихся материалов для целей оружия. Сегодня, как нам представляется, сложилась благоприятная ситуация: в США фактически прекращена наработка свежего оружейного плутония; в Советском Союзе принята программа вывода из эксплуатации всех промышленных реакторов по наработке оружейного плутония до 2000 года. Э.А.Шеварднадзе проинформирует Американскую Сторону о конкретных деталях этой программы. Хочу отметить, что мы были бы готовы ускорить ее осуществление в случае соответствующих ответных шагов с вашей стороны.

В этих условиях наши страны могли бы приступить к практическому решению вопроса о контролируемом прекращении производства расщепляющихся материалов для оружия. В качестве первого шага мы могли бы уже сейчас дать поручение нашим экспертам заняться совместной проработкой вопросов, связанных с механизмом взаимного контроля за такой мерой. На наш взгляд, взаимное прекращение производства расщепляющихся материалов не только способствовало бы укреплению предсказуемости в стратегической области, но и позволяло бы обеим Сторонам решить - с гораздо меньшими финансовыми затратами - целый ряд экологических проблем, связанных с функционированием ядерных производственных комплексов.

Еще одним приоритетным вопросом - и в этом, как нам кажется, мы едины - является заключение глобальной и поддающейся эффективному контролю конвенции о запрещении и уничтожении химического оружия. Мы приветствуем Ваше заявление о том, что к такому запрещению необходимо решительно стремиться. В этом наши подходы совпадают.

Хочу также с удовлетворением отметить, что на последних двух раундах двусторонних консультаций был достигнут прогресс в достижении этой цели. Надеюсь, что наши министры в ходе их текущей встречи смогут подписать меморандум о понимании по двустороннему эксперименту по проверке.

Многосторонние переговоры по конвенции вступили сейчас в решающую фазу. Вместе с тем им, как нам кажется, все еще не хватает целеустремленности. Возможно, это происходит в какой-то степени и оттого, что нет согласованного срока, к которому участники переговоров стремились бы завершить разработку конвенции. Почему бы нашим двум странам не проявить здесь инициативу: выступить с совместным призывом заключить конвенцию уже в 1990 или 1991 году? Думается, что такой срок является вполне реалистичным.

Господин Президент, есть и еще один вопрос, который требует от нас с Вами непосредственных усилий. Я имею в виду сокращение обычных вооруженных сил. Собственно говоря, и Вы и я уже взяли эти переговоры в свои руки, когда выступили с инициативами, которые прокладывают путь к развязке проблем, долгие десятилетия отравлявших отношения Восток-Запад. Именно эти политические решения на высшем уровне позволили Венским переговорам взять беспрецедентный старт и далеко продвинуться вперед.

Вы сделали смелый шаг, господин Президент, предложив завершить эти переговоры в небывало короткий срок - 6-12 месяцев. Что ж, мы принимаем этот вызов, хотя, прямо скажу, сделать это будет нелегко.

Но если мы хотим с Вами, чтобы эти обязательства были реализованы, то нужно выработать своего рода стратегию ускорения Венских переговоров. Скажем, условиться между собой и с другими участниками НАТО и ОВД о проведении во второй половине 1990 года совещания на высшем уровне для

подписания соглашения по обычным вооружениям, на котором могли бы присутствовать все руководители европейских государств. Уверен, это было бы беспрецедентное по своим результатам общеевропейское совещание.

Для этого нужно поручить нашим министрам иностранных дел интенсифицировать работу по развязке нерешенных вопросов. Может быть, для этого потребуется две-три встречи между нашими министрами и министрами других заинтересованных государств - участников переговоров в Вене. Причем не для произнесения речей, а именно для развязки нерешенных вопросов.

Почему бы, например, не провести в начале будущего года в Вене первую такую встречу для рассмотрения основных трудностей на переговорах?

Мы по достоинству оценили согласие США и других стран НАТО пойти на сокращение боевых самолетов. Это - важный шаг навстречу позиции Варшавского Договора. Но, откровенно скажу, он не учитывает нашу серьезную озабоченность, касающуюся авиации ПВО, которая базируется на европейской территории Советского Союза и предназначена только для прикрытия жизненно важных объектов от возможных ударов с воздуха с различных направлений и не обладает способностью наносить удары по наземным объектам. Эти самолеты не являются частью потенциала внезапного нападения. Мы готовы предоставить американским специалистам возможность убедиться, что это именно так. Чтобы решить этот вопрос, можно было бы договориться об установлении определенного уровня таких самолетов, который не включал бы истребители фронтовой авиации. Разумеется, при этом не должно было бы быть наращивания средств, для действий против которых предназначены эти самолеты.

В контексте наметившегося прорыва на переговорах в Вене мы полагаем возможным уже сейчас начать обсуждение вопроса о постепенном изъятии из европейского военного уравнения тактического ядерного компонента. Тем более, как мы понимаем, в Брюсселе страны НАТО в принципиальном плане дали согласие на такое обсуждение. Хотел бы проинформировать Вас, что с учетом этого развития позиции НАТО Советский Союз, как я уже говорил об этом в Страсбурге, рассматривает возможность дальнейших крупных односторонних сокращений своих тактических ядерных ракет в Европе.

И последний вопрос. Мы приветствуем выдвинутое Вами предложение об установлении режима "открытого неба", предусматривающего взаимное осуществление полетов невооруженных самолетов над территориями СССР и США и их союзников по ОВД и НАТО с целью осуществления контроля за военной деятельностью, и согласны участвовать в международной конференции для обсуждения вопросов, связанных с установлением такого режима.

Думаю, что сейчас мы на пороге выработки взаимоприемлемой договоренности. Но нам с Вами вместе нужно переступить этот порог. И мы это можем сделать, если учтем основные озабоченности друг друга.

В заключение, господин Президент, хочу выразить готовность к дальнейшему обмену мнениями по поставленным вопросам и надежду, что он будет результативным для дела мира и безопасности.

С искренним уважением

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

19 сентября 1989 года

Brent – You may have seen this – or may be familiar with similar type material. If not, however, it is worth perusing (especially the front end). It is based on observation rather than speculation. Jim Jeffrey

APNSA Has Seen

MOSCOW IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

by Vladimir Shlapentokh

Moscow, July 1989

INTRODUCTION

When I visited Moscow in May 1988 for the first time since my emigration nearly a decade years earlier, it was clear that great progress had been made in the country's political atmosphere. The level of fear, the major indicator of Soviet life over the last 70 years, was far lower than it had been at any time during the Brezhnev era. In general, however, the major structures of the Soviet system (e.g., economic, political, cultural, and scientific) remained almost completely intact.

Although I very much enjoyed meeting with my old friends and acquaintances, I was quite disappointed with the intellectual aspects of my trip. That is, my visit aroused very few new ideas regarding the country's development.

By contrast, my second trip, only one year later, proved highly intellectually stimulating. The hiatus between my two trips had proven to be a critical period in recent Soviet history, and I returned to a Moscow embroiled in turmoil and change.

In this document, I will try to convey some observations and impressions from my most recent trip. My primary focus will be on political, economic, and ethnic matters.

IS THE SOVIET UNION ON THE VERGE OF THE CATASTROPHE ENVISIONED BY ITS PEOPLE?

The first session of the Congress of People's Deputies produced results quite antithetical to those anticipated by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Congress not only sharply intensified the continuing conflicts between the Soviet Union's four major political actors--the party reformers headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, the party apparatus, the liberal intelligentsia, and the masses--but it heightened the tensions between various ethnic groups as well.

While visiting Moscow in the aftermath of the Congress, I spoke with numerous people from all walks of life, and I listened to speakers at meetings of both liberals and conservatives. I had no choice but to agree with the message conveyed by all--the current political situation in the country is clearly more explosive than it had been prior to May 25th when the new Soviet parliament began its 13 day marathon.

During my May 1988 trip to Moscow, the Soviet people discussed their future in terms of the survival of both Gorbachev and his liberal program. Now, little more than one year later, Soviet politicians and intellectuals discuss the future in terms of peaceful versus violent courses of events--the possibility of civil war, mass strikes and riots, an internecine ethnic war, or the collapse of the state.

Talk of these possibilities is rampant in Moscow at the meetings of both Stalinists and liberals, and is even splashed

across the pages of Soviet periodicals. Iurii Chernichenko, a committed foe of private farming, finished an article in *Ogoniok* with a direct warning of merciless riots should Moscow fail to solve the country's food problem. Boris Kurashvili, another liberal, predicted the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a multinational state should the Kremlin's national policy falter.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the Congress was its deleterious effect on the relationship between the leader and the masses.

Gorbachev's great miscalculation, which was made by many Western analysts as well, was that the Soviet people would assess the Congress in the same way that Soviet planners evaluated the performance of various enterprises--through comparison "with the level achieved in the previous year." Indeed, with its genuine freedom of speech, with free access to the podium (in some cases even against the will of Gorbachev), and with open critique of Gorbachev (not to mention of other Politburo members), the Congress represented a great step toward democratic order.

In assessing the Congress, however, the Soviet people refused to recognize that the Britons required several centuries to refine their near-perfect parliamentary system. Instead, the Soviets measured the work of the Congress by contemporary world standards, and found these standards grossly violated, particularly by Gorbachev himself. In a survey conducted by Vladimir Iadov, the director of the Sociological Institute, the majority of the Soviet people supported the harsh accusations of anti-democratism directed

at the Congress by Iurii Afanasiev, the leader of a tiny liberal minority. By contrast, only one-third of the respondents endorsed the positions taken by their deputies at the Congress (*Izvestia*, May 31, 1989).

In addition, an even larger percentage of the Soviet people labeled the Congress "a big circus" (the expression often used by ordinary people), and saw no link between its work and their concerns. In the opinions of most people, the Congress (like Glasnost in general) was designed simply to divert their attention from the rapid deterioration of their lifestyle.

Probably even more important than the people's anger at the Congress's anti-democratic nature is the apocalyptic mood currently gripping the Soviet people, who feel that neither the Congress nor democratization will alleviate the problems currently plaguing nearly every aspect of Soviet life.

In May 1988, the prevailing psychological atmosphere was rather positive, despite ongoing economic stagnation. Glasnost, with its new freedom of speech and daring publications, still seemed to millions of Soviet people (especially the intelligentsia) to be adequate compensation for the hardships of everyday life.

The current situation, however, is radically different. Continuing revelations regarding Stalin and his time fail to excite even the liberal intelligentsia, not to mention the masses, who grew indifferent to such reports a year ago. Moreover, further movements in the last year toward the disappearance of fear and the attainment of near-total freedom of speech (in Moscow's Arbat, the

Soviet Hyde Park, speakers spare neither socialism nor Lenin, Gorbachev nor his wife) have failed to impress the Soviet people, who no longer hail Gorbachev for this truly great progress.

The majority of the Soviet people, whose salaries were fixed dozens of years ago, have been devastated by soaring inflation. Even more humiliating for the Soviet people, however, is the declining role of money in their lives. With most stores offering nothing but empty shelves, only connections, barter exchanges, and bribes are useful in obtaining needed goods and services (this phenomenon will be addressed more completely in the next section). For the average Soviet individual, the scope of corruption appears far broader now than during Brezhnev's period of "stagnation," the official label for the Brezhnev era.

My personal observations are in complete accord with the results of a nation-wide, random sample survey directed by Boris Grushin at the Center for Public Opinion Studies. In the survey, conducted six months ago when the situation was better than is currently the case, half of the Soviet population complained about deterioration in the supply of food and other consumer goods.

The Soviet people's melancholia is also fed by recurrent technological disasters, which the people feel result from a combination of technological backwardness, incompetence, and a lack of discipline. Fortunately, the Chernobyl incident, which seemed to usher in this lugubrious era, remains foremost among such events. Other disasters, however, have joined its ranks. The oil pipeline blast in Bashkiria in June, during the session of the

Congress of People's Deputies, was one of several disasters which have occurred in the last two months.

It is no surprise that, even before a series of new catastrophes in early 1989, two-thirds of the respondents in Grushin's survey considered technological disasters a part of their everyday lives.

The Soviet people are also horrified by their country's deteriorating ecological situation. Only seven percent of the respondents in Grushin's survey expressed optimistic views regarding the ecological situation, while almost two-thirds voiced gloomier sentiments.

Still more upsetting to the Soviet people than inflation, the lack of goods, and technological and ecological disasters is the growing tension in the country. Social and political conflicts, which often become violent, have emerged as a part of Soviet life. Confrontations between the police and members of informal organizations, and the strikes and demonstrations of workers, students, and even policemen, significantly contribute to the apocalyptic mood of the Soviet people.

Finally, when the Soviet people are asked to name the gravest threat to Soviet life and Soviet society, their answer is clear: the incessant spread of ethnic conflicts.

Having first appeared in Alma-Ata in December 1986, these conflicts have since spread to many regions of the country, engendering violent clashes with hundreds of victims in Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Uzbekistan, and Kasakhstan. Minorities everywhere,

including Russians living in non-Russian regions, live in a constant state of high anxiety. Gorbachev's recent televised speech on ethnic relations in the Soviet Union, in which he spoke of the possibility of a terrible ethnic disaster, only served to confirm the worst apprehensions of the average citizen.

During my most recent stay in Moscow I attended several political meetings, both of the right and of the left. I was shocked that, wherever I went, civil war and the collapse of the state were debated as very real possibilities. For example, at a large meeting in the Olympic village, Oles Adamovich, a prominent Soviet intellectual and a leader of the liberal opposition at the Congress of People's Deputies, publicly pondered about possible structures to be put into place to prevent mass bloodshed in the event of the collapse of the existing political order.

Also while I was in Moscow, *Pravda* published an article about Rostov, a large southern city, which in recent months has lived in "the expectation of some disaster, an apocalypse". The nervousness in the city has reached such proportions that the majority of parents have forbidden their children to go to school.

When asked by several Moscow intellectuals to identify the most striking aspect of my visit, I chose the increase in the society's general level of anxiety and nervousness, a phenomenon which I had never before observed. The intellectuals with whom I was speaking immediately concurred.

Since my last departure from Moscow, new developments, such as the violent clashes in Abkhasia, which have rendered Black Sea

resorts out of reach for millions of vacationers, and, especially, the national miner's strike, have served to exacerbate the country's apocalyptic mood.

Given their feelings of hopelessness, many Soviet people have grown indifferent to recent political developments, such as the participation of the Supreme Soviet in the selection of the government. The Soviets feel that such developments are irrelevant to their worries and predicaments, and that any changes are simply cosmetic adaptations of the old political order to new circumstances. A significant number of Americans, with their political apathy, will understand the sentiments of the Soviet people.

Although, according to the polls, about two-thirds of the Soviet people endorsed Gorbachev's election as President, they did so without enthusiasm, and primarily because they saw no viable alternative. Gorbachev has lost his aura, his long speeches irritate people, and one no longer hears toasts for Mikhail Sergeievich at Moscow parties, as was the case even one year ago. Moscow liberals, aware of the decline of Gorbachev's prestige, now strive to further his image (Adamovich did so at the Olympic village meeting mentioned above, and Igor Kliamkin followed suit in a recent issue of *Moscow News*), and a growing number of people mention Boris El'tsin as a potential leader truly capable of saving the country.

As a result of his behavior at the Congress, Gorbachev lost a great deal of support, even among the liberal intelligentsia,

which has proven to be his major ally in the years of Perestroika. It is curious that during the July 9 meeting of Soviet and French intellectuals on Soviet TV, all six Soviet participants curtly declined to answer their counterpart's questions regarding Gorbachev's current prestige in the USSR.

Despite the apparent increase in Gorbachev's power following his election as President, the decline of his prestige in the country is an extremely destabilizing factor. Only one year ago, Gorbachev successfully used his authority to prevent the outburst of ethnic unrest in various regions of the country, but he is no longer able to do so. In its coverage of the growing ethnic tension in Moldavia, Soviet TV (July 10) lamented the fact that the unrest occurred despite Gorbachev's special appeal for national reconciliation. More recently, Gorbachev proved unable to use his prestige to defuse the coal miner's strike in July.

Although still recuperating from its defeat in the March 1989 election, the party apparatus dominated the Congress. With Gorbachev's help (similar to that which he gave at the 19th party conference), the party apparatus maintained the upper hand in almost all controversial issues. Consequently, the gap between the party apparatus and the liberal intelligentsia has widened immensely in the wake of the Congress.

The party apparatus launched its counteroffensive at the meetings of the Leningrad regional party committee and the Central Committee in April. Following its success at the Congress, the party apparatus continued its assault at the very aggressive

meeting of the Moscow party committee in June, which stopped just short of demanding the immediate convening of an extraordinary Congress of the party.

In all of these meetings, apparatchiks openly challenged the liberal reformers and demanded the restoration of authoritarian order and Stalinist ideology in the country. "State, motherland, and Communism"--the key words poignantly proclaimed by Afghan veteran S. Chervonopisky at the Congress of People's Deputies during a broadside against Sakharov--became a rallying slogan for Stalinists in the country (*Izvestia*, June 4, 1989).

The apparatchiks have clearly tied their political plans to the worsening of the material situation in the country. According to an ever-increasing consensus, the apparatchiks are doing everything within their power to hasten the deterioration of the Soviet people's lifestyle, up to and including the creation of deficits of basic goods.

The apparatchik's hope is that the growing material concerns of the Soviet people will pit them not only against Gorbachev and his reforms but also against the liberal intelligentsia, which, in its preoccupation with democratization, has paid little attention to the plight of the masses. When I attended the big rally of the liberal intelligentsia in the Olympic village, I was amazed that not only Oles Adamovich and Iurii Koriakin, the main speakers, but the other intellectuals at the podium and in the audience as well, totally ignored the rapidly deteriorating standard of living in the country and remained absorbed by political issues.

The strategy of the intellectuals's opponents--the apparatchiks--is radically different. They focus on and emphasize the current material hardships of the masses, and then place the responsibility for these hardships on Perestroika and its leaders.

Having not yet dared directly express their hatred of the political leadership and the liberal intelligentsia, the apparatchiks have formed their own informal organizations, such as "The Association of Scientific Communism" and the notoriously chauvinistic "Pamiat'".

I attended a meeting of the former organization, which was held under the aegis of the Moscow party committee and was directed against Gorbachev and, especially, Alexander Iakovlev. These two were accused of promoting the new bourgeoisie which, through economic reforms, has grabbed the leading positions in society, while the workers, having been betrayed by the Politburo, suffer harshly from the marketization and decentralization of the economy and from ever-increasing social inequality. The participants at the meeting, who were quite militant and aggressive, demanded the creation of a struggle against the government.

At the present time, it is difficult to measure the potential of this Stalinist association. But, given a natural alliance with chauvinistic forces (from time to time some of the participants of the meeting shouted pure anti-Semitic slogans, equating the new bourgeoisie with "Zionists" and "Masons"), increases in inflation and social differentiation, and increased animosity among the Soviet people (a fact unanimously confirmed by those with whom I

spoke in Moscow), it would be foolish to discount the party apparatus's chances of redirecting the people's attention away from liberal ideas and toward anger aimed at political reformers in the Kremlin, private cooperatives, the intelligentsia, and Jews. All of the elements of this ideological shift were clearly present at the Congress (see the speeches of V. Bakulin, a foreman from Ivanovo, *Izvestia*, June 2; Vasilii Belov, writer, *Izvestia*, June 2; V. Kalish, worker from Zaporozhie, *Izvestia*, June 2; S. Melekhin, worker from N. Tagil, *Izvestia*, May 31; and V. Shcherbakov, the chairman of the Moscow Trade Union, *Izvestia*, June 4).

In Moscow, many People's Deputies, including Boris Vasiliev, Iuri Vlasov, and others, consider Chervonopiski's slogan ("State, motherland, and Communism") reasonable ideological justification for the intervention of the army, a military coup, and martial law, and they regard the merciless massacre in Tbilisi in April 1989 a general rehearsal for the quenching of the democratic movement in the country.

The speech of General I. Rodionov at the Congress, which lacked even one word of regret for his victims, and the stormy ovation of the majority of the Deputies, suggest that there are generals available for the crushing of mass movements (many people singled out General Gromov, former commander of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and current commander of the Kiev military district, to fill the shoes of Cavaignak, the famous French general who quenched the riots of 1848). In addition, it is clear that there

are Deputies who will praise such generals as heroes and saviors of the motherland (*Izvestia*, June 1).

In general, I found the mood of the Soviet people to be in dire straits. Further developments in the Soviet Union in July, following my departure from Moscow, have only intensified the country's apocalyptic mood. The clashes between the Tadzhiks and the Kirgizs, and especially those between the Georgians and the Abkhasians, mark an expansion of the area engulfed in armed conflict. This area now includes the zone on the shore of the Black Sea where millions of Soviet people pass their vacations.

Much more ominous, however, are the strikes of hundreds of thousands of coal miners. Should the miners be joined by workers from other sectors of the economy, particularly those employed by the railroads, they could paralyze the Soviet economy.

It is difficult to imagine how the USSR, even when headed by a politician as shrewd as Gorbachev, can possibly sidestep a period of turmoil and subsequent intervention by the army to support order in the country.

It should be noted that, as recent events revealed, the Soviet population possesses a large number of weapons, and various ethnic minorities throughout the country are actively enlarging their stockpiles. At the same time, the creation of detachments of workers to fight crime also increases the number of people owning lethal weapons.

There are those in Moscow who, with the conspiratorial mindset common to citizens in authoritarian states, believe that recent

major social and ethnic conflicts, as well as some technological disasters, have been organized or triggered by the enemies of Gorbachev, one of the greatest reformers in Russian history. In support of their position they point to the unusually high number of catastrophes which occurred during the work of the Congress.

Similarly, some people in Moscow had feared a military coup during Gorbachev's trip to China on the eve of the Congress--an issue candidly discussed by Rasputin in his speech at the Congress (*Izvestia*, June 7).

The USA and the West must brace themselves for a situation in Russia which may be even more dramatic than that in China, and must elaborate their policies toward various possible domestic events which might occur in the near future. At the same time, the possibility remains that Gorbachev will manage to overcome the major obstacles to his reforms and will be able to stabilize his country. This scenario is, of course, the most desirable for the West, which would hardly benefit should the worst fears of the Soviet people come to pass.

THE ROUBLE ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

Recently, the world has become convinced that Soviet society, under Gorbachev's guidance, has expanded the role of its free market, with money occupying a primary place and with consumers free to pick and choose their goods. During my most recent trip to Moscow, however, I observed a situation far different from that envisioned by outsiders.

Radical changes have occurred within the last year. When I visited Moscow in May 1988, I found the economic situation much as it had been upon my departure nearly a decade ago. By contrast, during my most recent trip I found that soaring inflation rates (currently about ten percent per year, an unprecedented rate for the Soviet economy) have nearly destroyed the country's state market. In addition, the number of rationed goods has risen drastically compared to one year ago. In many regions of the country, this list now includes not only meat and butter, but sugar, soap, detergents, tea, and several other items as well. Although some people's coupon allotment provides them with much more than they need, they rarely fail to fill their quota. Instead, they either hoard their food or sell it on the black market. According to my friends in Moscow, sugar and soap have never been as plentiful as they are now that they have become rationed.

The distribution of industrial goods, mostly of foreign origin, in enterprises and offices has swelled enormously. The state has elaborated a complicated mechanism for such distribution, which includes the use of lotteries to determine who among the workers of a given institution will be entitled to "buy," for example, one of the ten pairs of Italian womens shoes or one of the five jackets made in France that have been allotted to their institution. Winners of these lotteries very rarely refuse items which do not fit them or one of their family members.

The bartering of goods and services among those with access to such commodities (primarily workers in commerce, of course), which places money in a secondary role, and speculation with deficit goods--two phenomena which were strongly condemned during the Brezhnev era--have only increased in importance in recent years. Most Soviets rely on a network of sales people to provide them with under-the-counter basic and non-basic goods.

The mass media regularly publish articles about stocks of various goods hidden from ordinary buyers in almost every store. To combat this development, which has aroused strong anger among the masses, Gorbachev's leadership (again following Brezhnev's line) has created numerous teams of workers to monitor such activities. Unfortunately, rather than providing any benefit to ordinary consumers, Gorbachev's action will most likely result in increased numbers of people involved in corrupt activity.

With increasing numbers of rationed items and the growing role of barter in everyday life, the importance of the rouble has decreased dramatically. Taxi drivers in Moscow provide a typical example of this phenomenon: they go to great lengths to avoid passengers ready to pay the official rate (even with a tip). They can be persuaded only if promised a double fare or, of course, hard currency. People in restaurants and other enterprises behave likewise, refusing to provide services at the official rate.

Of course, the decline in the power of the rouble affects only those with the "small rouble," which is linked to official prices

and the average salary in the state sector (about 200 roubles per month). Similar declines have not affected the "big rouble."

Practically all goods and services are accessible to the minority who possess the "big rouble," i.e., those whose income exceeds the average state salary several fold. For a double or triple rate, one can always get taxi, find a place in a restaurant, buy furniture or a color TV set, and, of course, buy good food at the free market.

While it is true that people continue to find some goods and services in state stores and cafeterias at official prices, the quality of these goods and services leaves much to be desired. Perestroika has legalized networks of private enterprises which offer rich people goods of higher quality (at much higher prices, of course).

Compare, for instance, the prices in state and private cafeterias. For about 2 roubles, one can buy a dinner at a state cafeteria. Unfortunately, one must first wait in line for hours, and then both the dinner and the service will be of extraordinarily poor quality. By comparison, for about 20 roubles, one can relish a fine dinner and excellent service in a cooperative cafe. Unfortunately, the 20 roubles spent on this dinner will cost the average Soviet worker about 10 percent of his or her monthly salary.

The open coexistence of enterprises such as those in the previous example provides one of the most striking elements of Soviet life. When wandering through Moscow, one gets the feeling

one is observing two totally separate economies intertwine and meander through one another.

Of course, this is not a new phenomenon for Soviet society. Privileged stores for the apparatchiks have always been a part of Soviet life. In the past, however, such stores remained closed and hidden from the public, without so much as a sign to announce their existence or whereabouts. More importantly, such stores supplied a much smaller number of goods than now crowd the newly legalized private market. The coexistence of these two markets--one very meager, another very rich--lies at the heart of one of the most serious social issues of Soviet life.

It is no surprise that the hatred felt by the masses toward the private cooperatives easily equals their hostility toward the party bureaucracy. When last in Moscow, I attended a meeting of neo-Stalinists who were in the process of creating a new organization to fight Gorbachev. They clearly saw the social hatred generated by the two groups of stores as a tool with which to pit the masses against Gorbachev's policies.

Perhaps even more significant is the decline of material incentives in the state economy, which still produces 90 percent of the country's GNP. With the negligible value of the "small rouble" and no prospect of earning the "big rouble" through honest work, Soviet laborers are loosing interest in hard work, a pattern which was clearly present in Brezhnev's times.

The extremely low prestige of both the rouble and the state market have created a real mania for the dollar in the country.

The rate of exchange in Moscow of one dollar for twelve roubles (the official rate is one dollar for sixty kopecks) has contributed to a fervent hunt for hard currency among those engaged in commerce and services.

Much more interesting, however, is the increasingly insistent demand for hard currency emanating from the Soviet industrial and agricultural industries. The movement for the dollar has been joined recently by the striking miners in Kuzbass. Among the demands they sent to Gorbachev was the right to sell coal for dollars, without which they have little hope of improving their lives.

Gorbachev's strategists hope that the rapid expansion of various private and semiprivate forms of economic activity will soon begin to compensate for the deleterious effect of the decline of the rouble's prestige. Unfortunately, however, I cannot avoid sharing the deep pessimism of many Soviet people regarding the Soviet state's ability to cope with the economic problems it faces in the near future.

DANGEROUS INCOMPETENCE IN MOSCOW

During my most recent trip to Moscow, I spoke with several Gorbachev admirers about the current state of affairs in the USSR. While these devotees certainly could not deny that the country is going through an extremely difficult period, they argued that, in domestic affairs, Gorbachev has simply experienced a string of bad luck. Examples of this bad luck, they said, include the series of

technological disasters ushered in by Chernobyl, the unprecedented incessant ethnic conflicts, and, of course, the rampant inflation, which, having appeared in 1987, has led to near-total collapse of the market. Were I to talk with them today, they could add the mass miner's strike to their list.

In response to this argument, it must be conceded that, bad luck notwithstanding, Gorbachev can hardly be held personally responsible for all of the domestic tribulations of the last four years. At the same time, however, it is also inappropriate to resort to attributions of bad luck in order to absolve Gorbachev of the mistakes made by his leadership.

One such mistake has been the Kremlin's incredibly flippant and amateurish approach to planning and implementing major projects. Proposals have invariably failed to address even the most immediate consequences of their implementation, and have ignored even the most elementary lessons from the past.

The anti-alcoholism campaign designed in 1986 is an early example of such planning. Although driven by the admittedly noble idea of eliminating alcoholism within a short period of time, the campaign totally ignored the failure of similar campaigns in Russia as well as in other countries.

Incredibly, Gorbachev and the authors of the project were oblivious to the Soviet people's inevitable reaction to any drastic decrease in the state's production of liquor: massive moonshining (a reaction which, by the way, was predicted by illiterate country women within days of the law's passage).

Even more astounding, however, was Kremlin's refusal to acknowledge the impact of the anti-alcohol legislation on state revenues. Despite their limited wits, angry drunkards predicted that the state would be devastated by the loss of the revenue they provided for vodka. And, sure enough, further developments proved the drunkards correct, as the Kremlin strategists failed to make good on their groundless promises to replace the 40 billion roubles in lost liquor sales with additional production of consumer goods.

As is now evident throughout the country, the revenge of the alcoholics has surpassed their wildest dreams: the diversion of money which would have paid for liquor in state stores, along with a few other factors not anticipated by Gorbachev's advisors, has fueled inflation, and has contributed to the massive disarray of the market, which directly endangers the survival of the regime.

Now, two years later, the Gorbachev regime, having recognized both its mistakes and its defeat, has abolished almost all of its anti-alcoholism measures.

The characteristics which marred, and eventually doomed, the anti-alcoholism campaign (e.g., the dilettantism, the ignorance of elementary concepts of economic and social sciences, the absence of any serious data produced by special investigations and calculations) are typical of all of Gorbachev's "grand ideas." The epic of the private cooperative movement provides another good illustration.

As in the case of the anti-alcoholism campaign, the motivation of Gorbachev's team was excellent--to promote individual initiative

and private business. Unfortunately, the authors of the private cooperative movement gave no thought to several seemingly basic factors, such as where the cooperatives would get the resources necessary for their production, the resistance of local authorities to innovation, the number of people ready to join cooperatives, their income and how it would affect employees in the state economy, and how the cooperatives would be taxed.

Given this lack of foresight, it is no surprise that the decree on private cooperatives, like practically all of Gorbachev's laws, became obsolete within a month, and was replaced or changed by new decisions. This process has clearly damaged a commodity vital to the restoration of private business in the country--the people's trust in official economic policies.

Gorbachev's advisers demonstrated particular incompetence in their failure to ensure well-organized competition among private cooperatives. These advisors placed their complete trust in the self-regulatory forces of the nascent Soviet free market, and took no steps to prevent either monopolies or corrupt alliances with local authorities, the two main causes of the extremely high prices which now exist.

Instead of providing an example of success, the private cooperative movement has become an eloquent indicator of the heavy liabilities which haunt Gorbachev's regime. Indeed, private cooperatives currently account for far less than one percent of the Soviet GNP.

In addition, due to their monopolistic nature, cooperatives are able to charge exorbitant prices to the average Soviet consumer and produce extraordinarily high incomes for their members. Because of this negative effect on consumers, private cooperatives have generated tremendous hatred and social envy, both of which contribute significantly to the tension in the country.

Recent polls, such as Grushin's nation-wide poll, suggest that the masses are strongly hostile toward private cooperatives, which are regarded as being the major beneficiary of Perestroika, and private cooperatives now vie with the bureaucracy for the position of most hated institution. During the July riots in Novyi Uzen (in Kasakhstan), Fergana (in Uzbekistan), and Nebit-Dag (in Degestan), private cooperatives joined the local governmental bodies as the prime targets of violence. The suspension of cooperative activity was also high on the list of the demands sent by the miners to Gorbachev in July.

In the last two years, Gorbachev has energetically promoted family farming in agriculture, and some of his lieutenants have demanded the dismantling of the country's big farms, both collective and state. Like the anti-alcoholism and private cooperative campaigns, this program of transformation in the countryside is extremely ill-conceived.

The advocates the family farming program did not conduct a single survey to assess the peasants's attitudes toward any new reforms, nor was any investigation made into the possible consequences of such reform. Thus, a myriad of issues remain

unaddressed, including the number of peasants currently ready to lease land who will abandon their private farms in two to three years, whether it is possible to use modern technology on small farms, and the ways in which privatization will affect relatively efficient collective farms.

How is it that all of Gorbachev's economic, social, and political decrees (such as those regarding non-labor income and state enterprises) have been plagued with serious defects apparent even to non-specialists? Why has Gorbachev's staff proven so inept in the decision-making process? The personality of the General Secretary himself (i.e., over-confident and, like Khrushchev, quick to look for miracles) is a likely contributor to the quality of the decisions made in the Kremlin.

Equally important, however, is the low level of professionalism demonstrated by Gorbachev's advisers, particularly those in economics. Their experience in commanding the economy has left them unprepared for designing programs able to account for the activity of millions of actors, producers, and consumers. In addition, having been recruited during the period of intellectual stagnation, they not only lack necessary knowledge, especially in market economics, but they have little experience as qualified advisers to their boss, who wants to modernize his country. For all of their professional lives, they have learned to predict and then deliver what their boss wants, and they have never been taken to task for a professional fiasco.

The country's general discontent with Gorbachev's advisers was clearly manifested at the Congress of People's Deputies, where delegates demanded that Gorbachev name the authors of various botched decrees. In order to ensure the success of, and popular support for, any future decisions made in the Kremlin, it is clear that a new brand of professional adviser to the top leadership must emerge.

A SIMMERING THREAT TO THE JEWS?

Although the Soviet people are strongly divided in their evaluations of the first session of the Congress of People's Deputies, even the most caustic critics of Gorbachev's enterprise concede that never before in Soviet history have deputies been so free to bring up, before millions of TV viewers, the most sensitive political, social, and economic issues.

Almost 500 delegates, representing left and right, liberals and conservatives, Russian chauvinists and Baltic nationalists, and practically every social and ethnic group in the Soviet population, were given an open forum in which to vent previously suppressed grievances, no matter how minor.

Throughout the 13-day session of the Congress, I carefully watched the Soviet TV in my office in Michigan and read the detailed reports of the Congress's work in Soviet newspapers. At the end of the Congress's session, it occurred to me that, of the thousands of subjects debated at the Congress, one issue was conspicuously absent: the fate of the Soviet Jews.

It happened that my most recent visit to Moscow occurred only a few days after the end of the Congress's session, and I shared my realization about the absence of the Jewish issue at the Congress with my friends, many of whom are Russian Jews. I almost immediately discerned two schools of thought: that of the optimists and that of the pessimists.

Those promoting the first school of thought argued that, with the advent of Glasnost, the Jewish question ceased to be acute and important. Indeed, continued the advocates of this view, Jews were among those to greet Glasnost with enthusiasm, despite the fact that Gorbachev's regime waited two years before doing anything for the Jews (state anti-Semitism, rampant since the late 1930s, finally started to abate in 1987-1988).

For the first time in five decades, the word "Jew" appeared in the Soviet press in a positive context. Jewish cultural life was resurrected from total oblivion, and when I was in Kiev, which is renowned for its brazen anti-Semitism, I actually found a billboard with at least two announcements about Jewish concerts. The Kremlin simultaneously opened the gates for Jewish emigration and permitted the very friendly treatment of former Jewish emigrants.

In this new climate, argued the optimists, it is only natural that the Jewish question lost its centrality and was ignored by the delegates, even by those acclaimed for their struggle against anti-Semitism, such as Andrei Sakharov, Evgenii Evtushenko, and Oles'

Adamovich. These delegates, continued the optimists, were concerned with much more important problems.

By contrast, many people (including ethnic Russians) with whom I met in Moscow in the first few days of my visit resolutely rejected the optimist's position, declaring it self-deluding and even dishonest. Proponents of the pessimistic view held that the Congress, which patiently dealt with many ethnic groups far smaller in number than the 2 million Jews (such as the 26 tiny groups in the Far East which together total less than 180,000), avoided the Jewish issue simply because of its explosive character. According to the pessimists, the inflammatory nature of the Jewish question dissuaded even the most famous liberals from using the podium to discuss, in front of millions of TV viewers, either the current problems of the Jewish people or the anti-Semitism of Stalin's times.

Defenders of yet another pessimistic view suggested that while anti-Semitism from "above" is actually ebbing, that from "below" is on the rise. Although the "Pamiat'" organization, with its inhuman and brutish hatred of Jews, fared poorly in the last election, it has become a serious political force ready to demonstrate its genuine strength should a critical situation arise. Equally significant is the fact that the role of Jews in Russian and Soviet history has become the main divisive issue for the Soviet intellectuals and their periodicals (the chauvinistic *Nash Sovremennik* regularly publishes acrimonious anti-Semitic articles, and the liberal *Ogoniok* regularly denounces them).

It is remarkable, however, that even the brave *Ogoniok* has yet to publish an article about anti-Semitism containing a serious analysis of its roots from "above" as well as those from "below." Despite the merciless critique of Stalin's times, no magazine has published an article about the essential role of anti-Semitism in Stalin's ideology and policy.

Even more important, however, was another argument of the pessimists. The Soviet Union is currently embroiled in increasingly violent ethnic conflicts. These conflicts, which have already claimed hundreds of thousands of victims in one way or another, are fueled not only by old ethnic grievances, but by the deterioration of material life and the decline of the state's authority.

Given the history of the Jewish people, it would be incredible if further exacerbation of ethnic conflicts failed to include Jews as scapegoats for the deprivations of the masses and as pawns in the political struggle. In Kokand, a city close to Fergana, for instance, Jews were among those to incur the wrath of Uzbek youngsters, most of whom were unemployed and living under terrible conditions.

Still, the strongest evidence in favor of the pessimist's position was presented by Grigorii Kanovich, a Jewish writer from Lithuania who represented his republic in the Congress. Kanovich staunchly rejected the optimist's position as self-lulling, and maintained that popular anti-Semitism was indeed on the rise. In addition, he argued that the Jews face a very real physical threat,

since the state has proven unable (or unwilling) to defend the victims of ethnic assaults in both Sumgaiti and Fergana.

Kanovich's assertions were supported by Vitali Ginzburg and Oleg Gazenko, both of whom are members of the Academy of Science as well as People's Deputies. Ginzburg, Gazenko, and Kanovich submitted an appeal to Gorbachev, requesting that he pass a resolution condemning anti-Semitism and create a special committee of the Congress to follow up on the issue. The appeal was signed by more than 200 Deputies, despite the fact that none of them would risk discussing the issue from the podium. Although Kanovich conferred briefly with Gorbachev on three occasions and tried to persuade him to make the appeal known to the Congress, his efforts proved futile. Not only did the appeal remain hidden from the Congress, but it was stricken from the list of petitions submitted to the presidium by the delegates.

This incident confirms that neither Gorbachev nor his opponents from the left want their names associated with the Jewish cause, for fear that their conservative and chauvinistic enemies would immediately declare them Zionists and Masons.

This little known but extremely telling episode at the Congress has strengthened the views of the pessimists, who continue to hold that beneath the surface of Glasnost lies seething anti-Semitic rage ready to explode at the slightest provocation, as occurred in Sumgaiti and Fergana.

During my visit to the USSR, it became clear that most Soviet Jews (and indeed all other minorities, including Russians in

Central Asia and the Baltic republics) are living in a constant state of alert. Soviet Jews share a sense that they must brace themselves for dangerous times, and many of them, especially the youth, look to emigration as the solution.

Jewish organizations in the West, and indeed the entire international community, should very carefully monitor the developments in the Soviet Union, and should remember that the fate of the Soviet Jews depends not only on Gorbachev's good intentions, but on the country's aggressive chauvinistic forces as well. Should Gorbachev's enemies decide to use the increasing ethnic animosity and the country's deteriorating lifestyle to incite the chauvinists, the latter might once again horrify the world with bloody pogroms.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing this letter to you on my way back from Europe to the United States. My mind is full of the fascinating conversations that I had with people in Hungary and Poland and with the many world leaders gathered in Paris for France's bicentennial.

Let me get quickly to the point of this letter. I would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our shoulders, without the ever-present briefing papers and certainly without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about "who's winning," "what agreements have been reached," or "has our meeting succeeded or failed."

Up until now I have felt that a meeting would have to produce major agreements so as not to disappoint the watching world. Now my thinking is changing.

Perhaps it was my visit to Poland and Hungary or perhaps it is what I heard about your recent visits to France and Germany -- whatever the cause -- I just want to reduce the chances there could be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more personal basis. If you agree that an unstructured meeting would be productive, I would make the following suggestion.

My suggestion is that you decide, on your own, to come to speak at the U.N. early in the General Assembly session -- perhaps around the end of September (the 27th and 28th of September would be perfect for me, but so would other dates). Immediately following your public announcement that you were coming to the United Nations, I would invite you to come to meet with me for an informal, "no agenda" visit. In my view, it would be preferable to avoid the word "summit" which is, at best, overworked and, at worst, a word whose connotation is one of a momentous happening.

I would propose inviting you to visit me for a day or two of private chats.

There are two alternative ways I would suggest to do this. One way would be for you to fly from New York to Washington where I would meet you at Andrews Air Force Base. We could then go by helicopter to Camp David. There, in a relaxed setting with neckties off, we could talk about any and all subjects. The very nature of the invitation would guard against the danger of "overpromise." I would propose no more than a handful of advisers on each side. I would visualize long chats between you and me alone and, also, good discussions with my Secretary of State, NSC Adviser, and Chief of Staff present, along with their counterparts, of course.

Another option would be for you to visit Barbara and me at our seaside house in Maine. Late September can be very nice there. You could fly to Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire, about 40 minutes from New York and helicopter another 15 minutes to our home, for the same kind of talks.

Camp David perhaps would offer the most privacy, but Maine would offer you a glimpse of our Atlantic seacoast. It would also give me a chance to take you for a ride in my speed boat and maybe catch a fish.

Perhaps there is some entirely different way more convenient for you, and I would welcome a suggestion. The General Assembly seems to me to provide the ideal cover needed for a "spontaneous" invitation to an unstructured, informal meeting. I do not intend in any way to put you in an awkward position and I will understand completely if, for whatever reason, you do not feel you can respond positively to my suggestion.

General Brent Scowcroft and Secretary Jim Baker, plus my Chief of Staff John Sununu, are the only ones who know of this letter, which I have personally written. I hope I can demonstrate to you that some things need not "leak."

My respects and sincere regards,

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

DIANE EDWARDS

4129

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As we resume negotiations at the Nuclear and Space Talks, I have been giving considerable thought to the challenges before us and would like to share my views with you. It is my hope that we can have frequent and personal exchanges between the two of us on this and other subjects, exchanges that will be as free as possible from ritualistic formulations. We bear enormous -- and mutual -- responsibility to take advantage of the promise of these extraordinary times to improve international security. Direct and substantive communication between us is essential in building the kind of relationship between our countries that I believe we both seek.

One of our most pressing concerns is to reduce the risk of war and the Nuclear and Space Talks are an essential component of efforts to do so. Dedicated Soviet and American negotiators have worked painstakingly over the past few years to forge understandings and agreements on a number of issues. I was supportive of that process as Vice President and remain so today. As Secretary Baker noted when he met with you in May, while we reserve the right to make changes in our position and introduce new ideas, the United States believes that the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement.

It is imperative that we work in these negotiations to remove any incentive to attack first. Vulnerable systems with short time of flight are particularly troubling in this regard. We must also minimize the concentration of warheads on vulnerable systems, since they increase the incentives for attack.

You and I have both directed the modernization of our strategic forces in order to improve their survivability. But arms control gives us an opportunity, working together, to push the evolution of both arsenals toward more stable systems and to introduce predictability into military planning so that we can slow the pace of military competition. We must work to insure that the forces that remain after an agreement are survivable.

I am also concerned about the verification challenge before us. The introduction of mobile land-based systems has improved survivability but, at the same time, made verification extremely difficult. Traditional means of monitoring are insufficient and even with intrusive inspection, confidence in monitoring may not be high. This problem is exacerbated when mobile systems are MIRVed, because undetected missiles carry so many warheads. We need to cooperate more intensively and creatively to address this problem.

Toward this end, I believe that the two sides should try, as a part of our effort in START, to agree on and begin implementing as soon as possible some verification and stability measures drawn from proposals that both sides have advanced in START or in other contexts.

The measures we are proposing do not constitute a comprehensive verification regime and I understand that either side may choose to alter or augment them in the context of a final START agreement on the basis of experience gained. The objective is to reach agreement promptly in as many specific areas as possible so that we can set in place concrete verification measures and gain practical experience that will help the negotiations.

Specifically, the United States will propose:

(1) Immediate establishment of perimeter/portal monitoring of certain ICBM production facilities along the lines described in the U.S. START proposal.

(2) Prompt exchange of data. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on a reciprocal basis would begin to exchange numbers for the agreed categories in the Memorandum of Understanding which are now blank. We can also begin to conduct familiarization visits to learn more about the forces, operations, practices and procedures that would be subject to inspections.

(3) Cessation of ballistic missile telemetry encryption and data denial.

(4) Ballistic missile reentry-vehicle inspection. Each side would demonstrate its reentry-vehicle inspection procedures on one of its missiles chosen by the other side.

(5) Demonstration of the U.S. concept for tagging ballistic missiles and the Soviet concept of registration in order to facilitate technical exchanges on promising approaches.

In addition, I believe that we can benefit by agreeing to two additional measures that, while not a part of the START treaty, would enhance strategic stability.

(1) Following on your suggestion to Secretary Baker, the United States is prepared to address the problem of short-time-of-flight (depressed trajectory) SLBMs.

(2) The United States suggests that the two countries implement the proposal to notify the largest strategic exercise each year that was discussed in an exchange of letters between then-Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Minister of Defense Yazov.

I am confident that if we can reach agreement and implement measures such as these, it would facilitate early agreement on the START treaty.

Finally, let me note that I remain committed to preserving U.S. options for development and deployment of strategic defenses when they are ready. We believe that defenses can enhance mutual security and stability, particularly when introduced at a measured pace and in a cooperative manner. Although I know you have disagreed with this view in the past, I hope that you will rethink your position and that we can continue to discuss the subject between the two of us. We need to narrow the conceptual gap that now divides us on this issue.

The United States will work hard to find creative approaches to address the problems outlined above. An agreement that contributes to a stable environment at the strategic nuclear level will enhance our joint security, that of our allies and of the international system as a whole. Personal communication between us will help bridge our differences.

Sincerely, with respect —

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 4729

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 6/20/89

June 19, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1028-MR
SCS 3/22/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Gorbachev

Purpose

To explore the U.S. START position with Gorbachev and to preview the verification and stability measures that we will table in Geneva.

Background

The letter is intended to serve several purposes. It is a fairly detailed analysis of the requirements for reducing the risk of war and thus establishes communication between you and the General Secretary at a serious, conceptual level. This is particularly important if we intend, during this process, to introduce new wrinkles and departures in our START negotiating position.

The Soviet system can absorb new ideas much better than at the time of the Carter SALT II proposal of March 1977 which the Soviets rejected publicly and violently. But we need to lay the ground work, step by step, for any departure. Gorbachev seems willing to confront the General Staff and demand breakthrough proposals when he is personally convinced of the wisdom of doing so. Through a series of exchanges between you and Gorbachev, we should seek to convince him of the wisdom of a change in emphasis at START from reductions for their own sake to reducing the risk of war.

The letter also lays out several of our concerns with the evolution of the START agreement thus far while trying to allay Soviet fears that we intend to start over. The letter tells Gorbachev that you believe that any agreement must promote the evolution of the arsenals in directions that enhance stability. The letter reiterates your commitment to strategic defenses that enhance deterrence.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR ~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Finally, the letter lays out in some detail the verification and stability measures that we will table in Geneva. It tells Gorbachev that these measures are intended to expedite the START process.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Mikhail Gorbachev attached at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev

~~SECRET~~

4729

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6/17/89
1305

Brent -- This is our first effort at a more personal tone in the President's letters to Gorbachev.
Bob Blackwill

June 16, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Eve of the Resumption the START Talks

We have drafted a Presidential letter to Gorbachev for delivery when the START Talks resume. Your memorandum to the President at Tab II tells him that a letter to Gorbachev has several purposes. First, the letter, which is a fairly detailed analysis of the requirements for reducing the risk of war, establishes communication between the President and the General Secretary at a serious, conceptual level. This is particularly important if we intend, during this process, to introduce new wrinkles and departures in our position.

The Soviet system can absorb new ideas much better than at the time of the Carter proposal of March 1977. But we need to lay the ground work, step by step, for any new departure. Gorbachev is seemingly willing to confront the General Staff and demand breakthrough proposals when he is personally convinced of the wisdom of doing so. He is, himself, the key figure and though he has "civilian" advisors around him, the evidence is that he still turns to the General Staff to assess the impact of proposals on Soviet forces. Through a series of Presidential exchanges we are seeking to convince Gorbachev of the wisdom of a change in emphasis at START from reductions for their own sake to reducing the risk of war.

Secondly, the letter lays out several of our concerns with the evolution of the agreement thus far while trying to allay Soviet fears that we intend to start over. The letter tells Gorbachev that the President believes that any agreement must promote the evolution of the arsenals toward survivable systems, thereby enhancing stability. It notes our continuing concern with vulnerable land-based systems and with the verification problems that land-based mobiles pose.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2012-0881-MR
ES 12/2/13

Finally, the letter reiterates the President's commitment to strategic defenses that enhance deterrence.

Some of the language in the letter may need revision if we decide to make new proposals.

Concurrences by: CR for Arnie Kanter and John Gordon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President. Review no later than June 19.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Secretary General Gorbachev

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1989

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would appreciate it if you would deliver the attached letter from the President to the General Secretary. The contents, except for the personal note at the end, have been cabled to Moscow. The President considers this a very private communication and has no intention of making it public in any way.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

His Excellency
Yuriy V. Dubinin
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 24, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Secretary of State Baker has reported to me on his meetings in Moscow. I am quite satisfied with the outcome of his visit. I strongly support intensifying our dialogue and cooperation across the full range of issues of mutual interest, including regional issues, bilateral and transnational issues, human rights, and arms control. The resumption of the full array of arms control and arms reduction negotiations is a welcome development.

Mr. Chairman, I wrote you in April to express our condolences over the tragic loss of your Mike-class submarine in the Norwegian Sea and the lives of so many young sailors. In recent weeks we have seen several indications of Soviet interest in obtaining Western assistance in raising the sunken submarine. We have certain capabilities for this kind of mission and, from a purely humanitarian standpoint, I would like to offer our cooperation and assistance should you wish to pursue raising the submarine. I know that you would be sensitive about military technologies associated with the submarine. I respect such sensitivity and arrangements could be made to safeguard your technology.

From our perspective, we have not examined either the cost or the time that would be required to ready our ship for such a mission. However, I can appreciate the concern of the families and the Soviet people for the men lost in the submarine and wish to extend this offer. It is this concern for those young sailors' familiies that prompts this offer.

Should you have interest in pursuing a cooperative effort to raise the submarine, we would be prepared to begin exploring the feasibility with you.

Sincerely,

Geo Bush

P.S. This is a personal letter I will see that it remains just between us —

Geo Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: PRES MSGS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 241721Z MAY 89

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

NODIS

~~S E C R E T~~ MOSCOW 13686
NODIS
SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
REF: THE WHITE HOUSE 241208Z MAY 89 (~~SECRET~~
- SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY)

NODIS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 1900 ON MAY 24 (DUE TO THE ONGOING PROCESS OF FORMING A NEW LEGISLATURE THIS WEEK, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DELIVER THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, SINCE HE WAS INVOLVED ALL DAY IN MEETINGS WITH DEPUTIES).
3. SHEVARDNADZE LISTENED CAREFULLY AS THE LETTER WAS READ, PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT'S POSITIVE COMMENTS ON SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, AND TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RECOVER THE MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE THAT SANK LAST APRIL IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE VERY MUCH VALUED THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESPENT'S OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUBMARINE AND RECOVER THE BODIES OF THE SOVIET SAILORS WHO WERE LOST AT SEA,

NODIS

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT OF COURSE A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL MATTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. HE OFFERED TO PASS THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, AND SAID THAT AN ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN A FEW DAYS. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL GRATITUDE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS PROPOSAL, AND NOTED THAT THIS, AS WELL AS THE AID GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE ARMENIAN TRAGEDY AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INDICATED JUST HOW MUCH THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD CHANGED FOR THE BETTER.

NODIS

4. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUB NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SOVIET SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FULLY AND GET BACK WITH A CONSIDERED REPLY.

NODIS

5. SHEVARDNADZE MADE OTHER COMMENTS ON THIS WEEK'S POLITICAL EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ON THE SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS. MATLOCK

BT

#3686

NODIS

COMM, PRES_MSGS
<DIST>
PRT: COMM
SIT: PRES_MSGS
<PREC> IMMEDIATE
<DTG> 241208Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY
QQQQ
-
EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.
-
-
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.
-
BEGIN TEXT
-
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
-
SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME ON HIS MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW. I AM QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT. I
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0374 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
STRONGLY SUPPORT INTENSIFYING OUR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION
ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING
REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, ANDARMS
CONTROL. THE RESUMPTION OF THE FULL ARRAY OF ARMS CONTROL
AND ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT.
-
MR. CHARIMAN, I WROTE YOU IN APRIL TO EXPRESS OUR CONDOLENCES
OVER THE TRAGIC LOSS OF YOUR MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE IN THE
NORWEGIAN SEA AND THE LIVES OF SO MANY YOUNG SAILORS. IN RECENT
WEEKS WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN
OBTAINING WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN RAISING THE SUNKEN SUBMARINE.
WE HAVE CERTAIN CAPABILITIES FOR THIS KIND OF MISSION
AND, FROM A PURELY HUMANITAIRAN STANDPOINT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER
OUR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD YOU WISH TO PURSUE RAISING
THE SUBMARINE. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD BE SENSITIVE ABOUT MILITARY
TECHNOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBMARINE. I RESPECT SUCH
SENSITIVITY AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO SAFEGUARD YOUR
TECHNOLOGY. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE HAVE NOT EXAMINED EITHER
THE COST OR THE TIME THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO READY OUR SHIP
FOR SUCH A MISSION. HOWEVER, I CAN APPRECIATE THE CONCERN OF
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0374 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
THE FAMILIES AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE MEN LOST IN THE
SUBMARINE AND WISH TO EXTEND THIS OFFER. IT IS THIS CONCERN FOR
THOSE YOUNG SAILORS' FAMILIES THAT PROMPTS THIS OFFER.
-
SHOULD YOU HAVE INTEREST IN PURSUING A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO
RAISE THE SUBMARINE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN EXPLORING
THE FEASIBILITY WITH YOU.
-
SINCERELY,
-
GEORGE BUSH
-
END TEXT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

#0000

BT
#0374

DRAFT LETTER/18May/#2

FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Secretary of State Baker has reported to me on his meetings in Moscow. I am quite satisfied with the outcome of his visit. I strongly support intensifying our dialogue and cooperation across the full range of issues of mutual interest, including regional issues, bilateral and transnational issues, human rights, and arms control. The resumption of the full array of arms control and arms reduction negotiations is a welcome development.

Mr. Chairman, I wrote you in April to express our condolences over the tragic loss of your Mike-class submarine in the Norwegian Sea and the lives of so many young silors. In recent weeks we have seen several indications of Soviet interest in obtaining Western assistance in raising the sunken submarine. We have certain capabilities for this kind of mission and, from a purely humanitarian standpoint, I would like to offer our cooperation and assistance should you wish to pursue raising the submarine. I know that you would be sensitive about military

I respect such sensitivity and arrangements could be made to [illegible]

technologies associated with the submarine, from our perspective, we have not examined either the cost or the time that would be required to ready our ship for such a mission. However, I can appreciate the concern of the families and the Soviet people for the men lost in the submarine and wish to extend this offer. It is this concern for these young sailors that prompts this offer.

Should you have interest in pursuing a cooperative effort to raise the submarine, we would be prepared to begin exploring the feasibility with you.

Sincerely,

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your most recent letter concerning our mutual, as yet unfulfilled, interest in meeting together in an informal atmosphere. Our difficulty so far in finding an acceptable scenario has not diminished my desire for such a meeting nor my sense of its value. I am pleased to see from your correspondence that you share my assessment.

As I have explained at the outset of our efforts, my insistence on some sort of "umbrella" occasion as an excuse for a meeting has been to avoid all of the expectations and risks associated with attaching the word "summit" to our meeting. I must now admit that the chances of developing a scenario which would permit a spontaneous get-together appear increasingly remote.

The value of an intimate and informal meeting, however, seems to me to be overriding, and to warrant running a somewhat higher risk in order to make it possible. Accordingly, I would like to propose a direct meeting between us, still described, however, as an informal, private, no-agenda meeting in order that the two of us can exchange views on a variety of issues in a completely unstructured setting.

To do this in a manner which would permit the informality and privacy we both seek, I would like to invite you, at a mutually convenient time this fall, to be my guest at the Presidential retreat at Camp David. You will have your own optimal dates, but I might suggest for your consideration in

October either 6 and 7 or 20 and 21. If October is not convenient, we can, I am sure, find a mutually agreeable time in November. There is a tradition at Camp David that the press is not admitted, and the setting would guarantee complete privacy. I would meet you on your arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, where we could have a brief photo opportunity. We would then helicopter immediately to Camp David, with no further public exposure by either of us other than perhaps brief departure statements as you leave to return home and as I return to Washington. There would be no formal agenda, no communique, no agreements to sign and participation would be limited to our very closest associates.

Each of us would seek to make it impossible for the press to play their usual games of who won, who lost, and who made the most dramatic proposal. In short, you and I could engage in a serious, substantive and unstructured dialogue that would permit us better to understand each other and to establish a closer relationship. I am confident that a meeting of this nature of approximately two days and in such a setting would be extremely beneficial at this time of dramatic global change and challenge. Should you find my proposal attractive, I would, of course, anticipate that the next meeting between us, of whatever character, would take place in the Soviet Union.

I believe we have a mutual interest in an early meeting. I hope that you will find my effort to accommodate that interest while avoiding a summit atmosphere to be acceptable. I look forward to your early reply, as well as to meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on September 21.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

EYES ONLY ~~SECRET~~ DRAFT

Sent via Tele 8/30

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in Alaska (or offshore in U.S. and Soviet naval vessels), in conjunction with the viewing of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

From the U. S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada is not suitable because it does not meet our minimum criterion for such a meeting carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh when he was in Washington. Put briefly, that criterion is that our meeting appears to stem from, or incident to, some other event, in order that it cannot in any way be characterized as a "summit."

For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere of the nature I described in my first letter on this subject. I trust you will do the same. I continue to think such a meeting very desirable but, unfortunately, we perhaps must recognize that it might not, in the end, be possible to find an appropriate scenario.

In the meantime, I suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1029-MR
2/18/2014 MM

EYES ONLY ~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

PLEASE
SEND
EXTREMELY
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

NO OTHER
DISTRIBUTION


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RETURN ORIGINAL
TO FLORENCE GANTT

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
AP 7/20/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON




TO

BOB GATES

FROM

BRENT SCOWCROFT
KENNEBUNKPORT





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON




SENDING

PAUL REINA

RECIer

VELMA CEPHUS





Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in Alaska (or offshore in U.S. and Soviet naval vessels), in conjunction with the viewing of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

From the U. S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada is not suitable because it does not meet ~~the~~ our minimum criterion, for such a meeting carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Besmertnyk when he was in Washington.

For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere ~~while avoiding the label of "summit."~~ of the nature I described in my first letter on this subject. I trust you will do the same, but we perhaps must recognize that it might not, in the end, be possible to reach agreement on an appropriate scenario which would permit such a meeting.

In the meantime, ~~we~~ I suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

~~your message of~~

Dear Mr. Secretary General

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in ~~conjunction~~ Alaska (or offshore in US and Soviet naval vessels), ~~with the~~ in conjunction with the cleaning of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

~~I regret that your~~

From the ~~American~~ U.S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada ~~does not~~ is not workable because it does not meet the minimum criteria carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh when he was in Washington.

For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere while avoiding the load of "summit." I trust you will do the same, but we perhaps must recognize that it might not,

in the end, be possible to reach agreement on an appropriate scenario.

H

Canada since in his view it ~~for the reasons he described~~ does not meet the ~~criteria and~~ considerations he described to Deputy Foreign Minister Beesemyk when they met in General Denoncourt's office.

The President believes that we both should continue to consider ways in which our two leaders might meet in an informal atmosphere, recognizing that it may not be possible, in the end, to ~~reach~~ reach agreement.

In the meantime, we suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

~~With regard to your message of~~
~~——, we have carefully examined~~
~~the~~

The President has carefully considered the Soviet message of ——, and has instructed me to ~~make~~ inform you that he regrets that the suggestion for an informal meeting in Alaska is not convenient. ~~With regard to the Soviet suggestion proposal for a meeting at a suitable site in Canada, the President has~~ feels that

Further, the President ~~has received~~ is unable to accept ~~that the British suggestion~~ proposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in Alaska (or offshore in U.S. and Soviet naval vessels), in conjunction with the viewing of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

From the U. S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada is not suitable because it does not meet our minimum criterion for such a meeting carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Besmertnyk when he was in Washington. Put briefly, that criterion is that our meeting appear to stem from, or incident to, some other event. For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere of the nature I described in my first letter on this subject. I trust you will do the same, but, unfortunately, we perhaps must recognize that it might not, in the end, be possible to ~~reach agreement on~~ find an appropriate scenario. ~~which would permit such a meeting.~~

In the meantime, I suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

in order that it can not in any way be characterized as a "summit."

I continue to think such a meeting very desirable ~~would be useful~~

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 22

ADMIN FAX # _____

RECORD # _____

PAGES 1

DTG 292316Z AUG 89

Rreleaser PMR

FROM/LOCATION

1. BRENT SCOWCROFT

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. BOB GATES

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/9/09

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DRAMATIC EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BERLIN AND THE GDR THAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 10. I WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ARE CORRECT AND PROMISING. THE LIFTING OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR THE POPULATION OF THE GDR REPRESENTS A HISTORIC STEP. I BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOAL OF CREATING A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU AT OUR MEETING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NEXT MONTH.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDABLY HIGH EMOTIONS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, THE EVENTS IN RECENT DAYS IN BERLIN HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL. WE SHARE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER ARE MAINTAINED, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN. IN FACT, THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH OUR GERMAN PARTNERS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THIS REMAINS THE CASE. I SUGGEST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THE INTERESTS OF AVOIDING SURPRISES OR THE EMERGENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1031-MR
SCS 5/20/13

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU VOICED CONCERN THAT THE LEADERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE FRG LEADERSHIP HAS ACTED WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CHANGE IN THE GDR AND THE NEED TO AVOID DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

AS FOR THE APPROACH OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT, LET ME SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE DEPTH AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO LIFT CONTROLS ON THE TRAVEL OF ITS CITIZENS, AND WE WELCOME ITS EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM -- A COURSE WHICH REFLECTS THE WILL OF THE POPULATION OF THE GDR. I HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON SEE LEGISLATION ENACTED THAT CODIFIES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND THAT THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP WILL WORK WITH OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THESE STEPS WILL NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT THEY COULD LEAD AS WELL TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

LET ME ADD THAT I BELIEVE YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING YOUR ALLIES TO EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT THE

CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OWN PLANS TO MODIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ABROAD, AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. I HOPE THAT PRAGUE AND SOFIA WILL BE THE NEXT WARSAW PACT CAPITALS TO FEEL THE INVIGORATING BREEZE OF PERESTROYKA.

THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OF OUR ALLIES ARE UNITED IN THE VIEW THAT PERESTROYKA IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, BUT THAT ITS SUCCESS WILL OPEN THE WAY TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN WEST AND EAST. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR AND IN OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, NOR IS IT OUR WISH TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY ALL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION FROM OUR OWN STATEMENTS, I TRUST THAT YOU DO THE SAME.

SINCERELY,

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B C

S/S # 043775

MESSAGE NO _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 3

FROM ELIZABETH MCKUNE (Officer name) | S/S (Office symbol) | 647-8448 (Extension) | 7224 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW RE REPLY TO GORBACHEV MESSAGE ON BERLIN

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	G. PHILIP HUGHES	2224	GFWW
NSCS	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	Blackwill/Rice		
	Sittmann		
	HUTCHINGS		

FOR CLEARANCE [X] INFORMATION [ ] PER REQUEST [ ] COMMENT [ ]

REMARKS PLEASE CLEAR BY: 23/35 Must go tonight

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
STATE ~~White House~~ Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/9/09

S/S Officer Elizabeth McKune
ELIZABETH MCKUNE

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

11/15/89
1820

Brent -- For your clearance.

Bs Blackwill

APV RS DRAFT AV
CLR 1 JFM 2 CWK
3 PS 4 WB
5 JHM 6 NSC
7 SS 8 [illegible]
11/15

~~SECRET~~

EUR/SOV:AVERSHBOW
11/15/89 76729 SESOVFO 246
EUR:RGHSEITZ

EUR:JFDOBBINS
EUR/CE:PSMOSTAL/AGOODMAN
EUR/EEY:JHOOPER
S/S:
EUR:CWKAMMAN
S/P:WBURNS
NSC:
S/S-O:

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, BONN IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE LONDON, PARIS IMMEDIATE, USBERLIN PRIORITY, EMBBERLIN PRIORITY, USNATO PRIORITY
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PDIP, UR, US, GE, GC

SUBJECT: REPLY TO GORBACHEV MESSAGE ON BERLIN

REF: A) STATE 363047, B) STATE 364359, C) BONN 36036

1. X - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOR MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH GORBACHEV OR SHEVARDNADZE TO DELIVER PARA 4 TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE SOVIET LEADER'S NOVEMBER 10 MESSAGE ON BERLIN (REF A). THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. FOR BONN: EMBASSY MAY INFORM BONN GROUP COLLEAGUES THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS REPLIED TO GORBACHEV ALONG THE LINES OF THE CONSENSUS REPORTED IN REF C, BUT SHOULD NOT DISTRIBUTE THE TEXT. EMBASSY SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE BELIEVE THIS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL, AND THAT WE HOPE ALL ALLIES WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE CLOSELY ON THIS SENSITIVE SUBJECT. YOU SHOULD INQUIRE OF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1031-MR
SCS 5/20/13

Brent -- for your clearance.

BS Blackwill

THE FRENCH REP WHETHER HE HAS RECEIVED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING PARIS'S RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV MESSAGE TO MITTERRAND.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

. I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DRAMATIC EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BERLIN AND THE GDR THAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 10. I WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ARE CORRECT AND PROMISING. THE LIFTING OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR THE POPULATION OF THE GDR REPRESENTS A HISTORIC STEP. I BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOAL OF CREATING A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU AT OUR MEETING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NEXT MONTH.

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. IN YOUR LETTER, YOU VOICED CONCERN THAT THE LEADERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE FRG LEADERSHIP HAS ACTED WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CHANGE IN THE GDR AND THE NEED TO AVOID DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

. AS FOR THE APPROACH OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT, LET ME SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE DEPTH AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO LIFT CONTROLS ON THE TRAVEL OF ITS CITIZENS, AND WE WELCOME ITS EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM -- A COURSE WHICH REFLECTS THE WILL OF THE POPULATION OF THE GDR. I HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON SEE LEGISLATION ENACTED THAT CODIFIES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND THAT

THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP WILL WORK WITH OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THESE STEPS WILL NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT THEY COULD LEAD AS WELL TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

LET ME ADD THAT I BELIEVE YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING YOUR ALLIES TO EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OWN PLANS TO MODIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ABROAD, AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. I HOPE THAT PRAGUE AND SOFIA WILL BE THE NEXT WARSAW PACT CAPITALS TO FEEL THE INVIGORATING BREEZE OF PERESTROYKA.

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SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

YY

NO COPIES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NOV. 22, 1989

Dear Mr. President,

After talking with Anatoli Dobrinin yesterday it occured to me that even though we have a "no agenda" meeting you might be interested in some of the topics I would like to cover. What I set out below is not meant in any way to limit our discussions; but here is my list — a non-inclusive list.

A. Eastern Europe

B. Regional Differences
Central America, Angola, Afghanistan, Asia (Cambodia) + Middle East

C. The Defense spending of both our countries — What effect will changing times have on levels of defense spending?

D. Your vision and view of the World 10 years from now.
What are the differences when You say "Common European Home" & I say "Europe Whole & Free"?

E. Human Rights

F. Arms Control - philosophy and objectives - treating this in a broad, general sense

Of course, you will have your own priorities. I would like to hear from you your expectations for 'perestroika' - where does it lead down the road?

I want this meeting to be useful in advancing our mutual understanding and in laying the ground-work for a good relationship.

Success does not mean deals signed, in my view. It means that you and I are frank enough with each other so that our two great countries will not have tensions that arise because we don't know each other's innermost thinking.

I will be working next week to flesh out our sides thinking but there will be no 'December Surprise'. If however there is some proposal not covered by the list above, I will be prepared to make it.

I am writing this on the eve of our Thanksgiving Day – a day in which all Americans thank God for

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 4 -

our blessings

I will give thanks for the fact that we are living in times of enormous promise. I will give thanks that our 5 kids and our 11 grandchildren might just have a real chance to grow up in a more peaceful, less scary world.

I will give thanks that you are pressing forward with glasnost and perestroika; for, you see, the fate of my own family and yours is dependent on perestroika's success

I look forward to seeing you - with Respect

George Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Michael Beschloss

Nick Burns called —

said Strobe Talbott wanted some quotes from President's letter to Gorby re Nukes —

This is all I could find —

Has Seen

Post-It™ brand fax transmittal memo 7671 | # of pages ▸ 1

To	From
Co.	Co.
Dept.	Phone #
Fax #	Fax #

Let me get quickly to the point of this letter. I would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our shoulders, without the ever-present briefing papers and certainly without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about "who's winning," "what agreements have been reached," or "has our meeting succeeded or failed."

Gorbo corres

President/Gorbachev

Outgoing 1-13-89

Incoming 1-18-89

~~Outgoing 2-8-89 (Draft? not sure if sent)~~

✓ Outgoing 5- 7-89 (handwritten note)

✓ Outgoing 5-24-89

✓ Outgoing 6-20-89 (Pkg #4729)

✓ Outgoing 7-21-89 SENSITIVE
INCOMING 8-6-89
Incoming 8-25-89

✓ Outgoing 8-30-89
~~Incoming~~ 9-1-89
Incoming 9- -89

✓ Outgoing 9- 8-89

→ [illegible] -[illegible]-89

✓ [illegible] 11-15-89

✓ [illegible] 11-22-89 [illegible]

THESE ARE FILE COPIES

Outgoing 11-7-89 BB to Raisa
Incoming 11-13-89 Raisa to BB
Outgoing 11-15-89 BB to Raisa
Outgoing 4-5-90 BB to Raisa

L.S.E.
Incoming 9-1-89 Mikhail Sending over.
~~Outgoing 9-8-89~~

General Scowcroft:

Attached are copies of a note to Sec. Baker and a note to Gorbachev that the President gave to the Sit Rm this evening - originals are being given to MR. Gates

WHSR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5-7-89

FROM THE PRESIDENT GB

TO:

Jim Baker

hand carried by Bob Gates.

Jim,
Given the fact that gorbachev's latest letter was not reflected in my reply to him, you might want to hand him the handwritten note. I think it would show him we are being promptly responsive.

Have a great trip.

GB

Mr. Gates —

Attached are the signed Presidential letter, handwritten note for Gorbachev, and informal note for Baker.

WHSR
5/7/89

THE PRESIDENT

Sunday
May 7, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have just read your most recent letter.

Secretary Baker will be fully prepared to discuss all the subjects raised in that letter — ~~for~~ example Cuba,

5/7/89

Namibia etc.

I have a feeling
that contacts between
Jim Baker and Minister Shevernadze
plus continued contact between
you and me will lead to the
progress we both want.

Respectfully, GB

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

0307

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0942-MR
12/1/2014 MM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1990

This is a rare period in which we can seek to achieve a fundamental shift in the strategic balance, particularly in Europe. The future of the Soviet Union remains cloudy, but it is clearly in our interest to do what we can to prolong the tenure of the reformers -- men who have inadvertently set in motion events that have put long-standing U.S. objectives regarding the Soviet Union well within our reach: freedom for Eastern Europe; a significant reduction of the Soviet military threat to the West; and the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in the regions.

The principal challenge that you face in U.S.-Soviet relations this year is to engage Gorbachev effectively at a time when he faces mounting chaos at home; declining influence and authority in Eastern Europe; and uncertainty about the future of Russia's traditional nemesis, Germany. Gorbachev's sense of security stems from still powerful Soviet military forces and the conviction -- bordering on faith -- that sophisticated diplomacy can convince his adversaries not to take advantage of him. But there are observable cracks in Moscow's confidence about the fruits of the new foreign policy -- particularly where Germany is concerned -- and that Soviet insecurity is likely to grow.

1990 promises to be another very difficult year for Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union's ills are worsening. Problems like whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should have a constitutionally guaranteed "leading role" -- precluding fair competition with other parties; whether a command economy can be expected to produce the needed economic turnaround; whether to have private property; whether territory belonging to Azerbaijan should be transferred to Armenia; whether the Baltic states -- and other republics -- should be allowed to secede from the Union and similar issues cannot be resolved through Gorbachev's usual jawboning and equivocation. If they continue to grow worse, they could be his undoing.

Over time, the Soviet population -- while appreciating his role in initiating reform -- has increasingly come to see Gorbachev as ineffective and indecisive. Nationalists from Armenia and

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Azerbaijan to the Baltics regard him as a man without a bottom line and it is Gorbachev, not the nationalists, who has retreated in the face of repeated challenges.

The saving grace for Gorbachev at this time is that he is still regarded by moderate nationalists in the Republics as their best hope for the peaceful achievement of their goal -- total independence. But moderates, to say nothing of extremists, may take Gorbachev's continuing appeasement as weakness, leading them to press even harder (as with the mass demonstrations in Lithuania when Gorbachev visits there.) That in turn will further alarm conservatives, who already see these trends as a threat to the integrity of the Union. Challenges to Gorbachev's power will probably increase markedly in the next year. Within the last two months, Gorbachev has reportedly threatened to resign twice. The first Baltic elections in Lithuania at the end of February and the 28th Party Congress, now scheduled for October 1990, will be crucial tests for him.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The Soviet leadership will be anxious to keep U.S.-Soviet relations moving forward. Gorbachev cannot afford, in the face of mounting failures at home, to have his foreign policy line discredited too. Objectively, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has never had better prospects from our point of view. Your meeting at Malta infused U.S.-Soviet relations with a greater sense of direction -- pointing toward the June Summit. On arms control, human rights and the incipient economic agenda, there is every reason to be optimistic that the progress made in 1989 can be sustained and perhaps Moscow can even be moved to be more sensible on Central America.

But it is, of course, the unraveling of communist power in Eastern Europe that has changed the strategic environment and the face of U.S.-Soviet relations. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has been the most enduring and most fundamental source of American conflict with Moscow. Thus, our central and overriding objective in 1990 should be to facilitate the continued and graduated withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe.

A preeminent challenge, in this regard, is to help the FRG and the Soviet Union to manage their relationship. If there is a single external issue that might cause Moscow to reassess its course in Eastern Europe, might even bring Gorbachev down, it is the German question. With that much at stake for the United States, we will need to be intensively involved in the increasingly complicated diplomatic environment in Europe which will be ever more preoccupied with the future of Germany.

While we can do little to affect internal Soviet politics, we should do what we can to prolong perestroika as long as Gorbachev continues to tolerate the diminution of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. If Moscow maintains its present course, it will be impossible within a few years for the Soviet Union to do anything

about the changes in Eastern Europe, short of all out invasion. With this in mind, we need to work hard to insure a successful June U.S.-Soviet Summit -- particularly in arms control and the economic sphere -- which may boost Gorbachev's image at home and thus his staying power.

We must grasp while we can the chance for an early CFE agreement which would bring the conventional military balance into line with the new political realities in Eastern Europe. These reductions will also facilitate the orderly withdrawal of Soviet military power from the territory of its former allies. Rapid progress toward an "Open Skies" accord also would institutionalize Soviet openness on an unprecedented scale.

Finally, it is important that you continue to engage Gorbachev personally while emphasizing that it is the process of perestroika, not the man, on which U.S. policy is based.

As 1990 begins, the uncertainties surrounding the future of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev have only multiplied. At present, Gorbachev appears to be playing for time in the hope that, by some miracle, perestroika will succeed in creating a stable and prosperous Soviet Union. We have clearer and more realistic goals: the liberation of Eastern Europe and the consolidation of pluralist rule throughout the region; and a dramatic reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe and the United States.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0307

January 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1990

The memorandum for the President at Tab I examines the challenges in U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly relating to Europe, in light of continuing Soviet internal difficulties.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to President

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0942-MR
12/1/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
VIA BACK CHANNEL

May 10, 1989

FOR: ROBERT GATES
AmEmbassy Moscow

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
The White House

TO BE DELIVERED EYES ONLY FOR ADDRESSEE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS AND BEFORE DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW.

1. Panama situation is heating up rapidly. Noriega is now putting out the word he has won the election and this afternoon he beat up the opposition candidates. We have continued to work with Gonzalez and Perez, hoping now to get at least some vocal support and conceivably even concerted action. The President is having a Leadership meeting Thursday morning to consult on the measures against Noriega. At the request of Gonzalez we will not execute the package before Thursday afternoon.

2. I am glad to see that the intelligence old boy network is still operating.

3. Will you inform us of arrangements for announcing resumption of START. Currently the President has a sentence in the A&M speech about it. Also, anything else relevant to the speech.

4. The President wants to send Deng Xiaoping a cable outlining your discussions in Moscow. How about drafting something suitable and cabling it to me Thursday evening or Friday morning at the earliest so that we can get it to Deng before Gorbachev arrives in Beijing.

5. By separate cable we will be sending you what I hope is the penultimate draft of the A&M speech.

6. Where are you when I need you? Regards.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1027-MR
SCS 4/22/13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Florence Gantt / Gen Scowcroft

Phone Number

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20a. Handwritten Notes	Re: Dobrynin (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~; (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2012-0881-MR (512)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/2/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20b. Handwritten Notes	Re: Scowcroft Very Personal (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~; (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2012-0881-MR (512.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/2/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20c. Handwritten Notes	Re: Home in Moscow (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~; (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2012-0881-MR (512.02)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/2/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20d. Handwritten Notes	Re: 12:10 (1 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~; (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [5]

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91127-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2012-0881-MR (512.03)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/2/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

The USSR Presidency


Council of the Federation

The Council of the Federation ensures that the USSR republics comply with international treaties; it devises measures to implement the nationalities policy, submits recommendations to the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities on resolving specific interethnic conflicts, and ensures that the republics participate in resolving questions of nationwide significance. The Council is headed by the USSR president. The "supreme state official" from each of the 15 republics (whose title may vary depending on the republic) is an ex officio member of the Council of the Federation. Although they are not members of the Council, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the chairmen of its two chambers, as well as the "supreme state officials" from autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs, are entitled to participate in the Council's sessions.

USSR President

The presidency, which was created in March 1990, is the new office of the chief of state. In accordance with the Constitution, the president is elected by popular vote; Mikhail Gorbachev, however, was elected indirectly by the 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). The president can serve a maximum of two five-year terms and can be impeached by the CPD only if he violates the Constitution or USSR laws. He enjoys several constitutional powers, including the right to:

- Appoint (subject to legislative confirmation) and remove top government officials, excluding the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
- Veto laws and suspend orders and resolutions of the Council of Ministers.
- Declare martial law or a state of emergency (subject to a confirmation vote by two-thirds of the USSR Supreme Soviet).



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Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

USSR President since March 1990. . . General Secretary, CPSU, since March 1985. . . member, Politburo, CPSU, since October 1980. . . chairman, RSFSR Bureau, since December 1989. . . responsible for domestic and foreign policies. . . born March 1931.


Advisers to the President

Although they are not part of the formal apparatus, the President's personal advisers provide him with close policy support.

Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev
Anatoliy Fedorovich Dobrynin
Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin

USSR Presidential Council


The Presidential Council is responsible for implementing domestic and foreign policies and for ensuring the country's security. Council members are appointed and removed by the president.* The chairman of the Council of Ministers is the only ex officio member. Although the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet is not a member, he can participate in the sessions of the Presidential Council.



© Soviet Weekly

Chingiz Torekulovich Aytmatov

Well-known writer; chairman, Kirghiz Writers Union, since 1986. . . chairman, Culture Commission, USSR Supreme Soviet, since June 1989. . . ethnic Kirghiz. . . born December 1928.



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Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin

Minister of Internal Affairs since October 1988. . . former regional party official. . . ethnic Russian. . . born 1937.



Valeriy Ivanovich Boldin


Chief, General Department, Central Committee, CPSU, since May 1987 . . . adviser to Gorbachev 1981–87. . . ethnic Russian. . . born September 1935.



© Izvestiya

Albert Ernestovich Kauls

Chairman, Adazhi farming cooperative, since 1983. . . chairman, Latvian Union of Agriculture Workers, since April 1989. . . ethnic Latvian. . . born October 1938.



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Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov


Chairman, Committee for State Security (KGB), since October 1988. . . member, Politburo, CPSU, since September 1989 . . . KGB veteran. . . ethnic Russian. . . born February 1924.



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Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov


Chairman, State Planning Committee (Gosplan), since February 1988. . . member, Politburo, CPSU, since September 1989. . . first deputy chairman, Council of Ministers, since February 1988. . . ethnic Russian. . . born September 1937.



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Yuriy Andreyevich Osipyan


Vice President, USSR Academy of Sciences, since October 1988. . . director, Solid State Physics Institute, since 1973. . . ethnic Armenian. . . born February 1931.



© Globe Photo

Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov


Candidate member, Politburo, CPSU, since September 1989. . . former director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations. . . ethnic Russian. . . born October 1929.



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Valentin Grigor'yevich Rasputin


Writer. . . secretary, Union of Writers. . . not member of CPSU. . . ethnic Russian . . . born March 1937.



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Grigoriy Ivanovich Revenko

Member, Central Committee, CPSU, since March 1986. . . former first secretary, Kiev Oblast Party Committee (Ukraine), November 1985–2 April 1990. . . ethnic Ukrainian. . . born April 1936.



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Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov


Chairman, Council of Ministers, since September 1985. . . member, Politburo, CPSU, since April 1985. . . ethnic Russian. . . born September 1929.



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Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin


Acting academician secretary, Economics Department, USSR Academy of Sciences, since early 1990. . . ethnic Russian. . . born August 1934.



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Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze


Minister of Foreign Affairs since July 1985. . . member, Politburo, CPSU, since July 1985. . . ethnic Georgian. . . born January 1928.



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Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev


Chairman, International Policy Commission, Central Committee, CPSU, since September 1988. . . member, Politburo, CPSU, since June 1987. . . secretary, Central Committee, CPSU, since March 1986. . . ethnic Russian. . . born December 1923.



© Deputies Handbook

Veniamin Aleksandrovich Yarin

Deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet, since May 1989. . . co-chairman, United Russian Workers' Front. . . co-chairman, Rossiya (voluntary, public club of deputies). . . operator, metallurgical combine. . . ethnic Russian. . . born February 1940.



© Sovfoto

Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov

Minister of Defense since May 1987. . . Marshal of the Soviet Union since late April 1990. . . candidate member, Politburo, CPSU, since June 1987. . . senior military commander 1967–87. . . ethnic Russian. . . born November 1923.

* On 10 April 1990 President Gorbachev expressed his intention to eventually add members to the USSR Presidential Council.

LDA 90-12598
April 1990

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April 1990

Directorate of Intelligence

The USSR Presidency

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