

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91127
Folder ID Number: 91127-004

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	Dubin in to Baker [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memo	Dennis B. Ross to General Scowcroft Re: Memorandum for General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	11/2/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (12 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (15 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Cable	White House to Ruehmo/American Embassy Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Cable	White House to Ruehmo/American Embassy Re: Delivery to Chairman Gorbachev from President Bush (2 pp.)	5/29/89	(b)(1)	S
03c. Cable	White House to Ruehmo/American Embassy Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
03d. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Afghanistan (2 pp.)	3/15/89	(b)(1)	S
03e. Cable	Re: Soviet Submarine Accident: Gorbachev Message to the President's Reply (1 pp.)	4/8/89	(b)(1)	C

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1073

OA/ID Number: 91127-004

Date Closed: 4/9/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03f. Cable	Re: President's Letter to Gorbachev on Current Fighting in Lebanon (1 pp.)	4/26/89	(b)(1)	S
03g. Cable	Re: Delivery of Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
03h. Cable	Re: Presidential Message to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	6/7/89	(b)(1)	S
03i. Cable	Re: Response to Fourth of July Message to the President from Gorbachev (2 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	S
03j. Cable	Re: Cw - Message from President Bush (2 pp.)	9/23/89	(b)(1)	S
03k. Cable	Re: Gorbachev Letter to the President (2 pp.)	10/28/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Handwritten Notes	Re: Eagleburger Meeting (1 pp.)	8/13/89	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Notes	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (18 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	S
06a. Fax Copy	From Henry Kissinger Re: Meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin (2 pp.)	1/16/89	(b)(1)	
06b. Fax Copy	From Henry Kissinger Re: Memorandum of Conversation (8 pp.)	1/16/89	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06c. Fax Copy	From Henry Kissinger Re: Meeting with Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/17/89	(b)(1)	
06d. Fax Copy	From Henry Kissinger Re: Dinner with Dobrynin (2 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
07. Letter	To Mr. James Baker [Draft Official Translation] (7 pp.)	8/9/89	(b)(1)	S
08a. Letter	Vice President Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/13/89	(b)(1)	
08b. Letter	Vice President Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/13/89	(b)(1)	
08c. Letter	Vice President Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/13/89	(b)(1)	
08d. Draft Letter	Re: I am taking... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09. Demarche	Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev Re: Demarche to Soviet Union (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	
10. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (4 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	
12. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	1/5/90	(b)(1)	

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13. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	8/6/89	(b)(1)	
14b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (4 pp.)	8/6/89	(b)(1)	
15. Cable	White House to American Embassy Re: Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	12/8/89	(b)(1)	S

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Unofficial translation.

The verbal statement by the American leadership in connection with the situation in El Salvador and the incident involving an aircraft with air defense systems on board have been seen in Moscow with all seriousness. Naturally, we decline attempts to link us directly or indirectly with this incident and moreover to make unsubstantiated conclusions with regard to our policy.

At the same time, taking into account the US side's statement we instructed our Ambassadors in Managua and in Havana to discuss the situation with the leaderships of Nicaragua and Cuba, expressing our concern over the developments in El Salvador and reaffirming the Soviet position according to which the problems of Central America should be settled by political means and through the implementation of the Guatemala accord and other agreements reached by the countries of the region themselves.

The Soviet Union does not supply arms to the FMLN in any way. We do not know the origin of the air defense missiles in question. According to press reports, there were incidentally also American Red-eye missiles there. Nevertheless, we have deemed it necessary to once again remind the Nicaraguans and the Cubans that we expect them to see to it that the Soviet weapons transferred to them for their own defense needs are not used for other purposes.

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2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

We have taken these steps because we share the US side's concern over a sharp exacerbation of the situation in El Salvador, and are prepared to continue to cooperate with you in creating favorable outside conditions for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in this country and in the region as a whole.

Nevertheless, there is no reason for creating a crisis situation, let alone for calling into question the very prospect of the Soviet-American dialogue. After all, the Soviet Union in this case could also embark upon making claims and ultimatums. Take Afghanistan, for example, where, as is known, civilians are dying as a result of US-made rocket shelling, and the ways those rockets get there are not unknown to Washington.

But such an approach would only throw us back to the times of confrontation and at least would not be conducive to a political solution either in Central America, or Afghanistan, or any other part of the world.

We are convinced that the only reasonable way out of this situation is to continue and intensify efforts to contribute to the settlement of regional conflicts.

In this connection, we note with satisfaction the statement by the US side contained in its message that the US favors political dialogue and not continued military conflict in Central America. For its part, the Soviet Union has acted and will continue to act exactly in this manner.

Both you and we are supporting the agreements reached by the Central Americans themselves. Therefore, we do have a basis for a more effective cooperation. Of course, it will only be effective when neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union attempts to impose its will on the parties directly involved in the conflict, and shall act with due regard for their legitimate interests.

The whole process of the Central American settlement is rather fragile. The efforts of the countries of the region need constant positive support. It seems to us that both of us could, either jointly or in parallel, give this process a new political impetus. Specifically, one could think of bringing into action the UN and OAS Secretaries General whose efforts proved useful in the past, and to involve the neighboring countries such as Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba in the political negotiations of the five Central American states.

Involvement of Cuba is particularly important at this stage. Here we are proceeding from the positive experience which was gained in the course of the peaceful settlements in Africa.

We would like to know the view of the US side about the possibility of these initiatives by both of us.

Educational computers

A group of members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR working in close contact with the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Education are presently discussing with representatives of the electronic industry of the USA, NASA, American universities a project worth \$ 1,5 billion to construct an assembly plant in the USSR for IBM PC type personal computers. Their principal contact in the USA - Western Digital Corporation (President Roger W. Johnson) is willing to pursue this project aimed at supplying these types of computers for educational purposes to the USSR to the total volume of 1,3 million units on the basis of a joint venture arrangements if the financing problem is resolved.

B-20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1989

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Attached are the one-on-one memcons from the Wyoming Ministerial. The Secretary would appreciate it if you hold them very closely.



Dennis B. Ross

~~SECRET~~/NODIS ATTACHMENT

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2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MN



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Thursday, September 21, 1989

Time: 6:30pm - 8:30pm

Place: On the Plane to Jackson Hole, Wyoming

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
USSR

Secretary: I am interested in knowing your view and your perspective on what just happened at your plenum. I would really like to get your assessment of what it means and what some of the implications are if that is okay with you.

Shevardnadze: The nationality problems are one of the most sensitive and difficult problems that we face. They need to be understood in their historical setting. Before the October revolution and in the first years after the revolution the people who populated all parts of Russia did not have their own entities. Before the revolution there were no national entities such as the Byelorussia or Azerbajahn. Instead what one saw were provinces sometimes with provincial rights. So one of the slogans or principles that was put forward by Lenin and our party was the principle of self-determination for the people who made up the Russian empire and it was on this principle that we formed the Soviet Union, a union not of provinces but of republics. Initially, the union consisted of the Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Later there was Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and some other republics were formed. In our constitution there was a provision that each republic would be a sovereign state which would delegate some of its rights to the Soviet Union. Such as rights on defense and diplomacy. Under Lenin these were the only two rights that the Union had. Nothing more was delegated to the Union. All those rights remained in the constitution. In practice they were not given. Instead there was great centralization of power. That centralization came not only because of the subjective views of our leaders at the time but because of the difficulty of the conditions in which our country found itself. Centralization was needed if a weak country was to be transformed into a strong one.

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I think it is important to remember that World War I and the Civil War devastated our country. In addition, the economic and political blockade of our country made it that much more important to emphasize centralization. And one also has to realize that people were illiterate and it was important because of that to try to help raise the very low living and cultural standards that existed in most of their republics. As I said to the President we have no intention of negating our entire history. Despite all of our problems, and the problems that existed in our earlier decades, the Soviet Union was able, during a difficult period, to rebuild its national economy, its industrial base, its agricultural base, and its overall cultural standards. But, as I have said, this transformation took place in conditions of great centralization. Though constitutional rights existed that should have enabled the republics to develop independently the reality was that we developed as a unitary state. This served us well during a very difficult period because I can't imagine us going to war without centralization. And maybe there even was some justification after the war to maintain a highly centralized economy. We did after all have to rebuild. But in the 1960s and 70s it's clear that the actual gap between our constitutional rights and the actual practice in the republics was great and was also harmful. It is not surprising that during this period as the intelligentsia grew in each republic that they would want to have rights of greater self-expression. After all, every nation has its writers, its artists and its intellectuals. At that time we misled ourselves into thinking that the nationality problem had been definitively resolved. That was a mistake and it was wrong to think that way. Every nation is a living entity. It grows, it revolves; and it was a mistake to think the nationality problem could be solved once and for all.

We are now developing a new nationality policy but we should have done this 25 years ago. Now we must consider the need for maximum independence of the republics in all areas starting with the economy. We have decided that the republics should have a completely free hand in managing all sectors of their economies with very few exceptions; for example, energy, the railroads, possibly metal and steel and possibly also civil aviation. It is really unreasonable to try to divide these kinds of economic sectors. Also, some branches of the defense sector must belong to the Center. All the rest of the economic sectors should be transferred to the republics with the republics owning and having responsibility for light industry, machine building, construction, education, services, etc. We are now trying to implement the constitutional principle that our republics are sovereign states. We are in the process of searching for a political solution for the relations between

the republics and the Center. If I were to speak from purely a formal standpoint I might tell you that everything seems okay. After all, each republic has its own parliament, can discuss questions relating to the budget of the republic, and other related issues. Also each republic has the attributes of state power. Unfortunately, these attributes are not translated into reality. The truth is all important problems have to be taken to the Center. Now we are going to reverse this process. All these decisions will be sent back to the republics.

Baker: I take it this is what you meant by telling the President that you haven't firmly determined the method for defining completely economic autonomy and political autonomy under your existing system. But that your aim is to grant the republics extensive and real autonomy.

Shevardnadze: Yes. We aim to create greater independence, self-rule and a real autonomy for the republics. It is very important to have a division of functions between the Center and the republics. For example, take the question of property. What belongs to the union, what belongs to the republics. One idea that we have is that there should be some common national or state property.

Baker: Do you mean there should be central government property and property that is owned by the republics?

Shevardnadze: Yes, indeed. We should have federal or union property that can't be managed only by one republic. We should then have republic properties, in effect, creating a situation where there are both union and republic properties or mixed properties. And by the way this should go down to the municipal level as well. I should note that within the republics there will be property that will belong to the cooperatives. And this must really be seen as private property.

Baker: To what extent do you envision that private property will exist within the system.

Shevardnadze: For the time being we would not envision that there would be private property on a large scale. However, the system of cooperatives implies that private property is going to exist. Members of the cooperative become owners of what they produce including the machines or the equipment that is responsible for production.

Baker: When I saw Boris Yeltsin he suggested that the private sector might be equal to about 15 percent of all property. He did not elaborate on that suggestion or observation. I must say that I didn't believe that that was a

particularly productive course to follow. For economic reform to be successful a way must be found to move to an incentive system that enhances competition, markets, etc. I understand that there is incentive built into the cooperative system and I want to talk to you in more detail about some of these economic issues later on. For now I would like to ask you some additional questions on the nationality issues.

I know that it is a sensitive area for you but I have to tell you that we have a problem vis-a-vis the Baltics. You have heard me say we really want the reform effort to succeed and we will do nothing to complicate that process. I have said it publicly that we do not want to see instability in the Soviet Union. But let me also tell you that it has been US policy for over 40 years not to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union. These Baltic states were independent. Now that policy of 40 years is a difficult one for us to change because after all there remains a very strong public sentiment in our country that identifies with these Baltic states.

We are very conscious of your concern about sovereignty and borders and will do nothing to exacerbate the problem. Nevertheless, as hard as we might try to move our relations forward with you it would be very hard to sustain positive relations if you were to find it necessary to use force in the Baltics. Let me just say to you that a strong reaction by us would be a given. So I am very hopeful that a peaceful way would be found to solve the nationality problem generally and especially in the Baltics. I raise this only so that you will understand the extraordinary pressure on us. I don't raise this to pressure you or to hector you.

Let me add one final point on nationalities. The President and I have both said that your response to the nationality problem to date has been praise-worthy, measured, and responsible. We hope it will continue in that direction. Can I ask one other question on the plenum? How do the political changes that have taken place at the plenum affect the prospects for perestroika?

Shevardnadze: Do you mean the personnel changes?

Baker: Yes.

Shevardnadze: Well, they are not the most important result. The changes are significant but they are not the most important result to emerge from the plenum. The most important result is that we have now produced a platform to propose to all the republics on the nationality question. Now people have

an idea of what we mean by federation. They also have an idea of what we mean by sovereignty within the federation and by the real rights that each republic will have. I can tell you that we had very sharp debates on the issue of language.

Baker: How did you come out on the issue of language?

Shevardnadze: We have made a decision that every republic and its people have a right to have a home language. There will now be an official state language for every republic and that will be the local language. The Russian language will be recognized as the federal language or the language for inter-national communication. In a multinational state like ours, one needs this. It is not unusual to develop in this fashion. India has two national languages. Switzerland has three. So it is not unusual.

Baker: Do you think this satisfies most of the nationality demands?

Shevardnadze: This is a major decision and a very serious decision. The question of language is a central one. In only one republic before was there a constitution that made the local language the official language and that is my native republic of Georgia. In 1978 when the 3rd Soviet constitution proposed removing this provision from the Georgian constitution the population arose and demonstrated and it was decided not to make this change.

As to your concern about the use of violence, let me just say that this is ruled out by us. That would mean an end a perestroika. It would restore what we used to call the dictatorship of the proletariat. We can't reverse our course. We can't go back to the past. In some areas we were compelled to use force but this was only in circumstances where different ethnic groups like the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians were practically engaging in genocide. Here force was required to restore order. In the Baltics, no one intends to use force. As you know, in Georgia force was used and there were tragic consequences. Gorbachev and I were out of the country when that decision was made. That decision was taken by republican authorities. When we came back and saw this we sacked the people responsible. We condemned their decision, and we made it clear that the use of force is inconsistent with our principles. But extremism can produce some unfortunate reactions. Look at a place like Estonia which is a small republic. One-third of the population is Russian speaking. If Estonians insist on something illegal or want to separate from the Soviet Union how will the native Russians react? You know there are separatists in Estonia. They are not the majority but they exist.

Baker: How would a referendum on self-determination in Estonia come out? How, for example, would people vote on whether to stay within the Soviet Union or to choose to leave it?

Shevardnadze: There would probably be differences among ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians on how to answer this question. But I can tell you that I think complete separation wouldn't be practical from Estonia's interests. After all Estonia's economy is interlaced with the rest of the republics. Let me give you an example. There is a huge factory in Riga that produces radio equipment. That factory has an enormous network of suppliers throughout the rest of the country. In fact this factory is an assembly plant and has 25,000 workers. Separation would mean that the entire system is broken up and it would take a long time to build new economic relations. Similarly Estonia has important long time technical and scientific links to the Soviet establishment. And like many republics Estonia has specialized in certain areas. Estonia is mainly responsible for producing meat, milk, and potatoes. These products are exported to other republics. It must import all its other needs. It imports its grains, its energy, its fuel needs, its raw materials and so forth. One could go ahead and try to build another economic net but it would take them 20 years.

Baker: So you think that because it is impractical the vast majority of those in Estonia and elsewhere in the republic would chose to stay in the Soviet Union?

Shevardnadze: I spent my vacation in the south this year and I visited Georgia. And I talked with many of the Georgian separatists. And at one point I said to them okay let's assume you have your complete freedom and you can do what you want. If you chose to leave the Soviet Union what's going to happen in a week's time? Your metal plants would be stopped because you will need your supplies, your machine building would be stopped because of a lack of supplies and spare parts, your light industry would experience the same stoppage, you will need to get bread from elsewhere, sugar from elsewhere. You eat 40,000 kilograms of butter and 38,000 come from outside, the majority of your oil and natural gas come from outside -- you tell me what is going to happen after separation.

Baker: I understand the impracticality of independence for each republic.

Shevardnadze: You know the Swedes, the Finns and the Danish have very close relations with the Baltic republics. And they have very actively advised against the separatism.

They see it as a complication for them. The current leader of the Estonian Communist Party is a good friend of mine. We worked together in the youth organization and I have stayed in close touch with him over the years. You know he and I have a good and frank relationship and I asked him the same question you asked me. Would the Estonians prefer to leave the Soviet Union or stay. He said that they would not prefer to leave.

Baker: Let me raise two points. First, if it's totally impractical and the majority would choose to stay in any given republic, why not solve the problem by having a referendum? If you grant people the right of self-determination and they can vote on what they want to do, and if the majority vote to stay, then the separatists will no longer have a basis on which to push for separation. Second point: Isn't there a difference between the Baltic republics, which were once independent countries, and the others which were never independent?

Shevardnadze: First, on the question of the referendum, this is a constitutional question. This is a question for the national or union constitution and for each republican constitution. In the current constitutions there are no provisions for referendums. The fact is the union constitution doesn't provide any regulation on how the process of self-determination should take place. The Supreme Soviet has established a commission to develop a new union constitution and there are also commissions set up for the republic constitutions. If these constitutions provide for referendums then there is no reason why the referendum shouldn't take place.

You are raising an important issue and it needs to be addressed. But I would also note that the constitutions must answer the question not only of whether republics have the right to secede, but must also deal with other aspects of self-determination as well. After all, secession is only one aspect of self-determination and our objective is to produce real self-determination for our republics. We still have to determine how best to express the right of self-determination. A referendum is one way to do so. Perhaps in the congress of peoples deputies other ways would be discussed.

As for your point on the Baltic Republics, it is true that they joined the Soviet Union in 1939-40 and this was later than the others. But you might note that the Transcaucas republics were independent for three years after the October revolution. There were separate governments in Baku and in Yerevan. These governments in fact were set up under Kerensky. So, there may not be as much a difference here as you think and, indeed if the Baltics were to leave people, in Transcaucas might say why shouldn't we leave also. Frankly, it is okay for this to be a

part of our open debate. We don't fear to debate. Indeed we have a huge stadium in Moscow and a covered sports arena and people are coming there all the time to demonstrate. And these demonstrations are not banned and they are called by formal and informal groups. Indeed Boris Yeltsin gathers people there twice a week. I am confident that as we debate these issues openly people would come to see the real facts and the consequences of their decisions. I mentioned to the President that as we see politicization of the Soviet Union we are going to have a pluralization of opinion.

Baker: I am glad to hear that the questions being debated in the constitution are such that a discussion on a referendum would be permitted. I really believe that would be the best way to draw the poison out of the nationality problem. Once people have had an opportunity to express themselves through referendum they really wouldn't have a basis on which to complain. Perhaps then much of the agitation and unrest would disappear.

Shevardnadze: For the time being, they are not raising or demanding a referendum. But you are right; this possibility must be considered by the constitutional commission. We couldn't foresee everything in the development of our party platform on nationalities and that is why the Congress and Supreme Soviet established these commissions.

Baker: I would like to offer a comment on Eastern Europe. I hope the way we are approaching events in Eastern Europe is not troublesome to you. We do not desire to stir things up or ferment unrest. We are going to handle relations much the way the President did when he went to Poland and Hungary. We are going to try to assist Poland and Hungary in moving their economies towards more of a free market system. We are going to encourage them to develop private sectors. We would like for our relations with regard to Eastern Europe to be based on the principle of "no surprises." In that connection you told me you were going to Nicaragua. I would like to let you know that there is some chance that I may make a trip to Eastern Europe. Would that cause any problem for you in any way?

Shevardnadze: No. We are happy and pleased to see good relations between you and Poland and Hungary. We would like to see an expansion of this good relations and see them extended to other countries in Eastern Europe. In this connection of expanding ties I suggested to the Iranians that they should develop good relations with you.

Baker: We appreciate what you did in Iran after our meeting in Paris.

Shevardnadze: Let me suggest that on Eastern Europe that an unstable Poland would neither be good for you nor for us. By the same token a rupture of all of Poland's links with the Soviet Union would be suicide. Currently they have a 40 billion ruble debt to us. You surely can't solve their problems by yourself. On the outset we have built relations with Poland, and I might just add confidentially to you that we have given in the last few years 6.5 billion ruble alone, with interest rates of only about 4.8 percent.

Baker: Where do I apply?

Shevardnadze: You could ask the Poles what they pay for their oil and gas from us. Frankly, they don't know what world prices mean. So if you rupture all links, it would be suicide just like it would be suicide for the Baltic states. No one could take Poland under its wing, certainly not Germany. Yes, they could work with Poland, but no one could throw the kind of money at Poland that it really needs. Only we've done that. Only we've wasted our money.

Baker: How much does Hungary owe you?

Shevardnadze: Probably 4.5 billion.

Baker: They do a better job with their economy.

Shevardnadze: Well, they live better. But their per capital debt is actually higher than Poland's by a factor of 1.5. Of course their standards in industry and agriculture are much higher.

Baker: I have understood your views on Eastern Europe and their continued interest in the Warsaw Pact is essential. Do you feel as strongly about as remaining a part of CEMA?

Shevardnadze: I have got a reasonable proposal for you. Let's disband both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Let's release your allies and ours. While NATO exists, the Warsaw Pact also exists. As for CEMA it needs reconstruction. If that organization rebuilt itself into a sufficient organization, it will exist. If it continues working the way it does now it will serve neither our allies nor us. We are working to reform it but will have to see how it does. Could I mention a statement Kohl made at the Congress of his party? If you haven't read it might be worth your reading it.

Baker: I haven't read it but I will. What was its general thrust?

Shevardnadze: Well it is very similar to statements made by German leaders in the 1930s and it created a serious concern for us.

Baker: Did it talk about reunification?

Shevardnadze: Not just that although that is a part of it. No, he spoke in terms of ultimatum and he also said that the Soviet Union is on the verge of crumbling, Eastern Europe is on the verge of crumbling; CEMA is on the verge of crumbling; and the task in the West, Kohl said, was to see what it should be doing under such circumstances.

Baker: You know we always speak about self-determination because it goes to the essence of our philosophy. But we don't want to see instability anywhere in Eastern Europe and certainly not in the GDR. Rather, what we would like to see in Eastern Europe is a Europe that is whole and free, where the divisions have been ended, and all of this is accomplished in a peaceful fashion. I think that is the view of the federal republic as well.

Shevardnadze: We also want to see a common European house. But, it's important to respect existing realities.

Baker: As perestroika advances and gets applied to the GDR perhaps one won't see so many people wanting to leave the GDR. As you know, perestroika has been lagging in the GDR.

Shevardnadze: That's true but it is up to every country to decide how it wants to live.

Baker: When you have thousands of people seeking to leave, however, they obviously are saying something about the system and how it is working.

Shevardnadze: Well that is not always true. We in the Soviet Union are going through a period when we are allowing much greater freedom and yet we are having almost a 100,000 people a year leaving. You know from the standpoint of the freedom of expression we have never had people so good and yet people want to leave. As for the GDR, one has to admit that they have a high standard of living. They have a well-developed social infrastructure. Their housing problem is largely solved. They have day care centers. They produce lots of athletic champions.

Baker: So, how do you explain all of those people leaving?

Shevardnadze: Well it could be a division of families, relatives, that could be playing a part. But, let me say, it is not up to us to solve this problem, it is up to them. If I were in their shoes I'd let everybody who wants to go leave. Of course, it is true that if as many one million people leave that would be a serious problem for Eastern Europe, but I would let them go.

Baker: I've talked before about the importance of your having a new pricing system and making the ruble convertible. After studying the situation more carefully, I am convinced that before you can move on price reform or convertibility, action must be taken to soak up the ruble overhang. When we have our discussion on economic issues I am prepared to go into more detail on how to do that. In so doing, I don't mean to imply that we have all the answers. In fact, the value of my suggestions may be worth the price that you have to pay for them, but we have some new ideas that might be helpful to you I am prepared to go through those with you if it is of interest to you.

Shevardnadze: Moving on price reform is very difficult for us.

Baker: I know that but price reform and convertibility are necessary for opening the door for making the Soviet Union an attractive place for outside investment. When I was at Treasury I use to say that our great economic trump card is that we were open to foreign investment. Some fear foreign investment but it means jobs, technology and output. It also means you are using others' capital to create a better economy. We have some ideas on how you might take a number of steps that will make it possible for you to soak up the ruble overhang as a necessary precursor to doing anything on prices. Secondly, I think that if you are going to make headway on prices and convertibility, you have got to institutionalize a system of competitiveness and incentives. Thirdly you are going to need to create a social safety net that helps cushion the political effects of going to a new pricing system.

Shevardnadze: Well, let's have this discussion. There is a question of what's going on with the US economy also. Currently, US companies are investing less in the US than they are investing elsewhere.

Baker: That is not exactly right. There is not as much investment in the US as we would like to see but our investment is increasing each year. Foreign investment is increasing even faster. One major reason for that is that we have lowered the value of the dollar against other major convertible currencies

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 12 -

in the world. We did that to make ourselves more competitive from a trading standpoint that has reduced our trade deficit. In effect, what we have done is make property and businesses in the US cheaper for those with yen or sterling or marks, etc., to buy. What we have really done is create a good investment opportunity for people from the outside.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (15 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: COQ PRES MSGS WHSR OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 031706Z AUG 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

QQQQ

EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I WELCOME YOUR RESPONSE TO MY OFFER OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE WITH
RESPECT TO THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THAT SANK IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA.
AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR NOTE, WE WILL AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM YOU
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0963 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
ON WHETHER YOU WISH TO PROCEED.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAD A VERY VALUABLE MEETING WITH
MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, A SESSION THAT WAS EXTRAORDINARY FOR THE
CANDOR WITH WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.
HE AND I AGREED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE
ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO. SIMILARLY, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE
SOVIET SHIP VISIT TO NORFOLK LAST WEEK WAS ENORMOUSLY SUCCESSFUL.
SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GATHERED TO HEAR THE MUSICAL
PERFORMANCE BY THE SOVIETS SAILORS, AND THE PEOPLE OF NORFOLK
EXTENDED VERY WARM HOSPITALITY TO THE SHIPS' CREWS. ALL THESE
EVENTS ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

PAGE 03 RUEADWW0963 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MOSCOW

END TEXT

BT

#0963

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0963 <TOR> 890803131104 MSG000239461864

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>

PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER

SIT: PRES MSGS WHSR OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 290825Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

EYES ONLY EYES ONLY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

SECSTATE FOR UNDERSECRETARY KIMMIT TO PASS TO SECRETARY BAKER

BEGIN TEXT:

MAY 29, 1989

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE OUTLINED IN RECENT SPEECHES A NEW CONCEPTION OF A STABLE
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
AND COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP; ONE THAT MOVES BEYOND
CONTAINMENT. ON MAY 24, I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR
NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE), NOW UNDERWAY
IN VIENNA, IN PROMOTING THIS GOAL.

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT IN ORDER TO BROADEN AND ACCELERATE
NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, I AM PROPOSING
TODAY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL THAT NATO:

ACCEPT YOUR AGREEMENT TO CEILINGS ON TANKS
(20,000 FOR EACH SIDE) AND ARMORED TROOP
CARRIERS (28,000 FOR EACH SIDE). SEEK EARLY
AGREEMENT WITH THE WARSAW PACT ON A CEILING
FOR ARTILLERY IN THE RANGE BETWEEN 16,500 AND
24,000, USING A COMMONLY AGREED DEFINITION OF
THE EQUIPMENT INVOLVED. ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT
REDUCED WOULD BE DESTROYED.

EXPAND THE CURRENT NATO PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE CUTS
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
OF 15 PERCENT BELOW THE COMBINED TOTAL FOR MEMBERS
OF THE NATO ALLIANCE IN TWO ADDITIONAL
CATEGORIES: HELICOPTERS (ATTACK AND
ASSAULT/TRANSPORT) AND ALL LAND-BASED COMBAT
AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF ROLE OR CONFIGURATION.
ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT CUT WOULD BE DESTROYED.

CUT U.S. STATIONED MANPOWER BY 20 PERCENT AND
PROPOSE A CEILING ON U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND
AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER STATIONED OUTSIDE OF
NATIONAL TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

URALS ZONE AT THE U.S. RESIDUAL OF 275,000
EACH. WE CALCULATE THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN
EASTERN EUROPE UNDER THIS CEILING WOULD AMOUNT TO
ABOUT 325,000. WITHDRAWN SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN
ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE DEMOBILIZED.

AGREE TO AN ACCELERATED TIMETABLE FOR REACHING
AND IMPLEMENTING AN AGREEMENT ALONG THESE
LINES. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE
PAGE 04 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
TO REACH SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN SIX MONTHS TO A
YEAR, AND TO ACCOMPLISH THE REDUCTIONS BY 1992
OR 1993.

MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN VIENNA, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON
VERIFICATION OF OVERALL CEILINGS AND MEASURES TO MONITOR AND
VERIFY FORCE REDUCTIONS AND EQUIPMENT DESTRUCTION. BUT I
BELIEVE THAT OUR NEW PROPOSAL ADDRESSES WHAT WE UNDERSTAND
TO BE YOUR CENTRAL CONCERNS AND SHOULD ALLOW THE NEGOTIATIONS
TO MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
PAGE 05 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT.

WARM REGARDS, BRENT SCOWCROFT

DECL: OADR

BT

#0584

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0584 <TOR> 890529043604 MSG000233728564

<DIST>

PRT: COMM

SIT: PRES MSGS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 241208Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY

QQQQ

EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME ON HIS MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW. I AM QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT. I
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0374 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
STRONGLY SUPPORT INTENSIFYING OUR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION
ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING
REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ARMS
CONTROL. THE RESUMPTION OF THE FULL ARRAY OF ARMS CONTROL
AND ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT.

MR. CHARIMAN, I WROTE YOU IN APRIL TO EXPRESS OUR CONDOLENCES
OVER THE TRAGIC LOSS OF YOUR MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE IN THE
NORWEGIAN SEA AND THE LIVES OF SO MANY YOUNG SAILORS. IN RECENT
WEEKS WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN
OBTAINING WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN RAISING THE SUNKEN SUBMARINE.
WE HAVE CERTAIN CAPABILITIES FOR THIS KIND OF MISSION
AND, FROM A PURELY HUMANITAIRAN STANDPOINT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER
OUR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD YOU WISH TO PURSUE RAISING
THE SUBMARINE. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD BE SENSITIVE ABOUT MILITARY
TECHNOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBMARINE. I RESPECT SUCH
SENSITIVITY AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO SAFEGUARD YOUR
TECHNOLOGY. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE HAVE NOT EXAMINED EITHER
THE COST OR THE TIME THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO READY OUR SHIP
FOR SUCH A MISSION. HOWEVER, I CAN APPRECIATE THE CONCERN OF
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0374 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
THE FAMILIES AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE MEN LOST IN THE
SUBMARINE AND WISH TO EXTEND THIS OFFER. IT IS THIS CONCERN FOR
THOSE YOUNG SAILORS' FAMILIES THAT PROMPTS THIS OFFER.

SHOULD YOU HAVE INTEREST IN PURSUING A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO
RAISE THE SUBMARINE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN EXPLORING
THE FEASIBILITY WITH YOU.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>

SIT: PRES MSGS VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 110952Z MAR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3978
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 3857

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THANK YOU NOTE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT

UNCLAS STATE 076849

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KSCA, CASC, TBIO, UR, US, OPDC

SUBJECT: THANK YOU NOTE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
GORBACHEV

REFS: A) STATE 68417, B) MOSCOW 5717, C) FRANKFURT
3556

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING THANK YOU NOTE TO MFA FOR
CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

ON BEHALF OF ALL AMERICANS, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE
APPRECIATION FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN OBTAINING A RARE ANTI-SNAKEBITE
SERUM FOR AN AMERICAN VICTIM OF A PAKISTANI PIT VIPER.
I UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS ARRANGED A SPECIAL
FLIGHT SO THAT THE SERUM COULD BE EXPEDITIOUSLY
TRANSPORTED FROM TASHKENT TO MOSCOW AND ASSISTED U.S.
EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN COORDINATING ONWARD TRANSPORTATION
OF THE SERUM TO THE U.S. ALTHOUGH THE VICTIM IS STILL IN
SERIOUS CONDITION, HIS CHANCES FOR RECOVERY ARE MUCH
IMPROVED THANKS TO YOUR EFFORTS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,

CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
MOSCOW.

END TEXT. BAKER

BT

#6849

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6849 <TOR> 890311051427 MSG000226905267

<DIST>

PRT: DONLEY HUGHES PERITO

SIT: BLACKWILL HAASS PRES MSGS RICE RODMAN BRANSCUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 150321Z MAR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
- ON AFGHANISTAN

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 080473
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR, AF

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
- ON AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 054154

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER ON EXPEDITED BASIS THE
FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
GORBACHEV ON AFGHANISTAN, RESPONDING TO GORBACHEV'S
REFTEL LETTER ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR FEBRUARY 17 LETTER ON
AFGHANISTAN. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WELCOME YOUR ORDERLY
AND TIMELY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM THAT
COUNTRY, THUS BRINGING TO AN END A LONG AND UNFORTUNATE
CHAPTER IN AFGHAN HISTORY. A MAJOR STEP TOWARD SETTLE-
MENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION HAS THUS BEEN TAKEN.
AS YOUR LETTER INDICATES, WE SHARE A NUMBER OF INTERESTS
IN AFGHANISTAN: AN ATTENUATION OF CIVIL CONFLICT, THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT, THE RESTORATION OF ITS STATUS AS A NEUTRAL,
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY, AND THE FACILITATION OF REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE IS SIMPLY TO ENSURE THAT THE
PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, WHO HAVE SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY OVER
THE PAST DECADE, HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR
OWN POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES. OUTSIDE POWERS CAN
BEST CONTRIBUTE BY RESISTING THE TEMPTATION TO MANIPULATE
THE PROCESS.

WE HARBOR NO INTENTION OF PROMOTING AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
THAT IS HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION. RATHER, WE SUPPORT
THE EMERGENCE OF A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED
AFGHANISTAN LIVING IN PEACE WITH ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS.

I WISH ALSO TO ASSURE YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT OUR ACTIONS
WILL REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS WE UNDERTOOK
AS A GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS. WE LIKEWISE EXPECT
THE SOVIET UNION TO HONOR THOSE OBLIGATIONS; FOR YOUR
COUNTRY TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD FORFEIT THE VERY
CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL BENEFITS THE WITHDRAWAL HAS EARNED
FOR YOU IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

IN YOUR LETTER YOU SUGGESTED A MORATORIUM ON FURTHER
SUPPLIES TO CONTENDING AFGHAN FACTIONS. FOLLOWING YOUR
GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A SIMILAR PROPOSAL WE PUT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR

2/25/2014 MM

ON THE TABLE LAST APRIL, WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD EXERCISE RIGHTS TO SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS COMPARABLE TO THOSE WHICH YOU ASSERTED FOR YOURSELF. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MATERIAL SUPPORT -- INCREASINGLY IN THE FORM OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -- TO OUR FRIENDS IN AFGHANISTAN. AS FORMER SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED IN GENEVA LAST APRIL, THE CONTENT OF OUR SUPPORT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY RESTRAINT IN SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ITS KABUL CLIENTS. THE RECENT TURNOVER OF MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO AFGHAN UNITS DURING AND FOLLOWING YOUR WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT INDICATE SUCH RESTRAINT. THIS HAS AFFECTED OUR DECISION TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT.

DURING THE COMING MONTHS AFGHANISTAN WILL REQUIRE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE UNITED STATES, AS ALWAYS, STANDS READY TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO MEET HUMANITARIAN NEEDS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CARRY THROUGH EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH YOUR OWN PROMISE TO AID GENEROUSLY REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS THERE. THAT WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, WHICH THE WORLD WOULD NOTE. THE UN MUST PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN COORDINATING THIS MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. I TRUST THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL ALSO ASSIST UN EFFORTS TO REMOVE LAND MINES AND ANTI-PERSONNEL DEVICES FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE LONG SUFFERING AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME SAFELY AND WITH HONOR.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY THAT I SEE THIS AS A VERY IMPORTANT TIME IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I HOPE THAT OUR COUNTRIES CAN DEVISE COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES TOWARD THE RESIDUAL PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT AFGHANISTAN DURING THE MONTHS AHEAD. THIS WOULD BRING BENEFITS NOT ONLY TO OURSELVES, BUT ALSO TO THE SOUTH ASIAN AREA AS A WHOLE, AND TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE.

FINALLY, I AM HOPEFUL THAT COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE WILL SET A STANDARD OF GOODWILL TO WHICH WE CAN LOOK AS WE MOVE FORWARD TO ADDRESS OTHER PROBLEMS BEFORE US.

AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) GEORGE BUSH

INSERT TEXT OF HANDWRITTEN POSTSCRIPT FROM PRESIDENT BUSH IN PARA 4 BELOW.

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE

SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MOSCOW

END TEXT OF LETTER

4. BEGIN TEXT OF HANDWRITTEN POSTSCRIPT FROM PRESIDENT BUSH:

P.S. AS SOON AS JIM BAKER RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO EUROPE HE CAME TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND GAVE ME A DETAILED REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE - MOST INTERESTING (

(SIGNED AND UNDERLINED) GB

END TEXT OF POSTSCRIPT.

5. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BAKER

BT

#0473

<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: PRES MSGS VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 082134Z APR 89
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5954
INFO RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 4571
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 4286

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET SUBMARINE ACCIDENT: GORBACHEV MESSAGE
- AND THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 110232

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, MNUC, ENRG, PHSA, UR, US, NO

SUBJECT: SOVIET SUBMARINE ACCIDENT: GORBACHEV MESSAGE
- AND THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

1. ~~1~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON APRIL 7 SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ CONVEYED TO UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO THE PRESIDENT. BEGIN TEXT:
URGENT MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT BUSH ON APRIL 7, 1989 AT 1141 MOSCOW TIME ON BOARD A NUCLEAR-POWERED TORPEDO SUBMARINE LOCATED IN NEUTRAL WATERS IN THE AREA AT A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 180 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF MEDVEZHSKIY ISLAND, A FIRE STARTED IN ONE OF THE COMPARTMENTS. UNFORTUNATELY, DESPITE THE MEASURES TAKEN, THE SUBMARINE COULD NOT BE SAVED. AT 1715 MOSCOW TIME, THE SUBMARINE SANK AT A DEPTH OF OVER 1500 METERS. THE CREW IS BEING HELPED BY SOVIET SHIPS AND VESSELS, WHICH CAME TO THE AREA WHERE THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED. THERE ARE CASUALTIES. THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE ARE STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. THE REACTOR IS SHUT DOWN. BY THE ASSESSMENT OF SPECIALISTS, A POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IS EXCLUDED. ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL MEASURES ARE BEING WORKED OUT IN VIEW OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED.
END TEXT.

3. ON APRIL 8, THE DEPARTMENT CONVEYED TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY A REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. EMBASSY MAY WISH TO PASS TO THE MFA ON MONDAY, APRIL 10, THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, WHICH FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT:
APRIL 8, 1989

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING THE TRAGIC SUBMARINE ACCIDENT YESTERDAY. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES JOIN WITH ME IN EXTENDING OUR SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE LOST CREWMEN AND IN HOPING THAT YOUR RESCUE EFFORTS WILL SUCCESSFULLY PREVENT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.
END TEXT.

4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER
BT
#0232

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0232 <TOR> 890408174611 MSG000229369571

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>

SIT: PRES_MSGS

<DIST>

SIT: MORRISON VAX WELCH

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 260248Z APR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7079

INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0544

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 7912

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON CURRENT
FIGHTING IN LEBANON

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 130061

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, MOPS, PINS, PREL, UR, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON CURRENT
FIGHTING IN LEBANON

1. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT THE TEXT BELOW TO
THE MFA FOR TRANSMITTAL TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. ORIGINAL
WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

APRIL 24, 1989

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I AM GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE IN
THE SHELLING IN LEBANON, WHERE THE VIOLENCE HAS ESCALATED
BETWEEN GENERAL AOUN'S LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND THE
LEBANESE MUSLIMS, WITH ACTIVE SYRIAN PARTICIPATION.
THE CIVILIZED WORLD IS UNDERSTANDABLY OUTRAGED THAT SO
MANY INNOCENT LEBANESE ARE SUFFERING. WE HAVE BEEN
CALLING ON ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIGHTING, INCLUDING
GENERAL AOUN AND THE SYRIANS, TO TERMINATE THE FIGHTING
IMMEDIATELY. IN VIEW OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO SYRIA, I
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU WERE TO ADD YOUR
VOICE TO THOSE URGING SYRIA TO AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE
CEASE-FIRE.

SUCH AN EFFORT ON YOUR PART WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH YOUR
PUBLICLY EXPRESSED POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO ENDING THE
TRAGIC SHEDDING OF INNOCENT BLOOD.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MOSCOW

END TEXT.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER

BT

#0061

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0061 <TOR> 890426055138 MSG000230881898

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR

2/25/2014 MJ

<DIST>

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: PRES MSGS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEHMO <DTG> 241721Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 13686

NODIS

SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

REF: THE WHITE HOUSE 241208Z MAY 89 (~~SECRET~~
- SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 1900 ON MAY 24 (DUE TO THE
ONGOING PROCESS OF FORMING A NEW LEGISLATURE THIS
WEEK, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DELIVER THE LETTER TO
GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, SINCE HE WAS INVOLVED ALL DAY
IN MEETINGS WITH DEPUTIES).

3. SHEVARDNADZE LISTENED CAREFULLY AS THE LETTER WAS
READ, PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT'S
POSITIVE COMMENTS ON SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW, AND TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RECOVER
THE MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE THAT SANK LAST APRIL IN THE
NORWEGIAN SEA. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THE
SOVIET SIDE VERY MUCH VALUED THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED
BY THE PRESIDENT. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S
OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUBMARINE AND RECOVER THE
BODIES OF THE SOVIET SAILORS WHO WERE LOST AT SEA,
SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT OF COURSE A NUMBER OF
TECHNICAL MATTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION. HE OFFERED TO PASS THE PRESIDENT'S
MESSAGE ON TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, AND
SAID THAT AN ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD
BE FORTHCOMING IN A FEW DAYS. HE EXPRESSED HIS
PERSONAL GRATITUDE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS
PROPOSAL, AND NOTED THAT THIS, AS WELL AS THE AID
GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE ARMENIAN TRAGEDY
AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INDICATED JUST
HOW MUCH THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD CHANGED FOR
THE BETTER.

4. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S
OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUB NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FOR
THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SOVIET SIDE
AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FULLY AND GET
BACK WITH A CONSIDERED REPLY.

5. SHEVARDNADZE MADE OTHER COMMENTS ON THIS WEEK'S
POLITICAL EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ON THE SINO-SOVIET
SUMMIT WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS. MATLOCK

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>

SIT: BLACKWILL PRES MSGS RICE VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 070308Z JUN 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9827
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 5119

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 179123

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV

REF: MOSCOW 14059

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.

3.

MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

DEAR CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTIXN AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. I WISH YOU SUCCESS IN MEETING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES YOUR NEW POSITION PRESENTS. THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT UNFOLDING IN YOUR COUNTRY HAS GRIPPED THE WORLD'S ATTENTION BECAUSE OF ITS ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE, NOT ONLY FOR YOUR COUNTRY BUT FOR OTHERS AS WELL. I BELIEVE IT ALSO HOLDS GREAT PROMISE FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.

YOU KNOW THAT YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR EFFORTS TO REFORM AND RESTRUCTURE SOVIET SOCIETY. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD ON THE BETTER, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BAKER

BT

#9123

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 9123 <TOR> 890607002214 MSG000234490934

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 JMM

<DIST>
PRT: VANERON
SIT: PRES MSGS VAX
<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 141700Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2100
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 5645

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE
- PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8915441)

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 223458

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, UR, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE
- PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8915441)

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.
2. FYI FOR POSTS, FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV WAS RECEIVED BY THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 3:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INDEPENDENCE DAY, PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES FOR PROSPERITY AND PEACE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

I AM CONVINCED THAT CONTINUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON THE BASIS OF REALISM, EQUALITY, AND MUTUAL BENEFIT WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE FRAME OF MIND OF THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRIES, AND WOULD PROMOTE A GENERAL MOVE TOWARD A NEW, PEACEFUL PERIOD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

THE REPEATED EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN US, AS WELL AS OTHER CONTACTS, AND THE TALKS IN MOSCOW IN MAY CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF PREREQUISITES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ALONG THE BASIC LINES OF SUCH COOPERATION. OF COURSE, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENTS IN VIENNA AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS IN GENEVA WOULD BE OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR SAFEGUARDING SECURITY AND REMOVING THE THREAT OF WAR. WE ON OUR PART INTEND TO DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO MAKE THE TALKS SUCCEED.

POSSIBILITIES EXIST FOR PROGRESSING FASTER AND MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE MATTER OF COOPERATION IN SETTLING REGIONAL PROBLEMS, DEVELOPING BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND THE REST OF THE ISSUES ON THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGENDA. I WISH TO REAFFIRM, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS STEADFASTLY SUPPORTING ALL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

M. GORBACHEV

MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN

JULY 4, 1989

3. FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND I THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS IN CELEBRATION OF OUR 213TH ANNIVERSARY OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MA
2/25/2014 MM

SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

4. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF SOVIETS WISH
TO DO SO.

5. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

EAGLEBURGER

BT

#3458

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 3458 <TOR> 890714152717 MSG000237742037

<DIST>

SIT: BLACKWILL PRES MSGS RICE VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 290255Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3123
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 5866

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONDOLENCE LETTER
- FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8917168)

<TEXT>BT

UNCLAS STATE 241350

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, UR, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONDOLENCE LETTER
- FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8917168)

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.

2. FYI FOR POSTS, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN
GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT BUSH WAS RECEIVED AT THE WHITE
HOUSE JULY 24:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WAS DEEPLY MOVED BY A REPORT ABOUT THE PLANE CRASH IN
THE UNITED STATES WHICH CAUSED NUMEROUS CASUALTIES.
ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND MYSELF I ASK YOU TO
CONVEY MOST SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES AND
RELATIVES OF THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES.

SINCERELY,

M. GORBACHEV

MOSCOW, KREMLIN

JULY 21, 1989

END TEXT.

3. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. NO
RELEASE IS INTENDED, BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF THE
SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO THE
FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED IN THE TRAGIC ACCIDENT AT SIOUX
CITY AIRPORT.

BOTH OUR NATIONS HAVE SUFFERED TRAGIC LOSSES FROM
ACCIDENTS IN RECENT MONTHS. YOUR CONCERN WILL BE
APPRECIATED NOT ONLY BY THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO WERE
LOST IN THE CRASH, BUT BY ALL AMERICANS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MOSCOW

END TEXT.

4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

EAGLEBURGER

BT

#1350

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 1350 <TOR> 890729000033 MSG000238982433

<DIST>

PRT: VANERON BRANSCUM

SIT: PRES MSGS DORMINEY RODMAN VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 231931Z SEP 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 6701
INFO RUEHCDEBUSDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 7689

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: CW - MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 306804 TOSEC 140041

NODIS

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, XG

SUBJECT: CW - MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTED: FOLLOWING IN
PARA THREE BELOW IS MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
GORBACHEV RELATING TO CW INITIATIVE WHICH PRESIDENT WILL
ANNOUNCE IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNGA MONDAY SEPT. 25.
EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER MESSAGE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
MONDAY, SEPT. 25. EMBASSY WILL BE RECEIVING SEPARATELY
TALKING POINTS, FACT SHEET, AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
THE INITIATIVE.

3. BEGIN TEXT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE:

DEAR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV:

IN MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, I
EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION FOR THE RICHNESS OF THE
DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON ISSUES OF MUTUAL
IMPORTANCE. I WANT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF MR.
SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES TO EMPHASIZE TO
YOU ONE AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MORE WORK MUST BE DONE.
THIS IS THE ISSUE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT AS WELL AS THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON THIS SUBJECT. WHILE
PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS TO DATE, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT
THE EROSION OF RESTRAINTS IN THE THIRD WORLD ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE, AS WELL AS THE EVER GROWING DANGER OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. I AM CONVINCED THAT WE
MUST REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO MEET THIS THREAT TO THE
SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES.

I AM DETERMINED TO DO ALL I CAN TO ACHIEVE A
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON A WORLDWIDE BAN ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE THIS GOAL HAVING SPOKEN
OF IT PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A BOLD
APPROACH AIMED AT ACCELERATING THE WORK UNDERWAY IN
GENEVA AND BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. TO THAT END I AM
MAKING THE FOLLOWING COMMITMENTS:

-- DESTRUCTION OF MORE THAN 98 PERCENT OF THE U.S.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE WITHIN EIGHT YEARS AFTER
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION,
PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF THE
SIGNATORIES.

-- THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE STOCKPILE OF THE UNITED
STATES WITHIN TEN YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
CONVENTION, PROVIDED ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MJ

BECOME SIGNATORIES TO THE CONVENTION BY THE EIGHTH YEAR,
OR TOTAL ELIMINATION WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE TIME WHEN
ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES DO BECOME
SIGNATORIES, WHICHEVER IS LATER.

I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE A
SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO TAKE THE LEAD IN MOVING THE
MULTILATERAL PROCESS FORWARD. ACCORDINGLY, IN ADDITION
TO THE STEPS ABOVE, I AM PROPOSING THAT WHILE THE
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA CONTINUE, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION REDUCE THEIR RESPECTIVE
STOCKPILES TO LESS THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE CURRENT U.S.
LEVEL. AND THAT SUITABLE PROVISIONS BE MADE FOR THE
INSPECTION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROCESS.
VERIFICATION OF ANY AGREEMENT, EITHER BILATERAL OR
MULTILATERAL, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DAUNTING CHALLENGE.
IT WILL REQUIRE OPENNESS AND ACCEPTANCE OF A REGIME THAT
WILL DO JUSTICE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND
ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL THE SIGNATORIES.

SECRETARY BAKER HAS DISCUSSED MY PROPOSALS IN DETAIL
DURING HIS MEETINGS IN WYOMING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE. I INTEND TO ANNOUNCE THESE STEPS BEFORE
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

NEGOTIATING A MULTILATERAL, WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
BAN IS AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE. YET I BELIEVE THAT,
WITH THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION YOU HAVE SHOWN IN THE
PAST, OUR EFFORTS CAN SUCCEED.
SINCERELY,

END TEXT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE. EAGLEBURGER

BT

#6804

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6804 <TOR> 890925101027 MSG000244030227

<DIST>

PRT: VANERON

SIT: BENKO PRES MSGS BLACKWILL RICE DORMINEY RODMAN VAX BRANSCUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 280446Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2806-MR

12/2/2016 MM

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 345904

NODIS

E.O. 12356:: DECL:OADR

TAGS: UR, US, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF AN OCTOBER 18 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. IT WAS DELIVERED BY CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV DURING AN OCTOBER 26 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

HIS EXCELLENCY

MR. GEORGE BUSH

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY A SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, MAY I CONVEY TO YOU MY GOOD WISHES AND ALSO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY THOUGHTS.

MR. EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE INFORMED ME ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH YOU AND THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS HE HAD WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER. WE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE QUITE SATISFIED THAT IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO ENTER A NEW PHASE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND ALSO THAT A LARGER MEASURE OF CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED. IT IS MY HOPE THAT FOLLOWING DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND VIENNA AS WELL AS FURTHER MINISTERIALS YOU AND I SHALL BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.

IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OUR NEW ABM-RELATED PROPOSAL OFFERS A CHANCE FOR COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. WE FEEL THAT SOME SOLUTIONS MAY ALSO BE POSSIBLE ON THE ISSUE OF SLCMS AND ALCMS IN SHORT, WE SEEM TO HAVE COME WITHIN REACH OF THE SECOND TREATY IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS BOUND TO BE HIGHLY ACCLAIMED BY THE ENTIRE HUMAN RACE.

SIMILARLY, PROSPECTS NOW LOOK GOOD FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ALSO ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE -- THE TWO AREAS WHERE WE HAVE NOW A BROAD-BASED COINCIDENCE OF APPROACHES. I WISH TO TELL YOU PERSONALLY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE STEPS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE IN THOSE AREAS, WHICH HAVE PROVED QUITE HELPFUL.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WORK ON THE PROTOCOLS TO

THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING COMPLETED BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IN THE COURSE OF MY MEETING WITH YOU WE COULD SIGN AND SUBMIT THEM FOR RATIFICATION. THIS WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO ENHANCE UNIVERSAL SECURITY. WHAT I WISH TO REITERATE MOST FIRMLY IS THAT WE STAND FOR AGREEMENT ON TOTAL CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, ESPECIALLY SINCE VERIFICATION ISSUES NOW APPEAR TO BE MANAGEABLE.

THE STAGE WE HAVE JOINTLY REACHED IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL PROBLEMS IS AN INDICATION OF THE MATURITY AND PRODUCTIVENESS OF THE SOVIET-U.S. DIALOGUE. IN THIS AREA, IN ADDITION TO BROADER UNDERSTANDING, IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MEASURE OF COOPERATION ON A COMPROMISE BASIS.

IT IS A GOOD SIGN THAT SOVIET-U.S. TIES BETWEEN GENERAL PUBLIC AND IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE ARE ON THE RISE, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE INAUGURATION IN MOSCOW A FEW DAYS AGO OF AN IMPRESSIVE EXHIBITION "UNITED STATES-89," WHICH I TOURED LAST WEEK.

I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR THE KIND GREETINGS YOU CONVEYED THROUGH MR. EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE, FOR YOUR WISHES OF SUCCESS TO SOVIET PERESTROYKA. OF COURSE, WE ARE KEENLY FOLLOWING THE REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE ONGOING TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THERE IS EFFECTIVE RECOGNITION IN WASHINGTON THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF OUR REFORMS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. IF THAT IS THE CASE, OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAY EXPECT BROAD PROSPECTS TO OPEN BEFORE THEM, WHICH IT WILL BE YOUR AND MY TASK TO MAKE A REALITY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. CARRYING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU WILL BE MR. YEVGENI PRIMAKOV, HEAD OF THE VISITING SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, WHICH PLANS TO FAMILIARIZE ITSELF WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, SHARE INFORMATION ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN OUR COUNTRY, AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATORS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE DELEGATION WILL BE ACCORDED A WARM WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES. WITH PROFOUND RESPECT AND LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR EARLY MEETING.

KREMLIN, MOSCOW

OCTOBER 18, 1989

/SIGNED/MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

END TEXT OF LETTER.

KIMMITT

BT

#5904

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 5904 <TOR> 891028100349 MSG000246881029

<DIST>

PRT: VANERON

SIT: PRES MSGS VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 282036Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8826
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 7361

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THANK-YOU LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT

UNCLAS STATE 346876

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: THANK-YOU LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
THE PRESIDENT

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
THANK-YOU LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. A SIGNED ORIGINAL
WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED, BUT THERE IS NO
OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE IN THE WAKE OF
THE TRAGIC EARTHQUAKE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA. THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAVE THE SHARED
EXPERIENCE OF GREAT EARTHQUAKES. I KNOW THAT I SPEAK FOR
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN SAYING THAT WE WERE DEEPLY MOVED
BY YOUR MESSAGE AND BY YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE.

THOUGH THE DAMAGE AND LOSS OF LIFE WAS CONSIDERABLE, THE
CLEAN-UP EFFORT IS PROCEEDING WELL. OUR CONCERN NOW IS
TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO PREPARE BETTER FOR FUTURE
EARTHQUAKES. AS YOU KNOW, SEISMOLOGISTS ARE MAKING
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES AND
PATTERNS OF MAJOR DISTURBANCES. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND ASK YOU TO SEND
A TEAM OF SOVIET SEISMOLOGISTS TO JOIN THE U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY'S EFFORT TO ASSESS THE BAY AREA
EARTHQUAKE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS JOINT EFFORT -- DRAWING
UPON DATA FROM THE ARMENIAN AND BAY AREA EARTHQUAKES --
CAN CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
PHENOMENON.

SINCE WE HAVE RECENTLY SHARED THIS TRAGIC EXPERIENCE, LET
US TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE OUR KNOWLEDGE AND
EXPERTISE IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT FURTHER DISASTERS.
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF
SUCH A VISIT.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

- MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,

- CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

- OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,

- MOSCOW.

+ / Bessmeringh (+ Eagleburger)
8/13/69

B. Carl asked me to report.
He & Scher. met all day &
I have a vacation and must
there is desirability & necessity
to meet & discuss a prob bet
us. An informal mtg would
be best to get to know each
other. It is a modality which
is diff. I would go to D.R. if
I had not given a comprehensive
speech last year. That
possibility does not ~~exist~~
~~exist~~ offer itself. As for Canada
Munro already scheduled.
As for Mexico & H.A., not in
this time period. As for Norway
degree, my work & time would
not permit.

aside:
received
a tough
domestic
situation

Third country looks still best.
Spain would be ideal. We
even looked at secret mtg
but that doesn't appear
possible.

Let's look at a possibility
once again. Our Ministers
perhaps could meet at Carlsbad
first mtg or set a regular
Sept mtg. But we must
keep it confidential.

P I understand. Secret inty not possible, let's keep thinking about it & try to figure it out. I will discuss only w/ my top advisers & it will stay confidential.
My prob. w/ Spain is it become a summit. Perhaps more for us than for them because of our press. (Describes again a peak of summity).
We won't give cop center line to work at it.

B We have a security process I will report back.

P I just don't want to be pressed to go further than we really like on AC, for example. These things need to mature in their own time, not to a summit schedule.

B Perhaps we can prepare our people by talking about inty w/ no schedule, no agenda

S You maybe can do it. Our press would buy it. That's the way it started at Reyk.

B That's right. Keep a good example. That is the way

it started out.

S Unless it appears accidental,
our press turns it into
a secret.

P Well let's keep trying. We
will review all possibilities and
stay in touch on it. Please
give my regards to all in
this case + Gail Gohar Doby,
Abrownier w/ whom we had
a great wity.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 1, 1989

Bob Gates

Bob,

Here are the notes from Brent's meeting
last Saturday with Akhromeyev.

BB

Bob Blackwill

File ^{Flora} up here
"Super
Secretariat"

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Handwritten Notes	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (18 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [4]

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin - January 16, 1989
9:30 - 11:30 hrs.

A

Dobrynin received me in an office in the Kremlin in the suite of the President of the USSR. He welcomed me extremely warmly. He had been extremely pleased by Scowcroft's phone call. Gorbachev would receive me but it would help if Bush's letter could be studied ahead of time. I gave Dobrynin a copy and said I would turn the original over myself.

Dobrynin asked what Washington understood by a political dialogue. I said that the best I could do was to give him substantially the same analysis I had made to the President-elect about conditions in Central Europe. One possible topic would be to explore whether political control and security guarantees could be separated. Dobrynin asked whether we were willing to reduce American troops in Europe. Cautioning him that the Bush administration had not yet formulated precise policies, I expressed the personal opinion that as part of a general political agreement some reductions could be envisaged. The zero option was however totally out of the question.

Dobrynin asked about arms control talks. I pointed out that the new Administration needed time to review its position especially with respect to weapons such as mobiles. It was also interested in conventional arms control.

Dobrynin then turned to Afghanistan. I said that in my personal view we could agree to no solutions that kept the Najibullah government in place in the cities. This is why a cease fire as proposed by Gorbachev at the UN had been rejected. However, the US had no interest in using Afghanistan as a base for hostile acts against the USSR. But in any real political discussion the Soviet Union had to accept the same restraint with respect to Nicaragua. Dobrynin replied that Gorbachev had offered to stop sending arms to Nicaragua if the US ceased supplying arms to Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras. I said this was an absurd suggestion, as it implied that the Soviet Union had equal political and security interests in Central America.

There was a general discussion of other issues: Ethiopia, economic relations, Europe.

Dobrynin then returned to the problem of a channel. He said Gorbachev was eager to establish a system of truly confidential communication with the President. He thought it important to have an opportunity to "open his heart" and hoped Bush would do the same. The foreign policy of the two countries could then

January 16

-2-

A

be coordinated or at least harmonized. He analyzed various ideas. He did not think it could work via the ambassadors because it would be difficult to keep the required secrecy. On the Soviet side he would be the contact. He would get back to me after I had spoken to Gorbachev.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Henry A. Kissinger
Alexander Yakovlev
January 16, 1989, 4:00-6:45.

Initial conversation was about Yakovlev's alleged anti-Americanism, which he supposedly acquired while a student at Columbia. Yakovlev denied this, saying that he had learned much at Columbia, especially from the students, who had befriended him, and defended him on occasion, against Ukrainian nationalists. He did, however, believe that the average American had stereotypes about the Soviet Union; as an example, he related his experience on a visit to a farm in Iowa. The wife of the farmer was surprised at Yakovlev's fondness for children, because she thought that the Soviets had communal wives and communal children.

By way of introduction, Kissinger recalled that Yakovlev had said to him at a social gathering that if they had been in office at the same time they could have had some interesting conversations. Kissinger noted that he had recently met with the President-elect and his key advisors to discuss Kissinger's trip to the Soviet Union. He said he had two general subjects he wished to raise: foreign policy and perestroika.

He believed that the Administration wanted to make a major effort with the Soviet Union so that they could both look back in four years and say that they had made a significant difference, not just in adjusting numbers of weapons but politically as well. In this connection, he had discussed some ideas with the President-elect which he would repeat here. But Kissinger did not claim that the President-elect necessarily agrees with every last point.

The first question was how to start to give substance to symbolism of the recent improvement of relations. The new Administration will start immediately to study the situation and will be interested to find a way to start a dialogue that will lead to a broad understanding.

Yakovlev responded that personally he thought it would be important to strengthen elements of continuity of policy, even in words; during their luncheon with Gorbachev both Reagan and Bush had said they wanted to maintain good relations, and Gorbachev had replied that it was important to say just that to the world.

Kissinger said that this will certainly happen.

Yakovlev continued: the second point was that Bush had mentioned the ecology and chemical weapons as issues to address

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early; now there had been the Paris meeting on chemical weapons, but there could be something more if the Administration had ideas on the ecology. Senator Gore, before the election, had proposed a conference on ecology.

Kissinger said that as the new Administration reviewed policy there were two issues: first there were the strategic issues and arms control. As the Administration had yet to define its defense budget it could not finally decide on issues in START negotiations; for example, what to do about mobile missiles. Until that was decided, it was difficult to decide how to handle the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 in the negotiations. The Soviet Union should not exercise pressure to speed up the process.

The second issue to be reviewed was the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons and arms control. In part this was because in the past conventional arms control had not been stressed enough and had not been studied for concrete ideas. For example, equality of numbers of forces did not necessarily guarantee security; victories had been won with inferior numbers in the past. Moreover, there were other aspects of special importance: the difference between the US and the USSR in the distances that they each withdrew their forces and how quickly they could be returned; how quickly disbanded forces could be remobilized.

Thus this involved the future of Europe. If military dispositions change on both sides, it means that a fluid situation will develop. This could be dangerous if it occurred without discussion of political evolution.

In short, the most important issue was that the two sides had not had a serious discussion of the political relationship. The Soviet Union was settling Afghanistan, but the issue would not disappear; the situation will continue even after Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets had been helpful in settling Angola, but that issue, too, would continue to have a life of its own. And, of course, we were deeply concerned about Nicaragua.

Then there were the other issues, such as ecology, that Yakovlev had mentioned. Kissinger believed that rapid progress was possible on this, but on the other questions did Yakovlev have any ideas how to give them content?

Yakovlev replied that he understood that the new Administration would want to take some time to study issues including the strategic talks, and would want to look around. The Soviet Union would be patient. But still the two sides had to find

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ways to point out that the relationship was continuing, so as not to scare world opinion, lest people believe there is a danger that process will stop. To be clear, we agree that we have to go deeper into strategic and, above all, political issues.

But the fourth issue is the economic relationship. The Soviet Union does not need that much technology and frankly the Soviet Union does not have the money to buy it. But he thinks that the question is also a psychological one; the two sides have some distance to go, because of the obstacles that we put in the way in the past.

The old style was to exchange insults; i.e., Jackson-Vanik amendment; it did not have an economic impact on the USSR but did have a psychological impact.

The Soviet leaders now get letters saying that they are engaging in revisionism; people complain that they (the leaders) are going against the principles of socialism. Critics say that we, the Soviet side, stopped anti-American statements, but the Americans have not stopped their anti-Soviet campaign. We are criticised at party meetings, also, that we are "selling out" to the Americans. He, Yakovlev, had been attacked personally as a "Mason" whose name was Epstein (sic). Kissinger must understand this is because he had been accused of ridiculous things in his country.

But the period we have is a serious one. The reason is that new questions are arising and people ask what are we waiting for? The outside world is asking the same. So we must continue to build mutual relations but to consider the effect of politics within our own communities and of political issues between our countries.

Kissinger agreed that the problem was psychological as well as political. For example, he had been critical of the Reagan Administration on occasion because he found it difficult to believe that the personal friendship between a man of Reagan's background and a man of Gorbachev's background as a life-long member of the communist party could become the principal basis for settling our differences. The only reliable basis was national interest; and it would be precarious if put purely on a personal basis. Kissinger said that he did not believe that the Soviets had specific plans for world domination, though one could interpret some policies in that way. It could be argued that Gorbachev had two objectives: first, to take away from the US and the West the image of a common enemy, on the calculation that the alliances would fall apart, and, second, to delegitimize nuclear weapons beginning with the INF treaty. This is creating a new situation in Germany, in that the Germans feel

betrayed; then a nationalism will develop -- in both the East and West side of Germany. (Yakovlev nodded vigorously at this remark.) While the Soviets cannot be blamed for accepting the zero option, to put it on top of the political situation and then to start stressing conventional arms control -- where will it all lead? That is the question: for example, what does it mean when you say you will adopt "defensive" positions after some divisions are withdrawn? Where will the divisions go? We would like clarity on your unilateral acts. Meanwhile, in Germany there is a new trend toward nationalism; for us this will be embarrassing for 5 years, but for the Soviet Union it will be a problem for 50 years. Germany's unfulfilled goals are in the East, not in the West.

All of this could also create a situation in Eastern Europe that would become explosive; thus, the Soviets may see some trend or face some challenge and have to demonstrate that they are still powerful in Eastern Europe. At that point American opinion would react and conclude that the Soviets had always been devils.

Therefore we should begin a political discussion of the evolution in Europe (and elsewhere). We cannot stop history, but we can prevent events from blowing up. An evolution must be possible but it should be understood. We are not interested in securing our position on your back, not interested in creating new problems. But we will defend our vital interests in Afghanistan, for example; we are not seeking a permanent position or to make it a permanent challenge. You have legitimate security interests on your borders; the reverse is true in Central America. That could be the basis for a discussion: i.e., who can do what to whom; it could lead to some formal agreements, or understanding, but some issues cannot be formal.

If this discussion can occur, then when you have arms control it has a political context.

In sum, this is the kind of thinking that exists in the new group in Washington.

In addition, if both of us look around the world we can see new power centers emerging; neither of us can win anything permanent from the other. But we can exhaust ourselves against each other, and only the new centers would benefit. But if we can approach issues together, then when heads of government meet they can have a strategic review, while documents prepared at lower levels can be consummated.

We do not want a situation in which Europe blows up, but neither did the Great Powers before World War I; each contributed to that crisis, because no one knew what the limits

-5-

were.

Yakovlev: we are ready for detailed discussions; while our interests may not be the same, we can approach common problems "normally"; and above all we must not let different interests drive us to a military confrontation. As for the geopolitical process, this has started. The Soviets are leaving Afghanistan; we have talked hours and hours with the Cubans in this very room about Angola. And we are having discussions with the Ethiopians. You, the US, could use your influence with your friends to calm down others (meaning Somalia). These discussions can include other areas, including Europe.

Kissinger: this (Ethiopia) could be the subject of a quiet discussion.

Yakovlev: yes, I agree that we need to work on both the political and psychological. I mentioned our past history of relations, marked by suspicions (anecdote of Metternich's death: when Talleyrand was informed, he commented, 'I wonder what the old fox meant by that?') The point is how to change?

I (Yakovlev) have attended the five meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev; I read all of Reagan's statements before he took office and after, and we had concluded that we could never come to terms, but we were mistaken. There is another Reagan, who does not use the language of 5 years ago.

Kissinger: yes, but we have to move from here to political content. In four years we could say that there could be qualitative changes. (In light of perestroika) what could the outside world do about the Soviet situation?

Yakovlev: I still think we should strengthen the general atmosphere, to eliminate the stereotypes; trading helps both, not just communism. What has happened at Vienna (conference on CSCE) is alright.

Kissinger: Let me make a philosophical point. In our country, the US, we have no real tradition of a foreign policy based on national interests. We have thought other countries were either devils or angels. The result has been a great fluctuation. On the other hand, Russia has never lived in equilibrium with its neighbors. Russia was either invaded, or expanded outward to gain security. Thus both of our countries need to find a way to live with each other in equilibrium, without the US seeking to destroy the Soviet Union in its national borders, and without the Soviets seeking absolute security. The Soviets could possibly gain an advantage, and so could the US, but neither side can defeat the other without the

other side noticing. The net result would be both sides would be exhausted and others would benefit.

In short, this relationship should be the subject of a serious dialogue, and then arms control could be solved more quickly. I have discussed these views with our senior people in the next Administration and they are ready for a dialogue in good faith.

Kissinger: Finally, I have one question: what is the message I should carry back?

Yakovlev: I read in your book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and recall parts about the status quo. That is important; we have common interests in maintaining the status quo and to approach the changes life brings seriously and honestly.

Kissinger: I agree, but it is difficult to put it that way in the US.

Yakovlev: When bilateral relations improve, we have expectations and hopes; for example, I think about the possibility of no nuclear weapons. But then there would still be terrorism and local fires, so that is why we have to maintain the status quo.

Kissinger: It is not possible to eliminate nuclear weapons but we could achieve a situation in which the danger of nuclear confrontation was more remote.

The problem is that part of the world is in evolution. Take the situation in Poland. We have no anti-Soviet interest in Poland, but can we separate the political evolution for security interests. In that case, we could recognize what things threaten security and how could they be avoided, while the political evolution continues.

Yakovlev: I agree we could separate the two.

Kissinger: Our people are ready to discuss this seriously.

Yakovlev: But it is necessary not to increase agitation.

Kissinger: In Poland, preventing agitation also means refraining from suppression by the Soviet Union, while maintaining security requirements in the military field.

Yakovlev: If we get rid of all foreign troops there could be new evolution.

-7-

Kissinger: More likely that there would be small garrisons of foreign troops, stationary, as a security guarantee.

Yakovlev: Guarantee of security against whom?

Kissinger: You prefer to push our forces out, but that is out of the question. You can reinforce troops quicker than we. All forces from Germany?

You mentioned some mechanism for continuing discussions that could be used with 100 percent confidence.

Yakovlev: Yes, I mentioned this to Gorbachev. If Bush agrees, it is alright.

Kissinger: Our people have not worked out the details but agree to the principle.

II

Kissinger: We admire Gorbachev's courage in tackling these problems of perestroika. We are interested in how they are working, because foreign and domestic are related.

Yakovlev: On perestroika, frankly it is proving much more difficult than we anticipated. We were idealistic; we believed that its support would grow stronger and stronger. But the economy is more imbalanced than we expected. We thought people would welcome democratization and glasnost. But it is not so, many say why change. Recently we have had letters that say what we need is a firm hand. We answer that democracy will mean more power, but that is difficult to prove.

What we need is a good harvest.

Second, we started with new economic activities in management, cost accounting, and what happened? While increasing value of goods, they disappeared. People bought them immediately. There is no scarcity; goods have all been purchased, even expensive goods such as jewelry.

This of course was aggravated by rumors of price reforms. We could produce more goods, but our approach is to put more into investment. We have put money into machine building, for example. As we increase, and shift more and more to cost-accounting, then taken together we believe that this will produce results.

Kissinger: But there must be 10,000 officials who are

opposed to reforms, or at least are not eager to eliminate their jobs.

Yakovlev: Yes, but politically we want to make the Supreme Soviet an important control body, to check on results, to protect society from errors.

Kissinger: But this will reduce the power of the Central Committee?

Yakovlev: Yes, this will mean a reduction in Central Committee organizations, but in reality they will have more importance because now the minister can no longer say it was the center's fault, and now they will be independent.

As for price reforms, it is impossible to continue with prices based on arbitrary social categories. Prices must reflect the cost of production, but people are opposed to new prices. We have tried to explain that they will get back the extra cost in availability of goods, that they will not lose in the long run, but they do not believe it.

Kissinger: And now they have the Chinese experience as an example of problems.

Yakovlev: Yes. And now many are opposed to price reforms; even Arbatov who was originally for it is now opposed. You can ask him. Now they argue that cost of production must be reduced first so that prices will not rise much.

Our managers will be given more authority, but they do not know what to do with it. Some of our economists are poorly informed. A leading economist told me he knew nothing of the US Federal Reserve system, for example. But we are sending managers abroad for training, including to the US. When we do institute price reform, then they will have to deal in a free market, so they must be ready.

Meeting with Gorbachev - January 17, 1989
12:00-1:20 pm

B

Gorbachev received me in the office in the Kremlin familiar to me from Brezhnev's day. However the huge conference table has been replaced by a normal oval-shaped table seating perhaps eight. The telephone console looking like an organ near the desk has given way to a normal-sized telephone.

In the presence of some television reporters Gorbachev greeted me warmly though he seemed less ebullient than at his first meeting two years ago or even during his visit to the United States. I handed him the Presidential letter which he put aside, having obviously read the copy I had left with Dobrynin the day before.

Gorbachev said that he eagerly welcomed a confidential dialogue with the new Administration. He took the fact that the President-elect had approached him even before the inauguration as a sign of good faith and serious commitment to a dialogue. There were new forces at large in the world. Despite many changes, the United States and the Soviet Union still had the principal responsibility for preserving the peace. The two sides in conflict could only exhaust each other, not make permanent gains from each other.

Gorbachev joked that at Governor's Island Reagan had offered to be the conscience of Bush. I said that Bush needed no outside impetus to seek a stable peace. However, while Reagan had laid the foundation, the new Administration would have to work with Gorbachev to put up the structure and furnish it. This could only be done on the basis of reciprocity and concreteness, not a general atmosphere.

Gorbachev said he had taken my point to Dobrynin regarding START. There would be no Soviet pressure. However, he thought the political dialogue could begin earlier - as far as he was concerned as early as March. He was prepared to send Dobrynin to the United States or receive Scowcroft in Moscow. Or an emissary could come if Scowcroft was unavailable. A note should be sent via the Soviet UN Ambassador, preferably from Scowcroft, although in order to preserve the privacy of the channel it would be best if the outside envelope were from me. The Soviets would then announce Dobrynin's visit. On the Soviet side only the fewest people would know of the channel: at this point only Yakovlev, Dobrynin and himself, although he would tell Shevardnadze in his capacity as Politburo member when he returned from Vienna. I told him that on the US side to the best

B

of my knowledge only the President-elect, Baker, Scowcroft and Sununu were as yet involved.

// ??

Gorbachev then reviewed a number of international problems, especially the European situation along the lines of the meeting with Yakovlev (see attached). I summed up my concern about the European situation, especially Germany and Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev replied: "I have thought about what you said to Dobrynin and Yakovlev. My view is that we should both keep an eye on Germany and by that I mean both Germanies. We must not do anything to unsettle Europe into a crisis." As for Eastern Europe his view was as follows: life brings certain changes which no one can stop and that applied as well to Eastern Europe. But both sides should be careful not to threaten each other's security. That was the spirit in which he would approach the dialogue.

He recalled that the President-elect had expressed concerns about the environment on Governor's Island. He was prepared to move ahead on cooperative efforts immediately, though he realized that was not the heart of the President-elect's message.

// Let's move soon - no downside

He also stressed the need for better economic cooperation.

He then dictated the following oral message to the President-elect: "I am ready to begin an exchange of views taking into account the need to harmonize our policies on international matters. I greatly appreciate the message especially that a confidential channel has been opened even at this early stage. Please convey to Mr. Bush my very warm regards. Tell him that he can count not only on my understanding of the considerations you have put forward but on my very warm cooperation. He can rely on me."

As I got up to leave Gorbachev grew pensive. He said "I lead a strange country. I am trying to take my people in a direction they do not understand and many do not want to go. When I became General Secretary I thought that by now perestroika would be completed. Instead the economic reform has only just begun. But one thing is sure - whatever happens to perestroika this country will never be the same again."

I said if I were a historian I would ask how as a product of the old system he could be so determined to change its premises. He replied wistfully: "It was easy to see what

sum up Gov. Iske

U

B

was wrong. What is harder is to find out what works. But I need a long period of peace."

Conclusion: In my view Gorbachev is treading water with perestroika. He is looking to foreign policy as a way out. He will pay a reasonable price to that end.

Dinner with Dobrynin - January 12, 1989
18:30-20:00 hrs.

Dobrynin invited me to dinner at the elegant club for senior officials of the Communist party.

Dobrynin began the conversation by handing me a letter to the President from Gorbachev. In thinking about the conversation Gorbachev had concluded that an oral message was not enough. He therefore asked me to transmit the letter.

? As for the channel, Gorbachev was of the view that the political dialogue could start even before the arms control negotiations. I pointed out that the President as well as Baker and Scowcroft would be traveling to Japan during the last part of February. Dobrynin thought the first half of March might be a good time to start the channel. As for procedure, he outlined three options: (1) Scowcroft could come to Moscow; (2) I could return to Moscow; (3) Dobrynin could come to Washington on the pretext of accepting an invitation from Senator Pell in Dobrynin's capacity as a member of the Supreme Soviet.

Clearly Dobrynin preferred the last option. The best way to trigger it would be either a letter from me via the Soviet UN ambassador in a double envelope that Washington was ready to start the political dialogue. Even better would be a letter from Scowcroft to that effect, though in that case the outer envelope should be from me. A third possibility was to send the letter via Kendall who would be visiting the Soviet Union at the end of February. In that case, too, the outer envelope should be from me since much as he liked Kendall he did not want him as political messenger. In each case Dobrynin would then accept the invitation from Pell.

Dobrynin then reviewed once again the substance of the previous discussions to make sure he had understood the points correctly.

He asked specifically whether after Soviet troop withdrawal we would be willing to be helpful in Afghanistan. I replied that it depended on what was meant by helpful. We could not help keep Najibullah in power. I stressed the need for Soviet cooperation on ~~Afghanistan~~ **NICARAGUA**.

Dobrynin added to the agenda Soviet concern about Japanese rearmament and US support for it. He also repeated Soviet historic distrust of China. "In 30 years they will be a nightmare", he said. I did not comment.

January 18

-2-

P.8--

Coming back to the European concept Dobrynin mused whether perhaps Eastern Europe should form an economic unit to deal with the EEC in the framework I had outlined.

The atmosphere was boisterously cordial.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Draft Official Translation

His Excellency Mr. James Baker
U.S. Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have carefully studied your letter on Central America and would like to share with you certain thoughts in connection with the issues you have raised in it. Of course the exchange of opinions that we had in Paris with regard to this problem and your comments on various aspects of the American approach have helped us to gain a better understanding of the U.S. position.

Moreover, taking into consideration all of our latest contacts and discussions concerning the problems of Central America as well as the events occurring in the region itself, I believe that I am justified in saying that the conditions exist for a qualitatively new stage of Soviet-American cooperation in establishing the favorable, external prerequisites for a lasting and just political settlement in Central America. The Latin Americans themselves are consistently pursuing this goal and our own policy is firmly directed toward this end.

I will not conceal that I was pleased to learn of your high opinion of the Soviet approach to Central American affairs as responsible and constructive. As you know, its fundamental principles are set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's May letter to President Bush. We also welcomed further reciprocal identification of areas of coincident interests including during the consultations of experts, which I also regard as useful.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS
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2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

I wish to emphasize that we attribute great importance to the new U.S. approach towards settlement of Central American problems that you set forth in Moscow and, in particular, your intention to eventually normalize relations with Managua. This is an extremely important political statement and we believe that it offers very encouraging prospects.

However (and I believe that the new quality of our dialogue allows me to be so frank), we do not yet observe corresponding movement in the practice of U.S. policy. Even in your last letter, which on the whole I consider very positive, there are (to put it mildly) strained interpretations, imprecise judgments and statements that actually lead us far afield from the tasks of establishing a lasting and just peace in Central America. However, most important, I did not perceive concrete details or determination to achieve results in the immediate future.

I would not want you to reproach me for unfounded assertions and I, for my own part, will dwell upon certain questions which we consider of utmost importance in working out effective Soviet-American cooperation.

In your letter you put emphasis on the forthcoming elections in Nicaragua. However, first of all, the prospects of a comprehensive peace settlement are by no means based on the domestic situation in that country. Secondly, I disagree completely with your characterization of the motives of the Sandinista government. If one looks dispassionately with facts in hand at the actual implementation of the Guatemala and Salvadoran agreements (the latter of which for some reason you have not mentioned), any unbiased person will note that it is Nicaragua that has taken the lead here and it is Managua that is following the letter and spirit of those agreements in the most scrupulous fashion.

A new graphic example of this is the agreement between the Sandinista government and all political forces on measures guaranteeing the free choice of the Nicaraguan people during the February elections. Yes, Managua has made serious concessions and has even taken certain risks in the name of national reconciliation. Now (and this is acknowledged by many countries), it is difficult to cast aspersions on the sincerity of the Sandinistas. Demanding criteria have been established for holding the elections as well as reliable (one might even say dual) guarantees. Monitoring will be carried out not only by various parties within Nicaragua, but also by various international observers including representatives of such authoritative organizations as the United Nations and the OAS.

However, the issue I have touched upon primarily concerns the competence of the people of Central America themselves. Life has shown that if at least no one interferes with them and if nothing is done to thwart the Central American dialogue, they will be able to reach an agreement. You and I, I believe, should aim for a higher goal: not only not to hinder an internal settlement but to encourage it, to strengthen the constructive spirit of all the participants.

The latest conference of the Presidents of the five Central American countries which, in our opinion, concluded with very significant results, has confirmed once again that the main obstacle to reaching a settlement at the present time is lack of agreement on the disbandment of the contras. Many decisions have been taken, good decisions, but their implementation has been much worse. The Central Americans themselves will in fact now judge on the basis of actions in this regard about the sincerity and interest in a peaceful settlement in the region. To assert something else means, as I have said, to deviate from seeking a solution.

That is why I'm convinced that our joint and parallel steps in facilitating the process of political settlement would be the best manifestation of new thinking in the U.S. and Soviet approach to Central American affairs. I also see a specific area of coinciding views here. I have specifically noted your readiness to facilitate the working out and continuous functioning of the international monitoring regime. I think that the rapid implementation of such a regime will remove many concerns -- both on the part of the U.S. as well as on the part of those countries which, in turn, do not trust U.S. policy.

We note with satisfaction the clear movement forward with regard to El Salvador. There should be no misunderstanding here: the Soviet Union has been and is in favor of a political solution here and is not taking any steps which would impede it. Moreover, I am prepared to take upon myself the responsibility of certifying that Nicaragua and Cuba are also in favor of a political, and not a military solution. But, of course, they clearly are in favor of a just political solution.

Now, with regard to the evaluation of our actions which I can only qualify as biased evaluations. The Soviet Union has taken a very important step: in the interest of creating favorable conditions for a Central American settlement, it has suspended the implementation of its obligations with regard to the supply of weapons to Nicaragua. And why does someone have to purposely confuse the issue and distort it? What do we have here? A throwback to old thinking, or a conscious desire to mask the lack of one's own constructive reaction to this manifestation of unilateral restraint? For clearly it is impossible that, in Washington, they do not know the true situation in the area.

I do not want to end this useful conversation on a critical note, especially since, as I have already written, I share your

thought that the time for a breakthrough on Central America is not only ripe, but that there is a unique "window of opportunity" for it. And here, I repeat, the five-point program you have laid out is, undoubtedly, in principle a positive factor. However, the constructive intentions of the U.S. of which you spoke, are basically directed toward the future, but concrete steps are demanded of the two of us right now. I have already spoken of some of them. There are also others. Specifically, I am still convinced that the beginning of a direct dialogue with Managua will resolve many of the problems -- both for you and for the Nicaraguans. Obviously, this must be an open dialogue between partners ready to achieve an understanding, without pressure, without imposition of one's will, and without preconditions. I know from the Nicaraguans that they are prepared for such a constructive dialogue.

It is clear that our discussion of these important issues must not turn into a monologue and I anxiously await the thoughts you have in reply. In this regard we are very interested in the U.S. intention, of which you speak in your letter, to take "further steps" to demonstrate the fact that the U.S. is dedicated to abiding by all the provisions of the agreements reached by the Central American forces. I assume that we will return to this topic in the course of our following meeting.

Despite all the importance of the problems in Central America, I would nevertheless like to use this opportunity to expand somewhat the framework of our regional dialogue. You wrote in your letter that a breakthrough in questions of a Central American settlement would have far-reaching implications, and would demonstrate "the depth of the transformation which Soviet-American relations have undergone."

Agreeing with this thesis in principle, I, at the same time, believe that it should relate in equal measure to our cooperation in other regions as well where dangerous hotbeds of conflict exists. And here, without doubt, the question of Afghanistan is in the forefront.

To be blunt: I was encouraged by your statement in Paris that the U.S. is disposed with understanding toward our concern just as we are not indifferent to the concern of the U.S. side in connection with the situation in Central America. In actuality we will be able to use to the fullest the potential of Soviet-American regional cooperation only when we reject any "double standards" and attempts to depart from finding a just balance of interests.

Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, our practical policy both in Central America and in Afghanistan can be characterized as considered and responsible. In all situations, including the most complicated and ambiguous ones, we conduct a consistent policy of securing a balance of interests both for direct participants in conflicts as well as for other parties involved in them.

Unfortunately until now it is difficult for me to characterize US policy in an analogous way, especially on the Afghan question. On the contrary, one gets the impression that it is becoming increasingly rigid, one could even say demonstrably rigid. Despite the fact the America is one of the guarantors of the Geneva agreements, it is giving open support to an extremist element of the opposition, and actively helping to turn Pakistan into a staging ground for aggression against a sovereign neighboring country.

Such a policy flagrantly contradicts new Afghan realities (I am able to make a judgment about this boldly, on the basis of the freshest personal impressions from my visit to Afghanistan). A policy of encouraging fanatic fundamentalist forces could hardly serve the interests of the United States either. Moreover, of course, "this sort of reciprocity", if one takes into account the desire for peace and restraint which distinguishes Soviet policy on regional questions, does not fit into the generally encouraging development of the Soviet-American dialogue.

In connection with this I would like to express the hope that the constructive character of our last discussion will be turned into practical deeds and the American side will assess in a new way the situation surrounding Afghanistan and, most important, will introduce long overdue corrections into its policy. I am confident that this will give an even richer content to that "new closeness" between our two countries that President Bush spoke about and about which we, as I understand, agreed to facilitate in the process of our dialogue.

Just like you, I am looking forward to a deepened discussion of the entire U.S.-Soviet agenda for the purpose of moving relations forward; our next meeting in September in the U.S. will afford such an opportunity.

Sincerely,

/s/

Moscow
August 9, 1989



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1989

President Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow

Dear President Gorbachev:

I am taking advantage of Henry Kissinger's travel to Moscow to send you this personal note.

At the outset I want to tell you of my deep appreciation for the attention given my son and grandson during their recent mission to Armenia. Seeing that terrible tragedy firsthand was a deeply moving experience for them both; they came away with a great respect for the strength and dedication of the people who are now seeking to rebuild from the disaster.

May I also underscore the comments I made to you at the time of your visit to the United Nations last year. As I explained at that time, my new national security team and I will need time to reflect on the range of issues -- particularly those relating to arms control -- central to our bilateral relationship, and to formulate our own thoughts on how best to move that relationship forward. Our purpose is to assure a sound and coherent American approach; it is in no way an attempt to delay or reverse the positive progress that has marked the past year or two.

I am very serious about moving our relationship forward for the benefit of both our countries and world peace. I believe it is important to lift our dialogue -- especially between the two of us -- beyond the details of arms control proposals to the issues of the larger political relationship we should want to create.

I am determined to do everything I can to construct and solidify a sound and solid relationship. I am looking forward to maintaining personal contact with you as we deal with the common tasks we have before us.

Sincerely,

George Bush



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0100 FINAL
20 December 1989

Demarche to Soviet Union
Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev

1. Read enclosed Presidential announcement to Gorbachev
2. President asked me personally to brief you on this matter.
3. The President wants you to know that he took this action only after becoming convinced that General Noriega had become increasingly unstable and dangerous and that the American community, which numbers 35,000 people faced increasing violent threats. As you know, a U.S. serviceman was shot to death by PDF forces shortly after General Noriega declared war on the United States and a serviceman's was brutalized and his wife sexually threatened in a separate incident.
4. The United States sees no precedent in this action. Just the opposite. This situation is unique.
5. A democratic election was held May 7th and the results were internationally recognized. The democratic choice was denied through violence and repression.

6. Moreover, General Noriega is an indicted drug trafficker wanted for prosecution in the U.S.
7. In addition, the United States has obligations under the Panama Canal Treaties to safeguard safe passage through the Panama Canal for all nations. Those Treaties have the force of international law.
8. The United States intends to remove its forces as quickly as possible. It also intends to normalize its relations fully with the Endara government. We hope that the Endara government will have peaceful friendly relations with others, including the Soviet Union.
9. We have informed both Managua and Havana that they face absolutely no security threat as a result of this action. We hope you will repeat and reinforce this message.
10. We hope also that Nicaragua does not use this unique action as an excuse to violate its commitment under Esquipulas to go forward with the currently scheduled elections. The United States remains committed to recognize the winner of the election if it is free and fair no matter which party wins. The U.S. also remains fully committed to resolve the conflicts in both Nicaragua and El Salvador under the

Esquipulas Treaties, including the commitments relayed by Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

11. The President hopes that in the spirit of Malta that your government will take no action that will inflame this situation or make it more difficult to resolve this crisis quickly, peacefully, and democratically.

~~SECRET~~

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DRAMATIC EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BERLIN AND THE GDR THAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 10. I WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ARE CORRECT AND PROMISING. THE LIFTING OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR THE POPULATION OF THE GDR REPRESENTS A HISTORIC STEP. I BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOAL OF CREATING A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU AT OUR MEETING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NEXT MONTH.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDABLY HIGH EMOTIONS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, THE EVENTS IN RECENT DAYS IN BERLIN HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL. WE SHARE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER ARE MAINTAINED, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN. IN FACT, THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH OUR GERMAN PARTNERS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THIS REMAINS THE CASE. I SUGGEST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THE INTERESTS OF AVOIDING SURPRISES OR THE EMERGENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2011-0840-JR
2/25/2014 MM


IN YOUR LETTER, YOU VOICED CONCERN THAT THE LEADERS OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE
TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE
FRG LEADERSHIP HAS ACTED WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY,
EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH
TO CHANGE IN THE GDR AND THE NEED TO AVOID DESTABILIZING THE
SITUATION IN EUROPE. *As a matter of fact, I have
talked personally with Chancellor Kohl on this
point and I can assure you he agrees with us on the
need for*
AS FOR THE APPROACH OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT, LET ME SAY THAT WE
APPRECIATE THE DEPTH AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT'S *transi-*
DECISION TO LIFT CONTROLS ON THE TRAVEL OF ITS CITIZENS, AND WE
WELCOME ITS EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORM -- A COURSE WHICH REFLECTS THE WILL OF THE
POPULATION OF THE GDR. I HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON SEE LEGISLATION
ENACTED THAT CODIFIES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND
THAT THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP WILL WORK WITH OTHER POLITICAL FORCES
IN THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE
ELECTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THESE STEPS WILL NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE
TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT THEY COULD LEAD
AS WELL TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH
THE WEST.

LET ME ADD THAT I BELIEVE YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE
SOVIET UNION HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING YOUR
ALLIES TO EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND
ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT THE

CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OWN PLANS TO MODIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ABROAD, AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. I HOPE THAT PRAGUE AND SOFIA WILL BE THE NEXT WARSAW PACT CAPITALS TO FEEL THE INVIGORATING BREEZE OF PERESTROYKA.

THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OF OUR ALLIES ARE UNITED IN THE VIEW THAT PERESTROYKA IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, BUT THAT ITS SUCCESS WILL OPEN THE WAY TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN WEST AND EAST. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR AND IN OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, NOR IS IT OUR WISH TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY ALL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION, FROM OUR OWN STATEMENTS, I TRUST THAT YOU DO THE SAME. 

SINCERELY,



on a personal note, Barbara appreciated Raisa's letter. Given the nature of our shipboard meeting Barbara will not accompany me but she is genuinely looking forward to seeing Raisa in 1990.

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036


The Honorable
Brent SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

December 20, 1989

Dear General Scowcroft,

I have the honor to forward the enclosed original of
President Gorbachev's letter to President Bush of November 28, 198

Sincerely,


Yuri V. DUBININ

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Признателен за Ваше письмо от 23 сентября 1989 года, в котором Вы подчеркиваете, что на СССР и США лежит особая ответственность сыграть решающую роль в продвижении вперед многостороннего процесса запрещения и ликвидации химического оружия. Хочу сразу сообщить Вам, что я безусловно и искренне поддерживаю такую постановку вопроса.

С целью скорейшего достижения всемирного запрета на химическое оружие предлагаю по примеру венских переговоров высказаться за установление предельного срока для подготовки конвенции, совместно обратившись с призывом к участникам Конференции по разоружению завершить разработку текста конвенции не позднее 1990-1991 года.

В контексте заявленной нашими странами в Вайоминге решимости настойчиво добиваться запрещения химического оружия и уничтожения всех его запасов мы подходим к тем конкретным соображениям, которые Вы, господин Президент, выдвинули в своем письме, а также в ООН.

Вы пишете о готовности США уничтожить более 98 процентов своих запасов химического оружия в течение 8 лет после вступления в силу конвенции при условии, что СССР будет одним из государств, подписавших эту конвенцию. По вопросу об участии Советского Союза в конвенции я даю совершенно определенный положительный ответ. СССР уже заявил, что намерен войти в число первоначальных участников конвенции. Было бы неплохо, если бы США выступили с аналогичным заявлением, а еще лучше сделать такое заявление совместно, например, на нашей предстоящей в 1990 году встрече. Это в свою очередь подтолкнуло бы и другие государства занять столь же определенную позицию в отношении участия в конвенции.

В вопросе о полном уничтожении запасов химического оружия в рамках будущей конвенции, как мне кажется, нам следует придерживаться уже достигнутой на многосторонних переговорах, во многом по инициативе СССР и США, договоренности о безусловной 100-процентной их ликвидации в течение 10 лет со дня вступления конвенции в силу. На принципах полного уничтожения запасов и объектов по его производству в этот срок разработаны совместные советско-американские предложения по порядку уничтожения запасов и объектов, которые были одобрены в Вайоминге. Право на сохранение любых запасов, пусть даже минимальных, означало бы увековечение

Его Превосходительству
Джорджу Бушу,
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки

г.Вашингтон

угрозы применения химического оружия, давало бы по существу повод любому государству под различными предлогами отказаться от полного уничтожения химического оружия.

Что касается участия в конвенции всех государств, способных обладать химическим оружием, то Советский Союз, как и США, придает этому вопросу первостепенное значение. Мы считаем, что он во многом уже решен специальной советско-американской договоренностью о категориях государств, которые должны стать первоначальными участниками конвенции, и теперь можно было бы приступить к обсуждению конкретного плана действий по привлечению к участию в конвенции государств, представляющих потенциальную угрозу с точки зрения химического оружия. Разумеется, здесь нужен гибкий подход, учет тех разнообразных обстоятельств, которые существуют в том или ином регионе мира.

Вы предложили также радикальное сокращение запасов химического оружия СССР и США в период, пока в Женеве ведутся многосторонние переговоры. Я думаю, что наши страны, учитывая их особую ответственность в деле химического разоружения, могли бы пойти и дальше и, не дожидаясь заключения конвенции, взять на себя целый пакет встречных и взаимосвязанных обязательств.

Первое. Полностью прекратить любое производство химического оружия. Это естественный и сравнительно легко осуществимый первый шаг к будущей конвенции. Он позволил бы значительно подкрепить наше политическое воздействие на тех, кто, возможно, осуществляет или планирует собственное производство химического оружия.

Должен откровенно сказать, что у нас вызвали серьезную озабоченность появившиеся в последнее время сообщения о том, что США намерены продолжать производить химическое оружие даже после вступления конвенции в силу. Мы с определенным недоверием отнеслись к этим сообщениям, поскольку такие действия США прямо противоречили бы уже имеющимся договоренностям, разработанным в значительной мере усилиями Советского Союза и Соединенных Штатов. Тем более, что о таком подходе Вы также ничего не говорили и в Вашем письме. Любое допущение производства химического оружия в рамках конвенции вольно или невольно будет подталкивать другие страны к началу его производства, чтобы иметь право его продолжать после вступления конвенции в силу. Это неизбежно приведет к тому, что распространение химического оружия делается политически и юридически допустимым.

Второе. Радикально сократить, а еще лучше – полностью уничтожить химическое оружие СССР и США. Советский Союз намеревается начать уничтожение своих запасов еще до заключения конвенции, и нам импонирует идея о том, чтобы СССР и США двигались по этому пути параллельно. Построенное в районе г. Чапаевска наше первое опытное предприятие по уничтожению химического оружия пришлось по просьбе общественности пере-профилировать в учебный центр, и теперь для того, чтобы иметь представление о наших реальных возможностях по ликвидации запасов, мы должны завершить разработку проекта комплексной программы уничтожения химического оружия в СССР для представления в Верховный Совет СССР. Рассмотрение столь сложного и многогранного вопроса в Верховном Совете, а также реализация принятых решений, разумеется, займут определенное время.

С целью обеспечить наилучшую подготовку к уничтожению химического оружия, в том числе решение непростых экологических вопросов, можно было бы наладить сотрудничество наших стран по вопросам, связанным с методами уничтожения химического оружия, эксплуатацией соответствующих предприятий, разработкой подходящих процедур контроля и т.д., и оформить специальную двустороннюю договоренность на этот счет.

С тем чтобы не вызывать у участников переговоров никаких опасений в том, что встречные шаги СССР и США задумываются как подмена многосторонней конвенции о полном запрещении химического оружия, можно было бы объявить о том, что договоренность о сокращении, а если позволит время, – и об уничтожении химического оружия СССР и США вступит в силу в момент подписания самой конвенции.

Третье. Ни при каких условиях не применять химическое оружие. В отличие от СССР и США подавляющее большинство стран не имеет оговорок к Женевскому протоколу 1925 года, дающих право на ответное применение химического оружия. Совместный отказ СССР и США от своих оговорок внес бы осязаемый вклад в процесс усиления нетерпимости к химическому оружию. Установление абсолютного и контролируемого с помощью эффективных процедур ООН запрета на применение химического оружия снизило бы побудительные стимулы к приобретению государствами химического оружия.


Четвертое. Мы твердо исходим из того, что за прекращением производства химического оружия, его ликвидацией и неприменением должен быть установлен строжайший контроль как в рамках конвенции, так и в рамках того комплекса шагов, которые СССР и США могли бы осуществить до ее заключения.

Что касается нашего возможного совместного вклада в процесс многосторонних переговоров, то, на мой взгляд, он необходим сейчас, прежде всего с целью окончательного решения всего комплекса проблем контроля. В этой связи я хочу предложить, чтобы наши две страны выступили с совместной инициативой по инспекциям по запросу.

В Советском Союзе теперь по достоинству оценили тот важный вклад, который Вы, господин Президент, внесли в постановку этого вопроса на переговорах. Его обсуждение показало, что он может быть адекватно решен, если все государства примут концепцию "постоянного" или "открытого приглашения к инспекции", которая предусматривала бы возможность проведения таких проверок силами международного инспектората по просьбе любого участника конвенции, в любое время, на любой точке или объекте другого участника, в самые сжатые сроки, без каких-либо изъятий и без права отказа. Наша совместная инициатива на этой основе стала бы крупнейшим вкладом в дело успешного завершения переговоров по конвенции.

В заключение хочу выразить уверенность, что совместными усилиями нам удастся уже в ближайшее время прийти к нашей общей цели - введению полного запрета на химическое оружие во всемирном масштабе. С интересом ознакомился бы с Вашими ответными соображениями по этому приоритетному вопросу.

С искренним уважением



М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

28 ноября 1989 года

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1-5-90

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the magnificently crafted model of the "Aleksandr Nevsky." It is an ideal gift for me because, as an old navy man, I dearly love the sea.

I am sending along a few pictures which I hope you will enjoy. When I look at them I am reminded of our Malta meeting which, in my view, was a big success.

I am also enclosing a video tape which was prepared for you by a friend of mine who is a U.S. movie producer, Jerry Weintraub. He used some historical footage out of a famous film library. The announcer on this tape, incidentally, is a famous U.S. movie actor, Charlton Heston.

I hope you and Mrs. Gorbacheva have a wonderful New Year. I am convinced that the next year will be one of even greater cooperation and improvement in our relations.


I am determined to follow up on our talk about START and about CFE. The whole world hopes that we can reach agreement on these two treaties.

I also hope we can move ahead in the chemical weapons field. I know you want to ban these weapons and so do I. I still worry about verification, but let's find the way to make real progress in 1990.

I have followed the developments in Europe with keen interest and with a genuine sense of excitement. I note with great interest and admiration the way those who support changes all across Eastern Europe invoke your name in a most favorable way - a well deserved tribute to your own leadership for reform.

Let's vow to stay in close touch during this coming year.

Most sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

P.S. That ship model
will always remind me
of Malta and of our
most constructive
and pleasant meeting

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I think that the letter you sent me on June 20 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international security.

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union believe--and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this--that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. In a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.

At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.

In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.

One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure. In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we must, of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic arms, would result in strengthening strategic stability.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.

You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptual gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of this situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approached more pragmatically.

The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.

I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talks by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.

We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.

The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.

As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision--to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related to the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trade off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointly once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.

A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with the Secretary of State. And you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at our upcoming meeting.

The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last round. It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bombers must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important not to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warheads. I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.

Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of the two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.

Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arms and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.

We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.

I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.

It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.

I wish now to address two more problems that deal with the set of nuclear issues.

The first one concerns our nuclear testing talks. It seems to me that our acceptance, at the latest round of the talks, of using the CORTEX method to monitor all nuclear tests above the agreed yield threshold, as the US side had insisted, makes it possible to bring the first stage of these talks to the concluding phase. I hope that our US partners will now look in the same unbiased way at the verification procedures that we propose. If during the ministerial meeting the two sides

recorded their fundamental understanding regarding the verification mechanism, instructions could then be given to our respective delegations at the Geneva talks to complete as soon as possible--in any case before the end of the year--work on the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and to prepare them for signing at our meeting. I also think that it is time for us to give general consideration to the guidelines for further restrictions on the yield and number of tests, which we are going to set for our delegations as their goal for the second stage of the talks.

The other problem to which I would like to call your attention has to do with the possibility of starting talks to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Today, as we see it, we have a favorable situation--the United States has actually ceased the production of fresh weapon-grade plutonium while the Soviet Union has adopted a program for phasing out before the year 2000 all the industrial reactors used to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Eduard Shevardnadze will inform the US side about the specific details of the program. I want to point out that we are ready to speed up its implementation in the event of matching reciprocal steps on your part.

In these circumstances our two countries could address in practical terms the problem of a verifiable cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. As a first step we could even now instruct our experts to consider jointly the issues related to the mechanism of mutual verification of such a measure. It is our view that the reciprocal cessation of the production of fissionable material not only would help to strengthen predictability in the strategic field, but would also make it possible for both sides to solve--at a much lower cost--a large number of environmental problems involved in the operation of nuclear production complexes.

Another priority issue--and we seem to be of one mind on this-- is the conclusion of a global and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We welcome your statement that every effort must be made to achieve such a prohibition. In this, our approaches coincide.

I also wish to note with satisfaction that during the last two rounds of bilateral consultations progress was made toward achieving this goal. I hope that our ministers will be able during their current meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding on a bilateral verification experiment.

We have also decided to take an additional step to accommodate the US position by agreeing to the inclusion of saxitoxin and ricin into the relevant list under the convention.

The multilateral talks on the convention have now entered a crucial phase. At the same time they still seem to lack a sense of purpose. Perhaps this is due to some extent to the fact that there is no agreed date by which the negotiators would seek to complete the preparation of the convention. Why shouldn't our two countries take an initiative here by issuing a joint appeal to conclude the convention as early as 1990 or 1991? Such a time limit seems to be quite realistic.

Mr. President, there is another issue which calls for the personal efforts of the two of us. I am referring to the reduction of conventional armed forces. Actually, both you and I took these talks into our own hands when we proposed the initiatives which are now paving the way to resolving the problems which for decades have poisoned East-West relations. It is precisely those political decisions taken at the highest level that have made it possible for the Vienna talks to take an unprecedented start and make very good headway.

You took a bold step, Mr. President, by proposing that the talks be completed within six to twelve months, which is an unheard-of challenge. Well, we accept it, even though I will say frankly that it will not be easy to do it.

But if you and I want to give effect to those commitments we must work out a kind of strategy for speeding up the Vienna talks. We could perhaps agree between ourselves and with the other participants from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to convene in the second half of 1990 a summit meeting in order to sign the agreement on conventional arms, to be attended by all the leaders of the European states. I am confident that such a European conference would be unprecedented as regards its results.

To that end we should instruct our foreign ministers to intensify work to find solutions to outstanding issues. Perhaps it will take two or three meetings between our ministers and the ministers from other states concerned which participate in the Vienna talks; meetings not for making speeches but to find solutions to outstanding issues.

For example, why not hold the first such meeting in Vienna early next year to review the principal difficulties holding up the talks?

We have duly appreciated agreement by the United States and other NATO countries to reduce combat aircraft. This is an important step toward accommodating the position of the Warsaw Treaty. But let me say frankly that it fails to address our serious concern regarding air defense aircraft based in the European territory of the Soviet Union and intended only to protect vital facilities against possible air strikes from various directions. They do not have the capability to strike ground targets. Those aircraft are not part of the surprise attack capability. We are prepared to give American experts an opportunity to see for themselves that that is precisely the case. In order to resolve this issue we could agree to set a certain limit for such aircraft, which would not include frontline fighters. Of course, we expect that there should not be any buildup of systems which these aircraft are intended to counter.

In the context of the likely breakthrough at the Vienna talks we believe it is possible even now to begin discussing the question of a gradual removal of the tactical nuclear component from the European military equation. All the more so since we understand that in Brussels the NATO countries gave their agreement in principle to such discussions. I would like to inform you that with due regard for this evolution in NATO's

position, the Soviet Union, as I already said in Strassbourg, is considering the possibility of further major unilateral reductions in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

And now the last point. We welcome your proposal concerning an "open skies" regime which would provide for mutual overflights by unarmed aircraft over the territories of the USSR and the United States and their Warsaw Treaty and NATO allies for the purpose of monitoring their military activities, and we agree to take part in an international conference to discuss issues involved in establishing such a regime.

I think that we are now on the threshold of mutually acceptable agreement. But you and I together will have to cross that threshold. And we can do so if we take into account each other's fundamental concerns.

In closing, Mr. President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your letter, conveyed to me by Marshal Akhromeyev. Let me say right away that I welcome your proposal that you and I should meet as early as this September. This confirms beyond any doubt our common interest in greater cooperation between us.

It is, of course, good that you and I have already met and gained some knowledge of each other in both political and human terms. Both of us have already managed to do something to build on the modicum of mutual understanding and trust established before you took office. And yet I cannot escape the feeling that we are not making full use of the opportunities now available in both objective and subjective terms. The least that can be said is that we are not taking advantage of the chance which history has given us, and which the Soviet Union and America did so much to bring about, as speedily as our time demands. The world and both our nations do need a tangibly different quality of Soviet-American cooperation.

I feel that all of this is of concern to you too. That is how I am inclined to interpret your letter.

I like the format of the meeting that you suggest - for the two of us to leave behind the cumbersome retinue of aides and, without haste or protocol ceremony, to talk about everything that we must discuss by virtue of our position.

His Excellency George Bush,
President of the United States
of America
Washington D.C.

I do not think that we should now, as part of preparations for the meeting, try to formulate its agenda. We could talk freely about everything.

It would seem worthwhile to exchange views on the main trends of current world developments, which clash and at the same time adjust to each other. We should speak of the most painful trouble-spots that aggravate the situation in the world and think of how we could help in healing them.

I have no doubt that we shall have to discuss, more specifically than is usually done, the global and so-called transnational problems that are looming before us and that we simply can no longer ignore.

I would like to find some new way of discussing our bilateral relations. You are quite right in saying that we cannot afford misunderstanding in those relations. Still, for all their advances in recent years, something about them is being left unsaid. I think this is because the burden of mistrust and mutual suspicion is still too great. But we shall not be able to put an end to this situation unless we really come to grips with the concept of the balance of interests of the USSR and the USA, unless we understand what is its genuine meaning, where are its limits and what should be the arrangements for its continuous maintenance with due regard for the multiplicity of our countries' internationalties and numerous obligations.

It is clear that mistrust is rooted also in our mutual superarmament, in all that accumulated in the years of the

Cold War. I have been thinking about this for some time now, and I would like to discuss with you how we could together vigorously push forward the process of reducing arms to a level fully consistent with a defensive doctrine. As I see it, this would have a powerful impact on the entire political process and help solve all other problems - economic, cultural, humanitarian, information, legal or any problem. And it would mean a crucial, definitive step toward a new state of the world, toward the world community of the 21st century.

And, of course, you are quite right - we must meet to know each other better. I fully support the spirit of your letter in that regard too.

Now about the dates and venue of our meeting. I agree with the time-frame; the precise dates could be determined.

As for the venue, I am indeed grateful for the invitation to come to your house or to Camp David. But since I am not planning on visiting New York, I regret to say that I shall not be able to enjoy your hospitality. Could we perhaps meet at some halfway point? There has already been such a meeting - and as the ensuing events showed, a productive one.

I think that the most appropriate place, both geopolitical-ly and in terms of relations you and we have with that country, would be Spain. I hope that the King and the Gonzales government would not refuse us. As for the specific venue in Spain, they could suggest one themselves. After all, Spain has islands, too. Please give it some thought, Mr. President.

I agree with you that this exchange of letters - not just its substance but also the fact itself - should be kept as far away as possible from those who need not know. I have told about your letter only a few people personally close to me.

I am sending you this reply with a man whom, as I understand, you know and whom I fully trust. He is Alexander Bessmertnykh, Eduard Shevardnadze's first deputy. You can say to him whatever you want me to know and to keep in mind.

Yours, with respect and trust,

Mikhail Gorbachev

Moscow, August 6, 1989

Его Превосходительству

Джорджу Б У Ш У

Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки

г.Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент!

Я получил Ваше письмо, переданное мне маршалом Ахромеевым. И сразу скажу – я приветствую Ваше предложение о том, чтобы нам с Вами встретиться уже в сентябре нынешнего года. И это со всей очевидностью подтверждает нашу общую заинтересованность в углублении сотрудничества между нами.

Конечно, в нашем с Вами активе уже личное знакомство, какое-то представление друг о друге и в политическом, и в человеческом плане. Что-то мы с Вами уже успели сделать в развитие того минимума взаимопонимания и доверия, который был заложен до того, как Вы вступили на свой пост. И тем не менее у меня постоянно ощущение, что мы не реализуем всех возможностей, которые и объективно, и субъективно сейчас имеются. Тот шанс, который нам представила история и к возникновению которого Советский Союз и Америка приложили свои немалые усилия, мы используем, по крайней мере, не в том темпе, в каком требует время. Мир и оба наши народа нуждаются все-таки в ощутимо ином качестве советско-американского взаимодействия.

Мне кажется, что все сказанное мною и Вас беспокоит. И я склонен воспринимать именно так Ваше письмо.

Мне импонирует предлагаемая Вами форма встречи. А именно — чтобы мы с Вами вдвоем, не обремененные шлейфом сопровождающих, не наспех и без протокольных излишеств поговорили обо всем, к чему нас обязывает наше с Вами положение.

Не думаю, что мы должны сейчас в качестве подготовки к встрече заняться формулированием повестки дня. Мы могли бы обо всем говорить свободно.

Видимо, нам стоит обменяться мнениями об основных процессах в мире, которые, сталкиваясь и вместе с тем адаптируясь друг к другу, сейчас происходят. Надо будет поговорить о наиболее важных болевых точках, отягчающих мировую ситуацию, и подумать, как мы смогли бы помочь их залечиванию.

Безусловно, мы должны будем в более конкретном, чем обычно, плане обсудить глобальные и так называемые транснациональные проблемы, которые нас подстерегают и мы просто уже не можем их игнорировать.

Мне хотелось бы обсудить под каким-то новым углом зрения наши двусторонние отношения. Вы правы, когда говорите, что мы не можем допустить непонимания в этих отношениях. Однако при всем прогрессе за последние годы в них остается какая-то недоговоренность. Я думаю, она объясняется еще слишком большим грузом недоверия, взаимных подозрений. Но нам не преодолеть их, пока мы основательно не разберемся, в чем же по существу состоит баланс интересов СССР и США. Каково его доподлинное содержание, где его

границы и каковы должны быть механизмы его постоянного поддержания с учетом всего многообразия наших и ваших международных связей и многочисленных обязательств.

Понятно, что недоверие связано и с нашей обоюдной сверхвооруженностью, со всем тем, что накопилось в годы "холодной войны". Я давно уже думаю над этим. И у меня есть желание поговорить с Вами о том, как совместно энергично двинуть вперед сокращение вооружений, чтобы свести их до полного соответствия оборонительной доктрине. Как мне представляется, это бы сильно сказалось на всем политическом процессе, на решении всех других проблем - экономических, культурных, гуманитарных, информационных, правовых, каких угодно. И обеспечило бы окончательный перелом к новому состоянию мира, к мировому сообществу XXI века.

И разумеется, Вы правы - нам действительно надо поближе познакомиться друг с другом. Я целиком поддерживаю дух Вашего письма и в этом смысле.

Теперь о том, когда и где нам встретиться. Со сроками я согласен, окончательно даты можно согласовать.

О месте встречи. Я, конечно, искренне признателен за приглашение приехать к Вам в имение или в Кэмп-Дэвид. Но поскольку в мои планы не входит поездка в Нью-Йорк, то, к сожалению, я не смогу воспользоваться Вашим гостеприимством. Может быть, нам встретиться где-нибудь на полпути? Опыт уже есть. И он, как показали последовавшие события, оказался продуктивным.

Я думаю, что самым подходящим местом как с точки зрения геополитической, так и с точки зрения наших и ваших отношений

с этой страной, была бы Испания. Надеюсь, король и правительство Гонсалеса не откажут нам. А конкретно, где именно в Испании, они могли бы предложить сами. В конце концов у Испании есть ведь и острова. Подумайте над этим, господин Президент.

Я согласен с Вами, что эту нашу переписку - не только ее содержание, но и сам ее факт - лучше держать подальше от посторонних глаз. О Вашем письме я поставил в известность всего нескольких близких мне людей.

Этот свой ответ Вам я направляю с человеком, которого Вы, кажется, знаете и которому я полностью доверяю. Он - первый заместитель Э.А.Шеварднадзе - Александр Бессмертных. Вы можете ему сказать все, что сочтете нужным, чтоб я знал и учитывал.

С уважением и доверием



г. Москва

6 августа 1989 года

Его Превосходительству
господину Джорджу Бушу,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов
Америки

Dec 12, 1989

Condi Rice

a Bob Blackwell

read attached cable

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

SCOWCROFT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

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2/25/2014 MM

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: COQ PRIVACY_{OUT} WHSR_{OUT}

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
0000

-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, EYES ONLY, TO AMBASSADOR
JACK MATLOCK. FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO
THE PRESIDENT.

-
I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO
SIGNED ORIGINAL.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

-
I JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I AM WITH OUR
PAGE 02 RUEADWW1790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
MEETING IN MALTA. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER WAS DISAPPOINTING, THE
SUBSTANCE, CANDOR AND ATMOSPHERE OF OUR TALKS MORE THAN FULFILLED
MY EXPECTATIONS. AT A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY,
I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE IN NEARLY ALL ASPECTS OF
THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH
WE DISCUSSED FRANKLY, AND WE WILL PURSUE THESE. BECAUSE WE HAD
TO FOREGO ONE OF OUR SESSIONS, THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES I WAS
UNABLE TO RAISE WITH YOU. FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO
DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, CHINA, AND OTHER ASIAN
ISSUES SUCH AS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, A MATTER OF GREAT

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CONCERN TO OUR FRIENDS. THE JAPANESE. I WILL HAVE SECRETARY BAKER PURSUE THESE ISSUES WITH MINISTER SHEVANDNADZE AT THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL.

LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. ALL OF THE ALLIES WERE QUITE PLEASED WITH THE CONTENT AND TONE OF OUR TALKS IN MALTA. THEY WELCOMED ACCELERATING THE PACE OF KEY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE FURTHER AREAS OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY WANT TO REVIEW THE FOUR PRINCIPLES I PRESENTED PAGE 03 RUEADWW1790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF GERMANY. I WILL ASK AMBASSADOR MATLOCK TO PROVIDE THEM TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE.

AGAIN, I BELIEVE THAT OUR MALTA MEETING SETS THE STAGE FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON NEXT JUNE, AND ESTABLISHES A STRONG BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN MANY AREAS AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES.

ON A VERY PERSONAL BASIS I WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU AGAIN. IN MY VIEW, THE PERSONAL "CHEMISTRY" WAS GOOD AND I HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT DURING 1990 AND BEYOND.

PLEASE GIVE MY REGARDS TO MRS. GORBACHEV. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO SEE HER IN MALTA.

SINCERELY,
SIGNED
GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

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WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DECL: OADR

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