

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:	Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number:	91127
Folder ID Number:	91127-003

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	4/2/90	(b)(1)	
02. Message	Re: In the course... (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03a. Letter	Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev (2 pp.)	11/7/89	(b)(1)	
03b. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
03c. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
03d. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
03e. Letter	Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	
03f. Letter	Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	
03g. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
03h. Letter	Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev (2 pp.)	11/7/89	(b)(1)	

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1072

OA/ID Number: 91127-003

Date Closed: 4/7/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04. Draft Letter	To Mr. President [Back up] (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05. Draft Letter	To Mr. President (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	4/2/90	(b)(1)	
07. Talking Points	Re: As I said in my letter... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08a. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [301240Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S
08b. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [301238Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S
08c. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to DCM Mike Joyce from General Scowcroft [300025Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S
08d. Draft Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to DCM Moscow, Re: Personal Letter from the President to President Gorbachev [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08e. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to White House Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce (1 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	S

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08f. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to DCM Mike Joyce from General Scowcroft [292053Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	S
08g. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft or Mr. Robert Gates [291932Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	S
08h. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock from Brent Scowcroft [291748Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	S
09. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [301238Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S
10. Cable Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (8 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
11a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce, Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Mike Joyce [211924Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
11b. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
11c. Cable	From Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [President's Letter to Gorbachev] [211107Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

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11d. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
11e. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
12a. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on START (1 pp.)	3/16/90	(b)(1)	S
12b. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush (1 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
12c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Cable	Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (2 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	S
14. Handwritten Note	Re: US Signs Trade Agreement (1 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	Re: Memorandum for the President (3 pp.)	2/8/90	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	Re: Memorandum for the President (4 pp.)	2/8/90	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
17. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
18. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
19a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for Presidential Phone Call to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/30/90	(b)(1)	S
19b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Phone Call to Gorbachev Concerning the New CFE Manpower Proposal (1 pp.)	1/30/90	(b)(1)	S
19c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Phone Call to Gorbachev Concerning Your VFE Proposal (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
19d. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
20. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	1/17/90	(b)(1)	
21. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev [Meeting Notes] (1 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	
22. Memcon	Re: First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (6 pp.)	12/2/89	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
23. Memcon	Re: Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (2 pp.)	12/3/89	(b)(1)	S
24a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (4 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
24b. Handwritten Notes	Re: Shevardnadze Private Meeting (9 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	
25a. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	11/20	(b)(1)	
25b. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
26. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

4/4/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

The attached is an advance copy of the letter which Minister Shevardnadze will present to the President on Friday.

JABIII

Blackwell has rec'd
4/5/90

Kanter has a copy
Rice 7 Apr

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of March 21, 1990 prompts serious reflections on the emerging - and possibly unique - prospects of the evolution of the Soviet-US strategic relationship.

Indeed, now that we have come within reach of completing painstaking work on a whole package of arms reduction agreements the time has come to think about the future and to try to delineate the main parameters of the next, qualitatively different phase of disarmament.

I have to say that we remain committed to radical balanced measures aimed at a gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. Achieving this noble goal, set forth in our program of January 15, 1986, would give the most solid guarantee of security and tranquillity for all people on Earth.

I think, however, that you will agree that our immediate and top-priority task is still the early completion of the treaty on 50 percent strategic offensive arms reductions and its

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington D.C.

official signing, in keeping with our agreement at Malta, before the end of the year.

In light of this common understanding, I welcome your proposal that we initial the treaty at our forthcoming meeting in Washington, having in mind that all the main issues would be resolved by that time.

I am encouraged by the efforts of our delegations and the more rapid pace of work on the treaty, although I still think that the negotiating process should be speeded up substantially. In this regard the Soviet side attaches key importance to the April round of talks between our foreign ministers.

Let me now turn to some additional ideas that you outlined in your letter of March 21, 1990.

I have studied it carefully, and I find that the suggestions and proposals contained in it merit thorough consideration in our dialogue.

Regarding your proposal on banning MIRVed mobile ICBMs, I would like first of all to say that, in principle, I welcome your readiness to adopt radical, large-scale decisions in the field of strategic arms reduction. Also, I can only agree that it is always better not to deploy some weapons systems rather than first to deploy and then eliminate them. Thorough analysis of the draft START Treaty shows, however, that it would be difficult to implement your proposal within its framework now.

First of all, our countries have already reached fundamental agreement that ICBM mobility is a factor that serves to strengthen strategic stability. Both of us proceeded on that basis while preparing the START Treaty in its present form. In the process of negotiations the two sides have arrived at a carefully-weighed balance of mutual concessions and compromises; changing any part of that balance would entail the risk of reopening many of the problems already solved.

Nevertheless, we could consider a substantial reduction of our deployment program of SS-24 mobile missiles, limiting their number at the level of January 1, 1991, if the US side were to decide not to deploy the MX missiles in a mobile mode. An understanding to this effect could be formalized through an exchange of political declarations. This would, without doubt, impart additional momentum to the process of real nuclear disarmament.

Concerning the other of your proposals - on considering the question of fixed MIRVed ICBMs in subsequent negotiations. This is a question that has a bearing on the entire range of further strategic offensive arms reductions. We have more than once spoken in favor of starting negotiations on second-phase reductions right after the conclusion of the treaty now being prepared. I regard positively the fact that discussions, for the time being informal, of the tasks of future negotiations are already underway in Geneva. I think that at our meeting

in Washington we could adopt a declaration of intent regarding future talks on further reductions in US and Soviet strategic offensive arms and agree on when they should begin. A draft such statement could be worked out by our foreign ministers during their forthcoming meetings.

It appears that even now we could record a common view which has emerged in the exchanges between the two of us, i.e. that future negotiations should provide for reductions in quantitative levels of all strategic arms and help to attain a mix and structure of arms that would be consistent with the goal of strengthening strategic stability.

In this context I would like to emphasize that, as before, we regard observance by the USSR and the USA of the ABM Treaty as the basis for maintaining and strengthening strategic stability.

I also wrote to you about the problem arising from significant differences in the structures of Soviet and US strategic offensive arms. Logic prompts that in the future, too, this objective factor will have to be considered by us in further arms reductions. Accordingly, all our steps should be extremely prudent and cautious. Reducing one component of the strategic triad should not lead to a general destabilization of the strategic situation as a result of the two other components remaining intact.

In the context of these talks the whole range of issues, considered by each side to be important for attaining the final

objective of the negotiations, could be examined. In particular, we believe it is possible to consider the question of significantly reducing the concentration of warheads on all ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and of ALCMs on heavy bombers, and the number of their delivery vehicles as well.

In our view, the situation now evolving in the world and in Soviet-US relations augurs well for negotiations on follow-on strategic arms reductions to proceed at a good pace and productively.

We even do not rule out the possibility that a new agreement could be concluded earlier than reductions would actually be completed under the treaty being prepared now. This would enable us more rapidly to attain genuinely stable structures of both sides' strategic arsenals at low levels.

I am convinced that we can confidently put before ourselves such far-reaching goals and expect to achieve them, not only in START, but also as regards the limitation and prohibition of nuclear tests, radical reduction of conventional arms in Europe, the prohibition of chemical weapons etc.

In conclusion let me also point out the following. In order to advance effectively along this path we have to attach particular importance to the atmosphere of our dialogue and the mutual willingness to avoid unnecessary complications and artificial problems. I appreciate your realistic approach to the development of Soviet-US dialogue, your desire to understand the other side, to consider its interests and problems. This

is how I regard your private letter to me of March 29, 1990. I want to reiterate that we intend firmly to continue to follow the course of radically reshaping Soviet society on the basis of democratization and glasnost, active and serious dialogue, and building a truly law-governed state. It goes without saying that all this presupposes respect for constitutional order and safeguarding the rights and security of all citizens of our country.

Eduard Shevardnadze plans to share with you thoughts on how these fundamental principles are being applied to the difficult task of creating a new federation in our country and building just and healthy interethnic relations.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

Kremlin, Moscow

April 2, 1990

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

5/14/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JABIII

Attached is the written text
of the message which Ambassador
Dubinin delivered to me orally
this morning.

In the course of her recent contacts with a number of Western leaders, Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania K. Prunskiene contended that the present Lithuanian leadership wants dialogue with the USSR leadership and is prepared to suspend the decisions of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11 which unilaterally proclaimed the Republic's independence, as well as other recently adopted laws and resolutions which run contra ry to the USSR Constitution.

At the same time, in her conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on May 11, while proposing an urgent meeting with the Soviet leadership, Prunskiene again put forward a number of conditions and reservations. She said bluntly that the decision of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11 cannot be suspended or rescinded. She was saying in this context, though, that it would be possible to suspend a number of laws and resolutions by the Lithuanian authorities, which affect the interests of the Soviet Union. She didn't say what, specifically, could be suspended, giving to understand that this should be the subject of negotiations with Moscow.

Prunskiene admitted that the Lithuanian authorities' decisions to repudiate the army draft and dismantle the organizational structures of the local organs of power were somewhat hasty. The issuance of Lithuanian citizenship IDs is, in her words, largely symbolic. But in order to remove all fears the Lithuanian leadership is prepared to provide guarantees of the

rights of the "non-Lithuanian population". She also said that for the transition period one could think of a "dual border", "dual visas", and "dual customs".

All of this was being presented by Prunskiene as her personal initiative to settle the conflict. She emphasized that Lithuania will relax its maximalist posture, but that it must be met halfway. In the course of the conversation Prunskiene was throwing numerous lightly veiled threats. She said she could allegedly send a signal, - and oil tankers would start coming to Lithuania, for the USSR is not likely to stop them by force, is it? Money had been promised to her. There was also this theme: as a result of her trip to the US she had showered Gorbachev's road to Washington with flowers. And if there is no agreement with Lithuania, his meeting with Bush could be soured.

Prunskiene insisted that her trip to Western countries had been very successful. She allegedly found support and understanding.

Prunskiene's conversation with the Soviet Ambassador makes it clear that the present Lithuanian leadership is trying to play a double game: in words, it assures Western representatives of its willingness to accept a dialogue expecting to gain some political capital on it, and in deeds, it has done nothing to make such dialogue a reality.

The Soviet leadership - and I wish to stress it - is for dialogue and a political solution to the Lithuanian problem. The solution, however, can only be found within the framework of the constitutional process, on the basis of the legislation which is in force.

To begin the dialogue, it is necessary first of all to restore the situation as it existed on March 10 last. The USSR President has an absolutely clear mandate from the Third Congress of Peoples' Deputies, and the Lithuanian leadership must reckon with it. Unfortunately, the present Lithuanian leadership ignores it, and by its actions is creating insurmountable obstacles to dialogue.

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 7, 1989

Dear Raisa:

I have asked General Scowcroft to pass along to you a suggestion that I am very enthusiastic about.

George has decided, and I concur, that the character, location, and the site of the upcoming meeting on board ship makes it inappropriate for me to accompany him to Malta. However, knowing that you will be in Italy with your husband, I wanted to suggest to you that I meet you in Italy.

I have never been to Florence and it occurred to me we could meet in that beautiful city. If Florence doesn't appeal, I would love to meet you in Rome. In either place, we could have good discussions, renew our friendship, and perhaps jointly, in some way, show the concerns that we both feel for some of the world's problems. Your interests in the fine arts and the preservation of historic monuments and mine in expanding literacy could both be accommodated in either location.

THE WHITE HOUSE

2

If for some reason none of this can be worked out, let me assure you I am really looking forward to seeing you in Washington at the "Summit" next year. I have enjoyed our previous meetings.

Most sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Barbara Bush". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Barbara Bush

Mrs. Raisa Maksimovna Gorbachev
The Kremlin
Moscow

Unofficial translation

Dear Mrs. Bush,

I sincerely appreciate your kind letter transmitted through General Scowcroft and the good feelings expressed in it.

It is with great pleasure that I recall our previous meetings. I really very much wanted to meet with you once again, and to talk about the problems that are of interest to both of us, and I feel those may be quite a few. Therefore, it seemed to me that a joint visit to Malta would give us a good opportunity to do so.

As such, our joint trip to Florence would have been a wonderful idea. At one time, I already had an opportunity to see this magnificent city of the world with its enchanting and wondrous richness of artistic treasures. Unfortunately, however, to go to Florence or some other city in Italy after Mikhail Sergeyevich and I would have already completed our visit to that country would not, I feel, look logical. I think you will agree.

Mrs. Barbara BUSH
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Bush, I shall have full understanding, if you will not be able to accompany the President on his trip to Malta. I do believe that you and I shall not fail to avail ourselves of a future opportunity, whenever it presents itself, to renew our direct contacts and conversations.

In the meantime, I wish you all the very best. I am confident that you and I share the hope for the success of the forthcoming Soviet-US meeting in Malta.

Sincerely,

Raisa GORBACHEVA

Moscow

November 13, 1989

Дорогая госпожа Буш,

Сердечно благодарю за Ваше любезное письмо, переданное через генерала Скоукрофта, и выраженные в нем добрые чувства.

Я с большим удовольствием вспоминаю наши предыдущие встречи. Мне искренне хотелось вновь встретиться с Вами, поговорить о проблемах, которые интересуют и Вас, и меня, — а таковых, чувствую, у нас немало. Поэтому мне казалось, что совместное посещение Мальты предоставило бы нам для этого удобную возможность.

Сама по себе идея нашей с Вами поездки во Флоренцию была бы превосходной. Однажды я уже имела возможность посетить этот великолепнейший город мира, прельщающий удивительным богатством своих художественных сокровищ. Однако, к сожалению, посещение Флоренции или какого-то другого итальянского города уже по завершении нашего с Михаилом Сергеевичем визита в эту страну, думается, выглядело бы нелогичным. Полагаю, Вы согласитесь с этим.

Госпоже Барбаре БУШ
Белый дом
Вашингтон

Дорогая госпожа Буш, я с полным пониманием отнесусь к тому, если Вы не сможете сопровождать президента в поездке на Мальту. Верю, что мы с Вами не преминем воспользоваться последующей возможностью, когда она появится, для того, чтобы возобновить наши непосредственные контакты, беседы.

Тем временем желаю Вам всего самого доброго. Уверена, что мы с Вами одинаково надеемся на успех предстоящей советско-американской встречи на Мальте.

С искренним уважением,

Раиса ГОРБАЧЕВА

Москва

13 ноября 1989 года

Unofficial translation

Dear Mrs. Bush,

I sincerely appreciate your kind letter transmitted through General Scowcroft and the good feelings expressed in it.

It is with great pleasure that I recall our previous meetings. I really very much wanted to meet with you once again, and to talk about the problems that are of interest to both of us, and I feel those may be quite a few. Therefore it seemed to me that a joint visit to Malta would give us a good opportunity to do so.

As such, our joint trip to Florence would have been a wonderful idea. At one time, I already had an opportunity to see this magnificent city of the world with its enchanting and wondrous richness of artistic treasures. Unfortunately, however, to go to Florence or some other city in Italy after Mikhail Sergeyevich and I would have already completed our visit to that country would not, I feel, look logical. I think you will agree.

Mrs. Barbara BUSH
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Bush, I shall have full understanding, if you will not be able to accompany the President on his trip to Malta. I do believe that you and I shall not fail to avail ourselves of a future opportunity, whenever it presents itself, to renew our direct contacts and conversatio

In the meantime, I wish you all the very best. I am confident that you and I share the hope for the success of the forthcoming Soviet-US meeting in Malta.

Sincerely,

Raisa GORBACHEVA

Moscow

November 13, 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 15, 1989

Dear Raisa,

I got your good letter
and I certainly understand.
I will look forward to seeing
you when you and The President
come to the United States next
year.

Please feel free to let me know
what you would like to see when
you are here. All of America
is awaiting your visit with
great anticipation.
Most warmly - Barbara

delivered to oval size at 9:30
Unofficial translation

*my - Paltip Pressack hand carried out
to Mrs. Bush*

Mrs. Barbara BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Barbara,

It was a pleasure to have received a letter from you, which E.A. Shevardnadze delivered to me.

I look forward with the same great interest as you do to our meeting, to personal contacts with you. I am glad to have an opportunity to visit your country once again, to see America, to meet with its people.

As far as I know, joint work is now getting under way to prepare a program for the visit of the USSR President. My possible plans will depend on this program. I thank you in advance for attention to them.

With the best of feelings and wishes

(signature)

Moscow

May 2, 1990

Госпоже Барбаре БУШ

БЕЛЫЙ ДОМ

ВАШИНГТОН


Дорогая Барбара,

Мне было приятно получить от Вас письмо, которое передал
Э.А.Шеварднадзе.

Так же, как и Вы, я с большим интересом жду нашей встречи,
личных контактов с Вами. Рада возможности вновь побывать в вашей
стране, видеть Америку, общаться с ее людьми.

Сейчас, насколько я знаю, начинается совместная работа над
программой визита Президента СССР. Исходя из нее будут решаться
возможности моих планов. Я заранее благодарю Вас за внимание
к ним.

С самыми добрыми чувствами и пожеланиями



Москва

" 1 " мая 1990 года

Госпоже БАРБАРЕ БУШ

Handed to
Secretary
4-15-90

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 5 - 1990

Dear Raisa,

We are so pleased that
a date has been set for our
husbands' meeting.

On Friday June 1st. I have
been invited to give the graduation
speech at Wellesley College, a
fine women's college in our
State of Massachusetts near Boston.

I would love to have you
join us. We could fly up
on a government plane in the

morning and return by early afternoon.
I would hope that you would
speak to the graduating
class for about 5 to 6 minutes
and I would do the same.
It would be a great
opportunity for many young
women to learn about your
great country and your hopes
for the Russian women of
the same age group.

I do hope you will say
yes. Either way I look forward
to being with you - Warmly -
Barbara

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 15, 1989

Dear Raisa,

I got your good letter
and I certainly understand.
I will look forward to seeing
you when you and The President
come to the United States next
year.

Please feel free to let me know
what you would like to see when
you are here. All of America
is awaiting your visit with
great anticipation.
Most warmly - Barbara

Dear Mrs. Bush,

I sincerely appreciate your kind letter transmitted through General Scowcroft and the good feelings expressed in it.

It is with great pleasure that I recall our previous meetings. I really very much wanted to meet with you once again, and to talk about the problems that are of interest to both of us, and I feel those may be quite a few. Therefore it seemed to me that a joint visit to Malta would give us a good opportunity to do so.

As such, our joint trip to Florence would have been a wonderful idea. At one time, I already had an opportunity to see this magnificent city of the world with its enchanting and wondrous richness of artistic treasures. Unfortunately, however, to go to Florence or some other city in Italy after Mikhail Sergeyevich and I would have already completed our visit to that country would not, I feel, look logical. I think you will agree.

Mrs. Barbara BUSH
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Bush, I shall have full understanding, if you will not be able to accompany the President on his trip to Malta. I do believe that you and I shall not fail to avail ourselves of a future opportunity, whenever it presents itself, to renew our direct contacts and conversation.

In the meantime, I wish you all the very best. I am confident that you and I share the hope for the success of the forthcoming Soviet-US meeting in Malta.

Sincerely,

Raisa GORBACHEVA

Moscow

November 13, 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 7, 1989

Dear Raisa:

I have asked General Scowcroft to pass along to you a suggestion that I am very enthusiastic about.

George has decided, and I concur, that the character, location, and the site of the upcoming meeting on board ship makes it inappropriate for me to accompany him to Malta. However, knowing that you will be in Italy with your husband, I wanted to suggest to you that I meet you in Italy.

I have never been to Florence and it occurred to me we could meet in that beautiful city. If Florence doesn't appeal, I would love to meet you in Rome. In either place, we could have good discussions, renew our friendship, and perhaps jointly, in some way, show the concerns that we both feel for some of the world's problems. Your interests in the fine arts and the preservation of historic monuments and mine in expanding literacy could both be accommodated in either location.

THE WHITE HOUSE

2

If for some reason none of this can be worked out, let me assure you I am really looking forward to seeing you in Washington at the "Summit" next year. I have enjoyed our previous meetings.

Most sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Barbara Bush". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Barbara Bush

Mrs. Raisa Maksimovna Gorbachev
The Kremlin
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 5 - 1990

Dear Raisa,

We are so pleased that a date has been set for our husbands' meeting.

On Friday June 1st. I have been invited to give the graduation speech at Wellesley College, a fine women's college in our State of Massachusetts near Boston.

I would love to have you join us. We could fly up on a government plane in the

morning and return by early afternoon.
I would hope that you would
speak to the graduating
class for about 5 to 6 minutes
and I would do the same.
It would be a great
opportunity for many young
women to learn about your
great country and your hopes
for the Russian women of
the same age group.

I do hope you will say
yes. Either way I look forward
to being with you - Warmly -
Barbara

9/29/89

1152

Wilma --

I produced this memcon from
Brent's notes. I believe he wants
no further distribution.

BB Blackwill

Denial -

Bob Gates has

seen.

Wise

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Back up

Dear Mr. President:

These are trying times. I have tried very hard to understand the problems you face at home. Indeed, as Jim Baker has told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, not only have we tried to understand, but we have acted with restraint and prudence.

I understand your view that the Baltic States are part of the Soviet Union; and I expect you know our view that we have never recognized ^{their} ~~the~~ incorporation ~~[of Lithuania]~~ into the Soviet Union.

I have given a lot of weight to your stated view that force would not be used and ^{that} ~~the~~ eventual separation or self determination is in the cards for Lithuania.

The problem is we can no longer sit idly by, giving the impression that we are unconcerned about the aspirations ~~for~~ ^(to) freedom of the people of Lithuania.

I have often stated publicly, not only my desire to see

perestroika succeed, but also to see you personally prevail. I
 still feel very strongly about that. ^{the Minister from} ~~Recently~~ ^{Last ~~on~~ Monday} your ^{Embassy} ~~ECM~~ came to
 the State Department and once again asked that we show restraint.

On Tuesday I met with key leaders in our Congress and explained
 that I was not prepared to take action on this matter, though

there is a growing feeling in this country that my inaction

^{delivers}
~~serves~~ a serious blow to the aspirations of freedom loving

people in Lithuania, and indeed everywhere. This growing

feeling, which I share, leads me to believe that there is no way

we will ^{be} ~~be~~ able to ^{conclude} ~~go forward~~ with our Trade Agreement, and thus
 with MFN, unless dialogue with the Lithuanians begins.

We realize there is no easy answer; but, as you know, we felt

that a "suspension" by Lithuania of its resolution, coupled with

your willingness to meet with the Lithuanians outside the

federation concept, would be the best way to break the ice. We

have, as you probably know, urged this course upon Mr.

Landsberg~~his~~.

Here is the ^{basic} ~~bottom line~~ reality -- there is no way Congress will approve MFN under existing circumstances -- no way at all.

Further, I will not be able to recommend approval under existing circumstances. I have felt that ^{these} ~~the~~ negotiations should

continue, and, indeed, have taken some "flak" for not cutting off trade talks from our end. I assume that you have seen some of the statements on this critical subject, ~~but wanted to call to your attention the attached statements (discuss.)~~

~~Munich~~

I recognize, with respect, the restraint that you have shown, indeed, the encouragement you have given, to the new democracies in Eastern Europe. I recognize that this restraint and understanding has cost you support at home. You have a large stock of goodwill here and in other western countries for what you have done. But now we have Lithuania and the enormous problems accompanying Lithuania and the other Baltic States,

which, ^{to us} ~~in our view~~, to repeat, have special standing.

I wish I could think of a ^{more} positive role that I could play to help ameliorate matters. In this regard, I would welcome any suggestions you might care to make. (I regret we have no secure voice communications at this time. It would be very useful if we could talk this out in a reasonable way, trying to work together to solve what at this moment is a terrible problem between us.)

~~Next~~ ^{This} week I will publicly state that under existing conditions there ^{can} ~~will~~ be no trade agreement. This is simply a statement of reality. It is not intended to be provocative. It is not intended to complicate matters for you. I will accompany this "marker" ^{between Lithuania and Soviet Union,} with the fervent hope that dialogue will begin. We must clear the path so that the era of improved relations between our two great countries will continue to flourish.

I regret that the latest Lithuanian attempt at dialogue, with Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukashenko, failed to produce positive results. You have done too much, and we come too far to see matters between

L. KRYANOV

us revert to tension and anxiety.

I would welcome any suggestions. Please know that this was not an easy letter to write. I have tried very hard to keep relations on ^{track}~~track~~, recognizing ^{the}~~that~~ dramatic changes that you have brought to much of this world.

^{now}
~~have no choice but to~~
I ~~must~~ identify publicly with our strongly held convictions about Lithuania's self determination and the right to control its own destiny.

I look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meeting. I am determined to keep that meeting on ^{track}~~track~~ in spite of existing tensions. There is a lot ^{at}~~to~~ stake there.

My sincere best wishes,

Dear Mr. President:

These are trying times. I have tried very hard to understand the problems you face at home. Indeed, as Jim Baker has told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, not only have we tried to understand, but we have acted with restraint and prudence.

I understand your view that the Baltic States are part of the Soviet Union; and I expect you know our view that we have never recognized ^{their} [the] incorporation [of Lithuania] into the Soviet Union.

I have given a lot of weight to your stated view that force would not be used ^{that} and [^] the eventual separation or self determination is in the cards for Lithuania.

The problem is we can no longer sit idly by, giving the impression that we are unconcerned about the aspirations ^(to) for ~~the~~ freedom of the people of Lithuania.

I have often stated publicly, not only my desire to see

perestroika succeed, but also to see you personally prevail. I still feel very strongly about that. ^{the Minister from} ^{On Monday} ^{Embassy} [Recently], your [DC/M] came to the State Department and once again asked that we show restraint.

On Tuesday I met with key leaders in our Congress and explained that I was not prepared to take action on this matter, though

there is a growing feeling in this country that my inaction

^{delivers} ~~serves~~ a serious blow to the aspirations of freedom loving

people in Lithuania, and indeed everywhere. This growing

feeling, which I share, leads me to believe that there is no way

we will ^{be} ^{conclude} ~~by~~ able to [go forward] with our Trade Agreement, and thus

with MFN, unless dialogue with the Lithuanians begins.

^{as suggested by}
^{President Mitterand &}
^{Chancellor Kohl}
We realize there is no easy answer; but, as you know, we felt

that a "suspension" by Lithuania of its resolution, coupled with

your willingness to meet with the Lithuanians outside the

federation concept, would be the best way to break the ice. We

have, as you probably know, urged this course upon Mr.

Landsberghis.

Here is the ^{basic} [bottom line] reality -- there is no way Congress will approve MFN under existing circumstances -- no way at all.

Further, I will not be able to recommend approval under existing circumstances. I have felt that ^{these} [the] negotiations should

continue, and indeed have taken some "flak" for not cutting off trade talks from our end. I assume that you have seen some of the statements on this critical subject, but wanted to call to your attention the attached statements (discuss.)

Munich

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which ~~in our view~~ ^{to us}, to repeat, have special standing.

^{more}
I wish I could think of a [^]positive role that I could play to help ameliorate matters. In this regard, I would welcome any suggestions you might care to make. (I regret we have no secure voice communications at this time. It would be very useful if we could talk this out in a reasonable way, trying to work together to solve what at this moment is a terrible problem between us.)

^{unless}
~~But~~ ^{there is a breakthrough on this issue perhaps on the basis of the Mitterand-Lahf initiative,}
[~~next week~~] I will publicly state that under existing conditions ^{can} ~~will~~ be no trade agreement. ^{may be forced upon you to} This is simply a statement of reality. It is not intended to be provocative. It is not intended to complicate matters for you. I will accompany this "marker" ^{between Lithuania and Soviet Union} with the fervent hope that dialogue will begin. We must clear the path so that the era of improved relations between our two great countries will continue to flourish.

I regret that the latest Lithuanian attempt at dialogue, with Supreme Soviet Chairman Lubyshev, failed.
You have done too much, and we come to far to see matters between

us revert to tension and anxiety.

I would welcome any suggestions. Please know that this was not an easy letter to write. I have tried very hard to keep relations on ^{track} [tract], recognizing ^{the} [that] dramatic changes that you have brought to much of this world.

^{have no choice but to}
I [must] identify publicly with our strongly held convictions about Lithuania's self determination and the right to control its own destiny.

I look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meeting. I am determined to keep that meeting on ^{track} [tract] inspite of existing tensions. There is a lot ^{at} [to] stake there.

My sincere best wishes,

2 Dec 90
George Bush
FBI

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of March 21, 1990 prompts serious reflections on the emerging - and possibly unique - prospects of the evolution of the Soviet-US strategic relationship.

Indeed, now that we have come within reach of completing painstaking work on a whole package of arms reduction agreements the time has come to think about the future and to try to delineate the main parameters of the next, qualitatively different phase of disarmament.

I have to say that we remain committed to radical balanced measures aimed at a gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. Achieving this noble goal, set forth in our program of January 15, 1986, would give the most solid guarantee of security and tranquillity for all people on Earth.

I think, however, that you will agree that our immediate and top-priority task is still the early completion of the treaty on 50 percent strategic offensive arms reductions and its

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington D.C.

official signing, in keeping with our agreement at Malta, before the end of the year.

In light of this common understanding, I welcome your proposal that we initial the treaty at our forthcoming meeting in Washington, having in mind that all the main issues would be resolved by that time.

I am encouraged by the efforts of our delegations and the more rapid pace of work on the treaty, although I still think that the negotiating process should be speeded up substantially. In this regard the Soviet side attaches key importance to the April round of talks between our foreign ministers.

Let me now turn to some additional ideas that you outlined in your letter of March 21, 1990.

I have studied it carefully, and I find that the suggestions and proposals contained in it merit thorough consideration in our dialogue.

Regarding your proposal on banning MIRVed mobile ICBMs, I would like first of all to say that, in principle, I welcome your readiness to adopt radical, large-scale decisions in the field of strategic arms reduction. Also, I can only agree that it is always better not to deploy some weapons systems rather than first to deploy and then eliminate them. Thorough analysis of the draft START Treaty shows, however, that it would be difficult to implement your proposal within its framework now.

First of all, our countries have already reached fundamental agreement that ICBM mobility is a factor that serves to strengthen strategic stability. Both of us proceeded on that basis while preparing the START Treaty in its present form. In the process of negotiations the two sides have arrived at a carefully-weighed balance of mutual concessions and compromises; changing any part of that balance would entail the risk of reopening many of the problems already solved.

Nevertheless, we could consider a substantial reduction of our deployment program of SS-24 mobile missiles, limiting their number at the level of January 1, 1991, if the US side were to decide not to deploy the MX missiles in a mobile mode. An understanding to this effect could be formalized through an exchange of political declarations. This would, without doubt, impart additional momentum to the process of real nuclear disarmament.

Concerning the other of your proposals - on considering the question of fixed MIRVed ICBMs in subsequent negotiations. This is a question that has a bearing on the entire range of further strategic offensive arms reductions. We have more than once spoken in favor of starting negotiations on second-phase reductions right after the conclusion of the treaty now being prepared. I regard positively the fact that discussions, for the time being informal, of the tasks of future negotiations are already underway in Geneva. I think that at our meeting

in Washington we could adopt a declaration of intent regarding future talks on further reductions in US and Soviet strategic offensive arms and agree on when they should begin. A draft such statement could be worked out by our foreign ministers during their forthcoming meetings.

It appears that even now we could record a common view which has emerged in the exchanges between the two of us, i.e. that future negotiations should provide for reductions in quantitative levels of all strategic arms and help to attain a mix and structure of arms that would be consistent with the goal of strengthening strategic stability.

In this context I would like to emphasize that, as before, we regard observance by the USSR and the USA of the ABM Treaty as the basis for maintaining and strengthening strategic stability.

I also wrote to you about the problem arising from significant differences in the structures of Soviet and US strategic offensive arms. Logic prompts that in the future, too, this objective factor will have to be considered by us in further arms reductions. Accordingly, all our steps should be extremely prudent and cautious. Reducing one component of the strategic triad should not lead to a general destabilization of the strategic situation as a result of the two other components remaining intact.

In the context of these talks the whole range of issues, considered by each side to be important for attaining the final

objective of the negotiations, could be examined. In particular, we believe it is possible to consider the question of significantly reducing the concentration of warheads on all ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and of ALCMs on heavy bombers, and the number of their delivery vehicles as well.

In our view, the situation now evolving in the world and in Soviet-US relations augurs well for negotiations on follow-on strategic arms reductions to proceed at a good pace and productively.

We even do not rule out the possibility that a new agreement could be concluded earlier than reductions would actually be completed under the treaty being prepared now. This would enable us more rapidly to attain genuinely stable structures of both sides' strategic arsenals at low levels.

I am convinced that we can confidently put before ourselves such far-reaching goals and expect to achieve them, not only in START, but also as regards the limitation and prohibition of nuclear tests, radical reduction of conventional arms in Europe, the prohibition of chemical weapons etc.

In conclusion let me also point out the following. In order to advance effectively along this path we have to attach particular importance to the atmosphere of our dialogue and the mutual willingness to avoid unnecessary complications and artificial problems. I appreciate your realistic approach to the development of Soviet-US dialogue, your desire to understand the other side, to consider its interests and problems. This

is how I regard your private letter to me of March 29, 1990. I want to reiterate that we intend firmly to continue to follow the course of radically reshaping Soviet society on the basis of democratization and glasnost, active and serious dialogue, and building a truly law-governed state. It goes without saying that all this presupposes respect for constitutional order and safeguarding the rights and security of all citizens of our country.

Eduard Shevardnadze plans to share with you thoughts on how these fundamental principles are being applied to the difficult task of creating a new federation in our country and building just and healthy interethnic relations.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

Kremlin, Moscow

April 2, 1990

- 1
- 12
- As I said in my letter to President Gorbachev, I am pleased to see that you recognize we have been careful in our public statements to avoid making the situation with respect to Lithuania worse.
- As you know, we have never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. We support self-determination for them. We are sympathetic to their aspirations for independence.
- Yet, we are not unmindful of the complexity of the situation, including economic relationships, security issues, and other problems that must be resolved.
- We believe these issues must be dealt with through discussion, through peaceful means.
- I have said that the use of coercion or intimidation would backfire in terms of our bilateral relationship.
- But let me be clear. Discussion does not mean ultimatums. In our view, it does mean a willingness to compromise and work together toward an outcome agreeable to both parties.

- You should understand that, beyond overt coercion, the step by step suppression of the powers and responsibility of Lithuania's freely elected government, an imposed outcome, or demands for capitulation will create grave problems for our otherwise very satisfactory relationship. While we have no desire to interfere in your affairs, you must know that these kinds of actions would be inconsistent with our principles and thus would produce a strongly negative reaction in the United States and, specifically, in our Congress.

- Given the principles that President Gorbachev has stated underlie perestroika and democratization, as well as our own principles, I would understand and be sympathetic to such a reaction.

- Much is at stake here. I have been widely criticized for not speaking out publicly against Soviet actions thus far. But, as I wrote to President Gorbachev, my flexibility on this matter is steadily diminishing. I have no wish to see this issue disrupt our progress but absent voluntary, peaceful, mutually acceptable agreement between the two parties, it surely will.

<ORIG> REUTER
<TOR> 900330074135

<TEXT>

UU EUK

301241 DIP :BC-SOVIET-LETTER

BUSH WRITES TO GORBACHEV - MESSAGE UNDISCLOSED

MOSCOW, MARCH 30, REUTER - A LETTER FROM U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV WAS HANDED OVER ON FRIDAY, BUT OFFICIALS DID NOT DISCLOSE ITS CONTENTS.

THE OFFICIAL TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID U.S. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN JOYCE GAVE THE LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE.

AN SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW CONFIRMED A LETTER WAS SENT -- A WEEK BEFORE SHEVARDNADZE IS DUE IN WASHINGTON FOR TALKS AIMED AT PREPARING A SUPERPOWER SUMMIT IN JUNE.

THE TWO LEADERS SPOKE LAST JANUARY BY TELEPHONE ABOUT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY CHANGES IN EUROPE.

REUTER GA HP JF

NNNN

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [301240Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0838-MR(507)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 301240Z MAR 90

FM 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
MM 5/28/2015

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM
MIKE JOYCE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, EMBASSY MOSCOW
REF: JOYCE/SCOWCROFT TELCON 0530Z MARCH 30

SCOWCROFT MESSAGE 300025Z MAR 90

1. PER REFTELCON, I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER FOR GORBACHEV TO SHEVARDNADZE AT 0545Z MARCH 30. SHEVARDNADZE WAS LEAVING AT 0600Z TO JOIN GORBACHEV AT A NORTHERN NATIONALITIES CONFERENCE, AND THE TWO OF THEM WERE TO GO FROM THERE TO THE FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION.
2. IN PRESENTING THE LETTER TO SHEVARDNADZE I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT WHICH SHOWED CLEARLY HOW IMPORTANT HE THOUGHT IT WAS THAT A SOLUTION TO THE LITHUANIAN PROBLEM BE REACHED PEACEFULLY AND IN A MANNER WHICH PRODUCED NO LOSERS. SHEVARDNADZE'S INTERPRETER THEN TRANSLATED THE LETTER ORALLY FOR HIM. HE MADE NO COMMENT UNTIL THE INTERPRETER HAD FINISHED.
3. SHEVARDNADZE SAID IN RESPONSE THAT HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S SINCERITY IN HOPING FOR A NORMALIZATION IN LITHUANIA WHICH DEFENDED PERESTROYKA'S GAINS AND THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. DEMOCRATIZATION WOULD SURELY CONTINUE IN LITHUANIA AS WELL AS IN THE OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. IT WAS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST, AND THE PROCESS WOULD NOT BE STOPPED.
4. HOWEVER, THE FINAL OUTCOME IN THE CURRENT DISPUTE WOULD BE SHAPED TO AN IMPORTANT DEGREE BY THE LITHUANIAN LEADERS THEMSELVES AND THE ACTIONS THEY CHOSE TO TAKE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THEY APPEARED

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION IN SEVERAL HOURS. IT WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE LEADERS OF ALL OF THE OTHER REPUBLICS. IF THEY DID NOT PARTICIPATE, THAT CLEARLY WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.

5. THE SITUATION COULD BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR LITHUANIA IF THE VARIOUS REPUBLICS DECIDED TO STOP GOODS AND MATERIAL SHIPMENTS TO LITHUANIA BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF A REAL DIALOGUE TO TAKE PLACE. AGAIN, IF THE LITHUANIAN LEADERS SHOWED UP AT THE COUNCIL OF FEDERATION, WE COULD DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS. I PERSONALLY CHECKED TO SEE IF AN INVITATION HAD BEEN SENT TO THEM, AND FOUND THAT IT HAD. IF THEY REFUSED TO COME THE QUESTION OF A DIALOGUE BECAME MORE DIFFICULT.

6. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE MAIN WEAPON WE HAD IN SOLVING THIS DISPUTE WAS DIALOGUE. WE HAD TO USE IT. THERE WAS A LARGE ANTI-INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATION IN VILNIUS SEVERAL DAYS AGO -- 30,000 - 40,000 PEOPLE. SUCH OUTPOURINGS OF STRONG FEELINGS ON THE MATTER COULD PRODUCE INCIDENTS. LITHUANIA'S NEW LEADERS WERE NOT CORRECTLY JUDGING THE MATTER IF THEY DID NOT SEE THAT POSSIBILITY.

7. LITHUANIA NOW HAD PROBLEMS NOT ONLY WITH THE CENTER, BUT WITH A NUMBER OF THE REPUBLICS. SOME HAD ECONOMIC CLAIMS AGAINST HER. BYELORUSSIA EVEN HAD A TERRITORIAL CLAIM WHICH IT WAS NOW DISCUSSING. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS ALL FOR OPEN DISCUSSIONS OF THESE PROBLEMS. EVERYONE MUST REMAIN AWARE THAT CONFLICTS COULD ERUPT ON AN ETHNIC

BASIS. NO ONE HAD PREDICTED SUCH SEVERE DISORDER IN THE CAUCASUS, BUT ETHNIC DISAGREEMENTS PRODUCED MUCH BLOODSHED. SOMETHING COULD EVEN HAPPEN BETWEEN, SAY, BYELORUSSIA AND LITHUANIA BECAUSE OF THE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS.

8. IN ANY CASE, SHEVARDNADZE SAID, I KNOW YOU HAVE STRESSED TO MY COLLEAGUES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER REACH GORBACHEV BEFORE THE FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION. I ASSURE YOU THAT WILL BE DONE. HE WILL HAVE IT IN PLENTY OF TIME TO STUDY IT BEFORE THE MEETING.

9. COMMENT: SHEVARDNADZE ONLY INDIRECTLY ADDRESSED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LETTER, APPARENTLY PREFERRING TO LEAVE THAT TO GORBACHEV HIMSELF. HIS FOCUS ON THE DANGER OF OUTBREAKS OF ETHNIC HATRED IS

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

NOT NEW. THOUGH HIS PREDICTION THAT LITHUANIA MIGHT FACE PRESSURE FROM OTHER REPUBLICS IN THE FORM OF CUTBACKS ON GOODS AND MATERIAL SHIPMENTS TO THE REPUBLIC IS. IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT HIS STATEMENTS ON THESE TWO POINTS WERE INTENDED IN ANY WAY AS THREATS. HE MAY SIMPLY HAVE BEEN LISTING ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS HE SAW COMING DOWN THE PIKE FOR LITHUANIA. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ANY MAJOR LITHUANIAN LEADERS ARE IN MOSCOW TODAY. AND WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY APPEAR AT THE COUNCIL OF FEDERATION MEETING.

~~SECRET~~

#0418

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08b. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [301238Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0838-MR(507.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 301238Z MAR 90

FM 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM
MIKE JOYCE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, EMBASSY MOSCOW

SUBSEQUENT TO TRANSMISSION OF CABLE REPORTING MY CONVERSATION
WITH SHEVARDNADZE THIS MORNING, AMBASSADOR OBUKHOV, HEAD OF
MFA'S USA DEPARTMENT, CALLED AT SHEVARDNADZE'S REQUEST TO PASS
THE FOLLOWING TO ME:

-- GORBACHEV WAS IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF THE RECEIPT FO THE
LETTER:

-- AN URGENT TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER WAS DONE:

-- HE WAS AQUAINTED WITH LETTER'S CONTENTS; AND

-- GORBACHEV "WILL FIND A WAY TO RESPOND."

JOYCE.

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#0419

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-JR
MM 5/28/2015

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to DCM Mike Joyce from General Scowcroft [300025Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0838-MR(507.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>

PRT: COMM 3.3(b)(6)

SIT: COQ PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 3.3(b)(1)

<DTG> 300025Z MAR 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE MAKE IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
DCM MIKE JOYCE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

TO: DCM MOSCOW

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

HEREWITH IS THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. PLEASE DELIVER AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE
TIME APROPOS OF OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON I HEARD FROM MARGARET THATCHER ABOUT HER
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH YOU CONCERNING LITHUANIA. YOUR
COMMENTS TO HER, COUPLED WITH A REPORT ON SENATOR KENNEDY'S
MEETING WITH YOU LAST MONDAY, HAVE GREATLY INCREASED MY
CONCERN OVER THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS IN LITHUANIA AND PROMPT
ME TO WRITE TO YOU.

DURING THE LAST YEAR, DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE
SOVIET UNION ITSELF, AND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE
FILLED BOTH OF OUR PEOPLES -- AND PEOPLE EVERYWHERE -- WITH
HOPE AND A SENSE OF GREAT OPPORTUNITY TO SHAPE A FUTURE
BASED ON COOPERATION, DIALOGUE AND PEACEFUL COMPETITION.
THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND YOU IN PARTICULAR, HAVE
WON THE RESPECT AND ADMIRATION OF MILLIONS AT HOME AND IN
THE WEST FOR YOUR BOLDNESS AND COURAGE IN PURSUIT OF
PERESTROIKA, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GLASNOST, AND NEW THINKING
IN YOUR MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICIES. THROUGH OUR TALKS IN
MALTA, OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AND OUR CORRESPONDENCE,
I HAVE FELT A DEEPENING SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AND
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US PERSONALLY. I ALSO AM VERY PLEASED
WITH THE FRANK, OPEN, AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JIM
BAKER AND EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT EARLY THIS SUMMER AND
BELIEVE OUR MEETING CAN MARK A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN SO MANY
AREAS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY ARMS CONTROL. AND I KNOW YOU
WILL RECEIVE A VERY WARM WELCOME FROM ALL AMERICANS.

IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF PROGRESS, HOPE AND PROMISE THAT THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO LITHUANIA PROMPTS ME TO WRITE YOU PRIVATELY AND PERSONALLY. I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT, IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR KENNEDY, YOU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I WANT PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED. I HAVE SAID THAT PUBLICLY MANY TIMES AND I HAVE ALSO STATED THAT I WANT TO SEE YOU CONTINUE TO SUCCEED. I MEAN IT.

BELIEVE ME WHEN I TELL YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO DESIRE TO EXPLOIT THE LITHUANIAN SITUATION FOR ADVANTAGE OF ANY KIND. WHILE, AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED THE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE USSR, AND WE SUPPORT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THEM, WE HAVE TAKEN GREAT CARE IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO AVOID INFLAMING THE SITUATION AND HAVE NOT CRITICIZED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE TOLD JIM BAKER YOU HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE NUANCES IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND APPRECIATED OUR POSTURE. I SHOULD TELL YOU THAT EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING HIGH HERE IN THE U.S. ON THE LITHUANIAN QUESTION, BUT I HAVE CONTINUED TO TALK ABOUT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM -- ABOUT THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATION. WE HAVE URGED PATIENCE, RESTRAINT AND PEACEFUL DISCUSSION AS THE ONLY COURSE TO FOLLOW.

THIS MEASURED POSTURE HAS LED TO GROWING CRITICISM IN THIS COUNTRY, INCLUDING FROM CONGRESS, THE PRESS AND EVEN MEMBERS OF MY OWN PARTY, FROM PEOPLE SINCERE -- AS AM I -- IN THEIR SYMPATHY FOR LITHUANIA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE. THIS CRITICISM IS, IN FACT, BEGINNING TO REDUCE MY OWN FLEXIBILITY.

YOU TOLD PRIME MINISTER THATCHER THAT YOUR OPTIONS ARE NARROWING. I SENSE INCREASING PESSIMISM ON YOUR PART ABOUT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. MR. PRESIDENT, IN THE SPIRIT OF GENUINE RESPECT AND INDEED FRIENDSHIP MAY I STATE THAT ANY OUTCOME NOT BASED ON PEACEFUL DISCUSSIONS AND ACCOMMODATION POSES REAL RISKS TO WHAT YOU HAVE ACHIEVED, AND HOPE TO ACHIEVE, NOT ONLY IN OUR RELATIONS BUT IN YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WEST. BOTH YOU AND MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAVE SAID TO JIM BAKER AND TO ME THAT THE USE OF FORCE WOULD ALSO BE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO REFORM. I BELIEVE THE USE OF COERCION WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR CONSEQUENCE FOR OUR EFFORTS. PERESTROIKA CANNOT BE DIVISIBLE. IMPOSED OR MILITARY RULE IN LITHUANIA, THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF THE USE OF FORCE OR INTIMIDATION, IS SIMPLY INCONSISTENT WITH DEMOCRATIZATION ELSEWHERE.

TAKING ALL OF THIS INTO ACCOUNT, IS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO DRAW BACK FROM CONFRONTATION, ULTIMATUMS AND DEMANDS, AND RETURN TO A CALM ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH REASONED DISCUSSION CAN PROCEED? IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH JIM BAKER, EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF REFERENDUM FOR DEALING WITH NATIONALITY QUESTIONS. DR. LANDSBERGIS HAS NOW PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER A REFERENDUM. DOES THIS OFFER SOME COMMON GROUND? COULD IT BE A MEANS FOR MOVING AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION AND FOR BEGINNING A CREDIBLE PROCESS THAT MEETS YOUR RESPECTIVE NEEDS? I HOPE SO.

MR. PRESIDENT, I AM WRITING YOU BECAUSE I AM DEEPLY

CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT IMPASSE WITH LITHUANIA HOLDS THE
#0203

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

POTENTIAL TO IMPERIL THE POSITIVE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
AND OUTSIDE OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE SUPPORT THE CHANGES YOU
ARE BRINGING TO THE USSR AND IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WE
ALSO SUPPORT THE FREE CHOICE OF LITHUANIANS TO DETERMINE
THEIR OWN STATUS, A CHOICE TRAGICALLY TAKEN FROM THEM BY
STALIN IN A DEAL THE SUPREME SOVIET ALREADY NOTED WAS
ILLEGITIMATE. WE WANT TO HELP DEFUSE THE CURRENT SITUATION
IN THE HOPE YOUR INTERESTS AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE
LITHUANIAN PEOPLE CAN BE RECONCILED THROUGH DISCUSSIONS. I
AM INFORMALLY AND INDIRECTLY ALSO URGING DR. LANDSBERGIS TO
DRAW BACK FROM ACTIONS AND DEMANDS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO
CONFRONTATION.

IN CONCLUSION, THERE IS AN EXPRESSION HERE IN THE U.S. WHEN
A PERSON IS IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION, IT IS SAID, "HE'S
CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE." WITHOUT
INTERVENING IN YOUR AFFAIRS, LET ME SAY I HAVE TRIED TO
UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES YOU FACE AT HOME AS YOU WRESTLE
WITH THIS TOUGH PROBLEM. IN WRITING FROM THE HEART, AS I
HAVE TRIED TO DO HERE, I ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE NO MOTIVE
OTHER THAN THE PREVENTION OF A TRAGEDY WITH UNTOLD POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0204

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0203 <TOR> 900329192546 MSG000260047546

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0204 <TOR> 900329192556 MSG000260047556

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08d. Draft Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to DCM Moscow, Re: Personal Letter from the President to President Gorbachev [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 1/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0838-MR(507.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



FROM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

Please make immediate delivery of the following message to DCM
Mike Joyce from General Scowcroft

BEGIN TEXT

TO: DCM Moscow

FROM: Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Herewith is the text of a personal letter from the President to
President Gorbachev. Please deliver at earliest possible time
apropos of our telephone conversation.

Dear Mr. President:

Wednesday afternoon I heard from Margaret Thatcher about her
telephone conversation with you concerning Lithuania. Your
comments to her, coupled with a report on Senator Kennedy's
meeting with you last Monday, have greatly increased my concern
over the direction of events in Lithuania and prompt me to write
to you.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
MM 5/28/2015

During the last year, developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union itself, and in our bilateral relations have filled both of our peoples -- and people everywhere -- with hope and a sense of great opportunity to shape a future based on cooperation, dialogue and peaceful competition. The leaders of the Soviet Union, and you in particular, have won the respect and admiration of millions at home and in the West for your boldness and courage in pursuit of perestroika, democratization, and glasnost, and new thinking in your military and foreign policies. Through our talks in Malta, our telephone conversations and our correspondence, I have felt a deepening sense of confidence and understanding between us personally. I also am very pleased with the frank, open, and friendly relationship between Jim Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze.

I am looking forward to your visit early this summer and believe our meeting can mark a major step forward in so many areas, including especially arms control. And I know you will receive a very warm welcome from all Americans.

It is against this background of progress, hope and promise that the situation with respect to Lithuania prompts me to write you privately and personally. I was pleased to learn that, in your conversation with Senator Kennedy, you acknowledged that I want

perestroika to succeed. I have said that publicly many times and I have also stated that I want to see you continue to succeed. I mean it.

Believe me when I tell you that the United States has no desire to exploit the Lithuanian situation for advantage of any kind. While, as you know, the United States has never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR, and we support self-determination for them, we have taken great care in our public statements to avoid inflaming the situation and have not criticized the Soviet government. Eduard Shevardnadze told Jim Baker you had taken note of the nuances in our public statements and appreciated our posture. I should tell you that emotions are running high here in the U.S. on the Lithuanian question, but I have continued to talk about a peaceful resolution of this difficult problem -- about the need for negotiation. We have urged patience, restraint and peaceful discussion as the only course to follow.

This measured posture has led to growing criticism in this country, including from Congress, the press and even members of my own party, from people sincere -- as am I -- in their sympathy for Lithuania's desire for independence. This criticism is, in fact, beginning to reduce my own flexibility.

You told Prime Minister Thatcher that your options are narrowing. I sense increasing pessimism on your part about a peaceful outcome. Mr. President, in the spirit of genuine respect and indeed friendship may I state that any outcome not based on peaceful discussions and accommodation poses real risks to what you have achieved, and hope to achieve, not only in our relations but in your relations with other countries in the West. Both you and Minister Shevardnadze have said to Jim Baker and to me that the use of force would also be a serious setback to reform. I believe the use of coercion would have a similar consequence for your efforts. Perestroika cannot be divisible. Imposed or military rule in Lithuania, the inevitable result of the use of force or intimidation, is simply inconsistent with democratization elsewhere.

Taking all of this into account, is it not possible to draw back from confrontation, ultimatums and demands, and return to a calm atmosphere in which reasoned discussion can proceed. In his recent conversations with Jim Baker, Eduard Shevardnadze seemed to accept the principle of referendum for dealing with nationality questions. Dr. Landsbergis has now publicly stated that he would be ready to consider a referendum. Does this offer some common ground? Could it be a means for moving away from confrontation and for beginning a credible process that meets your respective needs. I hope so.

Mr. President, I am writing you because I am deeply concerned that the current impasse with Lithuania holds the potential to imperil the positive course of developments in and outside of the Soviet Union. We support the changes you are bringing to the USSR and in international relations. We also support the free choice of Lithuanians to determine their own status, a choice tragically taken from them by Stalin in a deal the Supreme Soviet already noted was illegitimate. We want to help defuse the current situation in the hope your interests and the aspirations of the Lithuanian people can be reconciled through discussions. I am informally and indirectly also urging Dr. Landsbergis to draw back from actions and demands that contribute to confrontation.

In conclusion, there is an expression here in the U.S. when a person is in a difficult situation, it is said, "He's caught between a rock and a hard place." Without intervening in your affairs, let me say I have tried to understand the difficulties you face at home as you wrestle with this tough problem. In writing from the heart, as I have tried to do here, I assure you that we have no motive other than the prevention of a tragedy with untold possible consequences.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

President of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics

Moscow

FLASH

~~SECRET~~

PG notes

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM

<PREC> FLASH

<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 292329Z MAR 90

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 292329Z MAR 90 PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM MIKE JOYCE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, EMBASSY MOSCOW

MFA ASSURED ME AT 0240 HOURS LOCAL THAT IT HAD PASSED MY REQUEST TO GORBACHEV'S "ASSISTANTS." MFA HAS INFORMED THE "ASSISTANTS" THAT THE MESSAGE IS A PERSONAL ONE FROM THE PRESIDENT, THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO PASS IT DIRECTLY TO GORBACHEV, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE FEDERAL COUNCIL MEETING. MFA SAID IT WOULD BE BACK TO ME BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900 HOURS LOCAL WITH A REPLY. THE COUNCIL MEETING IS UNLIKELY TO BE BEFORE 1000 HRS.

I CANNOT BE CERTAIN THIS WILL PRODUCE THE RESULTS WE WANT, BUT IT IS THE BEST WE CAN DO NOW.

ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS? WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT YET RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

DECL: OADR

#0387

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
9/29/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08f. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to DCM Mike Joyce from General Scowcroft [292053Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

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FLASH

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GATES COMM ^{3.3(b)(6)} SDO
SIT: COO FILE PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 292053Z MAR 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ^{3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)}

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE MAKE IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
TO DCM MIKE JOYCE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT

TO: DCM MOSCOW
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

REFERENCE MY MESSAGE 291748Z MAR 90.

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV FRIDAY MORNING TO DELIVER AN URGENT PERSONAL
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO MAKE THIS
APPOINTMENT, SEEK FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM ME.

END TEXT

#0199

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08g. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft or Mr. Robert Gates [291932Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0838-MR(507.06)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

FLASH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 291932Z MAR 98

FM 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 291932Z VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO BRENT SCOWCROFT,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS OR MR.
ROBERT GATES FROM 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK LEFT MOSCOW EN ROUTE WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON.
PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU WISH YOUR MESSAGE DELIVERED TO CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES MIKE JOYCE.

DECL: OADR

#0373

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
MR 5/28/2015

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08h. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock from Brent Scowcroft [291748Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/29/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0838-MR(507.07)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

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 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

FLASH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: COMM ^{3.3(b)(6)}
SIT: COQ PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 291748Z MAR 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ^{3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)}

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT. ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. IF AMBASSADOR IS UNAVAILABLE. CALL MR. GATES OR GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

THE PRESIDENT WILL BE SENDING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WITHIN THE NEXT HOUR OR TWO. PLEASE CONTACT GORBACHEV'S OFFICE. TELL THEM YOU HAVE A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND SEE IF YOU CAN SEE GORBACHEV LATER TONIGHT OR EARLY TOMORROW MORNING -- BUT ABOVE ALL BEFORE THE FEDERAL COUNCIL MEETING TOMORROW.

DECL: OADR
#0196

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
MM 5/28/2015

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Cable	To White House, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [301238Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files

Subseries: Gorbachev Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/7/2009

OA/ID Number: 91127-003

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #: 2011-0838-MR(507.01)

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition: Released in Part

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

PREC: IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 301238Z MAR 90

FM 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FROM
MIKE JOYCE. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, EMBASSY MOSCOW

SUBSEQUENT TO TRANSMISSION OF CABLE REPORTING MY CONVERSATION
WITH SHEVARDNADZE THIS MORNING. AMBASSADOR OBUKHOV, HEAD OF
MFA'S USA DEPARTMENT, CALLED AT SHEVARDNADZE'S REQUEST TO PASS
THE FOLLOWING TO ME:

-- GORBACHEV WAS IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF THE RECEIPT FO THE
LETTER:

-- AN URGENT TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER WAS DONE;
-- HE WAS AQUAINTED WITH LETTER'S CONTENTS; AND
-- GORBACHEV "WILL FIND A WAY TO RESPOND."

JOYCE.

DECL: OADR

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#0419

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1990

Dick:

Here is Baker's cable
reporting on his meeting
with Shevardnadze. After
reading, please return it
to me.

Brent

K
Return to Scowcroft -
very close hold -

[Signature]

From the desk of

George Bush

Patty

Hand Carry
to Gen S office

GB

NO copies

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 08

PRT: GATES KANTER SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: FILE SIT SUM

PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 200905Z MAR 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NAMIBIA

TO RUEHC/SECTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4858
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 02017
NODIS

FOR BOB ZOELICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

NAMIBIA, MARCH 20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE

I MET WITH EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE FOR THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS
TONIGHT. ONCE AGAIN, WE HAD A WIDE-RANGING AND RATHER
EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSION. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING THE SUMMIT
DATES AND THE DATES FOR OUR MAY MINISTERIAL, WE COVERED START,
GERMANY, LITHUANIA AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
UNION, AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN.

I CAN'T SAY THAT WE RESOLVED ANYTHING, BUT THE CHARACTER OF OUR
DISCUSSION IS ANOTHER REMINDER OF THE CHANGED NATURE OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP. LET ME BRIEFLY RUN THROUGH EACH TOPIC.

SUMMIT-DATES

I GAVE HIM OUR PROPOSED DATES -- EITHER JUNE 18-22 OR THE
EARLIER TIME OF JUNE 11-15. I ALSO OUTLINED YOUR PREFERRED
SCENARIOS FOR TIME IN WASHINGTON AND AT KENNEBUNKPORT. HE
RESPONDED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE SCENARIOS,
BUT THEY NEEDED TO COME EARLIER IN THE MONTH. THE JUNE 11-15

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*Brent
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08

DATES CONFLICTED WITH THE FIRST EVER CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIA
FEDERATED REPUBLIC'S COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS WAS A VERY
IMPORTANT POLITICAL
EVENT FOR GORBACHEV AND HE COULDN'T MISS IT OR ALTER THE DATE.
PUSHING THE SUMMIT DATE LATER WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE BIG
PARTY CONGRESS THAT WAS SO CRITICAL TO GORBACHEV'S SUCCESS. HE
SAID AGAIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SUMMIT COME BEFORE
THE PARTY CONGRESS -- IMPLYING THAT A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WOULD
BOOST GORBACHEV GOING INTO THE RUSSIAN AND THE UNION-WIDE PARTY
CONGRESS.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE AND GORBACHEV HAD GONE OVER DATES
CAREFULLY, AND THE ONLY TIMES THAT WORKED WERE IN THE FIRST
WEEK IN JUNE, SPECIFICALLY THE JUNE 4-8 TIMEFRAME. HE WAS
AFRAID NO OTHER TIME WOULD WORK, AND HOPED WE WOULD BE
UNDERSTANDING GIVEN THEIR "COMPLEX" INTERNAL SITUATION AND
THEIR "UPCOMING BIG EVENTS."

I TOLD HIM THOSE DATES COINCIDED WITH A STATE VISIT TO
WASHINGTON OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN AND THE SPRING NAC
MINISTERIAL. I SAID I WOULD TALK IT OVER WITH YOU AND SEE WHAT
WE COULD ARRANGE TO MEET THEIR NEEDS.
START

ON START, SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO
RESOLVE ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES BY THE JUNE SUMMIT. HE THEN RAN
THROUGH SEVERAL ISSUES, HE WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE QUICKLY:
ALCMS, SLCMS, THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE, AND DURATION OF THE
TREATY. OF THESE, THE ONLY ONE WHERE HE FELT THERE WAS A
PROBLEM WAS ALCMS, WHERE HE SAID THEY HAVE NO FALL-BACK ON THE
600KM RANGE.

I TOLD HIM IF THAT WAS THE CASE, THEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS WOULD
HAVE TO RESOLVE THIS ONE BECAUSE I HAD NO FURTHER ROOM TO MOVE
ON RANGE. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING OUR PRESIDENTS' TIME WAS TOO
VALUABLE TO SPEND ON A TECHNICAL ISSUE LIKE THIS AND WE WOULD
HAVE TO RESOLVE IT. WE WILL SEE IF OR WHEN THEY MOVE ON THIS;
I SUSPECT IT MAY BE THE LAST THING AGREED TO BECAUSE GORBACHEV
CLEARLY HAS TO OVERRULE AKHROMEYEV.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 08

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I THEN RAISED OUR START PROPOSAL. MAKING CLEAR THAT I WAS NOT SEEKING AN ANSWER NOW, WHY I THOUGHT IT HAD MERIT, AND, ABOVE ALL ELSE, HOW NO IDEA SHOULD IN ANY WAY IMPEDE OUR COMPLETION OF THE START TREATY. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD GIVE US A RESPONSE WHEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON IN TWO WEEKS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD TRY TO HAVE AN ANSWER BY THAT TIME, AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE VERY MUCH "VALUED" OUR PRESENTING NEW IDEAS, AND ESPECIALLY IN THIS FASHION. HE ADDED THEY WERE WORKING ON NEW IDEAS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, THAT NONE HAD CRYSTALIZED YET, THAT THEIR MILITARY AND MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET WERE OFTEN TIMES "EMOTIONAL" ON ALL SUCH IDEAS, AND THAT THEY TOO WOULD DO NOTHING TO IMPEDE AN AGREEMENT. AS HE PUT IT, "OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE IS TO COMPLETE THE START AGREEMENT."

BT

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 02017

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FOR BOB ZOELICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY
GERMANY

ON GERMANY. SHEVARDNADZE CHOSE NOT TO GET INTO SPECIFICS, BUT INSTEAD FOCUSED ON SOME GENERAL CONCERNS. PUT SIMPLY, HE SAID THE PACE OF UNIFICATION WAS TOO FAST, OUTSTRIPPING THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURE OF SECURITY.

WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS HELPED MEET SOME OF THE SOVIET NEEDS, HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD A BASIC PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM WASN'T WHO RAN GERMANY; AFTER ALL, "WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TODAY." THE PROBLEM IS THE GERMANY OF THE FUTURE.

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IN SAYING THIS, HE SEEMED TO HAVE CONCERNS AT TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS. ONE WAS AN IMAGERY CONCERN -- I.E., "WE CAN'T ACCEPT A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO." I SAY AN IMAGERY CONCERN BECAUSE AT THE SAME TIME THAT HE SAID GERMANY CAN'T BE IN NATO, HE ALSO SAID WE RECOGNIZE THAT GERMANY CAN'T BE NEUTRAL, "THAT WOULD BE A BIG PROBLEM." FRANKLY, HE SAID, "WE DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 08

THE PROBLEM. YOU AND I WILL HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS MORE AND OUR PRESIDENTS WILL HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS AS WELL."

WHEN I WENT THROUGH THE LOGIC OF ANCHORING GERMANY IN NATO, ENSURING GERMANY WOULDN'T HAVE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OWN SECURITY AND GUARANTEEING THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY, HE HAD AN INTERESTING AND REVEALING RESPONSE. HE SAID WE DON'T QUESTION THE VALUE OF YOUR MILITARY PRESENCE. IN FACT, HE SAID ANY SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE EASTERN PART OF GERMANY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TEMPORARY, AND WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO AN ONGOING U.S. PRESENCE IN GERMANY. THE PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS

THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO GUARANTEE A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE. GERMANY'S CURRENT LEADERS WOULD NOT BE THE PROBLEM, BUT THE NEXT GENERATION MIGHT BE. WHATEVER MIGHT BE AGREED TO NOW, WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN OVER TIME. HE SAID HE MIGHT BE WRONG, BUT HE DOUBTED FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW THE NEXT GENERATION OF GERMAN LEADERS WILL WANT US TROOPS. IF [REDACTED]

THAT GENERATION IS LED BY THE GERMAN RIGHT, HE ASKED, WHERE WOULD WE BE THEN? HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS A WORST CASE SCENARIO,

[REDACTED] BUT IT COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. AGAIN, HE SAID, WE DO NOT HAVE THE ANSWER, BUT WE NEED TO THINK ALL THIS THROUGH WITH YOU.

I SAID WE DID NEED TO THINK THESE ISSUES THROUGH, BUT IF THEIR STARTING POINT WAS THAT THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE WAS A GOOD THING, NATO WAS THE VEHICLE FOR MAINTAINING THAT PRESENCE. TAKE IT AWAY, AND YOU TAKE AWAY OUR PRESENCE.

I SHOULD ADD THAT HE INDIRECTLY TOUCHED ON THE SOVIET DESIRE TO LIMIT THE BUNDESWEHR IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION WE HAD ON CFE. I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE U.S. - SOVIET STATIONED FORCES LIMITS WE HAD AGREED TO AND WHY THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR IN VIENNA HAD SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF OVERALL MANPOWER. HE SAID THE 750,000 PROPOSAL FOR PACT-TO-PACT STATIONED FORCES REFERRED ONLY TO THE CENTRAL ZONE NOT THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS ZONE. THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO GET AT GERMAN FORCES IN CFE I.

LITHUANIA

ON LITHUANIA. HE SAID FLATLY, THE SOVIETS WON'T USE FORCE. HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 08

SAID THE ONLY ANSWER IS A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE. HE FELT THAT LITHUANIA HAD GOTTEN CAUGHT UP IN THE EUPHORIA OF INDEPENDENCE AND HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE CONSEQUENCES. GETTING EMOTIONAL, HE ASKED "WHO IS GOING TO PROVIDE THEM HIGHLY SUBSIDIZED OIL AND GAS; WHO IS GOING TO PROVIDE THEM RAW MATERIALS FOR THEIR FACTORIES... THEY GET A LOT FROM US. AND THEY CAN'T SIMPLY AND SUDDENLY GO IT ALONE."

HE SAID THE LITHUANIAN DECISION ON INDEPENDENCE WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, BUT NOW MANY LITHUANIANS WERE REALIZING THERE WERE CONSEQUENCES AND, AS A RESULT, HE FELT THEY WOULD NOW BE ABLE TO HAVE THE KIND OF QUIET, CIVILIZED DIALOGUE NEEDED TO DECIDE THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

HE REFERRED INDIRECTLY TO THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT THE NUCLEAR POWER AND DEFENSE PLANTS IN LITHUANIA. LASTLY, HE SAID THEY HAD NOTED THE NUANCES OF OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THEY HAD BEEN APPRECIATED.

I TOLD HIM WE HAD NOT TRIED TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION, BUT WE FELT STRONGLY ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF ITS USE. I WAS GLAD TO HAVE HIM REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO USE FORCE, BUT I SAID WE WOULD BE WATCHING THINGS CLOSELY.

BT

#2017

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 02017

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FOR BOB ZOELICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY

MORE GENERALLY, I SUGGESTED THAT THE DRAFT SECESSION LAW HE HAS TOLD ME ABOUT SHOULD BE PASSED QUICKLY AND A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION (E.G., REFERENDUMS IN EACH REPUBLIC) SHOULD BE ADOPTED. WHILE APOLOGIZING FOR GIVING UNSOLICITED ADVICE, I SAID IT LOOKED TO AN OUTSIDER LIKE THE NATIONALITIES, PROBLEMS WOULD SIMPLY SPIN OUT OF CONTROL IF THE SOVIETS DIDN'T ACT SOON.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE AGREED WITH ME. HE SAID THEY WERE TRYING TO FINALIZE THE SECESSION LAW; AS PAINFUL AS THIS IS FOR US, HE

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 08

SAID THEY HAVE TO DO IT. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD COME TO ACCEPT THE REFERENDUM IDEA AS WELL. BUT THAT IT JUST WASN'T POSSIBLE TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS I WAS SUGGESTING.

ONCE AGAIN. HE SAID THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM WAS THE MOST SERIOUS ONE THEY FACED AND THE ONE THEY WERE LEAST ABLE TO MANAGE. (INDEED. WHEN I APPLAUDED THE ADOPTION OF THE ABALKIN ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN. HE SAID "YES. WE WILL MANAGE THE ECONOMY -- AS DIFFICULT AS IT IS -- BUT THE NATIONALITIES ARE ANOTHER MATTER.")

AFRICA

SHEVARDNADZE IS ON A NINE-DAY TOUR OF AFRICA AND SEEMED GENUINELY IMPRESSED WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND POSSIBILITIES. HE TALKED ABOUT THE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, NOTING THAT HE HAS KNOWN ANC LEADERS FOR A LONG TIME AND HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE CHANGES HE IS SEEING. HE SAID BEING IN NAMIBIA FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION WAS A REMINDER OF WHAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION CAN DO WHEN THEY COOPERATE. HE SUGGESTED THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR A SIMILAR EFFORT ON ANGOLA. HE SAID DOS SANTOS WAS READY FOR IT: "HE HAS GROWN TIRED OF WAR JUST THE WAY THEY DID IN NICARAGUA AND IN ETHIOPIA."

HE SAID THAT HE FAVORED OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE A SECRET FOUR-WAY MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S.-SOVIETS-MPLA-UNITA, AND ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT DOS SANTOS WOULD GO ALONG WITH IT. "HE NEEDS A LITTLE MORE TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT."

I TOLD HIM I HAD SEEN DOS SANTOS AND MADE CLEAR THAT WE COULD ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND DOS SANTOS COULD COME TO THE U.S. IF THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE AND A GOOD-FAITH NEGOTIATIONS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. I MADE CLEAR WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SAVIMBI AND I PRESENTED A PROPOSAL WE GAVE TO DOS SANTOS. ONE WHICH CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, MUTUAL UNITA AND GOVERNMENT FORCE WITHDRAWALS, A SET OF AGREED PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TALKS, AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND UNITA BY EACH OTHER.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE PROPOSAL WAS INTERESTING AND WE SHOULD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 08

WORK TOGETHER TO FOLLOW UP ON IT. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WAS OPTIMISTIC WE COULD MAKE REAL PROGRESS SOON.

AFGHANISTAN

I RAISED A VARIANT OF THE THREE-PHASE PROPOSAL I MADE IN MOSCOW. I SUGGESTED THAT IF NAJIBULLAH WERE TO GO, WE COULD IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGATIVE SYMMETRY, A CEASEFIRE, AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT NO ONE COULD FORCE NAJIBULLAH OUT, AND OUR STARTING POINT WOULD LEAD TO A DEAD END. LET US FOCUS, HE SAID, ON A PROCESS. NAJIB SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT ELECTIONS AND THAT THE ELECTIONS COULD BE RUN BY THE UN WITH ALL SORTS OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO GUARANTEE ITS FAIRNESS. HE SAID THIS APPROACH HAD WORKED IN NAMIBIA, IN NICARAGUA, AND WE WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT IT FOR CAMBODIA. WHY NOT TRY IT IN AFGHANISTAN?

I SAID THE MUJIHADDIN WOULD NEVER ACCEPT IT IF NAJIB COULD RUN IN THE ELECTIONS. IT WAS NOT A CASE OF BEING RIGHT OR WRONG, THIS WAS SIMPLY THE REALITY. HE ASKED IF WE WOULD THINK MORE ABOUT THE ELECTIONS APPROACH. FRANKLY, I HAVE GOT TO SAY, THERE IS SOMETHING PARADOXICAL AND INDEFENSIBLE ABOUT US OPPOSING ELECTIONS, THAT ARE FREE AND FAIR. IF THE MUJIHADDIN WON'T PARTICIPATE IN SUCH ELECTIONS, HOW CAN WE JUSTIFY CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THEM?

CONCLUDING-IMPRESSIONS

AS ALWAYS, SHEVARDNADZE WAS CALM, RELAXED, AND IN GOOD HUMOR.

I SENSED HE ENJOYED BEING IN AFRICA, AND FOR THE MOMENT OUT OF THE FRAY IN MOSCOW. HIS MOOD ON GERMANY AND ON THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION WAS MORE PENSIVE THAN I HAVE SEEN BEFORE. HE AND GORBACHEV SEEM TO BE GENUINELY WRESTLING WITH THESE PROBLEMS, BUT HAVE YET TO FASHION A COHERENT OR CONFIDENT RESPONSE. THEY ALSO HAVE YET TO SHAPE THEIR BOTTOM LINES. MAYBE THAT WILL COME IN TIME, POSSIBLY EVEN BY THE SUMMIT. BUT, WE ARE NOT THERE YET AND WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT

THEIR CHOICES AND PERHAPS EVEN THE FORMULATION OF SOME OF THEIR OPTION

Brent
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israel
pant

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 08

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce, Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Mike Joyce [211924Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Date Closed:	4/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0838-MR(510)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>

PRT: COMM 3.3(b)(6)

SIT: COQ PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 3.3(b)(1) <DTG> 211924Z MAR 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE MAKE IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT TO MIKE JOYCE.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: MIKE JOYCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

BEGIN TEXT

IF I HAD WANTED THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV TO GO THROUGH THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, WE WOULD NOT HAVE SENT IT BACK CHANNEL AND
ASKED FOR DELIVERY PERSONALLY TO GORBACHEV. I SUGGEST THAT IN
THE FUTURE WHEN COMMUNICATIONS ARE HANDLED IN A MANNER OUT OF THE
ORDINARY THAT YOU CONSULT BEFORE DECIDING ON A DIFFERENT COURSE
OF ACTION.

END TEXT

#0163

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0163 <TOR> 900321142249 MSG000259338169

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
MM 5/28/2015



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

March 21, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: MIKE JOYCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

IF I HAD WANTED THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV TO GO THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WE WOULD NOT HAVE SENT IT BACK CHANNEL AND ASKED FOR DELIVERY PERSONALLY TO GORBACHEV. I SUGGEST THAT IN THE FUTURE WHEN COMMUNICATIONS ARE HANDLED IN A MANNER OUT OF THE ORDINARY THAT YOU CONSULT BEFORE DECIDING ON A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTION.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
MM 5/28/2015

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11c. Cable	From Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [President's Letter to Gorbachev] [211107Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Date Closed:	4/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0838-MR(510.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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21 MAR 90 11 44z

O 211107Z MAR 90 ZYH ZEP-1 ZEP-4<<=

FM 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE<<=

ZEN<<=

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVATE CHANNEL<<=

OPR<<=

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT<<=
FROM MIKE JOYCE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW<<=

MARCH 20, 1990<<=

FROM: MIKE JOYCE<<=

DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW<<=

FOR: MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT<<=

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS<<=
THE WHITE HOUSE<<=

JACK MATLOCK WILL BE RETURNING FROM CENTRAL ASIA ON MARCH<<=
28. IN HIS ABSENCE I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO<<=
GORBACHEV TO FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BISSMERTNYKH AT<<=
10:00 LOCAL MARCH 21. THOUGH I HANDED THE LETTER IN A SEALED<<=
ENVELOPE I TOLD HIM THAT IT CONTAINED IMPORTANT PROPOSALS<<=
ON START. HE UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV<<=
IMMEDIATELY.<<=

DECL: OADR.<<=

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR

MM 5/28/2015



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11d. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

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<DIST>

PRT: COMM 3.3(b)(6)

SIT: COQ PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 3.3(b)(1)

<DTG> 210001Z MAR 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK,
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

MARCH 20, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH. OBVIOUSLY THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS VERY
SENSITIVE. JIM BAKER AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER ARE THE ONLY TWO
PEOPLE IN STATE AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS. SECRETARY BAKER DISCUSSED
THE SAME PROPOSAL WITH SHEVARDNADZE DURING THEIR MEETING IN
NAMIBIA.

BEGIN TEXT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MARCH 20, 1990

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MADE DRAMATIC AND HISTORIC PROGRESS IN
OUR EFFORTS TO INVIGORATE AND ACCELERATE THE ARMS CONTROL
PROCESS. OUR OWN TALKS AT MALTA AND THE RECENT MEETINGS
BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN
MOSCOW AND OTTAWA HAVE IMPARTED SIGNIFICANT MOMENTUM TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE INJECTED IMPORTANT NEW IDEAS THAT CAN
HELP RESOLVE THE MAJOR ISSUES QUICKLY.

I BELIEVE THE TIME IS RIGHT TO BUILD ON THIS MOMENTUM BY
TAKING A BOLD INITIATIVE IN START.

OUR TWO SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE PRINCIPAL GOAL OF
START IS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED
IN THE PAST, THIS MEANS MORE THAN REDUCING NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS
-- IT ALSO MEANS SHAPING THE FORCES OF EACH SIDE SO THAT THEY
ARE INHERENTLY MORE STABILIZING. I BELIEVE WE CAN DO MORE
TOWARD THIS END IN THE CURRENT START NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT
DELAYING THEIR CONCLUSION, AND ALSO SET THE COURSE FOR EVEN
MORE STABILIZING MEASURES IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS THAT COULD
BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER START. IN PARTICULAR, I BELIEVE WE



SHOULD CONSIDER THE ELIMINATION OF MOBILE MIRVED MISSILES AS PART OF THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT. THEN, IN FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVS.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT I PUT CONSIDERABLE PRIORITY ON THE PROMPT COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT. IN FACT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU AND I BE PREPARED TO INITIAL THE DRAFT TREATY DURING THE UPCOMING WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO SIGNIFY THAT WE HAVE AGREED ON ALL THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE A BAN ON MOBILE MIRVS COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAYING ITS COMPLETION. TO ACHIEVE SUCH A BAN, I AM PREPARED TO CANCEL OUR RAIL-GARRISON SYSTEM IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET MOBILE SS-24S. I KNOW YOU HAVE SEVERAL TRAINS ALREADY DEPLOYED. THE UNITED STATES HAS A SYSTEM THAT I AM READY TO DEPLOY RAPIDLY, BUT I WOULD PREFER ANOTHER COURSE, TO BAN THESE MOBILE-MIRV SYSTEMS NOW BEFORE OUR TWO SIDES HAVE EVEN MORE INVESTED IN THEM AND THEIR ELIMINATION BECOMES THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

I ALSO AM PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF SILO-BASED MIRVED MISSILES. CERTAINLY THIS BOLD STEP WOULD TAKE MORE EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT OUR AGREEMENT ON THIS GOAL COULD BE THE FOUNDATION OF FOLLOW-ON TALKS THAT COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE CURRENT START TREATY. I ALSO WOULD NOTE THAT IF OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MIRVED ICBMS, THE US WILL BE WILLING TO DEFER OUR REMAINING CONCERNS ABOUT HEAVY ICBMS TO THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS.

I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON ALL THREE GOALS -- BANNING MOBILE MIRVS IN START, INITIALING THE START TREATY AT THE JUNE SUMMIT, AND BEGINNING FOLLOW-ON TALKS IMMEDIATELY TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVS -- AT THE MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE NEXT MONTH. IF, HOWEVER, YOU ARE UNABLE TO AGREE TO CONSIDER A BAN ON MOBILE MIRVS IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO ANNOUNCE, FOLLOWING THE APRIL MINISTERIAL, AN AGREEMENT TO BEGIN FOLLOW-ON TALKS ONCE THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT IS INITIALED THAT WOULD HAVE AS CENTRAL OBJECTIVES THE NEAR-TERM ELIMINATION OF MOBILE MIRVS, FOLLOWED BY ALL LAND-BASED MIRVS.

I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY BAKER TO OUTLINE THESE IDEAS TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WHEN THEY MEET IN NAMIBIA IN ORDER TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO HAVE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL WHEN THEY MEET IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL.

I KNOW THAT WE ALREADY HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK BEFORE US BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT CONDITIONS MAY NEVER BE BETTER TO BEGIN TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND ELIMINATE THESE MOST THREATENING SYSTEMS.

SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV

PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

.
END TEXT

.
WARMS REGARDS,
BRENT

.
DECL: OADR

#0162

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0162 <TOR> 900320190212 MSG000259268532

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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11e. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT. COMM

PREC. IMMEDIATE. CLAS. ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 210001Z MAR 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

MARCH 20, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
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NAMIBIA.

BEGIN TEXT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MARCH 20, 1990

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MADE DRAMATIC AND HISTORIC PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS TO INVIGORATE AND ACCELERATE THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. OUR OWN TALKS AT MALTA AND THE RECENT MEETINGS BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW AND OTTAWA HAVE IMPARTED SIGNIFICANT MOMENTUM TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE INJECTED IMPORTANT NEW IDEAS THAT CAN HELP RESOLVE THE MAJOR ISSUES QUICKLY.

I BELIEVE THE TIME IS RIGHT TO BUILD ON THIS MOMENTUM BY TAKING A BOLD INITIATIVE IN START.

OUR TWO SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE PRINCIPAL GOAL OF START IS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED IN THE PAST, THIS MEANS MORE THAN REDUCING NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS -- IT ALSO MEANS SHAPING THE FORCES OF EACH SIDE SO THAT THEY ARE INHERENTLY MORE STABILIZING. I BELIEVE WE CAN DO MORE TOWARD THIS END IN THE CURRENT START NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT DELAYING THEIR CONCLUSION, AND ALSO SET THE COURSE FOR EVEN

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LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT I PUT CONSIDERABLE PRIORITY ON THE PROMPT COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT. IN FACT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU AND I BE PREPARED TO INITIAL THE DRAFT TREATY DURING THE UPCOMING WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO SIGNIFY THAT WE HAVE AGREED ON ALL THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE A BAN ON MOBILE MIRVS COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAYING ITS COMPLETION. TO ACHIEVE SUCH A BAN, I AM PREPARED TO CANCEL OUR RAIL-GARRISON SYSTEM IN EXCHANGE FOR

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

THE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET MOBILE SS-24S. I KNOW YOU HAVE SEVERAL TRAINS ALREADY DEPLOYED. THE UNITED STATES HAS A SYSTEM THAT I AM READY TO DEPLOY RAPIDLY. BUT I WOULD PREFER ANOTHER COURSE. TO BAN THESE MOBILE-MIRV SYSTEMS NOW BEFORE OUR TWO SIDES HAVE EVEN MORE INVESTED IN THEM AND THEIR ELIMINATION BECOMES THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

I ALSO AM PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF SILO-BASED MIRVED MISSILES. CERTAINLY THIS BOLD STEP WOULD TAKE MORE EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT OUR AGREEMENT ON THIS GOAL COULD BE THE FOUNDATION OF FOLLOW-ON TALKS THAT COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE CURRENT START TREATY. I ALSO WOULD NOTE THAT IF OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MIRVED ICBMS. THE US WILL BE WILLING TO DEFER OUR REMAINING CONCERNS ABOUT HEAVY ICBMS TO THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS.

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~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

WASHINGTON IN APRIL.

I KNOW THAT WE ALREADY HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK BEFORE US
BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT CONDITIONS MAY NEVER BE BETTER TO
BEGIN TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND ELIMINATE THESE MOST
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SINCERELY.
GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT

WARMS REGARDS.
BRENT

DECL: OADR
#0162

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

Non-log Item

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *RB* *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on START

The draft letter that you asked us to prepare from the President to Gorbachev is at Tab A. Your Memorandum to the President is at Tab I.

CR
Condi Rice concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

March 20, 1990

VIA BACK CHANNEL

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH. OBVIOUSLY THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS VERY
SENSITIVE. JIM BAKER AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER ARE THE ONLY TWO
PEOPLE IN STATE AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS. SECRETARY BAKER DISCUSSED
THE SAME PROPOSAL WITH SHEVARDNADZE DURING THEIR MEETING IN
NAMIBIA.

BEGIN TEXT

(Copy attached text)

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2011-0838-MR

MM 5/28/2015

END TEXT

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

Our two countries have made dramatic and historic progress in our efforts to invigorate and accelerate the arms control process. Our own talks at Malta and the recent meetings between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow and Ottawa have imparted significant momentum to the negotiations and have injected important new ideas that can help resolve the major issues quickly.

I believe the time is right to build on this momentum by taking a bold initiative in START.

Our two sides are in agreement that the principal goal of START is to enhance strategic stability. As we have discussed in the past, this means more than reducing numbers of systems -- it also means shaping the forces of each side so that they are inherently more stabilizing. I believe we can do more toward this end in the current START negotiations, without delaying their conclusion, and also set the course for even more stabilizing measures in future negotiations that could begin immediately after START. In particular, I believe we should consider the elimination of mobile MIRVed missiles as part of the current START agreement. Then, in follow-on negotiations, we should eliminate all land-based MIRVs.

Let me emphasize that I put considerable priority on the prompt completion of the current START agreement. In fact, I would suggest that you and I be prepared to initial the draft treaty during the upcoming Washington Summit to signify that we have agreed on all the major substantive issues. However, I believe a ban on

mobile MIRVs could be incorporated into the current START agreement without delaying its completion. To achieve such a ban, I am prepared to cancel our rail-garrison system in exchange for the elimination of Soviet mobile SS-24s. I know you have several trains already deployed. The United States has a system that I am ready to deploy rapidly, but I would prefer another course, to ban these mobile-MIRV systems now before our two sides have even more invested in them and their elimination becomes that much more difficult.


I also am prepared to agree to the mutual elimination of silo-based MIRVed missiles. Certainly this bold step would take more extensive negotiations, but our agreement on this goal could be the foundation of follow-on talks that could begin as soon as substantive agreement is reached on the current START Treaty. I also would note that if our two countries are able to agree to the eventual elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs, the US will be willing to defer our remaining concerns about heavy ICBMs to the follow-on negotiations.

I hope we will be able to announce agreement on all three goals -- banning mobile MIRVs in START, initialing the START Treaty at the June Summit, and beginning follow-on talks **immediately to eliminate all land-based MIRVs** -- at the meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next month. If, however, you are unable to agree to consider a ban on mobile MIRVs in the current negotiations, an alternative would be for the two sides to announce, following the April Ministerial, an agreement to begin follow-on talks once the current START agreement is initialed that would have as central objectives the near-term elimination of mobile MIRVs, followed by all land-based MIRVs.

I have asked Secretary Baker to outline these ideas to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when they meet in Namibia in order to be in a better position to have substantive discussions about this proposal when they meet in Washington in April.

I know that we already have a great deal of work before us but I am convinced that conditions may never be better to begin to improve stability and eliminate these most threatening systems.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G. B. L.' or similar, written in a cursive style.

—
His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Moscow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Cable	Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (2 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 2/13/2015

Date Closed: 4/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91127-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0839-MR(512)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT. GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE OLEARY SIT SIGLER
DIST:
SIT: PRIVACY IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 220645Z MAR 90

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM MIKE JOYCE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW
MARCH 22, 1990

FROM: MIKE JOYCE

DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW

FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

I TAKE YOUR POINT ON THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE GORBACHEV
LETTER. GIVEN THE SEEMING URGENCY OF THE LETTER, JACK'S
ABSENCE FROM MOSCOW FOR A FEW MORE DAYS, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY,
OUR SINGULAR LACK OF SUCCESS IN THE PAST IN DELIVERING MESSAGES
DIRECTLY TO GORBACHEV, I DECIDED TO GO AHEAD AND DELIVER IT
TO BESSMERTNYKH. I HAVE KNOWN HIM FOR YEARS AND AM CONFIDENT
THAT HE IS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV. (HIS
RUMORED UPCOMING APPOINTMENT AS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. IF IT
COMES OFF, WILL BE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THEIR TRUST IN HIM.) I
KNOW HE COMMUNICATES DIRECTLY WITH GORBACHEV.

GIVEN THE NEW STRUCTURE HERE, THIS WOULD PERHAPS BE A GOOD
TIME FOR THE WHITE HOUSE TO IMPRESS ON GORBACHEV THE EMBASSY'S
OCCASIONAL NEED TO PASS MESSAGES DIRECTLY TO HIM. I MAY BE
WRONG. BUT I AM NOT AWARE THAT THE EMBASSY HAS EVER, IN ANY
INSTANCE, BEEN ABLE TO DO THAT. WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ASKED TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

GO THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

DECL: OADR.

#0219

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Eyes Only
Gen Henscroft / Bob Hoto
Camp David note 6/2/90

- US
1. Signs Trade agreement
- announce ^{we} will not send up until emigration ^{right away} legislation passed
 2. Sows pass emig. law
 3. Sows announce suspension of sanctions
 4. Dialogue
 5. US sends up Trade agreement.

6/1/90

Prepared to sign c/w
following

- 1) SC will move promptly
to pass emig. legis
- 2) SC will lift all
sanctions & begin
dialogue w/ Aeth
shortly after passage
of emig. legis.

Amb. Blackwill's
office has requested
a copy of the
attached memo for
the President from
Baker on his mtg.
with Sherdadnadze.

SECTO messages are
normally treated as
privileged communications
and require your
approval for further
distribution.

WHSR

2/12 *mm*

OK ^{to} Come ^{to} Read

Other

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

<DIST>

PRT: SECTO

SIT: WHSR DUP WHSR SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEHCH <DTG> 081430Z FEB 90

<ORIG>FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MOSCOW

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4791
RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE WASDC IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 01008

NODIS

FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

I'VE JUST COME BACK FROM MY FIRST PRIVATE MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE. IT LASTED THREE HOURS AND ACTUALLY REQUIRED HIM TO LEAVE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM BEFORE IT ENDED. PRINCIPALLY, WE COVERED ARMS CONTROL AND THE PLENUM AND WHAT IT SIGNIFIES ABOUT WHERE PERESTROIKA IS AND WHERE IT'S GOING. (HE RAISED HIS SENSITIVITIES ABOUT GERMANY, BUT PREFERRED TO DISCUSS THAT IN OUR PRIVATE DINNER TOMORROW.)

BEFORE GETTING INTO OUR EXTENDED DISCUSSION ON THE PLENUM, LET ME BRIEFLY RUN THROUGH THE ARMS CONTROL PART OF THE MEETING. BASICALLY, IT AMOUNTED TO ME PRESENTING THE VARIOUS NEW POSITIONS OR IDEAS WE HAVE IN ARMS CONTROL. DURING THE COURSE OF MY PRESENTATION I TURNED OVER TO HIM PAPERS ON CFE (NEW MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT POSITIONS), CW (A DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT LAYING OUT THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR CW INITIATIVE AND STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTING IT), AND ALCMS (AND OUR EFFORT TO MOVE TOWARD SOVIETS ON DISTINGUISHABILITY, ATTRIBUTION, AND RANGE). I PUSHED HARD TO GET HIS AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE THE THREE START ISSUES YOU AND GORBACHEV SAID WE'D TABLE IN THIS MINISTERIAL -- ALCMS, NON-DEPLOYED MISSILE (NDMS), AND TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION. I SENSE SOME, BUT MANAGEABLE, DIFFICULTY ON NDMS AND TELEMETRY. WHILE NOTING SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN OUR POSITIONS ON ALCMS, SHEVARDNADZE CLEARLY DREW A DISTINCTION ON THIS ISSUE, THE MOST POLITICALLY-VISIBLE OF THE THREE, AND I SUSPECT IT WILL BE A GOOD DEAL HARDER TO RESOLVE. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED RANGE AS A MAJOR CONCERN -- AS I HAD EXPECTED. SO I MAY BE BACK TO YOU ON THIS.

ONE ADDITIONAL ARMS CONTROL POINT: SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO NEWSMEN IN ANSWER O Q#:Q0RA00QAT THEY WILL HAVE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO YOURS ON CFE#P/AQQ WAS A COUNTER-PROPOSAL, NOT A "COUNTER-OFFENSIVE," BUT HE DECLINED TO DESCRIBE IT. HERE AGAIN, I

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SUSPECT THAT BEYOND WANTING TO PRESERVE A LINKAGE BETWEEN OUR FORCES AND THEIRS, THEY COULD COME IN WITH A CALL FOR DRAMATICALLY DEEPER CUTS IN THE CENTRAL ZONE. (I'VE GOT A GOOD ANSWER FOR THIS: OUR ALLIES WANT US THERE; THERE IS ALLIED CONSENSUS ON YOUR PROPOSED CEILING; WHEN WE DO LEAVE WE'RE AN OCEAN AWAY -- UNLIKE THEIR SITUATION; THEY CAN ALWAYS DEPLOY LESS THAN THE CEILING; AND WE'RE OFFERING THEM A FRAMEWORK THAT PERMITS THEM TO WITHDRAW FORCES ON A MUTUAL, NOT SIMPLY UNILATERAL, BASIS.)

WE'LL SEE HOW TOUGH THE SLU'DING IS GOING TO BE

O

SASMS CSNTROL (TOMORROW. FOR THE MOMENT, IT'S CLEAR THAT SHEVARENADZI AND THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN RIVETED ON THE PLENUE AND (LOVTELEQ&.) DESCRIBED IT AS A VERY MOMENTOUS EVENT FOR PERESTROIKA AND ITS PROSPECTS. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN VERY CONTENTIOUS WITH VERY HEATED DEBATES. FOR ALL THE DIFFICULTY, HE SAID GORBACHEV HAD GOTTEN WHAT HE WANTED: A NEW PARTY PLATFORM THAT MAKES FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF FAR-REACHING REFORM ON THE PARTY AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY; ON THE ECONOMY AND ITS NEED TO BECOME MORE MARKET BASED; ON THE NATIONALITIES AND THE NEED FOR A GENUINE MECHANISM TO PROVIDE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION; AND ON THE NEED FOR A STRONG PRESIDENT -- ONE WHO CAN HELP BRING ORDER TO THE PROCESS.

BT

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 01008

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FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SHEVARDNADZE SAID ALL THESE CHANGES WILL BE ENSHRINED IN A NEW PARTY PROGRAM. THAT PROGRAM WILL BE ADOPTED AT THE PARTY CONGRESS THAT THEY ARE SCHEDULING FOR LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY. THAT TIMING WILL AFFECT OUR TIMING FOR THE SUMMIT, BUT I REALLY BELIEVE IT'S BETTER TO LET THEM SORT THIS OUT BEFORE YOU MEET WITH GORBACHEV.

CAN THEY SORT IT OUT AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS THAT MAY FINALLY PROMISE TO REVOLUTIONIZE THE SYSTEM?

I'M NOT SURE. THE PROBLEMS ARE IMMENSE AND, THOUGH I DON'T DOUBT THE SHEVARDNADZE OR GORBACHEV COMMITMENT, THEY'VE GOT A LONG WAY TO GO AND A VERY STEEP HILL TO CLIMB. AS HE ACKNOWLEDGED, POLITICAL REFORM HAS OUTSTRIPPED THE PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORM. EVEN SO, HE SAID THEY'LL PUSH AHEAD IN THIS AREA AND END THE PARTY'S MONOPOLY ON POLITICAL POWER. THEY'LL MAKE IT COMPETE FOR POWER AND EARN IT -- A NOTION HE SAID WAS VERY HARD FOR EVEN THE REFORM MINDED AT THE TOP OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT.

(SHEVARDNADZE SAID THIS WILL TAKE SOME DIFFICULT ADJUSTMENT, AS MUCH PSYCHOLOGICALLY AS POLITICALLY.)

IF THE PARTY'S ACQUIESCENCE IN PLURALISM WILL BE DIFFICULT, THE TRANSITION TO EVEN A LIMITED MARKET-BASED ECONOMY MAY BE HARDER STILL.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO INTRODUCE A PRICE SYSTEM AND PRICE REFORM, AND WILL TRY TO DO SO WITHIN A YEAR'S TIME. HE SAID THEY HAVE NO CHOICE. BUT, WHEN I ASKED HIM HOW THEY WERE GOING TO SOAK UP THE TREMENDOUS RUBLE OVERHANG, HIS ANSWER SUGGESTED THEY'VE NOT FIGURED THIS ONE OUT YET. HE SPOKE OF THE SALE OF APARTMENTS, AND THE EXPANSION OF CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS. EACH MIGHT HELP, BUT MUCH MORE WILL BE REQUIRED.

AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE, HE SAID TO PERMIT PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED AND CONVINCE THE PEOPLE THAT IT WOULD WORK, THE SOVIETS NEEDED TWO/THREE GOOD YEARS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. BUT HE, HIMSELF, NOTED THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEMS AND STRIKES ARE HAVING ON THE ECONOMY. THEY REALLY NEED A BREATHING SPACE ON THE INSIDE OF A COUPLE OF YEARS, AND IT'S HARD TO SEE THEM GETTING IT.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM WAS THEIR MOST SEVERE ONE, AND, BY IMPLICATION, MADE CLEAR THEY PROBABLY WON'T GET A BREATHING SPACE ON THIS ISSUE.

IT'S NOT THAT THEY AREN'T WORKING ON THE PROBLEM, BUT IT DOESN'T LEND ITSELF TO EASY SOLUTIONS. WHEN I RAISED AGAIN THE IDEA OF REFERENDUMS AND EVEN SUGGESTED THEY COULD BE CREATIVE ABOUT TIMING AND ANNOUNCEMENTS (E.G., PERHAPS OFFERING REPUBLICS REFERENDA ON SELF-DETERMINATION IN TWO-THREE YEARS TIME), HE SAID I WAS RIGHT IN PRINCIPLE BUT HE WASN'T CERTAIN IT WOULD WORK. RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN MANY REPUBLICS AND OLD ETHNIC ANIMOSITIES IN OTHERS MIGHT CREATE CIVIL WARS IF ONE SIDE LOST IN THE REFERENDUM. THAT SAID, SHEVARDNADZE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAD TO FIND A WAY TO PROVIDE FOR REAL SELF-DETERMINATION. HE ALSO SAID THEY HAD PUT INTO THE PLATFORM A NEW BASIS FOR FEDERALISM: THE CENTER WILL CONCLUDE A TREATY WITH EACH REPUBLIC, WORKING OUT THE ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL GOVERN THEIR RELATIONS.

IT'S AN INTERESTING IDEA, AND IT SHOWS THAT THEY'RE WILLING TO BE CREATIVE. BUT WHEN YOU GIVE UP OLD CONTROL MECHANISMS AND YOU CAN'T IMMEDIATELY REPLACE THEM WITH NEW ONES, YOU'RE BOUND TO HAVE TROUBLE -- AND THEY ARE ACROSS THE BOARD.

WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR US IS THAT THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH THEIR OWN SITUATION IS GREAT AND THEIR NEED FOR A QUIET, STABLE, AND COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IS ALSO GREAT. THIS ISN'T GOING TO CHANGE IN THE NEAR-TERM, AND WE HAVE A STAKE IN TRYING TO LOCK THEM INTO A VERY NEW AND MORE STABILIZING SET OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

WHEN I SEE YOU, I WILL FILL YOU IN ON FOOD AID/CONSUMER GOODS ASSISTANCE ISSUES.

3. END TEXT.

BAKER

BT

#1008

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 1008 <TOR> 900209173913 MSG000255893952

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 1008 <TOR> 900209185616 MSG000255898576

<DIST>

PRT: SCOWCROFT SDO SECTO

SIT: PRES MSGS FILE SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEHCH <DTG> 081500Z FEB 90

<ORIG>FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MOSCOW

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4793

RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTO 01009

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FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I HAD A BRIEF BUT GOOD VISIT TO PRAGUE. SINCE YOU WILL SEE PRESIDENT HAVEL LATER THIS MONTH, I WANTED TO SEND YOU SOME QUICK IMPRESSIONS WHILE THEY ARE FRESH.

PRAGUE IS AN EXCITING PLACE THESE DAYS. THERE IS AN AIR OF EXCITEMENT, A "GREAT AWAKENING," AS NEW OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS ALIKE REVEL IN THE FREEDOM, OPENNESS, AND OPPORTUNITY. THERE IS A GREAT FEELING OF POTENTIAL, MIXED WITH A DOSE OF CONFUSION AND A SENSE OF URGENCY TO MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME. ONE HAS A SENSE THAT AMID THE HUSTLE AND BUSTLE, PEOPLE ARE STILL PINCHING THEMSELVES TO MAKE SURE IT ISN'T A DREAM.

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, ALSO THE EARLIEST OF INDICATIONS THAT LEADERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT ARE COMING TO RECOGNIZE THAT FREEDOM ALSO CARRIES WITH IT GREAT RESPONSIBILITY. THE LEADERS ARE RECOGNIZING THIS RESPONSIBILITY FIRST IN DOMESTIC MATTERS, ESPECIALLY THE ECONOMY. THEY KNOW THEY MUST OVERHAUL THEIR ECONOMY, AND MANY HAVE CONCLUDED THIS CAN'T BE DONE PIECEMEAL. THEY WANT OUR ECONOMIC EXPERTISE, "OUR BEST ECONOMISTS," TO HELP THEM PLAN THE CHANGES AND TO GIVE THEM AN "EXPERT AUTHORITY" THAT WILL HELP JUSTIFY AND EXPLAIN DIFFICULT CHANGES TO THEIR PEOPLE.

I SUSPECT THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL TAKE LONGER TO DEVELOP IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. PRESIDENT HAVEL AND HIS COLLEAGUES KNOW THEY WANT SOVIET TROOPS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND DEFINITELY BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. BEYOND THAT, THEY WANT TO BE LEADERS IN CREATING A NEW, UNITED EUROPE -- WITHOUT A VERY GOOD SENSE OF WHAT THAT INVOLVES OR HOW TO GET THERE. BUT SOME OF THESE DISSIDENTS-TURNED-MINISTERS ARE ALSO DREAMERS, IN THE GOOD SENSE OF THE WORD. THEY HAVE JUST SEEN SOME FORMERLY FORLORN DREAMS COME TRUE, AND THEY ARE NOT

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GOING TO BE EASILY PERSUADED THAT SOME OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL DREAMS INVOLVE LARGE RISKS (INCLUDING FOR THEM) AND EVEN CONTRADICTIONS.

I BELIEVE MY SPEECH HERE FIT THE CONTEXT OF PEOPLE'S THINKING: I SPOKE ABOUT THE TASK OF MOVING FROM REVOLUTIONS TO LASTING DEMOCRACIES, EXPLAINING HOW THEY (AND WE WITH THEM) NEED TO FACE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY CHALLENGES TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THEIR YOUNG DEMOCRACY. (BUT YOU CAN ASK NANCY ELLIS FOR HER IMPRESSIONS, SINCE SHE LISTENED TO MY REMARKS.)

MY CONVERSATIONS ON THE POLITICAL CHALLENGES LED ME TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL REFORM IS IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE HERE. THERE IS A BROAD COMMITMENT TO ELECTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW. NO BACKSLIDING HERE. THE OLD COMMUNIST PARTY IS SLIPPING OUT OF THE PICTURE. WHILE THE REFORMERS NEED HELP IN SETTING UP EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, I BELIEVE THEY ARE ON THE RIGHT PATH. THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM RELATES TO THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE ECONOMY -- HOW TO MOVE IT TOWARD A FREE MARKET AND EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTMENT HARDSHIP TO THE PUBLIC. I WAS TOLD THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE HAVE REJECTED THE COMMUNISTS, BUT NOT YET EMBRACED ANY NEW PARTY OR GROUP IN PART BECAUSE OF THEIR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ECONOMIC CHANGE

BT

#1009

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 SECTO 01009

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)

UBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

AS FOR THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE, I WAS TOLD CZECHOSLOVAKIA NEEDS OUR ECONOMIC ADVICE, MANAGERIAL TRAINING, TRADE, AND INVESTMENT -- NOT FINANCIAL AID (AT THIS POINT). AS YOU KNOW, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, UNLIKE POLAND AND HUNGARY, HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF A SMALL DEBT BURDEN. THE REFORMERS PROPERLY RECOGNIZE THAT ONCE THEY START TO DISMANTLE THE PLANNING SYSTEM OF A COMMAND ECONOMY, THEY NEED TO HAVE IN PLACE A MARKET SYSTEM. OTHERWISE, THE PIECES OF ECONOMIC LIFE WILL HAVE NO WAY -- EITHER BY PLAN OR MARKET -- TO INTERACT. SO THEY WANT OUR HELP IN WORKING OUT A TRANSITION PACKAGE THAT CAN CHANGE THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM FROM PLANNED TO MARKET QUICKLY. (I ALSO SUPPORTED THEIR CALL TO LOCATE THE NEWLY-PROPOSED EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IN PRAGUE -- WHICH SEEMS MUCH MORE APPROPRIATE THAN LONDON, PARIS, BERLIN, OR THE OTHER SUITORS.)

THE REQUEST FOR ECONOMIC EXPERTISE WAS PART OF A LARGER PATTERN OF CRYING OUT FOR GREATER EXCHANGE WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WANT PEOPLE TO TEACH ENGLISH, AND THEY WANT MANY OF THEM. CIVIC FORUM LEADERS SAID THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM HAD A NEW OPENING, BECAUSE RUSSIAN AND MARXIST-LENINIST THOUGHT WERE NO LONGER MANDATORY SUBJECTS. THEY HAD

PLENTY OF OFFERS FOR GERMAN TEACHERS, BUT THEY WANTED ENGLISH TEACHERS, TOO. FOREIGN MINISTER DIENSTBIER EVEN SUGGESTED A PROGRAM WHEREBY THEY WOULD PAY YOUNG AMERICANS IN LOCAL CURRENCY TO TEACH FOR SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR.

WHEN IT CAME TO SECURITY MATTERS, HOWEVER, WE PARTED COMPANY ON SOME ELEMENTS. BUT I THINK THIS IS A SUBJECT YOU CAN DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL TO USEFUL EFFECT.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE NEW LEADERS' MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO GET SOVIET TROOPS OUT. (THE SOVIETS CAME IN A DAY IN 1968, THE CZECHS SAY, SO WHY DOES IT TAKE THE SOVIETS SO LONG TO DEPART?) BOTH HAVEL AND DIENSTBIER SAID THEIR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS END WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULDN'T INTERFERE WITH CFE. HAVEL ALSO RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF CODIFYING CHANGE (AND MAKING IT LESS EASY TO REVERSE) THROUGH A TREATY.

BUT THE CZECHS ALSO CALL FOR THE TWO ALLIANCES TO WITHER AWAY -- BECAUSE THEY SEE THEM AS REMNANTS OF THE COLD WAR THAT KEPT THEM OPPRESSED. IN BOTH MY SPEECH AND MY COMMENTS, I MADE A STRONG CASE FOR NATO'S CONTINUED ROLE. I SAID NATO WASN'T EQUIVALENT TO THE WARSAW PACT, BECAUSE NATO WAS A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION OF 16 DEMOCRACIES THAT WELCOMED U.S. TROOPS AS PART OF A COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. I ADDED THAT THE UNCERTAINTY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION SUGGESTED NATO MUST REMAIN A PROTECTIVE FORCE. AND EVEN IF THE SOVIETS PULL BACK WITHIN THEIR BORDERS, THEY REMAIN ON THE SAME CONTINENT WHEREAS U.S. NATO FORCES WOULD BE A DISTANT OCEAN AWAY IF WE LEFT. MOREOVER, I SAID NATO COULD ASSUME NEW SECURITY MISSIONS (PROLIFERATION) AND EMPHASIZE ITS POLITICAL NATURE TO A GREATER DEGREE. IN SUM, I SAID NATO WAS A FORCE FOR FREEDOM AND SHOULD BE A COMPLEMENTARY PIECE OF THE NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURE, ALONG WITH THE EC AND THE CSCE PROCESS.

THE CZECHS RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF A U.S. PRESENCE FOR NOW. HAVEL SAID THE U.S. SAVED EUROPE TWICE. BUT THE CZECH REFORMERS WANT EUROPE TO DEVELOP ITS OWN SECURITY PROTECTIONS OVER TIME. FRANKLY, THEY SEEM TO WORRY THAT NATO JUSTIFIES THE PACT, AND THEY WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT; TO THEM, THE ALLIANCES MEAN A DIVIDED EUROPE. (IT'S CLEAR TO ME THAT WHILE WE PRESS FOR NATO'S ONGOING ROLE, WE ALSO HAVE AN INTEREST IN BEING IN ON THE GROUND FLOOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE CSCE WORK SO WE CAN DIRECT IT TO OUR LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE.)

MANAGING THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY WITHIN NATO COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR THESE CENTRAL EUROPEANS. IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE NATO DOES NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF MAKING GERMANY (AND EUROPE) WHOLE. INTERESTINGLY, HAVEL SAID HE WAS GOING TO TELL MODROW THAT GERMANY COULD NOT BE NEUTRAL, BUT HAVEL ALSO TOLD ME HE COULDN'T IMAGINE A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO. AS I SAID EARLIER, IDEAS ARE MOVING FAST AND FURIOUS HERE -- BUT THEY AREN'T ALSO RECONCILED EFFECTIVELY.

BT

#1009

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 SECTO 01009

NODIS

FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

OVERALL, I THINK YOU'LL ENJOY HAVEL'S VISIT.
YOU CAN HAVE A GOOD CONVERSATION WITH AN OPEN-MINDED
MAN WHO WILL VALUE YOUR IDEAS (EVEN THOUGH YOU MAY
NOT ALWAYS AGREE). AND THERE IS A WARM FEELING FOR
AMERICA HERE. JUST TWO EXAMPLES: FIRST, THE CIVIC
FORUM REPRESENTATIVES TOLD ME THEY WOULD LONG
REMEMBER THAT THE U.S. ALWAYS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED
(AND TO A DEGREE, PROTECTED) THEM DURING THEIR
DISSIDENT DAYS -- EVEN WHEN OTHERS IN THE WEST WOULD
NOT. SECOND, THE CZECHS WANT TO HAVE A CEREMONY
THANKING THE 16TH U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION FOR
LIBERATING PILSEN IN 1945; THEY SAID THEY HAVE
THANKED THE SOVIETS FOR 45 YEARS AND NOW IT WAS TIME
TO GIVE THE U.S. ITS PROPER DUE.

3. END TEXT.

BAKER

BT

#1009

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 <SSN> 1009 <TOR> 900208135541 MSG000255794141

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 1009 <TOR> 900208135741 MSG000255794261

<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03 <SSN> 1009 <TOR> 900208135802 MSG000255794282

President - boxed
to Camp David

Baker - cleared
direct

Rice - tubed

Scowcroft {3 Feb} Transmitted

2 Feb 90
1900

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I have just had important discussions with GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow, and in this connection would like to share with you some views on the German question.

As the leaders of the powers vested with special responsibility for the destinies of two German states, you and I have on more than one occasion, most recently at Malta, addressed this matter. We have come to share the conclusion that the situation obtaining in Central Europe is a very complicated one. This was privately confirmed to me by Hans Modrow. The GDR is under strong pressure, including from various quarters in the FRG. This pressure is reaching a critical mark. Unification sentiments are boiling over, which someone is clearly trying to exploit in order to create an uncontrollable situation.

The GDR leadership (and the Modrow coalition government is presently the principal organizing entity in the country) understands the need for practical actions. The approach that the Prime Minister spelled out to me and subsequently in his public statement on February 1 appears to be prudent and realistic. The path toward the two German states' rapprochement is envisioned as one based on a gradual, stage-by-stage evolution, on deepening the CSCE process,

enhancing stability on the continent, and taking into account legitimate interests of all peoples.

I support this approach which is prompted by the desire to avoid upheavals in the very heart of Europe, and, for that matter, beyond Europe. Any haste, leaping over stages, overly categorical conclusions and assessments can only result in a chaos.

Under the circumstances, the institute of the Four Powers' responsibility in German affairs as a factor of political stability on the continent acquires particular importance. Incidentally, Hans Modrow agrees with that, too. Like us, he supports the idea of regular consultations among "the Four", which could address, inter alia, issues arising from the special status of West Berlin.

I would like to inform you, confidentially, that the Soviet leadership has invited Chancellor Kohl of the FRG to come to Moscow on February 9 for an informal working meeting. Eduard Shevardnadze shall promptly brief Secretary of State James Baker, who at that time will be on an official visit in Moscow, on the results of our discussions with Helmut Kohl.

I wish to stress in conclusion that the situation in German-German affairs now requires particular attention and a heightened sense of responsibility. In this connection, I am counting on your understanding and willingness to cooperat

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

February 2, 1990

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I have just had important discussions with GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow, and in this connection would like to share with you some views on the German question.

As the leaders of the powers vested with special responsibility for the destinies of two German states, you and I have on more than one occasion, most recently at Malta, addressed this matter. We have come to share the conclusion that the situation obtaining in Central Europe is a very complicated one. This was privately confirmed to me by Hans Modrow. The GDR is under strong pressure, including from various quarters in the FRG. This pressure is reaching a critical mark. Unification sentiments are boiling over, which someone is clearly trying to exploit in order to create an uncontrollable situation.

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Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

February 2, 1990

APNSA Has Seen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 31, 1990

Jim,

Here is the letter inviting the President's daughter. It is my understanding that the President's daughter expressed an interest in visiting the Soviet Union during a dinner with Yevgenyi Primakov. I am forwarding it to you for appropriate action.

Condi
Condi Rice

General

*FYI - Condi is
going to tell Jim
NSC has no
problems*

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

1990 FEB -2 AM 9:17

January 26, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

It is my pleasant duty to inform you that the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies will be delighted to host Dorothy in the Soviet Union.

To make her stay as enjoyable as possible it would be useful for us to have some understanding of her preferences as far as the date of her arrival and the itinerary are concerned.

Sincerely,


Yuri V. DUBININ

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C., 20500


AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

January 26, 1990

Dear General,

I would be grateful if you could forward the enclosed
letter to Mr. President.

Sincerely,


Yuri V. DUBININ

The Honorable
Brent SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House,
Washington, D.C., 20500

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Non-log item

January 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *mk*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *ca*
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Presidential Phone Call to
Gorbachev

Your memorandum to the President at Tab I provides talking points (Tab A) for his call to Chairman Gorbachev concerning the CFE initiative.

We have asked Ambassador Dubinin to inquire as to Gorbachev's availability between 0700 - 0900 EST tomorrow. (The time difference with Moscow is eight hours).

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum and talking points for the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Non-log item

30 January 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Your Phone Call to Gorbachev Concerning the New
CFE Manpower Proposal.

Purpose

To tell Gorbachev of your new CFE manpower proposal in advance of your State of the Union Address announcement.

Background

This call will give you an opportunity to apprise Gorbachev of the proposal; emphasize that you hope that the lower manpower ceiling will facilitate rapid agreement at CFE; and tell him that Jim Baker will be ready to discuss the details of the manpower proposal and some new ideas on aircraft at the Ministerial in Moscow.

I also recommend that we send the letter to Gorbachev (Tab B). This will give the Soviets a written description of the proposal and minimize the risk of misunderstanding due to translation errors or poor phone-line quality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you call Gorbachev drawing on the talking points at Tab A.

That you approve the letter at Tab B for dispatch to Moscow.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Letter to Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

SECRET

TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL TO GORBACHEV
CONCERNING YOUR CFE PROPOSAL

- At Malta, our two governments agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a CFE treaty. Our common aim is to be able to sign the treaty this year.
- I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Secretary Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on the aircraft problem.
- The conclusion of this treaty is even more urgent today because of the hopeful and fast-moving events taking place in Eastern Europe.
- We need to do everything possible to make sure that the military situation reflects the new political realities.
- I have been examining with my advisors, and with U.S. allies, the question of the maximum number of troops that the United States and the Soviet Union should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented.
- The current Western position is that neither your country nor ours should have more than 275,000 troops stationed on foreign soil in Europe.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

- In light of recent political developments, I have come to the conclusion that 275,000 figure is too high for both your country and mine.
- I hope you agree that we should set a new lower manpower ceiling for the CFE treaty.
- I want to propose to you that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and revise the current position on manpower in CFE to set a new ceiling for these forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe.
- I intend to announce this proposal to the American people tonight in my address on the State of the Union.
- If you accept my proposal, it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations in which we are now engaged can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent.
- We intend, with the consent of our allies, to retain a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future, regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces.

- I believe you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability.
- Today, the issue is how to treat U.S and Soviet manpower in this agreement and I think our new proposal is a fair solution.
- I hope that you will see in this initiative, Mr. Chairman, my commitment to accelerated progress toward a CFE treaty.
- We have each taken important steps in the last year to give a political impetus to the CFE negotiations.
- I believe that we are close to a completed treaty and hope that you will join me in quickly resolving the remaining differences so that we can conclude this crucial treaty.
- I hope that we can do so before we meet in the United States in June.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chairman Gorbachev,

At Malta, you and I agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a treaty reducing and limiting conventional forces in Europe. In light of that commitment, I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Secretary Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on our part to resolve the aircraft problem, when they meet in Moscow.

The conclusion of this treaty takes on new urgency in light of the remarkable and hopeful events taking place in Eastern Europe -- events that are moving us closer every day to overcoming the division of Europe. I want to do everything that I can to make certain that the military situation reflects those hopeful changes. In this regard, I have been examining with my advisors and with U.S. allies, the question of the number of troops that the United States and the Soviet Union should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented.

I know that you too have been giving close attention to this question.

As you know, the Western position in the CFE negotiations is that neither your country nor ours should be allowed to have more than 275,000 troops stationed on foreign soil in Europe. This is one of the important unresolved issues in the talks.

I believe that, in light of recent political developments, the 275,000 figure is unrealistically high for both your country and mine. I hope you agree that we should set a new lower ceiling.

I have carefully reviewed our defense requirements in light of changes in the strategic environment, and have decided that we need to settle this manpower issue, and settle it quickly.

I want to propose to you that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and set instead a new ceiling for these forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe.

The U.S. intends, within this ceiling and with the consent of our allies, to retain a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future, regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces. I think that you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability.

If you accept my proposal, it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent. I believe that, together with the ideas that Secretary Baker will present on aircraft, we can move rapidly to conclusion of this important agreement.

I intend to announce this proposal concerning U.S.-Soviet stationed forces to the American people in my address on the State of the Union so that they will understand my readiness to respond to the new political situation in Europe and my commitment to stable reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe through CFE.

I hope that you too will see in this initiative, Mr. Chairman, my commitment to accelerated progress toward a CFE treaty and that you will agree that this manpower proposal is both

equitable and timely. We have each taken important steps in the last year to give a political impetus to the CFE negotiations. I believe that a completed treaty is now within our reach. I hope that you will join me in resolving the outstanding differences so that we can finalize and sign this crucial treaty -- before we meet in the United States in June.

Sincerely

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

Unofficial translation

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President

Thank you for your letter of December 8, transmitted through Ambassador Matlock. I wish to say from the outset that I share your assessment of the Malta meeting. I believe we have every reason to say that it has taken Soviet-American relations to a new level of mutual understanding.

The fact that we, while remaining realists in approaching the issues that divide us, have begun to clear the USSR-US relationship of everything that stands in the way of its normal development, opens up great opportunities, in my view, for bilateral cooperation and for building new international relations based on trust, mutual respect, and a balance of interests.

Of course, a number of issues were not discussed in depth at Malta. Therefore, I support your idea that all issues which are the subject of the Soviet-American dialogue be discussed in the coming months between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker.

I took note of your information about the US allies' reaction to the Malta talks. At a meeting in Moscow we informed in detail the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member states on the substance of the Soviet-American talks at Malta. Our allies welcomed the results of those talks and expressed their satisfaction with the thoughtfulness and the reasonable approach to the developments in Western and Eastern Europe.

It is my view that the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to conduct business with respect to Europe, which is going through turbulent and profound changes, on the basis of prudence and great responsibility.

As a separate issue, I would like to touch on the question of Panama. I acquainted myself with the arguments conveyed by your Ambassador in Moscow. I must say that I cannot agree with them, as well as with the statement contained in your message of December 26, 1989, to the effect that the US action in Panama is somehow fully consistent with the principles that we discussed at Malta.

Our position of principle is known to you. We reject the use of force in international relations as an instrument of resolving conflict situations. It is in those terms that this question was discussed during the Malta talks. There, we sought to make this principal idea clear to the US side: no objective can serve as a justification of the use of military force. Universality of the politico-diplomatic procedures must be recognized as absolute. To allow for a multitude of interpretations or authorize exceptions here would mean to emasculate the efforts of the international community (and both our countries are playing a prominent role in them) to affirm the primacy of law.

We in the Soviet leadership have begun to reflect on the possible areas of progress to be made at the forthcoming Soviet-American negotiations in 1990. We believe that a more specific determination in this regard could be made as a result of our foreign ministers' meetings on which you and I agreed earlier.

I would like to invite you, Mr. President, to continue our correspondence not only on urgent problems, but on key conceptual issues in the interests of USSR-US rapprochement and enhancing stability in international relations.

I wish to conclude this letter by expressing the hope that the year 1990 will be productive for our relations.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow
Kremlin

F/Gorbachev
1/31/90

I will React to 2 or 3 points now

1- We share your view of importance of Talks

- CFE should be consistent w/ new realities in pace & content
- We must push the process to lucky conclusion

2- We should not slow down or divert these negot.

3- Your idea is for a new lower ceiling. US will retain a presence in Eur. after these Talks - regardless what SO does.

We will be talking about central & other zones - and not only US & SO troops.

You will have our constructive cooperation.

Baker & Schenckel. our discuss

- I happy we are in touch & discussing a important problems day

- You will get a more direct answer later.

- I share the spirit of your approach.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
General Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 2, 1989, 12:00 - 1:00 pm
AND PLACE: Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta

Chairman Gorbachev: I have three points. I already referred to Central America especially Cuba. I recall a letter to you after Cuba. My talks in Cuba weren't simple. Castro expressed caution about our policy -- I explained our aims were good. I said as for our internal affairs we are doing what we want. What you do is your business. He asked me, in effect, to help normalize U.S.-Cuban relations. (S/SEN)

Recently, the Cuban Chief of Staff visited the Soviet Union. He talked to Yazov and said some things, I say this for the first time in the most private way. If Castro found out (S/SEN)

The President: I understand. It will stay with me. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I think perhaps we would think how to do it. Some contacts. We could participate but that is not necessary. I can say that Castro understands that the world is changing dramatically but he has his own sense of dignity and pride. Even raising this possibility was not easy for him. (S/SEN)

The President: What is he saying? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: His very words, "Find a way to make the President aware of my interest in normalization." It is on the basis of that remark that I made my comment. (S/SEN)

The President: Let's put all our cards on the table about Castro. Our allies can't see why we care about Central America. It just isn't a gut issue for them. For the political left in the U.S., it isn't a gut issue. But for the fledgling democracies in Latin America and the U.S. right it is a gut issue. Castro is like a sea anchor as you move forward and the Western Hemisphere moves. He is against all this -- Eastern Europe and the Western Hemisphere. (S/SEN)

Publicly Latin Americans will not criticize a colleague. But Arias' call was a clear indication that Castro is now totally isolated. There is another major Castro problem -- the emigres (in Florida) who have strong emotions about this last dictator. We have had feelers from Castro but never with an indication of a willingness to change. (S)

Switching to Nicaragua, you said Ortega had nothing to do with [ILLEGIBLE]. I am inclined to agree though I didn't use to think so. But I am convinced that they are exporting revolution. They are sending weapons. I don't care what they have told you, they are supporting the FMLN. I am now convinced there is a new shipment of helos going from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua. I don't question Shevardnadze's word on this. (S/SEN)

Chairman Gorbachev: There were U.S. rockets too. (S)

The President I see a solution as in a verifiable election -- free and open -- and that if Ortega loses he doesn't try to cling to power. If it is a free election, we will abide by the results. (S/SEN)

The only other open cancer is Panama, but there is no feeling that the Soviet Union wants Noriega to succeed. He is a terrible problem for us. I asked the Attorney General if our indictments were strong ones. I am seeking for him to get out. This is quite confidential. He said these are good indictments and given feelings on drugs in the U.S., I can't drop the indictments. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Let me tell you how your steps are perceived in the Soviet Union. People ask are there no barrier to the U.S. action in independent countries? The U.S. passes judgement and executes that judgement. (S)

The President: There is no military operation against Colombia, but if we are asked for help against the scourge of drugs, we will help. (S)

Then I would like to mention the Philippines. (S)

I was surprised at your Philippines reaction. Aquino is democratically elected and asked for our help to prevent the palace from being bombed by the rebels. It never occurred to me that this would cause problems in the Soviet Union, though I probably would have done it anyway. But that notion never occurred to me. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: In the Soviet Union some are saying the Brezhnev doctrine is being replaced by the Bush doctrine. (S)

The President: I want to understand. Here is a democracy saying that it needs help against rebels. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I agree she is democratically elected. It depends on the context. In Eastern Europe there are governments, legitimately elected, that are now being replaced. The question is in Eastern Europe it is prohibited for Soviet troops to intervene. All now is interrelated. Some now are ~~saying~~ that we are not performing our duty to our friends. But we have not been asked. (S)

The President: In Eastern Europe, change is peaceful and encouraged by you. In the Philippines, there is a Colonel trying to shoot his way into power. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I agree -- peaceful change is the way. Our position is non-interference. The process of change can be painful but we believe in non-interference. Colonels can be found everywhere to do those jobs. (S)

The President: If we can stick with the notion of peaceful change, better relations will occur between the Soviet Union and the U.S. I would never give advice to a senior office holder like you. I can accept your criticism, but not on this issue, in this circumstance. Aquino is struggling to bring democracy. I would hope your criticism could be muted. I can accept it but I think that your criticism would cut the wrong way. (S)

I appreciate your explanation in the Philippines. One more comment on Latin America. I don't want to sound like a broken record. Let me express U.S. public opinion on you yourself. There is strong support for perestroika and for establishing pluralistic answers in Eastern Europe -- strong support. But I think people see support for Castro -- almost -- speaking frankly -- as an embarrassment. He is against the causes you are advocating. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: That is pluralism (laughs). (U)

The President: I wish we could find a way. You are spending billions into the pipeline and getting nothing for it, and it does interfere with our overall relationship. The way you have handled it is clear. Castro doesn't just do what you say. (S)

Just to end it -- anything we can do to cut support for Cuba and Nicaragua so we are not on opposite sides. Chile is moving in the right direction -- not toward the U.S. but toward democracy and I don't want these others to get in the way of what I want to do with the Soviet Union. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: The most important thing is that we have no plan for Latin America -- no bridges, no bridgeheads. That is not our policy -- you have it from me. {NEXT LINE ILLEGIBLE}

I am moving toward democracy. Of course they are fledgling and the road ahead will be difficult. We are satisfied with that -- as you -- but we will not interfere. (S)

With Cuba, yes, we have a long relationship -- responding to the economic blockade. We seek to put it on a more normal basis, especially economic. We are trading with Cuba and that meets our need -- sugar, citrus, nickel -- but it is much more to Cuba's advantage. For example, we sell oil to Cuba on a market clearing basis which we could sell for much more. But Cuba is independent with its own view and we don't want to interfere. (S)

I mention Castro's signal because I think it shows Castro sees his interest lies in changing his relations with the U.S. and others. So please give it some thought. If you have something to share with us or something we can pass on. We can note we have had a frank conversation and understand each other better. (S)

The President: We have had feelers from him. But if he could do something in human rights. I will think carefully on it. I will let you know so we don't get disconnected on this. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: We could say that to him about human rights. (S)

The President: He won't even let the U.N. in to see. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I haven't finished (laughs). (U)

The President: Neither have I. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: O.K. (U)

The President: O.K. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Let me address Eastern Europe. I have three points. (S)

- (1) The direction of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is such as to bring us closer -- that is important. (S)
- (2) What I dislike is when some U.S. politicians say unity of Europe should be on the basis of Western values. We have long been accused of exporting ideology. That is what is now being proposed by some -- not you. (S)
- (3) Mr. Kohl is in too much of a hurry on the German question. That is not good. I worry that this could be part of his pre-election game and not because of a strategic outlook. There are some differences in view in West Germany, within the coalition, and with the SPD. We should let Kohl know that his approach could damage things. (S)

For example, would a united Germany be outside alliances or within NATO? Answer is premature and we shouldn't put it forth -- should let it run its natural course. You and I are not responsible for the division of Germany. Let history decide what should happen. We need an understanding on this. (S)

The President: I think Kohl feels an enormous emotional response to what has happened -- as does Genscher. There is some politics in his three part program and some emotional outpouring. I think he knows his allies -- after they support right of the German people to reunify, have some private reservations about reunification. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Yes I know -- and they have let me know. Unlike they and you -- I am saying there are two states, mandated by history. So let history decide the outcome. Kohl assures me he will abide by understandings made in Bonn. Now he says he wants to talk on the phone and Genscher is coming. I think this is an ? particular prudence. (S)

The President: I agree and we will do nothing to recklessly try to speed up reunification. When you talk to Kohl, I think you will see he agrees. But his rhetoric, you must understand, is emotional and possibly some politics, but mostly emotion. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: It is good that things have [ILLEGIBLE] (U)

The President: The most conservative Americans salute how you have handled this issue. They are now looking back into history. I will be timid -- that is how in a nutshell they describe my refusal to jump up and down at the Wall. This is no time for grandstanding -- a step that looks good but could prove reckless. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: The times we live in are of great responsibility -- great opportunity but great responsibility. (S)

The President: I would like to spend some time on one other point at some time. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I have one other point as well -- later. A point which you carefully avoided. (S)

The President: Yes, I was hoping to avoid it. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I once said something -- You used a word that means "a test" to see if we could solve mutual problems. (S)

The President: Afghanistan is more important to you than to us. I was wrong about what would happen after Soviet troops left. Let's discuss it. (S)

The President: Let me not blind side you. You may not want to discuss it. But I would like to know your views concerning the sensitive area of the Baltics. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Yes, we will. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 3, 1989, 11:45 am - 12:45 pm
AND PLACE: Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta

The President: I want to discuss an idea on bibles and a proposal on Billy Graham. (Described the question he is asked about the Baltics). (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I have discussed how we see a [ILLEGIBLE]. Many problems have arisen. We were ready to deal with them through greater autonomy. If separatism would become dominant, that would be dramatic. I must not create a danger to perestroika. The Soviet peoples would not understand. We lived together for fifty years, we are integrated. We have sixty million living out there in nationality areas. Fifty percent of Estonia are Russians, over 50% of Latvians are now Russian, Lithuanian majority in Lithuania. In the Ukraine, 50 million are non-Ukrainian. Kazakhs are only 30% of the population. Our country is that way and separatism brings out strong feelings by people. (S)

There has been a calming down but still there are problems. This is a sensitive issue for us. I hope you understand our position. This would bring out all sorts of terrible fires. If the U.S. has no understanding it would spoil relations with the U.S. more than anything else. (S)

The President: But if you use force -- you don't want to -- that would create a firestorm. You will get that question. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: We want all to get equal treatment. If we removed our MVD troops from Nagorno-Karabakh we would have war. We are committed to a democratic process and we hope you understand. (S)

What happened here is precisely what we wanted. We are very pleased. There are some in both countries who don't like what we are doing. But we are right. Destructive forces should not be allowed to undermine this. Let me [ILLEGIBLE] some. (S)

The President What forces? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Sometimes lies are presented in the press, etc., i.e. that Gorbachev sold his friends down the river as a student after drinking ...[ILLEGIBLE] (S)

The President: I never heard of this. We have a lot of nuts. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I know you don't believe it. (U)

The President: The visit is exactly what I hoped. I didn't respond to all arms control but we want to move forward. But we must be prudent. We are looking for ways to make further reductions, especially in manpower in CFE. I must consult with NATO. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Dmitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Alexander Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister
P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME September 21, 1989, 3:05 p.m. - 3:40 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is good that these issues have been intensively discussed. President Gorbachev has reaffirmed the need for an informal meeting -- no agenda, small group. We have discussed all this on several occasions. As for a quick trip to the United States, we believe that would raise many problems, especially with an official trip expected next year. We concluded that would create a mistaken impression. A meeting, in the absence of agreements, would also lead to disappointment in both countries.

President Gorbachev asks you to weigh the possibility of meeting in any third country. President Gorbachev is planning to visit Finland in October and Italy in November (after November 20th). If the President was interested in any other places in Europe, or close to Europe, we could arrange a meeting.

The President: When will President Gorbachev be going to Italy?

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: His visit will begin on November 20. He will be in Finland in October.

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If that working meeting does not go forward, we should prepare for a real Summit. Given the current state of discussions, there may be an urgent need for major decisions on START, and Summit input will be needed.

If we were to begin working toward a Summit, when should it take place? We should give negotiators time for serious preparation. Perhaps late spring or early summer would be right. If we set that date, we could get two ministerial meetings in before the Summit. Any date later than that would be difficult because we will be holding a Party Congress in October. Holding no Summit at all would be inconsistent with the situation in our relationship.

The President: I am glad we could have this discussion. Just so you hear it from me, let me go back a bit. I have been officially opposed to an informal meeting. But, because of rapid changes around the globe, the problems you face and we face, I have changed my position 180 degrees. The four of us were in Paris, and we heard our allies indicate their desire that I meet with President Gorbachev. We spoke with our allies of the many changes, in China, Eastern Europe, the global environment, and elsewhere. We talked about the possibility that maybe we, in the U.S., should change our minds and favor an informal meeting without an agenda.

If we did, I would have to explain to the press why I changed. But my real concern is that I do not want us to miss anything, to let something fall through the cracks. Today Eastern Europe is important -- not to make decisions -- just to discuss important issues.

We need to get comfortable with each other, so we can talk really frankly -- pick up the phone, for example. My predecessor did not have a close relationship with President Mitterrand. I wanted a better one. He can be a difficult man -- we all can. I invited him to Maine. It was the best darn thing I ever did. Because of this recent step, our relationship is on a completely different plane. The chemistry is different. It could become the same with us. It would be good; I know it.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: This is consistent with what President Gorbachev thinks.

The President: I understand why it won't work, but that is why a meeting connected to the UN General Assembly would have been

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perfect. The press might otherwise reflect disappointment that no agreements were signed, etc.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: That would have been best, but for the fact that President Gorbachev spoke there last year.

The President: We know, but that is why we thought of Alaska and the environment. We understand why that was not possible. We will regroup and keep thinking about this. I really want to do this. I am convinced it would be a good thing.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: That is why President Gorbachev wanted me to tell you about his two visits in Europe which are already set.

The President: I will think about it. We are not saying no. Please ask President Gorbachev to think further. There has to be some rationale to keep the fact of a meeting from getting out of hand. That was the problem with Spain. There would be no reason for me to go there absent a crisis.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: If some trip you made would coincide with our trips, that would stop the speculation.

The President: Let me ask a logistics question. We thought about this idea for Alaska. How about holding one meeting on our ship and one on yours. Is there some problem in that notion from your perspective?

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Korea. If we were to meet you in Alaska, North Korea would ask why we did not visit them as well.

The President: Let's keep talking about this until we find an answer.

Secretary Baker: I suggest that we tell the press we have agreed on holding a Summit meeting by next summer.

The President: That would take the pressure off and then, if we could have another meeting, it would be clear it was not a Summit.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: So we will make an announcement, indicating a time frame for the Summit.

(There was then a discussion which resulted in agreement to

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describe the time frame as before mid-year 1990.)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: When would we announce this? I need to call President Gorbachev. We could say we had a good discussion and will be more specific later.

(End of meeting)

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Shenandoah Private City
9/21/89

- S Good that this issue has been
intensively discussed
Gov regarding needs & tech
& format - no agenda, small
group
We have discussed all aspects on
several occasions
As for trip to US, he believes that
would raise many questions,
like official trip expected
next year.
We concluded that would create
impression of emergency event.
Mtg in absence of agreements
would lead to disappointment
in both countries
So he asks you to weigh
possibility of any 3rd country
He is planning to return in Sept
& stay in Nov (after 20th)
If any plans for Eur or else
to, we could arrange a
mtg
P When Italian trip
S 20 Nov it begins - Ferdinand
Dit

S If that working party doesn't go forward, we should prepare for real summit. Given a current state of ~~discovery~~ there might be need for major tensions or start of summit might be needed.

If we were to begin work in ~~October~~ summit, ~~where~~ when should it take place.

We should give my states time for serious preparation. Perhaps late spring or early summer would be right. If we set that date, we could get 2 summits in. Any date later would be too late because we have party core in Oct. No summit at all would be inconsistent w/ a situation.

P Glad for this discussion. Just so you hear it from me, let me go back. I have been official representative to an informal party.

But because of rapid changes
in our globe, probs you know
I've face, I have changed.
180. The 4 of us were in Paris
& we heard a lot of our allies
that we met. We spoke of a
many changes, China, EE,
environment, etc. We talked & that
maybe we should change our
mind in favor of an informal
no agreed entity.

If we did I would have to
explain to you why I changed.
But real reason is I don't want
to miss anything, to let something
fall through & checks - Policy EE
is important - not to make
decisions, just to discuss
important issues.

We need to get comfortable
w/ each other, so we can
talk really freely - pick
up a phone, for example.

My pred. didn't have close
relationships w/ Mitterrand
I wanted a better one. He can
be a diff. man - we all can.
I wanted him to move. But

damn thing I ever did. Because
of this one entry, our relationship
is on a completely different plan.
Take chemistry is different.

It would be some w/ us.
we could both have been small
travellers - it would be good. I
know it.

S This is consistent w/ what G
thinks

P I understood why it would be
like that is why V N would have
been perfect. (Discussed press
disappointment issue w/ no agreement
signed, etc.)

S That ~~could~~ be best but for fact
G spoke last year.

P well known, but that's why we
that of Alder & environment.
we understand why that not
possible

We will look at merit, we'll
re-group & keep thinking of it.
I really want to do this. Convinced

that it would be good.

S Gorbunov ~~was~~ ^{is} here to tell you
about his 2 reports which are
not.

P will think about it. we not saying no. ask him to think further. There has to be some rationale to keep it from getting out of hand. That was prob w/ Spain. No reason to go there absent a crisis.

S If some trip you make would coincide w/ our trips that would stop a speculation.

P let me ask a logistic question. Worth of this for Alaska. How about holding one mtg on our ship + one on yamro. Is there some prob in that notion from your perspective.

S Kneec. If we were to visit in Alaska, H Kneec would ask why we didn't visit them also.

P let's keep talking until we find an answer.

B (Suggested we say to press on agreed on summit by next summer)

P That would take a pressure off of them if we could have another mtg. it would be clear it was not a summit.

5 So we need make an announcement, in the time frame (Discussion of summer cutoff) (agreed to say would be over before next year) when we could announce this. I need to call Kate Carb. we could say we had a good discussion & will have more specifics later.

damn thing I ever did. Because
of this one city, our relationship
is on a completely different plan.
The chemistry is different.
It would be some w/ us.
we could both have been small
towns - it would be good. I
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we understand why that not
possible

we will look at merit, we'll
re-group & keep thinking of it.
I really want to do this. Craved

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S Gorbunov told me to tell you
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5. So we will make an
announcement, in the time frame
(Discussion of seminar cutoff)
(Agreed to say would be done
before next year)
then we will announce this.
I need to call ~~late~~ Carb.
we could say we had a
good discussion & will have
more specific later.

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Dear Mr. President,

I think that our agreement to meet in early December was a timely decision. It is viewed that way throughout the world.

We have much to talk about and to discuss, and I am looking forward to a free-flowing and informal conversation, to a meeting without too much protocol.

Our meeting, Mr. President, will be taking place at a time of a new beginning, a clear turning point in the course of world events. A time for us, I think, to take a broad, conceptual view of the role of our two countries in that process and to assess the responsibility which you and I, personally, will have to shoulder.

In this context and, of course, with due regard for the national interests of each of our two countries we shall have to discuss the fundamental aspects of the further development of Soviet-American relations.

What is notable about the current situation is, in my view, the fact, that you and I already can predict the course of the relationship with a great deal of certainty. Surely we can think together about the practical meaning of the new closeness which you, Mr. President, have proclaimed. We can try to formulate an overall concept of Soviet-American relations, which it will be our task to implement in the coming years, at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

Without going into the specific issues of the Soviet-American agenda let me just say that they will probably have to be discussed in one degree or another, most likely with a view to giving an additional impetus at our level to the negotiating process, particularly in Geneva and Vienna.

In the current crucial period some particularly sensitive problems have arisen in the world, which require that big powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States give them special attention and show extraordinary caution and responsibility in assessing and approaching them. We shall probably discuss them too, for it is important not to leave anything unsaid or unclear in that regard.

We will be able, as we agreed, to talk about anything without being constrained by some fixed agenda, with maximum openness and trust and with the hope that our meeting will consolidate the movement "from mutual understanding to mutual action" in the process of Soviet-American dialogue.

See you soon.

Sincerely,

Mikhail Gorbachev

Уважаемый господин президент!

Думаю, что наша договоренность о встрече в начале декабря была своевременным решением. Так она воспринимается и во всем мире.

Нам есть о чем поговорить. Есть, что обсудить - тем более в условиях свободного, неофициального разговора, без протокольных излишеств.

Наша с Вами встреча, господин президент, будет происходить в момент, когда уже явственно обозначилось начало перелома во всем мировом развитии. И пора, видимо, посмотреть в широком, концептуальном плане на роль наших двух государств в этом процессе и определиться с мерой ответственности, которая ложится и лично на нас с Вами.

В этом контексте и, разумеется, с учетом национальных интересов каждой из обеих стран, предстоит обсудить принципиальную сторону дальнейшего развития советско-американских отношений.

Как мне представляется, особенность нынешней ситуации в том, что мы с Вами уже можем с большой долей уверенности прогнозировать эти отношения. Во всяком случае поразмышлять о практическом содержании, "новой близости" США с СССР, которую Вы, господин президент, провозгласили. Попытайтесь выстроить общую концепцию советско-американских отношений, которую именно нам с Вами придется воплощать в жизнь в предстоящие годы, в канун XXI века.

Не буду сейчас касаться конкретных вопросов советско-американской повестки дня. Они, надо полагать, будут в той или иной степени затрагиваться, причем, скорее всего, в целях дать на нашем с Вами уровне дополнительный импульс переговорным процессам, особенно в Женеве и в Вене.

В нынешнее переломное время в мире возникли проблемы особо деликатного порядка. От таких держав, как СССР и США, они требуют особого внимания и сугубой осторожности и ответственности в оценках и в подходе к ним. Наверное, мы поговорим и о них: тут важно не оставлять недоговоренности или неясности.

Мы можем, как условились, говорить обо всем, не будучи ограничены какой-то фиксированной повесткой дня, в обстановке максимальной откровенности и доверительности и в расчете на то, что эта наша встреча закрепит движение в советско-американском диалоге "от взаимопонимания к взаимодействию".

До скорой встречи.

С уважением

Handwritten signature in cursive script, likely belonging to A. Korbintsev.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DB

S/S #

044276

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 1
FROM: ROBERT KIMMITT P 642-1598 7008 NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (TRANSLATION)
ICW LETTER DUBENIN TO KIMMITT ON 11/28)

TO: (Agency) DELIVER TO: Extension Room No.
NSC BOB GATES VIA WHSITRM
Zelikow
Kanter
Mahley
Blackwill

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Col NARA, Date 9/7/09

S/S Officer: [Signature]

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I am grateful to you for your letter of September 23, 1989, in which you underscore the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have a special responsibility to play a decisive role in advancing the multilateral process of prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. I would like to tell you at the outset that I fully and sincerely support such an approach.

In order to promptly achieve a universal ban on chemical weapons I propose, just as in the case of Vienna talks, to express ourselves in favor of setting a deadline for finalizing the convention, through a joint appeal to the participants in the Conference on Disarmament, to finalize the text of the convention by 1990-1991 at latest.

It is in the context of the determination stated by our two countries in Wyoming to persist in achieving chemical weapons prohibition and elimination of all its stockpiles that we approach the specific ideas, which you, Mr. President, have put forward in your letter as well as at the UN.

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

TREAT AS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

You've been writing about the readiness of the United States to eliminate over 98% of its CW stockpiles during the period of 8 years after the convention comes into effect, provided that the Soviet Union is to be one of the state signatories to that convention. As regards the Soviet Union participation in the convention, I give you a completely unequivocally positive answer. The Soviet Union has already stated that it is ready to be among the original parties to the convention.

It would be nice, if the United States were to make a similar announcement, and still better if we were to make such announcement jointly, for instance, at our forthcoming meeting in 1990. In turn, that would push other states to take no less a definite stance with regard to participating in the convention.

As to the issue of complete destruction of CW under the future convention, it seems to me that we should adhere to the agreement reached at the multinational negotiations, mostly due to the initiative of the USSR and United States, on their unconditional 100 per cent destruction within the 10 year period after the coming into force of the convention. It is on the principles of complete destruction of CW stockpiles and production facilities in this time-frame that the joint Soviet-US proposals on the order of destruction of such stockpiles and facilities have been drafted and then adopted in Wyoming. The right to retain any stockpiles, however minimal, would signify the perpetuating of a threat of CW use, would provide, as a matter of fact, ground for any state to renounce under various pretexts the complete destruction of chemical weapons.

As to the participation in the convention of all CW capable states, the Soviet Union, like the United States, attaches priority significance to this question.

We believe that it has been resolved to a great extent by the special Soviet-US agreement on the categories of states which should be original parties to the convention, and now it seems to be possible to get down to discussing a specific plan of action with a view to involving as parties to the convention such states that pose a potential threat in terms of CW. Naturally, what is required here is a flexible approach, taking into account diverse conditions existing in each given region of the world.

You have also proposed a radical reduction of the CW stockpiles of the USSR and the United States while the multilateral talks in Geneva are still underway. I think that our two countries, given their special responsibility in the area of CW disarmament, could move even further and without waiting for a convention to be concluded, undertake an entire package of reciprocal and mutually interrelated obligations.

First. To halt completely any CW production. It is a natural and relatively easy first step to take toward the future convention. It would enable to considerably reinforce our political impact on those who are possibly engaged in their own CW production or are planning to do so.

I must frankly say that the recent reports to the effect that the United States intends to continue the CW production even after the coming into force of the convention have given rise to our serious concern. It is with a certain degree of mistrust that we have treated these reports because such US actions would directly contradict the already existing agreements worked out mostly through the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, you made no mention of this approach in your letter either. Any permission to produce

chemical weapons in the framework of the convention would push other states, one way or the other, to initiate its production in order to retain the right to continue it after the coming into force of the convention. It would inevitably lead to a point where the proliferation of chemical weapons would become politically and legally admissible.

Second. To radically reduce and - what is even better - to completely destroy the chemical weapons of the USSR and the US. The Soviet Union intends to start destruction of its stockpiles prior to the conclusion of the convention, and we like the idea of the USSR and the US moving along this road on parallel courses. We had to convert our first pilot CW destruction plant built near Chapaevsk, into a training center as requested by the public, and now in order to have an idea of our real possibilities for destroying the stockpiles, we must complete the draft comprehensive program for CW destruction in the USSR to be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Consideration of such a complex and multifaceted issue in the Supreme Soviet as well as implementation of the decisions to be adopted will obviously take some time.

With a view to ensuring the best possible preparation for CW destruction, including solutions to complex ecological question, it might be possible to build on cooperation between our two countries concerning the methods of CW destruction, operating respective facilities, elaboration of suitable verification procedures, etc. and formalize a special bilateral agreement to that effect.

In order to avoid any apprehensions on the part of the participants in the talks to the effect that the reciprocal steps of the USSR and the US are conceived

as a substitute for a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it would be possible to declare that the agreement on reduction and, time permitting, destruction of US and Soviet chemical weapons will come into force at the moment of the signing of the convention itself.

Third. Under no circumstances chemical weapons should be used. Unlike the USSR and the US the overwhelming majority of countries have no reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol enabling the use of CW in retaliation. The mutual renunciation by the USSR and the US of their reservations would make a tangible contribution to the process of strengthening intolerance toward chemical weapons. Establishing an absolute and verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons through effective UN procedures would lessen the incentives for acquiring chemical weapons by states.

Fourth. We resolutely believe that the discontinuation of CW production, their destruction and non-use must be verified in the strictest possible manner in the framework of both convention and the range of steps which the USSR and the US could implement prior to its conclusion.

As to our possible joint contribution to the process of multilateral negotiations, I think there is a need for it, now, above all, with a view to finalizing a solution to the entire range of verification problems. In this connection I'd like to propose that our two countries come out with a joint initiative on challenge inspections.

The important contribution that you, Mr. President, made in raising this issue at the negotiations has been now appreciated on its merits in the Soviet Union. Its discussion showed that it may be adequately resolved,

provided all states accept the concept of "continuous" or "open invitation for inspection" which would provide for a possibility to conduct such inspections by the international inspectorate at the request of any party to the convention, at any time, at any point or facility of the other party within the most limited time-frame, without any exceptions and the right to refusal. Our joint initiative on this basis would become a most significant contribution to the successful completion of the negotiations on the convention.

In conclusion I'd like to express my conviction that through joint efforts we will succeed, already in the near future, to attain our common objective - introduction of a complete global ban on CW. I would be interested to know your considerations in reaction concerning this priority question.

With sincere respect.

M. GORBACHEV

November 28, 1989