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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91127
Folder ID Number: 91127-001

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	7/4/90	(b)(1)	
01b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	7/4/90	(b)(1)	
02. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)	4/6/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (20 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Message	Re: In the course... (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Notes	Re: [Translator's Notes on the One-on-One Between the President and Gorbachev] (15 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (13 pp.)	6/2/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev [Meeting Notes] (3 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
08. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Yeltsin [Meeting Notes] (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1070
OA/ID Number: 91127-001
Date Closed: 4/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev [Meeting Notes] (11 pp.)	11/19/90	(b)(1)	
10. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (6 pp.)	4/6/90	(b)(1)	
11. Memo	Robert M. Gates to POTUS Re: Gorbachev -- Moses, not Joshua (3 pp.)	7/13/90	(b)(1)	C
12. Message	Re: Message from Secretary James A. Baker III (1 pp.)	6/5/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

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President/Gorbachev

Gorbo comes

Outgoing 1-13-89

Incoming 1-18-89

~~Outgoing 2-8-89 (Draft not sure if sent)~~

✓ Outgoing 5-7-89 (handwritten note)

✓ Outgoing 5-24-89

✓ Outgoing 6-20-89 (Pkg #4729)

✓ Outgoing 7-21-89 SENSITIVE

INCOMING 8-6-89

Incoming 8-25-89

✓ Outgoing 8-30-89

Incoming 9-1-89

Incoming 9--89

✓ Outgoing 9-8-89

✓ Incoming 10-20-89

✓ Incoming 11-15-89

✓ Incoming 11-22-89 (also 11-22-89)

Outgoing 11-7-89 BB to Raisa

Incoming 11-13-89 Raisa to BB

Outgoing 11-15-89 BB to Raisa

Outgoing 4-5-90 BB to Raisa

LSE

Incoming 9-1-89 Miller
~~Outgoing~~ Sending over

Gorbachev/President

Outgoing 1-13-89
Incoming 1-18-89
Outgoing 5- 7-89 (handwritten note)
Outgoing 5-24-89
Outgoing 6-20-89 (Pkg #4729)
Outgoing 7-21-89 SENSITIVE
Outgoing 8-30-89
Outgoing 9- 8-89

Incoming 8-25-89

S/S Incoming
S/S Incoming
9/8/89 outgoing

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 5

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 184

DTG 041755Z JUL 09

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX #

RELEASER J1

ROUTINE

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GEN. SCOWCROFT / K-PORT

2.

3.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 4/6/09

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
The President of the United
States of America

Dear Mr. President,

Addressing this message to you as Chairman of the Sixteenth Economic Summit of the Seven's leaders due to be held in Houston, and through you, to its other participants, I wish to continue the discussion of the general problems of the world's development and of ways of getting our economies closer together.

The time which has elapsed since the Paris summit has been filled with developments of truly historic proportions. At the political level, a great deal has been done in terms of overcoming the divisions in the world. The division of Europe is becoming a thing of the past. The antagonism between the blocs and the superpowers is giving way to relations of partnership and cooperation.

Disarmament processes are gaining strength, which not only makes the world safer, but is creating a solid foundation for a sustained development of the world economy.

Overcoming the economic division of the world is now the order of the day. What needs to be done is achieving compatibility between different economic mechanisms and creating new cooperative structures. The decisions of the Bonn conference on economic cooperation and the establishment of the European bank for reconstruction and development are going in this direction.

The granting to the Soviet Union of the observer status in GATT is cause for satisfaction. It is a real step toward economic openness. The Soviet contacts with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development are on the increase. The agreement between the USSR and the European communities on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, concluded last December, has begun to operate. The recent US-Soviet summit in Washington saw a genuine "breakthrough" in economic matters.

It is important that the rapprochement between East and West is not taking place in isolation from the rest of the world and that it is contributing to shaping universal principles of economic comity of all states, including developing countries, which was stipulated in the decisions of the Eighteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

Looking back at the year past, we believe that the Soviet leadership has been doing everything in its power in order to buttress its new policies with concrete actions both at home and abroad.

Today, the USSR is going through a most critical stage in perestroika. It involves breaking the obsolete economic structures and a transition to market economy. Without these radical steps, further renewal of our society will be impossible.

At present, the Soviet leadership is looking for ways of supplementing the internal transformations with outside financial and economic support. These efforts are directed toward securing credit assistance, attraction of foreign capital, transfer of managerial experience, personnel training, and include other measures conducive to creating a competitive economy.

The first contacts in this regard have taken place, and by and large we are finding understanding.

Perhaps, it would be possible to talk about working out long-term agreements on large-scale credit and investment cooperation which in effect would be a serious factor of

stabilization and a transition to the market economy in the USSR. Establishment of a specific program of cooperation - eventually mutually beneficial cooperation - would best serve this objective.

I feel that a sustained economic dialogue between the USSR and the Seven would contribute to that as well.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin

July 4, 1990

Его Превосходительству
Господину Джорджу БУШУ,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Обращаясь к Вам как к председателю предстоящего в Альбустоне АУ1 экономического совещания руководителей семи государств и через Вас - к другим его участникам, хотел бы продолжить разговор об общих проблемах мирового развития и путях сближения наших экономик.

Время, прошедшее после саммита в Париже, оказалось заполненным событиями подлинно исторического значения. На политическом уровне сделано очень многое для преодоления разобщенности мира. Уходит в прошлое раскол Европы. Антагонизм между блоками и сверхдержавами уступает место отношениям партнерства и сотрудничества.

Набирают силу разоруженческие процессы, что не только делает мир более безопасным, но и закладывает прочную основу для устойчивого развития мировой экономики.

На повестке дня - преодоление экономического раскола мира. Предстоит достичь совместимости различных хозяйственных механизмов, создать новые структуры взаимодействия. В этом направлении идут решения Боннской конференции по экономическому сотрудничеству, учреждение Европейского банка реконструкции и развития.

Мы с удовлетворением отмечаем предоставление СССР статуса наблюдателя в ГАТТ. Это - реальный шаг на пути к экономической открытости. Развиваются контакты СССР с Международным валютным фондом, Мировым банком, Организацией экономического сотрудничества и развития. Начало работать заключенное в декабре прошлого года соглашение между СССР и европейскими сообществами

о торговле и коммерческом и экономическом сотрудничестве. настоящим "прорывом" в области экономики завершилась советско-американская встреча в верхах в Вашингтоне.

Важно, что сближение Востока и Запада происходит не изолированно от остального мира, способствует формированию универсальных принципов экономического общения всех государств, включая развивающиеся, что закреплено решениями 18-й специальной сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН.

Отглядываясь на прошедший год, мы считаем, что советское руководство делало все возможное для того, чтобы подкрепить свою новую политику конкретными действиями как у себя дома, так и за рубежом.

Сегодня СССР переживает наиболее ответственный этап перестройки. Он связан с ломкой отживших экономических структур, переходом к рыночной экономике. Без этих радикальных шагов невозможно дальнейшее обновление нашего общества.

В настоящее время руководство СССР ищет способы дополнить внутренние преобразования внешней финансово-экономической поддержкой. Эти усилия направлены на обеспечение кредитного содействия, привлечение иностранного капитала, передачу управленческого опыта, подготовку кадров и включают другие меры, способствующие созданию конкурентоспособной экономики.

Первые контакты на этот счет состоялись, и в целом мы находим понимание.

Видимо, речь могла бы идти о проработке долгосрочных договоренностей о крупномасштабном кредитном и инвестиционном сотрудничестве, которое на деле стало бы серьезным фактором стабилизации и перехода к рыночной экономике в СССР. Наилучшим образом этому послужило бы формирование целевой программы сотрудничества - в конечном итоге взаимовыгодного.

Думается, этому мог бы способствовать и устойчивый экономический диалог СССР с "семеркой".

С уважением,

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

Москва, Кремль

4 июля 1990 года

April 6, 1990

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: April 5, 1990
Time: 9:00pm - 11:00pm
Place: Secretary Baker's Residence

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0836-MR
SCS 8/5/13

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Baker
William Hopkins (Interpreter)

Minister Shevardnadze
Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

During the course of the dinner conversation, Secretary Baker said he had a comment to make in the form of a question. He wondered whether Foreign Minister Shevardnadze believed that if President Landsbergis were to go to Moscow and agree to suspend (as opposed to annul) actions taken in Lithuania, whether that would be sufficient to lead to the beginning of a dialogue. The Secretary also expressed the hope that the Soviet leadership would not make a decision to introduce direct Presidential rule in Lithuania. In the United States, for example, that would be perceived as a blatantly anti-democratic move which would play very badly in terms of U.S. public opinion. He concluded by expressing the hope that a process will be initiated whereby a solution can be found to the current situation in Lithuania.

Baker further expressed the hope that the Soviet government will do all it can to discourage the Russian minority in Lithuania from organizing demonstrations which could potentially lead to clashes. He recalled that in his first conversation with Minister Shevardnadze during the current Ministerial he had expressed U.S. support for the positive changes taking place in the Soviet Union. The U.S. desires to be able to continue to support the efforts of Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev. The positive changes in the Soviet Union are important to the entire world.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paused for a rather long moment before responding to the Secretary's remarks. Then he replied that in responding, it should be understood that decisions concerning such considerations as those implied in the Secretary's remarks are ordinarily made by the Soviet leadership on a collective basis. Despite that, speaking personally and individually, he expressed the supposition that if Landsbergis were to come to Moscow, it would be very positive and helpful. Changing his tone and expression somewhat, the Foreign Minister wondered aloud whether under the circumstances the Lithuanians could really expect Gorbachev to come to them. He continued that as far as the Soviet leadership is concerned Landsbergis is an unknown entity. However, he is considered to be inexperienced, naive -- and, therefore, politically speaking, dangerous. In this respect, under the former music professor's leadership, rather starry-eyed decisions have been taken in Lithuania, the profound implications of which have only subsequently become apparent.

Shevardnadze continued that there are large Russian, Polish and Belorussian minorities in Lithuania. Many of those minority people who are against secession are employed at factories. Thus far, particularly in those factories that are "all-union" (as opposed to those of the Lithuanian Republic), despite the ethnic mix, it has been possible to keep order. He said his most grave fear is that there will be some kind of incident or clash between factions or minorities or even between individuals that could lead to an explosion.

Shevardnadze again stated that the Soviet leadership is unequivocally and categorically against the use of force in Lithuania. In that connection he recalled two incidents from recent times. Force was used during the Georgian uprising last year. The decision on that score had been made "legally" in the Georgian Republic; still, the actions of the local political and military authorities were subsequently officially condemned at the highest governmental level. He emphasized that it had not been easy to make the decision to condemn the use of force, since that reflected so badly on the local authorities and on the military. In connection with the Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes, he recalled that there had actually been an all-out civil war. In that situation, the Central Government was accused of being remiss for not having sent troops in early enough to prevent the bloodshed that took place.

Despite such considerations, Shevardnadze reiterated that the use of force in Lithuania is something totally outside the Weltanschauung of the current Soviet leadership. The only "weapon" it desires to use is dialogue. He again expressed his profound concern about the possibility of the accidental outbreak of explosive violence as the result of some individual incident. He maintained that troops have been sent into Lithuania solely for the purpose of "keeping the lid on" and preventing a repetition of events such as those in Tbilisi or Baku.

Alluding to other remarks made by the Secretary, Shevardnadze said that as to foreigners being put out of Lithuania or journalists being fettered in their work there, if any such measures are taken it is not with the intention on the part of the authorities to prevent news coverage of events or to have any "closed" areas. All those kinds of things are in the past. However, he continued, it has been learned from sad experience that extremist factions on both ends of a local political spectrum in these kinds of situations "play to the cameras." The presence of foreigners and representatives of the media and exacerbates fosters that kind of grandstanding.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet leadership is deeply mindful of its profound responsibility -- in the given instance in terms of Lithuania -- and in a larger sense because it realizes its responsibility to all the other peoples and republics in the USSR, as well as to the peoples of Europe and, indeed, of the world. Consequently, it would neither be in anyone's interest to have this situation go badly, nor to have perestroika fail. He alluded to serious internal conservative criticism of the current leadership. The Gorbachev Administration has been accused by conservatives of bringing about the dissolution of a stable, secure Soviet state. Shevardnadze repeated that he used to maintain that there is no alternative to perestroika. Now, he said, he realizes his earlier contention was not correct. Should perestroika fail, the alternative is the emergence of a dictatorship -- with all the attendant deportations, enforced exiles, and executions that will take place. There are enough sufficiently recent examples of this sort of thing.

Shevardnadze maintained that in Lithuania there will be no use of force. He said every effort will be made to avoid incidents and to maintain order and peace -- as well as to work out some dialogue and some solution to the current situation. Despite his expression of such grave concerns, Shevardnadze said he is by nature an optimist, and he expressed his optimistic confidence in the fact that the current situation will be resolved peacefully.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: April 4, 1990

Time: 4:00pm - 7:30pm

Place: Secretary Baker's Office

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.: Secretary Baker
Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
Interpreter

USSR: Eduard Shevardnadze
Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
Interpreter

Baker: I want to start by welcoming you and since you are the guest I think you should go ahead and feel free to kick off the discussions.

Shevardnadze: Thanks for the welcome. I believe this meeting is of great importance because we have little time before the Summit and we have a lot of work to do. I might begin by discussing the date of the Summit. Taking into account your previous proposals, we propose that we go ahead and have the Summit between May 30th and June 3rd. My impression is that this should be suitable to you. If it is acceptable we could make the announcement during my visit.

Baker: When the Ambassador gave me the dates he said that it was important that there be no leaks. I have discussed this only with the President and so far there have been no leaks. As I understand it, the dates and the scenario, as I have described them in Namibia, would be okay with you. That is to say we would have meetings here and then we would go to Maine and we might come back here.

Shevardnadze: I discussed this with Gorbachev before leaving and he believes that the main task right now is to set the dates. All that you propose in terms of scenario is basically acceptable, but he does prefer to reserve on certain possible proposals that he might want to suggest about the program. In any case, I will communicate our suggestions on the program after I get back to Moscow.

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Baker: Good. You have no objection to the concept of spending time at the President's residence in Maine?

Shevardnadze: No, that is fine with us.

Baker: Well, let me just say that the dates are acceptable to us. They really do suit our needs as well. We might decide how best to announce this. My sense would be that we should announce this simultaneously from both capitals while you are here.

Shevardnadze: We are ready to accept anything that you suggest. Whatever you say is fine with us.

Baker: Well, I think it might be agreeable to us to announce this tomorrow or Friday. If we announce this tomorrow, we could do it simultaneously with an announcement in both Washington and Moscow. That would leave much less of a chance of a leak.

Shevardnadze: That could be. Maybe we might want to announce it right after the meeting with the President or before.

Baker: Whatever. Again, I think the important point is that we would want a simultaneous announcement.

Shevardnadze: That is fine with us. Really whatever you say is going to be fine with us and if you want to do it before the meeting with the President, that is fine.

Baker: I just want to be sure that we agree that this should be a simultaneous announcement coming out of both Washington and Moscow.

Shevardnadze: Yes, that's the most desirable.

Baker: Why don't I ask the President. I do worry about a leak.

Shevardnadze: Fine. Let's leave it to the President. Whatever he says will also be the opinion of the Soviet President. You know you have a big advantage. You can just pick up the phone and consult with him. It is a lot harder for me.

Baker: That is the way it is for me when I am in Moscow.

Shevardnadze: Well, it is good that the dates are set. The most important thing is to set the dates.

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Now, as for the negotiations themselves, and what's going to be involved with them, and what's going to be involved with the results of the Summit, we have a lot to do and a lot is going to depend upon the talks that you and I have. Of course, a lot will also depend upon the specific results that emerge from Vienna and Geneva. We have every reason to hope by the end of May that we are going to have important and major agreements. As I discussed with you, we are going to have a lot to do in advance of that to prepare the documents that will be signed at the Summit and to prepare well for the Summit and that is one of the reasons I said we are going to need another meeting between the two of us.

I have studied very carefully the status of the talks and I must say that our readiness to have the Summit is not high at this point.

Baker: I agree with that. We might also just finalize what the other dates of the ministerial are going to be. The May 16-19 is acceptable for us.

Shevardnadze: That's very good.

Baker: I do think on the announcement that tomorrow morning is probably better because that will guarantee there isn't a leak. We could do it at 9:00 in the morning here, 5:00 in Moscow. Is that okay?

Shevardnadze: That's quite okay.

Baker: One other item that the President wanted me to make very clear to you -- and he just reiterated that on the phone -- is that we are very concerned about the events in Lithuania. I know you are aware of this and I want to let you go through your agenda before I offer some comments on Lithuania. But it is important especially given what the President has just noted, that while we do not want to have anything get in the way of the Summit and the ministerial, we are making the assumption that Lithuania is going to be managed in the way that is consistent with the principles of perestroika and glasnost and that it will be settled peacefully.

Shevardnadze: Should we discuss the program of the Summit tomorrow or should we talk about it now?

Baker: Well, we could do it now. The way we see it is that the arrival would be in Washington on Wednesday afternoon, May 30. The formal arrival ceremony would be on Thursday morning, May 31st; there might be a state dinner that night. Friday, June 1st the two Presidents would go to Kennebunkport.

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- 4 -

You might have discussions here in advance of going up to Kennebunkport on June 1 and then you could continue discussions up there. There would be further meetings in Kennebunkport on Saturday, June 2nd and you might return to Washington either Saturday evening or Sunday morning. There would, of course, be the possibility of additional meetings down here in Washington, if needed. Perhaps there might also be a reciprocal dinner if that is what you want on Sunday and maybe also a concluding press event. What I am saying in a sense is that the June 1-3 timeframe can have a lot of built-in flexibility.

Shevardnadze: After our meeting, I will convey this to President Gorbachev. We will want to have a reciprocal dinner and probably also a press event. It is possible that President Gorbachev will also want to make a public statement during his visit here, but that is not definite at this point.

Baker: President Bush would hope that this timeframe will be committed entirely to meetings with the President. If President Gorbachev wants other events in the country, outside of Washington, we would hope that those would take place either before or after the May 30th-June 3rd dates. That doesn't mean that he might not have time to visit the Congress while he is here in Washington, that would be understandable. I'm really only talking about his possible travel to other parts of the United States.

Shevardnadze: Maybe we can decide this way. I will go ahead and convey this to Moscow and then give you an answer back on all this after my return to Moscow.

Baker: We can work out the details of the schedule through normal diplomatic procedure. Tomorrow we will announce only that there will be a Summit in the United States and we will announce what the timeframe is from Wednesday, May 30th to June 3rd.

Shevardnadze: That's fine. We might also announce the next ministerial.

Baker: Well, we need not do that as part of the White House statement. We can do that at the conclusion of our meeting in our press statements.

Shevardnadze: That's fine. What is important to me is that the May 16th-19th dates are acceptable to you for the ministerial. The only disadvantage that I see of those dates is that they are too close to the Summit. On the other hand, that gives our delegations a chance to work and to prove themselves; they are going to have a lot to do so that the Summit is well-prepared by the end of that meeting.

~~SECRET~~

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I brought with me a letter from President Gorbachev that responds to President Bush's letter. I'll give the original to President Bush in the meeting but I wanted to give you an advance copy so that you could tell the President about the contents.

Let me make some preliminary comments on the letter. You will see in the letter that we are providing some answers to some of the questions you have raised. I would like to emphasize that we gave very close consideration to the letter and we take a very broad view of the problems and of the issues that will come up in the future talks after the 50% reduction treaty is concluded. Overall, our approach is that we need to really focus on concluding the 50% reductions treaty. I know this is a view that you share as well. This will enable us to initial the treaty at the Summit so that we can sign the treaty by the end of the year. As I have said, we still have quite a few issues that have to be worked out in the treaty, and they are both of a substantive and technical nature. It is going to require a lot of work to get that done. I know that your people have proposed that we should take an inventory of all the issues between us and see where we stand on each of them. I support this. I think it is a practical and appropriate way to proceed. I'd like to direct our people to do this exercise.

Baker: Good.

Shevardnadze: Yes, that would be very good because we really have, as I have said, a number of substantive and technical problems. And I remember the final stages of the INF Treaty, we really had a lot of difficulties with some of the technical problems that posed themselves.

Baker: Well, as you noted, I have got a list of the problems that need to be solved and I will present it to you tomorrow in the small group meeting on arms control and you can compare our list against any list you might have. You are quite right that we have a very big job if we are going to get ready by the 30th of May.

Shevardnadze: With respect to some of the substantive aspects of the reply, I do believe that it is not desirable at this time when we have a number of substantive differences to add to any of them. In other words, our real task right now is to try to reduce the substantive differences and not necessarily put a new one on the table -- an additional item that we really don't have time to work out. But in the context of your proposal, I have a suggestion to make. We would be ready to make a substantial cut in our mobile SS-24s if you would decide not to deploy your MX missile in a mobile form.

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We could record that in a political document if you'd like. To be more precise, we would be ready to stop deployment of these missiles by January 1, 1991. We would not be able to stop deployment during this year. This is our initial position. You will, of course, want to study it and discuss it. As you remember, I said in Namibia that there is a need for bold steps and major tradeoffs that are equitable if we are going to secure stability in our countries over time.

The second point in the letter I should note focuses on fixed MIRVed missiles in the next negotiations, and our readiness to discuss this. But cuts in one component should not create instability in other components. We are ready to discuss all problems, all issues, including major cuts in warheads in all missiles -- ICBMs and SLBMs. We also are willing to discuss cuts in ALCMs and bombers. In other words, I think we need to have a full discussion of the strategic triad. There are quite a few different variants that need to be considered and I think all these elements must be taken into account if we are going to have a real balance.

There is a factor I would like you to consider and that is that we now have a situation that has been typical in your country for a long time. That being, that all of these issues of parity, balance, the end of the arms race, are being scrutinized by our legislature. That is not new for you but it is new for us. And I must tell you quite frankly that we are hearing that we have made too many concessions. Both Gorbachev and I are being criticized quite seriously. We are being told that we make too many one-sided concessions; we are being told that the INF treaty was an example of that; we are being told that in these agreements now we are reducing 50% more missiles than the US is. So, please understand that our positions reflect an awareness of some of our political pressures as well. There certainly are many interesting and reasonable points in President Bush's letter and we want to look for solutions and variants that will be acceptable to both sides.

Also, in order to record the interests of both countries in continuing the START process, both Presidents really should sign a statement of intent at the Summit on future talks. Many of the ideas in the President's letter should be reflected in such a statement of intent. We have come with a draft of such a statement or declaration of intent. Your people should take a look at it and we will try to take into account their ideas. When you were in Namibia, you mentioned that the proposal that you were passing on to us was one that you were keeping confidential. Do you intend to keep it confidential or are you going to go public with it?

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Baker: Well, I think we will keep it confidential. But, undoubtedly, it will become public when we have to testify to Congress on our discussions. I must tell you that I have heard at the White House that an arms control reporter has already been inquiring about this matter. So I don't know how much longer we will be able to keep it confidential.

Shevardnadze: Well, then let's not make that a problem. If it comes out, it comes out.

Baker: We sought to keep it confidential because we did not want to publicize a proposal in the period between the time you got it and had a chance to come back with an answer on it.

Shevardnadze: I understand.

Baker: Two other points in response to what you said about the letter.

First, we too have a statement of intent or joint declaration of principles for follow-on negotiations that we would like to see signed. And secondly, in light of your response to our proposal, maybe we could put in that statement or that joint declaration the concept of de-MIRVing, noting that the concept ought to be explored because it is something that would promote stability. Our initial view is that we would prefer not to talk about START II, but rather talk of building on the START agreement because this is something that will facilitate our ratification process here. But these matters we can discuss further.

Shevardnadze: Yes, let's discuss them in greater detail and get our experts to discuss that. Of course, when we speak of the arms reduction process we have in mind MIRVed missiles too, not only ICBMs, but SLBMs, and also heavy bombers. Indeed the entire spectrum of arms, not just one component of the armed forces.

Baker: I understand that's your counter-proposal. We are not in a position to agree at this point but I think we ought to at least be thinking about some kind of generic statement on de-MIRVing of land-based missiles because this is something that could enhance our ability to talk about follow-on negotiations and its purposes.

Shevardnadze: Well, let's think about that. In our statement we are trying to identify all the main areas or aspects of future talks, emphasizing the most de-stabilizing weapons. But, let's take into account the fact that we each have interests and that historically our forces and structures have evolved in a certain way. That ought to be reflected in the statement.

Baker: Well, we will see. Certainly whatever you have to present, we will take a look at. Whether we could agree to it will depend upon what's in it.

Shevardnadze: Yes, of course. The main element is our readiness to begin follow-on talks after the 50% reduction treaty has been completed. The objectives and the main aspects of those talks are what we are outlining. But we could compare our draft with yours and we will see where they overlap.

Baker: Yes, we will have to see it. I haven't seen yours, you haven't seen ours. Our experts can exchange them.

Shevardnadze: Let me emphasize what I said in Windhoek. On the issue of ALCMs, my bag is empty. I really have no room to maneuver on ALCM range. Other questions we can go over tomorrow and discuss them and see if we can find compromise solutions. I am hopeful that we can. On the possibility of a statement as a result of our talks, I think we ought to at least consider that. I have no objection to reflecting, in a short statement, what we have agreed to. Maybe we don't have to have a long statement.

Baker: I think that is right. I think we ought to not have to feel the need to produce a long joint communique every time we meet. If there is a very brief statement that records what we have agreed to, that is fine.

Shevardnadze: I think that is right. We can ask our experts to work out a brief statement reflecting agreements only. On the basis of our previous meetings I have always had a sense that we really run out of time and don't have enough time to review the results of our overall discussions. We have very wide-ranging talks. We have lots of experts, including experts on bilateral relations. And somehow 90 minutes for a concluding session doesn't seem to leave enough time.

Baker: Well, we can always extend that.

Shevardnadze: I brought with me our best experts on regional issues, on economic issues, on transnational questions, on humanitarian rights issues, on arms control -- really on everything.

Baker: Yes, it is true. In Moscow we made very good progress on arms control, but we really gave short shrift to the rest of our agenda. We shouldn't do that this time.

Shevardnadze: Yes. President Bush was saying in Malta that at the forthcoming Summit, our bilateral relations should take an appropriate and big place. Now, would you like me to say something about Lithuania?

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Baker: I have got some things to say, but you are the guest and if you would like to go first, that would be fine.

Shevardnadze: Maybe you should make your remarks first.

Baker: Before I get into the issue of Lithuania, let me make one other comment. When Admiral Crowe was visiting Moscow President Gorbachev said to him that he was unhappy about a tendency he saw on the part of some of the US delegation after the Ottawa meetings to comment in an arrogant way about the decisions that had been taken there. And further, he said he felt that perhaps I was responsible for this attitude. I bring this up because I have written a personal note to President Gorbachev. In the note I said that I do not operate that way; that I would not say anything like that, nor would I authorize members of our delegation to do so. Also, I said in the note that there were two people in this government that were most supportive of perestroika and of Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev and that is President Bush and myself. We are receiving a great deal of criticism for being too much the defenders of the Soviet Union and the current Soviet administration. And everything we have tried to do is to be supportive of what you are trying to do. We certainly haven't tried to make the job that the two of you have any harder. I mention this only because I have written a letter to your President and I just wanted you to know about that.

Shevardnadze: Let me say that when Gorbachev received Admiral Crowe I was not even in Moscow, I was out of the country, as you know. And I must be honest, I really didn't attach too much importance to that meeting so I didn't even ask to get a briefing about it. We respect Admiral Crowe but he is not active, he is no longer a member of the Joint Chiefs. So we don't attach that much significance to it. I will talk to Akhromeyev about it and find out about what was said, and I can tell you tomorrow if you would like. But let me just say that President Gorbachev has a lot of respect for both President Bush and you. He feels that very deeply.

Baker: I only mention this because I wanted to let you know that I had written such a note. There is no need for you to follow up on it. I just wanted you to know I had done this and why I had done it. Can I go to Lithuania now.

Perhaps your Ambassador has given you a bit of the mood in this country about Lithuania. All I have to say, I am going to say because I know we have a very fine personal relationship. Because of that and because of the kinds of discussions that we have had, I can speak very frankly to you. In fact, I am going to speak to you from the heart. I sent you a personal message on the way back from Africa. And President Bush several days after that send a message to President Gorbachev as well.

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I have got to tell you that Lithuania is creating problems that can easily spill over into the relationship between our two countries. In fact, it may already be doing that.

You need to know that this is going to happen because public opinion in this country and in the Congress is hardening all the time. We have just had a vote in the Senate, a 93-0 vote, expressing the Senate's attitude on the issue of Lithuania. Unless we can see some real prospect of progress toward a peaceful solution, I really question how much longer we will be able to maintain our current position with the kinds of nuanced statements that you yourself pointed out in Windhoek we have been making. I am just not sure we can maintain this kind of posture.

I really think it would be untenable unless we begin to see some real movement towards a peaceful solution. You need to know that we are being accused of abandoning our principles, we are being accused of rather naively trusting our personal relationship with you and President Gorbachev.

I said in Africa, right after our meeting there, that you had said that force would not be used and I said that I believed you because I had no reason not to. Now the press is saying that coercion and intimidation are being used. And as you saw downstairs, they are raising this very question with you. What you said at Andrews when you arrived yesterday was perfect, because you said our only weapon is dialogue, honest dialogue. And that's what we are seeking to promote.

That is one of the reasons we were encouraged. We were encouraged by your statement, and I must tell you that we were also encouraged by the meeting that Yakolev had yesterday. But one of the reasons I am not encouraged right now is that your Interior Minister did not have the meeting that was scheduled today take place with the Lithuanian delegation.

We are very conscious of the pressures that you face and we are also very concerned that events not spiral out of control. I mentioned that to you in Africa. I mean it is clear that all that is needed right now is one incident where you feel the need to go in and restore order. And we are going to be put in a position where we are simply not able to defend what is going on and what you are doing.

I really only mention this because of the genuine interest and desire we have to see you succeed. I say this also because I want you to know that the pressures are really building up within the United States. It seems to us, and I didn't want this to sound like we're preaching to you, that you need a process or a mechanism to defuse the situation and to permit a dialogue to begin and to continue. That is really very badly needed. I am very pleased to see that in the debate in the

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Supreme Soviet about the secession law, that some have emphasized the role of referendums. I am pleased, as well, by statements that had been made, including I think by your Interior Minister, that a suspension, not rescission or annulment, of the Lithuanian declarations might be a basis for a dialogue. I am also pleased that the Lithuanians now favor a referendum to be followed by discussions and a dialogue to solve the problem.

A referendum could be the starting point for a credible process. It would permit you to move away from past disputes. Both parties could be looking to the future. It would establish a new basis for talks that isn't tainted by old arguments regarding legal status and sovereignty. The talks that could begin about a referendum would give you time to go forward with your secession law and you could say that law applies in the case of other republics. It permits you to side-step the declaration of independence. Pointing to a referendum would allow you to make the argument, at least to your hardliners, that you are not accepting the issue of independence or that it has already been decided. Why would there be a need to have a referendum if that were the case?

Now what you have said is that the Lithuanians have the right to go, but with due regard to your laws. This idea of referendum would provide a practical mechanism for getting there. And it seems to me it also is consistent with at least some of the elements of the secession law you have been debating. And it would certainly meet the test of self-determination and provide for self-determination.

I have further ideas, but I probably have already worn out my welcome by getting into all of this. Please understand that the reason I raise this issue and go into this kind of detail is because we are genuinely concerned about how long we can hold the position that we currently have. I know we have talked about this generally before, and you have talked about the difficulty of establishing a precedent for other republics. But this approach could be taken without being precedential because you are taking it with regard to a republic prior to the finalization of your secession law. Any referendum would have to be followed by talks that settle all of the issues that are of concern to you -- security, economic relations, borders, minority rights, etc.

I have got to tell you that I am worried. I am deeply and genuinely worried. We don't want to see this thing spin out of control. We do not want to see this deteriorate because it is going to have a direct effect on our relations. We have come so far in the last fourteen months. I do not want to see that undermined. We simply have to find a way to keep moving in a positive direction across the full range of our agenda and our relations. But that isn't going to happen if this thing spins out of control and deteriorates. In any case, to do that, it

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seems to us, that the people in the Baltics have got to believe that they will, in fact, have the right of self-determination. And that right, even if exercised some time in the future, is not going to be subject to onerous technical and legal requirements. I just don't see any other way out of the problem.

One final thing. The Baltics are, of course, different from the standpoint of the United States from other republics. So the American people feel very strongly about the Baltics. And they identify with that much more than they might with republics in, for example, Central Asia. There is a different juridical position in the view of the United States. So finding a solution that deals with the desire for self-determination in the Baltics is, in my view, far more critical to the well-being of US-Soviet relations than it might be in terms of some other republics.

Again, let me come back to the referendum. The referendum and your acceptance of the referendum is a practical way to go. The Lithuanian acceptance of the referendum is an implicit acceptance of their backing away from the declaration of independence. And it certainly can be portrayed as such by you. I am sorry to spend so much time on this but I regard it as a matter of extreme urgency. Today you closed the borders. You have expelled two of our diplomats. The foreign press has been told to leave, APCs move through the streets and are seen on our TV. Now all of these moves normally presage a use of force. And that is disturbing to everybody. And I must tell you that everyone who doesn't like the fact that our relations are moving from confrontation to cooperation are using what you are doing as a vehicle to beat up on both President Bush and myself. [Shevardnadze nodded at this point.] I just don't know how long we are going to be able to hold the line, unless we can point to a process that gives the Lithuanians a chance for self-determination.

Shevardnadze: I will try to answer the points and some of the questions you have raised. I acknowledge that it is not necessarily easy. I agree that we have done a great deal to improve the US-Soviet relationship and we are not just doing this because of the US-Soviet relationship but we are doing it for the general climate in the world. That is the reason we can speak about the end of the Cold War and that is the reason we can talk about ending the military face-off between us.

President Bush has talked about a new closeness. President Gorbachev has said that we don't regard the United States as a military enemy any longer. These really are great accomplishments for our generation. I believe that we have a responsibility to the world community, and it is very important

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for us to act wisely with restraint and with care in order that we don't retreat from what's been achieved. I assure you that we in the Soviet leadership, President Gorbachev and others, value and indeed cherish the US-Soviet relationship. We don't doubt for a minute your sincerity and President Bush's sincerity when you speak of your support for what we are trying to do in the Soviet Union. We know that you and the President have been criticized over Lithuania. But please allow me to be candid.

Gorbachev and I have also come in for a great deal of criticism. We've come in for criticism after Panama. We were criticized for not standing by certain principles and values. What we actively did at that time need not be recounted here, you know it well. Of course, the comparison between Panama and Lithuania is not necessarily appropriate -- Panama was a different country, Lithuania is part of our country. But still we acted and were able to act and speak with some restraint.

It wasn't easy for us, wasn't easy for our President. What do we do now? First, we were faced with an accomplished fact. And I must tell you, we were deceived. When the Communist Party in Lithuania became independent and established itself, we discussed this at our National Party Plenum. The leaders of Lithuania at that time said that in no way were they planning to secede from the Soviet Union. They said that we really didn't have anything to worry about, that they didn't plan to secede. Though they did say that at some future point their objective would be independence, but that was for the future, it wasn't for now. Then when Gorbachev went to Lithuania and he had good, frank and open discussions in Lithuania, secession wasn't even mentioned.

Then there was the election to the Supreme Soviet in Lithuania. And during that election, if you look at the figures, you will see that the numbers of people who actually participated in the election and those who voted for secessionists, was not all that great. So the legality of that decision, at least in our eyes, is somewhat doubtful. Moreover, the decision was taken at night. In fact, we refer to it as a night-time coup. Now, they like to say that the decision of the Supreme Soviet in 1940 to be part of the Soviet Union was illegal because there were Soviet troops in the country. Well there are Soviet troops in the country today. In fact there are three times as many. In any case, perhaps you can say that the decisions that were taken at that time didn't give the Lithuanians any choice; or rather the choice that they had was to go with Russia or share their destiny with the other countries that were being occupied by Hitler.

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If we were to look at this from the standpoint of international law, this dispute could go on indefinitely. No one imposed on Lithuania the constitution that is now in effect, the one that was adopted in 1978. That was adopted in a nationwide referendum. And the Lithuanians supported it unanimously. That constitution is still in effect, and it is a constitution that has elements that deal with the issues of borders, foreign policy, defense, all the components that you would expect to be dealt with in a constitution. It also, of course, had the right of self-determination embodied in it. And they have that right. But along with that right there are also some obligations. You have to take into account the other components that I mentioned.

Let me say to you, this is just for you, it is not for the press. I may understand Lithuania better than others because I am an ethnic, others aren't. And what I'll tell you, from my perspective, is that they have acted in an irresponsible way. We have been together for 50 years, and we have established a common economy. If today we were to stop the supply of oil, gas, grain and cotton, in two days that republic would explode. There are thousands of different factories that are linked to various organizations in other republics and I must tell you that we are under some pressure to take measures to sever these links. And it is not so easy at a point when we have gone to decentralization to guarantee that such links won't be severed. Moreover, Lithuania is a multi-ethnic republic. There are Belorussians, there're Ukrainians, there are Russians, there are Poles; in our estimate there are about 2.5 million Lithuanians and there may be nearly one million others. I might also tell you that the Russian-speaking population is employed in the biggest factories and they are against secession. There was a rally, you may know, that was attended by 200,000 people. There is a real force that is opposed to secession. In addition to this, the Belorussians are saying that five or six of their rural districts were given to Lithuania and they want them back. They have come to us and they have said that if the Center isn't going to help, they'll do it by force. We are trying to calm the situation.

You know what happened in Armenia and Azerbaijan. That's what could happen here as well. In addition to that we have big garrisons that are stationed in Lithuania; the Baltic Sea is there, there are military bases; there are townships where the military and their families live. No one can guarantee that all this will remain calm. So the leaders of the Soviet Union are very concerned; we are alarmed about the situation.

You are right, one incident could cause everything to spiral out of control. In the Caucasus, we face a civil war. In fact, we were accused there of moving too slowly, too late.

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We want a serious dialogue. There was a chance for it when Gorbachev called for a new body of the Council of the Federation to be attended by the top leaders of all the republics, including the Lithuanians. There was a preliminary discussion and we asked the Lithuanians to come to this Council to meet with Soviet leaders and lay out their concerns. We hoped this would be the beginning of the dialogue. We know that the Lithuanians are at an impasse and we know that they do not know how to get out of it. They didn't come when we asked them to come a week ago Friday. Gorbachev had even sent a personal invitation to come and there were also telephone calls from senior Soviet leaders asking them to come and discuss the issue.

One other point. I must tell you that in the Soviet Union the Lithuanian events are playing very badly. They are playing especially badly in the big republics, like Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan. And the President is facing a lot of pressure. We need to find a common language, and we also need to restore and re-establish order. We categorically rule out the use of any force. That's our conviction. We can't do otherwise. But we have a responsibility to maintain order. If there is a clash, who is responsible? Those irresponsible ones who acted over night. We have to ensure order.

Still we think there must be a dialogue. It has to begin. I can't tell you why the Interior Minister's meeting did not take place today. I can tell you there was no political reason for it, and I will look into it for you and I will give you an answer.

As for the law of secession, it has already been adopted. And the institution of a referendum that you mentioned is there. But it is not a panacea because they have already decided in Lithuania without consultations with anyone. So now there is a lot of discussion for how we deal with the referendum, what the basis for it would be, what its date would be and so forth. But I can say it would simply be irresponsible to get up and say: "okay, you are free to go right now."

Baker: I agree with that. That is not what I was suggesting.

Shevardnadze: We can't simply let them go immediately. What are we suppose to do, how are they suppose to live, how are they suppose to operate? We'd have to separate all these links. It wouldn't work.

Baker: What I was suggesting was that you talk to resolve the questions that you were raising about borders, about economic relations, about the relationship with Belorussia.

All these things ought to be resolved through dialogue, and you really need a process to be able to ensure that you can resolve this through dialogue.

Shevardnadze: You are very wise to use the word process. We've talked about getting a process and having a decision that could work out whether we have a confederate relationship or whether they choose to go. But that ought to be the result of the process. We have now declared that we will have a differentiated approach to each republic. That there will be a separate treaty with each republic. And maybe the outcome will be confederation with some republics. Maybe the outcome will be secession with some republics. But there has to be a process. We know we have to begin such a process. What is important now for us in the Soviet Union and our friends abroad is to exercise maximum restraint. People are beginning to understand that this is all a big misunderstanding. Some of the peasants we know are realizing this.

Baker: I agree that there is a big set of problems. And I think that many of them can be resolved after you have had a referendum or plebiscite. But the fact that you and they agree that there ought to be a referendum should be some important common ground. I believe that a referendum would calm the situation. It would lay the groundwork for a dialogue which wouldn't require that you rehash all the legalities or technicalities. And, if you can begin to calm the situation, you will also find that it has an effect on what's going on outside the Soviet Union and the perception of what's happening in the Soviet Union. Why don't you show that there can be a dialogue. Why don't you permit the free expression of people and let them go ahead and exercise their right to self-determination?

Shevardnadze: Well, let me make several points: First, I can't name a single leader in any other country that is more interested in solving this problem and having stability in Lithuanian than we are.

My second point is on the use of force. This again is a deep conviction of ours. My third point is, and I have told US reporters in the past, that there is no alternative to perestroika. Well the truth is that that's a mistake. There is an alternative to perestroika. If perestroika doesn't succeed, then you are going to have the destabilization of the Soviet Union. And if that happens there will be a dictator.

You know I was struck at the time by a speech that one of the members of the Plenum made accusing us -- Gorbachev and me -- of having ruined the country, of having lost Eastern Europe and saying look at what we were doing to the country. He was heavily applauded. And that applause represented a clear

statement against those who support democratization and against those of us who favor new civilized relations between the Center and the individual nations and republics within the Soviet Union. We have to find a way to get to a dialogue. But we must ensure stability in the Soviet Union.

Destabilization in the Soviet Union is going to mean anarchy not just in the Soviet Union, maybe in Europe, maybe not only there.

Baker: I agree that what you have outlined could well be a possible alternative. Nobody wants to see that happen. That's precisely the reason I feel such a sense of urgency about getting a process started that could put the Lithuanian situation into a different category. In effect, put it on hold, create a dialogue in which you could work out what needs to be worked out. I think the way to get that process started is by focusing on the issue of a referendum. It can't be a referendum that is somehow suspect, that doesn't include everybody. It has to include everybody in Lithuania.

Shevardnadze: Well, but the Lithuanians are proposing to hold a referendum about not about whether they will secede from the Soviet Union but rather whether or not they should be entering into the Soviet Union. Since they said they never were legally a part of it.

Baker: But if you offer a true referendum to be followed by talks, I don't see how that could be turned down. No one is going to turn that down because if they turn it down they are not going to be able to keep the support of public opinion. If you just offer it, I think it is going to enhance and achieve stability.

Shevardnadze: Well, now, this mechanism has been established in our mechanism of secession. And we are in fact providing for a procedure for referendum or plebiscite. Now they said that this doesn't apply to them because they are not a part of the Soviet Union. They must overcome this psychology. They have to begin a dialogue. They had a chance to come, they should have come to the Federation Council. Gorbachev was ready and they didn't come.

Baker: But they are saying they want a dialogue and they want to have a dialogue with the leadership of the Soviet Union, not just with the Council. They say, as well, they would like the opportunity for a referendum. It seems like they are looking very hard for a way to take a step back and the dynamics are good for putting in place a mechanism or process that could short-circuit an incident that would result in the loss of everything we have tried to build up.

Shevardnadze: Well, we are looking for ways.

Baker: Was the meeting with Yakolev the beginning of a dialogue?

Shevardnadze: It was a very good meeting, in a normal civilized way. It just wasn't conclusive.

Baker: Let's take a break for a couple of minutes. I don't think we will have time to get to Germany tonight so why don't we do that at our dinner tomorrow night.

Back on Lithuania.

Baker: It is our assessment that the Lithuanians are trying to take a step back. We hope you find a way to step back as well. What gives us trouble is that you close your borders; journalists are forced to leave; we see tanks in the streets; there is no way to explain that. The Lithuanians are now saying that they will accept a referendum and I suppose that the basis of that referendum is something that you should discuss. I don't know why you shouldn't. It also seems to be that a future referendum would, in effect, nullify the declaration of independence. In addition to this, the Lithuanians have also said that independence should only come in stages. Moreover, I have heard that they evidently agreed in the meeting with Yakolev that the acts that had been taken could be suspended or at least that they might suspend future acts. So it seems to me that they are quite anxious to begin a process, and it is a process that meets many of your requirements. I just hope that someone in Moscow, maybe it is you, will focus on getting a process or mechanism going before there is an incident that basically destroys any possibility of resolving the situation peacefully.

Shevardnadze: Well, we have to begin a serious discussion. I don't know, as I said, how conclusive the talk with Yakolev was. One meeting is not enough. Once a dialogue begins, I think it will calm things down. Now we have a decision of the Congress of Peoples Deputies that annuls a declaration of independence. President Gorbachev has to comply with the decision of the Congress. But, I think the process will begin and I think we will work things out. It is very important that we avoid any serious complications or clashes. If we are able to avoid incidents, I think the people will speak out and make their voices heard.

Baker: I think if you can avoid incidents you can start a process.

Ross: Could I ask a question? What, Mr. Minister, in your eyes, would it take right now to begin the process or a dialogue? What prevents it from starting now? Why wasn't the Yakolev meeting the beginning of a dialogue?

Shevardnadze: Well, speaking strictly or legally, they have to return to the status quo ante. Their decision has no legal force. On that basis, we will won't be able to discuss anything. A referendum can take place and afterwards we can talk about afterwards what their place is going to be in a federation. Or whether there will be confederate links or whether they will want to leave the Union altogether. But that takes serious discussion. One meeting with one leader is not enough. Without a serious dialogue, things just cannot work out. I must tell you that the Lithuanians are not simple people. By that I mean they are not angels. They have certain residency tests, they have also adopted discriminating laws. You know they adopted a law that would prosecute people for anti-state activities. It sounds a lot like the kinds of laws we used to have.

Baker: You answered Dennis' question in a legal way; in a kind of formal way. But why don't you approach it politically and not legally? Politically, couldn't you over-look or ignore the illegal act? You say it doesn't have the force of law. Why not simply agree to start a dialogue and announce you will go to a referendum and have talks about future relations? If this very act that you say is illegal and doesn't have the force of law in your eyes, then why do you have to pay any attention to it?

Shevardnadze: Well, first of all they have to come to Moscow. Gorbachev can't go there. You know, they know how to get there. They can buy tickets and come on the train or we will send a plane for them.

Baker: Well, three of them are in Moscow.

Shevardnadze: In any case, they will have to come to Moscow and that's where we can work this out.

Baker: I appreciate the discussion we've had and I appreciate our spending time on this. I just want to reiterate the point that this cannot be allowed to spiral out of control. It really will undermine everything we have accomplished. And as you said we have an obligation to the world to try to keep things moving forward.

Shevardnadze: We don't want to see our relations sour. And you don't want to see our relations spoil. As for Lithuania, we will manage it, we will find a common language, and it will work out.

Baker. I hope so.

Ross took Tarasenko aside at the end of the conversation and said the Minister spoke of the importance of having a dialogue but avoided any mention of how such a dialogue could begin. Did the Soviets have an idea? To be specific, what did it take from the Soviet standpoint to get the dialogue, the process, started?

Tarasenko said the key issue was that Landsbergis had to come to Moscow. That this had become a matter of face for Gorbachev. When Landsbergis hadn't come to Moscow when he'd been invited, this had caused Gorbachev serious problems. This, in Tarasenko's words, was the "codeword" for getting over the hump: Landsbergis to Moscow.

Following the Baker and Shevardnadze comments to the press a little while later, **Tarasenko** said Landsbergis needs to come to Moscow and he implied Landsbergis should attend a Federation Council meeting.

End of conversation.

May 17, 1990

Working Paper

General --

Laurie Firestone called about the guest list for the Gorbachev dinner. One of the people on the list is Archbishop Iakovos. The president told Laurie he wanted your thinking on whether he should be invited.

Okay on Iakovos _____ No on Iakovos _____

She would like to know the names of 4 or 5 Cabinet members that should be included:

Baker, Cheney, _____

She also asked about the following:

Kissinger Okay _____ No _____

Brzezinski Okay _____ No _____

Kampelman Okay _____ No _____

This is a reminder to you: You had several requests from people to be invited to the dinner if at all possible.

Howard Baker Okay _____ No _____

Alan Cranston Okay _____ No _____

James D. Doolittle _____


George Shultz
Dwaine Anderson

Florence

Jim Robinson

Carlson

Ernestine
Hugh



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

REMINDER: Gorbachev Dinner
(want to be invited:)

Secy Cheney

Howard Baker



THE WHITE HOUSE

May 11, 1990

Dear Alan:

I have received your note about the Gorbachev dinner. We will do our best.

Brent

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Alan Cranston
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

STATE DINNER (USSR) THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1990 - 7:30 PM

*V General
Scowcroft*

THE PRESIDENT & MRS. BUSH
(14) OFFICIAL FOREIGN DELEGATION

The Vice President & Mrs. Quayle
(2) Guests of the Vice President

m/a James C Quayle

CABINET

The Secretary of the Treasury & Mrs. Brady
The Secretary of Defense & Mrs. Cheney
The Secretary of Commerce & Mrs. Mosbacher

Attorney General - m/a

SUPREME COURT

The Chief Justice & Mrs. Rehnquist

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Secretary of State & Mrs. Baker
The Chief of Protocol & Mrs. Reed
Ambassador & Mrs. Jack Matlock

Eugene Wigner

*+ m/a Ray Seitz (ast Sec't Europe
affairs)*

*{ m/a Richard Burt ? (arms)
Ron Lyman*

WHITE HOUSE

Governor & Mrs. Sununu
General Scowcroft
Hon. & Mrs. Robert Gates
~~Hon. & Mrs. Andrew Card~~

*m/a Bob Blackwell
Rice*

OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

General & Mrs. Colin Powell
Dr. & Mrs. James Billington
~~Hon. & Mrs. Arthur Fletcher~~

*adm/mrs Truly
m/a John Pickering ?
m/a Howard Baker* *OR*

*Soviet briefers
Giffen (ast Sec'y)*

CONGRESS

SENATE:

Hon. George Mitchell (D/Maine)
Hon. Robert Dole & The Secretary of Labor (R/Kansas)
Hon. & Mrs. Claiborne Pell (D/Rhode Island)
Hon. & Mrs. Jesse Helms (R/North Carolina)

ALTERNATES: Hon. & Mrs. Joseph Biden (D/Delaware)
~~Hon. & Mrs. Larry Pressler (R/South Dakota)~~
Hon. & Mrs. Sam Nunn (D/Georgia)
Hon. John Warner (R/Virginia)

HOUSE:

The Speaker & Mrs. Foley (D/Washington)
Hon. & Mrs. Richard Gephardt (D/Missouri)
Hon. & Mrs. Robert Michel (R/Illinois)
Hon. & Mrs. Dante Fascell (D/Florida)
Hon. & Mrs. William Broomfield (R/Michigan)

ALTERNATES: Hon. & Mrs. Lee Hamilton (D/Indiana)
Hon. & Mrs. Benjamin Gilman (R/New York)
Hon. Les Aspin (D/Wisconsin)
Hon. & Mrs. William Dickinson (R/Alabama)

GOVERNORS

PRESS

1 Mr. & Mrs. Hugh Sidey
2 Mr. & Mrs. Arthur "Punch" Sulzberger, Sr. (Chairman, NY Times)
alt Ms. Wendy Walker (CNN Senior Producer)
3 Mr. & Mrs. Tom Brokaw (NBC)
~~Mr. & Mrs. Terence Hunt (Associated Press)~~

Don Graham

FRIENDS OF VISITING NATION

Maestro & Mrs. Mstislav Rostropovich
Mr. & Mrs. Vladimir Feltsman

Chasler

Greenman

ACADEMICIANS, SCHOLARS & CLERGY

Rev. & Mrs. Billy Graham
 { Dr. & Mrs. Henry Kissinger
 Dr. & Mrs. Zbigniew Brzezinski
 Archbishop Iakovos

BUSINESS LEADERS

Dr. Armand Hammer
 ? ~~Mr. & Mrs. David Rockefeller~~
 Mr. & Mrs. Harold Poling (Ford Motor Co.)
 ? ~~Mr. & Mrs. James Robinson (Chairman, American Express)~~
 Hon. & Mrs. Tom Watson (former Amb. & former IBM)
 Mr. & Mrs. W.C. Butcher (Chase Manhattan Bank)
 Mr. & Mrs. Joe Allbritton (Riggs National Bank)
 ✓ Mr. & Mrs. Donald Kendall (Pepsico)

m/m Henry Kravitz

Brady
Reed
Clawson

COMMUNITY LEADERS/GRASS ROOTS REPRESENTATIVES

m/m John Jacob - Urban League
 alt *Mr. & Mrs. Benjamin Hooks*

Guerrero

POLITICAL & FINANCIAL SUPPORTERSFAMILY

Mr. & Mrs. Neil Bush

EVENING'S ENTERTAINERS

Miss Frederica Von Stade (& guest)

CELEBRITIES/SPORTS FIGURES

Mr. & Mrs. Ivan Lendl

~~Miss Helen Hayes (& guest)~~

Mr. & Mrs. Jack Nicklaus

~~Miss Cynthia Gregory~~

Mr. & Mrs. Michael Jordon (Basketball)

Mr. & Mrs. Hugh Cronyn (Jessica Tandy)

Mr. & Mrs. Morgan Freeman

Miss Michelle Pfeiffer?

64 Mr. Van Cliburn

FRIENDS

Mr. & Mrs. Jerry Weintraub

~~Ms. Susan Eisenhower~~ & Dr. Roald Sagdeev

M/M Max Fisher -



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Guest List for State Dinner for Soviet
President Gorbachev and Mrs. Gorbachev

We have prepared the following list of distinguished Americans who might be invited to the State Dinner in honor of Soviet President and Mrs. Gorbachev, May 31, 1990. In compiling the list we have sought to identify individuals with previous connections to the USSR. The list does not include current U.S. officials in the executive or legislative branches.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

FIN
Government Officials (former) (3)

Arthur Hartman, ex-Ambassador to USSR
 Gen. William Odom, retired, locally based, teaching at Yale
 Henry Kissinger
 Jeanne Kirkpatrick
 William Luers, ex-Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and President
 Metropolitan Museum of Art
 Susan Eisenhower and Roald Sagdeyev (her Soviet husband)
 James Billington, Library of Congress
 Rozanne Ridgeway, President, Atlantic Council
 Robert Bernstein, Chairman, US Helsinki Watch

Finr Chmn Arden Huse Bush

Academicians

Ed Hewitt, economist at Brookings
 S. Fred Starr, President Oberlin College
 George Kennan
 Richard Pipes, Harvard
 Marshall Goldman, Harvard
 George Breslauer, Cal-Berkeley
 Jerry Hough, Duke University
 Gertrude Schroeder-Greenslade, U. Virginia
 Dmitri Simes, Carnegie Endowment for Intl. Peace
 Marshall Shulman, Columbia U.
 Robert Levgold, Columbia U.
 Murray Feshbach, Georgetown U.
~~Suzanne and Robert Massey, Harvard Univ.~~
 Blair Ruble, Kennan Institute
 Seweryn Bialer, Columbia U.
~~Edward Teller, Hoover Institute~~

*ash
Brent*

Scientist

Media (4)

Hedrick Smith, former NYTimes correspondent in Moscow
 Robert Kaiser, Associate Editor, Washington Post, former
 correspondent in Moscow
 Vivian Castleberry, former Women's Editor, Dallas Times-Herald,
 prominent in U.S.-Soviet cultural exchanges
 William F. Buckley Jr., editor, National Review magazine
 ✓ Ted Turner, owner, TBS/CNN broadcasting
 Gary Lee, writes on Soviet Union for Washington Post
 Harrison Salisbury, journalist
 John McLaughlin, The McLaughlin Group
 Abe Rosenthal, NYTimes
 Bill Hyland, Foreign Affairs
 Bruce Van Voorst, Time Magazine

W. Connie Chung

Timothy

R.W. Apple, NYTIMES

① Business

Charles Hugel, Chairman, ABB Inc. (Asea, Brown, Bovari, Inc., formerly Combustion Engineering)
 Armand Hammer, Occidental Petroleum
 John J. Phelan Jr., Chmn and CEO, NY Stock Exchange
 John J. Murphy, Chairman and CEO Dresser Industries, Inc. ✓
 Stephan P. Munn, President and CEO, Carlisle Co. Inc.
 James J. Renier, Chairman and CEO, Honeywell, Inc. - W.C. Butcher
 Robert Mallott, Chairman and CEO, FMC, Inc. ✓ Chase Manhattan
 John Capiolotas, Chairman and CEO Sheraton Corp. Bank
 Thomas Plaskett, Chairman and CEO, PANAM
 Edwin Artzt, Chairman and CEO, Procter and Gamble
 Donald Kendall, Pepsico
 Dwayne Andreas, of ADM (Archer, Daniel, Midlands) ✓ - Joe L. Allbritton
 Robert J. Carbonell, RJR DelMonte, Chairman, American Trade Riggs
 Consortium Nat'l Bank
 George Soros, investor in EE democratic institutions (financing by Soviet Ent)

② Misc. (Arts, Religion, Entertainment)

Rev. Billy Graham
 Mstislav and Galina Rostropovich
 Bob Hope
 Van Cliburn, pianist
 ✓ Mikhail Baryshnikov
~~Charles Colson, former Nixon staffer, planning to start up Prisons Fellowship ministry in USSR~~
 Zelda Fishchandler, Arena Stage (has done Soviet productions)
 Yakov Smirnov, emigre comedian
 Pam Shriver, tennis star
~~Vlade Divac, center, Los Angeles Lakers~~
 Tom Clancy, author, Hunt for Red October
 Sean Connery, star "Hunt for Red October"
 Michele Pfeiffer, star "Hunt for Red October"
 Leon Uris, author of "Exodus"

Amel Suryan

Issac Asimov

Robin Williams

Robert Shuler

Arthur C. Clarke

John F. Kennedy

Barry Goldwater

Bob Allen

John F. Kennedy

Joseph Papp

Joe Papp

~~David Tuckman~~

Bank of Am?
 Brady -
 W.C.

Govt Dinner
State Fair ?

(US) Soviet Academics

Redesign Club - if Advance doesn't
go well.

Greenspace
Faulkner Institute

George Kenna
Steve Meyer

 Don Kendall
Gorb State Dinner

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



 Craustin
Gorb State
Dinner

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jim Thompson
TOB

wants to know
if he can be
added to list
for Gorbby dinner
per ^{Bill} working.

Bill is telling him
he passed along
the request.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Baker

Names - job dinner

Seitz

Zoe Wick

Burt

DRAFT NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICIAL VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

(May 30 to June 4, 1990)

May 30, Wednesday

18.30	Arrival in Washington, D.C. (Andrews AF base)
19.00	Arrival at Embassy. No functions scheduled.

May 31, Thursday

10.00	Official arrival ceremony at the White House.
10.30-12.00	Meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.
13.00-14.30	Luncheon at the Embassy for prominent intellectuals (the list of American participants to be transmitted later).
16.00-17.30	Second meeting with President Bush.
19.00-	Official dinner hosted by President Bush at the White House.

June 1, Friday

9.30- Meeting at the Embassy with Congressional leaders over a cup of coffee (Speaker Foley, House and Senate majority and minority leaders Gephardt, Michel, Mitchell, Dole, Chairmen of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees Fascell, Les Aspin, Pell, Nunn).

11.30-13.00 Third meeting with President Bush.

14.00-15.30 Private lunch.

15.30-16.30 Awards for President Gorbachev to be presented at the Embassy:
FDR Medal of Freedom;
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Sciences of the Brown University;
International Martin Luther King Prize for 1990.

17.00-18.00 Concluding meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.

18.00-18.30 Ceremony of signing Soviet-US documents.

19.30- Official dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Gorbachev at the Embassy.

June 2, Saturday

9.30-10.30	President Gorbachev and President Bush hold joint press conference.
11.00-11.30	Official departure ceremony at the White House.
12.00	Departure to Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Stay in Minneapolis

	- Luncheon hosted by the Governor and local authorities.
17.00	Meeting with Mid-West business leaders (electronics, chemical, food industries) and with US agricultural leaders (Cristal, Block and others).
Evening	No functions scheduled.

June 3, Sunday

10.00	Depart for San Francisco.
13.30	Arrive San Francisco.
16.30	Meeting with former President Reagan.
19.30	Dinner hosted by West Coast political and business leaders.

June 4, Monday

10.30-12.30

Visit to Stanford University

(by invitation from the leadership of the student organization and professors).
There will be an address.

- Depart San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

5/14/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JABIII

Attached is the written text
of the message which Ambassador
Dubinin delivered to me orally
this morning.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Message	Re: In the course... (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

Date Closed:	4/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91127-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

С Х Е М А

ПРОГРАММЫ ОФИЦИАЛЬНОГО ВИЗИТА В США
(30 мая - 4 июня 1990 года)

30 мая (среда)

- | | |
|-------|---|
| 18.30 | - Прибытие в Вашингтон (авиабаза "Эндрюс"). |
| 19.00 | - Размещение в совпосольстве. |
| | - Вечер свободный. |

31 мая (четверг)

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 10.00 | - Официальная церемония встречи в Белом доме. |
| 10.30-12.00 | - Встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома. |
| 13.00-14.30 | - Завтрак в совпосольстве для видных представителей интеллигенции.
(Список американских участников будет передан позднее). |
| 16.00-17.30 | - Вторая встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем. |
| 19.00 | - Официальный обед от имени Дж.Буша в Белом доме. |

1 июня (пятница)

9.30

- Встреча в посольстве за чашкой кофе с лидерами конгресса (спикер палаты представителей Т.Фоли, лидеры демократического большинства и республиканского меньшинства в палате и в сенате Р.Гепхардт, Р.Майкл, Дж.Митчелл, Р.Доул, председатели Комиссий по иностранным делам и вооруженных сил палаты представителей и сената Д.Фассел, Л.Эспин, К.Пэлл, С.Нанн).

11.00-13.00

- Третья встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.

14.00-15.30

- Частный завтрак.

15.30-16.30

- Церемония вручения М.С.Горбачеву (в совпосольстве) Медали Свободы им. Ф.Рузвельта Почетной степени доктора наук Брауновского университета Международной премии им. Мартина Лютера Кинга 1990 года.

17.00-18.00

- Заключительная встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.

18.00-18.30

- Церемония подписания советско-американских документов.

19.30

- Официальный обед от имени М.С.Горбачева с супругой в совпосольстве.

2 июня (суббота)

- 9.30-10.30 - Совместная пресс-конференция
М.С.Горбачева и Дж.Буша.
- 11.00-11.30 - Официальная церемония проводов в
Белом доме.
- 12.00 - Отлет в Миннеаполис (штат Миннесота).

Пребывание в Миннеаполисе

- Завтрак от имени губернатора и местных
властей.
- 17.00 - Встреча с представителями деловых кругов
Среднего Запада (электроника, химия,
пищевая промышленность), а также с
лидерами сельского хозяйства США
(Кристалл, Блок и др.).
- Вечер свободный.

3 июня (воскресенье)

- 10.00 - Отлет в Сан-Франциско.
- 13.30 - Прибытие в Сан-Франциско.
- 16.30 - Беседа с бывшим президентом Р.Рейганом.
- 19.30 - Обед от имени ведущих представителей
политического и делового мира Западного
побережья.

4 июня (понедельник)

10.30-12.30

- Посещение Стэнфордского университета
(есть приглашение руководства
студенческой организации и от профессоров)
Выступление.
- Вылет из Сан-Франциско в Петропавловск-
Камчатский.

May 10, 1990

General --

Secretary Baker called to say he was sending the attached papers he received from the Soviets. He penned in some notes and read them to me so they would be clear. He will touch base with you in the morning.

1. The Soviets want the whole visit to be called a STATE VISIT to the United States from arrival to departure.

2. The Soviets want to know who pays for what. For example, what is our normal practice and how will that be applied in this visit?

3. The Soviets want to know all the details of the trip to Boston with Mrs. Bush.

Florence

- We wish to confirm our acceptance of a visit to Camp David to stay there for the entire day of Saturday, June 2, returning to Washington on the evening of the same day. Minister Shevardnadze asked me to tell you that Mrs. Gorbachev intends to accompany her husband to Camp David. We are convinced that her joint stay there with Mrs. Bush will be mutually useful and agreeable.

- As for the nature of the visit, we assume that for the entire stay of the USSR President in the US this is going to be an official state visit.

- Mrs. Gorbachev accepts Mrs. Bush's invitation that they go together to Boston.

- ① Want whole visit to be called
a STATE VISIT to US from arrival to departure.
- ② Want to know who pays what? IE. What our normal
practice is & how this
" will be applied in this
case?
- ③ ^{also} Want all details
of trip to Boston w/ Mrs. B.

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICIAL VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

(May 30 to June 5, 1990)

May 30, Wednesday

18.30	Arrival in Washington, D.C. (Andrews AF base).
19.00	Arrival at the Embassy. No functions scheduled.

May 31, Thursday

10.00	Official arrival ceremony at the White House.
10.30-12.00	Meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office. Mrs. Bush invites Mrs. Gorbachev for a cup of coffee to the White House Green Room.
13.00-14.30	Luncheon at the Embassy for prominent intellectuals (the list of American participants to be transmitted later).
15.30-17.00	Mrs. Gorbachev opens the exhibition of ancient Russian manuscripts at the Library of Congress. Tour of the Library.

Church

16.00-17.30 Second meeting with President Bush.

19.00- Official dinner hosted by President Bush at the White House.

June 1, Friday

9.30- Meeting at the Embassy with Congressional leaders over a cup of coffee (Speaker Foley, House and Senate majority and minority leaders Gephardt, Michel, Mitchell, Dole, Chairmen of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees Fascell, Les Aspin, Pell, Nunn).

11.00-13.00 Third meeting with President Bush.

10.00-13.30 Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush depart for Boston.
Call on the Wellesly College.
Brief address.

X 14.00-15.30 Private lunch.

15.30-16.30 Presentation of awards to President Gorbachev (at the Embassy):
FDR Medal of Freedom;
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Sciences of the Brown University;
International Martin Luther King Prize for 1990.

X 17.00-18.00 Concluding meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.

18.00-18.30	Ceremony of signing Soviet-US documents.
19.30-	Official dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Gorbachev at the Embassy. Entertainment by Soviet performers.

June 2, Saturday

9.30-	Depart for Camp David (by helicopter).
10.00-	Talks at Camp David.
Evening	Return to Washington, D.C.

June 3, Sunday

10.00-	President Gorbachev and President Bush hold joint press conference.
11.00-11.30	Official departure ceremony at the White House.
12.00-	Depart for Minneapolis, Minnesota. - Luncheon hosted by the Governor and local authorities.
17.00-	Meeting with Mid-West business leaders and with US agricultural leaders (Cristal, Block and others).
19.00-	Depart for San Francisco.
21.30-	Arrive San Francisco.
Evening	Free time.

June 4, Monday

9.30-10.15

Breakfast and conversation with President Reagan (at the Soviet residence).

11.00-13.00

Visit to Stanford University
(by invitation from the leadership of the student organization and faculty).
President Gorbachev will make an address.

13.30-15.00

Luncheon hosted by West Coast political and business leaders.

15.30-

Depart San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

June 5, Tuesday

8.30-

(local time)

Arrive Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

УТОЧНЕННЫЙ ПРОЕКТ СХЕМЫ ПРОГРАММЫ
ОФИЦИАЛЬНОГО ВИЗИТА В США
(30 мая - 4 июня 1990 г.)

30 мая, среда

- 18.30 - Прибытие в Вашингтон (аэропорт "Эндрюс").
- 19.00 - Размещение в совпосольстве.
- Вечер свободный.

31 мая, четверг

- 10.00 - Официальная церемония встречи в Белом доме.
- 10.30-12.00 - Встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.
- Б.Буш приглашает Р.М.Горбачеву на кофе в Зеленую гостиную Белого дома.
- 13.00-14.30 - Завтрак в совпосольстве для видных представителей интеллигенции. (Список американских участников готовится).
- 15.30-17.00 - Р.М.Горбачева открывает выставку древнерусских рукописей в Библиотеке конгресса США. Осмотр Библиотеки конгресса.
- 16.00-17.30 - Вторая встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.
- 19.00 - Официальный обед от имени Дж.Буша в Белом доме.

I июня. Пятница

9.30

- Встреча в посольстве за чашкой кофе с лидерами конгресса (спикер палаты представителей Т.Фоли, лидеры демократического большинства и республиканского меньшинства в палате и в сенате - Р.Гепхардт, Р.Майкл, Дж.Митчелл, Р.Доул, председатели комиссий по иностранным делам и вооруженных сил палаты представителей и сената Д.Фассел, Л.Эспин, К.Пэлл, С.Нанн).

11.00-13.00

- Третья встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.

10.00-13.30

- Поездка Р.М.Горбачевой в сопровождении Б.Буш в Бостон. Посещение женского колледжа Уэлзли.
Краткое выступление.

14.00-15.30

- Частный завтрак.

15.30-16.30

- Церемония вручения М.С.Горбачеву (в совпосольстве) Медали Свободы им.Ф.Рузвельта.
Почетной степени доктора наук Брауновского университета.
Международной премии им.Мартина Лютера Кинга 1990 года.

17.00-18.00

- Заключительная встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома

18.00-18.30

- Церемония подписания советско-американских документов.

19.30

- Официальный обед от имени М.С.Горбачева с супругой в совпосольстве. Концерт советских артистов.

2 июня, суббота

- 9.30 - Отлет вертолетом в Кэмп-Дэвид.
- 10.00 - Переговоры в Кэмп-Дэвиде.
- Вечер - Возвращение в Вашингтон.

3 июня, воскресенье

- 10.00 - Совместная пресс-конференция
М.С.Горбачева и Дж.Буша.
- 11.00-11.30 - Официальная церемония проводов
в Белом доме.
- 12.00 - Отлет в Миннеаполис (шт.Миннесота).
- Завтрак от имени губернатора и
местных властей.
- 17.00 - Встреча с представителями деловых
кругов Среднего Запада, а также с
лидерами сельского хозяйства США
(Блок, Кристалл и др.).
- 19.00 - Отлет в Сан-Франциско.
- 21.30 - Прибытие в Сан-Франциско.
- Вечер - Свободный.

4 июня, понедельник

- 9.30-10.15 - Завтрак и беседа с бывшим президентом
Р.Рейганом (в советской резиденции).

11.00-13.00

- Посещение Стэнфордского университета (есть приглашение руководства студенческой организации и от профессоров).
- Выступление.

13.30-15.00

- Обед от имени ведущих представителей политического и делового мира Западного побережья.

15.30

- Вылет из Сан-Франциско в Петропавловск-Камчатский.

5 июня. вторник

8.30

(время местное)

- Прибытие в Петропавловск-Камчатский.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Translator's notes
one on one
President &
Gorbachev

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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2011-0836-MR
SCS 8/5/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Sergei Akhromeyev, Advisor to President Gorbachev

DATE, TIME June 2, 1990, 11:15 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Gorbachev: In this setting, maybe we can think of some good things to do. But first let me take one step back. Yesterday was an important day. My main thought is that it is good to make good statements and declarations but yesterday, in addition to philosophizing, the right decisions were made. I am pleased with the way we are working on the right actions. Without this, nothing is possible. I promise you my constructive efforts. Naturally, we will not always agree. Optimum solutions are difficult. (S)

I would like Camp David to be a place where we repeat what we said yesterday and reaffirm the kind of relationship we want. We should reaffirm that relationship from Camp David, including regular meetings, and a regular secure phone link so that we can exchange views frequently. (S)

The President: Do you want to say all this at our press conference? (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (S)

The President: I agree. So far, I think our meeting is being portrayed this way. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, even the pictures now are showing the closeness -- ourselves, the Ministers, the two ladies, all

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showing closeness. (S)

The President: We will keep it going. We will take some hits on trade and arms control from the Right, but I think we can manage it. We talked last night about trying for meetings without all the trappings. (S)

President Gorbachev: I have been told the Supreme Soviet has three pages of questions for me. I said I will answer more than that when I get back. I included two Committee Chairmen in my delegation for this reason. One represents our military-industrial complex, and I also brought the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now they are not on the sidelines and it is important that they see how these things work. Soon I will have a Warsaw Pact meeting, and it will be a new Warsaw Pact. Only Shevardnadze and myself and Jaruzelski are old members -- all the others are new. I will report the results to you. (S)

The President: Just a technical point. We will have a secure line in a year and a direct line this fall. (Description of secure line.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Shall we go through our points? (S)

The President: Fine. There are points I must raise: human rights, refuseniks, immigration, and human rights in general. You want us to take more Jews. We are taking more -- about all we can. (S)

There are many vestiges of anti-Semitism. We have skinheads and you have a problem too, and to the degree you could speak out publicly: that would help. It helps me. We would encourage direct flights to Israel. You should know that I am in a big fight with Shamir over settling immigrants in the occupied territories. My administration is seen as anti-Israel. It stems from my saying no settlements in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem. This caused a firestorm here and on the Right in Israel. (Described what Netanyahu had said.) We are a true friend of Israel. In our new relationship I hope that you can take account of anti-Semitism, direct flights to Israel, refuseniks, and keep up human rights progress. It would help me a lot. If we can separate anti-Semitism from policy it would help. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We will seek to cooperate on the full spectrum of human rights. On immigration, here is information on refuseniks. There are twenty on the list. We have given exit visas for five, a temporary departure for one, a temporary visit for one to Great Britain (probably with relatives), one is dead, and there is nothing on the other eleven. We will have more movement but that is my report for now. I agree that we do have to take a stand against anti-Semitism. I have spoken out in general and I will find a way to speak out specifically. (S)

The President: That would help. It is a world-wide problem and if we are seen cooperating on it that would help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We do have a problem between the Russian and Jewish intelligentsia. We will speak out but I don't want to take sides; here we have to find a way. There are many organizations, some even Fascist which say ugly things. Israel, in letting that settlement go on in Jerusalem has caused an outcry in the Arab press. Even Mubarak said he would have to protest in our press that we are settling the West Bank and replenishing the Israeli army. They are trying to put us against each other. Maybe Israel should be told that if they settle in the occupied territories I will have to stop immigration. (S)

The President: It sounds easy, but it is complicated. Individual settlers make it hard to be clear on it. (S)

President Gorbachev: Our Ministers could consult on the language. We must try to figure out a solution. (S)

The President: Saying no more than this to Israel would get world Jewry up in arms. We could not sign up to that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Maybe Bakov and Shevardnadze can work something out. (S)

The President: It is a risky issue for a joint statement. (S)

President Gorbachev: I am not thinking of a joint statement but just getting our policies coordinated. (S)

Secretary Baker: I just wanted to say that in 1988 we started a dialogue that let us talk to both parties and move forward on a peace process. It would be helpful if you could let Arafat know that our dialogue can continue only if he speaks out on Abu Abbas. Otherwise, we cannot continue the dialogue. (S)

President Gorbachev: He has disassociated himself, but not condemned the attack. (S)

Secretary Baker: That is right, but the basis for our dialogue is that there must be no terrorism. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We got a telegram from Arafat which says: "Violence is getting out of control. Close to explosion. Exacerbated by US veto." I don't know why you had to do that -- it (the UN resolution) would have pacified the situation. (S)

Secretary Baker: (Describes U.S. actions.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's think about this. There is a lot of truth to what Arafat says. If there is an explosion, he will be totally isolated. We have worked hard to get Assad and Arafat to work together. Mubarak is easier and so is Benjedid. Qadhafi is a problem. But maybe we can work on sending Goulding. We will work on Arafat to clam things down. (S)

The President: I am having lunch with Perez de Cuellar on Monday. I will tell him this. We will do it even against Israel if necessary. (S)

Secretary Baker: And remember, we cannot continue the dialogue if he is tied to terrorism. (S)

President Gorbachev: But Arafat thinks this is patriotic resistance. It is tough for him to speak out. (S)

Secretary Baker: But he disassociated himself from it. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Shamir is more difficult. (S)

The President: (Describes U.S. problems with Shamir over settlements.) (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Maybe this is a time to mention the idea of an international conference. We support your idea of a dialogue but we should think of a conference also. (S)

President Gorbachev: Everyone but Shamir supports a conference. If we started preparations for a conference we could recognize Israel immediately.

Secretary Baker: As Eduard knows, we don't reject a conference but for now I would not appear at a conference. Under the right circumstances we could go along with one, however. Right now the circumstances are not right. Back to Arafat. The timing of that attack was terrible. We want to keep the pressure on for the dialogue, and this gives Israel a way out. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Israel would go along with a conference? (S)

Secretary Baker: No. (Describes situation). (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's have Eduard and Jim talk about it. Maybe we can get Israel to take the first step towards a conference. We could jointly guarantee Israel's existence as a state. We could establish immediate diplomatic relations; then we could be helpful. The bigger Arab nations could make statements recognizing the realities and the Israeli situation. We have contact with Jewish organizations. Eduard has met Peres and Shamir. We could establish consulates.

The President: You have gained much by your immigration policy. (Talks about Max Fisher comment.) (S)

Secretary Baker: One thing you said is interesting. Israel complains that among the Arabs no one but Egypt recognizes Israeli's right to exist. That could help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We have worked with Arafat to bring him around. (S)

Secretary Baker: We will talk. (S)

President Gorbachev: When Mubarak came to Moscow he spoke of a free zone without nuclear or chemical weapons (jokes, toes curling up). Maybe we could look at it and support Mubarak. There are too many weapons there. They are different from the Europeans; they get all fired up. We really should think about it, because the region is so heavily armed. (S)

The President: Israel would resist that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let Eduard and Jim think about it. (S)

The President: Let's move to other regional issues, starting with India and Pakistan. We are concerned about a war. Bob Gates came back with negative assessment. We should stay in touch. Everyone would be a loser in such a war. In the 1970's we tilted toward Pakistan and you tilted toward India. The situation is different now. We won't try to take advantage of you. We don't have a dog in that fight, even though we like Bhutto. We would encourage an immediate cease fire. We are open to suggestions. If the situation heats up I hope we can work together. Maybe not, but I don't want it to disrupt us. (S)

President Gorbachev: I had a call from Singh -- the morning I was coming here. He wanted me to know that he would do his best to calm things down. I responded that I would welcome a solution to this old problem. I want good relations with both India and Pakistan. We never broke with Pakistan, even in the worst days of Afghanistan. It is therefore in our interest that the situation not become more acute. Let's keep in touch. (S)

The President: I understand that you have a problem with making a joint statement, but maybe we could deal with this at the press conference. (S)

President Gorbachev: It might be sensitive for India and Pakistan if we were concerting on them, but at the press conference would be a good way to do it. (Discussion on what is going on.) Let's stay in close touch, and let's do the press conference thing (i.e., deal with the issue by responding to press questions). (S)

The President: My other regional items include Africa, Ethiopia, etc., but I need to register a point on Cuba. Jim and Eduard have talked about Afghanistan. On Cuba, we think Castro is swimming against the tide; he is unreconstructed. Many think we are picking on him, but he is an outcast. If you changed your economic relationship with Cuba, that would push him. He won't take the Ortega route. (S)

President Gorbachev: Castro supported the Nicaragua solution. (S)

The President: That was because he thought that Ortega would win the election. But maybe we could use that as a model. (S)

Secretary Baker: As in the case of Nicaragua, if Castro were to change we would change our policy. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me say a few words on this. I agree that there can be no peace in Central America if Cuba is isolated. We are not doing that, but we see that you have that syndrome. I spoke about it to the Vice President. He said he had gone to the Caribbean six times, and I said "you did not stop in Cuba." (S)

We should analyze Castro. He is criticizing us more than you. In the Cuban missile crisis, he kept Mikoyan running around the island for a week. Teaching lessons to Castro is useless. When I was there, I could see they were tense. I told him I was not trying to change the way he does things, but let me do things my way as well. Then they relaxed and it went alright. If you got in touch with him I think he would respond, but trying to force him to change would be useless. He has told me, "I will not take U.S. dictation, but if they will sit and talk" Maybe we could set something up that is not bilateral. He is ready to hear you out -- to talk at any level. It is better if he hears from you rather than from us. A change in our economic relations is coming. It will be based on buying the things we need, although I realize it will not be at market prices. It can be sold for dollars on the world market. Also, we buy citrus and nonferrous metals. We are beginning to put our economic relations on a realistic relations. Before, no one even thought about the economic aspects of our relations. The Latin Americans show more understanding of the role of Cuba, so it is not that simple. (S)

There is a remaining problem to discuss: the Contras. (S)

The President: I think that is back on track. (S)

General Akhromeyev: I have a personal relationship with Castro, and he says he is prepared to go very far. He understands the problem. (S)

The President: Let me tell you about the U.S.-Cuban problem. (He describes the Cuban-American patriotic community.) Therefore there is a lot of emotion in this issue for the Americans. (Hands him a Congressional letter on Cuba). I hear what you have said on Castro and I hope you understand our feelings on the issue. Let's keep it on the table. (S)

Secretary Baker: We haven't asked Castro to give us something before we sit down to talk, only that he cease subversion in El Salvador and Latin America -- that is all. (S)

President Gorbachev: Do you want us to convey this to him? (S)

The President: It would be helpful. (S)

President Gorbachev: If El Salvador improved visibly there would

be a change by you? (S)

The President: Yes, but I won't give him a State Dinner! (S)

Secretary Baker: El Salvador has a freely elected government, and he is subverting it. (S)

The President: I don't like seeing Umberto Ortega as head of the army in Nicaragua because the armed forces were a Party. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Just a word on Cuba. We are having some discussions with the US on Cuba in quest of some imaginative solutions. If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal, things might work -- as in the case of Angola, where we made it work after they got treated like equal partners. On El Salvador, I think that Castro may undertake a serious discussion. (S)

President Gorbachev: What do you want us to do? (S)

Secretary Baker: Here is a wild suggestion: that you tell him the President said that there will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency to Central America. (S)

The President: That only deals with a small part of the problem. For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights, like letting people out of jail, etc. For normal relations, Castro cannot be the only one out of step in the hemisphere. (S)

President Gorbachev: For now we will convey to him suggestions that will permit the dialogue to begin. Then it can progress. (S)

The President: I must tell you that the Soviet relationship to Cuba sours the US view of you. (S)

Secretary Baker: The MIG-29 is a big issue for us psychologically. (S)

The President: Why don't we break for lunch then we can rest and get back together at 3 p.m. (U)

(Lunch break)

President Gorbachev: (Begins with a discussion of the differences between the Soviet and US federations, emphasizing the nationalities aspect of the Soviet federation. Describes the fight between Stalin and Lenin on the nature of the federation, saying that after Lenin died Stalin left the law the same but ruthlessly created a military state. Then Stalin said that the nationalities problem no longer existed; there was a "Soviet" nationality. So once the dam burst, the nationalities issues burst out into the open. The Byelorussian language had almost died out.) (S)

The President: Shall we return to our agenda? I dominated the discussion with my subjects this morning, although we didn't raise Afghanistan. (S)

President Gorbachev: I would be happy to discuss Afghanistan. (S)

The President: On Afghanistan, we would really like to be disengaged. We would like to cut loose, and we have no interest in a radical, and Muslim administration. We are also worried about the radicals, and we are not trying to install an anti-Soviet fundamentalist regime. (Described the political arrangements that the U.S. seeks.) If they got underway, we would stop our aid to the Mujahedin. If we could both state that no party would be able to subvert the process and state that a neutral body would arrange the elections, we would have a good outcome. Najibullah could participate but not as head of government. Hebmaytyar is an undesirable conservative. I asked whether you can live with a short supervised period where Najibullah could participate but step aside from government.

President Gorbachev: There is mutual understanding for a neutral period plus a mechanism for conducting an election leading to a broad-based government; also, for a UN role for a transition period and in the conduct of elections. Do we understand that neither the government nor the opposition would transfer the government to a neutral authority. So the only hope is elections on the basis of the status quo. Let them conduct their elections in their own way. We can't remove Najibullah or Hekmaytyar from the scene. Najibullah is beginning to put more strings on us. (S)

The President: He thinks he is getting stronger. (S)

President Gorbachev: He thinks he is getting more support. Some former opposition members are managing local government under the general supervision of government forces. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We need a new approach, because neither side has the leverage to achieve a solution. (S)

The President: How does Najilbah feel about elections? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: I have talked to him. He favors a Nicaragua-type solution, with a group charged with developing elections. (S)

President Gorbachev: Would Najilbah be willing to step aside as part of a normal process, but not be kicked out? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, but not as a withdrawal. Then a conference could set up an election process. Our differences are not great. We can't get Najibullah out. Actually, this process is getting under way. He is inviting Zahir Shah to take the highest position. (S)

President Gorbachev: We would like a neutral regime, not one hostile to the U.S. (S)

The President: We can't argue against Najibullah staying in power, a la Nicaragua, but the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in. (S)

President Gorbachev: Neither the Mujahedin nor Najibullah will conduct the elections. The UN or the OIC will do it. Najibullah does not want to be kicked out. That is his minimum condition. (S)

Secretary Baker: It is difficult for us to argue against the Nicaraguan model. Our problem is with the Resistance. We need something for them to show that elections would be fair, that supervision would be neutral, and that the outcome would be observed. What about Najibullah taking a head of state role during this period to demonstrate that a transition authority would conduct the election and provide security. (S)

President Gorbachev: Najibullah would be a kind of interim acting president during the election? (S)

Secretary Baker: Yes, but with something less than full authority. (S)

President Gorbachev: We must think about it. (S)

The President: Let's have Jim and Eduard talk some more about this. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, let's, because there are lots of areas of agreement. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We could try to formulate three or four points on which the Afghans could agree: on the transition period for elections and the conduct thereof, on the role of the UN, etc. We would agree that Afghanistan would be unified, neutral, and demilitarized. (S)

President Gorbachev: And the only solution to Afghanistan is a political solution. The two sides should recognize each other. There would be four or five principles on which we could agree. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: This would be similar to Nicaragua and to what we are trying to do in Angola, etc. It is a tested process. (S)

The President: How about Ethiopia? (S)

President Gorbachev: We have an appeal from Mengistu. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: The essence of his letter is that he would agree to the UN as observers in his talks with Eritrea.

They were opposed to any outside body until now. One other element: they agree to Massawa for humanitarian relief, subject to the sovereignty of Ethiopia. The Eritreans must agree. The US and the Soviet Union should suggest an international conference for an overall settlement in the horn of Africa. That should come from us, not them. Our two groups have been working on language. Another issue was our cargo planes for relief -- we agree, on condition that the Eritreans don't shoot them down.

(S)

Secretary Baker: How about a joint appeal that the Eritreans should not shoot, on the basis that people will starve if they do. (S)

The President: This is about all we can do today. (S)

President Gorbachev: If we can issue a joint appeal, let's conclude and let our experts work on it. (Dennis brings a paper that is given to Obukov and it is read to Gorbachev.) (S)

Secretary Baker: I think that a joint statement on aid involving Soviet planes and US food would look good. (S)

President Gorbachev: On Southern Africa, we don't have a big disagreement on what is happening in South Africa. In Southern Africa we are already working together. We will be flexible toward changes in South Africa, supporting those people who are working peacefully to abolish apartheid. We would encourage a joint statement here. (S)

The President: Mandela is a hopeful person to conduct a dialogue with de Klerk. Both of them are coming here. The Europeans may ease sanctions, but we will not do that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: A unique situation may be emerging with both sides urging a peaceful solution. We should stimulate this process. (S)

Secretary Baker: On Angola, we would like to pursue the election route. You say that Dos Santos is not quite ready. But we should push in that direction. The two sides are talking and we have offered talks under our joint sponsorship. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: One new element: Savimbi offered to meet with us. Dos Santos does not object and we will do it privately. (S)

The President: What shall we discuss next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Korea -- a lot of things worry us on the peninsula. I think we agree the two sides should engage in dialogue. A small step was taken in the release of U.S. troops. Politically, that is an important gesture. We are worried there is no agreement between North Korea and the IAEA, and they are very touchy about any contacts we have with South Korea. Those contacts are economic, and they are good. South Korea would like Siberian resources, and we are willing. Roh asked for a contract

and we agreed, thinking it would be kept quiet. I am worried about the reaction of the North. We have told Kim there is no change in our policy, no recognition. We have said we were just meeting with the South Koreans to make their acquaintance and to promote Korean dialogue. We don't know what will come of it. Once again, we may be accused of betrayal. (S)

The President: We think it is a good thing you are seeing Roh. Our concern is Kim and his blocking of the IAEA agreement and the lack of moderating behavior. South Korea's reaching out is good. If Kim could accept safeguards, it would help. We are worried about instability on the peninsula. Earlier, we would have been upset about your talking to the South Koreans. This is no longer the case.

President Gorbachev: We will try to explain ourselves. (S)

The President: North Korea made one positive move: their return of the remains of five US soldiers. (S)

President Gorbachev: We did our bit on that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: The Koreans asked if the US would provide them with non nuclear guarantees. Then maybe they will sign on with the IAEA. (S)

The President: Will there be a more moderate government in Korea? We don't know much about it. (S)

President Gorbachev: These Eastern systems are hard to figure out. The way is being paved to transfer power to the son. They have swallowed Hungary's establishment of relations with South Korea, but it will be different when we make contact. Think about nuclear guarantees. (S)

General Scowcroft: If they would guarantee not to attack South Korea. (S)

President Gorbachev: Why not? (S)

General Scowcroft: We have tried formulations before but we can look at it again. (S)

The President: Let's talk about Japan. It can be helpful; they can help with economic assistance, as they have in Eastern Europe. Kaifu is stronger now, and we are working pragmatically on trade. Many feel Japan is buying up the U.S., but I don't worry about that. Japan might be helpful if you could deal with the Territories. It is your business, but I think you would find it beneficial. I commend Kaifu to you -- and hope he is still in power when you go there. (S)

President Gorbachev: We decided it was worthwhile for me to visit next year. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and Yeltsin will visit this fall. The Japanese know in principle that the Territories issue is clear, but their involvement in our Eastern

Territories has been unsatisfactory thus far. For a long time they resisted any economic discussions, and they still think the economic relationship benefits us more than them. Their Foreign Ministry is conservative through and through. There is people contact, but no real business being conducted. When we move to a market system and open up to foreign firms, I think they will change. But 97% of the Soviet people oppose any movement on the Islands. (S)

The President: Let's move on to Cambodia. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think there is some hope there. I am slightly optimistic. Our common task is to solidify the agreements that the four sides made, and to help set up the supervisory organization. I have statements from Sihanouk and from Hun Sen which are very similar. There is some convergence emerging. (S)

The President: We have little influence, but we will urge cooperation. We will talk to the PRC even though we are without much influence with them. We hope that you will also do so. (S)

President Gorbachev: My impression is that the Chinese are acting more positively. Shevardnadze discussed the issue with Li Peng and they are now normalizing relations with Vietnam. The fact that China and Vietnam are talking is sending a signal to Phnom Penh. (There was a humorous discussion of Cuba, sugar and moonshine. The President described the US sugar problem and Central American sales of coffee and sugar to the US.) (S)

Secretary Baker: (Renews our proposal for the Soviet Union to join the G-24 in helping Central America.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Our cooperation with Nicaragua in the past will continue. We are considering it (the proposal regarding the G-24). (S)

The President: What is next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Cyprus. Vassilliou has written to both of us. He wants us to support a UN mission to Cyprus to break the deadlock. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: In order not to antagonize Greece or Turkey, the best way is for each side to support UN efforts. (S)

The President: What is left? (S)

General Scowcroft: We need to discuss coordination for the press conference on Germany and Lithuanian. (S)

President Gorbachev: We could say we had a good exchange, that both sides presented their arguments and made their case, and that it is not just a question between the two of us. As a result we decided that these consultations should continue. That is the shortest formula. (S)

The President: They will press me on trade, that I said Lithuania complicated the situation. I will say that the trade agreement is in the best interest of both sides. The next step is emigration legislation and that is where it stands. They will ask how about Lithuania. I will say I expressed myself fully on Lithuania but the next step is emigration legislation. (S)

Secretary Baker: They will ask whether there is a side deal. When I was asked, I said I could not talk about private conversations. The President said it will be difficult to get trade legislation through Congress and that is true, but that issue does not arise now because the next step is Soviet emigration legislation. (S)

President Gorbachev: The rest of it I will say. We have to bear in mind that rigid linkage should be avoided. We had a direct discussion of Lithuania. I discussed the situation and the prospects. We are looking for, and I expect I will find a solution within the framework of our Federation. Each Republic can withdraw or change the form of its relationship, but this must be in the established framework. (S)

The President: The more you can explain that to the US, the better. I will just stay away from linkage. (S)

President Gorbachev: And we will point out that it is not just one agreement, we have agreements on grain, aviation, etc. I will say that we cannot take away the right of self-determination, but since it is a constitutional right it must be done constitutionally. (S)

The President: The press is now more positive. Time and Newsweek said you were in trouble. That created a tough environment, but you have shown yourself completely in charge. (S)

President Gorbachev: It is a complex period, but we have to accept a pluralism of views. Not every one will agree with us, or we wouldn't have pluralism. (S)

Secretary Baker: (AFL and Donets Conference) (S)

P / Gorbachev 9/27/91

- G Read your letter & very much want to talk to you
- P Let me go thru some T.P. first
- G I have prelim. analysis. I consider this a major initiative of US. My view & that of closest assoc. Just one question. Will you do this immediately, as to follow?
- P Yes (describes).
- G Thank you for clarification. Since you are urging us in early work steps our response will be positively say I
- P Great. I consulted w/ Gorb & while they haven't had time to absorb I feel their resp will be positive
- G That would be fine. George. I suggest that I could give positive reaction on our 9 pm news. I have some points & questions: Hope for more detail.
- P Absolutely.
- G Will you include other newspapers. Open plan to involve others.
- P Told Br & Fr & would plan further consultations, but we feel this is really a superpower relationship
- G OK. Question of new testing.
- P We are silent on it. but will

- Macedonia has accepted integration of prob.
 - If we did not C & S impact, Serbs with cert against Yugoslavia.
 - Please treat as important prob. of Central Eur.
 - If we don't stop Serbs, we could get 1000000 refugees also
 - Anti Croats of Serbia need encouragement
 - Oil pipeline has been shut off by Serbs
 - Our & Czech reserves are dwindling
 - Also possibility Slovakia will declare independence next wk
 - Best solution commonwealth of seven nations but this has become a fiction
 - Czechs won't give up Slovakia, but there would be puts in Slovakia & 50000 Hungarians in E Slovakia.
 - If world can't contain Yugo, it raises problems in many other areas.
- Request: US/UK get UN involved to send stern warning.
- wants inty cost 4 th
- P we agree that really C & S implice could lead to escalation. You wish a statement from US & SC. What do you think such a statement should say.
- A ~~the~~ EC should take explicit position. That hasn't happened. US/UK need perhaps C-7 should make separate statements

consider input on testing & will
have consultations w/ you on this
point.

G

Does this affect carriers & strategic
fleet?

P

Carriers yes, strategic no.

G

What do you think is a right way
to discuss this? Our strategic studies
talks?

P

Initial feeling is positive but we'd
get back to you. Should be
broader than civil-civil.

G

Thank you. I even asked you
on major + this core
initiative.

P

Yeltsin (courtesy notification)

G

OK. Please w/ input w/ Baber
Brady Creenspan.

Send data to Major.

P

~~Let~~ Please w/ your response. We can
do great things together.

P/Yeltsin 9/22/91

Yeltsin - Been here 3 days. Feel better
P Hope he got letter. Hope he can
support. Good words from Corb

Y Read it. I mentioned to you
an initiative like this only
narrower. Won't go into detail
But I appreciate it highly
Corresponds to new level of
confidence that ex. Value
it very highly.

Corresponds to policies personally
Russek. We will do what
we can to push a Union to
implement your initiative
Now we have abolished a rail center
a rail people are more civilized.
New Def Min & Assoc are in
favor of things like this.
Your initiative is a beautiful
concept.

step toward eliminating news entirely
Next step should be CTB.

+ Vanderson knows pretty
well of this.

... That is according to NATO's records.

Sovs should be shown in Moscow
JNA goes still listen to Sovs
Consider it & issue concerning - by
US / SU / + EW Euro

- Bring attention to potential sumbri
against Serbia & world credit
drop w/ country which does serious
things.
- Important to have EC automotive
free come in
- If CGPs threaten to reorg after of CBS, =
Serbs may hold back.
 - Would only work if US / UK / SC were
separations
- Show intention this to K Stb - who agrees
this shouldn't be done by H, Ger, It.

P/Garboche 11/19/90
1001

- P There not easy times. Don't want to mislead myself but want you to know if there is anything I can do . . . I know it isn't easy. But anyone who can drive a wheel prize can do it.
- G Thank you. Yes, these are difficult times. But it can't be determined if we are changing country in a big way. But as all roads I say to all we must look for answers in the future not the past. We must look for a piece of change + priorities. Each republic has its own priorities. But time is limited. Our main societal worry is instability, econ politics + with ethnic. People are speaking out for stability + they want a firm govt to achieve it. That means to achieve peace + order. So in near future we will have to take certain measures - drastic admin measures, like Roosevelt did so that changes don't generate chaos. Until recently, diplomats have gone to: move toward market + stabilize money, + move toward unity. But there was a 2nd vacuum in our world. Reps went home + people gave them a beating. At present with a

they returned they rejected a gesture, asked
for further discussion & asked for a report
by me. I said I would come on 2
days time. Did it & gave certain
suggestions. They agreed w/ my
speech but asked for more specific
measures. I listened for 1 day & felt they
didn't want to wait for a constitution but
to act ~~at~~ now. So I proposed ideas I was
saving for later after all in just week.
150 asked to speak. Tensions were
really high. Never before had SS been
in such a state. I asked for peace &
people sat quietly & listened to my 8 points
at first, silence, then big applause
P Where does it go now?

G It will amount to Presidential rule.
All exec authority subord. to P.
New structure & controls for country.

P Where does Yeltsin fit?

G Wood supports stabilization not
rolling back. They resist & separate.
They ask: what prevents Gorb & Yeltsin
from coop. Answer: nothing. Objective
there is a need for coop. People thinking;
if you can't agree - go. but we make
a purely personal statement. Capability
of Yeltsin is not enough. People have
to find this out for themselves. Letty is

he popular? Because he regrets everything + people say "how brave." He just says everything bad + blames a center. He likes glory. He is vain, a heavy drinker. Cohen brings + doesn't come to office for days. I had known this for long time but ethically I can't make it public. He will be used + then thrown out - unless he can probe + people because of a existing tensions. He may be able to do that. I will include all people regardless of their ideology - even Yeltsin. People must know they can't just talk. w/o help from a center, USSR can't be changed. would starve.

P We have a federal system w/ strong centers, so we don't understand what is going on

C I do not know. I told Yeltsin he had to put forth how he proposes to preserve a SO. But what I have found is that ethically, morally he has double standards. So what I am putting into place with whom will have to involve w/ us or get out.

The day after I spoke of discipline + order, things appeared in stores.

I will publish Union Treaty when I get

have.

P They gave me today notes for my speech. It had reference to Bettie I crossed it out because I didn't want to embarrass you in public. You know we were really their ruler. I don't want to add to your problems but I hope some way they can have their pop letter.

C We have consulted extensively in Union County. We have learned a great deal about Bettie. There is acute tension now in area. The current authorities are threatened - leaders are in trouble. Prison & hands - are not popular now. When we asked back his father's property & servants & workers didn't like that. People saying Castro ruled better than he is - he is seizing everything - clothes, cars, etc. Behind their backs, extremists & former little collaborationists are gaining power. There may be explosion any time.

P Don't they all want ephe?

C None of them want a referendum, so who knows. So we speaking up union process. Those who want to sign, will. Those who don't - let people decide. Then we will move

to discuss proceedings.

Let me get to my important email.
Barack told me of our talks & I understand.
Thank you for concern for patience, etc.
(Coleman barrels & troops

looking like grandchildren)

I need your help. We need to get UK
to authorize force to convince SA to do
what UK demands. I can't think of any
other way to convince him. He is
diff, cruel - he is like Hitler. I am
hell for that w/ Jews at home. Because
of Holocaust. I want you to know how
strongly I feel. Feelings in US are
miserable. When you tell those who
think I going too slowly, get back
when it concerns what I want to
do w/ you, it tends right & equal.
Not persuaded; I'll be out in 2 or 4
yrs, but it is right & right & need
answer. Don't want to put you
on spot w/ your colleagues but
I had to tell you how strongly I felt.

I have given in a lot of that. Your
letter & James' talk. But we very
it not just a 2 of us. This is im-
portant. If these 2 of us must answer the
we are able to work together to solve
- probs facing world. We dealing

if you want to do this
I have (let me)
overhead

right
step

w/ aggression, corruption, violation
of int'l law. 2nd, because of choices
not made each one (I think) on
comp w/ each other, we can't accept that
where US Pres would find himself
one spot. All our ~~eff~~ efforts to change
things if we want our separate
UN. On some things, of course,
we may have differences. But on
this we must go together.

In my heart ^{as every man here} I prefer to solve
w/out blood. I can all turn out
very, very badly, worse than VN.
We must do try to avoid int'l relations
but we must solve this problem.

So we must ratchet up pressure.
I'd like you not to resort to act 51 but
to work w/ UN - that is very important.
Of course, some people might say
forget UNSC when BH getting colder
& colder & US looks weak. After
much thinking I decided we need a
resolution but in which would
combine your & my ideas. 1st part
would contain deadline on act &
2nd part would say all necessary
measures can be used. That
should be adopted while you're
P of UNSC. In ultimate period we

should do certain things to get his compliance, i.e. meet w/ Iraqi leaders at FA level ^{or say enough} will bring ^{you to} your knees - or use UNSC.

P What kind of time frame for a settlement
G Mid Jan. One month, or couple. Then
Then all approp measures. There is
a certain probab / PRL. They have
begun to maneuver

P They won't do it.

G Agree

P They will do what you do. They
don't want to be isolated.

G We should do this. You should let
choose sanctions

P We have legal probs. I have stood
against Cong & prevailed pretty. You
talk about your system. Ours is
crazy

G Ours is 1/2 crazy

P I very pleased to hear this. We will
~~handle~~ directly - handle however
best for you. I don't want to send bills
into battle.

G Agree. This 2 tier approach is to
relieve some pressure to get him
to comply.

P One resolution

G Yes. 2 parts. Ultimatum & then use all

Agreed to take firm stand. Aggression
reversed. Continue to pursue this line.
Use UNSC
approp means. We should instruct
Bochen / Sheward not just to wait
after a resolution but to work to get
compliance

P I not negotiator... appropriate

G let Jim / Edward work it out. We
mean something

P How about press?

G We will say that serious exchange
approach we have taken is right
will continue to stand together w/
other UNSC members. Aggressor
won't be rewarded. Agreed that time
has come to discuss set in UNSC
(End of the news)

(Discussion of def of SS-12)

G ISACEUR came to inset. I said
open everything up. This is new
age

P Now we have CFE, let's get
these 2 minutes to get it
done

G We are working hard. I think
we can sign this within

Y Cheney visited our CAC. He
prob that we were fooling him, but
when we showed him everything
on screen, he believed us.

- Mit / Bush / Gov | Mit and the mad aids
- B Start issues left are so technical.
They found a way around non-circum
PPCM, etc are tough to deal w/
G Experts will of resolve - we will
just OK. But need to be you had
ratification prob. now we have one.
We have our summit - but not
to serious issues.

Mit: 100 meetings / 10/10
Bush: 100 security / 10/10
Gov: 100 Econ / 10/10

Kennedy } on picking ship.
Widom } women & children?
Ford } Soans & women
Do we have time

(WW II stories)

- Continue to emphasize 3 things
- 1) analyzed - it is already too
 - 2) continue to evolve (dangerous)
 - 3) UK Resos to date have been
approp.

Reaffirm support in favor
of armed resolution of this aggression.
Because of it, it necessary to
consider ties again w/ in UNSC
B could public live. Need to contact &
Cover

- G They won't into
- B P PRC will ask for your position
- P Let ~~them~~ them tell PRC
- B We need to agree how to approach PRC
- G You & Edward discuss this. Best would be to let Chinese Secretaries & us have.
- P We can't tie them together.
- G Shouldn't be tied in. Even before resolution, you need to something. Send a mission
- B Maybe Minister could come to coach.
- G You will find a way. We have to find a way to keep up a pressure. He should feel a heat, but we bring it to avoid a fire. If it comes to blow, may be worse than off

next page

2 3 questions

1) How to deal w/ PRC

2) Contact Iraqis before Resolution

6 Maybe after

5 We now have no serious contact regarding Arab-I conflict. We need some common understanding.

B Continuing to coop in UN framework

C Sit is dangerous - requires more SC discussion. Will consult w/ other partners.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (6 pp.)	4/6/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [Copy Set] [1]

Date Closed:	4/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91127-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mrs. President-

While my analysis
of the situation differs in
part from Beró's, I
certainly concur in
his conclusion.

Brent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

13 July 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert M. Gates 8.
SUBJECT: Gorbachev -- Moses, not Joshua

One aspect of our policy toward the Soviet Union that warrants reconsideration is our unreserved support for Gorbachev personally. Until a few months ago, this was justifiable inasmuch as he was seen, in reality and in perceptions at home and abroad, as the engine of change, one who was quite literally indispensable to reform in the Soviet Union.

Now, however, especially at home, Gorbachev is increasingly viewed unfavorably by the public at large -- as indecisive, a "chatterbox," a leader who offers no way out of the present sorry state to which he has brought the USSR. Indeed, popular resentment against the Party itself -- and its system of privileges -- seems to be growing sharply and aimed in no small part at Gorbachev. He is seen as a straddler, unwilling to walk away from an increasingly irrelevant Party or to take bold actions to reverse the decline of the economy and disintegration of social peace.

Among the political elite, Gorbachev's centrist approach until recently was a source of strength. Now, however, he who once drew support from both reform and traditionalist elements, in today's polarized climate seems to be increasingly isolated. The reformers are establishing control of the Supreme Soviet/state structure and the traditionalists have demonstrated at the Party Congress their continued domination of the Party -- however skillfully Gorbachev manipulates its leadership politics. (His new deputy, Ivashko, is unenthusiastic about market reforms and recently called for a purge of those Party members in the Democratic Platform.) Gorbachev does not seem fully "at home" any longer in either camp. While, as shown at the Party Congress, Gorbachev's personal position is strong, his ability to

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guide or influence events, especially with respect to the economy, is very limited. He turns the wheel, but nothing happens.

It is worth recalling that the Party Congress was advanced from 1991 to this month so that Gorbachev could purge the Central Committee and get a Party committed to his reforms. He not only has failed to rout the conservatives, they remain the dominant force in the Party and in control of the only real management apparatus in the country, however weakened. The Party will continue to obstruct reform, but Gorbachev can't let go of it and cast his lot fully with the reformers.

While Gorbachev seeks to eliminate Stalinist political and economic structures, he is not an advocate of market economics nor of democracy as we practice it. He remains, in his heart of hearts, a Communist -- and continues to say so. Unlike Mazowiecki or other East Europeans, Gorbachev is unwilling to put himself or his program before the voters. And, as more reform leaders emerge in the USSR as a result of elections, he is becoming more and more a symbol of the old way of doing business. He increasingly stands alone in lacking electoral legitimacy.

His effort to meld state socialism and "regulated" markets, his refusal to countenance private ownership of large scale enterprises or the "exploitation of labor," his fear of public reaction to critically necessary reforms (partly because the government -- and he personally -- lacks popular legitimacy), and the incoherent mish-mash of reform measures all have produced economic catastrophe. And, there is no indication that, in fact, he has the faintest idea of a way out.

Indeed, as incipient moves toward decentralization likely offer the most promising path toward further strengthening of democracy and market reforms, it is symptomatic that Gorbachev is fighting a rear-guard action to slow, if not thwart, such decentralization.

Gorbachev has successfully carried out a political revolution and, in so doing, has broken the USSR's tie to the past. Thanks to him, the country is able to contemplate a different future economically, politically and structurally. But, like Moses, having brought his people out of bondage, it is increasingly evident that Gorbachev cannot lead them over into the Promised Land. Delivered by Gorbachev from the past, the peoples of the USSR seem destined now to wander in the desert awaiting a Joshua to take them into the future.

Whether you agree with this analysis or not (Larry Eagleburger and Condi Rice do, Brent doesn't), I would argue that

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

there is little to lose by subtly de-personalizing our support for reform in the Soviet Union. We mustn't risk discrediting ourselves with the emerging genuine believers in (and practitioners of) democracy and market economics in the USSR by expressing our support for reform so exclusively in terms of support for Gorbachev. We may make an error of historic consequence in tying the U.S. -- and you -- only to him.

We should not-- must not-- pull the rug out from under Gorbachev, especially while waiting for the pieces to fall into place in Europe. But, while remaining supportive of him, we should also focus more on support for the process of reform and, most importantly, recognize and give visibility to other reform leaders in the USSR, leading advocates of democratic and market reforms, and key economic and political reform measures themselves. We ought not be reluctant to criticize Gorbachev when he takes steps that are contrary to his own reforms, steps that are anti-democratic or economically counter-productive. And, we should stress the importance of institutionalizing healthy changes.

Gorbachev has earned his place in history but history now seems to be moving beyond him. It would be a pity for you, Mr. President, as you boldly and confidently lead the West into the future, to be seen in the Soviet Union as wagering everything on a man whose vision at the end of the day does not reach far enough.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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5:30 p.m.
Tuesday, June 5, 1990

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY JAMES A. BAKER III

Wanted to add one thing: It was the feeling on the part of the person with whom he (JAB) had his meeting that the representatives of the other government from the EAST think that the man that you are going to see on Friday is trying to move things too fast. Therefore, the fellow JAB was talking to thinks that, for that reason, this process will not be concluded until next year.

That was the only bit of information that JAB would characterize as other than very positive that came out of JAB's meeting. If you want to discuss further prior to your Friday meeting, JAB will be available tomorrow and Thursday.

Patty Presock

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By SS NARA, Date 2/26/24

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