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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91126
Folder ID Number: 91126-006

Folder Title:
For the President

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Gorbachev on START (1 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	
02. Cable Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (8 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (8 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce, Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce [211924Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
04c. Cable	From Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [211107Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: For the President

Pinksheet Number: cap1069
OA/ID Number: 91126-006
Date Closed: 4/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04d. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
04f. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable	Re: Former CJCS Crowe's Conversations with Gorbachev and Akhromeyev (5 pp.)	3/24/90	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on START (1 pp.)	3/16/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Honorable Jack Matlock Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush (1 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
06c. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20 March 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on START

Purpose

To propose a deMIRVing initiative to Gorbachev.

Background

The letter proposes that the U.S. and Soviet Union agree to a ban on MIRVed mobiles within the context of the current START negotiations. The two sides would then state their intention to ban all MIRVed ICBMs in follow-on talks to START. The letter makes it clear to Gorbachev that you are committed to prompt conclusion of a START treaty and think that a MIRVed mobile ban can be accomplished without delaying the treaty's completion.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0837-MR
SCS 2/25/13

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TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

Our two countries have made dramatic and historic progress in our efforts to invigorate and accelerate the arms control process. Our own talks at Malta and the recent meetings between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow and Ottawa have imparted significant momentum to the negotiations and have injected important new ideas that can help resolve the major issues quickly.

I believe the time is right to build on this momentum by taking a bold initiative in START.

Our two sides are in agreement that the principal goal of START is to enhance strategic stability. As we have discussed in the past, this means more than reducing numbers of systems -- it also means shaping the forces of each side so that they are inherently more stabilizing. I believe we can do more toward this end in the current START negotiations, without delaying their conclusion, and also set the course for even more stabilizing measures in future negotiations that could begin immediately after START. In particular, I believe we should consider the elimination of mobile MIRVed missiles as part of the current START agreement. Then, in follow-on negotiations, we should eliminate all land-based MIRVs.

Let me emphasize that I put considerable priority on the prompt completion of the current START agreement. In fact, I would suggest that you and I be prepared to initial the draft treaty during the upcoming Washington Summit to signify that we have agreed on all the major substantive issues. However, I believe a ban on

mobile MIRVs could be incorporated into the current START agreement without delaying its completion. To achieve such a ban, I am prepared to cancel our rail-garrison system in exchange for the elimination of Soviet mobile SS-24s. I know you have several trains already deployed. The United States has a system that I am ready to deploy rapidly, but I would prefer another course, to ban these mobile-MIRV systems now before our two sides have even more invested in them and their elimination becomes that much more difficult.


I also am prepared to agree to the mutual elimination of silo-based MIRVed missiles. Certainly this bold step would take more extensive negotiations, but our agreement on this goal could be the foundation of follow-on talks that could begin as soon as substantive agreement is reached on the current START Treaty. I also would note that if our two countries are able to agree to the eventual elimination of all MIRVed ICBMS, the US will be willing to defer our remaining concerns about heavy ICBMS to the follow-on negotiations.

I hope we will be able to announce agreement on all three goals -- banning mobile MIRVs in START, initialing the START Treaty at the June Summit, and beginning follow-on talks immediately to eliminate all land-based MIRVs -- at the meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next month. If, however, you are unable to agree to consider a ban on mobile MIRVs in the current negotiations, an alternative would be for the two sides to announce, following the April Ministerial, an agreement to begin follow-on talks once the current START agreement is initialed that would have as central objectives the near-term elimination of mobile MIRVs, followed by all land-based MIRVs.

I have asked Secretary Baker to outline these ideas to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when they meet in Namibia in order to be in a better position to have substantive discussions about this proposal when they meet in Washington in April.

I know that we already have a great deal of work before us but I am convinced that conditions may never be better to begin to improve stability and eliminate these most threatening systems.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Moscow


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
March 26, 1990

Dick:

Here is Baker's cable
reporting on his meeting
with Shevardnadze. After
reading, please return it
to me.

Brent

K
return to Scowcroft -
very close hold -


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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 08

PRT: GATES KANTER SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: FILE SIT SUM

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<DTG> 200905Z MAR 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NAMIBIA

TO RUEHC/SECTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4858
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

FOR BOB ZOELICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

NAMIBIA, MARCH 20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE

I MET WITH EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE FOR THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS
TONIGHT. ONCE AGAIN, WE HAD A WIDE-RANGING AND RATHER
EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSION. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING THE SUMMIT
DATES AND THE DATES FOR OUR MAY MINISTERIAL, WE COVERED START,
GERMANY, LITHUANIA AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
UNION, AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN.

I CAN'T SAY THAT WE RESOLVED ANYTHING, BUT THE CHARACTER OF OUR
DISCUSSION IS ANOTHER REMINDER OF THE CHANGED NATURE OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP. LET ME BRIEFLY RUN THROUGH EACH TOPIC.

SUMMIT-DATES

I GAVE HIM OUR PROPOSED DATES -- EITHER JUNE 18-22 OR THE
EARLIER TIME OF JUNE 11-15. I ALSO OUTLINED YOUR PREFERRED
SCENARIOS FOR TIME IN WASHINGTON AND AT KENNEBUNKPORT. HE
RESPONDED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE SCENARIOS,
BUT THEY NEEDED TO COME EARLIER IN THE MONTH. THE JUNE 11-15

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-07-08 MJB
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on page 7

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08

DATES CONFLICTED WITH THE FIRST EVER CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIA
FEDERATED REPUBLIC'S COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS WAS A VERY
IMPORTANT POLITICAL
EVENT FOR GORBACHEV AND HE COULDN'T MISS IT OR ALTER THE DATE.
PUSHING THE SUMMIT DATE LATER WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE BIG
PARTY CONGRESS THAT WAS SO CRITICAL TO GORBACHEV'S SUCCESS. HE
SAID AGAIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SUMMIT COME BEFORE
THE PARTY CONGRESS -- IMPLYING THAT A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WOULD
BOOST GORBACHEV GOING INTO THE RUSSIAN AND THE UNION-WIDE PARTY
CONGRESS.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE AND GORBACHEV HAD GONE OVER DATES
CAREFULLY, AND THE ONLY TIMES THAT WORKED WERE IN THE FIRST
WEEK IN JUNE, SPECIFICALLY THE JUNE 4-8 TIMEFRAME. HE WAS
AFRAID NO OTHER TIME WOULD WORK, AND HOPED WE WOULD BE
UNDERSTANDING GIVEN THEIR "COMPLEX" INTERNAL SITUATION AND
THEIR "UPCOMING BIG EVENTS."

I TOLD HIM THOSE DATES COINCIDED WITH A STATE VISIT TO
WASHINGTON OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN AND THE SPRING NAC
MINISTERIAL. I SAID I WOULD TALK IT OVER WITH YOU AND SEE WHAT
WE COULD ARRANGE TO MEET THEIR NEEDS.
START

ON START, SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO
RESOLVE ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES BY THE JUNE SUMMIT. HE THEN RAN
THROUGH SEVERAL ISSUES, HE WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE QUICKLY:
ALCMS, SLCMS, THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE, AND DURATION OF THE
TREATY. OF THESE, THE ONLY ONE WHERE HE FELT THERE WAS A
PROBLEM WAS ALCMS, WHERE HE SAID THEY HAVE NO FALL-BACK ON THE
600KM RANGE.

I TOLD HIM IF THAT WAS THE CASE, THEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS WOULD
HAVE TO RESOLVE THIS ONE BECAUSE I HAD NO FURTHER ROOM TO MOVE
ON RANGE. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING OUR PRESIDENTS' TIME WAS TOO
VALUABLE TO SPEND ON A TECHNICAL ISSUE LIKE THIS AND WE WOULD
HAVE TO RESOLVE IT. WE WILL SEE IF OR WHEN THEY MOVE ON THIS;
I SUSPECT IT MAY BE THE LAST THING AGREED TO BECAUSE GORBACHEV
CLEARLY HAS TO OVERRULE AKHROMEYEV.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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I THEN RAISED OUR START PROPOSAL, MAKING CLEAR THAT I WAS NOT SEEKING AN ANSWER NOW, WHY I THOUGHT IT HAD MERIT, AND, ABOVE ALL ELSE, HOW NO IDEA SHOULD IN ANY WAY IMPEDE OUR COMPLETION OF THE START TREATY. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD GIVE US A RESPONSE WHEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON IN TWO WEEKS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD TRY TO HAVE AN ANSWER BY THAT TIME, AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE VERY MUCH "VALUED" OUR PRESENTING NEW IDEAS, AND ESPECIALLY IN THIS FASHION. HE ADDED THEY WERE WORKING ON NEW IDEAS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, THAT NONE HAD CRYSTALIZED YET, THAT THEIR MILITARY AND MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET WERE OFTEN TIMES "EMOTIONAL" ON ALL SUCH IDEAS, AND THAT THEY TOO WOULD DO NOTHING TO IMPEDE AN AGREEMENT. AS HE PUT IT, "OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE IS TO COMPLETE THE START AGREEMENT."

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FOR BOB ZOELICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY
GERMANY

ON GERMANY. SHEVARDNADZE CHOSE NOT TO GET INTO SPECIFICS, BUT INSTEAD FOCUSED ON SOME GENERAL CONCERNS. PUT SIMPLY, HE SAID THE PACE OF UNIFICATION WAS TOO FAST, OUTSTRIPPING THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURE OF SECURITY.

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WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS HELPED MEET SOME OF THE SOVIET NEEDS, HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD A BASIC PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM WASN'T WHO RAN GERMANY; AFTER ALL, "WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TODAY." THE PROBLEM IS THE GERMANY OF THE FUTURE.

IN SAYING THIS, HE SEEMED TO HAVE CONCERNS AT TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS. ONE WAS AN IMAGERY CONCERN -- I.E., "WE CAN'T ACCEPT A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO." I SAY AN IMAGERY CONCERN BECAUSE AT THE SAME TIME THAT HE SAID GERMANY CAN'T BE IN NATO, HE ALSO SAID WE RECOGNIZE THAT GERMANY CAN'T BE NEUTRAL, "THAT WOULD BE A BIG PROBLEM." FRANKLY, HE SAID, "WE DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO

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WHEN I WENT THROUGH THE LOGIC OF ANCHORING GERMANY IN NATO, ENSURING GERMANY WOULDN'T HAVE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OW SECURITY AND GUARANTEEING THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY, HE HAD AN INTERESTING AND REVEALING RESPONSE. HE SAID WE DON'T QUESTION THE VALUE OF YOUR MILITARY PRESENCE. IN FACT, HE SAID ANY SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE EASTERN PART OF GERMANY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TEMPORARY, AND WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO AN ONGOING U.S. PRESENCE IN GERMANY. THE PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS

THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO GUARANTEE A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE. GERMANY'S CURRENT LEADERS WOULD NOT BE THE PROBLEM, BUT THE NEXT GENERATION MIGHT BE. WHATEVER MIGHT BE AGREED TO NOW, WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN OVER TIME. HE SAID HE MIGHT BE WRONG. BUT HE DOUBTED FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW THE NEXT GENERATION OF GERMAN LEADERS WILL WANT US TROOPS. IF [REDACTED] THAT GENERATION IS LED BY THE GERMAN RIGHT, HE ASKED, WHERE WOULD WE BE THEN? HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS A WORST CASE SCENARIO, BUT IT COULD NOT

BE RULED OUT. AGAIN, HE SAID, WE DO NOT HAVE THE ANSWER, BUT WE NEED TO THINK ALL THIS THROUGH WITH YOU.

I SAID WE DID NEED TO THINK THESE ISSUES THROUGH, BUT IF THEIR STARTING POINT WAS THAT THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE WAS A GOOD THING, NATO WAS THE VEHICLE FOR MAINTAINING THAT PRESENCE. TAKE IT AWAY, AND YOU TAKE AWAY OUR PRESENCE.

I SHOULD ADD THAT HE INDIRECTLY TOUCHED ON THE SOVIET DESIRE TO LIMIT THE BUNDESWEHR IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION WE HAD ON CFE. I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE U. S. - SOVIET STATIONED FORCES LIMITS WE HAD AGREED TO AND WHY THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR IN VIENNA HAD SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF OVERALL MANPOWER. HE SAID THE 750,000 PROPOSAL FOR PACT-TO-PACT STATIONED FORCES REFERRED ONLY TO THE CENTRAL ZONE NOT THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS ZONE. THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO GET AT GERMAN FORCES IN CFE I.

LITHUANIA

ON LITHUANIA, HE SAID FLATLY, THE SOVIETS WON'T USE FORCE. HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 08

SAID THE ONLY ANSWER IS A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE. HE FELT THAT LITHUANIA HAD GOTTEN CAUGHT UP IN THE EUPHORIA OF INDEPENDENCE AND HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE CONSEQUENCES. GETTING EMOTIONAL, HE ASKED "WHO IS GOING TO PROVIDE THEM HIGHLY SUBSIDIZED OIL AND GAS; WHO IS GOING TO PROVIDE THEM RAW MATERIALS FOR THEIR FACTORIES... THEY GET A LOT FROM US, AND THEY CAN'T SIMPLY AND SUDDENLY GO IT ALONE."

HE SAID THE LITHUANIAN DECISION ON INDEPENDENCE WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, BUT NOW MANY LITHUANIANS WERE REALIZING THERE WERE CONSEQUENCES AND, AS A RESULT, HE FELT THEY WOULD NOW BE ABLE TO HAVE THE KIND OF QUIET, CIVILIZED DIALOGUE NEEDED TO DECIDE THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

HE REFERRED INDIRECTLY TO THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT THE NUCLEAR POWER AND DEFENSE PLANTS IN LITHUANIA. LASTLY, HE SAID THEY HAD NOTED THE NUANCES OF OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THEY HAD BEEN APPRECIATED.

I TOLD HIM WE HAD NOT TRIED TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION, BUT WE FELT STRONGLY ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF ITS USE. I WAS GLAD TO HAVE HIM REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO USE FORCE, BUT I SAID WE WOULD BE WATCHING THINGS CLOSELY.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 02017

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FOR BOB ZOELLICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY

MORE GENERALLY, I SUGGESTED THAT THE DRAFT SECESSION LAW HE HAS TOLD ME ABOUT SHOULD BE PASSED QUICKLY AND A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION (E.G., REFERENDUMS IN EACH REPUBLIC) SHOULD BE ADOPTED. WHILE APOLOGIZING FOR GIVING UNSOLICITED ADVICE, I SAID IT LOOKED TO AN OUTSIDER LIKE THE NATIONALITIES, PROBLEMS WOULD SIMPLY SPIN OUT OF CONTROL IF THE SOVIETS DIDN'T ACT SOON.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE AGREED WITH ME. HE SAID THEY WERE TRYING TO FINALIZE THE SECESSION LAW; AS PAINFUL AS THIS IS FOR US, HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 08

SAID THEY HAVE TO DO IT. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD COME TO ACCEPT THE REFERENDUM IDEA AS WELL, BUT THAT IT JUST WASN'T POSSIBLE TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS I WAS SUGGESTING.

ONCE AGAIN, HE SAID THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM WAS THE MOST SERIOUS ONE THEY FACED AND THE ONE THEY WERE LEAST ABLE TO MANAGE. (INDEED, WHEN I APPLAUDED THE ADOPTION OF THE ABALKIN ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN, HE SAID "YES, WE WILL MANAGE THE ECONOMY -- AS DIFFICULT AS IT IS -- BUT THE NATIONALITIES ARE ANOTHER MATTER.")

AFRICA

SHEVARDNADZE IS ON A NINE-DAY TOUR OF AFRICA AND SEEMED GENUINELY IMPRESSED WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND POSSIBILITIES. HE TALKED ABOUT THE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, NOTING THAT HE HAS KNOWN ANC LEADERS FOR A LONG TIME AND HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE CHANGES HE IS SEEING. HE SAID BEING IN NAMIBIA FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION WAS A REMINDER OF WHAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION CAN DO WHEN THEY COOPERATE. HE SUGGESTED THE TIME WAS RIFE FOR A SIMILAR EFFORT ON ANGOLA. HE SAID DOS SANTOS WAS READY FOR IT: "HE HAS GROWN TIRED OF WAR JUST THE WAY THEY DID IN NICARAGUA AND IN ETHIOPIA."

HE SAID THAT HE FAVORED OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE A SECRET FOUR-WAY MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S. - SOVIETS - MPLA - UNITA, AND ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT DOS SANTOS WOULD GO ALONG WITH IT. "HE NEEDS A LITTLE MORE TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT."

I TOLD HIM I HAD SEEN DOS SANTOS AND MADE CLEAR THAT WE COULD ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND DOS SANTOS COULD COME TO THE U.S. IF THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE AND A GOOD-FAITH NEGOTIATIONS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. I MADE CLEAR WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SAVIMBI AND I PRESENTED A PROPOSAL WE GAVE TO DOS SANTOS, ONE WHICH CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, MUTUAL UNITA AND GOVERNMENT FORCE WITHDRAWALS, A SET OF AGREED PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TALKS, AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND UNITA BY EACH OTHER.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE PROPOSAL WAS INTERESTING AND WE SHOULD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WORK TOGETHER TO FOLLOW UP ON IT. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WAS OPTIMISTIC WE COULD MAKE REAL PROGRESS SOON.

AFGHANISTAN

I RAISED A VARIANT OF THE THREE-PHASE PROPOSAL I MADE IN MOSCOW. I SUGGESTED THAT IF NAJIBULLAH WERE TO GO, WE COULD IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGATIVE SYMMETRY, A CEASEFIRE, AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT NO ONE COULD FORCE NAJIBULLAH OUT, AND OUR STARTING POINT WOULD LEAD TO A DEAD END. LET US FOCUS, HE SAID, ON A PROCESS. NAJIB SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT ELECTIONS AND THAT THE ELECTIONS COULD BE RUN BY THE UN WITH ALL SORTS OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO GUARANTEE ITS FAIRNESS. HE SAID THIS APPROACH HAD WORKED IN NAMIBIA, IN NICARAGUA, AND WE WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT IT FOR CAMBODIA. WHY NOT TRY IT IN AFGHANISTAN?

I SAID THE MUJIHADDIN WOULD NEVER ACCEPT IT IF NAJIB COULD RUN IN THE ELECTIONS. IT WAS NOT A CASE OF BEING RIGHT OR WRONG, THIS WAS SIMPLY THE REALITY. HE ASKED IF WE WOULD THINK MORE ABOUT THE ELECTIONS APPROACH. FRANKLY, I HAVE GOT TO SAY, THERE IS SOMETHING PARADOXICAL AND INDEFENSIBLE ABOUT US OPPOSING ELECTIONS, THAT ARE FREE AND FAIR. IF THE MUJIHADDIN WON'T PARTICIPATE IN SUCH ELECTIONS, HOW CAN WE JUSTIFY CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THEM?

CONCLUDING-IMPRESSIONS

AS ALWAYS, SHEVARDNADZE WAS CALM, RELAXED, AND IN GOOD HUMOR.

I SENSED HE ENJOYED BEING IN AFRICA, AND FOR THE MOMENT OUT OF THE FRAY IN MOSCOW. HIS MOOD ON GERMANY AND ON THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION WAS MORE PENSIVE THAN I HAVE SEEN BEFORE. HE AND GORBACHEV SEEM TO BE GENUINELY WRESTLING WITH THESE PROBLEMS, BUT HAVE YET TO FASHION A COHERENT OR CONFIDENT RESPONSE. THEY ALSO HAVE YET TO SHAPE THEIR BOTTOM LINES. MAYBE THAT WILL COME IN TIME, POSSIBLY EVEN BY THE SUMMIT. BUT, WE ARE NOT THERE YET AND WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT THEIR CHOICES AND PERHAPS EVEN THE FORMULATION OF SOME OF THEIR OPTIONS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



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PRT: GATES KANTER SCOWCROFT SIT

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<DTG> 200905Z MAR 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NAMIBIA

TO RUEHC/SECTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4858

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 02017

NODIS

FOR BOB ZOELICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

NAMIBIA, MARCH 20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE

I MET WITH EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE FOR THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS TONIGHT. ONCE AGAIN, WE HAD A WIDE-RANGING AND RATHER EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSION. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING THE SUMMIT DATES AND THE DATES FOR OUR MAY MINISTERIAL, WE COVERED START, GERMANY, LITHUANIA AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN.

I CAN'T SAY THAT WE RESOLVED ANYTHING, BUT THE CHARACTER OF OUR DISCUSSION IS ANOTHER REMINDER OF THE CHANGED NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. LET ME BRIEFLY RUN THROUGH EACH TOPIC.

SUMMIT-DATES

I GAVE HIM OUR PROPOSED DATES -- EITHER JUNE 18-22 OR THE EARLIER TIME OF JUNE 11-15. I ALSO OUTLINED YOUR PREFERRED SCENARIOS FOR TIME IN WASHINGTON AND AT KENNEBUNKPORT. HE RESPONDED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE SCENARIOS, BUT THEY NEEDED TO COME EARLIER IN THE MONTH. THE JUNE 11-15

*Brent
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08

DATES CONFLICTED WITH THE FIRST EVER CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIA
FEDERATED REPUBLIC'S COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS WAS A VERY
IMPORTANT POLITICAL
EVENT FOR GORBACHEV AND HE COULDN'T MISS IT OR ALTER THE DATE.
PUSHING THE SUMMIT DATE LATER WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE BIG
PARTY CONGRESS THAT WAS SO CRITICAL TO GORBACHEV'S SUCCESS. HE
SAID AGAIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SUMMIT COME BEFORE
THE PARTY CONGRESS -- IMPLYING THAT A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WOULD
BOOST GORBACHEV GOING INTO THE RUSSIAN AND THE UNION-WIDE PARTY
CONGRESS.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE AND GORBACHEV HAD GONE OVER DATES
CAREFULLY, AND THE ONLY TIMES THAT WORKED WERE IN THE FIRST
WEEK IN JUNE, SPECIFICALLY THE JUNE 4-8 TIMEFRAME. HE WAS
AFRAID NO OTHER TIME WOULD WORK, AND HOPED WE WOULD BE
UNDERSTANDING GIVEN THEIR "COMPLEX" INTERNAL SITUATION AND
THEIR "UPCOMING BIG EVENTS."

I TOLD HIM THOSE DATES COINCIDED WITH A STATE VISIT TO
WASHINGTON OF THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN AND THE SPRING NAC
MINISTERIAL. I SAID I WOULD TALK IT OVER WITH YOU AND SEE WHAT
WE COULD ARRANGE TO MEET THEIR NEEDS.
START

ON START, SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO
RESOLVE ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES BY THE JUNE SUMMIT. HE THEN RAN
THROUGH SEVERAL ISSUES, HE WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE QUICKLY:
ALCMS, SLCMS, THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE, AND DURATION OF THE
TREATY. OF THESE, THE ONLY ONE WHERE HE FELT THERE WAS A
PROBLEM WAS ALCMS, WHERE HE SAID THEY HAVE NO FALL-BACK ON THE
600KM RANGE.

I TOLD HIM IF THAT WAS THE CASE, THEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS WOULD
HAVE TO RESOLVE THIS ONE BECAUSE I HAD NO FURTHER ROOM TO MOVE
ON RANGE. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING OUR PRESIDENTS' TIME WAS TOO
VALUABLE TO SPEND ON A TECHNICAL ISSUE LIKE THIS AND WE WOULD
HAVE TO RESOLVE IT. WE WILL SEE IF OR WHEN THEY MOVE ON THIS;
I SUSPECT IT MAY BE THE LAST THING AGREED TO BECAUSE GORBACHEV
CLEARLY HAS TO OVERRULE AKHROMEYEV.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 08

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I THEN RAISED OUR START PROPOSAL, MAKING CLEAR THAT I WAS NOT SEEKING AN ANSWER NOW, WHY I THOUGHT IT HAD MERIT, AND, ABOVE ALL ELSE, HOW NO IDEA SHOULD IN ANY WAY IMPEDE OUR COMPLETION OF THE START TREATY. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD GIVE US A RESPONSE WHEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON IN TWO WEEKS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD TRY TO HAVE AN ANSWER BY THAT TIME, AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE VERY MUCH "VALUED" OUR PRESENTING NEW IDEAS, AND ESPECIALLY IN THIS FASHION. HE ADDED THEY WERE WORKING ON NEW IDEAS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, THAT NONE HAD CRYSTALIZED YET, THAT THEIR MILITARY AND MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET WERE OFTEN TIMES "EMOTIONAL" ON ALL SUCH IDEAS, AND THAT THEY TOO WOULD DO NOTHING TO IMPEDE AN AGREEMENT. AS HE PUT IT, "OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE IS TO COMPLETE THE START AGREEMENT."

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FOR BOB ZOELLICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY
GERMANY

ON GERMANY, SHEVARDNADZE CHOSE NOT TO GET INTO SPECIFICS, BUT INSTEAD FOCUSED ON SOME GENERAL CONCERNS. PUT SIMPLY, HE SAID THE PACE OF UNIFICATION WAS TOO FAST, OUTSTRIPPING THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURE OF SECURITY.

WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS HELPED MEET SOME OF THE SOVIET NEEDS, HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD A BASIC PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM WASN'T WHO RAN GERMANY; AFTER ALL, "WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TODAY." THE PROBLEM IS THE GERMANY OF THE FUTURE.

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IN SAYING THIS, HE SEEMED TO HAVE CONCERNS AT TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS. ONE WAS AN IMAGERY CONCERN -- I.E., "WE CAN'T ACCEPT A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO." I SAY AN IMAGERY CONCERN BECAUSE AT THE SAME TIME THAT HE SAID GERMANY CAN'T BE IN NATO, HE ALSO SAID WE RECOGNIZE THAT GERMANY CAN'T BE NEUTRAL, "THAT WOULD BE A BIG PROBLEM." FRANKLY, HE SAID, "WE DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO

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LITHUANIA

ON LITHUANIA, HE SAID FLATLY, THE SOVIETS WON'T USE FORCE. HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 08

SAID THE ONLY ANSWER IS A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE. HE FELT THAT LITHUANIA HAD GOTTEN CAUGHT UP IN THE EUPHORIA OF INDEPENDENCE AND HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE CONSEQUENCES. GETTING EMOTIONAL, HE ASKED "WHO IS GOING TO PROVIDE THEM HIGHLY SUBSIDIZED OIL AND GAS; WHO IS GOING TO PROVIDE THEM RAW MATERIALS FOR THEIR FACTORIES... THEY GET A LOT FROM US. AND THEY CAN'T SIMPLY AND SUDDENLY GO IT ALONE."

HE SAID THE LITHUANIAN DECISION ON INDEPENDENCE WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, BUT NOW MANY LITHUANIANS WERE REALIZING THERE WERE CONSEQUENCES AND, AS A RESULT, HE FELT THEY WOULD NOW BE ABLE TO HAVE THE KIND OF QUIET, CIVILIZED DIALOGUE NEEDED TO DECIDE THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP. HE REFERRED INDIRECTLY TO THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT THE NUCLEAR POWER AND DEFENSE PLANTS IN LITHUANIA. LASTLY, HE SAID THEY HAD NOTED THE NUANCES OF OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THEY HAD BEEN APPRECIATED.

I TOLD HIM WE HAD NOT TRIED TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION, BUT WE FELT STRONGLY ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF ITS USE. I WAS GLAD TO HAVE HIM REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO USE FORCE, BUT I SAID WE WOULD BE WATCHING THINGS CLOSELY.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 02017

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FOR BOB ZOELLICK AND STAPE ROY ONLY

MORE GENERALLY, I SUGGESTED THAT THE DRAFT SECESSION LAW HE HAS TOLD ME ABOUT SHOULD BE PASSED QUICKLY AND A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION (E.G., REFERENDUMS IN EACH REPUBLIC) SHOULD BE ADOPTED. WHILE APOLOGIZING FOR GIVING UNSOLICITED ADVICE, I SAID IT LOOKED TO AN OUTSIDER LIKE THE NATIONALITIES, PROBLEMS WOULD SIMPLY SPIN OUT OF CONTROL IF THE SOVIETS DIDN'T ACT SOON.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE AGREED WITH ME. HE SAID THEY WERE TRYING TO FINALIZE THE SECESSION LAW; AS PAINFUL AS THIS IS FOR US, HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 08

SAID THEY HAVE TO DO IT. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD COME TO ACCEPT THE REFERENDUM IDEA AS WELL, BUT THAT IT JUST WASN'T POSSIBLE TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS I WAS SUGGESTING. ONCE AGAIN, HE SAID THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM WAS THE MOST SERIOUS ONE THEY FACED AND THE ONE THEY WERE LEAST ABLE TO MANAGE. (INDEED, WHEN I APPLAUDED THE ADOPTION OF THE ABALKIN ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN, HE SAID "YES, WE WILL MANAGE THE ECONOMY -- AS DIFFICULT AS IT IS -- BUT THE NATIONALITIES ARE ANOTHER MATTER.")

AFRICA

SHEVARDNADZE IS ON A NINE-DAY TOUR OF AFRICA AND SEEMED GENUINELY IMPRESSED WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND POSSIBILITIES. HE TALKED ABOUT THE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, NOTING THAT HE HAS KNOWN ANC LEADERS FOR A LONG TIME AND HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE CHANGES HE IS SEEING. HE SAID BEING IN NAMIBIA FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATION WAS A REMINDER OF WHAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION CAN DO WHEN THEY COOPERATE. HE SUGGESTED THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR A SIMILAR EFFORT ON ANGOLA. HE SAID DOS SANTOS WAS READY FOR IT: "HE HAS GROWN TIRED OF WAR JUST THE WAY THEY DID IN NICARAGUA AND IN ETHIOPIA."

HE SAID THAT HE FAVORED OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE A SECRET FOUR-WAY MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S. - SOVIETS - MPLA - UNITA, AND ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT DOS SANTOS WOULD GO ALONG WITH IT. "HE NEEDS A LITTLE MORE TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT."

I TOLD HIM I HAD SEEN DOS SANTOS AND MADE CLEAR THAT WE COULD ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND DOS SANTOS COULD COME TO THE U.S. IF THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE AND A GOOD-FAITH NEGOTIATIONS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. I MADE CLEAR WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SAVIMBI AND I PRESENTED A PROPOSAL WE GAVE TO DOS SANTOS, ONE WHICH CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, MUTUAL UNITA AND GOVERNMENT FORCE WITHDRAWALS, A SET OF AGREED PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TALKS, AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND UNITA BY EACH OTHER.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE PROPOSAL WAS INTERESTING AND WE SHOULD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 08

WORK TOGETHER TO FOLLOW UP ON IT. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WAS OPTIMISTIC WE COULD MAKE REAL PROGRESS SOON.

AFGHANISTAN

I RAISED A VARIANT OF THE THREE-PHASE PROPOSAL I MADE IN MOSCOW. I SUGGESTED THAT IF NAJIBULLAH WERE TO GO, WE COULD IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGATIVE SYMMETRY, A CEASEFIRE, AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT NO ONE COULD FORCE NAJIBULLAH OUT, AND OUR STARTING POINT WOULD LEAD TO A DEAD END. LET US FOCUS, HE SAID, ON A PROCESS. NAJIB SAID HE WOULD SUPPORT ELECTIONS AND THAT THE ELECTIONS COULD BE RUN BY THE UN WITH ALL SORTS OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO GUARANTEE ITS FAIRNESS. HE SAID THIS APPROACH HAD WORKED IN NAMIBIA, IN NICARAGUA, AND WE WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT IT FOR CAMBODIA. WHY NOT TRY IT IN AFGHANISTAN?

I SAID THE MUJIHADDIN WOULD NEVER ACCEPT IT IF NAJIB COULD RUN IN THE ELECTIONS. IT WAS NOT A CASE OF BEING RIGHT OR WRONG, THIS WAS SIMPLY THE REALITY. HE ASKED IF WE WOULD THINK MORE ABOUT THE ELECTIONS APPROACH. FRANKLY, I HAVE GOT TO SAY, THERE IS SOMETHING PARADOXICAL AND INDEFENSIBLE ABOUT US OPPOSING ELECTIONS, THAT ARE FREE AND FAIR. IF THE MUJIHADDIN WON'T PARTICIPATE IN SUCH ELECTIONS, HOW CAN WE JUSTIFY CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THEM?

CONCLUDING-IMPRESSIONS

AS ALWAYS, SHEVARDNADZE WAS CALM, RELAXED, AND IN GOOD HUMOR.

I SENSED HE ENJOYED BEING IN AFRICA, AND FOR THE MOMENT OUT OF THE FRAY IN MOSCOW. HIS MOOD ON GERMANY AND ON THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION WAS MORE PENSIVE THAN I HAVE SEEN BEFORE. HE AND GORBACHEV SEEM TO BE GENUINELY WRESTLING WITH THESE PROBLEMS, BUT HAVE YET TO FASHION A COHERENT OR CONFIDENT RESPONSE. THEY ALSO HAVE YET TO SHAPE THEIR BOTTOM LINES. MAYBE THAT WILL COME IN TIME, POSSIBLY EVEN BY THE SUMMIT. BUT, WE ARE NOT THERE YET AND WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT

THEIR CHOICES AND PERHAPS EVEN THE FORMULATION OF SOME OF THEIR OPTIONS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 08

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce, Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Mike Joyce [211924Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: For the President

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed:	4/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91126-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0838-MR(510)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>

PRT: COMM 3.3(b)(6)

SIT: COQ PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 3.3(b)(1)

<DTG> 211924Z MAR 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE MAKE IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT TO MIKE JOYCE.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: MIKE JOYCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

BEGIN TEXT

IF I HAD WANTED THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV TO GO THROUGH THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, WE WOULD NOT HAVE SENT IT BACK CHANNEL AND
ASKED FOR DELIVERY PERSONALLY TO GORBACHEV. I SUGGEST THAT IN
THE FUTURE WHEN COMMUNICATIONS ARE HANDLED IN A MANNER OUT OF THE
ORDINARY THAT YOU CONSULT BEFORE DECIDING ON A DIFFERENT COURSE
OF ACTION.

END TEXT

#0163

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0163 <TOR> 900321142249 MSG000259338169

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
MM 5/28/2015



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

March 21, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: MIKE JOYCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

IF I HAD WANTED THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV TO GO THROUGH THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, WE WOULD NOT HAVE SENT IT BACK CHANNEL AND
ASKED FOR DELIVERY PERSONALLY TO GORBACHEV. I SUGGEST THAT IN
THE FUTURE WHEN COMMUNICATIONS ARE HANDLED IN A MANNER OUT OF THE
ORDINARY THAT YOU CONSULT BEFORE DECIDING ON A DIFFERENT COURSE
OF ACTION.

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2011-0838-MR

mm 5/28/2015

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Cable	From Mike Joyce to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft from Mike Joyce [211107Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: For the President

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed:	4/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91126-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0838-MR(510.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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FM 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

TO WHITE HOUSE<<=

ZEM<<=

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS<<=

0000<<=

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT<<=
FROM MIKE JOYCE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW<<=

MARCH 20, 1990<<=

FROM: MIKE JOYCE<<=

DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW<<=

FOR: MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT<<=

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS<<=
THE WHITE HOUSE<<=

JACK MATLOCK WILL BE RETURNING FROM CENTRAL ASIA ON MARCH<<=
23. IN HIS ABSENCE I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO<<=
GORBACHEV TO FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH AT<<=
10:30 LOCAL MARCH 21. THOUGH I HANDED THE LETTER IN A SEALED<<=
ENVELOPE I TOLD HIM THAT IT CONTAINED IMPORTANT PROPOSALS<<=
ON START. HE UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV<<=
IMMEDIATELY.<<=

DECL: GABR<<=

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR

MM 5/28/2015



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: For the President

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

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FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0838-MR(510.03)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/28/2015

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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>

PRT: COMM 3.3(b)(6)

SIT: COQ PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 3.3(b)(1)

<DTG> 210001Z MAR 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK,
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

MARCH 20, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH. OBVIOUSLY THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS VERY
SENSITIVE. JIM BAKER AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER ARE THE ONLY TWO
PEOPLE IN STATE AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS. SECRETARY BAKER DISCUSSED
THE SAME PROPOSAL WITH SHEVARDNADZE DURING THEIR MEETING IN
NAMIBIA.

BEGIN TEXT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MARCH 20, 1990

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MADE DRAMATIC AND HISTORIC PROGRESS IN
OUR EFFORTS TO INVIGORATE AND ACCELERATE THE ARMS CONTROL
PROCESS. OUR OWN TALKS AT MALTA AND THE RECENT MEETINGS
BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN
MOSCOW AND OTTAWA HAVE IMPARTED SIGNIFICANT MOMENTUM TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE INJECTED IMPORTANT NEW IDEAS THAT CAN
HELP RESOLVE THE MAJOR ISSUES QUICKLY.

I BELIEVE THE TIME IS RIGHT TO BUILD ON THIS MOMENTUM BY
TAKING A BOLD INITIATIVE IN START.

OUR TWO SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE PRINCIPAL GOAL OF
START IS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED
IN THE PAST, THIS MEANS MORE THAN REDUCING NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS
-- IT ALSO MEANS SHAPING THE FORCES OF EACH SIDE SO THAT THEY
ARE INHERENTLY MORE STABILIZING. I BELIEVE WE CAN DO MORE
TOWARD THIS END IN THE CURRENT START NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT
DELAYING THEIR CONCLUSION, AND ALSO SET THE COURSE FOR EVEN
MORE STABILIZING MEASURES IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS THAT COULD
BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER START. IN PARTICULAR, I BELIEVE WE



SHOULD CONSIDER THE ELIMINATION OF MOBILE MIRVED MISSILES AS PART OF THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT. THEN, IN FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVS.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT I PUT CONSIDERABLE PRIORITY ON THE PROMPT COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT. IN FACT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU AND I BE PREPARED TO INITIAL THE DRAFT TREATY DURING THE UPCOMING WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO SIGNIFY THAT WE HAVE AGREED ON ALL THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE A BAN ON MOBILE MIRVS COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAYING ITS COMPLETION. TO ACHIEVE SUCH A BAN, I AM PREPARED TO CANCEL OUR RAIL-GARRISON SYSTEM IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET MOBILE SS-24S. I KNOW YOU HAVE SEVERAL TRAINS ALREADY DEPLOYED. THE UNITED STATES HAS A SYSTEM THAT I AM READY TO DEPLOY RAPIDLY, BUT I WOULD PREFER ANOTHER COURSE, TO BAN THESE MOBILE-MIRV SYSTEMS NOW BEFORE OUR TWO SIDES HAVE EVEN MORE INVESTED IN THEM AND THEIR ELIMINATION BECOMES THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

I ALSO AM PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF SILO-BASED MIRVED MISSILES. CERTAINLY THIS BOLD STEP WOULD TAKE MORE EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT OUR AGREEMENT ON THIS GOAL COULD BE THE FOUNDATION OF FOLLOW-ON TALKS THAT COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE CURRENT START TREATY. I ALSO WOULD NOTE THAT IF OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL MIRVED ICBMS, THE US WILL BE WILLING TO DEFER OUR REMAINING CONCERNS ABOUT HEAVY ICBMS TO THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS.

I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON ALL THREE GOALS -- BANNING MOBILE MIRVS IN START, INITIALING THE START TREATY AT THE JUNE SUMMIT, AND BEGINNING FOLLOW-ON TALKS IMMEDIATELY TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVS -- AT THE MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE NEXT MONTH. IF, HOWEVER, YOU ARE UNABLE TO AGREE TO CONSIDER A BAN ON MOBILE MIRVS IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO ANNOUNCE, FOLLOWING THE APRIL MINISTERIAL, AN AGREEMENT TO BEGIN FOLLOW-ON TALKS ONCE THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT IS INITIALED THAT WOULD HAVE AS CENTRAL OBJECTIVES THE NEAR-TERM ELIMINATION OF MOBILE MIRVS, FOLLOWED BY ALL LAND-BASED MIRVS.

I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY BAKER TO OUTLINE THESE IDEAS TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WHEN THEY MEET IN NAMIBIA IN ORDER TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO HAVE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL WHEN THEY MEET IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL.

I KNOW THAT WE ALREADY HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK BEFORE US BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT CONDITIONS MAY NEVER BE BETTER TO BEGIN TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND ELIMINATE THESE MOST THREATENING SYSTEMS.

SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV

PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

.
END TEXT

.
WARMS REGARDS,
BRENT

.
DECL: OADR

#0162

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0162 <TOR> 900320190212 MSG000259268532

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04f. Cable	From Brent Scowcroft to Jack Matlock, Re: Message to President Gorbachev from President Bush [210001Z Mar 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: For the President

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2022

Date Closed:	4/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91126-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2011-0838-MR(510.03)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/28/2015

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT. COMM

PREC. IMMEDIATE. CLAS. ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 210001Z MAR 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

MARCH 20, 1990

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH. OBVIOUSLY THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS VERY
SENSITIVE. JIM BAKER AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER ARE THE ONLY TWO
PEOPLE IN STATE AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS. SECRETARY BAKER DISCUSSED
THE SAME PROPOSAL WITH SHEVARDNADZE DURING THEIR MEETING IN
NAMIBIA.

BEGIN TEXT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MARCH 20, 1990

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MADE DRAMATIC AND HISTORIC PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS TO INVIGORATE AND ACCELERATE THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. OUR OWN TALKS AT MALTA AND THE RECENT MEETINGS BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW AND OTTAWA HAVE IMPARTED SIGNIFICANT MOMENTUM TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE INJECTED IMPORTANT NEW IDEAS THAT CAN HELP RESOLVE THE MAJOR ISSUES QUICKLY.

I BELIEVE THE TIME IS RIGHT TO BUILD ON THIS MOMENTUM BY TAKING A BOLD INITIATIVE IN START.

OUR TWO SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE PRINCIPAL GOAL OF START IS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED IN THE PAST, THIS MEANS MORE THAN REDUCING NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS -- IT ALSO MEANS SHAPING THE FORCES OF EACH SIDE SO THAT THEY ARE INHERENTLY MORE STABILIZING. I BELIEVE WE CAN DO MORE TOWARD THIS END IN THE CURRENT START NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT DELAYING THEIR CONCLUSION, AND ALSO SET THE COURSE FOR EVEN

MORE STABILIZING MEASURES IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS THAT COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER START. IN PARTICULAR, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE ELIMINATION OF MOBILE MIRVED MISSILES AS PART OF THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT. THEN, IN FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MIRVS.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT I PUT CONSIDERABLE PRIORITY ON THE PROMPT COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT. IN FACT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU AND I BE PREPARED TO INITIAL THE DRAFT TREATY DURING THE UPCOMING WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO SIGNIFY THAT WE HAVE AGREED ON ALL THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE A BAN ON MOBILE MIRVS COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE CURRENT START AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAYING ITS COMPLETION. TO ACHIEVE SUCH A BAN, I AM PREPARED TO CANCEL OUR RAIL-GARRISON SYSTEM IN EXCHANGE FOR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

WASHINGTON IN APRIL.

I KNOW THAT WE ALREADY HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK BEFORE US
BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT CONDITIONS MAY NEVER BE BETTER TO
BEGIN TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND ELIMINATE THESE MOST
THREATENING SYSTEMS.

SINCERELY.
GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT

WARMS REGARDS.
BRENT

DECL: OADR
#0162

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: SIT

SIT: BENKO BLACKWILL RICE SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2111
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 8746

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 10060

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL. PGOV. PARM. PINR. UR

SUBJECT: FORMER CJCS CROWE'S CONVERSATIONS

/ WITH GORBACHEV AND AKHROMEYEV

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

<BEGIN SUMMARY>

SUMMARY

2. AS CONCERN MOUNTS ABOUT LITHUANIA, FORMER CJCS CROWE MET WITH GORBACHEV ON MARCH 23. SURPRISINGLY, GORBACHEV MADE NO MENTION OF LITHUANIA OR NATIONALITY PROBLEMS WHATSOEVER, FOCUSING INSTEAD OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. GORBACHEV POINTED OUT THAT HE REMAINS PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS BEING MADE ON ARMS CONTROL AND LOOKS FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH IN JUNE. HE ALSO REVEALED THAT MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV WOULD BE APPOINTED HIS SECURITY ADVISOR IN HIS NEW POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE USSR.

3. ADMIRAL CROWE HAD EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH AKHROMEYEV DURING THE VISIT AND WAS SURPRISED AT THE MARSHAL'S INCREASINGLY HARSH STANCE ON MANY ISSUES. AKHROMEYEV SAID THE POPULATION WOULD NOT TOLERATE GORBACHEV GIVING IN TO LITHUANIA'S DEMANDS FOR

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0837-MR
SCS 2/25/13

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT. IF PUSHED TO THE LIMIT. MOSCOW WOULD CRUSH LITHUANIA. SIMILARLY, AKHROMEYEV WAS VOCAL IN HIS OPPOSITION TO GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. INSISTING THIS WAS A GRASS-ROOTS ISSUE WHICH COULD NOT BE SOLD TO THE PEOPLE. ON ARMS CONTROL, CROWE WAS SURPRISED AT THE RIGIDITY OF MANY OF AKHROMEYEV'S POSITIONS, CONCLUDING THAT AKHROMEYEV HAS CONTINUALLY BEEN OVERRUN ON DECISIONS AND HAS BECOME TIRED AND DISILLUSIONED.

END SUMMARY

>END SUMMARY>

4. FORMER CJCS ADMIRAL WILLIAM CROWE WILL CONCLUDE ON MARCH 25 A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE USSR. THIS REPORT DETAILS A READOUT THAT CROWE PROVIDED THE DCM ON HIS MARCH 23 MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AND HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH GORBACHEV'S PRINCIPAL DEFENSE POLICY ADVISOR MARSHAL SERGEY AKHROMEYEV. EMBASSY WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON CROWE'S VISIT SEPTEL.

GORBACHEV MEETING

5. CROWE'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV WAS UPBEAT AND

LASTED APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR (ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS WERE AKHROMEYEV, GORBACHEV AIDE CHERNYAYEV AND INTERPRETERS). CROWE NOTED THAT THE TONE OF THE SESSION WAS FRIENDLY, BUT THAT GORBACHEV DID NOT ADDRESS SUBSTANCE IN DETAIL. HE DID, HOWEVER, REVEAL -- ALLEGEDLY FOR THE FIRST TIME -- THAT AKHROMEYEV WOULD BE APPOINTED HIS SECURITY ADVISOR IN HIS NEW POSITION OF PRESIDENT OF THE USSR. GORBACHEV REMARKED AT LENGTH ON CURRENT PROBLEMS, PRINCIPALLY ECONOMIC, BUT MADE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF LITHUANIA OR NATIONALITY ISSUES.

5. GORBACHEV TOLD CROWE THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH IN JUNE. GORBACHEV NOTED THAT HE WAS GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS BEING MADE ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THERE REMAINED PROBLEMS AHEAD. GORBACHEV POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD CRITICS ON ALL SIDES -- SOME WHO COMPLAINED THAT HE WAS DISARMING THE USSR; OTHERS WHO COMPLAINED HE WAS NOT GOING FAR ENOUGH. (NOTE: CROWE BELIEVES THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV WAS PROVIDED RECIPROCALLY FOR AKHROMEYEV'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH IN WASHINGTON.)

CONVERSATIONS WITH AKHROMEYEV

7. CROWE SAID THAT OVER THE COURSE OF TIME HE AND AKHROMEYEV HAD BECOME GOOD FRIENDS. DURING THIS VISIT, HOWEVER, AKHROMEYEV WAS DISTINCTLY LESS FRIENDLY AND MORE GUARDED. CROWE'S GENERAL CONCLUSION WAS THAT AKHROMEYEV HAD BECOME DEPRESSED BY THE DEVELOPMENTS AROUND HIM AND FELT HE WAS BEING

BT

#0060

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 10060

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, PINR, UR

SUBJECT: FORMER CJCS CROWE'S CONVERSATIONS

USED. CROWE AND AKHROMEYEV DISCUSSED A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS DURING THE VISIT, BUT OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WERE AKHROMEYEV'S COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECTS DETAILED BELOW.

LITHUANIA

-- AKHROMEYEV SAID THE LITHUANIANS CAN DO WHAT THEY WANT, BUT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT ALLOW A SINGLE UNION REPUBLIC TO LEAVE. HE STRESSED THAT THE POPULATION WOULD NOT TOLERATE GORBACHEV GIVING IN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

TO LITHUANIA'S DEMANDS FOR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT IF PUSHED TO THE LIMIT, MOSCOW WOULD CRUSH LITHUANIA.
-- HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT HOPED TO AVOID SUCH ACTION, CHOOSING INSTEAD TO DRAG OUT THE PROCESS BY USING A VARIETY OF LAWS AND PROCEDURES TO BUY TIME. CROWE EMPHASIZED THAT AKHROMEYEV'S POSITION ON LITHUANIA WAS MUCH HARSHER THAN LAST YEAR.

-- AKHROMEYEV EMPHASIZED THAT GORBACHEV HAD NOT REALIZED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN LITHUANIA.
GERMANY IN NATO

-- THE QUESTION OF A UNITED GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN

NATO WAS RAISED CONTINUALLY DURING THE VISIT AND AKHROMEYEV WAS QUITE VOCAL IN HIS OPPOSITION. AKHROMEYEV INSISTED THAT THIS WAS SIMPLY SOMETHING THE USSR COULD NOT ACCEPT; THAT THIS COULD NOT BE SOLD TO THE PEOPLE. HE NOTED THAT ALL SOVIET FAMILIES HAVE MEMORIES OF THE GERMANS FROM WORLD WAR II AND THAT THIS WAS A GRASS-ROOTS ISSUE.
ARMS CONTROL

-- CROWE WAS SUPRISED AT THE RIGIDITY OF MANY OF AKHROMEYEV'S POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, POINTING OUT THAT ON OCCASION AKHROMEYEV DISAGREED EVEN WITH THE AVOWED POSITION OF THE USSR. HE ARGUED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT ACCEPT A DECLARATORY APPROACH ON SLCMS. STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, HE SAID, WERE SIMPLY WRONG. CROWE'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT AKHROMEYEV HAS CONTINUALLY BEEN OVERRUN ON DECISIONS AND HAS BECOME TIRED AND DISILLUSIONED.

THE EXTENT OF CHANGE

-- AKHROMEYEV TOLD CROWE THAT HE HAD SUPPORTED GORBACHEV BECAUSE HE BELIEVED IN WHAT GORBACHEV WAS

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

DOING. NEVERTHELESS. AKHROMEYEV EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD NOT REALIZED THE EXTENT OR DEPTH OF DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE USSR. HE STRESSED THAT THE COUNTRY WAS NOT READY FOR ALL THE CHANGES UNDERWAY, ADDING THAT THERE WERE LIMITS. THE PARTY

-- AKHROMEYEV SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE DECLINING FORTUNES OF THE PARTY, NOTING THAT "WE WRECKED IT OURSELVES." IN A TOUCH OF RUSSIAN SENTIMENTALISM, HE SAID THIS HAD SHATTERED HIS HEART HUNDREDS OF TIMES. HE EXPRESSED SOME HOPE THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PUT THE PARTY BACK TOGETHER AGAIN, BUT INSISTED THAT THE OLD PARTY IS NOW GONE.

8. CROWE TOLD POLOFF THAT HE INTENDS TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY OR DENNIS ROSS SHORTLY AFTER HE RETURNS TO THE U.S. TO PERSONALLY SHARE HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE VISIT.

9. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MATLOCK

BT

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Non-log Item

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *AB*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on START

The draft letter that you asked us to prepare from the President to Gorbachev is at Tab A. Your Memorandum to the President is at Tab I.

CR
Condi Rice concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *cap* NARA, Date *4/19/01*

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~PER NSC WAIVER, August 6, 2010~~
~~By *cap* NARA, Date *7/9/12*~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

March 20, 1990

VIA BACK CHANNEL

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH. OBVIOUSLY THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS VERY
SENSITIVE. JIM BAKER AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER ARE THE ONLY TWO
PEOPLE IN STATE AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS. SECRETARY BAKER DISCUSSED
THE SAME PROPOSAL WITH SHEVARDNADZE DURING THEIR MEETING IN
NAMIBIA.

BEGIN TEXT

(Copy attached text)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0838-MR
mm 5/28/2015

END TEXT

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

Our two countries have made dramatic and historic progress in our efforts to invigorate and accelerate the arms control process. Our own talks at Malta and the recent meetings between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow and Ottawa have imparted significant momentum to the negotiations and have injected important new ideas that can help resolve the major issues quickly.

I believe the time is right to build on this momentum by taking a bold initiative in START.

Our two sides are in agreement that the principal goal of START is to enhance strategic stability. As we have discussed in the past, this means more than reducing numbers of systems -- it also means shaping the forces of each side so that they are inherently more stabilizing. I believe we can do more toward this end in the current START negotiations, without delaying their conclusion, and also set the course for even more stabilizing measures in future negotiations that could begin immediately after START. In particular, I believe we should consider the elimination of mobile MIRVed missiles as part of the current START agreement. Then, in follow-on negotiations, we should eliminate all land-based MIRVs.

Let me emphasize that I put considerable priority on the prompt completion of the current START agreement. In fact, I would suggest that you and I be prepared to initial the draft treaty during the upcoming Washington Summit to signify that we have agreed on all the major substantive issues. However, I believe a ban on

mobile MIRVs could be incorporated into the current START agreement without delaying its completion. To achieve such a ban, I am prepared to cancel our rail-garrison system in exchange for the elimination of Soviet mobile SS-24s. I know you have several trains already deployed. The United States has a system that I am ready to deploy rapidly, but I would prefer another course, to ban these mobile-MIRV systems now before our two sides have even more invested in them and their elimination becomes that much more difficult.


I also am prepared to agree to the mutual elimination of silo-based MIRVed missiles. Certainly this bold step would take more extensive negotiations, but our agreement on this goal could be the foundation of follow-on talks that could begin as soon as substantive agreement is reached on the current START Treaty. I also would note that if our two countries are able to agree to the eventual elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs, the US will be willing to defer our remaining concerns about heavy ICBMs to the follow-on negotiations.

I hope we will be able to announce agreement on all three goals -- banning mobile MIRVs in START, initialing the START Treaty at the June Summit, and beginning follow-on talks **immediately to eliminate all land-based MIRVs** -- at the meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next month. If, however, you are unable to agree to consider a ban on mobile MIRVs in the current negotiations, an alternative would be for the two sides to announce, following the April Ministerial, an agreement to begin follow-on talks once the current START agreement is initialed that would have as central objectives the near-term elimination of mobile MIRVs, followed by all land-based MIRVs.

I have asked Secretary Baker to outline these ideas to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when they meet in Namibia in order to be in a better position to have substantive discussions about this proposal when they meet in Washington in April.

I know that we already have a great deal of work before us but I am convinced that conditions may never be better to begin to improve stability and eliminate these most threatening systems.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Geo Bush", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Moscow