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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91126
Folder ID Number: 91126-004

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Notes	Re: Tell me what to say next... (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02. Message	Re: Message from Secretary James A. Baker III (1 pp.)	6/5/90	(b)(1)	C
03. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	4/2/90	(b)(1)	
04. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	4/2/90	(b)(1)	
05. Draft Letter	Re: Back up (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Memo	Robert M. Gates to POTUS Re: Gorbachev -- Moses, not Joshua (3 pp.)	7/13/90	(b)(1)	C
07. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (20 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)	4/6/90	(b)(1)	S
09. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (6 pp.)	4/6/90	(b)(1)	
10a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	7/4/90	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

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Pinksheet Number: cap1067
OA/ID Number: 91126-004
Date Closed: 4/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	7/4/90	(b)(1)	
11a. Message	Re: In the course of... (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11b. Schedule	Re: [Written in Russian] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11c. Schedule	Re: [Written in Russian] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (13 pp.)	6/2/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Cable	Moscow to White House Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S
14. Handwritten Notes	Re: [Translator's Notes on One-on-One for President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev] (12 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
15a. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (22 pp.)	5/18/90	(b)(1)	S
15b. Memcon	Re: Trip from Moscow to Zagorsk and return (6 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	
15c. Notes	Re: President Bush's Preliminary Notes (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
16. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Gorbachev One-on-One (11 pp.)	11/19/90	(b)(1)	

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THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1990
MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV

Aleksey OBUKHOV
(Phonetic: OHbookhuff)

USSR



Reuter ©

**Chief, USA and Canada Administration, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (since February 1989)**

Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador

Headed delegations to nuclear and space arms talks and to INF negotiations . . . attended Reagan-Gorbachev summits (1987, 1988), Bush-Gorbachev Malta meeting (1989) . . . studied under Hans Morgenthau at University of Chicago (1962) . . . collects paintings, antique furniture . . . married; has two sons . . . speaks English, French, Thai . . . born 12 November 1937.

5/90

Yevgeniy PRIMAKOV
(Phonetic: preemuhKAWF)

USSR



Globe Photo ©

**Member, USSR Presidential Council (since March 1990);
Candidate Member, Politburo (since September 1989)**

Addressed as: Mr. Primakov

Longtime foreign policy adviser to Gorbachev . . . former director, prestigious Institute of World Economics and International Relations; former chairman, Council of the Union, USSR Supreme Soviet . . . speaks English . . . widower . . . born 30 October 1929.

Mikhail GORBACHEV

(Phonetic: gorbahCHAWF)

USSR



Globe Photos ©

2 March 1931.

President of the USSR (since March 1990); General Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU (since March 1985)

Addressed as: Mr. President

One of youngest, best educated members of Soviet leadership . . . before achieving national prominence in 1978, spent most of life in Stavropol' Kray, major agricultural area in southern Russia . . . studied law at Moscow State University (1950-55) . . . received correspondence degree in agriculture (1967) . . . married; has daughter, two granddaughters . . . born on

5/90

Sergey AKHROMEYEV

(Phonetic: akhroMEHyef)

USSR



Photoreporters ©

Adviser to the President of the USSR (since December 1988)

Addressed as: Marshal Akhromeyev

National security adviser to Gorbachev . . . chief negotiator in past summits . . . Chief, General Staff (1984-88) . . . full member, Central Committee, CPSU, since 1983 . . . serves on Committee of Defense and State Security . . . elected to Supreme Soviet (1989) . . . born 5 May 1923.

Aleksandr BESSMERTNYKH

USSR

(Phonetic: bessMEHRTnik)



Wide World ©

Ambassador to the United States (since May 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador

Before taking up current post was First Deputy Foreign Minister (responsible for USA, Canada, Afghanistan) since 1988 . . . has served previous tours in US totaling almost 20 years, including 13 in Washington (1970-83) . . . expertise includes arms control issues, American system of government . . . avid tennis player . . . speaks fluent English . . . married second wife, Marina, in April 1990; daughter from first marriage, Marina, born in

1961 . . . born 10 November 1933.

Eduard SHEVARDNADZE

(Phonetic: shehvardNAHDzeh)

USSR



Camera Press ©

Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member, Politburo, CPSU (since July 1985); Member, USSR Presidential Council (since March 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Stalwart supporter of Gorbachev's foreign policy agenda . . . as Foreign Minister has become knowledgeable on all aspects of international affairs . . . rose to national prominence as leader of party organization of his native Georgian republic (1972-85) . . . married; has two children, four grandchildren . . . born 25 January 1928.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tell me what to
say next

① Ask Ministers
to work to
resolve.

Non-circumvention
Backfire
Havens

Non-circumvention

B' fire

Heavy IC BMS

statements on
Future Negot

and
statement on Fut. Negs.

② ask Gaby to join you in directing
solutions.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

① 3rd world
proliferation —

Destruction of
war heads

U.S. not given
agree —

war heads
mobile ICBM's
10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fear

Concerned

You say yes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

If G vs NATO

① Your Interests
Taken into consideration

Not more weapons
more stability

2 + 4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

German unity
moved faster

agree who gets
credit is not
in

Q is do we "single
out" Germany -

Rest of Europe
want

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Encourage ^{the} Vanquished, who

(German - Japan)
have renounced part - to be
dynamic part of future

Any Temptation -

No

to gain some dividends
by one's self?

Europe ~ United Germany

Involvement of Sov.

Essential -

G - "resurgence of united
Germany"

APPENDIX 2

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C., April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international

economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6¹

For the purpose of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,² on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the

1. The definition of the territories to which Article V applies has been revised by Article II of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (see Appendix 3).

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council has heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the 'Algerian departments of France' no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.

Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles III and V.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.


Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

0001

(4:00 p.m., Thursday, May 30, 1990)

0001



0001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5:30 p.m.

Tuesday, June 5, 1990

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY JAMES A. BAKER III

Wanted to add one thing: It was the feeling on the part of the person with whom he (JAB) had his meeting that the representatives of the other government from the EAST think that the man that you are going to see on Friday is trying to move things too fast. Therefore, the fellow JAB was talking to thinks that, for that reason, this process will not be concluded until next year.

That was the only bit of information that JAB would characterize as other than very positive that came out of JAB's meeting. If you want to discuss further prior to your Friday meeting, JAB will be available tomorrow and Thursday.

Patty Presock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
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2/18/2014 MM

Blackwell has read
4/5/90

Kauster
Rice have a copy
7 Apr

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

4/4/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

The attached is an advance copy of the letter which Minister Shevardnadze will present to the President on Friday.

JABIII

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of March 21, 1990 prompts serious reflections on the emerging - and possibly unique - prospects of the evolution of the Soviet-US strategic relationship.

Indeed, now that we have come within reach of completing painstaking work on a whole package of arms reduction agreements the time has come to think about the future and to try to delineate the main parameters of the next, qualitatively different phase of disarmament.

I have to say that we remain committed to radical balanced measures aimed at a gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. Achieving this noble goal, set forth in our program of January 15, 1986, would give the most solid guarantee of security and tranquillity for all people on Earth.

I think, however, that you will agree that our immediate and top-priority task is still the early completion of the treaty on 50 percent strategic offensive arms reductions and its

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the
United States of America
Washington D.C.

official signing, in keeping with our agreement at Malta, before the end of the year.

In light of this common understanding, I welcome your proposal that we initial the treaty at our forthcoming meeting in Washington, having in mind that all the main issues would be resolved by that time.

I am encouraged by the efforts of our delegations and the more rapid pace of work on the treaty, although I still think that the negotiating process should be speeded up substantially. In this regard the Soviet side attaches key importance to the April round of talks between our foreign ministers.

Let me now turn to some additional ideas that you outlined in your letter of March 21, 1990.

I have studied it carefully, and I find that the suggestions and proposals contained in it merit thorough consideration in our dialogue.

Regarding your proposal on banning MIRVed mobile ICBMs, I would like first of all to say that, in principle, I welcome your readiness to adopt radical, large-scale decisions in the field of strategic arms reduction. Also, I can only agree that it is always better not to deploy some weapons systems rather than first to deploy and then eliminate them. Thorough analysis of the draft START Treaty shows, however, that it would be difficult to implement your proposal within its framework now.

First of all, our countries have already reached fundamental agreement that ICBM mobility is a factor that serves to strengthen strategic stability. Both of us proceeded on that basis while preparing the START Treaty in its present form. In the process of negotiations the two sides have arrived at a carefully-weighed balance of mutual concessions and compromises; changing any part of that balance would entail the risk of reopening many of the problems already solved.

Nevertheless, we could consider a substantial reduction of our deployment program of SS-24 mobile missiles, limiting their number at the level of January 1, 1991, if the US side were to decide not to deploy the MX missiles in a mobile mode. An understanding to this effect could be formalized through an exchange of political declarations. This would, without doubt, impart additional momentum to the process of real nuclear disarmament.

Concerning the other of your proposals - on considering the question of fixed MIRVed ICBMs in subsequent negotiations. This is a question that has a bearing on the entire range of further strategic offensive arms reductions. We have more than once spoken in favor of starting negotiations on second-phase reductions right after the conclusion of the treaty now being prepared. I regard positively the fact that discussions, for the time being informal, of the tasks of future negotiations are already underway in Geneva. I think that at our meeting

in Washington we could adopt a declaration of intent regarding future talks on further reductions in US and Soviet strategic offensive arms and agree on when they should begin. A draft such statement could be worked out by our foreign ministers during their forthcoming meetings.

It appears that even now we could record a common view which has emerged in the exchanges between the two of us, i.e. that future negotiations should provide for reductions in quantitative levels of all strategic arms and help to attain a mix and structure of arms that would be consistent with the goal of strengthening strategic stability.

In this context I would like to emphasize that, as before, we regard observance by the USSR and the USA of the ABM Treaty as the basis for maintaining and strengthening strategic stability.

I also wrote to you about the problem arising from significant differences in the structures of Soviet and US strategic offensive arms. Logic prompts that in the future, too, this objective factor will have to be considered by us in further arms reductions. Accordingly, all our steps should be extremely prudent and cautious. Reducing one component of the strategic triad should not lead to a general destabilization of the strategic situation as a result of the two other components remaining intact.

In the context of these talks the whole range of issues, considered by each side to be important for attaining the final

objective of the negotiations, could be examined. In particular, we believe it is possible to consider the question of significantly reducing the concentration of warheads on all ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and of ALCMs on heavy bombers, and the number of their delivery vehicles as well.

In our view, the situation now evolving in the world and in Soviet-US relations augurs well for negotiations on follow-on strategic arms reductions to proceed at a good pace and productively.

We even do not rule out the possibility that a new agreement could be concluded earlier than reductions would actually be completed under the treaty being prepared now. This would enable us more rapidly to attain genuinely stable structures of both sides' strategic arsenals at low levels.

I am convinced that we can confidently put before ourselves such far-reaching goals and expect to achieve them, not only in START, but also as regards the limitation and prohibition of nuclear tests, radical reduction of conventional arms in Europe, the prohibition of chemical weapons etc.

In conclusion let me also point out the following. In order to advance effectively along this path we have to attach particular importance to the atmosphere of our dialogue and the mutual willingness to avoid unnecessary complications and artificial problems. I appreciate your realistic approach to the development of Soviet-US dialogue, your desire to understand the other side, to consider its interests and problems. This

is how I regard your private letter to me of March 29, 1990. I want to reiterate that we intend firmly to continue to follow the course of radically reshaping Soviet society on the basis of democratization and glasnost, active and serious dialogue, and building a truly law-governed state. It goes without saying that all this presupposes respect for constitutional order and safeguarding the rights and security of all citizens of our country.

Eduard Shevardnadze plans to share with you thoughts on how these fundamental principles are being applied to the difficult task of creating a new federation in our country and building just and healthy interethnic relations.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

Kremlin, Moscow

April 2, 1990

Cheney
Powell
Done 4/9

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of March 21, 1990 prompts serious reflections on the emerging - and possibly unique - prospects of the evolution of the Soviet-US strategic relationship.

Indeed, now that we have come within reach of completing painstaking work on a whole package of arms reduction agreements the time has come to think about the future and to try to delineate the main parameters of the next, qualitatively different phase of disarmament.

I have to say that we remain committed to radical balanced measures aimed at a gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. Achieving this noble goal, set forth in our program of January 15, 1986, would give the most solid guarantee of security and tranquillity for all people on Earth.

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In this context I would like to emphasize that, as before, we regard observance by the USSR and the USA of the ABM Treaty as the basis for maintaining and strengthening strategic stability.

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objective of the negotiations, could be examined. In particular, we believe it is possible to consider the question of significantly reducing the concentration of warheads on all ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and of ALCMs on heavy bombers, and the number of their delivery vehicles as well.

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Eduard Shevardnadze plans to share with you thoughts on how these fundamental principles are being applied to the difficult task of creating a new federation in our country and building just and healthy interethnic relations.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

Kremlin, Moscow

April 2, 1990

Back up

Dear Mr. President:

These are trying times. I have tried very hard to understand the problems you face at home. Indeed, as Jim Baker has told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, not only have we tried to understand, but we have acted with restraint and prudence.

I understand your view that the Baltic States are part of the Soviet Union; and I expect you know our view that we have never recognized ^{their} ~~the~~ incorporation ~~of Lithuania~~ into the Soviet Union.

I have given a lot of weight to your stated view that force would not be used and ^{that} ~~the~~ eventual separation or self determination is in the cards for Lithuania.

The problem is we can no longer sit idly by, giving the impression that we are unconcerned about the aspirations ~~for~~ ^{to} freedom of the people of Lithuania.

I have often stated publicly, not only my desire to see

perestroika succeed, but also to see you personally prevail. I
 still feel very strongly about that. ^{the Minister from} ~~Recently~~ ^{Last ~~on~~ Monday} your ^{Embassy} ~~ExM~~ came to
 the State Department and once again asked that we show restraint.
 On Tuesday I met with key leaders in our Congress and explained
 that I was not prepared to take action on this matter, though
 there is a growing feeling in this country that my inaction
^{delivers}
~~serves~~ a serious blow to the aspirations of freedom loving
 people in Lithuania, and indeed everywhere. This growing
 feeling, which I share, leads me to believe that there is no way
 we will ^{be} ~~be~~ able to ^{conclude} ~~go forward~~ with our Trade Agreement, and thus
 with MFN, unless dialogue with the Lithuanians begins.

We realize there is no easy answer; but, as you know, we felt
 that a "suspension" by Lithuania of its resolution, coupled with
 your willingness to meet with the Lithuanians outside the
 federation concept, would be the best way to break the ice. We
 have, as you probably know, urged this course upon Mr.

Landsberghis.

Here is the ^{basic} ~~bottom line~~ reality -- there is no way Congress will approve MFN under existing circumstances -- no way at all.

Further, I will not be able to recommend approval under existing circumstances. I have felt that ^{these} ~~the~~ negotiations should

continue, and, indeed, have taken some "flak" for not cutting off trade talks from our end. I assume that you have seen some of the statements on this critical subject, but ~~wanted to call to your attention the attached statements (discuss.)~~

Munich

I recognize, with respect, the restraint that you have shown, indeed, the encouragement you have given, to the new democracies in Eastern Europe. I recognize that this restraint and understanding has cost your support at home. You have a large stock of goodwill here and in other western countries for what you have done. But now we have Lithuania and the enormous problems accompanying Lithuania and the other Baltic States,

which, ^{to us} ~~in our view~~, to repeat, have special standing.

I wish I could think of a ^{more} positive role that I could play to help ameliorate matters. In this regard, I would welcome any suggestions you might care to make. (I regret we have no secure voice communications at this time. It would be very useful if we could talk this out in a reasonable way, trying to work together to solve what at this moment is a terrible problem between us.)

~~This~~ ^{Next} week I will publicly state that under existing conditions there ^{can} ~~will~~ be no trade agreement. This is simply a statement of reality. It is not intended to be provocative. It is not intended to complicate matters for you. I will accompany this "marker" ^{between Lithuanian and Soviet Union} with the fervent hope that dialogue will begin. We must clear the path so that the era of improved relations between our two great countries will continue to flourish.

I regret that the latest Lithuanian attempt at dialogue, with Supreme Soviet Chairman Lubyancov, failed to produce positive results. You have done too much, and we come too far to see matters between

LUKYANOV

us revert to tension and anxiety.

I would welcome any suggestions. Please know that this was not an easy letter to write. I have tried very hard to keep relations on ^{track} ~~tract~~, recognizing ^{the} ~~that~~ dramatic changes that you have brought to much of this world.

^{now}
~~have no choice but to~~
I ~~must~~ identify publicly with our strongly held convictions about Lithuania's self determination and the right to control its own destiny.

I look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meeting. I am determined to keep that meeting on ^{track} ~~tract~~ in spite of existing tensions. There is a lot ^{at} ~~to~~ stake there.

My sincere best wishes,

May 8, 1990

General --

On Friday, April 27, 1990, Bob Kimmitt passed along to Ambassador Dubinin the following message for President Gorbachev from President Bush:

The President wants to extend an invitation to President Gorbachev to spend the non-Washington portion of the Summit at Camp David.

It was a very brief meeting and Bob Kimmitt did not do a memcon.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mrs. President-

While my analysis
of the situation differs in
part from Boris, I
certainly concur in
his conclusion.

Brent

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

13 July 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert M. Gates 8.
SUBJECT: Gorbachev -- Moses, not Joshua

One aspect of our policy toward the Soviet Union that warrants reconsideration is our unreserved support for Gorbachev personally. Until a few months ago, this was justifiable inasmuch as he was seen, in reality and in perceptions at home and abroad, as the engine of change, one who was quite literally indispensable to reform in the Soviet Union.

Now, however, especially at home, Gorbachev is increasingly viewed unfavorably by the public at large -- as indecisive, a "chatterbox," a leader who offers no way out of the present sorry state to which he has brought the USSR. Indeed, popular resentment against the Party itself -- and its system of privileges -- seems to be growing sharply and aimed in no small part at Gorbachev. He is seen as a straddler, unwilling to walk away from an increasingly irrelevant Party or to take bold actions to reverse the decline of the economy and disintegration of social peace.

Among the political elite, Gorbachev's centrist approach until recently was a source of strength. Now, however, he who once drew support from both reform and traditionalist elements, in today's polarized climate seems to be increasingly isolated. The reformers are establishing control of the Supreme Soviet/state structure and the traditionalists have demonstrated at the Party Congress their continued domination of the Party -- however skillfully Gorbachev manipulates its leadership politics. (His new deputy, Ivashko, is unenthusiastic about market reforms and recently called for a purge of those Party members in the Democratic Platform.) Gorbachev does not seem fully "at home" any longer in either camp. While, as shown at the Party Congress, Gorbachev's personal position is strong, his ability to

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guide or influence events, especially with respect to the economy, is very limited. He turns the wheel, but nothing happens.

It is worth recalling that the Party Congress was advanced from 1991 to this month so that Gorbachev could purge the Central Committee and get a Party committed to his reforms. He not only has failed to rout the conservatives, they remain the dominant force in the Party and in control of the only real management apparatus in the country, however weakened. The Party will continue to obstruct reform, but Gorbachev can't let go of it and cast his lot fully with the reformers.

While Gorbachev seeks to eliminate Stalinist political and economic structures, he is not an advocate of market economics nor of democracy as we practice it. He remains, in his heart of hearts, a Communist -- and continues to say so. Unlike Mazowiecki or other East Europeans, Gorbachev is unwilling to put himself or his program before the voters. And, as more reform leaders emerge in the USSR as a result of elections, he is becoming more and more a symbol of the old way of doing business. He increasingly stands alone in lacking electoral legitimacy.

His effort to meld state socialism and "regulated" markets, his refusal to countenance private ownership of large scale enterprises or the "exploitation of labor," his fear of public reaction to critically necessary reforms (partly because the government -- and he personally -- lacks popular legitimacy), and the incoherent mish-mash of reform measures all have produced economic catastrophe. And, there is no indication that, in fact, he has the faintest idea of a way out.

Indeed, as incipient moves toward decentralization likely offer the most promising path toward further strengthening of democracy and market reforms, it is symptomatic that Gorbachev is fighting a rear-guard action to slow, if not thwart, such decentralization.

Gorbachev has successfully carried out a political revolution and, in so doing, has broken the USSR's tie to the past. Thanks to him, the country is able to contemplate a different future economically, politically and structurally. But, like Moses, having brought his people out of bondage, it is increasingly evident that Gorbachev cannot lead them over into the Promised Land. Delivered by Gorbachev from the past, the peoples of the USSR seem destined now to wander in the desert awaiting a Joshua to take them into the future.

Whether you agree with this analysis or not (Larry Eagleburger and Condi Rice do, Brent doesn't), I would argue that

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there is little to lose by subtly de-personalizing our support for reform in the Soviet Union. We mustn't risk discrediting ourselves with the emerging genuine believers in (and practitioners of) democracy and market economics in the USSR by expressing our support for reform so exclusively in terms of support for Gorbachev. We may make an error of historic consequence in tying the U.S. -- and you -- only to him.

We should not-- must not-- pull the rug out from under Gorbachev, especially while waiting for the pieces to fall into place in Europe. But, while remaining supportive of him, we should also focus more on support for the process of reform and, most importantly, recognize and give visibility to other reform leaders in the USSR, leading advocates of democratic and market reforms, and key economic and political reform measures themselves. We ought not be reluctant to criticize Gorbachev when he takes steps that are contrary to his own reforms, steps that are anti-democratic or economically counter-productive. And, we should stress the importance of institutionalizing healthy changes.

Gorbachev has earned his place in history but history now seems to be moving beyond him. It would be a pity for you, Mr. President, as you boldly and confidently lead the West into the future, to be seen in the Soviet Union as wagering everything on a man whose vision at the end of the day does not reach far enough.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: April 4, 1990
Time: 4:00pm - 7:30pm
Place: Secretary Baker's Office

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.: Secretary Baker
Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
Interpreter

USSR: Eduard Shevardnadze
Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
Interpreter

Baker: I want to start by welcoming you and since you are the guest I think you should go ahead and feel free to kick off the discussions.

Shevardnadze: Thanks for the welcome. I believe this meeting is of great importance because we have little time before the Summit and we have a lot of work to do. I might begin by discussing the date of the Summit. Taking into account your previous proposals, we propose that we go ahead and have the Summit between May 30th and June 3rd. My impression is that this should be suitable to you. If it is acceptable we could make the announcement during my visit.

Baker: When the Ambassador gave me the dates he said that it was important that there be no leaks. I have discussed this only with the President and so far there have been no leaks. As I understand it, the dates and the scenario, as I have described them in Namibia, would be okay with you. That is to say we would have meetings here and then we would go to Maine and we might come back here.

Shevardnadze: I discussed this with Gorbachev before leaving and he believes that the main task right now is to set the dates. All that you propose in terms of scenario is basically acceptable, but he does prefer to reserve on certain possible proposals that he might want to suggest about the program. In any case, I will communicate our suggestions on the program after I get back to Moscow.

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Baker: Good. You have no objection to the concept of spending time at the President's residence in Maine?

Shevardnadze: No, that is fine with us.

Baker: Well, let me just say that the dates are acceptable to us. They really do suit our needs as well. We might decide how best to announce this. My sense would be that we should announce this simultaneously from both capitals while you are here.

Shevardnadze: We are ready to accept anything that you suggest. Whatever you say is fine with us.

Baker: Well, I think it might be agreeable to us to announce this tomorrow or Friday. If we announce this tomorrow, we could do it simultaneously with an announcement in both Washington and Moscow. That would leave much less of a chance of a leak.

Shevardnadze: That could be. Maybe we might want to announce it right after the meeting with the President or before.

Baker: Whatever. Again, I think the important point is that we would want a simultaneous announcement.

Shevardnadze: That is fine with us. Really whatever you say is going to be fine with us and if you want to do it before the meeting with the President, that is fine.

Baker: I just want to be sure that we agree that this should be a simultaneous announcement coming out of both Washington and Moscow.

Shevardnadze: Yes, that's the most desirable.

Baker: Why don't I ask the President. I do worry about a leak.

Shevardnadze: Fine. Let's leave it to the President. Whatever he says will also be the opinion of the Soviet President. You know you have a big advantage. You can just pick up the phone and consult with him. It is a lot harder for me.

Baker: That is the way it is for me when I am in Moscow.

Shevardnadze: Well, it is good that the dates are set. The most important thing is to set the dates.

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Now, as for the negotiations themselves, and what's going to be involved with them, and what's going to be involved with the results of the Summit, we have a lot to do and a lot is going to depend upon the talks that you and I have. Of course, a lot will also depend upon the specific results that emerge from Vienna and Geneva. We have every reason to hope by the end of May that we are going to have important and major agreements. As I discussed with you, we are going to have a lot to do in advance of that to prepare the documents that will be signed at the Summit and to prepare well for the Summit and that is one of the reasons I said we are going to need another meeting between the two of us.

I have studied very carefully the status of the talks and I must say that our readiness to have the Summit is not high at this point.

Baker: I agree with that. We might also just finalize what the other dates of the ministerial are going to be. The May 16-19 is acceptable for us.

Shevardnadze: That's very good.

Baker: I do think on the announcement that tomorrow morning is probably better because that will guarantee there isn't a leak. We could do it at 9:00 in the morning here, 5:00 in Moscow. Is that okay?

Shevardnadze: That's quite okay.

Baker: One other item that the President wanted me to make very clear to you -- and he just reiterated that on the phone -- is that we are very concerned about the events in Lithuania. I know you are aware of this and I want to let you go through your agenda before I offer some comments on Lithuania. But it is important especially given what the President has just noted, that while we do not want to have anything get in the way of the Summit and the ministerial, we are making the assumption that Lithuania is going to be managed in the way that is consistent with the principles of perestroika and glasnost and that it will be settled peacefully.

Shevardnadze: Should we discuss the program of the Summit tomorrow or should we talk about it now?

Baker: Well, we could do it now. The way we see it is that the arrival would be in Washington on Wednesday afternoon, May 30. The formal arrival ceremony would be on Thursday morning, May 31st; there might be a state dinner that night. Friday, June 1st the two Presidents would go to Kennebunkport.

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You might have discussions here in advance of going up to Kennebunkport on June 1 and then you could continue discussions up there. There would be further meetings in Kennebunkport on Saturday, June 2nd and you might return to Washington either Saturday evening or Sunday morning. There would, of course, be the possibility of additional meetings down here in Washington, if needed. Perhaps there might also be a reciprocal dinner if that is what you want on Sunday and maybe also a concluding press event. What I am saying in a sense is that the June 1-3 timeframe can have a lot of built-in flexibility.

Shevardnadze: After our meeting, I will convey this to President Gorbachev. We will want to have a reciprocal dinner and probably also a press event. It is possible that President Gorbachev will also want to make a public statement during his visit here, but that is not definite at this point.

Baker: President Bush would hope that this timeframe will be committed entirely to meetings with the President. If President Gorbachev wants other events in the country, outside of Washington, we would hope that those would take place either before or after the May 30th-June 3rd dates. That doesn't mean that he might not have time to visit the Congress while he is here in Washington, that would be understandable. I'm really only talking about his possible travel to other parts of the United States.

Shevardnadze: Maybe we can decide this way. I will go ahead and convey this to Moscow and then give you an answer back on all this after my return to Moscow.

Baker: We can work out the details of the schedule through normal diplomatic procedure. Tomorrow we will announce only that there will be a Summit in the United States and we will announce what the timeframe is from Wednesday, May 30th to June 3rd.

Shevardnadze: That's fine. We might also announce the next ministerial.

Baker: Well, we need not do that as part of the White House statement. We can do that at the conclusion of our meeting in our press statements.

Shevardnadze: That's fine. What is important to me is that the May 16th-19th dates are acceptable to you for the ministerial. The only disadvantage that I see of those dates is that they are too close to the Summit. On the other hand, that gives our delegations a chance to work and to prove themselves; they are going to have a lot to do so that the Summit is well-prepared by the end of that meeting.

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I brought with me a letter from President Gorbachev that responds to President Bush's letter. I'll give the original to President Bush in the meeting but I wanted to give you an advance copy so that you could tell the President about the contents.

Let me make some preliminary comments on the letter. You will see in the letter that we are providing some answers to some of the questions you have raised. I would like to emphasize that we gave very close consideration to the letter and we take a very broad view of the problems and of the issues that will come up in the future talks after the 50% reduction treaty is concluded. Overall, our approach is that we need to really focus on concluding the 50% reductions treaty. I know this is a view that you share as well. This will enable us to initial the treaty at the Summit so that we can sign the treaty by the end of the year. As I have said, we still have quite a few issues that have to be worked out in the treaty, and they are both of a substantive and technical nature. It is going to require a lot of work to get that done. I know that your people have proposed that we should take an inventory of all the issues between us and see where we stand on each of them. I support this. I think it is a practical and appropriate way to proceed. I'd like to direct our people to do this exercise.

Baker: Good.

Shevardnadze: Yes, that would be very good because we really have, as I have said, a number of substantive and technical problems. And I remember the final stages of the INF Treaty, we really had a lot of difficulties with some of the technical problems that posed themselves.

Baker: Well, as you noted, I have got a list of the problems that need to be solved and I will present it to you tomorrow in the small group meeting on arms control and you can compare our list against any list you might have. You are quite right that we have a very big job if we are going to get ready by the 30th of May.

Shevardnadze: With respect to some of the substantive aspects of the reply, I do believe that it is not desirable at this time when we have a number of substantive differences to add to any of them. In other words, our real task right now is to try to reduce the substantive differences and not necessarily put a new one on the table -- an additional item that we really don't have time to work out. But in the context of your proposal, I have a suggestion to make. We would be ready to make a substantial cut in our mobile SS-24s if you would decide not to deploy your MX missile in a mobile form.

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We could record that in a political document if you'd like. To be more precise, we would be ready to stop deployment of these missiles by January 1, 1991. We would not be able to stop deployment during this year. This is our initial position. You will, of course, want to study it and discuss it. As you remember, I said in Namibia that there is a need for bold steps and major tradeoffs that are equitable if we are going to secure stability in our countries over time.

The second point in the letter I should note focuses on fixed MIRVed missiles in the next negotiations, and our readiness to discuss this. But cuts in one component should not create instability in other components. We are ready to discuss all problems, all issues, including major cuts in warheads in all missiles -- ICBMs and SLBMs. We also are willing to discuss cuts in ALCMs and bombers. In other words, I think we need to have a full discussion of the strategic triad. There are quite a few different variants that need to be considered and I think all these elements must be taken into account if we are going to have a real balance.

There is a factor I would like you to consider and that is that we now have a situation that has been typical in your country for a long time. That being, that all of these issues of parity, balance, the end of the arms race, are being scrutinized by our legislature. That is not new for you but it is new for us. And I must tell you quite frankly that we are hearing that we have made too many concessions. Both Gorbachev and I are being criticized quite seriously. We are being told that we make too many one-sided concessions; we are being told that the INF treaty was an example of that; we are being told that in these agreements now we are reducing 50% more missiles than the US is. So, please understand that our positions reflect an awareness of some of our political pressures as well. There certainly are many interesting and reasonable points in President Bush's letter and we want to look for solutions and variants that will be acceptable to both sides.

Also, in order to record the interests of both countries in continuing the START process, both Presidents really should sign a statement of intent at the Summit on future talks. Many of the ideas in the President's letter should be reflected in such a statement of intent. We have come with a draft of such a statement or declaration of intent. Your people should take a look at it and we will try to take into account their ideas. When you were in Namibia, you mentioned that the proposal that you were passing on to us was one that you were keeping confidential. Do you intend to keep it confidential or are you going to go public with it?

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Baker: Well, I think we will keep it confidential. But, undoubtedly, it will become public when we have to testify to Congress on our discussions. I must tell you that I have heard at the White House that an arms control reporter has already been inquiring about this matter. So I don't know how much longer we will be able to keep it confidential.

Shevardnadze: Well, then let's not make that a problem. If it comes out, it comes out.

Baker: We sought to keep it confidential because we did not want to publicize a proposal in the period between the time you got it and had a chance to come back with an answer on it.

Shevardnadze: I understand.

Baker: Two other points in response to what you said about the letter.

First, we too have a statement of intent or joint declaration of principles for follow-on negotiations that we would like to see signed. And secondly, in light of your response to our proposal, maybe we could put in that statement or that joint declaration the concept of de-MIRVing, noting that the concept ought to be explored because it is something that would promote stability. Our initial view is that we would prefer not to talk about START II, but rather talk of building on the START agreement because this is something that will facilitate our ratification process here. But these matters we can discuss further.

Shevardnadze: Yes, let's discuss them in greater detail and get our experts to discuss that. Of course, when we speak of the arms reduction process we have in mind MIRVed missiles too, not only ICBMs, but SLBMs, and also heavy bombers. Indeed the entire spectrum of arms, not just one component of the armed forces.

Baker: I understand that's your counter-proposal. We are not in a position to agree at this point but I think we ought to at least be thinking about some kind of generic statement on de-MIRVing of land-based missiles because this is something that could enhance our ability to talk about follow-on negotiations and its purposes.

Shevardnadze: Well, let's think about that. In our statement we are trying to identify all the main areas or aspects of future talks, emphasizing the most de-stabilizing weapons. But, let's take into account the fact that we each have interests and that historically our forces and structures have evolved in a certain way. That ought to be reflected in the statement.

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Baker: Well, we will see. Certainly whatever you have to present, we will take a look at. Whether we could agree to it will depend upon what's in it.

Shevardnadze: Yes, of course. The main element is our readiness to begin follow-on talks after the 50% reduction treaty has been completed. The objectives and the main aspects of those talks are what we are outlining. But we could compare our draft with yours and we will see where they overlap.

Baker: Yes, we will have to see it. I haven't seen yours, you haven't seen ours. Our experts can exchange them.

Shevardnadze: Let me emphasize what I said in Windhoek. On the issue of ALCMs, my bag is empty. I really have no room to maneuver on ALCM range. Other questions we can go over tomorrow and discuss them and see if we can find compromise solutions. I am hopeful that we can. On the possibility of a statement as a result of our talks, I think we ought to at least consider that. I have no objection to reflecting, in a short statement, what we have agreed to. Maybe we don't have to have a long statement.

Baker: I think that is right. I think we ought to not have to feel the need to produce a long joint communique every time we meet. If there is a very brief statement that records what we have agreed to, that is fine.

Shevardnadze: I think that is right. We can ask our experts to work out a brief statement reflecting agreements only. On the basis of our previous meetings I have always had a sense that we really run out of time and don't have enough time to review the results of our overall discussions. We have very wide-ranging talks. We have lots of experts, including experts on bilateral relations. And somehow 90 minutes for a concluding session doesn't seem to leave enough time.

Baker: Well, we can always extend that.

Shevardnadze: I brought with me our best experts on regional issues, on economic issues, on transnational questions, on humanitarian rights issues, on arms control -- really on everything.

Baker: Yes, it is true. In Moscow we made very good progress on arms control, but we really gave short shrift to the rest of our agenda. We shouldn't do that this time.

Shevardnadze: Yes. President Bush was saying in Malta that at the forthcoming Summit, our bilateral relations should take an appropriate and big place. Now, would you like me to say something about Lithuania?

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Baker: I have got some things to say, but you are the guest and if you would like to go first, that would be fine.

Shevardnadze: Maybe you should make your remarks first.

Baker: Before I get into the issue of Lithuania, let me make one other comment. When Admiral Crowe was visiting Moscow President Gorbachev said to him that he was unhappy about a tendency he saw on the part of some of the US delegation after the Ottawa meetings to comment in an arrogant way about the decisions that had been taken there. And further, he said he felt that perhaps I was responsible for this attitude. I bring this up because I have written a personal note to President Gorbachev. In the note I said that I do not operate that way; that I would not say anything like that, nor would I authorize members of our delegation to do so. Also, I said in the note that there were two people in this government that were most supportive of perestroika and of Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev and that is President Bush and myself. We are receiving a great deal of criticism for being too much the defenders of the Soviet Union and the current Soviet administration. And everything we have tried to do is to be supportive of what you are trying to do. We certainly haven't tried to make the job that the two of you have any harder. I mention this only because I have written a letter to your President and I just wanted you to know about that.

Shevardnadze: Let me say that when Gorbachev received Admiral Crowe I was not even in Moscow, I was out of the country, as you know. And I must be honest, I really didn't attach too much importance to that meeting so I didn't even ask to get a briefing about it. We respect Admiral Crowe but he is not active, he is no longer a member of the Joint Chiefs. So we don't attach that much significance to it. I will talk to Akhromeyev about it and find out about what was said, and I can tell you tomorrow if you would like. But let me just say that President Gorbachev has a lot of respect for both President Bush and you. He feels that very deeply.

Baker: I only mention this because I wanted to let you know that I had written such a note. There is no need for you to follow up on it. I just wanted you to know I had done this and why I had done it. Can I go to Lithuania now.

Perhaps your Ambassador has given you a bit of the mood in this country about Lithuania. All I have to say, I am going to say because I know we have a very fine personal relationship. Because of that and because of the kinds of discussions that we have had, I can speak very frankly to you. In fact, I am going to speak to you from the heart. I sent you a personal message on the way back from Africa. And President Bush several days after that send a message to President Gorbachev as well.

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I have got to tell you that Lithuania is creating problems that can easily spill over into the relationship between our two countries. In fact, it may already be doing that.

You need to know that this is going to happen because public opinion in this country and in the Congress is hardening all the time. We have just had a vote in the Senate, a 93-0 vote, expressing the Senate's attitude on the issue of Lithuania. Unless we can see some real prospect of progress toward a peaceful solution, I really question how much longer we will be able to maintain our current position with the kinds of nuanced statements that you yourself pointed out in Windhoek we have been making. I am just not sure we can maintain this kind of posture.

I really think it would be untenable unless we begin to see some real movement towards a peaceful solution. You need to know that we are being accused of abandoning our principles, we are being accused of rather naively trusting our personal relationship with you and President Gorbachev.

I said in Africa, right after our meeting there, that you had said that force would not be used and I said that I believed you because I had no reason not to. Now the press is saying that coercion and intimidation are being used. And as you saw downstairs, they are raising this very question with you. What you said at Andrews when you arrived yesterday was perfect, because you said our only weapon is dialogue, honest dialogue. And that's what we are seeking to promote.

That is one of the reasons we were encouraged. We were encouraged by your statement, and I must tell you that we were also encouraged by the meeting that Yakolev had yesterday. But one of the reasons I am not encouraged right now is that your Interior Minister did not have the meeting that was scheduled today take place with the Lithuanian delegation.

We are very conscious of the pressures that you face and we are also very concerned that events not spiral out of control. I mentioned that to you in Africa. I mean it is clear that all that is needed right now is one incident where you feel the need to go in and restore order. And we are going to be put in a position where we are simply not able to defend what is going on and what you are doing.

I really only mention this because of the genuine interest and desire we have to see you succeed. I say this also because I want you to know that the pressures are really building up within the United States. It seems to us, and I didn't want this to sound like we're preaching to you, that you need a process or a mechanism to defuse the situation and to permit a dialogue to begin and to continue. That is really very badly needed. I am very pleased to see that in the debate in the

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Supreme Soviet about the secession law, that some have emphasized the role of referendums. I am pleased, as well, by statements that had been made, including I think by your Interior Minister, that a suspension, not rescission or annulment, of the Lithuanian declarations might be a basis for a dialogue. I am also pleased that the Lithuanians now favor a referendum to be followed by discussions and a dialogue to solve the problem.

A referendum could be the starting point for a credible process. It would permit you to move away from past disputes. Both parties could be looking to the future. It would establish a new basis for talks that isn't tainted by old arguments regarding legal status and sovereignty. The talks that could begin about a referendum would give you time to go forward with your secession law and you could say that law applies in the case of other republics. It permits you to side-step the declaration of independence. Pointing to a referendum would allow you to make the argument, at least to your hardliners, that you are not accepting the issue of independence or that it has already been decided. Why would there be a need to have a referendum if that were the case?

Now what you have said is that the Lithuanians have the right to go, but with due regard to your laws. This idea of referendum would provide a practical mechanism for getting there. And it seems to me it also is consistent with at least some of the elements of the secession law you have been debating. And it would certainly meet the test of self-determination and provide for self-determination.

I have further ideas, but I probably have already worn our welcome by getting into all of this. Please understand that the reason I raise this issue and go into this kind of detail is because we are genuinely concerned about how long we can hold the position that we currently have. I know we have talked about this generally before, and you have talked about the difficulty of establishing a precedent for other republics. But this approach could be taken without being precedential because you are taking it with regard to a republic prior to the finalization of your secession law. Any referendum would have to be followed by talks that settle all of the issues that are of concern to you -- security, economic relations, borders, minority rights, etc.

I have got to tell you that I am worried. I am deeply and genuinely worried. We don't want to see this thing spin out of control. We do not want to see this deteriorate because it is going to have a direct effect on our relations. We have come so far in the last fourteen months. I do not want to see that undermined. We simply have to find a way to keep moving in a positive direction across the full range of our agenda and our relations. But that isn't going to happen if this thing spins out of control and deteriorates. In any case, to do that, it

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seems to us, that the people in the Baltics have got to believe that they will, in fact, have the right of self-determination. And that right, even if exercised some time in the future, is not going to be subject to onerous technical and legal requirements. I just don't see any other way out of the problem.

One final thing. The Baltics are, of course, different from the standpoint of the United States from other republics. So the American people feel very strongly about the Baltics. And they identify with that much more than they might with republics in, for example, Central Asia. There is a different juridical position in the view of the United States. So finding a solution that deals with the desire for self-determination in the Baltics is, in my view, far more critical to the well-being of US-Soviet relations than it might be in terms of some other republics.

Again, let me come back to the referendum. The referendum and your acceptance of the referendum is a practical way to go. The Lithuanian acceptance of the referendum is an implicit acceptance of their backing away from the declaration of independence. And it certainly can be portrayed as such by you. I am sorry to spend so much time on this but I regard it as a matter of extreme urgency. Today you closed the borders. You have expelled two of our diplomats. The foreign press has been told to leave, APCs move through the streets and are seen on our TV. Now all of these moves normally presage a use of force. And that is disturbing to everybody. And I must tell you that everyone who doesn't like the fact that our relations are moving from confrontation to cooperation are using what you are doing as a vehicle to beat up on both President Bush and myself. [Shevardnadze nodded at this point.] I just don't know how long we are going to be able to hold the line, unless we can point to a process that gives the Lithuanians a chance for self-determination.

Shevardnadze: I will try to answer the points and some of the questions you have raised. I acknowledge that it is not necessarily easy. I agree that we have done a great deal to improve the US-Soviet relationship and we are not just doing this because of the US-Soviet relationship but we are doing it for the general climate in the world. That is the reason we can speak about the end of the Cold War and that is the reason we can talk about ending the military face-off between us.

President Bush has talked about a new closeness. President Gorbachev has said that we don't regard the United States as a military enemy any longer. These really are great accomplishments for our generation. I believe that we have a responsibility to the world community, and it is very important

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for us to act wisely with restraint and with care in order that we don't retreat from what's been achieved. I assure you that we in the Soviet leadership, President Gorbachev and others, value and indeed cherish the US-Soviet relationship. We don't doubt for a minute your sincerity and President Bush's sincerity when you speak of your support for what we are trying to do in the Soviet Union. We know that you and the President have been criticized over Lithuania. But please allow me to be candid.

Gorbachev and I have also come in for a great deal of criticism. We've come in for criticism after Panama. We were criticized for not standing by certain principles and values. What we actively did at that time need not be recounted here, you know it well. Of course, the comparison between Panama and Lithuania is not necessarily appropriate -- Panama was a different country, Lithuania is part of our country. But still we acted and were able to act and speak with some restraint.

It wasn't easy for us, wasn't easy for our President. What do we do now? First, we were faced with an accomplished fact. And I must tell you, we were deceived. When the Communist Party in Lithuania became independent and established itself, we discussed this at our National Party Plenum. The leaders of Lithuania at that time said that in no way were they planning to secede from the Soviet Union. They said that we really didn't have anything to worry about, that they didn't plan to secede. Though they did say that at some future point their objective would be independence, but that was for the future, it wasn't for now. Then when Gorbachev went to Lithuania and he had good, frank and open discussions in Lithuania, secession wasn't even mentioned.

Then there was the election to the Supreme Soviet in Lithuania. And during that election, if you look at the figures, you will see that the numbers of people who actually participated in the election and those who voted for secessionists, was not all that great. So the legality of that decision, at least in our eyes, is somewhat doubtful. Moreover, the decision was taken at night. In fact, we refer to it as a night-time coup. Now, they like to say that the decision of the Supreme Soviet in 1940 to be part of the Soviet Union was illegal because there were Soviet troops in the country. Well there are Soviet troops in the country today. In fact there are three times as many. In any case, perhaps you can say that the decisions that were taken at that time didn't give the Lithuanians any choice; or rather the choice that they had was to go with Russia or share their destiny with the other countries that were being occupied by Hitler.

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If we were to look at this from the standpoint of international law, this dispute could go on indefinitely. No one imposed on Lithuania the constitution that is now in effect, the one that was adopted in 1978. That was adopted in a nationwide referendum. And the Lithuanians supported it unanimously. That constitution is still in effect, and it is a constitution that has elements that deal with the issues of borders, foreign policy, defense, all the components that you would expect to be dealt with in a constitution. It also, of course, had the right of self-determination embodied in it. And they have that right. But along with that right there are also some obligations. You have to take into account the other components that I mentioned.

Let me say to you, this is just for you, it is not for the press. I may understand Lithuania better than others because I am an ethnic, others aren't. And what I'll tell you, from my perspective, is that they have acted in an irresponsible way. We have been together for 50 years, and we have established a common economy. If today we were to stop the supply of oil, gas, grain and cotton, in two days that republic would explode. There are thousands of different factories that are linked to various organizations in other republics and I must tell you that we are under some pressure to take measures to sever these links. And it is not so easy at a point when we have gone to decentralization to guarantee that such links won't be severed. Moreover, Lithuania is a multi-ethnic republic. There are Belorussians, there're Ukranians, there are Russians, there are Poles; in our estimate there are about 2.5 million Lithuanians and there may be nearly one million others. I might also tell you that the Russian-speaking population is employed in the biggest factories and they are against secession. There was a rally, you may know, that was attended by 200,000 people. There is a real force that is opposed to secession. In addition to this, the Belorussians are saying that five or six of their rural districts were given to Lithuania and they want them back. They have come to us and they have said that if the Center isn't going to help, they'll do it by force. We are trying to calm the situation.

You know what happened in Armenia and Azerbaijan. That's what could happen here as well. In addition to that we have big garrisons that are stationed in Lithuania; the Baltic Sea is there, there are military bases; there are townships where the military and their families live. No one can guarantee that all this will remain calm. So the leaders of the Soviet Union are very concerned; we are alarmed about the situation.

You are right, one incident could cause everything to spiral out of control. In the Caucasus, we face a civil war. In fact, we were accused there of moving too slowly, too late.

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We want a serious dialogue. There was a chance for it when Gorbachev called for a new body of the Council of the Federation to be attended by the top leaders of all the republics, including the Lithuanians. There was a preliminary discussion and we asked the Lithuanians to come to this Council to meet with Soviet leaders and lay out their concerns. We hoped this would be the beginning of the dialogue. We know that the Lithuanians are at an impasse and we know that they do not know how to get out of it. They didn't come when we asked them to come a week ago Friday. Gorbachev had even sent a personal invitation to come and there were also telephone calls from senior Soviet leaders asking them to come and discuss the issue.

One other point. I must tell you that in the Soviet Union the Lithuanian events are playing very badly. They are playing especially badly in the big republics, like Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan. And the President is facing a lot of pressure. We need to find a common language, and we also need to restore and re-establish order. We categorically rule out the use of any force. That's our conviction. We can't do otherwise. But we have a responsibility to maintain order. If there is a clash, who is responsible? Those irresponsible ones who acted over night. We have to ensure order.

Still we think there must be a dialogue. It has to begin. I can't tell you why the Interior Minister's meeting did not take place today. I can tell you there was no political reason for it, and I will look into it for you and I will give you an answer.

As for the law of secession, it has already been adopted. And the institution of a referendum that you mentioned is there. But it is not a panacea because they have already decided in Lithuania without consultations with anyone. So now there is a lot of discussion for how we deal with the referendum, what the basis for it would be, what its date would be and so forth. But I can say it would simply be irresponsible to get up and say: "okay, you are free to go right now."

Baker: I agree with that. That is not what I was suggesting.

Shevardnadze: We can't simply let them go immediately. What are we suppose to do, how are they suppose to live, how are they suppose to operate? We'd have to separate all these links. It wouldn't work.

Baker: What I was suggesting was that you talk to resolve the questions that you were raising about borders, about economic relations, about the relationship with Belorussia.

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All these things ought to be resolved through dialogue, and you really need a process to be able to ensure that you can resolve this through dialogue.

Shevardnadze: You are very wise to use the word process. We've talked about getting a process and having a decision that could work out whether we have a confederate relationship or whether they choose to go. But that ought to be the result of the process. We have now declared that we will have a differentiated approach to each republic. That there will be a separate treaty with each republic. And maybe the outcome will be confederation with some republics. Maybe the outcome will be secession with some republics. But there has to be a process. We know we have to begin such a process. What is important now for us in the Soviet Union and our friends abroad is to exercise maximum restraint. People are beginning to understand that this is all a big misunderstanding. Some of the peasants we know are realizing this.

Baker: I agree that there is a big set of problems. And I think that many of them can be resolved after you have had a referendum or plebiscite. But the fact that you and they agree that there ought to be a referendum should be some important common ground. I believe that a referendum would calm the situation. It would lay the groundwork for a dialogue which wouldn't require that you rehash all the legalities or technicalities. And, if you can begin to calm the situation, you will also find that it has an effect on what's going on outside the Soviet Union and the perception of what's happening in the Soviet Union. Why don't you show that there can be a dialogue. Why don't you permit the free expression of people and let them go ahead and exercise their right to self-determination?

Shevardnadze: Well, let me make several points: First, I can't name a single leader in any other country that is more interested in solving this problem and having stability in Lithuanian than we are.

My second point is on the use of force. This again is a deep conviction of ours. My third point is, and I have told US reporters in the past, that there is no alternative to perestroika. Well the truth is that that's a mistake. There is an alternative to perestroika. If perestroika doesn't succeed, then you are going to have the destabilization of the Soviet Union. And if that happens there will be a dictator.

You know I was struck at the time by a speech that one of the members of the Plenum made accusing us -- Gorbachev and me -- of having ruined the country, of having lost Eastern Europe and saying look at what we were doing to the country. He was heavily applauded. And that applause represented a clear

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statement against those who support democratization and against those of us who favor new civilized relations between the Center and the individual nations and republics within the Soviet Union. We have to find a way to get to a dialogue. But we must ensure stability in the Soviet Union.

Destabilization in the Soviet Union is going to mean anarchy not just in the Soviet Union, maybe in Europe, maybe not only there.

Baker: I agree that what you have outlined could well be a possible alternative. Nobody wants to see that happen. That's precisely the reason I feel such a sense of urgency about getting a process started that could put the Lithuanian situation into a different category. In effect, put it on hold, create a dialogue in which you could work out what needs to be worked out. I think the way to get that process started is by focusing on the issue of a referendum. It can't be a referendum that is somehow suspect, that doesn't include everybody. It has to include everybody in Lithuania.

Shevardnadze: Well, but the Lithuanians are proposing to hold a referendum about not about whether they will secede from the Soviet Union but rather whether or not they should be entering into the Soviet Union. Since they said they never were legally a part of it.

Baker: But if you offer a true referendum to be followed by talks, I don't see how that could be turned down. No one is going to turn that down because if they turn it down they are not going to be able to keep the support of public opinion. If you just offer it, I think it is going to enhance and achieve stability.

Shevardnadze: Well, now, this mechanism has been established in our mechanism of secession. And we are in fact providing for a procedure for referendum or plebiscite. Now they said that this doesn't apply to them because they are not a part of the Soviet Union. They must overcome this psychology. They have to begin a dialogue. They had a chance to come, they should have come to the Federation Council. Gorbachev was ready and they didn't come.

Baker: But they are saying they want a dialogue and they want to have a dialogue with the leadership of the Soviet Union, not just with the Council. They say, as well, they would like the opportunity for a referendum. It seems like they are looking very hard for a way to take a step back and the dynamics are good for putting in place a mechanism or process that could short-circuit an incident that would result in the loss of everything we have tried to build up.

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Shevardnadze: Well, we are looking for ways.

Baker: Was the meeting with Yakolev the beginning of a dialogue?

Shevardnadze: It was a very good meeting, in a normal civilized way. It just wasn't conclusive.

Baker: Let's take a break for a couple of minutes. I don't think we will have time to get to Germany tonight so why don't we do that at our dinner tomorrow night.

Back on Lithuania.

Baker: It is our assessment that the Lithuanians are trying to take a step back. We hope you find a way to step back as well. What gives us trouble is that you close your borders; journalists are forced to leave; we see tanks in the streets; there is no way to explain that. The Lithuanians are now saying that they will accept a referendum and I suppose that the basis of that referendum is something that you should discuss. I don't know why you shouldn't. It also seems to be that a future referendum would, in effect, nullify the declaration of independence. In addition to this, the Lithuanians have also said that independence should only come in stages. Moreover, I have heard that they evidently agreed in the meeting with Yakolev that the acts that had been taken could be suspended or at least that they might suspend future acts. So it seems to me that they are quite anxious to begin a process, and it is a process that meets many of your requirements. I just hope that someone in Moscow, maybe it is you, will focus on getting a process or mechanism going before there is an incident that basically destroys any possibility of resolving the situation peacefully.

Shevardnadze: Well, we have to begin a serious discussion. I don't know, as I said, how conclusive the talk with Yakolev was. One meeting is not enough. Once a dialogue begins, I think it will calm things down. Now we have a decision of the Congress of Peoples Deputies that annuls a declaration of independence. President Gorbachev has to comply with the decision of the Congress. But, I think the process will begin and I think we will work things out. It is very important that we avoid any serious complications or clashes. If we are able to avoid incidents, I think the people will speak out and make their voices heard.

Baker: I think if you can avoid incidents you can start a process.

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Ross: Could I ask a question? What, Mr. Minister, in your eyes, would it take right now to begin the process or a dialogue? What prevents it from starting now? Why wasn't the Yakolev meeting the beginning of a dialogue?

Shevardnadze: Well, speaking strictly or legally, they have to return to the status quo ante. Their decision has no legal force. On that basis, we will won't be able to discuss anything. A referendum can take place and afterwards we can talk about afterwards what their place is going to be in a federation. Or whether there will be confederate links or whether they will want to leave the Union altogether. But that takes serious discussion. One meeting with one leader is not enough. Without a serious dialogue, things just cannot work out. I must tell you that the Lithuanians are not simple people. By that I mean they are not angels. They have certain residency tests, they have also adopted discriminating laws. You know they adopted a law that would prosecute people for anti-state activities. It sounds a lot like the kinds of laws we used to have.

Baker: You answered Dennis' question in a legal way; in a kind of formal way. But why don't you approach it politically and not legally? Politically, couldn't you over-look or ignore the illegal act? You say it doesn't have the force of law. Why not simply agree to start a dialogue and announce you will go to a referendum and have talks about future relations? If this very act that you say is illegal and doesn't have the force of law in your eyes, then why do you have to pay any attention to it?

Shevardnadze: Well, first of all they have to come to Moscow. Gorbachev can't go there. You know, they know how to get there. They can buy tickets and come on the train or we will send a plane for them.

Baker: Well, three of them are in Moscow.

Shevardnadze: In any case, they will have to come to Moscow and that's where we can work this out.

Baker: I appreciate the discussion we've had and I appreciate our spending time on this. I just want to reiterate the point that this cannot be allowed to spiral out of control. It really will undermine everything we have accomplished. And as you said we have an obligation to the world to try to keep things moving forward.

Shevardnadze: We don't want to see our relations sour. And you don't want to see our relations spoil. As for Lithuania, we will manage it, we will find a common language, and it will work out.

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Baker. I hope so.

Ross took Tarasenko aside at the end of the conversation and said the Minister spoke of the importance of having a dialogue but avoided any mention of how such a dialogue could begin. Did the Soviets have an idea? To be specific, what did it take from the Soviet standpoint to get the dialogue, the process, started?

Tarasenko said the key issue was that Landsbergis had to come to Moscow. That this had become a matter of face for Gorbachev. When Landsbergis hadn't come to Moscow when he'd been invited, this had caused Gorbachev serious problems. This, in Tarasenko's words, was the "codeword" for getting over the hump: Landsbergis to Moscow.

Following the Baker and Shevardnadze comments to the press a little while later, **Tarasenko** said Landsbergis needs to come to Moscow and he implied Landsbergis should attend a Federation Council meeting.

End of conversation.

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April 6, 1990

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: April 5, 1990
Time: 9:00pm - 11:00pm
Place: Secretary Baker's Residence

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

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SCS 8/5/13

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Baker
William Hopkins (Interpreter)

Minister Shevardnadze
Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

During the course of the dinner conversation, Secretary Baker said he had a comment to make in the form of a question. He wondered whether Foreign Minister Shevardnadze believed that if President Landsbergis were to go to Moscow and agree to suspend (as opposed to annul) actions taken in Lithuania, whether that would be sufficient to lead to the beginning of a dialogue. The Secretary also expressed the hope that the Soviet leadership would not make a decision to introduce direct Presidential rule in Lithuania. In the United States, for example, that would be perceived as a blatantly anti-democratic move which would play very badly in terms of U.S. public opinion. He concluded by expressing the hope that a process will be initiated whereby a solution can be found to the current situation in Lithuania.

Baker further expressed the hope that the Soviet government will do all it can to discourage the Russian minority in Lithuania from organizing demonstrations which could potentially lead to clashes. He recalled that in his first conversation with Minister Shevardnadze during the current Ministerial he had expressed U.S. support for the positive changes taking place in the Soviet Union. The U.S. desires to be able to continue to support the efforts of Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev. The positive changes in the Soviet Union are important to the entire world.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paused for a rather long moment before responding to the Secretary's remarks. Then he replied that in responding, it should be understood that decisions concerning such considerations as those implied in the Secretary's remarks are ordinarily made by the Soviet leadership on a collective basis. Despite that, speaking personally and individually, he expressed the supposition that if Landsbergis were to come to Moscow, it would be very positive and helpful. Changing his tone and expression somewhat, the Foreign Minister wondered aloud whether under the circumstances the Lithuanians could really expect Gorbachev to come to them. He continued that as far as the Soviet leadership is concerned Landsbergis is an unknown entity. However, he is considered to be inexperienced, naive -- and, therefore, politically speaking, dangerous. In this respect, under the former music professor's leadership, rather starry-eyed decisions have been taken in Lithuania, the profound implications of which have only subsequently become apparent.

Shevardnadze continued that there are large Russian, Polish and Belorussian minorities in Lithuania. Many of those minority people who are against secession are employed at factories. Thus far, particularly in those factories that are "all-union" (as opposed to those of the Lithuanian Republic), despite the ethnic mix, it has been possible to keep order. He said his most grave fear is that there will be some kind of incident or clash between factions or minorities or even between individuals that could lead to an explosion.

Shevardnadze again stated that the Soviet leadership is unequivocally and categorically against the use of force in Lithuania. In that connection he recalled two incidents from recent times. Force was used during the Georgian uprising last year. The decision on that score had been made "legally" in the Georgian Republic; still, the actions of the local political and military authorities were subsequently officially condemned at the highest governmental level. He emphasized that it had not been easy to make the decision to condemn the use of force, since that reflected so badly on the local authorities and on the military. In connection with the Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes, he recalled that there had actually been an all-out civil war. In that situation, the Central Government was accused of being remiss for not having sent troops in early enough to prevent the bloodshed that took place.

Despite such considerations, Shevardnadze reiterated that the use of force in Lithuania is something totally outside the Weltanschauung of the current Soviet leadership. The only "weapon" it desires to use is dialogue. He again expressed his profound concern about the possibility of the accidental outbreak of explosive violence as the result of some individual incident. He maintained that troops have been sent into Lithuania solely for the purpose of "keeping the lid on" and preventing a repetition of events such as those in Tbilisi or Baku.

Alluding to other remarks made by the Secretary, Shevardnadze said that as to foreigners being put out of Lithuania or journalists being fettered in their work there, if any such measures are taken it is not with the intention on the part of the authorities to prevent news coverage of events or to have any "closed" areas. All those kinds of things are in the past. However, he continued, it has been learned from sad experience that extremist factions on both ends of a local political spectrum in these kinds of situations "play to the cameras." The presence of foreigners and representatives of the media and exacerbates fosters that kind of grandstanding.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet leadership is deeply mindful of its profound responsibility -- in the given instance in terms of Lithuania -- and in a larger sense because it realizes its responsibility to all the other peoples and republics in the USSR, as well as to the peoples of Europe and, indeed, of the world. Consequently, it would neither be in anyone's interest to have this situation go badly, nor to have perestroika fail. He alluded to serious internal conservative criticism of the current leadership. The Gorbachev Administration has been accused by conservatives of bringing about the dissolution of a stable, secure Soviet state. Shevardnadze repeated that he used to maintain that there is no alternative to perestroika. Now, he said, he realizes his earlier contention was not correct. Should perestroika fail, the alternative is the emergence of a dictatorship -- with all the attendant deportations, enforced exiles, and executions that will take place. There are enough sufficiently recent examples of this sort of thing.

Shevardnadze maintained that in Lithuania there will be no use of force. He said every effort will be made to avoid incidents and to maintain order and peace -- as well as to work out some dialogue and some solution to the current situation. Despite his expression of such grave concerns, Shevardnadze said he is by nature an optimist, and he expressed his optimistic confidence in the fact that the current situation will be resolved peacefully.

Florence,

And here's #3 . . .

Cheers,

Caron

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Memorandum of Conversation

Date: April 6, 1990
Time: 11:50 am - 12:20 pm
Place: Oval Office

U.S. Participants:
President Bush
Secretary Baker
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

USSR Participants:
Minister Shevardnadze
P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

President Bush told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that he wished to pass a letter from Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev. In the past, the press had reported that relations between Nancy Reagan and Raisa had not been the best. But the President said that Barbara liked Raisa and felt that she was very gracious, that they would get along well and that Barbara Bush would like Raisa.

Secretary Baker added that the President could not say this, but he could, i.e., that Raisa would also like Barbara Bush. The President indicated that in her letter, Barbara was inviting Raisa to accompany her to a graduation speech which she would be giving at a well-known U.S. college, Wellesley. If Raisa would agree, Barbara would like to spend a half day with her there. But if this was not considered suitable, there would be no problem. Barbara had written this letter only this morning.

Shevardnadze thanked the President and said that President Gorbachev and Raisa had a great deal of respect for the President and his wife. They recalled with pleasure their meetings with the two of them. Shevardnadze continued that he had already said this in his remarks, but he wanted to stress that he felt that there was a good relationship between the two presidents and that this was in the interest of our peoples and the whole world. He said that it was not by chance that he had recalled the initial meetings between the two and how they compared to the latest meeting between the President and Gorbachev on Malta. The atmosphere was different and the entire relationship was different.

Shevardnadze wanted to add one more thing. He understood that there could be difficulties in the relationship. He had already mentioned to the Secretary that perhaps the U.S. side would need to say things which were critical in connection with events in the world and in the Soviet Union. When the U.S. took action in Panama the Soviet Union did not like it and said so but the Soviet side respected its relationship with the President, Secretary Baker and the U.S. administration. This was good, because the relationship was important.

The President responded that Lithuania was Panama squared or cubed. He was being clobbered by conservatives who said that he did not care about the freedom of the Lithuanians, that he was selling out his principles for Gorbachev's sake. Ambassador Dubinin had probably shown the newspaper clippings to the Minister. But the U.S. side was trying to hold back the rhetoric and not to increase tensions.

The President asked Shevardnadze if it were true that President Gorbachev was under tremendous pressure from the right wing of the military, that they were saying if he would not crack down, things would fall apart, and that this was a big problem.

Shevardnadze replied that there were difficulties within the party. There were people who severely criticized them and Gorbachev for not being decisive enough. These were the conservative elements. Recently, materials from the party plenum were published, including a speech which the President may have read made by an ambassador who was a Central Committee member.

Secretary Baker asked if this was the Soviet ambassador to Poland, and Shevardnadze replied in the affirmative.

Shevardnadze continued that the Polish ambassador criticized Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership for what they had done. The Soviet Union had been a model country. It had been united and monolithic. There had been no conflicts or excesses. For better or worse, things had been peaceful. There had been a socialist Eastern Europe. Security had been guaranteed. But now there was no guarantee of security. Within the Soviet Union there were conflicts and clashes. There were tendencies of secession. What had the leadership done to the country? Shevardnadze said that he would not conceal that this statement was applauded. There was a struggle in the country.

Shevardnadze continued that they had said that what was going on in the Soviet Union was a revolution. It was not an armed revolution, not a coup. It was a revolution of consciousness. And he wanted to add one more thing. The Soviet Union is an educated country. But its political education is not at a very high level. This is unfortunate. But political changes were sometimes hard to accept without a proper political education, and that this was rife with catastrophic potential.

Shevardnadze continued that things were difficult sometimes, but they were convinced that there was no other way. Perestroika was the path they felt Soviet society should follow. They were convinced that democracy needed to be defended, because if it was not, tomorrow there would be a dictator.

Shevardnadze said that at the plenum he had said that if there were no perestroika, democracy could not be realized. The result would be either anarchy or a dictatorship. If there were anarchy, this would destabilize the Soviet Union and Europe, and not only Europe. If there were to be a dictatorship, this would be a tragedy. He said that the U.S. knew what a dictatorship was in the Soviet Union and in other countries. The Soviet Union was now at a critical stage. The Soviet side had read the statements by the President and Secretary Baker and were convinced that they supported the programs which were being implemented in the Soviet Union.

The President said that he was very concerned that Lithuania could become a roadblock between our two countries because of historical circumstances. The U.S. was committed to freedom, democracy, and self-determination. He hoped that Minister Shevardnadze and Gorbachev could find a solution to this problem in order to remove the roadblock. The President continued that he appreciated that sometimes the President would need to say things which put the US at odds with the Soviet Union. He said that the Foreign Minister had also mentioned Soviet statements about Panama in that vein. The U.S. side was trying to hold down the rhetoric. The President would not want a host of Western European countries all of a sudden asking for the recognition of Lithuania. The U.S. side has not done this, although such a step would be very popular in the US.

Secretary Baker added that, as he had already discussed with the Minister, once such a cycle began, it could not be assuaged--there would be a demand to do more and more. If such demands were raised by the US side, then the question would be asked about why the ministers were meeting at all, and why there should be a summit meeting. This is why the U.S. felt that it was critical, as the President had said, to get a process going which would lead to dialogue in order to ~~diffuse~~ *defuse* the problems connected with the Baltic states. These problems differed from other ones because of the specific legal situation.

Shevardnadze replied that the Secretary had used a good word, i.e., that a solution for the Lithuanian problem required the establishment of a process. Things could not be done overnight. It was important that a dialogue had begun, and the Soviet side would facilitate such a dialogue. Dialogue was their weapon, their policy, their approach.

The President added that the U.S. side had no influence over Landsbergis, but if it did it would certainly urge him to engage in dialogue.

Shevardnadze wished to add that there had been a possibility for this. There was a new body in the Soviet Union called the Federation Council, where the leaders of the republics came together to discuss various issues. In the past, England had been an empire, and now there was a commonwealth. This was a pure formality, but the members of the commonwealth would meet once a year to discuss basic questions of interest. Gorbachev had invited the new Lithuanian leader to come to Moscow for a dialogue with him and with the leaders of the other republics. This had been a good opportunity but, unfortunately, he did not come. But perhaps there would be other opportunities. The final word would be up to the people. No one had asked the people. Secession was declared overnight.

The President replied that this was why a referendum would make sense. He remarked parenthetically that Shevardnadze probably thought that Bush was crazy to smile at Shevardnadze's mention of Panama, but he was smiling because he recalled Gorbachev's comparison of the Brezhnev Doctrine to the "Bush Doctrine" in reference to the Philippines.

Shevardnadze replied that anything can happen in a dialogue. Gorbachev had been severely criticized for not being critical of President Bush over the issue. A resolution had been passed in the Soviet Congress about this. The President had said today that he had difficulties with the U.S. Congress. But there were even greater difficulties with the Soviet Congress.

The President acknowledged that it was a difficult situation.

Secretary Baker indicated that he and Shevardnadze had spoken at length about a referendum during their last meeting, and he felt that a referendum, together with a dialogue, would diffuse the situation.

diffuse

Shevardnadze indicated that a new mechanism was now in place in the Soviet Union which could provide a method for resolving these issues. The appropriate legislation had been adopted.

Shevardnadze said that he wished to pass on to the President information from President Gorbachev, which he had already given to Secretary Baker, about the fact that Ambassador Dubinin was leaving the US. He was a good man, well-respected by the Soviet leadership. He would now be going to France. He was a specialist in that area and liked to work in Europe. The Soviet Union was satisfied that the Ambassador had established a good relationship with the President and the Secretary of State. Now, since the U.S.-Soviet relationship was such a special one, the Soviet Union was appointing Ambassador Bessmertnykh as Ambassador to the U.S. The President knew him. Bessmertnykh had "grown up" here. He knew and liked the United States, and he was trusted by Gorbachev. The President would recall that Bessmertnykh had come with a special letter concerning a sensitive matter in the past. He should be considered not only an ambassador, but a special envoy. Any delicate issues could be passed on through the new Ambassador.

The President said that he liked Bessmertnykh, as did Secretary Baker, and that all necessary protocol requirements would be concluded expeditiously. Ambassador Dubinin, when he first arrived, did not have that good a feel for the United States, but he came to handle the rapidly changing relationship quite well, and had secured many friends and much respect in the U.S. He was a good advocate for the policy of the USSR. As he bids the US farewell, we consider that he has done a good job and are glad that he is taking on a new and challenging assignment.

Shevardnadze thanked the President. He appreciated the fact that the President had given him his time and asked that he pass on to Barbara best wishes from President Gorbachev and Raisa. He thanked the President for the letter and said that he had no doubt there would be a good relationship between the President's wife and Raisa.

The President interjected that this was important.

Shevardnadze added that anything that the U.S. side would offer by way of a program would be appropriate.

The President indicated that he would very much like to invite Gorbachev to his home in Maine. The setting was a very beautiful one. They could have informal talks there. The only difficulty on the U.S. side was the question of logistics. It was a small town and there might be a problem with getting 4,000 press people there, so perhaps it might not be possible, although the President would like it to happen. If it were not possible, they might go to Camp David and spend a day and a half talking there without a lot of people around.

Shevardnadze replied that the Soviet side was awaiting U.S. proposals about the program for the visit.

Secretary Baker added that they would be able to discuss this.

The President said that in Maine even President Mitterrand was able to relax, amazing as that might seem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # _____

RELEASER JM

ROUTINE

FROM/LOCATION

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GEN. SCOWCROFT / K-PORT

2. _____

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 4/6/09

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

Unofficial translation

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
The President of the United
States of America

Dear Mr. President,

Addressing this message to you as Chairman of the Sixteenth Economic Summit of the Seven's leaders due to be held in Houston, and through you, to its other participants, I wish to continue the discussion of the general problems of the world's development and of ways of getting our economies closer together.

The time which has elapsed since the Paris summit has been filled with developments of truly historic proportions. At the political level, a great deal has been done in terms of overcoming the divisions in the world. The division of Europe is becoming a thing of the past. The antagonism between the blocs and the superpowers is giving way to relations of partnership and cooperation.

Disarmament processes are gaining strength, which not only makes the world safer, but is creating a solid foundation for a sustained development of the world economy.

Overcoming the economic division of the world is now the order of the day. What needs to be done is achieving compatibility between different economic mechanisms and creating new cooperative structures. The decisions of the Bonn conference on economic cooperation and the establishment of the European bank for reconstruction and development are going in this direction.

2.

The granting to the Soviet Union of the observer status in GATT is cause for satisfaction. It is a real step toward economic openness. The Soviet contacts with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development are on the increase. The agreement between the USSR and the European communities on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, concluded last December, has begun to operate. The recent US-Soviet summit in Washington saw a genuine "breakthrough" in economic matters.

It is important that the rapprochement between East and West is not taking place in isolation from the rest of the world and that it is contributing to shaping universal principles of economic comity of all states, including developing countries, which was stipulated in the decisions of the Eighteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

Looking back at the year past, we believe that the Soviet leadership has been doing everything in its power in order to buttress its new policies with concrete actions both at home and abroad.

Today, the USSR is going through a most critical stage in perestroika. It involves breaking the obsolete economic structures and a transition to market economy. Without these radical steps, further renewal of our society will be impossible.

At present, the Soviet leadership is looking for ways of supplementing the internal transformations with outside financial and economic support. These efforts are directed toward securing credit assistance, attraction of foreign capital, transfer of managerial experience, personnel training, and include other measures conducive to creating a competitive economy.

The first contacts in this regard have taken place, and by and large we are finding understanding.

Perhaps, it would be possible to talk about working out long-term agreements on large-scale credit and investment cooperation which in effect would be a serious factor of

3.

stabilization and a transition to the market economy in the USSR. Establishment of a specific program of cooperation - eventually mutually beneficial cooperation - would best serve this objective.

I feel that a sustained economic dialogue between the USSR and the Seven would contribute to that as well.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin

July 4, 1990

Его Превосходительству
Господину Джорджу БУШУ,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Обращаясь к Вам как к председателю предстоящего в Альбустоне АУ1 экономического совещания руководителей семи государств и через Вас — к другим его участникам, хотел бы продолжить разговор об общих проблемах мирового развития и путях сближения наших экономик.

Время, прошедшее после саммита в Париже, оказалось заполненным событиями подлинно исторического значения. На политическом уровне сделано очень многое для преодоления разобщенности мира. Уходит в прошлое раскол Европы. Антагонизм между блоками и сверхдержавами уступает место отношениям партнерства и сотрудничества.

Набирают силу разоруженческие процессы, что не только делает мир более безопасным, но и закладывает прочную основу для устойчивого развития мировой экономики.

На повестке дня — преодоление экономического раскола мира. Предстоит достичь совместимости различных хозяйственных механизмов, создать новые структуры взаимодействия. В этом направлении идут решения Боннской конференции по экономическому сотрудничеству, учреждение Европейского банка реконструкции и развития.

Мы с удовлетворением отмечаем предоставление СССР статуса наблюдателя в ГАТТ. Это — реальный шаг на пути к экономической открытости. Развиваются контакты СССР с Международным валютным фондом, Мировым банком, Организацией экономического сотрудничества и развития. Начало работать заключенное в декабре прошлого года соглашение между СССР и европейскими сообществами

о торговле и коммерческом и экономическом сотрудничестве. настоящим "прорывом" в области экономики завершилась советско-американская встреча в верхах в Вашингтоне.

Важно, что сближение Востока и Запада происходит не изолированно от остального мира, способствует формированию универсальных принципов экономического общения всех государств, включая развивающиеся, что закреплено решениями 18-й специальной сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН.

Отглядываясь на прошедший год, мы считаем, что советское руководство делало все возможное для того, чтобы подкрепить свою новую политику конкретными действиями как у себя дома, так и за рубежом.

Сегодня СССР переживает наиболее ответственный этап перестройки. Он связан с ломкой отживших экономических структур, переходом к рыночной экономике. Без этих радикальных шагов невозможно дальнейшее обновление нашего общества.

В настоящее время руководство СССР ищет способы дополнить внутренние преобразования внешней финансово-экономической поддержкой. Эти усилия направлены на обеспечение кредитного содействия, привлечение иностранного капитала, передачу управленческого опыта, подготовку кадров и включают другие меры, способствующие созданию конкурентоспособной экономики.

Первые контакты на этот счет состоялись, и в целом мы находим понимание.

Видимо, речь могла бы идти о проработке долгосрочных договоренностей о крупномасштабном кредитном и инвестиционном сотрудничестве, которое на деле стало бы серьезным фактором стабилизации и перехода к рыночной экономике в СССР. Наилучшим образом этому послужило бы формирование целевой программы сотрудничества - в конечном итоге взаимовыгодного.

Думается, этому мог бы способствовать и устойчивый экономический диалог СССР с "семеркой".

С уважением,

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

Москва, Кремль
4 июля 1990 года

DRAFT NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICIAL VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

(May 30 to June 4, 1990)

May 30, Wednesday

18.30	Arrival in Washington, D.C. (Andrews AF base)
19.00	Arrival at Embassy. No functions scheduled.

May 31, Thursday

10.00	Official arrival ceremony at the White House.
10.30-12.00	Meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.
13.00-14.30	Luncheon at the Embassy for prominent intellectuals (the list of American participants to be transmitted later).
16.00-17.30	Second meeting with President Bush.
19.00-	Official dinner hosted by President Bush at the White House.

June 1, Friday

9.30-	Meeting at the Embassy with Congressional leaders over a cup of coffee (Speaker Foley, House and Senate majority and minority leaders Gephardt, Michel, Mitchell, Dole, Chairmen of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees Fascell, Les Aspin, Pell, Nunn).
11.30-13.00	Third meeting with President Bush.
14.00-15.30	Private lunch.
15.30-16.30	Awards for President Gorbachev to be presented at the Embassy: FDR Medal of Freedom; Honorary Degree of Doctor of Sciences of the Brown University; International Martin Luther King Prize for 1990.
17.00-18.00	Concluding meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.
18.00-18.30	Ceremony of signing Soviet-US documents.
19.30-	Official dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Gorbachev at the Embassy.

June 2, Saturday

9.30-10.30 President Gorbachev and President Bush hold joint press conference.

11.00-11.30 Official departure ceremony at the White House.

12.00 Departure to Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Stay in Minneapolis

- Luncheon hosted by the Governor and local authorities.

17.00 Meeting with Mid-West business leaders (electronics, chemical, food industries) and with US agricultural leaders (Cristal, Block and others).

Evening No functions scheduled.

June 3, Sunday

10.00 Depart for San Francisco.

13.30 Arrive San Francisco.

16.30 Meeting with former President Reagan.

19.30 Dinner hosted by West Coast political and business leaders.

June 4, Monday

10.30-12.30

Visit to Stanford University

(by invitation from the leadership of
the student organization and professors).
There will be an address.

- Depart San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

5/14/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JABIII

Attached is the written text
of the message which Ambassador
Dubinin delivered to me orally
this morning.

In the course of her recent contacts with a number of Western leaders, Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania K. Prunskiene contended that the present Lithuanian leadership wants dialogue with the USSR leadership and is prepared to suspend the decisions of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11, which unilaterally proclaimed the Republic's independence, as well as other recently adopted laws and resolutions which run contra ry to the USSR Constitution.

At the same time, in her conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on May 11, while proposing an urgent meeting with the Soviet leadership, Prunskiene again put forward a member of conditions and reservations. She said bluntly that the decision of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11 cannot be suspended or rescinded. She was saying in this context, though, that it would be possible to suspend a number of laws and resolutions by the Lithuanian authorities, which affect the interests of the Soviet Union. She didn't say what, specifically, could be suspended, giving to understand that this should be the subject of negotiations with Moscow.

Prunskiene admitted that the Lithuanian authorities' decisions to repudiate the army draft and dismantle the organizational structures of the local organs of power were somewhat hasty. The issuance of Lithuanian citizenship IDs is, in her words, largely symbolic. But in order to remove all fears the Lithuanian leadership is prepared to provide guarantees of the

rights of the "non-Lithuanian population". She also said that for the transition period one could think of a "dual border", "dual visas", and "dual customs".

All of this was being presented by Prunskiene as her personal initiative to settle the conflict. She emphasized that Lithuania will relax its maximalist posture, but that it must be met halfway. In the course of the conversation Prunskiene was throwing numerous lightly veiled threats. She said she could allegedly send a signal, - and oil tankers would start coming to Lithuania, for the USSR is not likely to stop them by force, is it? Money had been promised to her. There was also this theme: as a result of her trip to the US she had showered Gorbachev's road to Washington with flowers. And if there is no agreement with Lithuania, his meeting with Bush could be soured.

Prunskiene insisted that her trip to Western countries had been very successful. She allegedly found support and understanding.

Prunskiene's conversation with the Soviet Ambassador makes it clear that the present Lithuanian leadership is trying to play a double game: in words, it assures Western representatives of its willingness to accept a dialogue expecting to gain some political capital on it, and in deeds, it has done nothing to make such dialogue a reality.

The Soviet leadership - and I wish to stress it - is for dialogue and a political solution to the Lithuanian problem. The solution, however, can only be found within the framework of the constitutional process, on the basis of the legislation which is in force.

To begin the dialogue, it is necessary first of all to restore the situation as it existed on March 10 last. The USSR President has an absolutely clear mandate from the Third Congress of Peoples' Deputies, and the Lithuanian leadership must reckon with it. Unfortunately, the present Lithuanian leadership ignores it, and by its actions is creating insurmountable obstacles to dialogue.

С Х Е М А

ПРОГРАММЫ ОФИЦИАЛЬНОГО ВИЗИТА В США
(30 мая - 4 июня 1990 года)

30 мая (среда)

- | | |
|-------|---|
| 18.30 | - Прибытие в Вашингтон (авиабаза "Эндрюс"). |
| 19.00 | - Размещение в совпосольстве. |
| | - Вечер свободный. |

31 мая (четверг)

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 10.00 | - Официальная церемония встречи в Белом доме. |
| 10.30-12.00 | - Встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома. |
| 13.00-14.30 | - Завтрак в совпосольстве для видных представителей интеллигенции.
(Список американских участников будет передан позднее). |
| 16.00-17.30 | - Вторая встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем. |
| 19.00 | - Официальный обед от имени Дж.Буша в Белом доме. |

I июня (пятница)

9.30

- Встреча в посольстве за чашкой кофе с лидерами конгресса (спикер палаты представителей Т.Фоли, лидеры демократического большинства и республиканского меньшинства в палате и в сенате Р.Гепхардт, Р.Майкл, Дж.Митчелл, Р.Доул, председатели Комиссий по иностранным делам и вооруженных сил палаты представителей и сената Д.Фассел, Л.Эспин, К.Пэлл, С.Нанн).

11.00-13.00

- Третья встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.

14.00-15.30

- Частный завтрак.

15.30-16.30

- Церемония вручения М.С.Горбачеву (в совпосольстве) Медали Свободы им. Ф.Рузвельта Почетной степени доктора наук Брауновского университета Международной премии им. Мартина Лютера Кинга 1990 года.

17.00-18.00

- Заключительная встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.

18.00-18.30

- Церемония подписания советско-американских документов.

19.30

- Официальный обед от имени М.С.Горбачева с супругой в совпосольстве.

2 июня (суббота)

- 9.30-10.30 - Совместная пресс-конференция
М.С.Горбачева и Дж.Буша.
- 11.00-11.30 - Официальная церемония проводов в
Белом доме.
- 12.00 - Отлет в Миннеаполис (штат Миннесота).

Пребывание в Миннеаполисе

- Завтрак от имени губернатора и местных
властей.
- 17.00 - Встреча с представителями деловых кругов
Среднего Запада (электроника, химия,
пищевая промышленность), а также с
лидерами сельского хозяйства США
(Кристалл, Блок и др.).
- Вечер свободный.

3 июня (воскресенье)

- 10.00 - Отлет в Сан-Франциско.
- 13.30 - Прибытие в Сан-Франциско.
- 16.30 - Беседа с бывшим президентом Р.Рейганом.
- 19.30 - Обед от имени ведущих представителей
политического и делового мира Западного
побережья.

4 июня (понедельник)

10.30-12.30

- Посещение Стэнфордского университета
(есть приглашение руководства
студенческой организации и от профессоров).
Выступление.
- Вылет из Сан-Франциско в Петропавловск-
Камчатский.

May 10, 1990

General --

Secretary Baker called to say he was sending the attached papers he received from the Soviets. He penned in some notes and read them to me so they would be clear. He will touch base with you in the morning.

1. The Soviets want the whole visit to be called a STATE VISIT to the United States from arrival to departure.

2. The Soviets want to know who pays for what. For example, what is our normal practice and how will that be applied in this visit?

3. The Soviets want to know all the details of the trip to Boston with Mrs. Bush.

Florence

- We wish to confirm our acceptance of a visit to Camp David to stay there for the entire day of Saturday, June 2, returning to Washington on the evening of the same day. Minister Shevardnadze asked me to tell you that Mrs. Gorbachev intends to accompany her husband to Camp David. We are convinced that her joint stay there with Mrs. Bush will be mutually useful and agreeable.

- As for the nature of the visit, we assume that for the entire stay of the USSR President in the US this is going to be an official state visit.

- Mrs. Gorbachev accepts Mrs. Bush's invitation that they go together to Boston.

- ① Want whole visit to be called
a STATE VISIT to US from arrival to departure.
- ② Want to know who pays what? IE. What our normal
practice is & how this
" will be applied in this
case?
- ③ ^{also} Want all details
of trip to Boston w/ Mrs B.

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICIAL VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

(May 30 to June 5, 1990)

May 30, Wednesday

18.30	Arrival in Washington, D.C. (Andrews AF base).
19.00	Arrival at the Embassy. No functions scheduled.

May 31, Thursday

10.00	Official arrival ceremony at the White House.
10.30-12.00	Meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office. Mrs. Bush invites Mrs. Gorbachev for a cup of coffee to the White House Green Room.
13.00-14.30	Luncheon at the Embassy for prominent intellectuals (the list of American participants to be transmitted later).
15.30-17.00	Mrs. Gorbachev opens the exhibition of ancient Russian manuscripts at the Library of Congress. Tour of the Library.

Church

16.00-17.30 Second meeting with President Bush.

19.00- Official dinner hosted by President Bush at the White House.

June 1, Friday

9.30- Meeting at the Embassy with Congressional leaders over a cup of coffee (Speaker Foley, House and Senate majority and minority leaders Gephardt, Michel, Mitchell, Dole, Chairmen of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees Fascell, Les Aspin, Pell, Nunn).

11.00-13.00 Third meeting with President Bush.

10.00-13.30 Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush depart for Boston.
Call on the Wellesly College.
Brief address.

X 14.00-15.30 Private lunch.

15.30-16.30 Presentation of awards to President Gorbachev (at the Embassy):
FDR Medal of Freedom;
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Sciences of the Brown University;
International Martin Luther King Prize for 1990.

X 17.00-18.00 Concluding meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.

18.00-18.30	Ceremony of signing Soviet-US documents.
19.30-	Official dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Gorbachev at the Embassy. Entertainment by Soviet performers.

June 2, Saturday

9.30-	Depart for Camp David (by helicopter).
10.00-	Talks at Camp David.
Evening	Return to Washington, D.C.

June 3, Sunday

10.00-	President Gorbachev and President Bush hold joint press conference.
11.00-11.30	Official departure ceremony at the White House.
12.00-	Depart for Minneapolis, Minnesota. - Luncheon hosted by the Governor and local authorities.
17.00-	Meeting with Mid-West business leaders and with US agricultural leaders (Cristal, Block and others).
19.00-	Depart for San Francisco.
21.30-	Arrive San Francisco.
Evening	Free time.

June 4, Monday

9.30-10.15

Breakfast and conversation with
President Reagan (at the Soviet
residence).

11.00-13.00

Visit to Stanford University
(by invitation from the leadership of
the student organization and faculty).
President Gorbachev will make an address.

13.30-15.00

Luncheon hosted by West Coast political
and business leaders.

15.30-

Depart San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatskiy.

June 5, Tuesday

8.30-

(local time)

Arrive Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11c. Schedule	Re: [Written in Russian] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [4]

Date Closed: 4/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91126-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



May 17, 1990

*Working
Papers*

General --

Laurie Firestone called about the guest list for the Gorbachev dinner. One of the people on the list is Archbishop Iakovos. The President told Laurie he wanted your thinking on whether he should be invited.

Okay on Iakovos _____ No on Iakovos _____

She would like to know the names of 4 or 5 Cabinet members that should be included:

Baker, Cheney, _____

She also asked about the following:

Kissinger Okay _____ No _____

Brzezinski Okay _____ No _____

Kampelman Okay _____ No _____

This is a reminder to you: You had several requests from people to be invited to the dinner if at all possible.

Howard Baker Okay _____ No _____

Alan Cranston Okay _____ No _____

Don Kendall _____

George Shultz

Dwaine Anderson

Jim Robinson

Radisson

*Ey Vanda
Hing*

Florence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

REMINDER: Gorbachev Dinner
(want to be invited:)

Secy Cheney

Howard Baker

Adm Murphy -
STATE DINNER (USSR) THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1990 - 7:30 PM

General Scowcroft

THE PRESIDENT & MRS. BUSH
(14) OFFICIAL FOREIGN DELEGATION

The Vice President & Mrs. Quayle
(2) Guests of the Vice President

m/m James C Quayle

CABINET

The Secretary of the Treasury & Mrs. Brady
The Secretary of Defense & Mrs. Cheney
The Secretary of Commerce & Mrs. Mosbacher

Attorney General - Ann T

SUPREME COURT

The Chief Justice & Mrs. Rehnquist

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Secretary of State & Mrs. Baker
The Chief of Protocol & Mrs. Reed
Ambassador & Mrs. Jack Matlock

Eugene

+ m/m Ray Seitz (asst Sec't Europe Affairs)

*{ m/m Richard Burt ? (arms)
Ron Lymann*

WHITE HOUSE

Governor & Mrs. Sununu
General Scowcroft
Hon. & Mrs. Robert Gates
~~Hon. & Mrs. Andrew Card~~

*Adm/m Bob Blackwell
Rice*

OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

General & Mrs. Colin Powell
Dr. & Mrs. James Billington
~~Hon. & Mrs. Arthur Fletcher~~

*Adm/m Mrs Grady
m/m John Pickering ?
m/m Howard Baker R*

*Soviet briefers
Goffen (ask Body)*

CONGRESS

SENATE:

Hon. George Mitchell (D/Maine)
Hon. Robert Dole & The Secretary of Labor (R/Kansas)
Hon. & Mrs. Claiborne Pell (D/Rhode Island)
Hon. & Mrs. Jesse Helms (R/North Carolina)

ALTERNATES: Hon. & Mrs. Joseph Biden (D/Delaware)
~~Hon. & Mrs. Larry Pressler (R/South Dakota)~~
Hon. & Mrs. Sam Nunn (D/Georgia)
Hon. John Warner (R/Virginia)

HOUSE:

The Speaker & Mrs. Foley (D/Washington)
Hon. & Mrs. Richard Gephardt (D/Missouri)
Hon. & Mrs. Robert Michel (R/Illinois)
Hon. & Mrs. Dante Fascell (D/Florida)
Hon. & Mrs. William Broomfield (R/Michigan)

ALTERNATES: Hon. & Mrs. Lee Hamilton (D/Indiana)
Hon. & Mrs. Benjamin Gilman (R/New York)
Hon. Les Aspin (D/Wisconsin)
Hon. & Mrs. William Dickinson (R/Alabama)

GOVERNORSPRESS

- 1 Mr. & Mrs. Hugh Sidey
2 Mr. & Mrs. Arthur "Punch" Sulzberger, Sr. (Chairman, NY Times)
alt Ms. Wendy Walker (CNN Senior Producer)
3 Mr. & Mrs. Tom Brokaw (NBC)
~~Mr. & Mrs. Terence Hunt (Associated Press)~~

Don Graham

FRIENDS OF VISITING NATION

Maestro & Mrs. Mstislav Rostropovich
Mr. & Mrs. Vladimir Feltsman

Platon
Greenman

ACADEMICIANS, SCHOLARS & CLERGY

Rev. & Mrs. Billy Graham
 { Dr. & Mrs. Henry Kissinger
 { Dr. & Mrs. Zbigniew Brzezinski
 { Archbishop Iakovos

BUSINESS LEADERS

Dr. Armand Hammer
 ? ~~Mr. & Mrs. David Rockefeller~~
 Mr. & Mrs. Harold Poling (Ford Motor Co.)
 ? ~~Mr. & Mrs. James Robinson (Chairman, American Express)~~
 Hon. & Mrs. Tom Watson (former Amb. & former IBM)
 Mr. & Mrs. W.C. Butcher (Chase Manhattan Bank)
 Mr. & Mrs. Joe Allbritton (Riggs National Bank)
 ✓ Mr. & Mrs. Donald Kendall (Pepsico)

m/m Henry Kravitz

Brady
Reed
Classen

COMMUNITY LEADERS/GRASS ROOTS REPRESENTATIVES

m/m John Jacob - Urban League
 alt ~~Mr. & Mrs. Benjamin Hooks~~

Guinness

POLITICAL & FINANCIAL SUPPORTERSFAMILY

Mr. & Mrs. Neil Bush

EVENING'S ENTERTAINERS

Miss Frederica Von Stade (& guest)

CELEBRITIES/SPORTS FIGURES

Mr. & Mrs. Ivan Lendl

~~Miss Helen Hayes (& guest)~~

Mr. & Mrs. Jack Nicklaus

~~Miss Cynthia Gregory~~

Mr. & Mrs. Michael Jordan (Basketball)

Mr. & Mrs. Hugh Cronyn (Jessica Tandy)

Mr. & Mrs. Morgan Freeman

Miss Michelle Pfeiffer?

af Mr. Van Cliburn

FRIENDS

Mr. & Mrs. Jerry Weintraub

~~Ms. Susan Eisenhower~~ & Dr. Roald Sagdeev

M/M Max Fisher -



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Guest List for State Dinner for Soviet
President Gorbachev and Mrs. Gorbachev

We have prepared the following list of distinguished Americans who might be invited to the State Dinner in honor of Soviet President and Mrs. Gorbachev, May 31, 1990. In compiling the list we have sought to identify individuals with previous connections to the USSR. The list does not include current U.S. officials in the executive or legislative branches.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

F-1N

③

Government Officials (former)

Arthur Hartman, ex-Ambassador to USSR
 Gen. William Odom, retired, locally based, teaching at Yale
 Henry Kissinger
 Jeanne Kirkpatrick
 William Luers, ex-Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and President
 Metropolitan Museum of Art
 Susan Eisenhower and Roald Sagdeyev (her Soviet husband)
 James Billington, Library of Congress
 Rozanne Ridgeway, President, Atlantic Council
 Robert Bernstein, Chairman, US Helsinki Watch

F-1N Chmn Arden House Books

Academicians

Ed Hewitt, economist at Brookings
 S. Fred Starr, President Oberlin College
 George Kennan
 Richard Pipes, Harvard
 Marshall Goldman, Harvard
 George Breslauer, Cal-Berkeley
 Jerry Hough, Duke University
 Gertrude Schroeder-Greenslade, U. Virginia
 Dmitri Simes, Carnegie Endowment for Intl. Peace
 Marshall Shulman, Columbia U.
 Robert Levgold, Columbia U.
 Murray Feshbach, Georgetown U.
~~Suzanne and Robert Massey, Harvard Univ.~~
 Blair Ruble, Kennan Institute
 Seweryn Bialer, Columbia U.
~~Edward Teller, Hoover Institute~~

ash
Brent

Scientist

Media

④

Hedrick Smith, former NYTimes correspondent in Moscow
 Robert Kaiser, Associate Editor, Washington Post, former
 correspondent in Moscow
 Vivian Castleberry, former Women's Editor, Dallas Times-Herald,
 prominent in U.S.-Soviet cultural exchanges
 William F. Buckley Jr., editor, National Review magazine
 ✓ Ted Turner, owner, TBS/CNN broadcasting
 Gary Lee, writes on Soviet Union for Washington Post
 Harrison Salisbury, journalist
 John McLaughlin, The McLaughlin Group
 Abe Rosenthal, NYTimes
 Bill Hyland, Foreign Affairs
 Bruce Van Voorst, Time Magazine

M. Connie Chung

Jane Pauley

R.W. Apple, NYTIMES

THE WHITE HOUSE

May 11, 1990

Dear Alan:

I have received your note about the Gorbachev dinner. We will do our best.

Brent

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Alan Cranston
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

① Business

Charles Hugel, Chairman, ABB Inc. (Asea, Brown, Bovari, Inc., formerly Combustion Engineering)
 Armand Hammer, Occidental Petroleum
 John J. Phelan Jr., Chmn and CEO, NY Stock Exchange
 John J. Murphy, Chairman and CEO Dresser Industries, Inc. ✓
 Stephan P. Munn, President and CEO, Carlisle Co. Inc.
 James J. Renier, Chairman and CEO, Honeywell, Inc. - W.C. Butcher, Chase Manhattan Bank
 Robert Mallott, Chairman and CEO, FMC, Inc. ✓
 John Capiolotas, Chairman and CEO Sheraton Corp.
 Thomas Plaskett, Chairman and CEO, PANAM
 Edwin Artzt, Chairman and CEO, Procter and Gamble
 Donald Kendall, Pepsico
 Dwayne Andreas, of ADM (Archer, Daniel, Midlands) ✓ - Joe L. Allbritton, Riggs National Bank
 Robert J. Carbonell, RJR DelMonte, Chairman, American Trade Consortium
 George Soros, investor in EE democratic institutions

Bank of Am?
 Brady -
 Bank of Am?

(financials use
 by Soviet Emb.

② Misc. (Arts, Religion, Entertainment)

Rev. Billy Graham
 Mstislav and Galina Rostropovich
 Bob Hope
 Van Cliburn, pianist
 ✓ Mikhail Baryshnikov
~~Charles Colson, former Nixon staffer, planning to start up Prisons Fellowship ministry in USSR~~
 Zelda Fishchandler, Arena Stage (has done Soviet productions)
 Yakov Smirnov, emigre comedian
 Pam Shriver, tennis star
~~Vlade Divac, center, Los Angeles Lakers~~
 Tom Clancy, author, Hunt for Red October
 Sean Connery, star "Hunt for Red October"
 Michele Pfeiffer, star "Hunt for Red October"
 Leon Uris, author of "Exodus"

Amell Sontag

Issac Asimov

Robin Williams

Robert Shiller

Arthur Schlesinger

John F. Kennedy

Warren Buffett

Walter Allen

...

Joseph Papp
 Tom Clancy

~~Barack Obama~~

Govt Dinner
State Fabrics?

(US) Secret Academics

Redesign Club - if Advance doesn't
go well.

Greenhouse
Ferdinand Mitchell

George Kenna
Steve Meyer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Cranston
Gov & State
Dinner

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jim Thompson
IOB

wants to know
if he can be
added to list
for Gorbby dinner
per ^{Bill} working.

Bill is telling him
he passed along
the request.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Baker

Names - job dinner

Seitz
Zoellick

Burt

Don Kendall

Gov. State Dinner

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0836-MR
SCS 8/5/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Sergei Akhromeyev, Advisor to President Gorbachev

DATE, TIME: June 2, 1990, 11:15 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

President Gorbachev: In this setting, maybe we can think of some good things to do. But first let me take one step back. Yesterday was an important day. My main thought is that it is good to make good statements and declarations but yesterday, in addition to philosophizing, the right decisions were made. I am pleased with the way we are working on the right actions. Without this, nothing is possible. I promise you my constructive efforts. Naturally, we will not always agree. Optimum solutions are difficult. (S)

I would like Camp David to be a place where we repeat what we said yesterday and reaffirm the kind of relationship we want. We should reaffirm that relationship from Camp David, including regular meetings, and a regular secure phone link so that we can exchange views frequently. (S)

The President: Do you want to say all this at our press conference? (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (S)

The President: I agree. So far, I think our meeting is being portrayed this way. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, even the pictures now are showing the closeness -- ourselves, the Ministers, the two ladies, all

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

showing closeness. (S)

The President: We will keep it going. We will take some hits on trade and arms control from the Right, but I think we can manage it. We talked last night about trying for meetings without all the trappings. (S)

President Gorbachev: I have been told the Supreme Soviet has three pages of questions for me. I said I will answer more than that when I get back. I included two Committee Chairmen in my delegation for this reason. One represents our military-industrial complex, and I also brought the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now they are not on the sidelines and it is important that they see how these things work. Soon I will have a Warsaw Pact meeting, and it will be a new Warsaw Pact. Only Shevardnadze and myself and Jaruzelski are old members -- all the others are new. I will report the results to you. (S)

The President: Just a technical point. We will have a secure line in a year and a direct line this fall. (Description of secure line.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Shall we go through our points? (S)

The President: Fine. There are points I must raise: human rights, refuseniks, immigration, and human rights in general. You want us to take more Jews. We are taking more -- about all we can. (S)

There are many vestiges of anti-Semitism. We have skinheads and you have a problem too, and to the degree you could speak out publicly: that would help. It helps me. We would encourage direct flights to Israel. You should know that I am in a big fight with Shamir over settling immigrants in the occupied territories. My administration is seen as anti-Israel. It stems from my saying no settlements in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem. This caused a firestorm here and on the Right in Israel. (Described what Netanyahu had said.) We are a true friend of Israel. In our new relationship I hope that you can take account of anti-Semitism, direct flights to Israel, refuseniks, and keep up human rights progress. It would help me a lot. If we can separate anti-Semitism from policy it would help. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We will seek to cooperate on the full spectrum of human rights. On immigration, here is information on refuseniks. There are twenty on the list. We have given exit visas for five, a temporary departure for one, a temporary visit for one to Great Britain (probably with relatives), one is dead, and there is nothing on the other eleven. We will have more movement but that is my report for now. I agree that we do have to take a stand against anti-Semitism. I have spoken out in general and I will find a way to speak out specifically. (S)

The President: That would help. It is a world-wide problem and if we are seen cooperating on it that would help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We do have a problem between the Russian and Jewish intelligentsia. We will speak out but I don't want to take sides; here we have to find a way. There are many organizations, some even Fascist which say ugly things. Israel, in letting that settlement go on in Jerusalem has caused an outcry in the Arab press. Even Mubarak said he would have to protest in our press that we are settling the West Bank and replenishing the Israeli army. They are trying to put us against each other. Maybe Israel should be told that if they settle in the occupied territories I will have to stop immigration. (S)

The President: It sounds easy, but it is complicated. Individual settlers make it hard to be clear on it. (S)

President Gorbachev: Our Ministers could consult on the language. We must try to figure out a solution. (S)

The President: Saying no more than this to Israel would get world Jewry up in arms. We could not sign up to that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Maybe Bakon and Shevardnadze can work something out. (S)

The President: It is a risky issue for a joint statement. (S)

President Gorbachev: I am not thinking of a joint statement but just getting our policies coordinated. (S)

Secretary Baker: I just wanted to say that in 1988 we started a dialogue that let us talk to both parties and move forward on a peace process. It would be helpful if you could let Arafat know that our dialogue can continue only if he speaks out on Abu Abbas. Otherwise, we cannot continue the dialogue. (S)

President Gorbachev: He has disassociated himself, but not condemned the attack. (S)

Secretary Baker: That is right, but the basis for our dialogue is that there must be no terrorism. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We got a telegram from Arafat which says: "Violence is getting out of control. Close to explosion. Exacerbated by US veto." I don't know why you had to do that -- it (the UN resolution) would have pacified the situation. (S)

Secretary Baker: (Describes U.S. actions.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's think about this. There is a lot of truth to what Arafat says. If there is an explosion, he will be totally isolated. We have worked hard to get Assad and Arafat to work together. Mubarak is easier and so is Benjedid. Qadhafi is a problem. But maybe we can work on sending Goulding. We will work on Arafat to clam things down. (S)

The President: I am having lunch with Perez de Cuellar on Monday. I will tell him this. We will do it even against Israel if necessary. (S)

Secretary Baker: And remember, we cannot continue the dialogue if he is tied to terrorism. (S)

President Gorbachev: But Arafat thinks this is patriotic resistance. It is tough for him to speak out. (S)

Secretary Baker: But he disassociated himself from it. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Shamir is more difficult. (S)

The President: (Describes U.S. problems with Shamir over settlements.) (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Maybe this is a time to mention the idea of an international conference. We support your idea of a dialogue but we should think of a conference also. (S)

President Gorbachev: Everyone but Shamir supports a conference. If we started preparations for a conference we could recognize Israel immediately.

Secretary Baker: As Eduard knows, we don't reject a conference but for now I would not appear at a conference. Under the right circumstances we could go along with one, however. Right now the circumstances are not right. Back to Arafat. The timing of that attack was terrible. We want to keep the pressure on for the dialogue, and this gives Israel a way out. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Israel would go along with a conference? (S)

Secretary Baker: No. (Describes situation). (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's have Eduard and Jim talk about it. Maybe we can get Israel to take the first step towards a conference. We could jointly guarantee Israel's existence as a state. We could establish immediate diplomatic relations; then we could be helpful. The bigger Arab nations could make statements recognizing the realities and the Israeli situation. We have contact with Jewish organizations. Eduard has met Peres and Shamir. We could establish consulates.

The President: You have gained much by your immigration policy. (Talks about Max Fisher comment.) (S)

Secretary Baker: One thing you said is interesting. Israel complains that among the Arabs no one but Egypt recognizes Israeli's right to exist. That could help. (S)

President Gorbachev: We have worked with Arafat to bring him around. (S)

Secretary Baker: We will talk. (S)

President Gorbachev: When Mubarak came to Moscow he spoke of a free zone without nuclear or chemical weapons (jokes, toes curling up). Maybe we could look at it and support Mubarak. There are too many weapons there. They are different from the Europeans; they get all fired up. We really should think about it, because the region is so heavily armed. (S)

The President: Israel would resist that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let Eduard and Jim think about it. (S)

The President: Let's move to other regional issues, starting with India and Pakistan. We are concerned about a war. Bob Gates came back with negative assessment. We should stay in touch. Everyone would be a loser in such a war. In the 1970's we tilted toward Pakistan and you tilted toward India. The situation is different now. We won't try to take advantage of you. We don't have a dog in that fight, even though we like Bhutto. We would encourage an immediate cease fire. We are open to suggestions. If the situation heats up I hope we can work together. Maybe not, but I don't want it to disrupt us. (S)

President Gorbachev: I had a call from Singh -- the morning I was coming here. He wanted me to know that he would do his best to calm things down. I responded that I would welcome a solution to this old problem. I want good relations with both India and Pakistan. We never broke with Pakistan, even in the worst days of Afghanistan. It is therefore in our interest that the situation not become more acute. Let's keep in touch. (S)

The President: I understand that you have a problem with making a joint statement, but maybe we could deal with this at the press conference. (S)

President Gorbachev: It might be sensitive for India and Pakistan if we were concerting on them, but at the press conference would be a good way to do it. (Discussion on what is going on.) Let's stay in close touch, and let's do the press conference thing (i.e., deal with the issue by responding to press questions). (S)

The President: My other regional items include Africa, Ethiopia, etc., but I need to register a point on Cuba. Jim and Eduard have talked about Afghanistan. On Cuba, we think Castro is swimming against the tide; he is unreconstructed. Many think we are picking on him, but he is an outcast. If you changed your economic relationship with Cuba, that would push him. He won't take the Ortega route. (S)

President Gorbachev: Castro supported the Nicaragua solution. (S)

The President: That was because he thought that Ortega would win the election. But maybe we could use that as a model. (S)

Secretary Baker: As in the case of Nicaragua, if Castro were to change we would change our policy. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me say a few words on this. I agree that there can be no peace in Central America if Cuba is isolated. We are not doing that, but we see that you have that syndrome. I spoke about it to the Vice President. He said he had gone to the Caribbean six times, and I said "you did not stop in Cuba." (S)

We should analyze Castro. He is criticizing us more than you. In the Cuban missile crisis, he kept Mikoyan running around the island for a week. Teaching lessons to Castro is useless. When I was there, I could see they were tense. I told him I was not trying to change the way he does things, but let me do things my way as well. Then they relaxed and it went alright. If you got in touch with him I think he would respond, but trying to force him to change would be useless. He has told me, "I will not take U.S. dictation, but if they will sit and talk" Maybe we could set something up that is not bilateral. He is ready to hear you out -- to talk at any level. It is better if he hears from you rather than from us. A change in our economic relations is coming. It will be based on buying the things we need, although I realize it will not be at market prices. It can be sold for dollars on the world market. Also, we buy citrus and nonferrous metals. We are beginning to put our economic relations on a realistic relations. Before, no one even thought about the economic aspects of our relations. The Latin Americans show more understanding of the role of Cuba, so it is not that simple. (S)

There is a remaining problem to discuss: the Contras. (S)

The President: I think that is back on track. (S)

General Akhromeyev: I have a personal relationship with Castro, and he says he is prepared to go very far. He understands the problem. (S)

The President: Let me tell you about the U.S.-Cuban problem. (He describes the Cuban-American patriotic community.) Therefore there is a lot of emotion in this issue for the Americans. (Hands him a Congressional letter on Cuba). I hear what you have said on Castro and I hope you understand our feelings on the issue. Let's keep it on the table. (S)

Secretary Baker: We haven't asked Castro to give us something before we sit down to talk, only that he cease subversion in El Salvador and Latin America -- that is all. (S)

President Gorbachev: Do you want us to convey this to him? (S)

The President: It would be helpful. (S)

President Gorbachev: If El Salvador improved visibly there would

be a change by you? (S)

The President: Yes, but I won't give him a State Dinner! (S)

Secretary Baker: El Salvador has a freely elected government, and he is subverting it. (S)

The President: I don't like seeing Umberto Ortega as head of the army in Nicaragua because the armed forces were a Party. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Just a word on Cuba. We are having some discussions with the US on Cuba in quest of some imaginative solutions. If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal, things might work -- as in the case of Angola, where we made it work after they got treated like equal partners. On El Salvador, I think that Castro may undertake a serious discussion. (S)

President Gorbachev: What do you want us to do? (S)

Secretary Baker: Here is a wild suggestion: that you tell him the President said that there will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency to Central America. (S)

The President: That only deals with a small part of the problem. For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights, like letting people out of jail, etc. For normal relations, Castro cannot be the only one out of step in the hemisphere. (S)

President Gorbachev: For now we will convey to him suggestions that will permit the dialogue to begin. Then it can progress. (S)

The President: I must tell you that the Soviet relationship to Cuba sours the US view of you. (S)

Secretary Baker: The MIG-29 is a big issue for us psychologically. (S)

The President: Why don't we break for lunch then we can rest and get back together at 3 p.m. (U)

(Lunch break)

President Gorbachev: (Begins with a discussion of the differences between the Soviet and US federations, emphasizing the nationalities aspect of the Soviet federation. Describes the fight between Stalin and Lenin on the nature of the federation, saying that after Lenin died Stalin left the law the same but ruthlessly created a military state. Then Stalin said that the nationalities problem no longer existed; there was a "Soviet" nationality. So once the dam burst, the nationalities issues burst out into the open. The Byelorussian language had almost died out.) (S)

The President: Shall we return to our agenda? I dominated the discussion with my subjects this morning, although we didn't raise Afghanistan. (S)

President Gorbachev: I would be happy to discuss Afghanistan. (S)

The President: On Afghanistan, we would really like to be disengaged. We would like to cut loose, and we have no interest in a radical, and Muslim administration. We are also worried about the radicals, and we are not trying to install an anti-Soviet fundamentalist regime. (Described the political arrangements that the U.S. seeks.) If they got underway, we would stop our aid to the Mujahedin. If we could both state that no party would be able to subvert the process and state that a neutral body would arrange the elections, we would have a good outcome. Najibullah could participate but not as head of government. Hebmaytyar is an undesirable conservative. I asked whether you can live with a short supervised period where Najibullah could participate but step aside from government.

President Gorbachev: There is mutual understanding for a neutral period plus a mechanism for conducting an election leading to a broad-based government; also, for a UN role for a transition period and in the conduct of elections. Do we understand that neither the government nor the opposition would transfer the government to a neutral authority. So the only hope is elections on the basis of the status quo. Let them conduct their elections in their own way. We can't remove Najibullah or Hebmaytyar from the scene. Najibullah is beginning to put more strings on us. (S)

The President: He thinks he is getting stronger. (S)

President Gorbachev: He thinks he is getting more support. Some former opposition members are managing local government under the general supervision of government forces. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We need a new approach, because neither side has the leverage to achieve a solution. (S)

The President: How does Najibullah feel about elections? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: I have talked to him. He favors a Nicaragua-type solution, with a group charged with developing elections. (S)

President Gorbachev: Would Najibullah be willing to step aside as part of a normal process, but not be kicked out? (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, but not as a withdrawal. Then a conference could set up an election process. Our differences are not great. We can't get Najibullah out. Actually, this process is getting under way. He is inviting Zahir Shah to take the highest position. (S)

President Gorbachev: We would like a neutral regime, not one hostile to the U.S. (S)

The President: We can't argue against Najibullah staying in power, a la Nicaragua, but the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in. (S)

President Gorbachev: Neither the Mujahedin nor Najibullah will conduct the elections. The UN or the OIC will do it. Najibullah does not want to be kicked out. That is his minimum condition. (S)

Secretary Baker: It is difficult for us to argue against the Nicaraguan model. Our problem is with the Resistance. We need something for them to show that elections would be fair, that supervision would be neutral, and that the outcome would be observed. What about Najibullah taking a head of state role during this period to demonstrate that a transition authority would conduct the election and provide security. (S)

President Gorbachev: Najibullah would be a kind of interim acting president during the election? (S)

Secretary Baker: Yes, but with something less than full authority. (S)

President Gorbachev: We must think about it. (S)

The President: Let's have Jim and Eduard talk some more about this. (S)

President Gorbachev: Yes, let's, because there are lots of areas of agreement. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: We could try to formulate three or four points on which the Afghans could agree: on the transition period for elections and the conduct thereof, on the role of the UN, etc. We would agree that Afghanistan would be unified, neutral, and demilitarized. (S)

President Gorbachev: And the only solution to Afghanistan is a political solution. The two sides should recognize each other. There would be four or five principles on which we could agree. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: This would be similar to Nicaragua and to what we are trying to do in Angola, etc. It is a tested process. (S)

The President: How about Ethiopia? (S)

President Gorbachev: We have an appeal from Mengistu. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: The essence of his letter is that he would agree to the UN as observers in his talks with Eritrea.

They were opposed to any outside body until now. One other element: they agree to Massawa for humanitarian relief, subject to the sovereignty of Ethiopia. The Eritreans must agree. The US and the Soviet Union should suggest an international conference for an overall settlement in the horn of Africa. That should come from us, not them. Our two groups have been working on language. Another issue was our cargo planes for relief -- we agree, on condition that the Eritreans don't shoot them down. (S)

Secretary Baker: How about a joint appeal that the Eritreans should not shoot, on the basis that people will starve if they do. (S)

The President: This is about all we can do today. (S)

President Gorbachev: If we can issue a joint appeal, let's conclude and let our experts work on it. (Dennis brings a paper that is given to Obukov and it is read to Gorbachev.) (S)

Secretary Baker: I think that a joint statement on aid involving Soviet planes and US food would look good. (S)

President Gorbachev: On Southern Africa, we don't have a big disagreement on what is happening in South Africa. In Southern Africa we are already working together. We will be flexible toward changes in South Africa, supporting those people who are working peacefully to abolish apartheid. We would encourage a joint statement here. (S)

The President: Mandela is a hopeful person to conduct a dialogue with de Klerk. Both of them are coming here. The Europeans may ease sanctions, but we will not do that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: A unique situation may be emerging with both sides urging a peaceful solution. We should stimulate this process. (S)

Secretary Baker: On Angola, we would like to pursue the election route. You say that Dos Santos is not quite ready. But we should push in that direction. The two sides are talking and we have offered talks under our joint sponsorship. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: One new element: Savimbi offered to meet with us. Dos Santos does not object and we will do it privately. (S)

The President: What shall we discuss next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Korea -- a lot of things worry us on the peninsula. I think we agree the two sides should engage in dialogue. A small step was taken in the release of U.S. troops. Politically, that is an important gesture. We are worried there is no agreement between North Korea and the IAEA, and they are very touchy about any contacts we have with South Korea. Those contacts are economic, and they are good. South Korea would like Siberian resources, and we are willing. Roh asked for a contract

and we agreed, thinking it would be kept quiet. I am worried about the reaction of the North. We have told Kim there is no change in our policy, no recognition. We have said we were just meeting with the South Koreans to make their acquaintance and to promote Korean dialogue. We don't know what will come of it. Once again, we may be accused of betrayal. (S)

The President: We think it is a good thing you are seeing Roh. Our concern is Kim and his blocking of the IAEA agreement and the lack of moderating behavior. South Korea's reaching out is good. If Kim could accept safeguards, it would help. We are worried about instability on the peninsula. Earlier, we would have been upset about your talking to the South Koreans. This is no longer the case.

President Gorbachev: We will try to explain ourselves. (S)

The President: North Korea made one positive move: their return of the remains of five US soldiers. (S)

President Gorbachev: We did our bit on that. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: The Koreans asked if the US would provide them with nuclear guarantees. Then maybe they will sign on with the IAEA. (S)

The President: Will there be a more moderate government in Korea? We don't know much about it. (S)

President Gorbachev: These Eastern systems are hard to figure out. The way is being paved to transfer power to the son. They have swallowed Hungary's establishment of relations with South Korea, but it will be different when we make contact. Think about nuclear guarantees. (S)

General Scowcroft: If they would guarantee not to attack South Korea. (S)

President Gorbachev: Why not? (S)

General Scowcroft: We have tried formulations before but we can look at it again. (S)

The President: Let's talk about Japan. It can be helpful; they can help with economic assistance, as they have in Eastern Europe. Kaifu is stronger now, and we are working pragmatically on trade. Many feel Japan is buying up the U.S., but I don't worry about that. Japan might be helpful if you could deal with the Territories. It is your business, but I think you would find it beneficial. I commend Kaifu to you -- and hope he is still in power when you go there. (S)

President Gorbachev: We decided it was worthwhile for me to visit next year. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and Yeltsin will visit this fall. The Japanese know in principle that the Territories issue is clear, but their involvement in our Eastern

Territories has been unsatisfactory thus far. For a long time they resisted any economic discussions, and they still think the economic relationship benefits us more than them. Their Foreign Ministry is conservative through and through. There is people contact, but no real business being conducted. When we move to a market system and open up to foreign firms, I think they will change. But 97% of the Soviet people oppose any movement on the Islands. (S)

The President: Let's move on to Cambodia. (S)

President Gorbachev: I think there is some hope there. I am slightly optimistic. Our common task is to solidify the agreements that the four sides made, and to help set up the supervisory organization. I have statements from Sihanouk and from Hun Sen which are very similar. There is some convergence emerging. (S)

The President: We have little influence, but we will urge cooperation. We will talk to the PRC even though we are without much influence with them. We hope that you will also do so. (S)

President Gorbachev: My impression is that the Chinese are acting more positively. Shevardnadze discussed the issue with Li Peng and they are now normalizing relations with Vietnam. The fact that China and Vietnam are talking is sending a signal to Phnom Penh. (There was a humorous discussion of Cuba, sugar and moonshine. The President described the US sugar problem and Central American sales of coffee and sugar to the US.) (S)

Secretary Baker: (Renews our proposal for the Soviet Union to join the G-24 in helping Central America.) (S)

President Gorbachev: Our cooperation with Nicaragua in the past will continue. We are considering it (the proposal regarding the G-24). (S)

The President: What is next? (S)

President Gorbachev: Cyprus. Vassilliou has written to both of us. He wants us to support a UN mission to Cyprus to break the deadlock. (S)

Minister Shevardnadze: In order not to antagonize Greece or Turkey, the best way is for each side to support UN efforts. (S)

The President: What is left? (S)

General Scowcroft: We need to discuss coordination for the press conference on Germany and Lithuanian. (S)

President Gorbachev: We could say we had a good exchange, that both sides presented their arguments and made their case, and that it is not just a question between the two of us. As a result we decided that these consultations should continue. That is the shortest formula. (S)

The President: They will press me on trade, that I said Lithuania complicated the situation. I will say that the trade agreement is in the best interest of both sides. The next step is emigration legislation and that is where it stands. They will ask how about Lithuania. I will say I expressed myself fully on Lithuania but the next step is emigration legislation. (S)

Secretary Baker: They will ask whether there is a side deal. When I was asked, I said I could not talk about private conversations. The President said it will be difficult to get trade legislation through Congress and that is true, but that issue does not arise now because the next step is Soviet emigration legislation. (S)

President Gorbachev: The rest of it I will say. We have to bear in mind that rigid linkage should be avoided. We had a direct discussion of Lithuania. I discussed the situation and the prospects. We are looking for, and I expect I will find a solution within the framework of our Federation. Each Republic can withdraw or change the form of its relationship, but this must be in the established framework. (S)

The President: The more you can explain that to the US, the better. I will just stay away from linkage. (S)

President Gorbachev: And we will point out that it is not just one agreement, we have agreements on grain, aviation, etc. I will say that we cannot take away the right of self-determination, but since it is a constitutional right it must be done constitutionally. (S)

The President: The press is now more positive. Time and Newsweek said you were in trouble. That created a tough environment, but you have shown yourself completely in charge. (S)

President Gorbachev: It is a complex period, but we have to accept a pluralism of views. Not every one will agree with us, or we wouldn't have pluralism. (S)

Secretary Baker: (AFL and Donets Conference) (S)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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13. Cable	Moscow to White House Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/30/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [4]

Date Closed:	4/6/2009	OA/ID Number:	91126-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Translator's notes
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
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Friday, May 18, 1990
Time: 11:00 am - 4:00 pm
Place: Kremlin

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.: Secretary Baker
Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
Interpreter

USSR: Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze
A. Chernayeb, Notetaker
Interpreter

Gorbachev: I am glad to see you again in Moscow. Our meetings provide a chance to build on the capital in our relationship.

You know that capital likes to be expanded and I think given the fact our meeting is happening in a certain context we can see that there is a certain potential for expansion. Our relations are characterized by a greater dynamism, more than they were in the past. What happened in the past is that we inserted actual problems as they occurred and were not, as a result, in a position to deal with those problems. After all, we would see certain problems and as a result of the problems there'd be a slow down or a contraction in our relationship. The problem if anything would make dialogue more difficult. Today because of our new relations and dynamism we have the potential to increase our dialogue when there are problems.

At the same time, I have to tell you that as I watch your country it seems to me that the process about deciding about the Soviet Union is a process that is not fully complete yet. One looks at a time like this, a time of great change, and you cannot afford to look at it from the standpoint of one or two Presidential terms. If you do, you will not really understand what's going on. What we're talking about now is about developing a long-term foundation for the whole world. We are developing an architecture for the whole world. And that's not just for the life of one President's term or two terms; it has a much longer term significance.

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You're probably bothered, it seems to me, by two problems. One, you're being very closely involved and identified with Gorbachev and you may ask yourself if it is worth it. We see the public debates in your country and I know there are many advisors who want to advise you on how to deal with this, how to deal with me. Let me tell you that for the time being I believe that you and the President are showing amazing restraint in terms of sticking to your position. The second problem is that I have the impression that we have been formulating a mutual understanding in terms of how to build our relations at this stage of world development. I believe that one of the central understandings that we have agreed upon is that we both have a very strong interest in a strong and confident United States -- politically, economically and militarily -- and we both have a strong interest in a strong and confident Soviet Union -- politically, economically, and militarily.

You know we began predicting two or three years ago, maybe even eighteen months ago, that we were on the verge of a major regrouping of forces in the world. We even saw that our interaction was not only useful to the two of us, but in fact useful for the world. My feeling now is that sometimes we still see a philosophy that suggests maybe there can be a repeat of the past. Maybe some of the political actions that dominated the past have not totally been put behind us. As I watch the critical points of our relations, sometimes I have a sense that you want an edge, you may seek an advantage. In the past I would note this and I would watch this. Now I think our relations are such that I have an obligation to share my view with you. That our relations have brought us to the point where that kind of candid discussion is very possible. What do I have in mind when I say this? First, I say this because I think that you are a man of very clear ideas and understanding and that's why I feel I can talk this way to you and that you'll take note and understand what I am saying.

Well, for example, let's take Eastern Europe. Everything that's happening there we have discussed with you and we are acting in accord with what I said we would do. But I have information that a part of your policy is driven by trying to disassociate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. You know my attitude is if these countries seek to disassociate themselves, if that's what they want, let them do so. That's okay. But it's not okay if they are being pushed in this regard.

Let's take another example, on the question of a united Germany. Your position on this I believe is contradictory. I don't know what the origin of that is, maybe you fear a united Europe. But I think that both in Europe and here in the Soviet Union we recognize the need for US presence. It's very clear to us, it is very clear to Europeans that there has to be a US presence. It doesn't necessarily have to be a military presence but there has to be a US presence in all European processes. That's the way I view things and it's the only way to view things, I believe.

You've said to us that both Germanies want peace, they both want democracy, and therefore, they pose no danger. But let me ask you if they pose no danger, if this is so, and I have said it to President Bush when I talked with him on the phone, then why not let the Germans go and become a member of the Warsaw Pact. I believe when I said this, President Bush was dismayed. Perhaps you would say that we could trust the Germans, that they have proved themselves. But I would ask you, if you trust the Germans why do you feel it's not necessary to include them in NATO? So when you are talking about a united Germany and you say that if Germany is not in NATO, it would create problems, what you are really saying is that you don't believe Germany can be trusted.

You know I could understand it if you offered a realistic analysis that said if Germany is out of NATO that would seriously undermine the infrastructure of NATO. That's an argument I could understand. But if you are saying that, then there's a problem. Because then you're saying you continue to need a bloc even when the other alliance is disappearing. We shouldn't have one alliance displace the other. What we need is a new security structure in Europe and you're saying that NATO is necessary for now, and the future because the Soviet Union still has large military forces. But if that's the position you premise NATO on now then I think that's really not consistent, I think it's contradictory. I just don't see how that is consistent with the principle that we're now trying to build our relationship on -- and this is a relationship of mutual understanding. It shouldn't be one that is driven by a sense of a Soviet military threat.

In developing this argument, perhaps I've spoken too long, but I believe it's important. A united Germany in NATO, that's going to mean a very serious development in the strategic balance; it's going to mean a serious shift in the balance. I think you have to ask what's going to be the next logical step for us. You are a man of logic and I ask you what's the next logic step for us? Well, one step might be for us to suspend all talks and to think about how this development is going to affect our doctrine, how it's going to affect our forces; what effect it should have on our approach to the Vienna talks. I say this not because I am playing games, not because I want to engage in a level of political squabbling. I say it because I really believe this is a serious problem for us.

Sometimes I have the impression that you are tempted to take advantage of our process of change and renewal. Now you know that process is not easy; you know it has many difficulties. I do know that trying to take advantage would be a great mistake. To sum up, let me just say that we have shared with you our plans for perestroika, for new thinking. We have laid out our designs for our country and how it should relate to the world. We have talked of our determination to

accommodate with the West, how we seek to meet the US half way, how we seek to integrate our country economically, and culturally with the world -- all of this is something that I think will benefit not only us but also you. And central to our ability to do so is the new relationship with the United States. Is the United States really for this? Is the United States really for building this kind of new understanding? Do you really favor a mutual understanding of our two countries?

Let me tell you how I see things from Moscow now. I believe I have a good understanding of a number of your positions and the nuances of your position. And I must say there are many positive aspects. But I also have to say that there are some elements that worry us. The important factor that shapes us for the near term is the economy. What's it going to be like? How are we going to develop our economic basis and how is it going to affect the political life of our country? How is it going to affect the mentality of our people in inter-ethnic affairs? And how is it going to affect our country in its relations with the outside world? Now we are approaching a time when we have to begin a transition to a regulated market economy. It is the most important thing for perestroika to succeed. It is a fundamental change in our society. It means de-emphasizing state property; it means emphasizing anti-monopoly companies. It means pushing and developing private property, shareholders; it means changing our banking system; it means a new tax system; it means a new price system and a safety net. The sum total of all of this is a radical turn-around. This is a critical time, there's no mistaking that. In fact this is the most critical time for perestroika.

Now, let me ask you are we entitled to expect solidarity and support from our partners? Should events in Nagorno-Karabakh or Vilnius really take up more time in our relations than perestroika and change in our colossal country? At this time of great change we need not just understanding but mutual action. Now what is the United States doing? The US said that it welcomes perestroika. The Secretary of State says this, that he welcomes it. He engages in serious nuances and sophisticated discussions on perestroika. I have seen how you've talked about it in detail -- it's very sophisticated, you're very knowledgeable. At the same time you've also been out there warning everybody against helping the Soviet Union. What's worse you say that any help will actually slow down perestroika. I don't understand the arguments for this position.

I really suspect that instead of doing something and sharing in our problems, and expressing solidarity, this approach is more like saying we'll let them go it alone. Let them go it alone with their problems, if it becomes worse, well maybe that's okay for us. I am saying all this before we meet

in Washington and at Camp David because I think we need to ask questions. Are we going to continue to work together? Is there going to be a change in our role, in the positions of our two countries? We're at an historical juncture. Are we going to work closely together? I had thought that we had finally made our choices in this direction -- both you and we. I really felt that we had already gotten beyond the question of do we want to go forward or not. But as I look at certain events I wonder whether or not that choice on the directions we're going to go is still before us and still to be made. That's why I wanted to meet with you alone first. I wanted to have this discussion, not in front of a larger group, but just with you. I want to have this discussion with our Ministers and with the President.

Baker: I'm glad you decided to do it in a small session like this and I'm glad you decided you should raise these kinds of concerns with me. Because it gives me an opportunity to respond to your questions and they are legitimate questions. And it will give the President a chance as well when he reads this transcript to focus on these issues -- and these are good issues for discussion.

First, there was a period of time at the beginning of the Administration when we were thinking about how to sort out our relations with the Soviet Union. There were a lot of questions about what our relationship should be. But that ended about a year ago. It really ended after my meeting with you here and with Eduard. After that, the President has made it clear that we would no longer be in the position of deciding what our relationship should be with the Soviet Union. We know what it should be like. I have stated it since Wyoming. I said then and I believe now that our relationship is moving from one of competition to one of cooperation and dialogue across the entire range of our relations. Now, obviously the character of our relations at any given time is going to depend upon the actions of not only the United States but also the Soviet Union. Let me assure you that there is no debate in the upper reaches of the U.S. administration about whether we should be closely involved with the efforts that you're making on perestroika. We made that decision last year. The President made that decision last year and we're firmly committed to it.

I said in a speech in October that we seek opportunities that would be mutually advantageous to both our countries. That we need to seek points of mutual advantage, that's what I called it. There is a lot of debate in the U.S. about whether you are going to be successful. There are indeed some who would prefer that you not succeed. I refer to them as old cold warriors -- their old habits die hard. There are some, quite a few, who criticize the President, criticize me for relying too much on our hopes that you'll succeed and for taking action that assist you in your efforts.

I thank you for taking note of the fact that the President has not yielded to the pressure, particularly in the aftermath of Lithuania. I have told Eduard on several occasions that it is not certain that we'll be able to maintain things as we have in the aftermath of Lithuania. We have a fundamental disagreement on this. You know, we have never recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltics in the Soviet Union, and as a result the Baltic flags fly in the State Department today. I first raised the Baltics and nationalities as a possible problem on the airplane out to Wyoming. This is why we're so anxious to see some sort of discussion develop that could lead to a resolution of this problem. But the last thing we're interested in seeing is instability in the Soviet Union. We make that clear every time we speak. The President has been extremely clear on this. The President has also made it very clear that we don't seek unilateral advantage from changes that have taken place. We're not looking for an edge; and we're not engaging in political game playing.

In a moment I would like to speak more specifically about German unification to give you the benefit of our thinking in that regard. I want to do that because it will also give me a chance to outline how we have been sensitive to your problems and have tried to take your concerns into account. People have asked me, well, what is the United States doing to contribute to the success of perestroika. And one of the things I say is that we are doing a lot to contribute to the stability of the international environment. And a stable international environment, as you yourself have often noted, is critical to the success of perestroika inside the Soviet Union.

The last three times that I testified before Congress I spent a lot of time being hammered on Lithuania and I spent a lot of time defending our policy approach in the face of great criticism. The President and I have both been accused of abandoning principles. Now I say that our commitment to support the aspirations of the Baltic people is not inconsistent with the support for perestroika. We have major interests at stake with the Soviet Union. It's important that there be conventional arms reduction agreement in Europe. It's important that we have a strategic arms reduction that reduces the risk of nuclear war. It's important that we cooperate on regional conflicts around the world the way we have in the last few years. Our policy of moving from competition to cooperation doesn't mean we are going to agree across the board. I already mentioned our differences of view on the Baltics. That's a fact and also a function of history. I know that you are concerned about having the Baltics become a precedent for other republics. But from our vantage point these republics are different. There is a different juridical basis on which to judge them. Another issue on which we don't agree is Cuba. Now I know and understand that you say you have obligations there, and you've told us about them. But it is one on which we disagree. It is an issue on which we have a problem, and really don't understand your position. That doesn't mean that we don't want to move from competition to cooperation overall.

I am very aware of the difficult issues facing you and the pressures that must exist. I look at what you're doing after 70 years of a political, economic and social approach that requires a fundamental overhaul. It's no easy thing for any leader to do that. I really do believe and I know the President does as well that what you're doing is really courageous and we support it. And I think we have been able to move public opinion in the United States in the last 15 to 16 months to support you. But you need to recognize that there is a vocal minority that wants to fight the Cold War and it doesn't trust the Russians. And with what's going on in Lithuania and the economic blockade that you have instituted, they say that Bush and Baker, you are just being naive. You don't recognize that the bear is still there.

Now, let me ask a word about your comments about warning people not to help the Soviet Union. After that I would like close with a comment on Germany. I presume you must be talking about the European Development Bank. Our position is that we could not justify the use of U.S. taxpayer dollars to provide subsidies for state-owned institutions in the Soviet Union. Indeed, even with you being in a position that you could only borrow back the capital that you paid in, we will still have a major battle with the Congress. And this stems from the fact that you continue to allocate, at least according to our information, up to 14 to 15 billion dollars for support to regimes around the world that are supporting subversion in other countries. Like, for example, Cuba. So our Congress says how could you draw on taxpayer dollars when the Soviets continue to use their own resources to support Cuba? How can we, in effect, help subsidize the Soviets when they are subsidizing an aggressive country like Cuba. I had this discussion with your Finance Minister when he came and he raised the issue of direct loans from the United States.

Gorbachev: He told me about that discussion. He said the Secretary of State categorically rejects providing direct loans, though other Western countries are prepared to support the idea. You really put a dam on this effort. I recently visited Sverdlovsk and I visited a defense factory there that is in the midst of converting itself to producing civilian products. That plant has good workers, good designers, good technology and research and development. But in order to convert it's going to need two to three years. Right now their financial situation is awful. Previously because of a lot of defense orders it used to be a thriving plant. Now they have found a partner for themselves -- the Phillips Corporation. Phillips has an interest in the scientific development of this plant. But they weren't sure they should invest in this plant. Because, as you know, the Germans are rather cautious. But when they actually saw the plant they apologized for their hesitancy and signed an agreement to participate. In two years time the products from that plant are going to be competitive with any in the world. So the Germans are saying to us that

you know there's some interesting research and development possibilities -- let's get together. And I've been thinking all the time that you can't really build a good U.S.-Soviet relationship if it is not underpinned by a good economic relationship.

Baker: I agree with that.

Gorbachev: But while you seem now to want to mark a little time, that's going to impose a cost. Our existing cooperative ties will be reduced as a result of that. A process like that can be dangerous. The Supreme Soviets and our deputies want and are insisting on new economic relations with all countries. And they feel that should be based upon our new economic principles. That's not going to happen over night. We certainly don't want to see the ups and downs in our economic ties, we don't want to have to go through another grain embargo with you.

Baker: That was a big mistake. Let's just keep things in perspective. Six months ago President Bush suggested a much broader range of U.S.-Soviet economic ties. We don't disagree with the need for broader economic ties. That's just also an existing political fact of life. Given the history between us we aren't likely to grant loans or use taxpayer dollars to, in effect, help subsidize the Soviet Union if at the same time the Soviet Union is continuing to subsidize countries around the world that jeopardize U.S. interests. But the fact is we do want to support you. Look at what we did yesterday. Yesterday the U.S. voted for your observer status in the GATT.

Gorbachev: Yes, but you hesitated for a long time and everyone else agreed.

Baker: Well, the Japanese hesitated, and in fact they only came around because we did. The fact is there is a distinct division of opinion in the U.S. as whether getting you more into the international economic system is the right course to follow. There are lot of people that don't agree with that. There is a debate. We have to deal with that debate.

Gorbachev: We have a similar situation. For example, we are told that we are abandoning or betraying the entire developing world. We're turning the whole Third World over to the capitalists, putting them in a position where they are going to be bought by the capitalist. Well I ask people who say this, what are we a welfare state for the Third World? Now I'm told I betray the Arabs, that we are helping the Israelis. That in effect we are allowing Soviet citizens to go to Israel and settle in Palestinian territory. That's a real provocation. There are others who say that the Soviet Union is

conceding everything unilaterally. There's a lot of resistance but we are moving forward and we expect you to move forward as well and not just wait for the apples to fall into the barrel.

Baker: We aren't.

Gorbachev: First we have to produce a few apples, don't we?

Baker: Well, if there aren't apples at the end of the road, we're both going to be in trouble. Just yesterday I proposed to Eduard that the Soviet Union should consider joining the G-24 efforts to assist Central America and the Caribbean, much like the G-24 has assisted Eastern Europe. Now we have produced 14 billion dollars in that effort when we got together. In Wyoming in September I suggested a process of economic and technical cooperation. That's something that is happening and I think it will be of benefit to both of us. That's something I can defend in the Congress because it doesn't require you to talk about taking U.S. taxpayer dollars. I said yesterday that you've embarked in a new effort and anything that we can do to be helpful, any advice we can give as you go through this transition period, any information or expertise we can provide, we are prepared to do and we want to do it.

Gorbachev: Well, I will discuss that with the President. You know there is a radical turnabout as we try to move to a market era. And it is very important to us to have temporary support. I will emphasize this to him especially because we are going to need some allocation from the West to help us get through this transition period. A transition to a market economy is, as you know, very difficult. In our country there is a very serious clash. I think the best way to put it is that we need some oxygen. We are not asking for a gift. We are asking for a loan; we are asking for specifically targeted loans for specific purposes. For example, there are some defense-oriented ministries that have their own factories and if they have 100 to 200 million dollars to invest they could produce goods worth one to two billion dollars within one to two years. Of course, the problem is what will we do in the interim during that one to two year period. We don't have the money. As we try to move to the market, it creates a very tense situation and it puts us in a position where we need credit. We need credit to provide commodities. We also need credit and loans to invest in the factories that we want to convert. What I will say to the President is that we're going to need 15 to 20 billion dollars to tide us over.

The truth is that is peanuts for a country like ours, but we will pay it back in seven years. Circumstances demand it. We have already dismantled the command economy. Unfortunately,

there is nothing there to replace it right now so we really don't have much choice but to move faster. Because of this we haven't been able to accumulate enough resources to maneuver. We just don't have it now. Please tell the President about this request of ours. We want an understanding in Europe that I think exists and we want an understanding in the United States. What is at stake is a great deal, really too much. On May 25th in the Supreme Soviet we will announce a move to a market.

Baker: The President is familiar with your interest in direct loans because I told him of the substance of my conversation with your Finance Minister when he was here. But, of course, I will tell him of the conversation that you and I are having right now.

Gorbachev: After the Finance Minister returned from your country we sounded out German attitudes. We also sounded out the attitude of others in Europe. And it was good, it was positive, but we need more understanding on your part. If we are to reach agreement on arms reductions we will both save a substantial amount of resources and money. For now we are in a special situation. I oppose very much our being a debtor country but we have a special situation and we need help from the outside.

Baker: I anticipate that you will have very little problem of securing loans from the West as a whole particularly if you are prepared to secure the loan you are seeking with some of your collateral.

Gorbachev: We are willing to collateralize.

Baker: I'll make certain the President understands this and make certain that he understands that you are willing to collateralize your loans as well.

Gorbachev: Yes, indeed. See our position is really one of being able to use the external resources to buy consumer goods and invest in industries that are converting to producing consumer goods.

Baker: I'll also make sure the President understands the political significance you put on the participation of the United States in this effort.

Gorbachev: Absolutely. It will be difficult to explain to our people why we are pushing and promoting U.S.-Soviet relations and then find that in this situation of a need there's no response from the United States. Recently I saw a

documentary here that looked at U.S.-Soviet relations over the last century. Last Saturday Raisa and I watched it and as I watched the faces and I saw the developments and the vacillations in our relations I couldn't help but feel there were a lot of opportunities that had been missed. I almost had the sense that frequently we were passing each other and I wonder whether we will miss another opportunity. I'm afraid that if we're not able to implement what's going on now and help develop what's happening in this country, that once again we will miss an opportunity.

Baker: I will make the point to the President. Please understand there is a political problem of our diverting loans to the Soviet Union or loans to the European Development Bank, if it takes place in a negative context. For example, if Lithuania is being squeezed economically, or if your subsidies to Cuba are unchanged, it will be very difficult. There are still many voices in our society who will say why now, why loan dollars to the Soviet Union when it continues to supply MIG-29 aircraft to Cuba. And why provide money to the Soviet Union when it is engaging in economic coercion in the Baltics.

I know you will ask how can Vilnius or a couple of MIG-29's be more important than success of perestroika in the Soviet Union? That's a valid question. But I'm trying to point out to you that the atmosphere that prevails is going to have a big impact on the body politic of the United States. The Senate has already voted three to one to suspend economic relations with the Soviet Union pending a resolution in the Baltics. And I am sure you know what kinds of passion Cuba arouses in the United States.

Now if I might let me try to response to some of your comments on Germany.

First, we don't seek to divide East European countries from the Soviet Union. That is something we might have tried to do in the past, we're not trying to do that any more. What we seek is an integrated and stable Europe. That's what we want to see built and we are prepared to participate with you in this exercise. Now you ask if you trust Germany, why does Germany need to be in NATO? And I might reverse that question and say if you trust Germany, why can't you let them choose. We're not forcing Germany into NATO. But we do think it's important that Germany be a part of NATO, not out of any fear of the Soviet Union but because we think unless we find a way to truly anchor Germany to European institutions we will sow the seeds for history to repeat itself. You remember the League of Nations. It's great to talk about a Pan-European security structure and CSCE -- but CSCE today and that

structure are a wonderful dream but today they are only a dream. NATO on the other hand exists. And NATO will mean that Germany will rely upon NATO for security.

Gorbachev: Why NATO?

Baker: Well, I'm talking about the existing institutions of the West -- NATO, the EC.

Gorbachev: That organization existed in one situation only, and the situation is now changing.

Baker: If you don't have Germany anchored to the existing institution, then what you are going to have is a powerful new entity concerned about developing its security measures. First, it is going to think about developing its own nuclear measures. In NATO it relies upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It is far easier for the Germans to renounce the development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as long as it is a part of NATO. I know this presents difficult psychological and political problems for the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev: What about militarily, isn't that a problem? What we have now is the Warsaw Pact simply deteriorating as a military alliance and becoming purely a political alliance. And at the same time what's going to happen to NATO. It's going to be strengthened because it's going to be adding a unified Germany.

Baker: Maybe so in the near term but we are talking about adapting NATO, making it more of a political alliance. We recognize the importance of limits on Bundeswehr to you. The difference between us that we disagree on how and where to get at such limits. We have thought a lot about your concerns and we've been developing approaches and ideas with those concerns in mind. As I have said before, we have no desire and haven't sought any unilateral advantage. We want stability in Europe and we want perestroika to succeed. We have fought two wars as a consequence of instability in Europe, we're not looking to recreate it. What I'd like to do is to give you some examples of how we have moved in a very practical way to try to take account of your concerns. I have nine such examples in mind:

First, we suggested that there should be limits on Bundeswehr and that they should be addressed promptly in CFE II negotiations. What I'm saying is that we should lock up CFE I agreement quickly. We ought to get it behind us, and then we can immediately go to CFE II and in those circumstances in that context, you will see reductions in Bundeswehr as well as other forces. I've talked with the Germans about this and I know that they are agreeable.

A **second** step that we've taken is that the President announced and proposed that we should move up the time for SNF negotiations. Here again we are taking a step that will change the military climate and security environment in Europe and it will lead to very different kind of nuclear posture on our part in Europe.

Third, we proposed and the Germans have agreed that they should recommit themselves to not develop, possess or acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

Fourth, we proposed that there should be no NATO forces in the GDR for some agreed transition period.

Fifth, we have the Germans believe that there ought to be a similar transition period for Soviet forces in the GDR.

Sixth, we have made it clear that NATO has to adapt politically and militarily. When we say that it has to adapt militarily what we're saying is that it needs to adapt both its conventional and military postures to conform to the new reality. And we know that NATO's strategy is going to have to change because the Warsaw Pact has changed and because there have been big changes in your forces as well.

Seventh, we have also worked with the Germans to emphasize the importance of getting an agreement on borders. Borders of a new Germany that would only involve only the FRG, the GDR and Berlin. This is something that is important not only to the Poles but we know also to you.

Eighth, we have emphasized the importance of developing CSCE. CSCE can be a new institution in Europe. It can be developed into an institution. It can create a sense of inclusion not exclusion in Europe. It could create a role for both the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europeans. We know that if you are going to develop a unified Europe based on common values there has to be a vehicle to get us there. Institutionalizing CSCE is one possible vehicle and I see it as being a cornerstone over time in the development of a new Europe.

And **ninth**, we know that you are very concerned about GDR economic obligations to you and one of the things that we see and proposed is that Germans need to work out a whole course and range of economic relations with you. Quite frankly we can see how that arrangement, the new economic arrangements with Germany, can be extremely beneficial for perestroika.

All of this is not to say that we don't recognize the problem that you face with a unified Germany in NATO. On the contrary, the very reasons that we are developing ideas to try to deal with your concerns is precisely because we do recognize the problems a unified Germany in NATO presents you. But again I come back to the point that the best way to ensure long term stability in Europe is to be sure that Germany is anchored in the existing security institution and the other institutions in the West. In anchoring Germany in this way we will, in Genscher's words, see "a new European Germany".

I want to add one other point, maybe a couple other points on Germany. I know you have certain concerns about NATO, but the reality is that a unified Germany in NATO is not only going to be a different Germany but there is also going to be a different NATO. And that again is very much a function of the changes that have taken place in Eastern and Central Europe. Let me add one final point. If Germany doesn't want to be in NATO it's not going to be in NATO. It's not a question of trust. The issue here is what's going to afford the greatest stability in Europe. I'm not thinking of the East-West dimension. Much of the instability in Europe is not the result of the East-West issue. The fact is that Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary all support the unified Germany NATO, not because of U.S. diplomacy but because they see that it has a value in and of itself. They understand the importance of a unified Germany with long-term stability in NATO. So in short I just wanted you to know that we have been very sensitive to your concerns. We believe that your concerns are legitimate and I have taken some time to lay out our thinking as a way of explaining how we have attempted to take some of your concerns into account.

Gorbachev: You know you may be prophetic. What if one day a unified Germany says they want to be out of NATO. What will we do then?

Baker: Well, that's a little bit like my asking you if you don't want Germany in NATO, what do you want?

Gorbachev: Well, that's why I said we really need to talk more about this, we need to think about these things. We have negotiations underway and we really ought to approach this question sooner and not later. What you're arguing for is based on just one premise and that's it. Though you are saying that it is going to happen, what if it doesn't happen? There's a real possibility that the premise that you're adopting is wrong. Mr. Secretary let's assume at this moment that one day Germany decides to withdraw from NATO. If that happens we would have lost our ability to affect events. We won't have

done anything in the interim period to try shape the new system. Currently we have the Four-Power rights, the unification process -- these give us a means to do something. These give us a means to help develop a new system, a new structure. Maybe a system based on de-militarization. Maybe you can document all the points you've mentioned to me in a final settlement. Maybe you can formalize that and other issues. If that happens we'll have a better situation. Still the Germans are still going to be closer to you but there would be better balance.

Baker: Well in this document that you talk about, would that document have to say that Germany would not have the right to remain in NATO.

Gorbachev: Yes. It is outside and it should be outside a military grouping.

Baker: Are you talking about a neutral Germany?

Gorbachev: I don't know if I'd call it that. Maybe I'd call it non-aligned. There are lots of different kinds of non-aligned. Look at status of France, for example. Let me just try to wind this up in a conceptual way. I will think very carefully about everything you just said and I will also ask you to please consider what I've said and I'd like very much to continue our discussion with the President. Let me just add that if in the end we aren't able to persuade you of our argument, then I will say to the President that we want enter NATO. After all you said that NATO wasn't directed against us, you said it was a new Europe, so why shouldn't we apply.

Baker: I got that question in the news conference in Bonn.

Gorbachev: Well, it's not such a hypothetical question. It's also not so far-fetched.

Baker: Let me offer a couple of comments. First, there are a number of countries that are neutral and non-aligned, but they are neutral and non-aligned by choice, not because it's been forced upon them.

Gorbachev: Well maybe Germany would want this. I think we have to reserve this option and not just assume they want to be in NATO.

Baker: Well I assume they want to be in NATO because they say they want to be in NATO. Neutrality or non-alignment cannot be forced upon a nation. You shouldn't contemplate that as a condition for releasing our Four-Power rights and

responsibilities. It runs counter to the very principles of Helsinki. Helsinki makes it very clear that every country will have the right to participate and to chose its own alliance. Now if you are going to say that Germany doesn't have that right then you are singularizing Germany in a way that I think is going to be a source of instability for the future. That's the very result we don't want.

Gorbachev: Well, why would there be that resentment if Germany were not a part of either Western or Eastern military organization.

Baker: The resentment would arise out of singling Germany out for special treatment or requirements. The resentment would arise in having someone else impose their will on the Germans. If they want to join the Warsaw Pact, it might be a different situation.

Gorbachev: But what if they do. Can I note from your statement that you say it would be okay if they join the Warsaw Pact?

Baker: Helsinki says that any country can choose its own alliance.

Gorbachev: Well, am I specifically to conclude that if a unified Germany wanted to be a member of the Warsaw Pact the U.S. would say okay.

Baker: Our position is that the best prescription for stability is that a unified Germany ought to be a part of NATO. But in the end that's a matter of choice for the Germans.

Gorbachev: In principle, you're for free choice for the Germans, a right that is fundamental in international relations. So if Germany wants this you will treat it with understanding.

Baker: Well, again I say that from our standpoint the best prescription for stability is for Germany to be a part of NATO. We don't see any other approach that is likely to produce stability. But you have to respect the Helsinki principles.

Gorbachev: Well, I'm pleased by this argument for I think it strengthens my position. We say for example from our standpoint that a unified Germany in NATO will threaten the stability that has existed for the last 45 years.

Baker: Well we have a fundamental disagreement.

Gorbachev: We have got to find a way to match our positions. We have to find a way to see if we can be compatible. Whether or not we can find a solution on a basis that reflects a balance of interests. Let's see if we can act together -- maybe we won't be able to.

Baker: Well, let me ask you a question. Will you accept Germany having free choice to remain a member of NATO?

Gorbachev: As I have said to you frankly we cannot accept a unified Germany as a member of just NATO or the Warsaw Pact because that's going to have a basic effect on the strategic balance in Europe and the world. You really should not leave us isolated at this crucial moment. We may have unusual moves to make. || ?

Shevardnadze: Let me add two points. First, when you say Germany will be in NATO you forget all about the Potsdam agreement. And in Potsdam there were a number of things that were agreed not only that there should be de-Nazification and de-militarization, but a number of other things that were agreed that give us the right to sort of see how things unfold with Germany. You say that all we should do is simply divest ourselves of these rights. Well that's very one-sided and it doesn't take account of our rights. You're right to note public opinion in your country. But if there is a unified Germany in NATO it going to mean the end of perestroika. And people will say that we are the losers, we're not the victors. I also don't share your assessment of CSCE. CSCE is not just a dream. We don't need to have military blocs all over Europe we should do without them. If we are to achieve a new Europe without blocs then it is not such a fantasy to think that the Soviet Union might apply to NATO. || NAME CHANG

Gorbachev: Why not have a grand coalition of states? We did before during the war. Why couldn't we do that again?

Baker: I understand what you are saying on not being isolated. And that's why we made the suggestion that we have made -- to develop the process -- I mentioned this earlier. That's the reason we came up with the Two-Plus-Four mechanism. We recognize that you have a need to be seen as managing with us the process of German unification.

Gorbachev: Absolutely, that's absolutely correct. Where we are a little concerned is that the process will become one plus four.

Baker: Why did we come up with the Two-Plus-Four process? We did so because we knew that everybody had to be at the table

equally. And also we did so because we understood very well your domestic needs.

Gorbachev: Bear in mind that it is increasingly one versus four.

Baker: When I say CSCE is a dream I mean it is a dream right now. But I've made specific suggestions on how to build it into something more than just a dream. But for the interim it is important to have Germany anchored to the existing institutions so that they don't feel a need to seek security on their own. You know we have an anchor in the EC and we support that even though we are not a member of the EC. We support German association with other institutions in Europe precisely because we saw what happened in the past when there was an independent neutral Germany.

Shevardnadze: Well we would like to see the Two-Plus-Four decide Bundeswehr limits and then have those limits inscribed in CFE. First we could have agreement among the six. Why do we need it? Well, isn't the military capability of Germany a legitimate question for the external unification of Germany? Doesn't that come up as part of the external unification of Germany?

Gorbachev: Let me sum up. We bandied about our thoughts. And you see in me someone who just had to read-out a report to the country on the 45th anniversary of the war. Now let's just think about what we have lost. I didn't even mention that before now. We lost 27 million people on the front lines and as POWs. They were the best part of our nation, the most active, the most dynamic. We had 18 million people injured. The health of millions of our people was affected because they were hungry, ill-clothed, ill-fed. This was a shock to the entire nation. So you can not have a simplistic approach to the situation we face today. Not just us, but you too have a stake in this. Our people say that the United States can't be trusted if they can't understand this. So let me support the key point you made -- we should manage this process today and tomorrow. Beyond this, let me just say you should tell anyone who tries to suggest that the Soviet Union is seeking to push the U.S. out of Europe that they're just wrong -- don't believe them. Without the U.S. in Europe nothing good could happen. Then we really will see some of the conflicts of the past repeat themselves.

Well, let's now get go on to other subjects, and invite our other colleagues in.

(There followed an one and one-half hour discussion on START. At its conclusion, the Secretary met with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze again without the delegations.)

Baker: Thank you very, very much for taking so much time and spending it with me. You know I have had a number of conversations with Eduard on Lithuania. We have worked hard to get the Lithuanians to moderate their position. We have taken the same position with our allies and urged them also to urge the Lithuanians to move in the right direction. We had indirect contact with Landsbergis, when I was talking to Eduard, and we know that we should be the last ones to try to mediate especially in this situation. But we are trying to understand your situation and we are hoping that neither you nor the Lithuanians will get locked into difficult positions that are hard to back away from. And we know this a very difficult problem. That's one of the reasons that we are very pleased that the Lithuanians said that they were prepared to suspend some of their actions and to come to Moscow.

Now I'm going to see Prunskiene while she is here in Moscow. The President saw her and I'm going to see her. If I were to tell her that if Lithuania suspends its declaration by announcing it's prepared to come to Moscow and begin a dialogue, would I be able to say that a dialogue would begin. I can tell you that if you are talking to them when you are in the United States it will make for a much more productive Summit. I'm only stating this as a political fact of life.

Gorbachev: Well, I met her yesterday. I'd say that our room for maneuver is quite limited. The situation takes a lot of very deft handling and it takes deft handling in very narrow context -- very little ability to be flexible or to maneuver. I'm not going to go into detail of our arguments. The point is that we favor a political solution. Yesterday she agreed with me that she would go back to Vilnius and try in the Supreme Soviet to get some formula for suspension of the laws and the declaration.

Baker: Did she agree to that?

Gorbachev: She did agree to try to persuade the Supreme Soviet. The fact is the situation is pushing both them and us to try to do something. Now we had decisions made by the Congress of Peoples Deputies that it validates her decision, her declaration. As President, I have to approach the independence declaration as something that is null and non-existent. But I will make an effort to prove that the freeze will mean going back to March 11 and we can, therefore, go ahead and start a dialogue. I will be over-ruling the

majority of our people who want me to invoke direct Presidential rule. And I told her that she too would have to make a big effort much the way I would be if we were going to get out of this impasse. Now I know if they are forced to revoke or cancel their declaration, that that's going to look as if Moscow brought them to their knees and that's too much for them to have to accept. That's why I'm saying that I am prepared to accept the suspension; that's a compromise. In any case she told me she would try to go and persuade the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet; if the decision is taken by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to suspend the declaration then we would have an immediate dialogue and the committee would begin meeting to discuss all the issues that will come up. We will engage in a normal process and all of the sanctions would be cancelled immediately.

Baker: What if they were to say that the declaration stands but it's a declaration of intent -- as the declaration of their aspirations to have independence?

Gorbachev: Well that is somewhat different. If they freeze the declaration, then we can begin the discussion with the Center and we can begin the discussion on the entire spectrum of problems associated with implementing their right to self-determination. It's possible to negotiate an acceptable outcome from a number of different points of view. From the Center's standpoint I think there ought to be a referendum. If they decide that they want to leave, so be it. But let's have the decision by referendum and then if they decide they want to leave we have to get together, we'll have to work it out, we have to decide how people are going to live and work. There are 800,000 non-Lithuanians who live in Lithuania. Several days ago ethnic Poles who want their part of Lithuania to become a member of the Russian Federated Republic came and saw me. They want to withdraw from Lithuania. Others like the Belorussians believe that they should also get territory back that had been taken from them and given to Lithuania. You know I hear frequently that if the US is so determined to rescue even one of its citizens that has been taken hostage that I too as the President has to be more active in protecting Russians, especially Russians that are living in a places like Lithuania. Let's look at independence -- it took France ten years to give Caledonia. The process of divorce is not easy. Our economies are intertwined. We must work out new economic arrangements. We have missiles there. The problems go on and on.

We want a normal and constitutional process. We have no irreconcilable differences with them. If they want to leave, do it the right way. Be real people about it.

You know it was new for me to find out that when Stalin incorporated the Baltics into the Soviet Union he also gave Lithuania several districts from Belorussia.

Baker: In my testimony I mentioned that there were several districts that had formerly been part of Belorussia and are now part of Lithuania.

Gorbachev: I know, I know that. I saw that you said that in your testimony. Stalin gave them the port. You know all of this is in the air. The Belorussians have come to us as a result of Chernobyl where they've had to evacuate certain areas around Gomel and they have said they need to be compensated for the land we've lost. And they have passed a resolution now saying they want the land, these five districts back, that were given to Lithuania. I told Lithuania that this is a mess that you have created. What we propose to them was real economic autonomy -- a special status for Lithuania as a state. Maybe they could have a confederal relationship with us. In any case all the issues related to human rights, territories, security, all of these would have to be removed and we are going to do our best to untie this knot.

Baker: Do you think that Prunskiene will be successful in getting the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to go along with what you have offered.

Gorbachev: I think so, there is already a split.

Baker: Is she with Brazaukis?

Gorbachev: Yes. We appreciate your position because we know that you are trying to find a way out of the situation. Please understand that we are not blood-thirsty in this situation and we want a constitutional way to resolve it. In Lithuanian villages, I might add, they are really for staying with the Soviet Union, for staying with Moscow. It's in the cities where the attitude is somewhat different, but in the countryside they understand there is a certain value in staying in the Union. For one thing all the villagers get their feedgrain at a very favorable price. In any case I think the current Lithuanian leadership fears referendum.

Baker: We are hopeful to see that this situation will be resolved. It really does have an effect on our ability to move our relationship forward.

Gorbachev: We understand that. And we also know that we've committed ourselves to pursuing democracy and moving things forward. If we were it committed in that way we would have done things differently in Lithuania. I can tell you that

~~SECRET~~

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I'm under very heavy pressure in this country to act -- I am under a lot of pressure because many are saying look you have become president and you're not acting, why not? I've gotten all these telegrams, I've got telegrams from all over the country -- maybe I'll show them to President Bush. Because what they do is protest and say American Presidents act very quickly to protect American citizens, why don't you as the Soviet President act quickly to protect Russian citizens in Lithuania. So I am under a lot of pressure but I want to resolve this peacefully and I'm determined to do that.

End of conversation

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Trip from Moscow to Zagorsk and return

Thursday, May 17, 1990

Participants: Secretary Baker
Debbie Garretson, Interpreter

Minister Shevardnadze
Pavel Palashzhenko, Interpreter

1. Minister Shevardnadze, the minute he was settled in the limousine, remarked that he found that the idea Secretary Baker had just raised at the Osobnyak was very interesting: that the deepening of US-USSR relations meant that they could jointly do a great deal in Central America and in Europe. The Secretary agreed, saying that that was the idea of having the Soviet Union participate in international economic organizations.

2. Shevardnadze replied that, to be frank, historically it worked out that the Soviet Union ended up isolated from world economics, and that the politics of the time, along with the "bloc" system, had led to this. It led to the division of Europe, and to an economic division both of Europe and of the world. Now the Soviet Union wanted to be integrated into the world economy, but this couldn't happen overnight. It will take serious reconstruction efforts. The Soviet Council for economics wants go to a market economy, but they know that it will take time to meet international standards. The first step would be the step Baker proposed, that is, observer status in GATT.

3. Baker said that this was the same idea -- support of observer status in GATT. This international effort organized by the U.S. could be the same as EEC is undertaking to assist Eastern Europe. All 24 countries would participate. This could be significant for the Soviet Union, Baker said, if the Soviet Union would help out in Cuba. The beneficiaries would be all the Central American countries as well as the Caribbean.

4. Shevardnadze said the idea was an interesting one, and that he would take a close look at it, so that the two of them could return to a discussion of it in Washington.

5. Baker then raised the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar, and asked Shevardnadze to look into it. When the time comes to sign the START treaty, the U.S. would like to be able to assure people that the dismantlement is underway, Baker stated. We said we would sign the START treaty if the Krasnoyarsk dismantlement has started and is proceeding at a reasonable pace. Baker added that many people had spoken out to insist that the dismantlement should be completed before the signing of START, but that Baker had persuaded President Bush to agree to signing if dismantlement had begun and was proceeding in good faith. As is known, our people in the SCC spend a good deal of time arguing, Baker added, and he expressed the wish that Shevardnadze look into this personally.

6. Shevardnadze responded that he had addressed this issue in Wyoming, and felt strongly about his responsibility for his words when he stated that the decision had been taken to dismantle the radar. As for the time frame for dismantlement and complete elimination, it would be provided in the SCC forum. You can be sure, Shevardnadze stated, that I will keep my word, as stated in Wyoming. The only difficulty is the time frame. Surely two to three months' difference in time should not be important. It's a large structure, and there is a lot of equipment to move and convert to commercial use, but the decision has been made in principle. If necessary, Shevardnadze added, this decision could be formalized in some way, in order to show that the dismantlement has begun and is proceeding at a reasonable pace. Perhaps a video could be made, and shown to invited guests.

7. Baker responded that this would be very helpful and would calm down some of the people in the SCC. Shevardnadze stated that apart from the Krasnoyarsk radar, other steps had been taken, for instance, an agreement had been reached to arrange mutual visits to other facilities. The next stage would be to implement this, since the Soviet Union attaches a good deal of importance to such visits to facilities.

8. Baker said he assumed Shevardnadze had in mind the visits to Thule and Pechory. Palashzhenko intervened to say to Shevardnadze that the time frames for these visits had not yet been set. Shevardnadze then spoke to say that the time frames for these visits could be arranged through diplomatic channels.

9. Baker stated he wished to raise a sensitive issue, and expressed his concern about the extensive biological weapons program underway in the Soviet Union. We have new information that the Soviet Union has a large, covert program which is in violation of the Biological Weapons convention, and that the U.S. knows specifically that this comprehensive program is developing the biotechnology for enhancing the effectiveness of biological agents, Baker said. This covert organization has been created under the cover of a research institute, with a large amount of military money and expertise involved. The biological weapons stocks are well over those permitted by the BW convention. The Soviet Union has been producing and stockpiling BW agents and field testing them throughout the '80's. This information comes from a variety of sources, over a number of years, and the activity is taking place in the Chief Directorate for Biological Preparation. On the same basis we are aware that, in the past, the organization worked under what was known as a medical and biological industry, and that this Ministry is now known as the Ministry of Microbiology.

10. Baker stated that he was concerned about these activities, since they have serious implications for the ministers' joint efforts in improving U.S.-USSR relations. Baker said he would like to ask the Soviet government to take the necessary steps to dismantle this BW program and destroy these weapons. Baker said he hoped that his people would soon be able to tell President Bush that these steps are underway.

Baker stated that the U.S. would not publicize these activities, but that Congress would have to be briefed, and that some information could be public. Perhaps the Soviet Union could reveal this program, Baker added, and announce the steps taken to remedy the situation, before the facts come out. This could lessen the negative impact.

11. Shevardnadze said that he knew a little bit about this issue, since Ambassador Matlock and the British ambassador had come to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to raise this problem with Shevardnadze and Yazov. Shevardnadze remarked, "What could I say?" Shevardnadze said he could only repeat what he had said to Baker the preceding day. The '72 convention of biological weapons has one serious drawback in that it does not have a comprehensive verification system. Such a system needs to be developed to put an end to suspicions of this kind.

12. Shevardnadze stated that he had no concrete facts, but he had been told on several occasions that the U.S. has similar work going on, and that a verification regime is necessary to remove suspicions. One cannot seriously accuse the Soviet Union of producing biological weapons, Shevardnadze continued, and stated that, although he could not speak to past practices, he had nonetheless served as a member of the Soviet Council on Defense for the past five years, and there is no basis for making such an accusation or raising such suspicions. Shevardnadze said that he did not want to get into discussing the source of such information, but that the best way to remove suspicions would be by organizing mutual visits to facilities and establishing a mutual system of verification. Then this subject could be seriously discussed. The Soviet Union has already provided a list of facilities in the Soviet Union involved in biological research which might have this kind of potential. Research institutes of this type, whether in the U.S. or USSR, are at work on combatting various diseases, cholera, for instance. The Soviet Union has made this list of facilities available to the UN, and Shevardnadze offered to provide one for Secretary Baker, in case people might want to look into a particular facility. The U.S. needs to know that it can have complete confidence in the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is honoring the convention, and that is why Shevardnadze suggested exchanges the preceding day.

13. Shevardnadze said that he had calmed down now about this issue, but that when the ambassadors first came to the MFA to raise this question he was dismayed. He would be upset, Shevardnadze said, if there were people who had deceived him as Foreign Minister and as a member of the Defense Council about something like this, and that if work of this nature is going on, then it would have to be with the highest authority. That would mean that the U.S. could not believe him, neither him, Shevardnadze, nor the Soviet Government nor the President of the Soviet Union.

14. Baker agreed, stating that this is precisely why it was such a serious matter. Baker stated that he would not raise this matter personally with Shevardnadze, if he did not think that the information was reliable. Baker suggested that Shevardnadze's suggestion be taken up, and that somehow, through inspections, or further inquiry and research, something be done to satisfy the concern.

15. Shevardnadze said he would not argue about U.S. sources, but that he had been told by some that it was possible that certain people were simply trying to make themselves look important in bringing up this kind of thing. It is important that there be no suspicions, and that is why a system is needed. It should be stated, Shevardnadze added, that it is theoretically possible that any institute involved in biological research, in both the U.S. and the USSR, could also be involved in work on biological agents. A system of inspections and verification, along with visits, as in the INF treaty and in the area of chemical weapons, should be instituted. Without mutual inspection visits and verification visits, it would be difficult to dispel rumors. Shevardnadze stated that he personally attached a great deal of importance to this issue, since otherwise the U.S. and USSR could not trust each other.

16. Baker agreed that this was very important, and said that there were people who were not interested in seeing progress made, who would seize on this issue. Shevardnadze said that each side had to prove that it was keeping its word, and that, if a side was not keeping its word, the other side had the right to call it on it. It is a most serious matter, Shevardnadze concluded.

17. Shevardnadze wished to turn to another issue, since trust was being discussed, and stated that a group of U.S. psychiatrists and legal experts had recently completed visits to the Soviet Union. The visit received a broad public response in the U.S. and throughout the world, since the group was able to visit everything they wanted to see, with no restrictions placed on them. It had then been agreed that a group of Soviet psychiatrists could visit locations in the U.S., but Shevardnadze said he had been informed that their request had been denied.

18. Baker responded that this matter had been brought to his attention and that it was outrageous, simply outrageous, and that he was very angry about it. Baker said he would correct the situation as soon as he returned to the U.S., but that he wanted to explain how this came about. The USIA was supposed to sponsor the visit financially, and the USIA is an independent agency, although it works closely with the State Department. There had been a recent visit to the U.S. by a group of intellectuals from the Soviet Union, some of whom had very strong anti-semitic views.

The USIA received considerable criticism for sponsoring a visit carrying such a strong anti-semitic message, and was therefore nervous about the psychiatrists' visit and suspended it. Baker assured Shevardnadze that he would look into this as soon as he returned to the U.S., and pointed out that Ambassador Schifter had done his best to prevent the denial, but had been unsuccessful. Baker stated that if he had known about it himself he would have spoken to Bruce Gelb, who was in charge, in person.

19. Shevardnadze said that if there were any requests, regarding issues of prestige or good faith, even regarding rumors, that they should be brought up, so that the ministers could discuss them. This is a matter of principle, Shevardnadze stated. Just as in the case of the Krasnoyarsk radar, Shevardnadze said the question of trust was extremely important to him personally. Hence the need for addressing suspicions regarding biological weapons, and putting them to rest. There is no other way to establish good relations for the two powers, who are responsible to the whole world.

20. Baker responded that it was indeed true that everything is based on credibility and trust, and that the fact that he and President Bush can trust Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev has been the main reason that so much has been accomplished. Baker stated that he had asked his people to go back and verify their sources on biological weapons many times, and he wished to make clear that he was not raising this question lightly. Baker stated that there was another rumor he had heard, that he wished to ask Shevardnadze about. Perhaps the minister can respond to it, and perhaps not, but the U.S. press had recently been suggesting that Shevardnadze was planning to leave his post of Foreign Minister, which would indeed be unfortunate, and replace, for instance Mr. Ryshkov. Could the Minister comment on this in any way, Baker inquired.

21. Shevardnadze chuckled and responded that he had already been asked the same question by Dan Rather. Shevardnadze said he knew nothing about it, and that neither he nor President Gorbachev had any such plans. Shevardnadze added that he assumed Secretary Baker had no plans of changing jobs either. Shevardnadze said he would like to recommend that the Secretary meet Ryshkov, that he was a knowledgeable, honest and progressive person, and knew life for what it was. Ryshkov rose to a very responsible position as a young man at the Ural machine building plant, legendary in World War II days. He is presently very active in the Supreme Soviet, and is particularly interested in the issue of transition to a market economy. Shevardnadze said he had no reason to believe that Ryshkov might be moving, and that he thought Secretary Baker ought to see him the next time he visited. Baker agreed that it would be a good idea.

22. On the return trip Baker briefly raised the issue of Ethiopia, stating that the U.S. and USSR should be able to do something to help the famine victims, without impinging on either Mengistu or the insurgents. Shevardnadze responded that he wanted to look into this matter, and that the situation in the whole region, Sudan and Somalia, was an extremely unstable one. Baker expressed his understanding that the situation was complicated for the Soviet Union since the three Soviet planes were blown up, and Shevardnadze agreed, saying that he had always wanted to visit the region, but had not been able to for lack of time. He was still interested in doing so, Shevardnadze added, since he wanted personally to try to influence the parties involved. Former President Carter had been doing good work in this area, Shevardnadze pointed out, and Baker agreed. Shevardnadze concluded that Carter's efforts were not enough and that, overall, what was needed was relief at a government level.

In talking to JAB you felt we were pushing Eastern Europe to
'disassociate' from Sov Union..... (not so)

you welcome U.S. presence (saying not necessarily military)

Next question.... do we trust Germany. Germany does not want in Warsaw Pact
they want in Nato.../

Not:driven" by fear of Soviet Threat..but make no mistake there is still a
concern about Soviet Threat--- in Wstrn Europe and in E. Europe...There
is no fear of USA threat.

You cite Economic problems and ask should Vilnius etc take precedence...?
Make no mistake Vilnius is serious roadblock to full cooperation
on economic front.

16-20 bill loan to 'tide us over'...6-7 years to repay.
How bout Godl backing..guarantees where loans go.
stull big problem for USA.

HARD to loan when missilies aimed at USA.... that's the key point.

I must convince you, Mr. ZPresident, that you have
nothing to fear from a united Germany in NATO. You have less to fear
by far than having Germany floating free with no constraints. i happen
to belive Germany has learned a difficult lesson. I dont' believ they will
threaten neighbors or resort to expansionism in any way. But before
convincing you on this you must know you have nothing ot fear
from USA.... you ask... what,someday, if Germany elects ot get out
of NATO?... By htne trust will have been solidified between
you and the rest of Europe... Gemrnay will never risk being
totally isolated.

Yopu asked about entering NATO.... the problem is... Nato members
dont' aim their missiles at each other(noty sure where htis leads)

You ask about Germnay joining Warsaw Pact.... That just won't happen.
If they so elected,finer.. but I have talked ot many Easern
European democratic leaders, and they want to be aligned with West...

Lithuania.....

after reading transcript i see know answer here. Referendum has some
appeal to me 9minority rights) but Lith strongly opposes.
Only hope for pre summit solution is that miraculously
negotiations begin.

GB

Biological.
Psychiatrist visit

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

P / Garbo cheer 11/19/90
1001

- P These not easy times. Don't want to injest myself but want you to know if there is anything I can do . . . I know it isn't easy. But anyone who can win Nobel prize can do it.
- G Thank you. Yes, these are dif times. But it can't be otherwise if we are changing country in a big way. But as I talk to all we must look forward in future not to past. We must look to pace of change + priorities. Each republic has its own priorities. But our time is limited. Our main societal worry is instability, econ political + with ethnic. People are speaking out for stability + they want firm gov't to achieve it. That means to achieve persistence. So in near future we will have to take certain measures - drastic + drastic measures, like Roosevelt did to avert changes that generate chaos. Until recently, efforts have gone to: move toward market + stabilize money, + move toward unity. But there was a 2nd vacuum in world. Reps went home + people gave them a beating. At opening of 70s when

they returned they rejected a gesture, asked for free discussion & asked for a report by me. I said I would cover in 2 days time. I did it & gave certain suggestions. They agreed w/ my speech but asked for more specific measures. I listened for 1 day & felt they didn't want to wait for a constitution but to act now. So I proposed ideas I was saving for later after cell in jail work. 150 asked to speak. Tensions were really high. Never before had SS been in such a state. I asked for peace & people sat quietly & listened to my 8 points. At first, silence, then big applause.

P Where does it go now?

G It will amount to Presidential rule. All exec authority subord. to P. New structure & controls for country.

P Where does Yeltsin fit?

G Wood supports stabilization not rushing a boat. They resist separation. They ask: what prevents Gorb & Yeltsin from coop. Answer: nothing. Objectively there is a need for coop. People thinking; if you can't agree - go. but we make a purely personal statement. Capability of Yeltsin is not much. People have to find this out for themselves. Why is

he popular? Because he rejects everything + people say "how brave." He just keeps everything back & blames & center. He likes glory. He is vain, a heavy drinker. Cohen brings & doesn't come to office for days. I had known this for long time but ethically I can't make it public. He will be used & then thrown out - unless he can produce people because of a existing tensions. He may be able to do that. I will involve all people regardless of their ideology - even Yellin. People must know they can't just talk. w/o help from center, there can't be anything and would starve.

P We have a federal system w/ strong centers, so we don't understand what is going on

C It's nonsense. I told Yellin he had to put forth how he proposes to preserve a SO. But what I have found is that ethically, morally he has double standards. So what I am putting into place with whom he'll have to work w/ us or get out.

The day after I spoke of discipline & order, things appeared in stores.

I will publish Union Treaty when I get

have.

P They gave me today notes for my speech. It had reference to Bettis. I crossed it out because I didn't want to embarrass you in public. You know we were ready. Their reply. I don't want to add to your problems but I hope some way they can have their paper later.

G We have conversed extensively on Union County. We have learned a great deal about Bettis. There is a great tension now in the area. The current authorities are threatened - leaders are in trouble. Prison & hands - are not popular now. When we asked about his father's property & servants & workers didn't like that. People saying Castro ruled better than he is - he is seizing everything - clothes, cars, etc. Behind their backs, extremists & former little collaborationists are gaining power. There may be explosion any time.

P Don't they all want peace?

G None of them want a referendum, so who knows. So we speaking up union process. Those who want to sign, will. Those who don't - let people decide. Then we will move

to discuss proceedings.

Let me get to my important ones.
Baker told me of our talks & I under-
stand your concern for patience, etc.

(Coleman, barrels & troops
looking like grandchildren)

I need your help. We need to get UN
to authorize force to convince SA to do
what UN demands. I can't think of any
other way to convince him. He is
dip, cruel - he is like Hitler. I can't
tell you that w/ Jews at home. Because
of Holocaust. I want you to know how
strongly I feel. Feelings in US are
unipol. When you add those who
think I going too slowly, it's a good
when it concerns what I want to
do w/ you, it sends right signal.
Not persuaded; I'll be out in 2 or 4
yrs, but it is right. I don't need
answer. I don't want to meet you
on spot w/ your colleagues but
I had to tell you how strongly I felt.
I have given it a lot of thought. Your
letter & James' talk. Let me say
it not just a 2 of us. This is im-
portant. If these 2 of us must demonstrate
we are able to work together to solve
- probs facing world. We are

and I am sure
you will be
happy to
hear from
me

Gift
copy

6

w/ aggression, recrimination, violation
of int'l law. 2nd, because of choices
not made each one (I think) are
comp w/ each other, we can't accept not
when US Pres would find himself
one spot. All our ~~eff~~ efforts & change
things if we want an ~~separate~~
wrap. On some things, of course,
we may have differences. But on
this we must ~~be~~ ^{cooperate} together.
In my heart's preference ^{as far as possible} to solve
w/out blood. It can all turn out
very, very badly, worse than VNI.
We must do everything to avoid civil war
but we must solve this problem.
So we must ratchet up pressure.
I told Jim not to resort to act 51 but
to work w/ UN — that is very important.
Of course, some people might say
forget UNSC when BH getting colder
& colder & US looks weak. After
much thinking I decided we need a
resolution but one which would
combine your & my ideas. 1st part
would contain deadline on act &
2nd part would say all necessary
measures can be used. That
should be adopted while you are
P of UNSC. In ultimate perspective

should do certain things to get his compliance, i.e. meet w/ Iraqi leaders at FM level ^{as early as possible} ^{you to} bring your buses - or use UNSC.

P What kind of time frame for a settlement

G Mid Jan. One month, or couple. Then all approp measures. There is a certain probab / PRL. They have begun to maneuver

P They won't do.

G Agree

P They will do what you do. They don't want to be isolated.

- We should do this. You should left choose sanctions

P We have legal probs. I have stood against Cong & prevailed pretty. You talk about your system. Ours is crazy

G Ours is 1/2 crazy

P I very pleased to hear this. We will handle directly - handle however best for you. I don't want to send bills into battle.

G I agree. This 2 tier approach is to match up pressure to get him to comply.

P One resolution

G Yes. 2 parts. Ultimatum & then use all

agreed to take firm stand. Aggression
reversed. Continue to pursue this line.
use UNSC
approp means. We should instruct
Bochen / Sheward not just to wait
after a resolution sent to work to get
compliance

P I not negotiator... appropriate
G let Jim / Sheward work it out. We
mean same thing

P How about press?

G. We will say that serious exchange
approach we have taken is what
will continue to stand together w/
other UNSC members. Aggressor
won't be rewarded. Agreed that time
has come to discuss set in UNSC
(End of the news)

(Discussion of def of SS-12)

G NACEUR came to inset. I said
open everything up. This is new
age

P Now we have CFE, let's get
these 2 ministers to get start
done

G We are working hard. I think
we can sign this with

Y Cheney visited our C&C. He
prob that we were fooling him, but
when we showed him everything
on screen, he believed us.

S 3 questions

1) How to deal w/ PRC

2) Contact Iraqis before Resolution

G Maybe after

S We now have no serious contact

regarding Arab-I conflict. We need some common understanding.

B Continuing to coop in UN framework

G Set is dangerous - requires more

SC discussion. Will consult w/ other partners.

Mit/Bush/Goob | mit aide had aids

- B Start issues left are so technical.
They found a way around non-circum
PPCM, etc are tough to deal w/
G Experts will of resolution - we will
just OK. B not used to be you had
ratification prob. now we have one.
We have our Gannum - but not
to serious as yours.

Mit: 100 meetings | 10/10/10
Bush: 100 security | 10/10/10
Goob: 100 Econ | 10/10/10

Kennedy } on speaking ship.
Widow } women & children, etc
Ford } same & women
Do we have time

(WW II stories)

Continue to emphasize 3 things

- 1) analyzed til as plans read
- 2) continue to evolve (dangerous)
- 3) UK Resos to date have been
approp.

Reaffirm support in favor
of armed resistance of this aggression.
Because of it, it necessary to
consider ties again w/ in UNSE

B good public line. Need to contact re.
Carter

- G They won't into
- B PRC will ask for your position
- P Let ~~them~~ tell PRC
- B We need to agree how to approach PRC
- G You & Edward discuss this. Best
would be to let Chinese Secretaries
know have.
- P We can't tie them together.
- G Shouldn't be tied in. Even before
resolution you could do something.
Send a mission
- B Maybe Minister could come
to work.
- G You will find a way.
We have to find a way to keep
up pressure. He should feel a
heat, but we bring it to avoid
a fire. If it comes to blow, may
be worse than off

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