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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries:	Gorbachev Files
OA/ID Number:	91126
Folder ID Number:	91126-003

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (4 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	
03. Cable	White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	12/8/89	(b)(1)	S
04a. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	
04b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8	(b)(1)	
05a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (7 pp.)	7/19/89	(b)(1)	
05c. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (7 pp.)	7/19/89	(b)(1)	
06. Memo	General Scowcroft to Michael Beschloss Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	8/31	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1066
OA/ID Number: 91126-003
Date Closed: 4/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Letter	Ambassador Dubinin to James A. Baker, III [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08. Draft Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09. Cable	To Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	S
10. Cable	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Memorandum for the President (3 pp.)	2/8/90	(b)(1)	S
11. Cable	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Memorandum for the President (4 pp.)	2/8/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
13a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for Presidential Phone Call to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/30/90	(b)(1)	S
13b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Your Phone Call to Gorbachev Concerning the New CFE Manpower Proposal (1 pp.)	1/30/90	(b)(1)	S
13c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Phone Call to Gorbachev Concerning Your CFE Proposal (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13d. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14. Handwritten Notes	Re: P/Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	
15. Talking Points	Re: As I said in my letter… (2 pp.)	11/5	(b)(1)	
16. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	2/2/90	(b)(1)	
17. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	
18. Message	From Ambassador Dubinin Re: In the course… (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
19. Talking Points	Re: Biological Weapons (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
20. Cable	White House Re: Message to Robert Gates and Arnold Kanter from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S
21. Cable	Ambassador Matlock to Susan Porter Rose Re: Public Announcement on Travel by Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev to Wellesley College (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
22. Cable	To White House Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft and Bob Blackwill from Gates and Kanter (2 pp.)	5/15/90	(b)(1)	S
23a. Letter	Eduard Shevardnadze to James A. Baker, III [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
23b. Paper	Re: Paper on Possible Additional Areas of Agreement on Long-Range ALCMs and SLCMs [Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
24a. Memo	R. Nicholas Burns to Florence E. Gantt and Diane L. Edwards Re: Soviet Advance Team (1 pp.)	5/9/90	(b)(1)	S
24b. Cable	Re: Memorandum for the President Bonn, May 4, 1990 (5 pp.)	5/5/90	(b)(1)	S
25. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush (3 pp.)	4/29/90	(b)(1)	
26. Letter	To President Bush [Condi's Translation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
27. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	5/3/90	(b)(1)	
28a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	5/3/90	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
28b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	5/3/90	(b)(1)	
29. Letter	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	4/29/90	(b)(1)	

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~~SECRET~~

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DRAMATIC EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BERLIN AND THE GDR THAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 10. I WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ARE CORRECT AND PROMISING. THE LIFTING OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR THE POPULATION OF THE GDR REPRESENTS A HISTORIC STEP. I BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOAL OF CREATING A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU AT OUR MEETING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NEXT MONTH.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDABLY HIGH EMOTIONS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, THE EVENTS IN RECENT DAYS IN BERLIN HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL. WE SHARE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER ARE MAINTAINED, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN. IN FACT, THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH OUR GERMAN PARTNERS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THIS REMAINS THE CASE. I SUGGEST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THE INTERESTS OF AVOIDING SURPRISES OR THE EMERGENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU VOICED CONCERN THAT THE LEADERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE FRG LEADERSHIP HAS ACTED WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CHANGE IN THE GDR AND THE NEED TO AVOID DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE. As a matter of fact, I have talked personally with Chancellor Kohl on this point and I can assure you he agrees with us on the need for tranquility. AS FOR THE APPROACH OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT, LET ME SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE DEPTH AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO LIFT CONTROLS ON THE TRAVEL OF ITS CITIZENS, AND WE WELCOME ITS EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM -- A COURSE WHICH REFLECTS THE WILL OF THE POPULATION OF THE GDR. I HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON SEE LEGISLATION ENACTED THAT CODIFIES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND THAT THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP WILL WORK WITH OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THESE STEPS WILL NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT THEY COULD LEAD AS WELL TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

LET ME ADD THAT I BELIEVE YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING YOUR ALLIES TO EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT THE

CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OWN PLANS TO MODIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ABROAD, AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. I HOPE THAT PRAGUE AND SOFIA WILL BE THE NEXT WARSAW PACT CAPITALS TO FEEL THE INVIGORATING BREEZE OF PERESTROYKA.

THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OF OUR ALLIES ARE UNITED IN THE VIEW THAT PERESTROYKA IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, BUT THAT ITS SUCCESS WILL OPEN THE WAY TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN WEST AND EAST. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR AND IN OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, NOR IS IT OUR WISH TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY ALL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION. FROM YOUR OWN STATEMENTS, I TRUST THAT YOU DO THE SAME.

SINCERELY,

on a personal note, Barbara appreciated Raisa's letter. Given the nature of our shipboard meeting Barbara will not accompany me but she is genuinely looking forward to seeing Raisa in 1990.

~~SECRET~~

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

The Honorable
Brent SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

December 20, 1989

Dear General Scowcroft,

I have the honor to forward the enclosed original of President Gorbachev's letter to President Bush of November 28, 1989.

Sincerely,

Yuri V. DUBININ

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Признателен за Ваше письмо от 23 сентября 1989 года, в котором Вы подчеркиваете, что на СССР и США лежит особая ответственность сыграть решающую роль в продвижении вперед многостороннего процесса запрещения и ликвидации химического оружия. Хочу сразу сообщить Вам, что я безусловно и искренне поддерживаю такую постановку вопроса.

С целью скорейшего достижения всемирного запрета на химическое оружие предлагаю по примеру венских переговоров высказаться за установление предельного срока для подготовки конвенции, совместно обратившись с призывом к участникам Конференции по разоружению завершить разработку текста конвенции не позднее 1990-1991 года.

В контексте заявленной нашими странами в Вайоминге решимости настойчиво добиваться запрещения химического оружия и уничтожения всех его запасов мы подходим к тем конкретным соображениям, которые Вы, господин Президент, выдвинули в своем письме, а также в ООН.

Вы пишете о готовности США уничтожить более 98 процентов своих запасов химического оружия в течение 8 лет после вступления в силу конвенции при условии, что СССР будет одним из государств, подписавших эту конвенцию. По вопросу об участии Советского Союза в конвенции я даю совершенно определенный положительный ответ. СССР уже заявил, что намерен войти в число первоначальных участников конвенции. Было бы неплохо, если бы США выступили с аналогичным заявлением, а еще лучше сделать такое заявление совместно, например, на нашей предстоящей в 1990 году встрече. Это в свою очередь подтолкнуло бы и другие государства занять столь же определенную позицию в отношении участия в конвенции.

В вопросе о полном уничтожении запасов химического оружия в рамках будущей конвенции, как мне кажется, нам следует придерживаться уже достигнутой на многосторонних переговорах, во многом по инициативе СССР и США, договоренности о безусловной 100-процентной их ликвидации в течение 10 лет со дня вступления конвенции в силу. На принципах полного уничтожения запасов и объектов по его производству в этот срок разработаны совместные советско-американские предложения по порядку уничтожения запасов и объектов, которые были одобрены в Вайоминге. Право на сохранение любых запасов, пусть даже минимальных, означало бы увековечение

Его Превосходительству
Джорджу Бушу,
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки

г.Вашингтон

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угрозы применения химического оружия, давало бы по существу повод любому государству под различными предлогами отказаться от полного уничтожения химического оружия.

Что касается участия в конвенции всех государств, способных обладать химическим оружием, то Советский Союз, как и США, придает этому вопросу первостепенное значение. Мы считаем, что он во многом уже решен специальной советско-американской договоренностью о категориях государств, которые должны стать первоначальными участниками конвенции, и теперь можно было бы приступить к обсуждению конкретного плана действий по привлечению к участию в конвенции государств, представляющих потенциальную угрозу с точки зрения химического оружия. Разумеется, здесь нужен гибкий подход, учет тех разнообразных обстоятельств, которые существуют в том или ином регионе мира.

Вы предложили также радикальное сокращение запасов химического оружия СССР и США в период, пока в Женеве ведутся многосторонние переговоры. Я думаю, что наши страны, учитывая их особую ответственность в деле химического разоружения, могли бы пойти и дальше и, не дожидаясь заключения конвенции, взять на себя целый пакет встречных и взаимосвязанных обязательств.

Первое. Полностью прекратить любое производство химического оружия. Это естественный и сравнительно легко осуществимый первый шаг к будущей конвенции. Он позволил бы значительно подкрепить наше политическое воздействие на тех, кто, возможно, осуществляет или планирует собственное производство химического оружия.

Должен откровенно сказать, что у нас вызвали серьезную озабоченность появившиеся в последнее время сообщения о том, что США намерены продолжать производить химическое оружие даже после вступления конвенции в силу. Мы с определенным недоверием отнеслись к этим сообщениям, поскольку такие действия США прямо противоречили бы уже имеющимся договоренностям, разработанным в значительной мере усилиями Советского Союза и Соединенных Штатов. Тем более, что о таком подходе Вы также ничего не говорили и в Вашем письме. Любое допущение производства химического оружия в рамках конвенции вольно или невольно будет подталкивать другие страны к началу его производства, чтобы иметь право его продолжать после вступления конвенции в силу. Это неизбежно приведет к тому, что расползание химического оружия сделается политически и юридически допустимым.

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Второе. Радикально сократить, а еще лучше - полностью уничтожить химическое оружие СССР и США. Советский Союз намеревается начать уничтожение своих запасов еще до заключения конвенции, и нам импонирует идея о том, чтобы СССР и США двигались по этому пути параллельно. Построенное в районе г.Чапаевска наше первое опытное предприятие по уничтожению химического оружия пришлось по просьбе общественности перепрофилировать в учебный центр, и теперь для того, чтобы иметь представление о наших реальных возможностях по ликвидации запасов, мы должны завершить разработку проекта комплексной программы уничтожения химического оружия в СССР для представления в Верховный Совет СССР. Рассмотрение столь сложного и многогранного вопроса в Верховном Совете, а также реализация принятых решений, разумеется, займут определенное время.

С целью обеспечить наилучшую подготовку к уничтожению химического оружия, в том числе решение непростых экологических вопросов, можно было бы наладить сотрудничество наших стран по вопросам, связанным с методами уничтожения химического оружия, эксплуатацией соответствующих предприятий, разработкой подходящих процедур контроля и т.д., и оформить специальную двустороннюю договоренность на этот счет.

С тем чтобы не вызывать у участников переговоров никаких опасений в том, что встречные шаги СССР и США задумываются как подмена многосторонней конвенции о полном запрещении химического оружия, можно было бы объявить о том, что договоренность о сокращении, а если позволит время, - и об уничтожении химического оружия СССР и США вступит в силу в момент подписания самой конвенции.

Третье. Ни при каких условиях не применять химическое оружие. В отличие от СССР и США подавляющее большинство стран не имеет оговорок к Женевскому протоколу 1925 года, дающих право на ответное применение химического оружия. Совместный отказ СССР и США от своих оговорок внес бы осязаемый вклад в процесс усиления нетерпимости к химическому оружию. Установление абсолютного и контролируемого с помощью эффективных процедур ООН запрета на применение химического оружия снизило бы побудительные стимулы к приобретению государствами химического оружия.

Четвертое. Мы твердо исходим из того, что за прекращением производства химического оружия, его ликвидацией и неприменением должен быть установлен строжайший контроль как в рамках конвенции, так и в рамках того комплекса шагов, которые СССР и США могли бы осуществить до ее заключения.

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Что касается нашего возможного совместного вклада в процесс многосторонних переговоров, то, на мой взгляд, он необходим сейчас, прежде всего с целью окончательного решения всего комплекса проблем контроля. В этой связи я хочу предложить, чтобы наши две страны выступили с совместной инициативой по инспекциям по запросу.

В Советском Союзе теперь по достоинству оценили тот важный вклад, который Вы, господин Президент, внесли в постановку этого вопроса на переговорах. Его обсуждение показало, что он может быть адекватно решен, если все государства примут концепцию "постоянного" или "открытого приглашения к инспекции", которая предусматривала бы возможность проведения таких проверок силами международного инспектората по просьбе любого участника конвенции, в любое время, на любой точке или объекте другого участника, в самые сжатые сроки, без каких-либо изъятий и без права отказа. Наша совместная инициатива на этой основе стала бы крупнейшим вкладом в дело успешного завершения переговоров по конвенции.

В заключение хочу выразить уверенность, что совместными усилиями нам удастся уже в ближайшее время прийти к нашей общей цели - введению полного запрета на химическое оружие во всемирном масштабе. С интересом ознакомился бы с Вашими ответными соображениями по этому приоритетному вопросу.

С искренним уважением

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

28 ноября 1989 года

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Miscellaneous Handwriting

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

SCOWCROFT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: COQ PRIVACY^OUT WHSR^OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 080128Z DEC 89

FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
QQQQ
-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, EYES ONLY, TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK, FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.
-
I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
-
I JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I AM WITH OUR
PAGE 02 RUEADWW1790 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
MEETING IN MALTA. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER WAS DISAPPOINTING, THE SUBSTANCE, CANDOR AND ATMOSPHERE OF OUR TALKS MORE THAN FULFILLED MY EXPECTATIONS. AT A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY, I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE IN NEARLY ALL ASPECTS OF THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH WE DISCUSSED FRANKLY, AND WE WILL PURSUE THESE. BECAUSE WE HAD TO FOREGO ONE OF OUR SESSIONS, THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES I WAS UNABLE TO RAISE WITH YOU. FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, CHINA, AND OTHER ASIAN ISSUES SUCH AS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, A MATTER OF GREAT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CONCERN TO OUR FRIENDS, THE JAPANESE. I WILL HAVE SECRETARY BAKER PURSUE THESE ISSUES WITH MINISTER SHEVANDNADZE AT THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL.

-

LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. ALL OF THE ALLIES WERE QUITE PLEASED WITH THE CONTENT AND TONE OF OUR TALKS IN MALTA. THEY WELCOMED ACCELERATING THE PACE OF KEY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE FURTHER AREAS OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY WANT TO REVIEW THE FOUR PRINCIPLES I PRESENTED

CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF GERMANY. I WILL ASK AMBASSADOR MATLOCK TO PROVIDE THEM TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE.

-

AGAIN, I BELIEVE THAT OUR MALTA MEETING SETS THE STAGE FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON NEXT JUNE, AND ESTABLISHES A STRONG BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN MANY AREAS AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES.

-

ON A VERY PERSONAL BASIS I WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU AGAIN. IN MY VIEW, THE PERSONAL "CHEMISTRY" WAS GOOD AND I HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT DURING 1990 AND BEYOND.

-

PLEASE GIVE MY REGARDS TO MRS. GORBACHEV. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO SEE HER IN MALTA.

-

SINCERELY,
SIGNED
GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

-

WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

-

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECL: OADR
BT
#1790

2/8

9/8/89

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your most recent letter concerning our mutual, as yet unfulfilled, interest in meeting together in an informal atmosphere. Our difficulty so far in finding an acceptable scenario has not diminished my desire for such a meeting nor my sense of its value. I am pleased to see from your correspondence that you share my assessment.

As I have explained at the outset of our efforts, my insistence on some sort of "umbrella" occasion as an excuse for a meeting has been to avoid all of the expectations and risks associated with attaching the word "summit" to our meeting. I must now admit that the chances of developing a scenario which would permit a spontaneous get-together appear increasingly remote.

The value of an intimate and informal meeting, however, seems to me to be overriding, and to warrant running a somewhat higher risk in order to make it possible. Accordingly, I would like to propose a direct meeting between us, still described, however, as an informal, private, no-agenda meeting in order that the two of us can exchange views on a variety of issues in a completely unstructured setting.

To do this in a manner which would permit the informality and privacy we both seek, I would like to invite you, at a mutually convenient time this fall, to be my guest at the Presidential retreat at Camp David. You will have your own optimal dates, but I might suggest for your consideration in

October either 6 and 7 or 20 and 21. If October is not convenient, we can, I am sure, find a mutually agreeable time in November. There is a tradition at Camp David that the press is not admitted, and the setting would guarantee complete privacy. I would meet you on your arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, where we could have a brief photo opportunity. We would then helicopter immediately to Camp David, with no further public exposure by either of us other than perhaps brief departure statements as you leave to return home and as I return to Washington. There would be no formal agenda, no communique, no agreements to sign and participation would be limited to our very closest associates.

Each of us would seek to make it impossible for the press to play their usual games of who won, who lost, and who made the most dramatic proposal. In short, you and I could engage in a serious, substantive and unstructured dialogue that would permit us better to understand each other and to establish a closer relationship. I am confident that a meeting of this nature of approximately two days and in such a setting would be extremely beneficial at this time of dramatic global change and challenge. Should you find my proposal attractive, I would, of course, anticipate that the next meeting between us, of whatever character, would take place in the Soviet Union.

I believe we have a mutual interest in an early meeting. I hope that you will find my effort to accommodate that interest while avoiding a summit atmosphere to be acceptable. I look forward to your early reply, as well as to meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on September 21.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

9/8

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr.President,

I think that the letter you sent me on June 20 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international security

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union believe--and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this--that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. In a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.

At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.

In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.

One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure. In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we must, of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic arm would result in strengthening strategic stability.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.

You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptual gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of thi situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approached more pragmatically.

The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.

I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talks by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.

We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.

The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.

As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision--to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related to the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trade off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointly once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.

A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with the Secretary of State And you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at our upcoming meeting.

The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last round. It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bombers must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important not to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warheads. I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.

Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of th two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.

Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arms, and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.

We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.

I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.

It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.

I wish now to address two more problems that deal with the set of nuclear issues.

The first one concerns our nuclear testing talks. It seems to me that our acceptance, at the latest round of the talks, of using the CORRTEX method to monitor all nuclear tests above the agreed yield threshold, as the US side had insisted, makes it possible to bring the first stage of these talks to the concluding phase. I hope that our US partners will now look in the same unbiased way at the verification procedures that we propose. If during the ministerial meeting the two sides

recorded their fundamental understanding regarding the verification mechanism, instructions could then be given to our respective delegations at the Geneva talks to complete as soon as possible--in any case before the end of the year--work on the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and to prepare them for signing at our meeting. I also think that it is time for us to give general consideration to the guidelines for further restrictions on the yield and number of tests, which we are going to set for our delegations as their goal for the second stage of the talks.

The other problem to which I would like to call your attention has to do with the possibility of starting talks to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Today, as we see it, we have a favorable situation--the United States has actually ceased the production of fresh weapon-grade plutonium while the Soviet Union has adopted a program for phasing out before the year 2000 all the industrial reactors used to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Eduard Shevardnadze will inform the US side about the specific details of the program. I want to point out that we are ready to speed up its implementation in the event of matching reciprocal steps on your part.

In these circumstances our two countries could address in practical terms the problem of a verifiable cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. As a first step we could even now instruct our experts to consider jointly the issues related to the mechanism of mutual verivicati of such a measure. It is our view that the reciprocal cessation of the production of fissionable material not only would help to strengthen predictability in the strategic field, but would also make it possible for both sides to solve--at a much lower cost--a large number of environmental problems involved in the operation of nuclear production complexes.

Another priority issue--and we seem to be of one mind on this-- is the conclusion of a global and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapon We welcome your statement that every effort must be made to achieve such a prohibition. In this, our approaches coincide.

I also wish to note with satisfaction that during the last two rounds of bilateral consultations progress was made toward achieving this goal. I hope that our ministers will be able during their current meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding on a bilateral verification experiment.

We have also decided to take an additional step to accomodate the US position by agreeing to the inclusion of saxitoxin and ricin into the relevant list under the convention.

The multilateral talks on the convention have now entered a crucial phase. At the same time they still seem to lack a sense of purpose. Perhaps this is due to some extent to the fact that there is no agreed date by which the negotiators would seek to complete the preparation of the convention. Why shouldn't our two countries take an ininiative here by issuing a joint appeal to conclude the convention as early as 1990 or 1991? Such a time limit seems to be quite realistic.

Mr.President, there is another issue which calls for the personal efforts of the two of us. I am referring to the reduction of conventional armed forces. Actually, both you and I took these talks into our own hands when we proposed the initiatives which are now paving the way to resolving the problems which for decades have poisoned East-West relations. It is precisely those political decisions taken at the highest level that have made it possible for the Vienna talks to take an unprecedented start and make very good headway.

You took a bold step, Mr. President, by proposing that the talks be completed within six to twelve months, which is an unheard-of challenge. Well, we accept it, even though I will say frankly that it will not be easy to do it.

But if you and I want to give effect to those commitments we must work out a kind of strategy for speeding up the Vienna talks. We could perhaps agree between ourselves and with the other participants from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to convene in the second half of 1990 a summit meeting in order to sign the agreement on conventional arms, to be attended by all the leaders of the European states. I am confident that such a European conference would be unprecedented as regards its results.

To that end we should instruct our foreign ministers to intensify work to find solutions to outstanding issues. Perhaps it will take two or three meetings between our ministers and the ministers from other states concerned which participate in the Vienna talks; meetings not for making speeches but to find solutions to outstanding issues.

For example, why not hold the first such meeting in Vienna early next year to review the principal difficulties holding up the talks?

We have duly appreciated agreement by the United States and other NATO countries to reduce combat aircraft. This is an important step toward accomodating the position of the Warsaw Treaty. But let me say frankly that it fails to address our serious concern regarding air defense aircraft based in the European territory of the Soviet Union and intended only to protect vital facilities against possible air strikes from various directions. They do not have the capability to strike ground targets. Those aircraft are not part of the surprise attack capability. We are prepared to give American experts an opportunity to see for themselves that that is precisely the case. In order to resolve this issue we could agree to set a certain limit for such aircraft, which would not include frontline fighters. Of course, we expect that there should not be any buildup of systems which these aircraft are intended to counter.

In the context of the likely breakthrough at the Vienna talks we believe it is possible even now to begin discussing the question of a gradual removal of the tactical nuclear component from the European military equation. All the more so since we understand that in Brussels the NATO countries gave their agreement in principle to such discussions. I would like to inform you that with due regard for this evolution in NATO's

position, the Soviet Union, as I already said in Strassbourg, is considering the possibility of further major unilateral reductions in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

And now the last point. We welcome your proposal concerning an "open skies" regime which would provide for mutual overflights by unarmed aircraft over the territories of the USSR and the United States and their Warsaw Treaty and NATO allies for the purpose of monitoring their military activities, and we agree to take part in an international conference to discuss issues involved in establishing such a regime.

I think that we are now on the threshold of mutually acceptable agreement. But you and I together will have to cross that threshold. And we can do so if we take into account each other's fundamental concerns.

In closing, Mr.President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

M.Gorbachev

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Письмо, которое Вы направили мне 20 июня, на мой взгляд, открывает новый важный этап нашего доверительного диалога. Я разделяю Вашу точку зрения о незаменимости прямых контактов между нами, особенно в том, что касается обмена мнениями по существу наиболее важных проблем, решение которых способствовало бы развитию отношений между нашими странами, укреплению международной безопасности.

Переговоры по ядерным и космическим вооружениям, которым посвящено Ваше послание, безусловно, требуют нашего первоочередного внимания. И как важнейший компонент усилий по уменьшению опасности войны в целом, и как осуществление преемственности исторического процесса реального ядерного разоружения, начало которому мы положили, подписав рубежный Договор по РСМД.

В Советском Союзе считают - и закончившийся в августе раунд женевских переговоров подтвердил это, - что достигнутое продвижение представляет собой хороший фундамент для продолжения работы. В наших подходах есть довольно много общего, что уже зафиксировано в совместных документах встреч на высшем уровне, а также в разрабатываемых на переговорах документах. Одним словом, как Вы пишите, достигнутое к настоящему времени обеспечивает твердую основу для заключения соглашения. Это - очень важная, обязывающая обе Стороны политическая констатация.

Вместе с тем есть вопросы, причем принципиального характера, нерешенность которых препятствует заключению договора о 50-процентном сокращении СНВ. Я призываю Вас сосредоточиться на их решении. Сейчас переговоры, я думаю, подошли к такому рубежу, который требует принятия смелых политических решений, которые вывели бы их на скорейшее успешное завершение.

В своем послании Вы затрагиваете принципы стратегической стабильности. Конечно, устранение стимулов для нанесения первого удара, уменьшение концентрации боезарядов на стратегических носителях, оказание предпочтения средствам, обладающим повышенной выживаемостью, - это важные ориентиры на переговорах по ЯКВ. Я убежден, что мы должны их

Его Превосходительству
Джорджу Бушу,
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки

г.Вашингтон

придерживаться - как в ходе переговоров о 50-процентных сокращениях СНВ, так и на тех переговорах, которые должны за ними последовать и на которых речь пойдет о еще более глубоких и радикальных сокращениях в контексте стратегической стабильности.

И еще одно соображение общего характера. Стратегические вооруженные силы наших двух стран в течение длительного времени развивались под воздействием географических и иных факторов, которые приводили к появлению заметных отличий в их структуре. Договариваясь о сокращении СНВ, мы, конечно, должны с пониманием относиться к этим особенностям друг друга. Нужно находить общие знаменатели, которые, учитывая различия в структуре наших стратегических вооружений, вели бы к укреплению стратегической стабильности.

Теперь о некоторых конкретных вопросах переговоров по ЯКВ.

В своем послании Вы отмечаете, что в вопросах ПРО и космоса нас разделяет концептуальный разрыв. Есть ли выход из этого положения? Думаю, что его можно найти, если подойти к проблеме более прагматически.

Главное здесь - продолжать придерживаться той договоренности относительно Договора по ПРО, которая была достигнута в декабре 1987 года на встрече в Вашингтоне, - соблюдать этот Договор в том виде, как он был подписан в 1972 году.

Я хочу предложить следующее: оставим временно наш концептуальный спор о том, приведут ли вывод оружия в космос, развертывание систем противоракетной обороны к укреплению стратегической стабильности или вызовут обратный эффект. Давайте не будем сейчас осложнять этим вопросом ход и без того сложных переговоров по ЯКВ, вернемся к нему на переговорах по стратегической стабильности - сразу же после подписания договора по СНВ, - о проведении которых мы уже договорились.

Остается у нас расхождение и в отношении того, как понимать то, что запрещается Договором по ПРО и что им разрешается. Несмотря на то, что я убежден в правильности нашего толкования, мы, очевидно, не продвинемся вперед, если будем продолжать спорить в прежней плоскости. Выход нам видится в том, чтобы попытаться конкретно определить, что можно делать в рамках Договора по ПРО.

Характер концептуальной дискуссии приобрело и обсуждение вопроса о фиксации срока невыхода из Договора по ПРО. В целях облегчения решения других вопросов на переговорах мы могли бы не настаивать на нашем предложении о таком фиксированном сроке невыхода.

Министр иностранных дел СССР и Государственный секретарь США могли бы, если изложенные выше соображения окажутся подходящими, разработать на их основе соответствующие инструкции для наших делегаций на переговорах по ЯКВ.

Остаются, как мы понимаем, трудности в связи с так называемым вопросом о Красноярской РЛС. Я уже неоднократно предлагал различные варианты, которые, с нашей точки зрения, могли бы устранить озабоченности Американской Стороны. К сожалению, они не достигли своей цели. Чтобы полностью расчистить путь к скорейшему заключению договора по СНВ, мы приняли радикальное решение - полностью ликвидировать этот объект. Хотелось бы рассчитывать, что и Американская Сторона предпримет соответствующие шаги, с тем чтобы устранить наши озабоченности, связанные с американскими РЛС в Гренландии и Великобритании.

Из вопросов, касающихся непосредственно СНВ, наибольшие трудности существуют в отношении КРМБ большой дальности. Эту проблему давно пора вывести из тупика. Для этого, как мне представляется, требуется принятие крупного политического решения в плане размена взаимных озабоченностей. Нужно бы еще раз проанализировать совместно данную проблему, в том числе и с точки зрения более широкого подхода к проблеме морских вооружений.

Нужно начать наконец продуктивный диалог по этой проблеме на переговорах по ЯКВ. Ваша Сторона ссылается на трудности контроля. Почему бы нам на этих переговорах не сосредоточиться на проблеме контроля в отношении ядерных КРМБ, а вопрос об их ограничениях мог бы быть решен с учетом результатов работы в отношении контроля. Э.А.Шеварднадзе готов подробнее переговорить по этому вопросу с Госсекретарем. А мы с Вами, если потребуется, вернулись бы к этому вопросу на нашей предстоящей встрече.

Нерешенной остается и проблема КРВБ, хотя в ходе последнего раунда какие-то подходы к ее решению стали нащупываться. Очевидно, что вопросы, связанные с КРВБ и ТБ, должны решаться в комплексе. При этом важно исключить возможность размывания установленного предела в 6000 боезарядов. Думаю, этот узел мог бы быть развязан уже в ходе нынешней встречи наших министров.

Наконец, вопросы контроля. Видимо, мы можем констатировать наше общее стремление обеспечить максимальную уверенность Сторон в соблюдении будущего договора по СНВ. Ваша идея опробования до его заключения методики контроля представляется нам полезной. Вместе с тем эффективно такая задача вряд ли может быть решена выборочным методом, согласно которому установление наблюдения за объектами по производству СНВ касалось бы только мобильных МБР.

Ясно, что в самом договоре контроль будет охватывать все вооружения, подпадающие под договор по СНВ, а обязательства по контролю должны иметь равноправный характер, при котором исключался бы односторонний подход. Поэтому "пробные" меры контроля следовало бы отрабатывать применительно к любым видам СНВ, которые должен охватывать будущий договор, что обеспечивало бы надежные гарантии его соблюдения.

Мы за аналогичный подход и к вопросу об обмене данными по СНВ; готовы договариваться также и об ознакомительных поездках на взаимной основе.

Считаю возможным, чтобы между нашими странами на уровне министров иностранных дел была достигнута принципиальная договоренность о подготовке пробных мер контроля и мер стабильности и их осуществления по мере готовности. А в ходе предстоящего раунда переговоров по ЯКВ были бы согласованы конкретные параметры и процедуры осуществления таких пробных мер.

Видимо, уже в ходе нынешней встречи министров можно было бы подписать соглашение об уведомлениях относительно крупных учений стратегических сил, которое практически готово.

Хочу затронуть еще две проблемы, относящиеся к ядерному комплексу вопросов.

Первая касается наших переговоров по ядерным испытаниям. Мне представляется, что выраженное нами на прошедшем раунде переговоров согласие с применением метода КОРРТЕКС для контроля за всеми ядерными испытаниями сверх согласованного порога мощности, как на том настаивала Американская Сторона, позволяет вывести первый этап этих переговоров на завершающую фазу. Надеюсь, что наши американские партнеры теперь столь же непредвзято рассмотрят процедуры контроля, предлагаемые нами. Если бы в ходе встречи министров Стороны зафиксировали принципиальное понимание по механизму контроля за испытаниями, можно было бы дать указание делегациям на переговорах в Женеве в сжатые сроки - во всяком случае до конца текущего года - завершить работу над контрольными протоколами к договорам 1974 и 1976 годов и подготовить их к подписанию на нашей с Вами встрече. Думаю также, что уже пора нам подумать в принципиальном плане, какие ориентиры по дальнейшим ограничениям на мощность и количество испытаний мы поставим перед нашими делегациями в качестве цели второго этапа переговоров.

Другая проблема, к которой хотелось бы привлечь Ваше внимание, - это возможность начать переговоры по запрещению производства расщепляющихся материалов для целей оружия. Сегодня, как нам представляется, сложилась благоприятная ситуация: в США фактически прекращена наработка свежего оружейного плутония; в Советском Союзе принята программа вывода из эксплуатации всех промышленных реакторов по наработке оружейного плутония до 2000 года. Э.А.Шеварднадзе проинформирует Американскую Сторону о конкретных деталях этой программы. Хочу отметить, что мы были бы готовы ускорить ее осуществление в случае соответствующих ответных шагов с вашей стороны.

В этих условиях наши страны могли бы приступить к практическому решению вопроса о контролируемом прекращении производства расщепляющихся материалов для оружия. В качестве первого шага мы могли бы уже сейчас дать поручение нашим экспертам заняться совместной проработкой вопросов, связанных с механизмом взаимного контроля за такой мерой. На наш взгляд, взаимное прекращение производства расщепляющихся материалов не только способствовало бы укреплению предсказуемости в стратегической области, но и позволяло бы обеим Сторонам решить - с гораздо меньшими финансовыми затратами - целый ряд экологических проблем, связанных с функционированием ядерных производственных комплексов.

Еще одним приоритетным вопросом - и в этом, как нам кажется, мы едины - является заключение глобальной и поддающейся эффективному контролю конвенции о запрещении и уничтожении химического оружия. Мы приветствуем Ваше заявление о том, что к такому запрещению необходимо решительно стремиться. В этом наши подходы совпадают.

Хочу также с удовлетворением отметить, что на последних двух раундах двусторонних консультаций был достигнут прогресс в достижении этой цели. Надеюсь, что наши министры в ходе их текущей встречи смогут подписать меморандум о понимании по двустороннему эксперименту по проверке.

Многосторонние переговоры по конвенции вступили сейчас в решающую фазу. Вместе с тем им, как нам кажется, все еще не хватает целеустремленности. Возможно, это происходит в какой-то степени и оттого, что нет согласованного срока, к которому участники переговоров стремились бы завершить разработку конвенции. Почему бы нашим двум странам не проявить здесь инициативу: выступить с совместным призывом заключить конвенцию уже в 1990 или 1991 году? Думается, что такой срок является вполне реалистичным.

Господин Президент, есть и еще один вопрос, который требует от нас с Вами непосредственных усилий. Я имею в виду сокращение обычных вооруженных сил. Собственно говоря, и Вы и я уже взяли эти переговоры в свои руки, когда выступили с инициативами, которые прокладывают путь к развязке проблем, долгие десятилетия отравлявших отношения Восток-Запад. Именно эти политические решения на высшем уровне позволили Венским переговорам взять беспрецедентный старт и далеко продвинуться вперед.

Вы сделали смелый шаг, господин Президент, предложив завершить эти переговоры в небывало короткий срок - 6-12 месяцев. Что ж, мы принимаем этот вызов, хотя, прямо скажу, сделать это будет нелегко.

Но если мы хотим с Вами, чтобы эти обязательства были реализованы, то нужно выработать своего рода стратегию ускорения Венских переговоров. Скажем, условиться между собой и с другими участниками НАТО и ОВД о проведении во второй половине 1990 года совещания на высшем уровне для

подписания соглашения по обычным вооружениям, на котором могли бы присутствовать все руководители европейских государств. Уверен, это было бы беспрецедентное по своим результатам общеевропейское совещание.

Для этого нужно поручить нашим министрам иностранных дел интенсифицировать работу по развязке нерешенных вопросов. Может быть, для этого потребуется две-три встречи между нашими министрами и министрами других заинтересованных государств - участников переговоров в Вене. Причем не для произнесения речей, а именно для развязки нерешенных вопросов.

Почему бы, например, не провести в начале будущего года в Вене первую такую встречу для рассмотрения основных трудностей на переговорах?

Мы по достоинству оценили согласие США и других стран НАТО пойти на сокращение боевых самолетов. Это - важный шаг навстречу позиции Варшавского Договора. Но, откровенно скажу, он не учитывает нашу серьезную озабоченность, касающуюся авиации ПВО, которая базируется на европейской территории Советского Союза и предназначена только для прикрытия жизненно важных объектов от возможных ударов с воздуха с различных направлений и не обладает способностью наносить удары по наземным объектам. Эти самолеты не являются частью потенциала внезапного нападения. Мы готовы предоставить американским специалистам возможность убедиться, что это именно так. Чтобы решить этот вопрос, можно было бы договориться об установлении определенного уровня таких самолетов, который не включал бы истребители фронтовой авиации. Разумеется, при этом не должно было бы быть наращивания средств, для действий против которых предназначены эти самолеты.

В контексте наметившегося прорыва на переговорах в Вене мы полагаем возможным уже сейчас начать обсуждение вопроса о постепенном изъятии из европейского военного уравнения тактического ядерного компонента. Тем более, как мы понимаем, в Брюсселе страны НАТО в принципиальном плане дали согласие на такое обсуждение. Хотел бы проинформировать Вас, что с учетом этого развития позиции НАТО Советский Союз, как я уже говорил об этом в Страсбурге, рассматривает возможность дальнейших крупных односторонних сокращений своих тактических ядерных ракет в Европе.

И последний вопрос. Мы приветствуем выдвинутое Вами предложение об установлении режима "открытого неба", предусматривающего взаимное осуществление полетов невооруженных самолетов над территориями СССР и США и их союзников по ОВД и НАТО с целью осуществления контроля за военной деятельностью, и согласны участвовать в международной конференции для обсуждения вопросов, связанных с установлением такого режима.

Думаю, что сейчас мы на пороге выработки взаимоприемлемой договоренности. Но нам с Вами вместе нужно переступить этот порог. И мы это можем сделать, если учтем основные озабоченности друг друга.

В заключение, господин Президент, хочу выразить готовность к дальнейшему обмену мнениями по поставленным вопросам и надежду, что он будет результативным для дела мира и безопасности.

С искренним уважением

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

19 сентября 1989 года

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Письмо, которое Вы направили мне 20 июня, на мой взгляд, открывает новый важный этап нашего доверительного диалога. Я разделяю Вашу точку зрения о незаменимости прямых контактов между нами, особенно в том, что касается обмена мнениями по существу наиболее важных проблем, решение которых способствовало бы развитию отношений между нашими странами, укреплению международной безопасности.

Переговоры по ядерным и космическим вооружениям, которым посвящено Ваше послание, безусловно, требуют нашего первоочередного внимания. И как важнейший компонент усилий по уменьшению опасности войны в целом, и как осуществление преемственности исторического процесса реального ядерного разоружения, начало которому мы положили, подписав рубежный Договор по РСМД.

В Советском Союзе считают - и закончившийся в августе раунд женевских переговоров подтвердил это, - что достигнутое продвижение представляет собой хороший фундамент для продолжения работы. В наших подходах есть довольно много общего, что уже зафиксировано в совместных документах встреч на высшем уровне, а также в разрабатываемых на переговорах документах. Одним словом, как Вы пишите, достигнутое к настоящему времени обеспечивает твердую основу для заключения соглашения. Это - очень важная, обязывающая обе Стороны политическая констатация.

Вместе с тем есть вопросы, причем принципиального характера, нерешенность которых препятствует заключению договора о 50-процентном сокращении СНВ. Я призываю Вас сосредоточиться на их решении. Сейчас переговоры, я думаю, подошли к такому рубежу, который требует принятия смелых политических решений, которые вывели бы их на скорейшее успешное завершение.

В своем послании Вы затрагиваете принципы стратегической стабильности. Конечно, устранение стимулов для нанесения первого удара, уменьшение концентрации боезарядов на стратегических носителях, оказание предпочтения средствам, обладающим повышенной выживаемостью, - это важные ориентиры на переговорах по ЯКВ. Я убежден, что мы должны их

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придерживаться - как в ходе переговоров о 50-процентных сокращениях СНВ, так и на тех переговорах, которые должны за ними последовать и на которых речь пойдет о еще более глубоких и радикальных сокращениях в контексте стратегической стабильности.

И еще одно соображение общего характера. Стратегические вооруженные силы наших двух стран в течение длительного времени развивались под воздействием географических и иных факторов, которые приводили к появлению заметных отличий в их структуре. Договариваясь о сокращении СНВ, мы, конечно, должны с пониманием относиться к этим особенностям друг друга. Нужно находить общие знаменатели, которые, учитывая различия в структуре наших стратегических вооружений, вели бы к укреплению стратегической стабильности.

Теперь о некоторых конкретных вопросах переговоров по ЯКВ.

В своем послании Вы отмечаете, что в вопросах ПРО и космоса нас разделяет концептуальный разрыв. Есть ли выход из этого положения? Думаю, что его можно найти, если подойти к проблеме более прагматически.

Главное здесь - продолжать придерживаться той договоренности относительно Договора по ПРО, которая была достигнута в декабре 1987 года на встрече в Вашингтоне, - соблюдать этот Договор в том виде, как он был подписан в 1972 году.

Я хочу предложить следующее: оставим временно наш концептуальный спор о том, приведут ли вывод оружия в космос, развертывание систем противоракетной обороны к укреплению стратегической стабильности или вызовут обратный эффект. Давайте не будем сейчас осложнять этим вопросом ход и без того сложных переговоров по ЯКВ, вернемся к нему на переговорах по стратегической стабильности - сразу же после подписания договора по СНВ, - о проведении которых мы уже договорились.

Остается у нас расхождение и в отношении того, как понимать то, что запрещается Договором по ПРО и что им разрешается. Несмотря на то, что я убежден в правильности нашего толкования, мы, очевидно, не продвинемся вперед, если будем продолжать спорить в прежней плоскости. Выход нам видится в том, чтобы попытаться конкретно определить, что можно делать в рамках Договора по ПРО.

Характер концептуальной дискуссии приобрело и обсуждение вопроса о фиксации срока невыхода из Договора по ПРО. В целях облегчения решения других вопросов на переговорах мы могли бы не настаивать на нашем предложении о таком фиксированном сроке невыхода.

Министр иностранных дел СССР и Государственный секретарь США могли бы, если изложенные выше соображения окажутся подходящими, разработать на их основе соответствующие инструкции для наших делегаций на переговорах по ЯКВ.

Остаются, как мы понимаем, трудности в связи с так называемым вопросом о Красноярской РЛС. Я уже неоднократно предлагал различные варианты, которые, с нашей точки зрения, могли бы устранить озабоченности Американской Стороны. К сожалению, они не достигли своей цели. Чтобы полностью расчистить путь к скорейшему заключению договора по СНВ, мы приняли радикальное решение - полностью ликвидировать этот объект. Хотелось бы рассчитывать, что и Американская Сторона предпримет соответствующие шаги, с тем чтобы устранить наши озабоченности, связанные с американскими РЛС в Гренландии и Великобритании.

Из вопросов, касающихся непосредственно СНВ, наибольшие трудности существуют в отношении КРМБ большой дальности. Эту проблему давно пора вывести из тупика. Для этого, как мне представляется, требуется принятие крупного политического решения в плане размена взаимных озабоченностей. Нужно бы еще раз проанализировать совместно данную проблему, в том числе и с точки зрения более широкого подхода к проблеме морских вооружений.

Нужно начать наконец продуктивный диалог по этой проблеме на переговорах по ЯКВ. Ваша Сторона ссылается на трудности контроля. Почему бы нам на этих переговорах не сосредоточиться на проблеме контроля в отношении ядерных КРМБ, а вопрос об их ограничениях мог бы быть решен с учетом результатов работы в отношении контроля. Э.А.Шеварднадзе готов подробнее переговорить по этому вопросу с Госсекретарем. А мы с Вами, если потребуется, вернулись бы к этому вопросу на нашей предстоящей встрече.

Нерешенной остается и проблема КРВБ, хотя в ходе последнего раунда какие-то подходы к ее решению стали нащупываться. Очевидно, что вопросы, связанные с КРВБ и ТБ, должны решаться в комплексе. При этом важно исключить возможность размывания установленного предела в 6000 боезарядов. Думаю, этот узел мог бы быть развязан уже в ходе нынешней встречи наших министров.

Наконец, вопросы контроля. Видимо, мы можем констатировать наше общее стремление обеспечить максимальную уверенность Сторон в соблюдении будущего договора по СНВ. Ваша идея опробования до его заключения методики контроля представляется нам полезной. Вместе с тем эффективно такая задача вряд ли может быть решена выборочным методом, согласно которому установление наблюдения за объектами по производству СНВ касалось бы только мобильных МБР.

Ясно, что в самом договоре контроль будет охватывать все вооружения, подпадающие под договор по СНВ, а обязательства по контролю должны иметь равноправный характер, при котором исключался бы односторонний подход. Поэтому "пробные" меры контроля следовало бы отрабатывать применительно к любым видам СНВ, которые должен охватывать будущий договор, что обеспечивало бы надежные гарантии его соблюдения.

Мы за аналогичный подход и к вопросу об обмене данными по СНВ; готовы договариваться также и об ознакомительных поездках на взаимной основе.

Считаю возможным, чтобы между нашими странами на уровне министров иностранных дел была достигнута принципиальная договоренность о подготовке пробных мер контроля и мер стабильности и их осуществления по мере готовности. А в ходе предстоящего раунда переговоров по ЯКВ были бы согласованы конкретные параметры и процедуры осуществления таких пробных мер.

Видимо, уже в ходе нынешней встречи министров можно было бы подписать соглашение об уведомлениях относительно крупных учений стратегических сил, которое практически готово.

Хочу затронуть еще две проблемы, относящиеся к ядерному комплексу вопросов.

Первая касается наших переговоров по ядерным испытаниям. Мне представляется, что выраженное нами на прошедшем раунде переговоров согласие с применением метода КОРРТЕКС для контроля за всеми ядерными испытаниями сверх согласованного порога мощности, как на том настаивала Американская Сторона, позволяет вывести первый этап этих переговоров на завершающую фазу. Надеюсь, что наши американские партнеры теперь столь же непредвзято рассмотрят процедуры контроля, предлагаемые нами. Если бы в ходе встречи министров Стороны зафиксировали принципиальное понимание по механизму контроля за испытаниями, можно было бы дать указание делегациям на переговорах в Женеве в сжатые сроки - во всяком случае до конца текущего года - завершить работу над контрольными протоколами к договорам 1974 и 1976 годов и подготовить их к подписанию на нашей с Вами встрече. Думаю также, что уже пора нам подумать в принципиальном плане, какие ориентиры по дальнейшим ограничениям на мощность и количество испытаний мы поставим перед нашими делегациями в качестве цели второго этапа переговоров.

Другая проблема, к которой хотелось бы привлечь Ваше внимание, - это возможность начать переговоры по запрещению производства расщепляющихся материалов для целей оружия. Сегодня, как нам представляется, сложилась благоприятная ситуация: в США фактически прекращена наработка свежего оружейного плутония; в Советском Союзе принята программа вывода из эксплуатации всех промышленных реакторов по наработке оружейного плутония до 2000 года. Э.А.Шеварднадзе проинформирует Американскую Сторону о конкретных деталях этой программы. Хочу отметить, что мы были бы готовы ускорить ее осуществление в случае соответствующих ответных шагов с вашей стороны.

В этих условиях наши страны могли бы приступить к практическому решению вопроса о контролируемом прекращении производства расщепляющихся материалов для оружия. В качестве первого шага мы могли бы уже сейчас дать поручение нашим экспертам заняться совместной проработкой вопросов, связанных с механизмом взаимного контроля за такой мерой. На наш взгляд, взаимное прекращение производства расщепляющихся материалов не только способствовало бы укреплению предсказуемости в стратегической области, но и позволяло бы обеим Сторонам решить - с гораздо меньшими финансовыми затратами - целый ряд экологических проблем, связанных с функционированием ядерных производственных комплексов.

Еще одним приоритетным вопросом - и в этом, как нам кажется, мы едины - является заключение глобальной и поддающейся эффективному контролю конвенции о запрещении и уничтожении химического оружия. Мы приветствуем Ваше заявление о том, что к такому запрещению необходимо решительно стремиться. В этом наши подходы совпадают.

Хочу также с удовлетворением отметить, что на последних двух раундах двусторонних консультаций был достигнут прогресс в достижении этой цели. Надеюсь, что наши министры в ходе их текущей встречи смогут подписать меморандум о понимании по двустороннему эксперименту по проверке.

Многосторонние переговоры по конвенции вступили сейчас в решающую фазу. Вместе с тем им, как нам кажется, все еще не хватает целеустремленности. Возможно, это происходит в какой-то степени и оттого, что нет согласованного срока, к которому участники переговоров стремились бы завершить разработку конвенции. Почему бы нашим двум странам не проявить здесь инициативу: выступить с совместным призывом заключить конвенцию уже в 1990 или 1991 году? Думается, что такой срок является вполне реалистичным.

Господин Президент, есть и еще один вопрос, который требует от нас с Вами непосредственных усилий. Я имею в виду сокращение обычных вооруженных сил. Собственно говоря, и Вы и я уже взяли эти переговоры в свои руки, когда выступили с инициативами, которые прокладывают путь к развязке проблем, долгие десятилетия отравлявших отношения Восток-Запад. Именно эти политические решения на высшем уровне позволили Венским переговорам взять беспрецедентный старт и далеко продвинуться вперед.

Вы сделали смелый шаг, господин Президент, предложив завершить эти переговоры в небывало короткий срок - 6-12 месяцев. Что ж, мы принимаем этот вызов, хотя, прямо скажу, сделать это будет нелегко.

Но если мы хотим с Вами, чтобы эти обязательства были реализованы, то нужно выработать своего рода стратегию ускорения Венских переговоров. Скажем, условиться между собой и с другими участниками НАТО и ОВД о проведении во второй половине 1990 года совещания на высшем уровне для

подписания соглашения по обычным вооружениям, на котором могли бы присутствовать все руководители европейских государств. Уверен, это было бы беспрецедентное по своим результатам общеевропейское совещание.

Для этого нужно поручить нашим министрам иностранных дел интенсифицировать работу по развязке нерешенных вопросов. Может быть, для этого потребуется две-три встречи между нашими министрами и министрами других заинтересованных государств - участников переговоров в Вене. Причем не для произнесения речей, а именно для развязки нерешенных вопросов.

Почему бы, например, не провести в начале будущего года в Вене первую такую встречу для рассмотрения основных трудностей на переговорах?

Мы по достоинству оценили согласие США и других стран НАТО пойти на сокращение боевых самолетов. Это - важный шаг навстречу позиции Варшавского Договора. Но, откровенно скажу, он не учитывает нашу серьезную озабоченность, касающуюся авиации ПВО, которая базируется на европейской территории Советского Союза и предназначена только для прикрытия жизненно важных объектов от возможных ударов с воздуха с различных направлений и не обладает способностью наносить удары по наземным объектам. Эти самолеты не являются частью потенциала внезапного нападения. Мы готовы предоставить американским специалистам возможность убедиться, что это именно так. Чтобы решить этот вопрос, можно было бы договориться об установлении определенного уровня таких самолетов, который не включал бы истребители фронтовой авиации. Разумеется, при этом не должно было бы быть наращивания средств, для действий против которых предназначены эти самолеты.

В контексте наметившегося прорыва на переговорах в Вене мы полагаем возможным уже сейчас начать обсуждение вопроса о постепенном изъятии из европейского военного уравнения тактического ядерного компонента. Тем более, как мы понимаем, в Брюсселе страны НАТО в принципиальном плане дали согласие на такое обсуждение. Хотел бы проинформировать Вас, что с учетом этого развития позиции НАТО Советский Союз, как я уже говорил об этом в Страсбурге, рассматривает возможность дальнейших крупных односторонних сокращений своих тактических ядерных ракет в Европе.

И последний вопрос. Мы приветствуем выдвинутое Вами предложение об установлении режима "открытого неба", предусматривающего взаимное осуществление полетов невооруженных самолетов над территориями СССР и США и их союзников по ОВД и НАТО с целью осуществления контроля за военной деятельностью, и согласны участвовать в международной конференции для обсуждения вопросов, связанных с установлением такого режима.

Думаю, что сейчас мы на пороге выработки взаимоприемлемой договоренности. Но нам с Вами вместе нужно переступить этот порог. И мы это можем сделать, если учтем основные озабоченности друг друга.

В заключение, господин Президент, хочу выразить готовность к дальнейшему обмену мнениями по поставленным вопросам и надежду, что он будет результативным для дела мира и безопасности.

С искренним уважением

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

19 сентября 1989 года

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Michael Beschloss

Nick Burns called —

said Strobe Talbot wanted some quotes from President's letter to Gorby re Malta —

This is all I could find —

Has Seen

Fax to Beschloss
8/31

Post-It™ brand fax transmittal memo 7671 | # of pages ▸ 1

To Michael Beschloss	From Jim Scowcroft
Co.	Co.
Dept.	Phone #
Fax # 965-0919	Fax #

Let me get quickly to the point of this letter. I would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our shoulders, without the ever-present briefing papers and certainly without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about "who's winning," "what agreements have been reached," or "has our meeting succeeded or failed."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Dobrynin to Baker 1988

Unofficial translation.

The verbal statement by the American leadership in connection with the situation in El Salvador and the incident involving an aircraft with air defense systems on board have been seen in Moscow with all seriousness. Naturally, we decline attempts to link us directly or indirectly with this incident and moreover to make unsubstanciated conclusions with regard to our policy.

At the same time, taking into account the US side's statement we instructed our Ambassadors in Managua and in Havana to discuss the situation with the leaderships of Nicaragua and Cuba, expressing our concern over the developments in El Salvador and reaffirming the Soviet position according to which the problems of Central America should be settled by political means and through the implementation of the Guatemala accord and other agreements reached by the countries of the region themselves.

The Soviet Union does not supply arms to the FMLN in any way. We do not know the origin of the air defense missiles in question. According to press reports, there were incidentally also American Red-eye missiles there. Nevertheless, we have deemed it necessary to once again remind the Nicaraguans and the Cubans that we expect them to see to it that the Soviet weapons transferred to them for their own defense needs are not used for other purposes.

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We have taken these steps because we share the US side's concern over a sharp exacerbation of the situation in El Salvador, and are prepared to continue to cooperate with you in creating favorable outside conditions for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in this country and in the region as a whole.

Nevertheless, there is no reason for creating a crisis situation, let alone for calling into question the very prospect of the Soviet-American dialogue. After all, the Soviet Union in this case could also embark upon making claims and ultimatums. Take Afghanistan, for example, where, as is known, civilians are dying as a result of US-made rocket shelling, and the ways those rockets get there are not unknown to Washington.

But such an approach would only throw us back to the times of confrontation and at least would not be conducive to a political solution either in Central America, or Afghanistan, or any other part of the world.

We are convinced that the only reasonable way out of this situation is to continue and intensify efforts to contribute to the settlement of regional conflicts.

In this connection, we note with satisfaction the statement by the US side contained in its message that the US favors political dialogue and not continued military conflict in Central America. For its part, the Soviet Union has acted and will continue to act exactly in this manner.

Both you and we are supporting the agreements reached by the Central Americans themselves. Therefore, we do have a basis for a more effective cooperation. Of course, it will only be effective when neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union attempts to impose its will on the parties directly involved in the conflict, and shall act with due regard for their legitimate interests.

The whole process of the Central American settlement is rather fragile. The efforts of the countries of the region need constant positive support. It seems to us that both of us could, either jointly or in parallel, give this process a new political impetus. Specifically, one could think of bringing into action the UN and OAS Secretaries General whose efforts proved useful in the past, and to involve the neighboring countries such as Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba in the political negotiations of the five Central American states.

Involvement of Cuba is particularly important at this stage. Here we are proceeding from the positive experience which was gained in the course of the peaceful settlements in Africa.

We would like to know the view of the US side about the possibility of these initiatives by both of us.

Educational computers

A group of members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR working in close contact with the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Education are presently descussing with representatives of the electronic industry of the USA, NASA, American universities a project worth $ 1,5 billion to construct an assembly plant in the USSR for IBM PC type personal computers. Their principal contact in the USA - Western Digital Corporation (President Roger W.Johnson) is willing to pursue this project aimed at supplying these types of computers for educational purposes to the USSR to the total volume of 1,3 million units on the basis of a joint venture arrangements if the financing problem is resolved.

Dear Mr. President:

These are trying times. I have tried very hard to understand the problems you face at home. Indeed, as Jim Baker has told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, not only have we tried to understand, but we have acted with restraint and prudence.

I understand your view that the Baltic States are part of the Soviet Union; and I expect you know our view that we have never recognized [the] incorporation [of Lithuania] into the Soviet Union. I have given a lot of weight to your stated view that force would not be used and the eventual separation or self determination is in the cards for Lithuania.

The problem is we can no longer sit idly by, giving the impression that we are unconcerned about the aspirations for freedom of the people of Lithuania.

I have often stated publicly, not only my desire to see

perestroika succeed, but also to see you personally prevail. I still feel very strongly about that. [Recently], your [DCXM] came to the State Department and once again asked that we show restraint. On Tuesday I met with key leaders in our Congress and explained that I was not prepared to take action on this matter, though there is a growing feeling in this country that my inaction ~~serves~~ delivers a serious blow to the aspirations of freedom loving people in Lithuania, and indeed everywhere. This growing feeling, which I share, leads me to believe that there is no way we will ~~by~~ be able to [go forward] conclude with our Trade Agreement, and thus with MFN, unless dialogue with the Lithuanians begins.

We realize there is no easy answer; but, as you know, we felt that a "suspension" by Lithuania of its resolution, coupled with your willingness to meet with the Lithuanians outside the federation concept, would be the best way to break the ice. We have, as you probably know, urged this course upon Mr.

Landsberghis.

Here is the basic bottom line reality -- there is no way Congress will approve MFN under existing circumstances -- no way at all. Further, I will not be able to recommend approval under existing circumstances. I have felt that these the negotiations should continue, and indeed have taken some "flak" for not cutting off trade talks from our end. I assume that you have seen some of the statements on this critical subject, but wanted to call to your attention the attached statements (discuss.)

Munich

I recognize, with respect, the restraint that you have shown, indeed the encouragement you have given, to the new democracies in Eastern Europe. I recognize that this restraint and understanding has cost you support at home. You have a large stock of goodwill here and in other western countries for what you have done. But now we have Lithuania and the enormous problems accompanying Lithuania and the other Baltic States,

which ~~in our view~~ to us, to repeat, have special standing.

I wish I could think of a more positive role that I could play to help ameliorate matters. In this regard, I would welcome any suggestions you might care to make. (I regret we have no secure voice communications at this time. It would be very useful if we could talk this out in a reasonable way, trying to work together to solve what at this moment is a terrible problem between us.)

~~But~~ unless there is a breakthrough on this issue perhaps on the basis of the Mitterand-Kohl initiative, ~~Next week~~ I ~~will~~ publicly state that under existing conditions there can ~~will~~ be no trade agreement. (May be forced very soon to) This is simply a statement of reality. It is not intended to be provocative. It is not intended to complicate matters for you. I will accompany this "marker" between Lithuania and Soviet Union with the fervent hope that dialogue will begin. We must clear the path so that the era of improved relations between our two great countries will continue to flourish.

I regret that the latest Lithuanian attempt at dialogue, with Supreme Soviet Chairman Yakovlev, failed.

You have done too much, and we come to far to see matters between

us revert to tension and anxiety.

I would welcome any suggestions. Please know that this was not an easy letter to write. I have tried very hard to keep relations on ~~tract~~ track, recognizing ~~that~~ the dramatic changes that you have brought to much of this world.

I ~~must~~ have no choice but to identify publicly with our strongly held convictions about Lithuania's self determination and the right to control its own destiny.

I look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meeting. I am determined to keep that meeting on ~~tract~~ track inspite of existing tensions. There is a lot ~~to~~ at stake there.

My sincere best wishes,

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
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PRT. GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE OLEARY SIT SIGLER
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(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM MIKE JOYCE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW
MARCH 22, 1990
FROM: MIKE JOYCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, EMBASSY MOSCOW
FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

I TAKE YOUR POINT ON THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE GORBACHEV LETTER. GIVEN THE SEEMING URGENCY OF THE LETTER, JACK'S ABSENCE FROM MOSCOW FOR A FEW MORE DAYS, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, OUR SINGULAR LACK OF SUCCESS IN THE PAST IN DELIVERING MESSAGES DIRECTLY TO GORBACHEV, I DECIDED TO GO AHEAD AND DELIVER IT TO BESSMERTNYKH. I HAVE KNOWN HIM FOR YEARS AND AM CONFIDENT THAT HE IS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV. (HIS RUMORED UPCOMING APPOINTMENT AS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S., IF IT COMES OFF, WILL BE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THEIR TRUST IN HIM.) I KNOW HE COMMUNICATES DIRECTLY WITH GORBACHEV.

GIVEN THE NEW STRUCTURE HERE, THIS WOULD PERHAPS BE A GOOD TIME FOR THE WHITE HOUSE TO IMPRESS ON GORBACHEV THE EMBASSY'S OCCASIONAL NEED TO PASS MESSAGES DIRECTLY TO HIM. I MAY BE WRONG. BUT I AM NOT AWARE THAT THE EMBASSY HAS EVER, IN ANY INSTANCE, BEEN ABLE TO DO THAT. WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ASKED TO

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
9/17/2013 MM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

GO THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.
DECL: OADR.
#0219

<DIST>
PRT: SECTO
SIT: WHSR_DUP WHSR_SPECIAL
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHCH <DTG> 081430Z FEB 90

<ORIG>FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MOSCOW

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4791
RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE WASDC IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 01008
NODIS
FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
1. Ø - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III
SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

I'VE JUST COME BACK FROM MY FIRST PRIVATE MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE. IT LASTED THREE HOURS AND ACTUALLY REQUIRED HIM TO LEAVE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM BEFORE IT ENDED. PRINCIPALLY, WE COVERED ARMS CONTROL AND THE PLENUM AND WHAT IT SIGNIFIES ABOUT WHERE PERESTROIKA IS AND WHERE IT'S GOING. (HE RAISED HIS SENSITIVITIES ABOUT GERMANY, BUT PREFERRED TO DISCUSS THAT IN OUR PRIVATE DINNER TOMORROW.)

BEFORE GETTING INTO OUR EXTENDED DISCUSSION ON THE PLENUM, LET ME BRIEFLY RUN THROUGH THE ARMS CONTROL PART OF THE MEETING. BASICALLY, IT AMOUNTED TO ME PRESENTING THE VARIOUS NEW POSITIONS OR IDEAS WE HAVE IN ARMS CONTROL. DURING THE COURSE OF MY PRESENTATION I TURNED OVER TO HIM PAPERS ON CFE (NEW MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT POSITIONS), CW (A DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT LAYING OUT THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR CW INITIATIVE AND STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTING IT), AND ALCMS (AND OUR EFFORT TO MOVE TOWARD SOVIETS ON DISTINGUISHABILITY, ATTRIBUTION, AND RANGE). I PUSHED HARD TO GET HIS AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE THE THREE START ISSUES YOU AND GORBACHEV SAID WE'D TABLE IN THIS MINISTERIAL -- ALCMS, NON-DEPLOYED MISSILE (NDMS), AND TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION. I SENSE SOME, BUT MANAGEABLE, DIFFICULTY ON NDMS AND TELEMETRY. WHILE NOTING SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN OUR POSITIONS ON ALCMS, SHEVARDNADZE CLEARLY DREW A DISTINCTION ON THIS ISSUE, THE MOST POLITICALLY-VISIBLE OF THE THREE, AND I SUSPECT IT WILL BE A GOOD DEAL HARDER TO RESOLVE. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED RANGE AS A MAJOR CONCERN -- AS I HAD EXPECTED. SO I MAY BE BACK TO YOU ON THIS.

ONE ADDITIONAL ARMS CONTROL POINT: SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO NEWSMEN IN ANSWER O Q#:Q0RA00QAT THEY WILL HAVE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO YOURS ON CFE#P/AQQ WAS A COUNTER-PROPOSAL, NOT A "COUNTER-OFFENSIVE," BUT HE DECLINED TO DESCRIBE IT. HERE AGAIN, I

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2011-0839-MR
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SUSPECT THAT BEYOND WANTING TO PRESERVE A LINKAGE BETWEEN OUR FORCES AND THEIRS, THEY COULD COME IN WITH A CALL FOR DRAMATICALLY DEEPER CUTS IN THE CENTRAL ZONE. (I'VE GOT A GOOD ANSWER FOR THIS: OUR ALLIES WANT US THERE; THERE IS ALLIED CONSENSUS ON YOUR PROPOSED CEILING; WHEN WE DO LEAVE WE'RE AN OCEAN AWAY -- UNLIKE THEIR SITUATION; THEY CAN ALWAYS DEPLOY LESS THAN THE CEILING; AND WE'RE OFFERING THEM A FRAMEWORK THAT PERMITS THEM TO WITHDRAW FORCES ON A MUTUAL, NOT SJPLY UFILATERAL, BASIS.)

WE'LL SEE HOW TOQGH$THE SLU'DING IS GOING TN0BE
O
$ASMS CSNTROL(TOMORROW. FOR T(E MOMENT,#IT'S CDEAR THATSHEVARENADZI AND THE POLITICAL LEADDRSHIP#HAVE BEEN"RIVETED ON THD,PLENUE AND(LOVTLE ELQ&.)E DESBRIBED IT AS A VERY MOMENTOUS EVENT FOR PERESTROIKA AND ITS PROSPECTS. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN VERY CONTENTIOUS WITH VERY HEATED DEBATES. FOR ALL THE DIFFICULTY, HE SAID GORBACHEV HAD GOTTEN WHAT HE WANTED: A NEW PARTY PLATFORM THAT MAKES FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF FAR-REACHING REFORM ON THE PARTY AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY; ON THE ECONOMY AND ITS NEED TO BECOME MORE MARKET BASED; ON THE NATIONALITIES AND THE NEED FOR A GENUINE MECHANISM TO PROVIDE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION; AND ON THE NEED FOR A STRONG PRESIDENT -- ONE WHO CAN HELP BRING ORDER TO THE PROCESS.

BT

#1008

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 01008

NODIS

FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SHEVARDNADZE SAID ALL THESE CHANGES WILL BE ENSHRINED IN A NEW PARTY PROGRAM. THAT PROGRAM WILL BE ADOPTED AT THE PARTY CONGRESS THAT THEY ARE SCHEDULING FOR LATE JUNE OR ERLY JULY. THAT TIMING WILL AFFECT OUR TIMING FOR THE SUMMIT, BUT I REALLY BELIEVE IT'S BETTER TO LET THEM SORT THIS OUT BEFORE YOU MEET WITH GORBACHEV.

CAN THEY SORT IT OUT AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS THAT MAY FINALLY PROMISE TO REVOLUTIONIZE THE SYSTEM?

I'M NOT SURE. THE PROBLEMS ARE IMMENSE AND, THOUGH I DON'T DOUBT THE SHEVARDNADZE OR GORBACHEV COMMITMENT, THEY'VE GOT A LONG WAYS TO GO AND A VERY STEEP HILL TO CLIMB. AS HE ACKNOWLEDGED, POLITICAL REFORM HAS OUTSTRIPPED THE PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORM. EVEN SO, HE SAID THEY'LL PUSH AHEAD IN THIS AREA AND END THE PARTY'S MONOPOLY ON POLITICAL POWER. THEY'LL MAKE IT COMPETE FORPOER AND EARN IT -- A NOTION HE SAID WAS VERY HARD FOR EVEN THE REFORM MINDED AT THE TOP OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT. (SHEVARDNADZE SAID THIS WILL TAKE SOME DIFFICULT ADJUSTMENT, AS MUCH PSYCHOLOGICALLY AS POLITICALLY.)

IF THE PARTY'S ACQUIESCENCE IN PLURALISM WILL BE DIFFICULT, THE TRANSITION TO EVEN A LIMITED MARKET-BASED ECONOMY MAY BE HARDER STILL.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO INTRODUCE A PRICE SYSTEM AND PRICE REFORM, AND WILL TRY TO DO SO WITHIN A YEAR'S TIME. HE SAID THEY HAVE NO CHOICE. BUT, WHEN I ASKED HIM HOW THEY WERE GOING TO SOAK UP THE TREMENDOUS RUBLE OVERHANG, HIS ANSWER SUGGESTED THEY'VE NOT FIGURED THIS ONE OUT YET. HE SPOKE OF THE SALE OF APARTMENTS, AND THE EXPANSION OF CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS. EACH MIGHT HELP, BUT MUCH MORE WILL BE REQUIRED.

AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE, HE SAID TO PERMIT PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED AND CONVINCE THE PEOPLE THAT IT WOULD WORK, THE SOVIETS NEEDED TWO/THREE GOOD YEARS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. BUT HE, HIMSELF, NOTED THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEMS AND STRIKES ARE HAVING ON THE ECONOMY. THEY REALLY NEED A BREATHING SPACE ON THE INSIDE OF A COUPLE OF YEARS, AND IT'S HARD TO SEE THEM GETTING IT.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM WAS THEIR MOST SEVERE ONE, AND, BY IMPLICATION, MADE CLEAR THEY PROBABLY WON'T GET A BREATHING SPACE ON THIS ISSUE.

IT'S NOT THAT THEY AREN'T WORKING ON THE PROBLEM, BUT IT DOESN'T LEND ITSELF TO EASY SOLUTIONS. WHEN I RAISED AGAIN THE IDEA OF REFERENDUMS AND EVEN SUGGESTED THEY COULD BE CREATIVE ABOUT TIMING AND ANNOUNCEMENTS (E.G., PERHAPS OFFERING REPUBLICS REFERENDA ON SELF-DETERMINATION IN TWO-THREE YEARS TIME), HE SAID I WAS RIGHT IN PRINCIPLE BUT HE WASN'T CERTAIN IT WOULD WORK. RUSSIAN MINORITIES IN MANY REPUBLICS AND OLD ETHNIC ANIMOSITIES IN OTHERS MIGHT CREATE CIVIL WARS IF ONE SIDE LOST IN THE REFERENDUM. THAT SAID, SHEVARDNADZE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAD TO FIND A WAY TO PROVIDE FOR REAL SELF-DETERMINATION. HE ALSO SAID THEY HAD PUT INTO THE PLATFORM A NEW BASIS FOR FEDERALISM: THE CENTER WILL CONCLUDE A TREATY WITH EACH REPUBLIC, WORKING OUT THE ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL GOVERN THEIR RELATIONS.

IT'S AN INTERESTING IDEA, AND IT SHOWS THAT THEY'RE WILLING TO BE CREATIVE. BUT WHEN YOU GIVE UP OLD CONTROL MECHANISMS AND YOU CAN'T IMMEDIATELY REPLACE THEM WITH NEW ONES, YOU'RE BOUND TO HAVE TROUBLE -- AND THEY ARE ACROSS THE BOARD.

WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR US IS THAT THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH THEIR OWN SITUATION IS GREAT AND THEIR NEED FOR A QUIET, STABLE, AND COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IS ALSO GREAT. THIS ISN'T GOING TO CHANGE IN THE NEAR-TERM, AND WE HAVE A STAKE IN TRYING TO LOCK THEM INTO A VERY NEW AND MORE STABILIZING SET OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

WHEN I SEE YOU, I WILL FILL YOU IN ON FOOD AID/CONSUMER GOODS ASSISTANCE ISSUES.

3. END TEXT.

BAKER

BT

#1008

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 1008 <TOR> 900209173913 MSG000255893952

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 1008 <TOR> 900209185616 MSG000255898576

<DIST>
PRT: SCOWCROFT SDO SECTO
SIT: PRES MSGS FILE SIT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHCH <DTG> 081500Z FEB 90

<ORIG>FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MOSCOW

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4793
RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTO 01009
NODIS
FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
1. Ø - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III
SUBJECT: MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVKIA

I HAD A BRIEF BUT GOOD VISIT TO PRAGUE. SINCE YOU WILL SEE PRESIDENT HAVEL LATER THIS MONTH, I WANTED TO SEND YOU SOME QUICK IMPRESSIONS WHILE THEY ARE FRESH.

PRAGUE IS AN EXCITING PLACE THESE DAYS. THERE IS AN AIR OF EXCITEMENT, A "GREAT AWAKENING," AS NEW OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS ALIKE REVEL IN THE FREEDOM, OPENNESS, AND OPPORTUNITY. THERE IS A GREAT FEELING OF POTENTIAL, MIXED WITH A DOSE OF CONFUSION AND A SENSE OF URGENCY TO MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME. ONE HAS A SENSE THAT AMID THE HUSTLE AND BUSTLE, PEOPLE ARE STILL PINCHING THEMSELVES TO MAKE SURE IT ISN'T A DREAM.

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, ALSO THE EARLIEST OF INDICATIONS THAT LEADERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT ARE COMING TO RECOGNIZE THAT FREEDOM ALSO CARRIES WITH IT GREAT RESPONSIBILITY. THE LEADERS ARE RECOGNIZING THIS RESPONSIBILITY FIRST IN DOMESTIC MATTERS, ESPECIALLY THE ECONOMY. THEY KNOW THEY MUST OVERHAUL THEIR ECONOMY, AND MANY HAVE CONCLUDED THIS CAN'T BE DONE PIECEMEAL. THEY WANT OUR ECONOMIC EXPERTISE, "OUR BEST ECONOMISTS," TO HELP THEM PLAN THE CHANGES AND TO GIVE THEM AN "EXPERT AUTHORITY" THAT WILL HELP JUSTIFY AND EXPLAIN DIFFICULT CHANGES TO THEIR PEOPLE.

I SUSPECT THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL TAKE LONGER TO DEVELOP IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. PRESIDENT HAVEL AND HIS COLLEAGUES KNOW THEY WANT SOVIET TROOPS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND DEFINITELY BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. BEYOND THAT, THEY WANT TO BE LEADERS IN CREATING A NEW, UNITED EUROPE -- WITHOUT A VERY GOOD SENSE OF WHAT THAT INVOLVES OR HOW TO GET THERE. BUT SOME OF THESE DISSIDENTS-TURNED-MINISTERS ARE ALSO DREAMERS, IN THE GOOD SENSE OF THE WORD. THEY HAVE JUST SEEN SOME FORMERLY FORLORN DREAMS COME TRUE, AND THEY ARE NOT

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GOING TO BE EASILY PERSUADED THAT SOME OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL DREAMS INVOLVE LARGE RISKS (INCLUDING FOR THEM) AND EVEN CONTRADICTIONS.

I BELIEVE MY SPEECH HERE FIT THE CONTEXT OF PEOPLE'S THINKING: I SPOKE ABOUT THE TASK OF MOVING FROM REVOLUTIONS TO LASTING DEMOCRACIES, EXPLAINING HOW THEY (AND WE WITH THEM) NEED TO FACE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY CHALLENGES TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THEIR YOUNG DEMOCRACY. (BUT YOU CAN ASK NANCY ELLIS FOR HER IMPRESSIONS, SINCE SHE LISTENED TO MY REMARKS.)

MY CONVERSATIONS ON THE POLITICAL CHALLENGES LED ME TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL REFORM IS IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE HERE. THERE IS A BROAD COMMITMENT TO ELECTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW. NO BACKSLIDING HERE. THE OLD COMMUNIST PARTY IS SLIPPING OUT OF THE PICTURE. WHILE THE REFORMERS NEED HELP IN SETTING UP EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, I BELIEVE THEY ARE ON THE RIGHT PATH. THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM RELATES TO THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE ECONOMY -- HOW TO MOVE IT TOWARD A FREE MARKET AND EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTMENT HARDSHIP TO THE PUBLIC. I WAS TOLD THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE HAVE REJECTED THE COMMUNISTS, BUT NOT YET EMBRACED ANY NEW PARTY OR GROUP IN PART BECAUSE OF THEIR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ECONOMIC CHANGE
BT
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BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 SECTO 01009
NODIS
FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)
UBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

AS FOR THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE, I WAS TOLD CZECHOSLOVAKIA NEEDS OUR ECONOMIC ADVICE, MANAGERIAL TRAINING, TRADE, AND INVESTMENT -- NOT FINANCIAL AID (AT THIS POINT). AS YOU KNOW, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, UNLIKE POLAND AND HUNGARY, HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF A SMALL DEBT BURDEN. THE REFORMERS PROPERLY RECOGNIZE THAT ONCE THEY START TO DISMANTLE THE PLANNING SYSTEM OF A COMMAND ECONOMY, THEY NEED TO HAVE IN PLACE A MARKET SYSTEM. OTHERWISE, THE PIECES OF ECONOMIC LIFE WILL HAVE NO WAY -- EITHER BY PLAN OR MARKET -- TO INTERACT. SO THEY WANT OUR HELP IN WORKING OUT A TRANSITION PACKAGE THAT CAN CHANGE THE EONOMIC SYSTEM FROM PLANNED TO MARKET QUICKLY. (I ALSO SUPPORTED THEIR CALL TO LOCATE THE NEWLY-PROPOSED EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IN PRAGUE -- WHICH SEEMS MUCH MORE APPROPRIATE THAN LONDON, PARIS, BERLIN, OR THE OTHER SUITORS.)

THE REQUEST FOR ECONOMIC EXPERTISE WAS PART OF A LARGER PATTERN OF CRYING OUT FOR GREATER EXCHANGE WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WANT PEOPLE TO TEACH ENGLISH, AND THEY WANT MANY OF THEM. CIVIC FORUM LEADERS SAID THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM HAD A NEW OPENING, BECAUSE RUSSIAN AND MARXIST-LENINIST THOUGHT WERE NO LONGER MANDATORY SUBJECTS. THEY HAD

PLENTY OF OFFERS FOR GERMAN TEACHERS, BUT THEY WANTED ENGLISH TEACHERS, TOO. FOREIGN MINISTER DIENSTBIER EVEN SUGGESTED A PROGRAM WHEREBY THEY WOULD PAY YOUNG AMERICANS IN LOCAL CURRENCY TO TEACH FOR SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR.

WHEN IT CAME TO SECURITY MATTERS, HOWEVER, WE PARTED COMPANY ON SOME ELEMENTS. BUT I THINK THIS IS A SUBJECT YOU CAN DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL TO USEFUL EFFECT.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE NEW LEADERS' MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO GET SOVIET TROOPS OUT. (THE SOVIETS CAME IN A DAY IN 1968, THE CZECHS SAY, SO WHY DOES IT TAKE THE SOVIETS SO LONG TO DEPART?) BOTH HAVEL AND DIENSTBIER SAID THEIR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS END WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULDN'T INTERFERE WITH CFE. HAVEL ALSO RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF CODIFYING CHANGE (AND MAKING IT LESS EASY TO REVERSE) THROUGH A TREATY.

BUT THE CZECHS ALSO CALL FOR THE TWO ALLIANCES TO WITHER AWAY -- BECAUSE THEY SEE THEM AS REMNANTS OF THE COLD WAR THAT KEPT TEM OPPRESSED. IN BOTH MY SPEECH AND MY COMMENTS, I MADE A STRONG CASE FOR NATO'S CONTINUED ROLE. I SAID NATO WASN'T EQUIVALENT TO THE WARSAW PACT, BECAUSE NATO WAS A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION OF 16 DEMOCRACIES THAT WELCOMED U.S. TROOPS AS PART OF A COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. I ADDED THAT THE UNCERTAINTY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION SUGGESTED NATO MUST REMAIN A PROTECTIVE FORCE. AND EVEN IF THE SOVIETS PULL BACK WITHIN THEIR BORDERS, THEY REMAIN ON THE SAME CONTINENT WHEREAS U.S. NATO FORCES WOULD BE A DISTANT OCEAN AWAY IF WE LEFT. MOREOVER, I SAID NATO COULD ASSUME NEW SECURITY MISSIONS (PROLIFERATION) AND EMPHASIZE ITS POLITICAL NATURE TO A GREATER DEGREE. IN SUM, I SAID NATO WAS A FORCE FOR FREEDOM AND SHOULD BE A COMPLEMENTARY PIECE OF THE NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURE, ALONG WITH THE EC AND THE CSCE PROCESS.

THE CZECHS RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF A U.S. PRESENCE FOR NOW. HAVEL SAID THE U.S. SAVED EUROPE TWICE. BUT THE CZECH REFORMERS WANT EUROPE TO DEVELOP ITS OWN SECURITY PROTECTIONS OVER TIME. FRANKLY, THEY SEEM TO WORRY THAT NATO JUSTIFIES THE PACT, AND THEY WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT; TO THEM, THE ALLIANCES MEAN A DIVIDED EUROPE. (IT'S CLEAR TO ME THAT WHILE WE PRESS FOR NATO'S ONGOING ROLE, WE ALSO HAVE AN INTEREST IN BEING IN ON THE GROUND FLOOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE CSCE WORK SO WE CAN DIRECT IT TO OUR LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE.)

MANAGING THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY WITHIN NATO COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR THESE CENTRAL EUROPEANS. IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE NATO DOES NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF MAKING GERMANY (AND EUROPE) WHOLE. INTERESTINGLY, HAVEL SAID HE WAS GOING TO TELL MODROW THAT GERMANY COULD NOT BE NEUTRAL, BUT HAVEL ALSO TOLD ME HE COULDN'T IMAGINE A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO. AS I SAID EARLIER, IDEAS ARE MOVING FAST AND FURIOUS HERE -- BUT THEY AREN'T ALSO RECONCILED EFFECTIVELY.

BT

#1009

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 SECTO 01009

NODIS
FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
OVERALL, I THINK YOU'LL ENJOY HAVEL'S VISIT.
YOU CAN HAVE A GOOD CONVERSATION WITH AN OPEN-MINDED
MAN WHO WILL VALUE YOUR IDEAS (EVEN THOUGH YOU MAY
NOT ALWAYS AGREE). AND THERE IS A WARM FEELING FOR
AMERICA HERE. JUST TWO EXAMPLES: FIRST, THE CIVIC
FORUM REPRESENTATIVES TOLD ME THEY WOULD LNG
REMEMBER THAT THE U.S. ALWAYS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED
(AND TO A DEGREE, PROTECTED) THEM DURING THEIR
DISSIDENT DAYS -- EVEN WHEN OTHERS IN THE WEST WOULD
NOT. SECOND, THE CZECHS WANT TO HAVE A CEREMONY
THANKING THE 16TH U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION FOR
LIBERATING PILSEN IN 1945; THEY SAID THEY HAVE
THANKED THE SOVIETS FOR 45 YEARS AND NOW IT WAS TIME
TO GIVE THE U.S. ITS PROPER DUE.
3. END TEXT.
BAKER
BT
#1009
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 <SSN> 1009 <TOR> 900208135541 MSG000255794141
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 1009 <TOR> 900208135741 MSG000255794261
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03 <SSN> 1009 <TOR> 900208135802 MSG000255794282

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I have just had important discussions with GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow, and in this connection would like to share with you some views on the German question.

As the leaders of the powers vested with special responsibility for the destinies of two German states, you and I have on more than one occasion, most recently at Malta, addressed this matter. We have come to share the conclusion that the situation obtaining in Central Europe is a very complicated one. This was privately confirmed to me by Hans Modrow. The GDR is under strong pressure, including from various quarters in the FRG. This pressure is reaching a critical mark. Unification sentiments are boiling over, which someone is clearly trying to exploit in order to create an uncontrollable situation.

The GDR leadership (and the Modrow coalition government is presently the principal organizing entity in the country) understands the need for practical actions. The approach that the Prime Minister spelled out to me and subsequently in his public statement on February 1 appears to be prudent and realistic. The path toward the two German states' rapprochement is envisioned as one based on a gradual, stage-by-stage evolution, on deepening the CSCE process,

enhancing stability on the continent, and taking into account legitimate interests of all peoples.

I support this approach which is prompted by the desire to avoid upheavals in the very heart of Europe, and, for that matter, beyond Europe. Any haste, leaping over stages, overly categorical conclusions and assessments can only result in a chaos.

Under the circumstances, the institute of the Four Powers' responsibility in German affairs as a factor of political stability on the continent acquires particular importance. Incidentally, Hans Modrow agrees with that, too. Like us, he supports the idea of regular consultations among "the Four", which could address, inter alia, issues arising from the special status of West Berlin.

I would like to inform you, confidentially, that the Soviet leadership has invited Chancellor Kohl of the FRG to come to Moscow on February 9 for an informal working meeting. Eduard Shevardnadze shall promptly brief Secretary of State James Baker, who at that time will be on an official visit in Moscow, on the results of our discussions with Helmut Kohl.

I wish to stress in conclusion that the situation in German-German affairs now requires particular attention and a heightened sense of responsibility. In this connection, I am counting on your understanding and willingness to cooperate.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

February 2, 1990

APNSA Has Seen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 31, 1990

Jim,

Here is the letter inviting the President's daughter. It is my understanding that the President's daughter expressed an interest in visiting the Soviet Union during a dinner with Yevgenyi Primakov. I am forwarding it to you for appropriate action.

Condi

Condi Rice

[redacted]

General —

FYI — Condi is going to tell Jim NSC has no problems

[redacted]

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

1990 FEB -2 AM 9:17

January 26, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

It is my pleasant duty to inform you that the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies will be delighted to host Dorothy in the Soviet Union.

To make her stay as enjoyable as possible it would be useful for us to have some understanding of her preferences as far as the date of her arrival and the itinerary are concerned.

Sincerely,

Yuri V. DUBININ

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C., 20500

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

January 26, 1990

Dear General,

I would be grateful if you could forward the enclosed letter to Mr. President.

Sincerely,

Yuri V.DUBININ

The Honorable
Brent SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House,
Washington, D.C., 20500

~~SECRET~~

7:00 AM, Wed
Jan 31

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Non-log item

January 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Presidential Phone Call to Gorbachev

Your memorandum to the President at Tab I provides talking points (Tab A) for his call to Chairman Gorbachev concerning the CFE initiative.

We have asked Ambassador Dubinin to inquire as to Gorbachev's availability between 0700 - 0900 EST tomorrow. (The time difference with Moscow is eight hours).

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum and talking points for the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Letter to Gorbachev

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By LAP NARA, Date 7/16/13

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Non-log item

30 January 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Your Phone Call to Gorbachev Concerning the New CFE Manpower Proposal.

Purpose

To tell Gorbachev of your new CFE manpower proposal in advance of your State of the Union Address announcement.

Background

This call will give you an opportunity to apprise Gorbachev of the proposal; emphasize that you hope that the lower manpower ceiling will facilitate rapid agreement at CFE; and tell him that Jim Baker will be ready to discuss the details of the manpower proposal and some new ideas on aircraft at the Ministerial in Moscow.

I also recommend that we send the letter to Gorbachev (Tab B). This will give the Soviets a written description of the proposal and minimize the risk of misunderstanding due to translation errors or poor phone-line quality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you call Gorbachev drawing on the talking points at Tab A.

That you approve the letter at Tab B for dispatch to Moscow.

Attachments
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Letter to Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL TO GORBACHEV
CONCERNING YOUR CFE PROPOSAL

-- At Malta, our two governments agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a CFE treaty. Our common aim is to be able to sign the treaty this year.

-- I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Secretary Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on the aircraft problem.

-- The conclusion of this treaty is even more urgent today because of the hopeful and fast-moving events taking place in Eastern Europe.

-- We need to do everything possible to make sure that the military situation reflects the new political realities.

-- I have been examining with my advisors, and with U.S. allies, the question of the maximum number of troops that the United States and the Soviet Union should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented.

-- The current Western position is that neither your country nor ours should have more than 275,000 troops stationed on foreign soil in Europe.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

-- In light of recent political developments, I have come to the conclusion that 275,000 figure is too high for both your country and mine.

-- I hope you agree that we should set a new lower manpower ceiling for the CFE treaty.

-- I want to propose to you that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and revise the current position on manpower in CFE to set a new ceiling for these forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe.

-- I intend to announce this proposal to the American people tonight in my address on the State of the Union.

-- If you accept my proposal, it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations in which we are now engaged can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent.

-- We intend, with the consent of our allies, to retain a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future, regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces.

-- I believe you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability.

-- Today, the issue is how to treat U.S and Soviet manpower in this agreement and I think our new proposal is a fair solution.

-- I hope that you will see in this initiative, Mr. Chairman, my commitment to accelerated progress toward a CFE treaty.

-- We have each taken important steps in the last year to give a political impetus to the CFE negotiations.

-- I believe that we are close to a completed treaty and hope that you will join me in quickly resolving the remaining differences so that we can conclude this crucial treaty.

-- I hope that we can do so before we meet in the United States in June.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chairman Gorbachev,

At Malta, you and I agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a treaty reducing and limiting conventional forces in Europe. In light of that commitment, I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Secretary Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on our part to resolve the aircraft problem, when they meet in Moscow.

The conclusion of this treaty takes on new urgency in light of the remarkable and hopeful events taking place in Eastern Europe -- events that are moving us closer every day to overcoming the division of Europe. I want to do everything that I can to make certain that the military situation reflects those hopeful changes. In this regard, I have been examining with my advisors and with U.S. allies, the question of the number of troops that the United States and the Soviet Union should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented.

I know that you too have been giving close attention to this question.

As you know, the Western position in the CFE negotiations is that neither your country nor ours should be allowed to have more than 275,000 troops stationed on foreign soil in Europe. This is one of the important unresolved issues in the talks.

I believe that, in light of recent political developments, the 275,000 figure is unrealistically high for both your country and mine. I hope you agree that we should set a new lower ceiling.

I have carefully reviewed our defense requirements in light of changes in the strategic environment, and have decided that we need to settle this manpower issue, and settle it quickly.

I want to propose to you that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and set instead a new ceiling for these forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe.

The U.S. intends, within this ceiling and with the consent of our allies, to retain a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future, regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces. I think that you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability.

If you accept my proposal, it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent. I believe that, together with the ideas that Secretary Baker will present on aircraft, we can move rapidly to conclusion of this important agreement.

I intend to announce this proposal concerning U.S.-Soviet stationed forces to the American people in my address on the State of the Union so that they will understand my readiness to respond to the new political situation in Europe and my commitment to stable reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe through CFE.

I hope that you too will see in this initiative, Mr. Chairman, my commitment to accelerated progress toward a CFE treaty and that you will agree that this manpower proposal is both

equitable and timely. We have each taken important steps in the last year to give a political impetus to the CFE negotiations. I believe that a completed treaty is now within our reach. I hope that you will join me in resolving the outstanding differences so that we can finalize and sign this crucial treaty -- before we meet in the United States in June.

Sincerely

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

P/Gorbachev
1/31/90

I will react to 2 or 3 points now

1- We share your view of importance of Talks
   - CFE should be consistent w/ new realities in pace & content
   - We must push the process to early conclusion
2- We should not slow down or distort these negot.
3- Your idea is for a new lower ceiling. US will retain a presence in Eur. after these Talks — regardless what SU does.

We will be Talking about Central + other zones — and not only US & Sov. troops.

You will have our constructive cooperation.

Baker + Scheverdnadze can discuss

- I hope we are in touch + discussing 1 important point a day.
- You will get a more direct answer later.
- I share the spirit of your approach.

RG
4/5

-- As I said in my letter to President Gorbachev, I am pleased to see that you recognize we have been careful in our public statements to avoid making the situation with respect to Lithuania worse.

-- As you know, we have never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. We support self-determination for them. We are sympathetic to their aspirations for independence.

-- Yet, we are not unmindful of the complexity of the situation, including economic relationships, security issues, and other problems that must be resolved.

-- We believe these issues must be dealt with through discussion, through peaceful means.

-- I have said that the use of coercion or intimidation would backfire in terms of our bilateral relationship.

-- But let me be clear. Discussion does not mean ultimatums. In our view, it does mean a willingness to compromise and work together toward an outcome agreeable to both parties.

-- You should understand that, beyond overt coercion, the step by step suppression of the powers and responsibility of Lithuania's freely elected government, an imposed outcome, or demands for capitulation will create grave problems for our otherwise very satisfactory relationship. While we have no desire to interfere in your affairs, you must know that these kinds of actions would be inconsistent with our principles and thus would produce a strongly negative reaction in the United States and, specifically, in our Congress.

-- Given the principles that President Gorbachev has stated underlie perestroika and democratization, as well as our own principles, I would understand and be sympathetic to such a reaction.

-- Much is at stake here. I have been widely criticized for not speaking out publicly against Soviet actions thus far. But, as I wrote to President Gorbachev, my flexibility on this matter is steadily diminishing. I have no wish to see this issue disrupt our progress but absent voluntary, peaceful, mutually acceptable agreement between the two parties, it surely will.

Hand delivered 2/2/90

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I have just had important discussions with GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow, and in this connection would like to share with you some views on the German question.

As the leaders of the powers vested with special responsibility for the destinies of two German states, you and I have on more than one occasion, most recently at Malta, addressed this matter. We have come to share the conclusion that the situation obtaining in Central Europe is a very complicated one. This was privately confirmed to me by Hans Modrow. The GDR is under strong pressure, including from various quarters in the FRG. This pressure is reaching a critical mark. Unification sentiments are boiling over, which someone is clearly trying to exploit in order to create an uncontrollable situation.

The GDR leadership (and the Modrow coalition government is presently the principal organizing entity in the country) understands the need for practical actions. The approach that the Prime Minister spelled out to me and subsequently in his public statement on February 1 appears to be prudent and realistic. The path toward the two German states' rapprochement is envisioned as one based on a gradual, stage-by-stage evolution, on deepening the CSCE process,

enhancing stability on the continent, and taking into account legitimate interests of all peoples.

I support this approach which is prompted by the desire to avoid upheavals in the very heart of Europe, and, for that matter, beyond Europe. Any haste, leaping over stages, overly categorical conclusions and assessments can only result in a chaos.

Under the circumstances, the institute of the Four Powers' responsibility in German affairs as a factor of political stability on the continent acquires particular importance. Incidentally, Hans Modrow agrees with that, too. Like us, he supports the idea of regular consultations among "the Four", which could address, inter alia, issues arising from the special status of West Berlin.

I would like to inform you, confidentially, that the Soviet leadership has invited Chancellor Kohl of the FRG to come to Moscow on February 9 for an informal working meeting. Eduard Shevardnadze shall promptly brief Secretary of State James Baker, who at that time will be on an official visit in Moscow, on the results of our discussions with Helmut Kohl.

I wish to stress in conclusion that the situation in German-German affairs now requires particular attention and a heightened sense of responsibility. In this connection, I am counting on your understanding and willingness to cooperate.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

February 2, 1990

5:00 pm, 5/7/90 Hand-delivered to GS by US Amb Joseph Reed

5/8 — Rice

DRAFT NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICIAL VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

(May 30 to June 4, 1990)

May 30, Wednesday

18.30	Arrival in Washington, D.C. (Andrews AF base)
19.00	Arrival at Embassy. No functions scheduled.

May 31, Thursday

10.00	Official arrival ceremony at the White House.
10.30-12.00	Meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.
13.00-14.30	Luncheon at the Embassy for prominent intellectuals (the list of American participants to be transmitted later).
16.00-17.30	Second meeting with President Bush.
19.00-	Official dinner hosted by President Bush at the White House.

June 1, Friday

9.30-	Meeting at the Embassy with Congressional leaders over a cup of coffee (Speaker Foley, House and Senate majority and minority leaders Gephardt, Michel, Mitchell, Dole, Chairmen of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees Fascell, Les Aspin, Pell, Nunn).
11.30-13.00	Third meeting with President Bush.
14.00-15.30	Private lunch.
15.30-16.30	Awards for President Gorbachev to be presented at the Embassy: FDR Medal of Freedom; Honorary Degree of Doctor of Sciences of the Brown University; International Martin Luther King Prize for 1990.
17.00-18.00	Concluding meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.
18.00-18.30	Ceremony of signing Soviet-US documents.
19.30-	Official dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Gorbachev at the Embassy.

June 2, Saturday

9.30-10.30	President Gorbachev and President Bush hold joint press conference.
11.00-11.30	Official departure ceremony at the White House.
12.00	Departure to Minneapolis, Minnesota.
	Stay in Minneapolis
	- Luncheon hosted by the Governor and local authorities.
17.00	Meeting with Mid-West business leaders (electronics, chemical, food industries) and with US agricultural leaders (Cristal, Block and others).
Evening	No functions scheduled.

June 3, Sunday

10.00	Depart for San Francisco.
13.30	Arrive San Francisco.
16.30	Meeting with former President Reagan.
19.30	Dinner hosted by West Coast political and business leaders.

June 4, Monday

10.30-12.30 Visit to Stanford University (by invitation from the leadership of the student organization and professors). There will be an address.

- Depart San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Проект

С Х Е М А

ПРОГРАММЫ ОФИЦИАЛЬНОГО ВИЗИТА В США
(30 мая - 4 июня 1990 года)

30 мая (среда)

18.30	- Прибытие в Вашингтон (авиабаза "Эндрюс").
19.00	- Размещение в совпосольстве.
	- Вечер свободный.

31 мая (четверг)

10.00	- Официальная церемония встречи в Белом доме.
10.30-12.00	- Встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.
13.00-14.30	- Завтрак в совпосольстве для видных представителей интеллигенции. (Список американских участников будет передан позднее).
16.00-17.30	- Вторая встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.
19.00	- Официальный обед от имени Дж.Буша в Белом доме.

I июня (пятница)

9.30	- Встреча в посольстве за чашкой кофе с лидерами конгресса (спикер палаты представителей Т.Фоли, лидеры демократического большинства и республиканского меньшинства в палате и в сенате Р.Гепхардт, Р.Майкл, Дж.Митчелл, Р.Доул, председатели Комиссий по иностранным делам и вооруженных сил палаты представителей и сената Д.Фассел, Л.Эспин, К.Пэлл, С.Нанн).
II.00-I3.00	- Третья встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.
I4.00-I5.30	- Частный завтрак.
I5.30-I6.30	- Церемония вручения М.С.Горбачеву (в совпосольстве) Медали Свободы им. Ф.Рузвельта Почетной степени доктора наук Брауновского университета Международной премии им. Мартина Лютера Кинга I990 года.
I7.00-I8.00	- Заключительная встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.
I8.00-I8.30	- Церемония подписания советско-американских документов.
I9.30	- Официальный обед от имени М.С.Горбачева с супругой в совпосольстве.

2 июня (суббота)

9.30-I0.30 – Совместная пресс-конференция М.С.Горбачева и Дж.Буша.

II.00-II.30 – Официальная церемония проводов в Белом доме.

I2.00 – Отлет в Миннеаполис (штат Миннесота).

Пребывание в Миннеаполисе

– Завтрак от имени губернатора и местных властей.

I7.00 – Встреча с представителями деловых кругов Среднего Запада (электроника, химия, пищевая промышленность), а также с лидерами сельского хозяйства США (Кристалл, Блок и др.).

– Вечер свободный.

3 июня (воскресенье)

I0.00 – Отлет в Сан-Франциско.

I3.30 – Прибытие в Сан-Франциско.

I6.30 – Беседа с бывшим президентом Р.Рейганом.

I9.30 – Обед от имени ведущих представителей политического и делового мира Западного побережья.

4 июня (понедельник)

10.30-12.30 - Посещение Стэнфордского университета (есть приглашение руководства студенческой организации и от профессоров). Выступление.

- Вылет из Сан-Франциско в Петропавловск-Камчатский.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 31, 1990

Dear Chairman Gorbachev,

At Malta, you and I agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a treaty reducing and limiting conventional forces in Europe. In light of that commitment, I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Secretary Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on our part to resolve the aircraft problem, when they meet in Moscow.

The conclusion of this treaty takes on new urgency in light of the remarkable and hopeful events taking place in Eastern Europe -- events that are moving us closer every day to overcoming the division of Europe. I want to do everything that I can to make certain that the military situation reflects those hopeful changes. In this regard, I have been examining with my advisors and with U.S. allies, the question of the number of troops that the United States and the Soviet Union should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented.

I know that you too have been giving close attention to this question.

As you know, the Western position in the CFE negotiations is that neither your country nor ours should be allowed to have more than 275,000 troops stationed on foreign soil in Europe. This is one of the important unresolved issues in the talks.

I believe that, in light of recent political developments, the 275,000 figure is unrealistically high for both your country and mine. I hope you agree that we should set a new lower ceiling.

I have carefully reviewed our defense requirements in light of changes in the strategic environment, and have decided that we need to settle this manpower issue, and settle it quickly.

I want to propose to you that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and set instead a new ceiling for these forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe.

The U.S. intends, within this ceiling and with the consent of our allies, to retain a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future, regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces. I think that you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability.

If you accept my proposal, it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent. I believe that, together with the ideas that Secretary Baker will present on aircraft, we can move rapidly to conclusion of this important agreement.

I intend to announce this proposal concerning U.S.-Soviet stationed forces to the American people in my address on the State of the Union so that they will understand my readiness to respond to the new political situation in Europe and my commitment to stable reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe through CFE.

I hope that you too will see in this initiative, Mr. Chairman, my commitment to accelerated progress toward a CFE treaty and that you will agree that this manpower proposal is both

equitable and timely. We have each taken important steps in the last year to give a political impetus to the CFE negotiations. I believe that a completed treaty is now within our reach. I hope that you will join me in resolving the outstanding differences so that we can finalize and sign this crucial treaty -- before we meet in the United States in June.

Sincerely

George Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 5, 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Bush and President Gorbachev have agreed on dates for holding their Summit meeting in the United States. The Summit will take place during the dates of Wednesday, May 30 and Sunday, June 3.

# # #

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

5/14/90

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JABIII

Attached is the written text of the message which Ambassador Dubinin delivered to me orally this morning.

In the course of her recent contacts with a number of Western leaders, Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania K.Prunskiene contended that the present Lithuanian leddership wants dialogue with the USSR leadership and is prepared to suspend the decisions of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11, which unilaterally proclaimed the Republic's independence, as well as other recently adopted laws and resolutions which run contra ry to the USSR Constitution.

At the same time, in her conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on May 11, while proposing an urgent meeting with the Soviet leadership, Prunskiene again put forward a member of conditions and reservations. She said bluntly that the decision of the Lithuanian Parliament of March 11 cannot be suspended or rescinded. She was saying in this context, though, that it would be possible to suspend a number of laws and resolutions by the Lithuanian authorities, which affect the interests of the Soviet Union. She didn't say what, specifically, could be suspended, giving to understand that this should be the subject of negotiations with Moscow.

Prunskiene admitted that the Lithuanian authorities' decisions to repudiate the army draft and dismantle the organizationsl structures of the local organs of power were somewhat hasty. The issuance of Lithuanian citizenship IDs is, in her words, largely symbolic. But in order to remove all fears the Lithuanian leadership is prepared to provide guarantees of the

rights of the "non-Lithuanian population". She also said that for the transition period one could think of a "dual border", "dual visas", and "dual customs".

All of this was being presented by Prunskiene as her personal initiative to settle the conflict. She emphasized that Lithuania will relax its maximalist posture, but that it must be met halfway. In the course of the conversation Prunskiene was throwing numerous lightly veiled threats. She said she could allegedly send a signal, - and oil tankers would start coming to Lithuania, for the USSR is not likely to stop them by force, is it? Money had been promised to her. There was also this theme: as a result of her trip to the US she had showered Gorbachev's road to Washington with flowers. And if there is no agreement with Lithuania, his meeting with Bush could be soured.

Prunskiene insisted that her trip to Western countries had been very successful. She allegedly found support and understanding.

Prunskiene's conversation with the Soviet Ambassador makes it clear that the present Lithuanian leadership is trying to play a double game: in words, it assures Western representatives of its willingness to accept a dialogue expecting to gain some political capital on it, and in deeds, it has done nothing to make such dialogue a reality.

The Soviet leadership - and I wish to strees it - is for dialogue and a political solution to the Lithuanian problem. The solution, however, can only be found within the framework of the constitutional process, on the basis of the legislation which is in force.

To begin the dialogue, it is necessary first of all to restore the situation as it existed on March 10 last. The USSR President has an absolutely clear mandate from the Third Congress of Peoples' Deputies, and the Lithuanian leadership must reckon with it. Unfortunately, the present Lithuanian leadership ignores it, and by its actions is creating insurmountable obstacles to dialogue.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

From
briefing
books
per
Condi

Gates was destroyed

Pres copy

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Key Theme

-- We can't allow a new, uncontrollable avenue for the arms race to develop. Biological weapons will be far more dangerous than chemical or nuclear weapons.

Key Points

-- We're finally making real progress on proliferation of chemical weapons and missiles.

-- At this time, we cannot afford to let the biological weapon genie out of the bottle. It will become a time bomb that could endanger all of humanity.

-- I can assure you that we are doing absolutely nothing in this area. And we will do nothing. That is a promise.

-- We have, however, clear-cut, authoritative evidence that you have a large, covert biological weapons program.

- We know quite a bit about this program.

- We know you have been producing and field testing biological weapons for over a decade.

- Jim Baker has provided details to Minister Shevardnadze.

-- I need to know that this program will be ended and dismantled.

- Your program is a clear violation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

-- If this continues, it will become a major constraint on our relations, not just on arms control but across the board.

Contingency Points

(If Gorbachev presses on verification or proposes reciprocal visits to laboratories:

-- We are interested in your suggestion. But, as you know, there is no means to legally verify whether biological weapons are being produced. You must simply stop your program.)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0837-MR
SCS 2/13/12

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Scowcroft COPY

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Key Theme

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Key Points

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20. Cable	White House Re: Message to Robert Gates and Arnold Kanter from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 10/2/14

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	4/6/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91126-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1025-MR (501)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

GEORGE H.W. BUSH
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PAGE 01

PRT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SDO
SIT: COO PRIVACY OUT

<PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 161810Z MAY 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO (b)(1)

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
QQQQ
-
(b)(1) PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ROBERT GATES AND ARNOLD KANTER FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

.

BEGIN TEXT:

.

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

.

2. CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT. WE SHOULD STICK TO THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN STEERING GROUP AND PRINCIPALS, WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH THE GERMANS AND WITH THE ALLIES: THE U.S. SUPPORTS FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO CFE TALKS WITH THE SAME MEMBERSHIP AND MANDATE AS THE CURRENT TALKS: THESE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ADDRESS A RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN A CENTRAL ZONE.

.

3. THERE IS NO NEED TO GO FURTHER AT THIS TIME WITH THE SOVIETS OR WITH KOHL.

.

END TEXT
DECL: OADR
#0201

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2008-0797-MR
SCS 10/24/13

~~SECRET~~

May 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Timothy J. McBride TJM

--Mark Weinberg called me this morning to report that Dubinin passed to President Reagan, Gorbachev's invitation for the Reagans to have breakfast with the Gorbachevs at the Soviet residence in San Francisco.

--Weinberg said that Reagan again expressed his desire that Gorbachevs visit the Ranch or at least southern California.

--Per Weinberg, the Reagans have not accepted the breakfast invitation yet, but expect to if Gorbachev holds firm in not visiting southern California, or unless you and the President advise against accepting.

--President Reagan may suggest some location other than the Soviet residence.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

APNSA Has Seen

PAGE 01

PRT: ROSE
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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161300Z MAY 90

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 161300Z MAY 90 PRIVACY CHANNELS

-

FROM: AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
FOR : SUSAN PORTER ROSE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF TO MRS. BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE

-

SUBJECT: PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON TRAVEL BY MRS. BUSH AND MRS. GORBACHEV TO WELLESLEY COLLEGE

WE PASSED THE PROPOSED TEXT OF THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY AT NOON MOSCOW TIME. AT 1600 HOURS MOSCOW TIME, WE WERE TOLD THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN CLEARED, AND WERE ASKED NOT TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL WE HEARD FURTHER. WE ARE PRESSING FOR A REPLY AND WILL LET YOUR KNOW AS SOON AS WE HAVE CLEARANCE.

DECL: OADR.

#0517

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0837-MR
SCS 2/25/13

12:30 p.m.
May 16, 1990

General:

Jim Woolsey called from Moscow with message:

You received a cable from Arnie -- haven't seen it but know of it. In light of your and my conversation on Sunday, I don't know that it is really necessary for them to check with that fellow in Europe that is mentioned in the cable. The sooner we can get clearance here to proceed the way we discussed on Sunday, the better.

This is Jim Woolsey's view.

Wilma

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
22. Cable	To White House Re: Message to Brent Scowcroft and Bob Blackwill from Gates and Kanter (2 pp.)	5/15/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	4/6/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91126-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

May 10, 1990

General --

Secretary Baker called to say he was sending the attached papers he received from the Soviets. He penned in some notes and read them to me so they would be clear. He will touch base with you in the morning.

1. The Soviets want the whole visit to be called a STATE VISIT to the United States from arrival to departure.

2. The Soviets want to know who pays for what. For example, what is our normal practice and how will that be applied in this visit?

3. The Soviets want to know all the details of the trip to Boston with Mrs. Bush.

Florence

① Want whole visit to be called a STATE VISIT to US from arrival to departure.

② Want to know who pays what? IE. What our normal practice is + how this will be applied in this case?

③ also Want all details of trip to Boston w/ Mrs B.

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S OFFICIAL VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

(May 30 to June 5, 1990)

May 30, Wednesday

18.30	Arrival in Washington, D.C. (Andrews AF base).
19.00	Arrival at the Embassy. No functions scheduled.

May 31, Thursday

10.00	Official arrival ceremony at the White House.
10.30-12.00	Meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office. Mrs. Bush invites Mrs. Gorbachev for a cup of coffee to the White House Green Room.
13.00-14.30	Luncheon at the Embassy for prominent intellectuals (the list of American participants to be transmitted later).
15.30-17.00	Mrs. Gorbachev opens the exhibition of ancient Russian manuscripts at the Library of Congress. Tour of the Library.

16.00-17.30	Second meeting with President Bush.
19.00-	Official dinner hosted by President Bush at the White House.

June 1, Friday

9.30-	Meeting at the Embassy with Congressional leaders over a cup of coffee (Speaker Foley, House and Senate majority and minority leaders Gephardt, Michel, Mitchell, Dole, Chairmen of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees Fascell, Les Aspin, Pell, Nunn).
11.00-13.00	Third meeting with President Bush.
10.00-13.30	Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush depart for Boston. Call on the Wellesly College. Brief address.
14.00-15.30	Private lunch.
15.30-16.30	Presentation of awards to President Gorbachev (at the Embassy): FDR Medal of Freedom; Honorary Degree of Doctor of Sciences of the Brown University; International Martin Luther King Prize for 1990.
17.00-18.00	Concluding meeting with President Bush at the Oval Office.

18.00-18.30	Ceremony of signing Soviet-US documents.
19.30-	Official dinner hosted by President and Mrs. Gorbachev at the Embassy. Entertainment by Soviet performers.

June 2, Saturday

9.30-	Depart for Camp David (by helicopter).
10.00-	Talks at Camp David.
Evening	Return to Washington, D.C.

June 3, Sunday

10.00-	President Gorbachev and President Bush hold joint press conference.
11.00-11.30	Official departure ceremony at the White House.
12.00-	Depart for Minneapolis, Minnesota.
	- Luncheon hosted by the Governor and local authorities.
17.00-	Meeting with Mid-West business leaders
	and with US agricultural leaders (Cristal, Block and others).
19.00-	Depart for San Francisco.
21.30-	Arrive San Francisco.
Evening	Free time.

June 4, Monday

9.30-10.15	Breakfast and conversation with President Reagan (at the Soviet residence).
11.00-13.00	Visit to Stanford University (by invitation from the leadership of the student organization and faculty). President Gorbachev will make an address.
13.30-15.00	Luncheon hosted by West Coast political and business leaders.
15.30-	Depart San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

June 5, Tuesday

8.30- (local time)	Arrive Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

УТОЧНЕННЫЙ ПРОЕКТ СХЕМЫ ПРОГРАММЫ ОФИЦИАЛЬНОГО ВИЗИТА В США

(30 мая - 4 июня 1990 г.)

30 мая, среда

18.30	- Прибытие в Вашингтон (авиабаза "Эндрюс").
19.00	- Размещение в совпосольстве.
	- Вечер свободный.

31 мая, четверг

10.00	- Официальная церемония встречи в Белом доме.
10.30-12.00	- Встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.
	- Б.Буш приглашает Р.М.Горбачеву на кофе в Зеленую гостиную Белого дома.
13.00-14.30	- Завтрак в совпосольстве для видных представителей интеллигенции. (Список американских участников готовится).
15.30-17.00	- Р.М.Горбачева открывает выставку древнерусских рукописей в Библиотеке конгресса США. Осмотр Библиотеки конгресса
16.00-17.30	- Вторая встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.
19.00	- Официальный обед от имени Дж.Буша в Белом доме.

I июня, пятница

9.30	– Встреча в посольстве за чашкой кофе с лидерами конгресса (спикер палаты представителей Т.Фоли, лидеры демократического большинства и республиканского меньшинства в палате и в сенате – Р.Гепхардт, Р.Майкл, Дж.Митчелл, Р.Доул, председатели комиссий по иностранным делам и вооруженных сил палаты представителей и сената Д.Фассел, Л.Эспин, К.Пэлл, С.Нанн).
II.00–I3.00	– Третья встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем.
I0.00–I3.30	– Поездка Р.М.Горбачевой в сопровождении Б.Буш в Бостон. Посещение женского колледжа Уэлзли. Краткое выступление.
I4.00–I5.30	– Частный завтрак.
I5.30–I6.30	– Церемония вручения М.С.Горбачеву (в совпосольстве) Медали Свободы им.Ф.Рузвельта. Почетной степени доктора наук Брауновского университета. Международной премии им.Мартина Лютера Кинга I990 года.
I7.00–I8.00	– Заключительная встреча с президентом Дж.Бушем в Овальном кабинете Белого дома.
I8.00–I8.30	– Церемония подписания советско-американских документов.
I9.30	– Официальный обед от имени М.С.Горбачева с супругой в совпосольстве. Концерт советских артистов.

2 июня, суббота

9.30	- Отлет вертолетом в Кэмп-Дэвид.
I0.00	- Переговоры в Кэмп-Дэвиде.
Вечер	- Возвращение в Вашингтон.

3 июня, воскресенье

I0.00	- Совместная пресс-конференция М.С.Горбачева и Дж.Буша.
II.00-II.30	- Официальная церемония проводов в Белом доме.
I2.00	- Отлет в Миннеаполис (шт.Миннесота).
	- Завтрак от имени губернатора и местных властей.
I7.00	- Встреча с представителями деловых кругов Среднего Запада, а также с лидерами сельского хозяйства США (Блок, Кристалл и др.).
I9.00	- Отлет в Сан-Франциско.
2I.30	- Прибытие в Сан-Франциско.
Вечер	- Свободный.

4 июня, понедельник

9.30-I0.I5	- Завтрак и беседа с бывшим президентом Р.Рейганом (в советской резиденции).

II.00-I3.00	- Посещение Стэнфордского университета (есть приглашение руководства студенческой организации и от профессоров). Выступление.
I3.30-I5.00	- Обед от имени ведущих представителей политического и делового мира Западного побережья.
I5.30	- Вылет из Сан-Франциско в Петропавловск-Камчатский.

5 июня, вторник

8.30 (время местное)	- Прибытие в Петропавловск-Камчатский.

- We wish to confirm our acceptance of a visit to Camp David to stay there for the entire day of Saturday, June 2, returning to Washington on the evening of the same day. Minister Shevardnadze asked me to tell you that Mrs. Gorbachev intends to accompany her husband to Camp David. We are convinced that her joint stay there with Mrs. Bush will be mutually useful and agreeable.

- As for the nature of the visit, we assume that for the entire stay of the USSR President in the US this is going to be an official state visit.

- Mrs. Gorbachev accepts Mrs. Bush's invitation that they go together to Boston.

Delivered to Sec. Baker 5-14-90

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. Secretary,

As was agreed at our meeting in Bonn, we have worked out the issues relating to the limits or the ban on MIRVed mobile missiles and about the overall ban on MIRVed missiles.

As was already stated in President Gorbachev's letter to President Bush, we believe that those issues deserve most serious discussion between our two countries.

At the same time, as I already noted in our conversation in Bonn, in the time that remains before the summit meeting, it is more useful to focus all our attention on resolving the outstanding issues of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. On this assumption, I would suggest that the question of the ban on MIRVed missiles or of the ban on mobile MIRVed missiles be discussed at the next stage of the negotiations, after the conclusion of the initial START Treaty. This could also be noted in the joint declaration of the sides' intentions with respect to the future START negotiations that we already discussed.

At this time, however, in the context of the initial treaty we are working on, we could discuss certain initial measures to limit mobile missiles' warheads. I am referring to the possibility of establishing a lower subceiling on mobile ICBM nuclear weapons, than the one we proposed to be included in the treaty text (1200 instead of 1600). I think this would be a serious move on our part to accomodate US wishes.

The Honorable
James A.BAKER III
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

I look upon this move of ours in the context of the issues which are still outstanding, in particular, those relating to ALCMs and SLCMs.

We have carefully studied the proposals that you gave us in Bonn. I wish to say from the outset that we are pleased to note that most proposals contained in both documents virtually coincide. In our view, this could provide a good basis for an agreement. At the same time, we have some comments to make on those aspects which we either cannot accept or would like to see worded differently.

We are enclosing our detailed proposals in a separate document which we consider to be a single package. Let me briefly discuss the most important points.

First of all, regarding the ALCM-carrying heavy bombers limit.

Within the total 1600 delivery vehicles level the US could have a "floating" limit for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear ALCMs, with the maximum limit of 120 such heavy bombers. This 120 limit could be exceeded, but in this case each heavy bomber in excess of this limit would be counted as having that number of ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The overall number of TU-95s equipped for nuclear ALCMs, TU-160s equipped for nuclear ALCMs, and the future USSR heavy bombers equipped for nuclear ALCMs, could exceed the maximum limit of US heavy bombers equipped for nuclear ALCMs by 40 percent.

Finally, the question of range. I wish to reiterate that the Soviet Union firmly adheres to the position that the range for ALCMs should be set at 600 kilometers. We are encouraged by the US willingness to look for a mutually acceptable solution on this basis.

In making this proposal, we have moved to meet the US side so far that our pocket is not only empty, but turned inside out.

In analysing the proposals that you gave us in Bonn, we noted that they do not have - perhaps, purely accidentally - a provision on inspections of heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear ALCMs, but of a type tested with such weapons. Since this proposal was made by the US side as early as our February meeting in Moscow, and we accepted it, we consider it agreed and have included it into the additional areas of agreement.

As for SLCMs, I would like to reiterate the Soviet Union's position which is that the sides' statements should include SLCMs capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The same rules should apply here as those concerning ALCMs, namely, that all long-range SLCMs are considered nuclear, unless they have externally observable differences. At the same time, in order to find a solution we would be prepared to have a confidential data exchange on nuclear weapons for naval arms with the range in excess of 300 kilometers.

If the United States accepts our proposed "package" solution on the entire range of issues relating to ALCMs and SLCMs, we would be prepared to consider raising the planned nuclear SLCM limit from 600 to 760 for each side.

I hope that the new Soviet proposals on the entire set of issues will constitute a foundation for constructive solutions at our forthcoming meeting in Moscow.

Sincerely,

Eduard SHEVARDNADZE

Unofficial translation

PAPER ON POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT ON LONG-RANGE ALCMs AND SLCMs

Additional areas of agreement on ALCMs

1. The range limit for long range ALCMs is 600 kilometers.

2. Each B-52 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, each B-1 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, each B-2 equipped for nuclear ALCMs and each future US heavy bomber equipped for nuclear ALCMs, shall be counted as having 10 weapons.

3. Each TU-95 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, each TU-160 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, and each future USSR heavy bomber equipped for nuclear ALCMs, shall be counted as having 8 warheads.

4. Each B-52 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, each B-1 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, each B-2 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, and each future US heavy bomber equipped for nuclear ALCMs can be equipped for no more than 20 nuclear ALCMs.

5. Each TU-95 equipped for nuclear ALCMs, each TU-160 equipped for nuclear ALCMs and each future USSR heavy bomber equipped for nuclear ALCMs can be equipped for no more than 12 nuclear ALCMs.

6. Within the aggregate limit of 1600 delivery vehicles the United States could have a "floating" limit for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear ALCMs with a maximum ceiling of 120 such heavy bombers. It would be permitted to exceed this 120 limit, but in this case each heavy bomber in excess of this limit would be counted as having that number of ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The total number of TU-95s equipped for nuclear ALCMs, TU-160s equipped for nuclear ALCMs, and future USSR heavy bombers equipped for nuclear

ALCMs may exceed the maximum ceiling of the US heavy bombers equipped for nuclear ALCMs by 40 per cent.

7. Each side shall ensure that its non-nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from its nuclear ALCMs by external differences that are observable by the national technical means of verification and those differences that are visible during on-site inspections (length of frame, cross section shape, fin configuration, mounting units and other features). Non-nuclear ALCMs that are not be distinguishable in this way shall be permitted but shall be counted as nuclear ones.

8. With respect to nuclear ALCMs, there will be exchanges of information regarding those external differences, and demonstrations of nuclear ALCMs in such a manner as to verify the information and the distinguishing features.

9. With respect to non-nuclear ALCMs, there will be exchanges of information regarding those external differences, and demonstrations of non-nuclear ALCMs in such a manner as to verify the information and the distinguishing features.

10. Access is permitted to the designated weapons storage sites at the bases of heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear ALCMs and at the bases of heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear weapons in order to verify that all ALCMs located there are non-nuclear. The storage sites of nuclear weapons for heavy bombers cannot be closer than at an agreed distance from the bases of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear weapons.

11. Inspections shall be permitted of heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear ALCMs of the types which have been tested with ALCMs, in order to verify that they are not equipped for nuclear ALCMs.

12. Inspections shall be permitted of heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear ALCMs which are not of the type earlier tested with nuclear ALCMs, in order to verify that they are not equipped for nuclear ALCMs.

13. MIRVed ALCMs shall be banned.

14. 107 non-modern heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear weapons shall be permitted outside of the START limits (1600 delivery vehicles). Non-modern heavy bombers are those of a type deployed for longer than 10 years.

15. Inspections shall be permitted of former heavy bombers earlier equipped for nuclear weapons but converted for non-nuclear weapons, in order to verify that they have been converted in accordance with the agreed procedures and are not capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

16. Conversion of aircraft originally built as aircraft which are not bombers, into heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs, shall be banned.

17. There shall be no sublimit of 1100 weapons for heavy bombers.

18. No limits shall be set for non-deployed nuclear ALCMs, air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 km, and nuclear bombs.

19. Other areas of heavy bomber verification not covered by the present areas of agreement, are under consideration at the Geneva negotiations.

On SLCMs:

Statement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding its Policy on the Long-Range Nuclear SLCMs

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in the interests of strengthening stability and confidence shall provide the United States of America with annual statements regarding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' planned deployment of nuclear SLCMs for the duration of the Treaty. The present statement and the subsequent annual statements will be politically binding.

The first such statement is given below, on the understanding that the United States shall be making a similar statement. Subsequent statements shall be provided on the date of the entry into force of the treaty, and later, annually. In those statements:

- the Soviet Union shall specify the maximum number of its deployed nuclear SLCMs for each of the subsequent five years in which the treaty will be in force;

- cruise missiles, except nuclear SLCMs, shall not be included in the statement, if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable features;

- the statements shall cover nuclear SLCMs with the range in excess of 600 km;

- the statement shall indicate that the number of nuclear SLCMs declared shall not exceed 600 for the duration of the treaty.

The Soviet Union shall provide the United States with the information on which specific types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying SLCMs. Such information shall be confidential. The Soviet Union shall not produce or deploy nuclear MIRVed SLCMs.

The Soviet Union shall make those statements for the duration of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and invites the United States to make similar statements. Those statements could be complemented by any cooperative measures that can be agreed upon between the Soviet Union and the United States in the future."

The Soviet side reiterates that the "package" proposals on ALCMs and SLCMs are interrelated. If the US side soon informs us about acceptability of the above Soviet proposals on ALCMs and SLCMs, the Soviet side shall be prepared to add the following provisions:

1. The number of long-range nuclear SLCMs declared by both sides shall not exceed 760 for the duration of the treaty.

2. The Soviet Union could agree, in addition to the statement on long-range SLCMs, to provide annually on a reciprocal basis for the duration of the Treaty information on the number of nuclear weapons on other sea-based arms with the range (radius) in excess of 300 kilometers. Such information would be confidential.

3. As for the issue of making exception for the already existing type of US non-nuclear ALCMs - Tacit Rainbow - which has the range in excess of 600 km, but which would not be counted against treaty-limited ALCMs number, this issue is under further consideration.

Statement on Deployment of Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

Over the year beginning on ..... 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' planned deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, shall not exceed ..... .

Over the year beginning on ..... 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' planned deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, shall not exceed ..... .

Over the year beginning on ..... 1992, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' planned deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, shall not exceed ..... .

Over the year beginning on ..... 1993, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' planned deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, shall not exceed ..... .

Over the year beginning on ..... 1994, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' planned deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, shall not exceed ..... .

* * *

The declared number shall not exceed 600 for the duration of the Treaty.

Passed to Laurie 5/11/90

May 10, 1990

General --

I checked with Condi for suggested invitees for cocktails in honor of the Dubinins on Monday, May 14 at 6:15 p.m. in the Residence. Mrs. Bush will not be there. Once we have a list, Laurie Firestone will extend the invitations. You said the President suggested a total of 10

6:30

1. The President
2. Ambassador Dubinin
3. Mrs. Dubinin
4. Governor
5. Mrs. Sununu
6. Brent Scowcroft
7. Bob Gates
8. Larry Eagleburger
9. Bob Blackwill
10. ~~Mrs. Blackwill~~ Mrs. Eagleburger
11. Bob Kimmitt
12. Mrs. Kimmitt
13. Condi Rice

Please advise which names I should submit to Laurie.

Florence

BS

APNSA Has Seen cc RG

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-May-1990 18:23 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Florence E. Gantt (GANTT)
Diane L. Edwards (EDWARDS)

FROM: R. Nicholas Burns
(BURNS)

SUBJECT: Soviet Advance Team

Please pass to the General and Mr. Gates

At their request, Ambassador Reed and I met with the leader of the Soviet summit advance team today. He came with one question which he repeated several times: he asked if the Camp David issue were resolved, would the U.S. have any other questions to raise on the Soviet-proposed schedule, which, he said, had been personally approved by Gorbachev. He wanted to know if he could return to Moscow with our concurrence on the rest of the Soviet schedule, apart from Camp David.

Ambassador Reed was very careful and responded that, in our view, the two sides only agreed on 1) the May 30 arrival; 2) the arrival ceremony on the South Lawn on May 31; and 3) the State Dinner. Amb. Reed said the U.S. was waiting to hear from the Soviets on the Camp David issue, per Secretary Baker's conversation yesterday with Dubinin. He said we would not comment on the Soviet schedule until we heard back from the Soviets on Camp David.

Other items of interest:

--The Soviets said Gorbachev will stay at the Embassy, not Blair House.
--The Advance team will leave tomorrow. The team led by the Soviet Chief of Protocol, Chernyshev, will arrive May 18 and stay through the Summit.

CC: Robert Blackwill (BLACKWILL)
CC: Condoleezza Rice (RICE)
CC: William F. Sittmann (SITTMANN)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0837-MR
scs 2/25/13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

GENERAL SCOWCROFT,

THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT SEEN THIS CABLE FROM SECRETARY BAKER, AWAITING YOUR AUTHORIZATION.

WHSR

Faxed to Camp David 0900, Sat., 5 May per BS

APNSA Has Seen

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 050830Z MAY 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GERMANY

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4917
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 06013
NODIS
FOR S, D AND S/S - EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
BONN, MAY 4, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CAP 08-0768-MR
9/30/2010

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III
SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

1. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED A NEARLY FOUR-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE. HE PROVIDED ME A COPY OF THE LETTER GORBACHEV HAS SENT TO YOU. IN ADDITION, HE GAVE ME ONE RAISA GORBACHEV IS SENDING TO BARBARA. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS LITHUANIA, GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR PROCESS AND ARMS CONTROL. WHILE THESE WERE OUR MAIN THEMES, I ALSO RAISED TWO OTHER ISSUES BRIEFLY. FIRST, I PROPOSED A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO HELP FEED THE STARVING IN ETHIOPIA -- USING OUR FOOD AND THEIR PLANES. DAVE BOREN IS PUSHING THIS AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED VERY RECEPTIVE. WE'LL TALK ABOUT THE DETAILS MORE TOMORROW. SECOND, I RAISED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT RUMORS WE'VE HEARD OF A PAMYAT-LED POGROM AGAINST JEWS THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION TOMORROW. INTERESTINGLY, HE BASICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED

THESE ARE NOT SIMPLY RUMORS. SAYING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS TAKEN ALL THE STEPS THEY CAN TO PREVENT THIS. HE SAID THEY COULDN'T EXCLUDE INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS BUT HE SAID THE MVD AND OTHER SECURITY ELEMENTS WERE ON HIGH ALERT AND HAD CALLED IN AND WARNED THE PAMYAT RING-LEADERS OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF VIOLENCE AND ATTACKS AGAINST JEWS.
LET ME TURN TO LITHUANIA.

NODIS

LITHUANIA

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2. I GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM OUR DISCUSSION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MORE RELAXED AND CONFIDENT THAT THEIR STRATEGY IS WORKING. SHEVARDNADZE IMPLIED NO SENSE OF URGENCY. INDEED, WHEN I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIETS NOT SIMPLY TALKING ABOUT THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE, BUT ACTUALLY TAKING STEPS TO PRODUCE ONE, HE SAID HE THOUGHT ONE WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN TIME. HE REFERRED TO THE GROWING DEBATE AMONG THE LITHUANIAN LEADERSHIP OVER THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE, AND IMPLIED THEY WOULD COME AROUND. HE REPEATED THAT THE SOVIETS

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WOULD BE WILLING TO START A DIALOGUE IF THE LITHUANIAN LEADERS ANNOUNCED THEY WERE FREEZING THE DECLARATION AND THE LAWS THAT FOLLOWED IT AND WERE WILLING TO COME TO MOSCOW TO BEGIN TALKS. BUT HE SAID THE INITIATIVE, THE FIRST STEP, MUST COME FROM THEM. I ASKED IF LANDSBERGIS ET AL. CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD FROM THE SOVIETS WHAT THEY NEEDED TO DO AND WHAT THE RESULT WOULD BE (NAMELY, BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE AND LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS). HE SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THEY DID. HE SAID THE MAIN PROBLEM AT THIS POINT WAS THE LITHUANIAN WILLINGNESS ONLY TO TALK OF POSSIBLE STEPS AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO ACTIVELY TAKE THEM. HERE AGAIN HE NOTED THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PATIENT AND "WAIT A LITTLE LONGER" AS THE LITHUANIANS DEBATE THE ISSUE.

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3. AS FOR POSSIBLE U.S. SANCTIONS, HE SAID THEY WOULD BE NO TRAGEDY, THOUGH THEY WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE -- AS THEY WOULD BE AN INDICATION OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO THE RELATIONSHIP.

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~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 06013

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FOR S, D AND S/S - EYES ONLY

GERMANY

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4. I MADE A FAIRLY LENGTHY PRESENTATION TO HIM, EMPHASIZING THE PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE US ON (1) THE UNIFICATION PROCESS (NO SINGULARITY AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GERMANY, THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF OTHERS); AND (2) THE ROLE OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A "STEERING GROUP" ABLE TO DECIDE A LIMITED NUMBER OF ISSUES (E.G., FOUR-POWER RIGHTS, BORDERS,) AND SHAPED TO DISCUSS OTHERS AND DIRECT THEM TO THEIR PROPER FORA FOR DECISION (NUCLEAR FORCES: SNF NEGOTIATIONS; BUNDESWEHR LIMITS: CFE).

5. I ALSO USED YOUR SPEECH AND OUR RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO ADAPT NATO, POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, AND TO DEVELOP CSCE TO REASSURE SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE PROCESS WOULD NOT YIELD WINNERS AND LOSERS. INSTEAD, IT WOULD PRODUCE A NEW LEGITIMATE EUROPEAN STRUCTURE -- ONE THAT WOULD BE INCLUSIVE, NOT EXCLUSIVE.

6. SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS WELCOMED YOUR SPEECH AND MY COMMENTS AT NATO: INDEED, THAT OUR DISCUSSION OF THE NEW EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE WAS COMPATIBLE WITH MUCH OF THEIR THINKING, THOUGH THEIR THINKING WAS STILL BEING DEVELOPED. HE SAID THEY AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE TWO GERMANIES OR, IN TIME,

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THE ONE GERMANY. THAT WAS THE MEANING OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR, WHERE AFTER ALL THE TWO GERMANIES WERE SITTING AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS.

7. IN ANSWER TO MY CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A STEERING GROUP DISCUSSING AND DIRECTING ISSUES TO OTHER FORA, SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE NEEDED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS REALLY THOUGHT OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A DECISION-MAKING BODY, NOT MERELY AS AN ADVISORY

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GROUP. MOREOVER, HE ALSO FELT THAT IT SHOULD NOT RUSH TO MAKE DECISIONS AND COMPLETE ITS WORK. THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR NEEDED TO ADDRESS MANY COMPLEX ISSUES AND NEEDED TIME TO DO THAT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT ENCOURAGE DELAY, BUT FELT THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR SHOULD BE WORKING IN PARALLEL WITH CSCE AND WITH CFE. AS HE PUT IT, THE THREE SHOULD BE SEEN AS A KIND OF SINGLE COMPLEX.

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8. HE DID NOT USE THE TERM "SYNCHRONIZATION," BUT HE CLEARLY WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AND THE OTHER POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC PROCESSES IN EUROPE.

9. WE'LL HAVE TO SEE IF WE CAN CHANNEL THAT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. WHILE THEY'RE NOT ON THE SAME WAVE LENGTH, I THINK OUR CONCEPT OF TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A STEERING GROUP MIGHT YET HAVE SOME APPEAL TO THEM.

10. MOVING THEM ON GERMANY IN NATO WILL PROBABLY PROVE MORE DIFFICULT. HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY THEY HAVE -- ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET PUBLIC HAS -- OF ACCEPTING A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO. HE DID THIS WHILE IMPLICITLY ACCEPTING THE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION -- AGREEING THAT NEUTRALITY WAS NOT THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM STABILITY AND STATING CLEARLY THAT THE SOVIETS WANT US MILITARY (NOT JUST POLTICAL AND ECONOMIC) PRESENCE IN EUROPE. (INDEED, HE SAID THE US MILITARY PRESENCE MUST REMAIN IN

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EUROPE FOR AT LEAST SEVEN TO TEN YEARS, PROBABLY LONGER.)

11. WHAT COMES THROUGH IS THAT THE SOVIETS DON'T KNOW HOW TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE. THEY'RE WRESTLING WITH IT. I SUSPECT THAT GORBACHEV DOESN'T WANT TO TAKE ON THIS KIND OF AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED POLITICAL ISSUE NOW, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BEFORE THE PARTY CONGRESS.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 06013

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FOR S, D AND S/S - EYES ONLY

12. I PRESENTED OUR PACKAGE ON ALCMS AND SLCMS, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR US TO MOVE IN THIS FASHION AND SAYING WE COULDN'T GO FURTHER. I ALSO SAID I DIDN'T WANT TO GO TO MOSCOW IN ELEVEN DAYS WITH THESE ISSUES UNRESOLVED. SHEVARDNADZE CALLED THE PACKAGE A MAJOR STEP ON OUR PART. HE WANTED TO STUDY IT BEFORE FORMALLY RESPONDING, BUT PROMISED AN ANSWER BY EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE CAUTIONED ONLY THAT OUR INABILITY TO ACCEPT AN ALCM CARRYING HEAVY BOMBER SUB-CEILING MIGHT BE A PROBLEM SINCE THIS LEFT OPEN A CHANNEL THAT NEEDED TO BE CONTROLLED. BUT HE SAID THIS WAS ONLY A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE AND HE AGAIN NOTED THAT WE HAD CLEARLY MOVED.

BAKER

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#6013

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Gates
Handed
to
Dubinin
11/30/90

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

These are trying times. I have tried very hard to understand the problems you face at home. Indeed, as Jim Baker has told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, not only have we tried to understand, but we have acted with restraint and prudence.

I understand your view that the Baltic States are part of the Soviet Union; and I expect you know our view that we have never recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union. I have given a lot of weight to your stated view that force would not be used and that eventual separation or self determination is in the cards for Lithuania.

The problem is we can no longer sit idly by, giving the impression that we are unconcerned about the aspirations to freedom of the people of Lithuania.

I have often stated publicly, not only my desire to see perestroika succeed, but also to see you personally prevail. I still feel very strongly about that. Last Monday, the Minister from your Embassy came to the State Department and once again asked that we show restraint. On Tuesday I met with key leaders in our Congress and explained that I was not prepared to take action on this matter, though there is a growing feeling in this country that my inaction delivers a serious blow to the aspirations of freedom loving people in Lithuania, and indeed everywhere. This growing feeling, which I share, leads me to believe that there is no way we will be able to conclude our Trade Agreement, and thus MFN, unless dialogue with the Lithuanians begins.

We realize there is no easy answer; but, as you know, we felt that a "suspension" by Lithuania of

its resolution, as suggested by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, coupled with your willingness to meet with the Lithuanians outside the federation concept, would be the best way to break the ice. We have, as you probably know, urged this course upon Mr.Landsbergis.

Here is the basic reality -- there is no way Congress will approve MFN under existing circumstances -- no way at all. Further, under existing circumstances, I will not be able to recommend approval. I have felt that these negotiations should continue and, indeed, have taken some "flak" for not cutting off trade talks from our end. I assume that you have seen some of the statements on this critical subject.

I recognize, with respect, the restraint that you have shown, indeed, the encouragement you have given, to the new democracies in Eastern Europe. I recognize that this restraint and understanding has cost you support at home. You have a large stock of goodwill here and in other western countries for what you have done. But now we have Lithuania and the enormous problems accompanying Lithuania and the other Baltic States, which, to us, to repeat, have special standing.

I wish I could think of a more positive role that I could play to help ameliorate matters. In this regard, I would welcome any suggestions you might care to make. (I regret we have no secure voice communications at this time. It would be very useful if we could talk this out in a reasonable way, trying to work together to solve what at this moment is a terrible problem between us.)

I may be forced very soon to state publicly that under existing conditions there can be no trade agreement. This is simply a statement of reality. It is not intended to be provocative. It is not intended to complicate matters for you. I will accompany this "marker" with the fervent hope that dialogue will begin between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. I regret that the latest Lithuanian attempt at dialogue, with Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov, failed to produce positive results. We

must clear the path so that the era of improved relations between our two great countries will continue to flourish.

You have done too much, and we have come too far to see matters between us revert to tension and anxiety.

I would welcome any suggestions. Please know that this was not an easy letter to write. I have tried very hard to keep relations on track, recognizing the dramatic changes that you have brought to much of this world.

I have no choice now but to identify with our strongly held convictions about Lithuania's self determination and the right to control its own destiny.

I look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meeting. I am determined to keep that meeting on track in spite of existing tensions. There is a lot at stake there.

My sincere best wishes,

George Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

Condi's / translation

Dear Mr. President:

I am in receipt of your letter of 30 April dealing with your assessment of Lithuania. The high level achieved in the Soviet-American dialogue permits us to talk with you about an issue that is within the internal competence of the U.S.S.R.

You are well aware of the one of the course we have adopted in relations of the Central government with Lithuania which is a Republics within the Federation. We spoke at length about the situation in Lithuania at Malta. Our Foreign Ministers have more than once exchanged views on this matter and I think there is perhaps no point in going over all the nuances of the current Lithuanian situation.

I only wish to reaffirm from the very beginning that we have looked to a peaceful solution to the issue and naturally to one that takes place within the framework of the constitution and laws which are in force.

It seems to me that at Malta we reached a basic mutual understanding regarding conduct vis a vis Lithuania. As I emphasized, this kind of problem can only be resolved democratically, level-headedly and without outside interference. I call your attention to this latter point. If you want to undermine the relationship between us or worsen our peoples' attitude toward the United States then encourage separatism. We are counting on careful and thoughtful actions by you in this case. Your expressed understanding of what I said at Malta created a foundation on which future actions should be built. The approach to the Lithuanian situation by us and by you until now confirmed that that understanding was being implemented.

the President of the USA

In this context, we took note of what you said to U.S. lawmakers late in April -- that actions to slow down trade and economic relations would not be suitable and could lead to escalation of tensions over Lithuania and be detrimental to relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Are we now to understand you have changed your view regarding the consequences of negative steps in U.S.-Soviet trade and economic ties? Or is Washington now prepared to go forward with this escalation that no more than ten days ago appeared unacceptable to the U.S. side?

I want to say bluntly that the emerging departure of the U.S. Administration from the previous reasonable position cannot stand in good stead either the normalization of the situation in Lithuania or the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Those who give the Administration such ~~advice~~ recommendations should know that there are two alternatives:

-- Support of the historical processes underway in the USSR; or
-- Attempts to extract short-term political benefits.

Those who counsel in this way are choosing the latter alternative.

This course is regrettable. I still hope that the positions of common sense and non-interference in the internal affairs of another country -- in brief statesmanship -- shall prevail and that the developing good relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will not be damaged.

We are prepared in the spirit of constructiveness to continue to discuss the matter of Lithuania.

Delivered on 5-3-90

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your letter of April 30 dealing with your assessments of the situation obtaining around Lithuania.

The rather high level of the Soviet-American dialogue that has been achieved permits us to talk with you about an issue pertaining to the internal competence of the USSR. And I believe you are well aware of the line adopted by the central government in its relations with one of the republics which is part of our federation.

We talked about Lithuania at Malta. Our Foreign Ministers, too, have more than once exchanged views on the matter. So perhaps there is no point in once again going over all the nuances of the current Lithuanian situation. I only wish to reiterate: from the very beginning we are looking to the peaceful solution of the issue. Naturally - within the framework of the Constitution and the laws which are in force.

It seems to me that at Malta a fundamental mutual understanding was reached regarding the conduct vis-a-vis Lithuania. As I emphasized then, this kind of problem could only be resolved democratically, in a level-headed manner, and excluding any outside interference. I called your special attention to this latter point, noting that if you want to undermine the relationship, to worsen the attitude of our people to the United States, then you should encourage separatism. I also said that we were counting on careful and thought-through

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.

actions by the US President in this extremely delicate area. You, Mr. President, expressed understanding of what I said. This created the foundation on which further actions should continue to be based.

Both your and our approach to the Lithuanian situation in the post-Malta period confirmed that this mutual understanding was indeed being implemented.

In this context, we took note of your statement made at the meeting with US lawmakers that actions to slow down the development of trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union were not appropriate, since they could lead to an escalation of tensions around Lithuania and be detrimental to the relations between the US and the USSR.

Are we now to understand you to have changed your view of the consequences of the negative steps in the area of Soviet-US trade and economic ties? Or is it that Washington is now prepared to go forward with that very escalation which no more than ten days ago was seen by the US side as unacceptable?

I wish to say bluntly that the emerging departure of the US administration from its previous reasonable position can do no good either to the normalization of the situation in Lithuania, or Soviet-US relations. Those who give such recommendations to the US leadership would like - out of the two alternatives which are the support of the historic processes going on in the USSR and the world at large, and the attempt to extract short-term political benefits - to choose the latter alternative. This, of course, is regrettable.

I hope nevertheless that the position of common sense, non-interference in the internal affairs of another country - in short, statesmanship, shall prevail and the developing good relations between the USSR and the US will not be seriously damaged.

Naturally, we are prepared to continue in the spirit of constructiveness to discuss the situation concerning Lithuania.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin
May 2, 1990

Delivered
ON 5-3-90

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

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His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.

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Naturally, we are prepared to continue in the spirit of constructiveness to discuss the situation concerning Lithuania.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow, Kremlin
May 2, 1990

Delivered by
Amb Dubinin
to Gen Scowcroft
5-3-90
(copy)

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Получил Ваше письмо от 30 апреля, касающееся Ваших оценок ситуации, складывающейся вокруг Литвы.

Весьма высокий уровень, достигнутый в советско-американском диалоге, позволяет нам разговаривать с Вами по вопросу, касающемуся внутренней компетенции СССР. И Вы, полагаю, хорошо представляете себе линию, занятую центральным правительством во взаимоотношениях с одной из республик, являющейся частью нашей федерации.

О Литве мы говорили с Вами на Мальте. Неоднократно обменивались мнениями на этот счет и наши министры иностранных дел. Так что, видимо, нет смысла вновь излагать все нюансы нынешней литовской ситуации. Хочу лишь подтвердить: мы с самого начала настроены на мирное решение вопроса. Разумеется, в рамках Конституции и действующих законов.

Мне представляется, что на Мальте было достигнуто базисное взаимопонимание относительно поведения применительно к Литве. Урегулировать такого рода проблему, как подчеркивалось с моей стороны, можно лишь демократически, взвешенно и при исключении любого вмешательства извне. На это последнее обстоятельство я обратил Ваше внимание особо, отметив, что, если Вы хотите подорвать отношения, испортить отношение наших людей к США, тогда поощряйте сепаратизм. Сказал я и о том, что мы рассчитываем на внимательные, продуманные действия Президента США в этой исключительно деликатной сфере. С Вашей стороны, г-н Президент, было выражено понимание сказанного мной. Это создало фундамент, на котором стоило бы действовать и впредь.

Его Превосходительству
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Джорджу БУШУ
Белый дом
г. Вашингтон

Подход к литовской ситуации и с нашей, и с вашей стороны в послемальтийский период подтверждал, что это взаимопонимание реализуется на деле.

В этом плане мы приняли к сведению сделанное Вами на встрече с американскими законодателями в апреле заявление о том, что акции по торможению развития торгово-экономических отношений с Советским Союзом не являются подходящими, поскольку могли бы привести к эскалации напряженности вокруг Литвы, нанесению ущерба отношениям между США и СССР.

Нужно ли теперь понимать Вас так, что Вы изменили свой взгляд на последствия негативных шагов в сфере советско-американских торгово-экономических связей? Или же в Вашингтоне теперь готовы пойти на ту самую эскалацию, которая еще десять дней назад представлялась американской стороне неприемлемой?

Хочу прямо сказать, что наметившийся отход администрации США от прежней разумной позиции не способен сослужить добрую службу ни нормализации обстановки в Литве, ни советско-американским отношениям. Те, кто дает американскому руководству подобного рода рекомендации, хотели бы выбрать из двух альтернатив - поддержка исторических процессов, протекающих в СССР и в мире, и попытка извлечь сиюминутные политические выгоды - последнюю альтернативу. Это, конечно, вызывает сожаление.

Я все же надеюсь, что позиции здравого смысла, невмешательства во внутренние дела другой страны, словом, государственная мудрость возобладают, и развивающимся добрым отношениям между СССР и США не будет причинено серьезного ущерба.

Естественно, мы готовы в духе конструктивности и далее обсуждать ситуацию, связанную с Литвой.

С уважением,

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

Москва, Кремль
2 мая 1990 года

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

These are trying times. I have tried very hard to understand the problems you face at home. Indeed, as Jim Baker has told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, not only have we tried to understand, but we have acted with restraint and prudence.

I understand your view that the Baltic States are part of the Soviet Union; and I expect you know our view that we have never recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union. I have given a lot of weight to your stated view that force would not be used and that eventual separation or self determination is in the cards for Lithuania.

The problem is we can no longer sit idly by, giving the impression that we are unconcerned about the aspirations to freedom of the people of Lithuania.

I have often stated publicly, not only my desire to see perestroika succeed, but also to see you personally prevail. I still feel very strongly about that. Last Monday, the Minister from your Embassy came to the State Department and once again asked that we show restraint. On Tuesday I met with key leaders in our Congress and explained that I was not prepared to take action on this matter, though there is a growing feeling in this country that my inaction delivers a serious blow to the aspirations of freedom loving people in Lithuania, and indeed everywhere. This growing feeling, which I share, leads me to believe that there is no way we will be able to conclude our Trade Agreement, and thus MFN, unless dialogue with the Lithuanians begins.

We realize there is no easy answer; but, as you know, we felt that a "suspension" by Lithuania of

its resolution, as suggested by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, coupled with your willingness to meet with the Lithuanians outside the federation concept, would be the best way to break the ice. We have, as you probably know, urged this course upon Mr.Landsbergis.

Here is the basic reality -- there is no way Congress will approve MFN under existing circumstances -- no way at all. Further, under existing circumstances, I will not be able to recommend approval. I have felt that these negotiations should continue and, indeed, have taken some "flak" for not cutting off trade talks from our end. I assume that you have seen some of the statements on this critical subject.

I recognize, with respect, the restraint that you have shown, indeed, the encouragement you have given, to the new democracies in Eastern Europe. I recognize that this restraint and understanding has cost you support at home. You have a large stock of goodwill here and in other western countries for what you have done. But now we have Lithuania and the enormous problems accompanying Lithuania and the other Baltic States, which, to us, to repeat, have special standing.

I wish I could think of a more positive role that I could play to help ameliorate matters. In this regard, I would welcome any suggestions you might care to make. (I regret we have no secure voice communications at this time. It would be very useful if we could talk this out in a reasonable way, trying to work together to solve what at this moment is a terrible problem between us.)

I may be forced very soon to state publicly that under existing conditions there can be no trade agreement. This is simply a statement of reality. It is not intended to be provocative. It is not intended to complicate matters for you. I will accompany this "marker" with the fervent hope that dialogue will begin between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. I regret that the latest Lithuanian attempt at dialogue, with Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov, failed to produce positive results. We

must clear the path so that the era of improved relations between our two great countries will continue to flourish.

You have done too much, and we have come too far to see matters between us revert to tension and anxiety.

I would welcome any suggestions. Please know that this was not an easy letter to write. I have tried very hard to keep relations on track, recognizing the dramatic changes that you have brought to much of this world.

I have no choice now but to identify with our strongly held convictions about Lithuania's self determination and the right to control its own destiny.

I look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meeting. I am determined to keep that meeting on track in spite of existing tensions. There is a lot at stake there.

My sincere best wishes,

George Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow