Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91126
Folder ID Number: 91126-002

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Draft Letter	Re: Draft Letter to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	
02a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (4 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Handwritten Notes	Re: Shevardnadze Private Meeting (6 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	
03a. Message	Re: Informal Message from President Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	
03b. Message	Re: Informal Message from President Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	
04a. Draft Letter	To Secretary General Gorbachev (1 pp.)	8/30	(b)(1)	S
04b. Draft Letter	To Secretary General Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04c. Handwritten Draft	Re: Your Message (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04d. Draft Letter	To Secretary General Gorbachev (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1065
OA/ID Number: 91126-002
Date Closed: 4/3/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05a. Letter	Re: The Soviet Leadership… [English] (3 pp.)	8/25/89	(b)(1)	
05b. Letter	Re: The Soviet Leadership… [Russia] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Handwritten Notes	Re: Eagleburger Meeting (3 pp.)	8/13/89	(b)(1)	
07a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	8/6/89	(b)(1)	
07b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (4 pp.)	8/6/89	(b)(1)	
08a. Cable	White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Cable	White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock, Amembassy Moscow for Immideiate Delivery to Chairman Gorbachev from President Bush (2 pp.)	5/29/89	(b)(1)	S
08c. Cable	White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
08d. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Afghanistan (2 pp.)	3/15/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08e. Cable	Re: Soviet Submarine Accident: Gorbachev Message to the President's Reply (1 pp.)	4/8/89	(b)(1)	C
08f. Cable	Re: President's Letter to Gorbachev on Current Fighting in Lebanon (1 pp.)	4/26/89	(b)(1)	C
08g. Cable	Re: Delivery of Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
08h. Cable	Re: Presidential Message to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	6/7/89	(b)(1)	C
08i. Cable	Re: Response to Fourth of July Message to the President from Gorbachev (2 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	C
08j. Cable	Re: CW [Chemical Weapons] - Message from President Bush (2 pp.)	9/23/89	(b)(1)	S
08k. Cable	Re: Gorbachev Letter to the President (2 pp.)	10/28/89	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	Bob Blackwill to Bob Gates Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	8/1/89	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (18 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	S
10. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	7/21/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12a. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (4 pp.)	6/20/89	(b)(1)	
12b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: President's Letter to Gorbachev (2 pp.)	6/19/89	(b)(1)	S
12c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Eve of the Resumption the START Talks (2 pp.)	6/16/89	(b)(1)	S
13a. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Yuriy V. Dubinin (1 pp.)	5/25/89	(b)(1)	
13b. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	
13c. Cable	Re: Delivery of Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
13d. Cable	From the White House Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
13e. Draft Letter	From the President to Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/18	(b)(1)	
14. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Robert Gates Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	5/10/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
15a. Memo	POTUS to Jim Baker Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	5/7/89	(b)(1)	
15b. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/7/89	(b)(1)	
16a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to Vice President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
16b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to Vice President Bush [Russian] (1 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
17a. Fax	From Henry Kissinger Re: Meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin (2 pp.)	1/16/89	(b)(1)	
17b. Fax	From Henry Kissinger Re: Memorandum of Conversation [Henry A. Kissinger and Alexander Yakovlev] (8 pp.)	1/16/89	(b)(1)	
17c. Fax	From Henry Kissinger Re: Meeting with Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/17/89	(b)(1)	
17d. Fax	From Henry Kissinger Re: Dinner with Dobrynin (2 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
18a. Letter	Vice President George Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/13/89	(b)(1)	
18b. Letter	Vice President George Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/13/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
18c. Letter	Vice President George Bush to President Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/13/89	(b)(1)	
18d. Draft Letter	Re: I am taking advantage… (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
19. Letter	Re: To Secretary of State James Baker [Draft Official Translation] (7 pp.)	8/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

From the desk of
George Bu

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9/8/89

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your most recent letter concerning our mutual, as yet unfulfilled, interest in meeting together in an informal atmosphere. Our difficulty so far in finding an acceptable scenario has not diminished my desire for such a meeting nor my sense of its value. I am pleased to see from your correspondence that you share my assessment.

As I have explained at the outset of our efforts, my insistence on some sort of "umbrella" occasion as an excuse for a meeting has been to avoid all of the expectations and risks associated with attaching the word "summit" to our meeting. I must now admit that the chances of developing a scenario which would permit a spontaneous get-together appear increasingly remote.

The value of an intimate and informal meeting, however, seems to me to be overriding, and to warrant running a somewhat higher risk in order to make it possible. Accordingly, I would like to propose a direct meeting between us, still described, however, as an informal, private, no-agenda meeting in order that the two of us can exchange views on a variety of issues in a completely unstructured setting.

To do this in a manner which would permit the informality and privacy we both seek, I would like to invite you, at a mutually convenient time this fall, to be my guest at the Presidential retreat at Camp David. You will have your own optimal dates, but I might suggest for your consideration in

October either 6 and 7 or 20 and 21. If October is not convenient, we can, I am sure, find a mutually agreeable time in November. There is a tradition at Camp David that the press is not admitted, and the setting would guarantee complete privacy. I would meet you on your arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, where we could have a brief photo opportunity. We would then helicopter immediately to Camp David, with no further public exposure by either of us other than perhaps brief departure statements as you leave to return home and as I return to Washington. There would be no formal agenda, no communique, no agreements to sign and participation would be limited to our very closest associates.

Each of us would seek to make it impossible for the press to play their usual games of who won, who lost, and who made the most dramatic proposal. In short, you and I could engage in a serious, substantive and unstructured dialogue that would permit us better to understand each other and to establish a closer relationship. I am confident that a meeting of this nature of approximately two days and in such a setting would be extremely beneficial at this time of dramatic global change and challenge. Should you find my proposal attractive, I would, of course, anticipate that the next meeting between us, of whatever character, would take place in the Soviet Union.

I believe we have a mutual interest in an early meeting. I hope that you will find my effort to accommodate that interest while avoiding a summit atmosphere to be acceptable. I look forward to your early reply, as well as to meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on September 21.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President James A. Baker, Secretary of State John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker) Dmitry Zarechnak (Interpreter) Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	September 21, 1989, 3:05 p.m. - 3:40 p.m. EDT The Oval Office

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is good that these issues have been intensively discussed. President Gorbachev has reaffirmed the need for an informal meeting -- no agenda, small group. We have discussed all this on several occasions. As for a quick trip to the United States, we believe that would raise many problems, especially with an official trip expected next year. We concluded that would create a mistaken impression. A meeting, in the absence of agreements, would also lead to disappointment in both countries.

President Gorbachev asks you to weigh the possibility of meeting in any third country. President Gorbachev is planning to visit Finland in October and Italy in November (after November 20th). If the President was interested in any other places in Europe, or close to Europe, we could arrange a meeting.

The President: When will President Gorbachev be going to Italy?

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: His visit will begin on November 20. He will be in Finland in October.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1029-MR
2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

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If that working meeting does not go forward, we should prepare for a real Summit. Given the current state of discussions, there may be an urgent need for major decisions on START, and Summit input will be needed.

If we were to begin working toward a Summit, when should it take place? We should give negotiators time for serious preparation. Perhaps late spring or early summer would be right. If we set that date, we could get two ministerial meetings in before the Summit. Any date later than that would be difficult because we will be holding a Party Congress in October. Holding no Summit at all would be inconsistent with the situation in our relationship.

The President: I am glad we could have this discussion. Just so you hear it from me, let me go back a bit. I have been officially opposed to an informal meeting. But, because of rapid changes around the globe, the problems you face and we face, I have changed my position 180 degrees. The four of us were in Paris, and we heard our allies indicate their desire that I meet with President Gorbachev. We spoke with our allies of the many changes, in China, Eastern Europe, the global environment, and elsewhere. We talked about the possibility that maybe we, in the U.S., should change our minds and favor an informal meeting without an agenda.

If we did, I would have to explain to the press why I changed. But my real concern is that I do not want us to miss anything, to let something fall through the cracks. Today Eastern Europe is important -- not to make decisions -- just to discuss important issues.

We need to get comfortable with each other, so we can talk really frankly -- pick up the phone, for example. My predecessor did not have a close relationship with President Mitterrand. I wanted a better one. He can be a difficult man -- we all can. I invited him to Maine. It was the best darn thing I ever did. Because of this recent step, our relationship is on a completely different plane. The chemistry is different. It could become the same with us. It would be good; I know it.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: This is consistent with what President Gorbachev thinks.

The President: I understand why it won't work, but that is why a meeting connected to the UN General Assembly would have been

perfect. The press might otherwise reflect disappointment that no agreements were signed, etc.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: That would have been best, but for the fact that President Gorbachev spoke there last year.

The President: We know, but that is why we thought of Alaska and the environment. We understand why that was not possible. We will regroup and keep thinking about this. I really want to do this. I am convinced it would be a good thing.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: That is why President Gorbachev wanted me to tell you about his two visits in Europe which are already set.

The President: I will think about it. We are not saying no. Please ask President Gorbachev to think further. There has to be some rationale to keep the fact of a meeting from getting out of hand. That was the problem with Spain. There would be no reason for me to go there absent a crisis.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: If some trip you made would coincide with our trips, that would stop the speculation.

The President: Let me ask a logistics question. We thought about this idea for Alaska. How about holding one meeting on our ship and one on yours. Is there some problem in that notion from your perspective?

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Korea. If we were to meet you in Alaska, North Korea would ask why we did not visit them as well.

The President: Let's keep talking about this until we find an answer.

Secretary Baker: I suggest that we tell the press we have agreed on holding a Summit meeting by next summer.

The President: That would take the pressure off and then, if we could have another meeting, it would be clear it was not a Summit.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: So we will make an announcement, indicating a time frame for the Summit.

(There was then a discussion which resulted in agreement to

describe the time frame as before mid-year 1990.)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: When would we announce this? I need to call President Gorbachev. We could say we had a good discussion and will be more specific later.

(End of meeting)

Spreadsheet Private Duty
9/21/89

S Could that the issue has been
extensively discussed
Gab receptive c need + lets
c Jarrett - no agenda, small
group
We have received all responses
except a couple
As for trip to U.S., we believe that
would raise many questions
like original trip expected
next year.
We recommended that would end
suppression of emergency event.
Duty in absence of agreements
would lead to disappointment
in both countries
So he asks you to weigh
possibility of any 3rd country.
He is planning + Finland early
& Italy in Nov (after 23rd)
If any plans in E Eur or else
to, interested arrange a
visit
P When Italian trip
S 20 Nov it begins - Finland in
Oct

S If that working unity doesn't go forward, we should prepare for real summit.
Even current state of disarray there might be need for major decisions or Start 2 summit might be needed.
If we were to begin working toward summit, then when should it take place.
We should give very serious preparation. Perhaps late spg or early summer would be right. If we set that date we could get 2 superpowers in. any date later would be too because we have unity Coord in Oct. No summit at all would be inconsistent w/ our strategy.

P Glad for this discussion. Just so you hear it from us, let me say a word. I have been officially unprovoked to an informal unity.

But because of rapid changes in our globe, brows grow fine & we pace, & time changed. 150. The '40's was were in Paris & we heard dissension of our allies that we must. We spoke of c many changes China EE curriculum, etc. We talked of that maybe we should change our minds in favor of an informal no agenda outing.

Then did I need to explain to pressure I changed. But real reason is I don't want to miss anything, & let something fall thru c cracks — today EE is important — not to make decisions, just to discuss important issues.

We need to get comfortable w/ each other, so we can talk really freely — pick up a phone, for example. My prof. didn't have office relationships w/ students & I wanted a better one. If c can be a diff. one — we'll see. I wanted him to Mexico. But

dumb thing I ever did. Because of this one act, our relationship is on a completely diff plane. The chemistry is dead.
It would be second w/us. We could both have our own small lives — it would be good. I know it. —

S This is consistent w/ what a thinks

P I understand why it won't work but that is why U.N. would have been perfect. (Discussed press disappointment issue w/ no agreement reached, etc.

S That would be best but/or just to go ahead now.

P We phrase but that only one that / aldsha environment. We understand why that not possible
We will look at Nairobi. We'll respond & keep thinking of it. I really want to do this. Convinced it would be good.

S Gorbachev asked me to tell you about his 2 requests which are set.

P will think about it. We not saying no. ask him to think protect. There has to be some rationale to keep it from getting out of hand. That was prob w/ Spain. No reason to go there absent a crisis.

S If your trip you made would coincide w/ our trips that would stop a speculation.

P Let me ask a logistic question. What if this for Alaska. How about holding one mtg on our ship + one on yours. Is there some prob in that notion from your perspective.

S Knew. If we talked to anyt in Alaska, N Korea would ask why we didn't visit them also.

P Lets keep talking until we find an answer.

B (suggested we say to press we agreed on Summit by next summer)

P That would take a presumption to them if we could have another mtg it would be clear it was not a agreement.

S So we could make an announcement, with time frame (Discussion of semester cutoff) (agreed to say would be one before mid year) (then could announce this. I need to call [illegible] Carb. We could say we had a good discussion & will have more specifics later.



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September 1, 1989

Informal Message from President Gorbachev to President Bush

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your informal message of August 30, 1989, and have carefully examined its contents.

I share your view with regard to the desirability of our meeting. As you already know, from the very beginning the idea expressed by you in your letter appealed to me. I continue to believe that this is a good proposal. There is good reason for us to meet and to become more closely acquainted with each other and to discuss, in a broad conceptual way, questions of substantial interest.

I admit that in advancing the Canadian version we hoped that it would be received naturally by the public of the United States and other countries, since it would have been the product of a spontaneous decision by two leaders who would be traveling in regions in their own countries which would be close to each other. I meant to be in the Far East at the time you would be in Alaska.

However, if you feel that this version is not suitable, we will think further how we should deal with the realization of the idea of our meeting. As I understood from your letter, you intend to do the same.

As practical circumstances develop now, this question perhaps should be once again considered and weighed by our Ministers at their forthcoming meeting on the 22d of September. They could, in greater detail and specificity, exchange views with regard to the prospect of a meeting at our level.

Уважаемый господин президент,

Я получил Ваше неофициальное послание от 30 августа 1989 года и внимательно ознакомился с его содержанием.

Разделяю Ваши настроения в отношении желательности нашей с Вами встречи. Вам уже известно, что сама высказанная Вами ранее идея на этот счет с самого начала импонировала мне. Я по-прежнему считаю, что это - хорошее предложение. Есть большой резон в том, чтобы встретиться, поближе познакомиться друг с другом, обсудить в широком концептуальном плане волнующие руководство СССР и США вопросы.

Признаюсь, выдвигая "канадский вариант", мы надеялись, что он будет воспринят нормально общественностью Соединенных Штатов и других стран, поскольку он явился бы продуктом как бы спонтанного решения двух руководителей, совершающих поездки по соответствующим регионам своих стран, территориально близко расположенных друг от друга: я имел в виду быть на Дальнем Востоке, в то время как Вы находились бы на Аляске.

Однако, если Вы считаете этот вариант не самым подходящим, давайте будем думать дальше, как нам быть с реализацией идеи нашей встречи. Как я понял из Вашего письма, Вы собираетесь поступить именно таким образом.

Практически обстоятельства теперь складываются так, что этот вопрос, видимо, стоит еще раз обдумать и взвесить нашим министрам на их ближайшей встрече 22-23 сентября. Они могли бы более детально и предметно обменяться мнениями о перспективе встречи на нашем с Вами уровне.

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EYES ONLY ~~SECRET~~ DRAFT

Sent via State 8/30

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in Alaska (or offshore in U.S. and Soviet naval vessels), in conjunction with the viewing of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

From the U. S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada is not suitable because it does not meet our minimum criterion for such a meeting carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh when he was in Washington. Put briefly, that criterion is that our meeting appears to stem from, or incident to, some other event, in order that it cannot in any way be characterized as a "summit."

For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere of the nature I described in my first letter on this subject. I trust you will do the same. I continue to think such a meeting very desirable but, unfortunately, we perhaps must recognize that it might not, in the end, be possible to find an appropriate scenario.

In the meantime, I suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1029-MR
2/18/2014 MM

EYES ONLY ~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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FROM

BRENT SCOWCROFT
KENNEBUNKPORT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SENDING

PAUL REINA

RECIER

VELMA CEPHUS

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in Alaska (or offshore in U.S. and Soviet naval vessels), in conjunction with the viewing of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

From the U. S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada is not suitable because it does not meet ~~the~~ our minimum criterion, for such a meeting carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Besmertnyk when he was in Washington.

For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere ~~while avoiding the label of "summit."~~ of the nature I described in my first letter on this subject. I trust you will do the same, but we perhaps must recognize that it might not, in the end, be possible to reach agreement on an appropriate scenario which would permit such a meeting.

In the meantime, ~~we~~ 2 suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

your message of

Dear Mr. Secretary General

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in ~~conjunction~~ Alaska (or offshore in US and Soviet naval vessels), ~~with the~~ in conjunction with the running of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

~~I regret that your~~

From the ~~American~~ U.S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada ~~does not~~ is not workable because it does not meet the minimum criterion carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh when he was in Washington

For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere while avoiding the load of "summit." I trust you will do the same, but we perhaps must recognize that it might not,

in the end, be possible to reach agreement on an appropriate scenario.

H

Canada since in his view it ~~for the reasons he described~~ does not meet the ~~criteria and~~ considerations he described to Deputy Foreign Minister Brewerthick when they met in General Deconcept's office.

The President believes that we both should continue to consider ways in which our two leaders might meet in an informal atmosphere, recognizing that it may not be possible, in the end, to ~~reach~~ reach agreement.

In the meantime, we suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

~~With regard to your message of~~
~~———, we have carefully examined~~
~~the~~

The President has carefully considered the Soviet message of ——, and has instructed me to ~~make~~ inform you that he regrets that the suggestion for an informal meeting in Alaska is not convenient. ~~With regard to the Soviet suggestion proposal for a meeting at a suitable site in Canada, the President has~~ feels that

Further, the President ~~has reserved~~ is unable to ~~believes~~ accept ~~that~~ the British ~~suggestion~~ proposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in Alaska (or offshore in U.S. and Soviet naval vessels), in conjunction with the viewing of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

From the U. S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada is not suitable because it does not meet our minimum criterion for such a meeting carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Besmerthyk when he was in Washington. Put briefly, that criterion is that our meeting appear to stem from, or incident to, some other event. For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere of the nature I described in my first letter on this subject. I trust you will do the same, but, unfortunately, we perhaps must recognize that it might not, in the end, be possible to ~~reach agreement on~~ find an appropriate scenario. ~~which would permit such a meeting.~~

In the meantime, I suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

in order that it can not in any way be characterized as a "summit."

I continue to think such a meeting very desirable ~~would be useful~~

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

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SECURE FAX # 22

ADMIN FAX # _____

RECORD # _____

PAGES 1

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Rreleaser PMR

FROM/LOCATION

1. BRENT SCOWCROFT

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. BOB GATES

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/3/09

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

WHCA FORM 8, 15 OCTOBER 84

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Bush

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The Soviet leadership has reviewed the considerations expressed through Mr. Eagleburger concerning possible organization of a meeting in Alaska during the planned visit there 18-19 September by President Bush. We have studied the basic suggestion concerning a meeting in Valdez or any other suitable place nearby, as well as an alternative related to a possibility to use American and Soviet naval vessels in that area. The discussion of all variants led us to an idea which we are convinced could be, instead of the suggestion expressed by the American side, more acceptable for your and our leader. This idea embodies the spontaneous character of the meeting, and it would not cause many unnecessary questions by the public in your and in our country. It goes without saying that the format of the conversation would be such as we have earlier discussed.

The essence of the idea is to have a meeting in a place not too far from the area which President Bush intends to visit, but located not in the territory of the United States but in the territory of neighboring Canada. If the President of the United States agrees, conversations could be held in Vancouver or, for instance, Calgary. We repeat if the American leadership finds this idea acceptable it could be considered as realistically implemented.

As for the dates of the meeting 18-19 September, which have been relayed to us in the latest communication, they, unfortunately, do not suit us. Very confidentially, I would like to explain that exactly on these days a very important plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party is scheduled. To change collectively approved dates for that meeting is not possible. Therefore it would be preferable for us were the meeting to be held on the 28-29 of September.

We would ask the President and the Secretary of State to consider this idea of ours.

With regard to the Ministerial meeting, the planned convocation of the plenary meeting actually makes it impossible to keep the dates for that meeting. It is impossible for the Minister not to participate in the plenary meeting.

In this connection, we suggest that we determine new dates in the course of the meeting of our leaders in Canada, proceeding from the assumption that it would require, in all probability, some time to prepare that meeting after considering the results of the first thorough discussion between the two leaders of all major aspects of Soviet-American relations. After the main event negotiations at the Ministerial level would require a special meeting.

We note that in your latest proposal there is an idea to hold a meeting between Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze after the main meeting.

We deeply hope that these considerations of ours will be taken as acceptable, and that thereafter we will be able quickly to work out all necessary technical details related to both meetings.

Советское руководство внимательно рассмотрело соображения, высказанные через Иглбергера относительно возможной организации встречи на Аляске во время планируемого пребывания там I8-I9 сентября президента Дж.Буша. Нами был изучен основной предложенный вариант, касающийся встречи в Валдизе или другом подходящем месте поблизости, равно как и альтернативный, связанный с возможностью использования американских и советских военных кораблей в этом районе. Обсуждение всех вариантов привело нас к идее, которая, по нашему убеждению, могла бы - вместо предложения, высказанного американской стороной - быть наиболее приемлемой для вашего и для нашего руководителей. Эта идея сохраняет в силе спонтанный характер встречи и не будет вызывать многих лишних вопросов общественности в вашей или нашей стране. Разумеется, формат беседы был бы таким, как мы его уже ранее обсуждали.

Смысл идеи состоит в том, чтобы встретиться в месте, не столь отдаленном от района, который собирается посетить президент Буш, однако, расположенном не на территории США, а на территории соседней Канады. Если президент США согласен, то беседы могли бы состояться в Ванкувере или, например, Калгари. Повторяем, если американское руководство сочтет эту идею приемлемой, то ее можно было бы рассмотреть как реально осуществимую.

Что касается упомянутых в переданном нам последнем сообщении сроков проведения встречи (I8-I9 сентября), то они, к сожалению, не подходят. Доверительно хотел бы пояснить, что именно на эти даты намечен очень важный Пленум ЦК КПСС. Изменить коллективно одобренные сроки его проведения никак невозможно. Поэтому для нас предпочтительным было бы встретиться 28-29 сентября.

Просили бы президента и госсекретаря взвесить эту нашу идею.

Теперь относительно встречи министров. Запланированный созыв Пленума фактически делает невозможным сохранить сроки этой встречи. Министр не может не участвовать в этом пленуме.

В этой связи мы предлагаем окончательно определиться о новых сроках в ходе встречи наших руководителей в Канаде, исходя из того, что потребовалось бы, видимо, какое-то время для того, чтобы подготовиться к ней после осмысления итогов первого солидного обсуждения двумя руководителями всех основных аспектов советско-американских отношений. После главного мероприятия переговоры на уровне министров приобрели бы особый смысл.

Собственно и в Вашем последнем предложении содержится мысль о

проведении встречи Дж.Бейкера - Э.А.Шеварднадзе после главной встречи.

Мы глубоко надеемся, что эти наши соображения будут восприняты как приемлемые и после этого мы сможем быстро отработать все необходимые технические детали, касающиеся обеих встреч.

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P/Bessmertnykh (+ Eagleburger)
8/13/89

B. Carlucci asked me to report. He & Schev. met all day & I have a valuation which summ. There is description & necessity & need & discuss c pros & cons. An informal mtg would be best to get & know each other. It is a modality which is key. I would go to DC if I had not given a comprehensive speech last year. ∴ That possibility does not ~~exist~~ exist of itself. As for Canada Mulroney already called. As for Mexico & LA, not in this time period. As for Eurasian degree, my work + Hud would not permit.

Third country visits still best. Spain would be ideal. We even looked at secret mtg but that doesn't appear possible

Let's look at c possibilities once again. Our Summit Reps perhaps could meet at Camdessus mtg or at a regular Sept mtg. Best we must keep it confidential.

reside received a tough domestic schedule

P I understand. Secret only not possible. Let's keep thinking about it + try to figure it out. I will discuss only w/ my Top advisors + it will stay confidential.
My pref. w/ Spain is it becomes a secondment. Perhaps more fr us than you because of our press. (Describes again pros of symmetry).
We won't give up until we have what we want.

B We have a sensible proposal. I will report back.

P I just don't want to be pressed & go faster than we really have on AC, for example. Those things need to mature on their own time, not to a secondment schedule.

B Perhaps we can postpone our problems by talking about unity w/ no schedule, no agenda

S You maybe can do it. Once you work thru it. ~~That is the way~~ and started at Rome.

B That's right. Rome a good example. That is the way

it started out.

S Unless it appears accidental, our press turns it into a disservice.

P Well let's keep trying. We will never exhaust possibilities and stay in touch on it. Please give my regards to all in Thurscourt + Gosfo, Edens, Debs, Abromsons w/ whom we had a great visit.

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Aug 4, 1989 (?)

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your letter, conveyed to me by Marshal Akhromeyev. Let me say right away that I welcome your proposal that you and I should meet as early as this September. This confirms beyond any doubt our common interest in greater cooperation between us.

It is, of course, good that you and I have already met and gained some knowledge of each other in both political and human terms. Both of us have already managed to do something to build on the modicum of mutual understanding and trust established before you took office. And yet I cannot escape the feeling that we are not making full use of the opportunities now available in both objective and subjective terms. The least that can be said is that we are not taking advantage of the chance which history has given us, and which the Soviet Union and America did so much to bring about, as speedily as our time demands. The world and both our nations do need a tangibly different quality of Soviet-American cooperation.

I feel that all of this is of concern to you too. That is how I am inclined to interpret your letter.

I like the format of the meeting that you suggest - for the two of us to leave behind the cumbersome retinue of aides and, without haste or protocol ceremony, to talk about everything that we must discuss by virtue of our position.

His Excellency George Bush,
President of the United States
of America
Washington D.C.

I do not think that we should now, as part of preparations for the meeting, try to formulate its agenda. We could talk freely about everything.

It would seem worthwhile to exchange views on the main trends of current world developments, which clash and at the same time adjust to each other. We should speak of the most painful trouble-spots that aggravate the situation in the world and think of how we could help in healing them.

I have no doublt that we shall have to discuss, more specifically than is usually done, the global and so-called transnational problems that are looming before us and that we simply can no longer ignore.

I would like to find some new way of discussing our bilateral relations. You are quite right in saying that we cannot afford misunderstanding in those relations. Still, for all their advances in recent years, something about them is being left unsaid. I think this is because the burden of mistrust and mutual suspicion is still too great. But we shall not be able to put an end to this situation unless we really come to grips with the concept of the balance of interests of the USSR and the USA, unless we understand what is its genuine meaning, where are its limits and what should be the arrangements for its continuous maintenance with due regard for the multiplicity of our countries' internationalties and numerous obligations.

It is clear that mistrust is rooted also in our mutual superarmament, in all that accumulated in the years of the

Cold War. I have been thinking about this for some time now, and I would like to discuss with you how we could together vigorously push forward the process of reducing arms to a level fully consistent with a defensive doctrine. As I see it, this would have a powerful impact on the entire political process and help solve all other problems - economic, cultural, humanitarian, information, legal or any problem. And it would mean a crucial, definitive step toward a new state of the world, toward the world community of the 21st century.

And, of course, you are quite right - we must meet to know each other better. I fully support the spirit of your letter in that regard too.

Now about the dates and venue of our meeting. I agree with the time-frame; the precise dates could be determined.

As for the venue, I am indeed grateful for the invitation to come to your house or to Camp David. But since I am not planning on visiting New York, I regret to say that I shall not be able to enjoy your hospitality. Could we perhaps meet at some halfway point? There has already been such a meeting - and as the ensuing events showed, a productive one.

I think that the most appropriate place, both geopolitically and in terms of relations you and we have with that counry, would by Spain. I hope that the King and the Gonzales government would not refuse us. As for the specific venue in Spain, they could suggest one themselves. After all, Spain has islands, too. Please give it some thought, Mr.President.

I agree with you that this exchange of letters - not just its substance but also the fact itself - should be kept as far away as possible from those who need not know. I have told about your letter only a few people personally close to me.

I am sending you this reply with a man whom,as I understand, you know and whom I fully trust. He is Alexander Bessmertnykh, Eduard Shevardnadze's first deputy. You can say to him whatever you want me to know and to keep in mind.

Yours, with respect and trust,

Mikhail Gorbachev

Moscow, August 6, 1989

Его Превосходительству

Джорджу Б У Ш У

Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки

г.Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент!

Я получил Ваше письмо, переданное мне маршалом Ахромеевым. И сразу скажу - я приветствую Ваше предложение о том, чтобы нам с Вами встретиться уже в сентябре нынешнего года. И это со всей очевидностью подтверждает нашу общую заинтересованность в углублении сотрудничества между нами.

Конечно, в нашем с Вами активе уже личное знакомство, какое-то представление друг о друге и в политическом, и в человеческом плане. Что-то мы с Вами уже успели сделать в развитие того минимума взаимопонимания и доверия, который был заложен до того, как Вы вступили на свой пост. И тем не менее у меня постоянно ощущение, что мы не реализуем всех возможностей, которые и объективно, и субъективно сейчас имеются. Тот шанс, который нам представила история и к возникновению которого Советский Союз и Америка приложили свои немалые усилия, мы используем, по крайней мере, не в том темпе, в каком требует время. Мир и оба наши народа нуждаются все-таки в ощутимо ином качестве советско-американского взаимодействия.

Мне кажется, что все сказанное мною и Вас беспокоит. И я склонен воспринимать именно так Ваше письмо.

Мне импонирует предлагаемая Вами форма встречи. А именно - чтобы мы с Вами вдвоем, не обремененные шлейфом сопровождающих, не наспех и без протокольных излишеств поговорили обо всем, к чему нас обязывает наше с Вами положение.

Не думаю, что мы должны сейчас в качестве подготовки к встрече заняться формулированием повестки дня. Мы могли бы обо всем говорить свободно.

Видимо, нам стоит обменяться мнениями об основных процессах в мире, которые, сталкиваясь и вместе с тем адаптируясь друг к другу, сейчас происходят. Надо будет поговорить о наиболее важных болевых точках, отягчающих мировую ситуацию, и подумать, как мы смогли бы помочь их залечиванию.

Безусловно, мы должны будем в более конкретном, чем обычно, плане обсудить глобальные и так называемые транснациональные проблемы, которые нас подстерегают и мы просто уже не можем их игнорировать.

Мне хотелось бы обсудить под каким-то новым углом зрения наши двусторонние отношения. Вы правы, когда говорите, что мы не можем допустить непонимания в этих отношениях. Однако при всем прогрессе за последние годы в них остается какая-то недоговоренность. Я думаю, она объясняется еще слишком большим грузом недоверия, взаимных подозрений. Но нам не преодолеть их, пока мы основательно не разберемся, в чем же по существу состоит баланс интересов СССР и США. Каково его доподлинное содержание, где его

границы и каковы должны быть механизмы его постоянного поддержания с учетом всего многообразия наших и ваших международных связей и многочисленных обязательств.

Понятно, что недоверие связано и с нашей обоюдной сверхвооруженностью, со всем тем, что накопилось в годы "холодной войны". Я давно уже думаю над этим. И у меня есть желание поговорить с Вами о том, как совместно энергично двинуть вперед сокращение вооружений, чтобы свести их до полного соответствия оборонительной доктрине. Как мне представляется, это бы сильно сказалось на всем политическом процессе, на решении всех других проблем - экономических, культурных, гуманитарных, информационных, правовых, каких угодно. И обеспечило бы окончательный перелом к новому состоянию мира, к мировому сообществу XXI века.

И разумеется, Вы правы - нам действительно надо поближе познакомиться друг с другом. Я целиком поддерживаю дух Вашего письма и в этом смысле.

Теперь о том, когда и где нам встретиться. Со сроками я согласен, окончательно даты можно согласовать.

О месте встречи. Я, конечно, искренне признателен за приглашение приехать к Вам в имение или в Кэмп-Дэвид. Но поскольку в мои планы не входит поездка в Нью-Йорк, то, к сожалению, я не смогу воспользоваться Вашим гостеприимством. Может быть, нам встретиться где-нибудь на полпути? Опыт уже есть. И он, как показали последовавшие события, оказался продуктивным.

Я думаю, что самым подходящим местом как с точки зрения геополитической, так и с точки зрения наших и ваших отношений

с этой страной, была бы Испания. Надеюсь, король и правительство Гонсалеса не откажут нам. А конкретно, где именно в Испании, они могли бы предложить сами. В конце концов у Испании есть ведь и острова. Подумайте над этим, господин Президент.

Я согласен с Вами, что эту нашу переписку - не только ее содержание, но и сам ее факт - лучше держать подальше от посторонних глаз. О Вашем письме я поставил в известность всего нескольких близких мне людей.

Этот свой ответ Вам я направляю с человеком, которого Вы, кажется, знаете и которому я полностью доверяю. Он - первый заместитель Э.А.Шеварднадзе - Александр Бессмертных. Вы можете ему сказать все, что сочтете нужным, чтоб я знал и учитывал.

С уважением и доверием

М. Горбачев

г. Москва

6 августа 1989 года

Его Превосходительству
господину Джорджу Бушу,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов
Америки

From the de
George
whole doc

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PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER
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<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
QQQQ
EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.
.
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.
.
BEGIN TEXT
.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
.
I WELCOME YOUR RESPONSE TO MY OFFER OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THAT SANK IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA. AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR NOTE, WE WILL AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM YOU
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0963 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
ON WHETHER YOU WISH TO PROCEED.
.
I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAD A VERY VALUABLE MEETING WITH MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, A SESSION THAT WAS EXTRAORDINARY FOR THE CANDOR WITH WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. HE AND I AGREED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO. SIMILARLY, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE SOVIET SHIP VISIT TO NORFOLK LAST WEEK WAS ENORMOUSLY SUCCESSFUL. SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GATHERED TO HEAR THE MUSICAL PERFORMANCE BY THE SOVIETS SAILORS, AND THE PEOPLE OF NORFOLK EXTENDED VERY WARM HOSPITALITY TO THE SHIPS' CREWS. ALL THESE EVENTS ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.
.
SINCERELY,
.
GEORGE BUSH
.
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0963 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
.
END TEXT
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<DIST>
PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER
SIT: PRES MSGS WHSR OUT
<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 290825Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~
QQQQ
EYES ONLY EYES ONLY
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK, AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.
.
SECSTATE FOR UNDERSECRETARY KIMMIT TO PASS TO SECRETARY BAKER
.
BEGIN TEXT:
.
MAY 29, 1989
.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
.
I HAVE OUTLINED IN RECENT SPEECHES A NEW CONCEPTION OF A STABLE

AND COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP; ONE THAT MOVES BEYOND CONTAINMENT. ON MAY 24, I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE), NOW UNDERWAY IN VIENNA, IN PROMOTING THIS GOAL.
.
I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT IN ORDER TO BROADEN AND ACCELERATE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, I AM PROPOSING TODAY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL THAT NATO:
.
.

ACCEPT YOUR AGREEMENT TO CEILINGS ON TANKS (20,000 FOR EACH SIDE) AND ARMORED TROOP CARRIERS (28,000 FOR EACH SIDE). SEEK EARLY AGREEMENT WITH THE WARSAW PACT ON A CEILING FOR ARTILLERY IN THE RANGE BETWEEN 16,500 AND 24,000, USING A COMMONLY AGREED DEFINITION OF THE EQUIPMENT INVOLVED. ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT REDUCED WOULD BE DESTROYED.

.

EXPAND THE CURRENT NATO PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE CUTS

OF 15 PERCENT BELOW THE COMBINED TOTAL FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE IN TWO ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES: HELICOPTERS (ATTACK AND ASSAULT/TRANSPORT) AND ALL LAND-BASED COMBAT AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF ROLE OR CONFIGURATION. ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT CUT WOULD BE DESTROYED.

.

CUT U.S. STATIONED MANPOWER BY 20 PERCENT AND PROPOSE A CEILING ON U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER STATIONED OUTSIDE OF NATIONAL TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

URALS ZONE AT THE U.S. RESIDUAL OF 275,000
EACH. WE CALCULATE THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN
EASTERN EUROPE UNDER THIS CEILING WOULD AMOUNT TO
ABOUT 325,000. WITHDRAWN SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN
ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE DEMOBILIZED.

.

AGREE TO AN ACCELERATED TIMETABLE FOR REACHING
AND IMPLEMENTING AN AGREEMENT ALONG THESE
LINES. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE

TO REACH SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN SIX MONTHS TO A
YEAR, AND TO ACCOMPLISH THE REDUCTIONS BY 1992
OR 1993.

.

MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN VIENNA, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON
VERIFICATION OF OVERALL CEILINGS AND MEASURES TO MONITOR AND
VERIFY FORCE REDUCTIONS AND EQUIPMENT DESTRUCTION. BUT I
BELIEVE THAT OUR NEW PROPOSAL ADDRESSES WHAT WE UNDERSTAND
TO BE YOUR CENTRAL CONCERNS AND SHOULD ALLOW THE NEGOTIATIONS
TO MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY.

.

SINCERELY,

.

.

GEORGE BUSH

.

.

.

.

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

.

END TEXT.

.

WARM REGARDS, BRENT SCOWCROFT

.

.

DECL: OADR
BT
#0584
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0584 <TOR> 890529043604 MSG000233728564

<DIST>
PRT: COMM
SIT: PRES_MSGS
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 241208Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY
QQQQ
-
EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.
-
-
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.
-
BEGIN TEXT
-
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
-
SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME ON HIS MEETINGS IN MOSCOW. I AM QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT. I
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0374 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
STRONGLY SUPPORT INTENSIFYING OUR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, ANDARMS CONTROL. THE RESUMPTION OF THE FULL ARRAY OF ARMS CONTROL AND ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT.
-
MR. CHARIMAN, I WROTE YOU IN APRIL TO EXPRESS OUR CONDOLENCES OVER THE TRAGIC LOSS OF YOUR MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA AND THE LIVES OF SO MANY YOUNG SAILORS. IN RECENT WEEKS WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN OBTAINING WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN RAISING THE SUNKEN SUBMARINE. WE HAVE CERTAIN CAPABILITIES FOR THIS KIND OF MISSION AND, FROM A PURELY HUMANITAIRAN STANDPOINT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER OUR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD YOU WISH TO PURSUE RAISING THE SUBMARINE. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD BE SENSITIVE ABOUT MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBMARINE. I RESPECT SUCH SENSITIVITY AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO SAFEGUARD YOUR TECHNOLOGY. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE HAVE NOT EXAMINED EITHER THE COST OR THE TIME THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO READY OUR SHIP FOR SUCH A MISSION. HOWEVER, I CAN APPRECIATE THE CONCERN OF
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0374 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
THE FAMILIES AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE MEN LOST IN THE SUBMARINE AND WISH TO EXTEND THIS OFFER. IT IS THIS CONCERN FOR THOSE YOUNG SAILORS' FAMILIES THAT PROMPTS THIS OFFER.
-
SHOULD YOU HAVE INTEREST IN PURSUING A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO RAISE THE SUBMARINE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY WITH YOU.
-
SINCERELY,
-
GEORGE BUSH
-

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
SIT: PRES_MSGS VAX
<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 110952Z MAR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3978
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 3857

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THANK YOU NOTE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
       GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT
UNCLAS STATE 076849
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KSCA, CASC, TBIO, UR, US, OPDC
SUBJECT: THANK YOU NOTE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
       GORBACHEV
REFS: A) STATE 68417, B) MOSCOW 5717, C) FRANKFURT
3556
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING THANK YOU NOTE TO MFA FOR
CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
ON BEHALF OF ALL AMERICANS, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE
APPRECIATION FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN OBTAINING A RARE ANTI-SNAKEBITE
SERUM FOR AN AMERICAN VICTIM OF A PAKISTANI PIT VIPER.
I UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS ARRANGED A SPECIAL
FLIGHT SO THAT THE SERUM COULD BE EXPEDITIOUSLY
TRANSPORTED FROM TASHKENT TO MOSCOW AND ASSISTED U.S.
EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN COORDINATING ONWARD TRANSPORTATION
OF THE SERUM TO THE U.S. ALTHOUGH THE VICTIM IS STILL IN
SERIOUS CONDITION, HIS CHANCES FOR RECOVERY ARE MUCH
IMPROVED THANKS TO YOUR EFFORTS.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
MOSCOW.
END TEXT. BAKER
BT
#6849
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6849 <TOR> 890311051427 MSG000226905267

<DIST>
PRT: DONLEY HUGHES PERITO
SIT: BLACKWILL HAASS PRES MSGS RICE RODMAN BRANSCUM
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 150321Z MAR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
- ON AFGHANISTAN

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 080473
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR, AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
- ON AFGHANISTAN
REF: STATE 054154
1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER ON EXPEDITED BASIS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV ON AFGHANISTAN, RESPONDING TO GORBACHEV'S REFTEL LETTER ON THE SAME SUBJECT.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR FEBRUARY 17 LETTER ON AFGHANISTAN. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WELCOME YOUR ORDERLY AND TIMELY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM THAT COUNTRY, THUS BRINGING TO AN END A LONG AND UNFORTUNATE CHAPTER IN AFGHAN HISTORY. A MAJOR STEP TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION HAS THUS BEEN TAKEN.
AS YOUR LETTER INDICATES, WE SHARE A NUMBER OF INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN: AN ATTENUATION OF CIVIL CONFLICT, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, THE RESTORATION OF ITS STATUS AS A NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY, AND THE FACILITATION OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.
THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE IS SIMPLY TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, WHO HAVE SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY OVER THE PAST DECADE, HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES. OUTSIDE POWERS CAN BEST CONTRIBUTE BY RESISTING THE TEMPTATION TO MANIPULATE THE PROCESS.
WE HARBOR NO INTENTION OF PROMOTING AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT THAT IS HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION. RATHER, WE SUPPORT THE EMERGENCE OF A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN LIVING IN PEACE WITH ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS.
I WISH ALSO TO ASSURE YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT OUR ACTIONS WILL REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS WE UNDERTOOK AS A GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS. WE LIKEWISE EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO HONOR THOSE OBLIGATIONS; FOR YOUR COUNTRY TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD FORFEIT THE VERY CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL BENEFITS THE WITHDRAWAL HAS EARNED FOR YOU IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
IN YOUR LETTER YOU SUGGESTED A MORATORIUM ON FURTHER SUPPLIES TO CONTENDING AFGHAN FACTIONS. FOLLOWING YOUR GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A SIMILAR PROPOSAL WE PUT

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

ON THE TABLE LAST APRIL, WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD EXERCISE RIGHTS TO SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS COMPARABLE TO THOSE WHICH YOU ASSERTED FOR YOURSELF. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MATERIAL SUPPORT -- INCREASINGLY IN THE FORM OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -- TO OUR FRIENDS IN AFGHANISTAN. AS FORMER SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED IN GENEVA LAST APRIL, THE CONTENT OF OUR SUPPORT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY RESTRAINT IN SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ITS KABUL CLIENTS. THE RECENT TURNOVER OF MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO AFGHAN UNITS DURING AND FOLLOWING YOUR WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT INDICATE SUCH RESTRAINT. THIS HAS AFFECTED OUR DECISION TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT.

DURING THE COMING MONTHS AFGHANISTAN WILL REQUIRE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE UNITED STATES, AS ALWAYS, STANDS READY TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO MEET HUMANITARIAN NEEDS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CARRY THROUGH EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH YOUR OWN PROMISE TO AID GENEROUSLY REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS THERE. THAT WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, WHICH THE WORLD WOULD NOTE. THE UN MUST PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN COORDINATING THIS MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. I TRUST THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL ALSO ASSIST UN EFFORTS TO REMOVE LAND MINES AND ANTI-PERSONNEL DEVICES FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE LONG SUFFERING AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME SAFELY AND WITH HONOR.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY THAT I SEE THIS AS A VERY IMPORTANT TIME IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I HOPE THAT OUR COUNTRIES CAN DEVISE COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES TOWARD THE RESIDUAL PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT AFGHANISTAN DURING THE MONTHS AHEAD. THIS WOULD BRING BENEFITS NOT ONLY TO OURSELVES, BUT ALSO TO THE SOUTH ASIAN AREA AS A WHOLE, AND TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE.

FINALLY, I AM HOPEFUL THAT COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE WILL SET A STANDARD OF GOODWILL TO WHICH WE CAN LOOK AS WE MOVE FORWARD TO ADDRESS OTHER PROBLEMS BEFORE US.

AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) GEORGE BUSH

INSERT TEXT OF HANDWRITTEN POSTSCRIPT FROM PRESIDENT BUSH IN PARA 4 BELOW.

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT OF LETTER

4. BEGIN TEXT OF HANDWRITTEN POSTSCRIPT FROM PRESIDENT BUSH:

P.S. AS SOON AS JIM BAKER RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO EUROPE HE CAME TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND GAVE ME A DETAILED REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE - MOST INTERESTING(

(SIGNED AND UNDERLINED) GB

END TEXT OF POSTSCRIPT.

5. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BAKER

BT

#0473

<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: PRES_MSGS VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 082134Z APR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5954
INFO RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 4571
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 4286

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET SUBMARINE ACCIDENT: GORBACHEV MESSAGE
- AND THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

<TEXT>BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 110232
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OPDC, MNUC, ENRG, PHSA, UR, US, NO
SUBJECT: SOVIET SUBMARINE ACCIDENT: GORBACHEV MESSAGE
- AND THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY
1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT
2. ON APRIL 7 SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ CONVEYED TO UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO THE PRESIDENT. BEGIN TEXT:
URGENT MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT BUSH ON APRIL 7, 1989 AT 1141 MOSCOW TIME ON BOARD A NUCLEAR-POWERED TORPEDO SUBMARINE LOCATED IN NEUTRAL WATERS IN THE AREA AT A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 180 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF MEDVEZHSKIY ISLAND, A FIRE STARTED IN ONE OF THE COMPARTMENTS.
UNFORTUNATELY, DESPITE THE MEASURES TAKEN, THE SUBMARINE COULD NOT BE SAVED. AT 1715 MOSCOW TIME, THE SUBMARINE SANK AT A DEPTH OF OVER 1500 METERS. THE CREW IS BEING HELPED BY SOVIET SHIPS AND VESSELS, WHICH CAME TO THE AREA WHERE THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED. THERE ARE CASUALTIES. THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE ARE STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. THE REACTOR IS SHUT DOWN. BY THE ASSESSMENT OF SPECIALISTS, A POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IS EXCLUDED. ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL MEASURES ARE BEING WORKED OUT IN VIEW OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED.
END TEXT.
3. ON APRIL 8, THE DEPARTMENT CONVEYED TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY A REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. EMBASSY MAY WISH TO PASS TO THE MFA ON MONDAY, APRIL 10, THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, WHICH FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT:
APRIL 8, 1989
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING THE TRAGIC SUBMARINE ACCIDENT YESTERDAY. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES JOIN WITH ME IN EXTENDING OUR SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE LOST CREWMEN AND IN HOPING THAT YOUR RESCUE EFFORTS WILL SUCCESSFULLY PREVENT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.
END TEXT.
4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER
BT
#0232
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0232 <TOR> 890408174611 MSG000229369571

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
SIT: PRES_MSGS
<DIST>
SIT: MORRISON VAX WELCH
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 260248Z APR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7079
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0544
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 7912

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON CURRENT
FIGHTING IN LEBANON
-

<TEXT>BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 130061
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OPDC, MOPS, PINS, PREL, UR, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON CURRENT
FIGHTING IN LEBANON
-
1. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT THE TEXT BELOW TO
THE MFA FOR TRANSMITTAL TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. ORIGINAL
WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
APRIL 24, 1989
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
I AM GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE IN
THE SHELLING IN LEBANON, WHERE THE VIOLENCE HAS ESCALATED
BETWEEN GENERAL AOUN'S LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND THE
LEBANESE MUSLIMS, WITH ACTIVE SYRIAN PARTICIPATION.
THE CIVILIZED WORLD IS UNDERSTANDABLY OUTRAGED THAT SO
MANY INNOCENT LEBANESE ARE SUFFERING. WE HAVE BEEN
CALLING ON ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIGHTING, INCLUDING
GENERAL AOUN AND THE SYRIANS, TO TERMINATE THE FIGHTING
IMMEDIATELY. IN VIEW OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO SYRIA, I
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU WERE TO ADD YOUR
VOICE TO THOSE URGING SYRIA TO AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE
CEASE-FIRE.
SUCH AN EFFORT ON YOUR PART WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH YOUR
PUBLICLY EXPRESSED POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO ENDING THE
TRAGIC SHEDDING OF INNOCENT BLOOD.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
END TEXT.
3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER
BT
#0061
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0061 <TOR> 890426055138 MSG000230881898

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: PRES_MSGS
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHMO <DTG> 241721Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ MOSCOW 13686
NODIS
SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
REF: THE WHITE HOUSE 241208Z MAY 89 (~~SECRET~~
- SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY)
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 1900 ON MAY 24 (DUE TO THE ONGOING PROCESS OF FORMING A NEW LEGISLATURE THIS WEEK, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DELIVER THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, SINCE HE WAS INVOLVED ALL DAY IN MEETINGS WITH DEPUTIES).
3. SHEVARDNADZE LISTENED CAREFULLY AS THE LETTER WAS READ, PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT'S POSITIVE COMMENTS ON SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, AND TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RECOVER THE MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE THAT SANK LAST APRIL IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE VERY MUCH VALUED THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESPENT'S OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUBMARINE AND RECOVER THE BODIES OF THE SOVIET SAILORS WHO WERE LOST AT SEA, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT OF COURSE A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL MATTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. HE OFFERED TO PASS THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, AND SAID THAT AN ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN A FEW DAYS. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL GRATITUDE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS PROPOSAL, AND NOTED THAT THIS, AS WELL AS THE AID GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE ARMENIAN TRAGEDY AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INDICATED JUST HOW MUCH THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD CHANGED FOR THE BETTER.
4. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUB NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SOVIET SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FULLY AND GET BACK WITH A CONSIDERED REPLY.
5. SHEVARDNADZE MADE OTHER COMMENTS ON THIS WEEK'S POLITICAL EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ON THE SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS. MATLOCK

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
SIT: BLACKWILL PRES MSGS RICE VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 070308Z JUN 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9827
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 5119

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV
-

<TEXT>BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 179123
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV
-
REF: MOSCOW 14059
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.
3.
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
DEAR CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV:
PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTIXN AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. I WISH YOU SUCCESS IN MEETING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES YOUR NEW POSITION PRESENTS. THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT UNFOLDING IN YOUR COUNTRY HAS GRIPPED THE WORLD'S ATTENTION BECAUSE OF ITS ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE, NOT ONLY FOR YOUR COUNTRY BUT FOR OTHERS AS WELL. I BELIEVE IT ALSO HOLDS GREAT PROMISE FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.
YOU KNOW THAT YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR EFFORTS TO REFORM AND RESTRUCTURE SOVIET SOCIETY. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD ON THE BETTER, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BAKER
BT
#9123
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 9123 <TOR> 890607002214 MSG000234490934

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
PRT: VANERON
SIT: PRES_MSGS VAX
<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 141700Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2100
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 5645

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE
- PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8915441)

<TEXT>BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 223458
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, UR, US
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE
- PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8915441)
1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.
2. FYI FOR POSTS, FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV WAS RECEIVED BY THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 3:
ON THE OCCASION OF THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INDEPENDENCE DAY, PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES FOR PROSPERITY AND PEACE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
I AM CONVINCED THAT CONTINUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON THE BASIS OF REALISM, EQUALITY, AND MUTUAL BENEFIT WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE FRAME OF MIND OF THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRIES, AND WOULD PROMOTE A GENERAL MOVE TOWARD A NEW, PEACEFUL PERIOD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
THE REPEATED EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN US, AS WELL AS OTHER CONTACTS, AND THE TALKS IN MOSCOW IN MAY CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF PREREQUISITES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ALONG THE BASIC LINES OF SUCH COOPERATION. OF COURSE, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENTS IN VIENNA AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS IN GENEVA WOULD BE OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR SAFEGUARDING SECURITY AND REMOVING THE THREAT OF WAR. WE ON OUR PART INTEND TO DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO MAKE THE TALKS SUCCEED.
POSSIBILITIES EXIST FOR PROGRESSING FASTER AND MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE MATTER OF COOPERATION IN SETTLING REGIONAL PROBLEMS, DEVELOPING BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND THE REST OF THE ISSUES ON THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGENDA.
I WISH TO REAFFIRM, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS STEADFASTLY SUPPORTING ALL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
M. GORBACHEV
MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN
JULY 4, 1989
3. FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY:
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND I THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS IN CELEBRATION OF OUR 213TH ANNIVERSARY OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
4. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF SOVIETS WISH
TO DO SO.
5. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
EAGLEBURGER
BT
#3458
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 3458 <TOR> 890714152717 MSG000237742037

<DIST>
SIT: BLACKWILL PRES_MSGS RICE VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 290255Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3123
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 5866

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONDOLENCE LETTER
- FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8917168)

<TEXT>BT
UNCLAS STATE 241350
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, UR, US
SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONDOLENCE LETTER
- FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8917168)
1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.
2. FYI FOR POSTS, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT BUSH WAS RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 24:
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I WAS DEEPLY MOVED BY A REPORT ABOUT THE PLANE CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH CAUSED NUMEROUS CASUALTIES.
ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND MYSELF I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MOST SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES AND RELATIVES OF THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES.
SINCERELY,
M. GORBACHEV
MOSCOW, KREMLIN
JULY 21, 1989
END TEXT.
3. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED, BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED IN THE TRAGIC ACCIDENT AT SIOUX CITY AIRPORT.
BOTH OUR NATIONS HAVE SUFFERED TRAGIC LOSSES FROM ACCIDENTS IN RECENT MONTHS. YOUR CONCERN WILL BE APPRECIATED NOT ONLY BY THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO WERE LOST IN THE CRASH, BUT BY ALL AMERICANS.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
END TEXT.
4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
EAGLEBURGER
BT
#1350
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 1350 <TOR> 890729000033 MSG000238982433

<DIST>
PRT: VANERON BRANSCUM
SIT: PRES MSGS DORMINEY RODMAN VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 231931Z SEP 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 6701
INFO RUEHCDEBUSDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 7689

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: CW - MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 306804 TOSEC 140041
NODIS
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, XG
SUBJECT: CW - MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTED: FOLLOWING IN PARA THREE BELOW IS MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO GORBACHEV RELATING TO CW INITIATIVE WHICH PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNGA MONDAY SEPT. 25. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER MESSAGE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS MONDAY, SEPT. 25. EMBASSY WILL BE RECEIVING SEPARATELY TALKING POINTS, FACT SHEET, AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE INITIATIVE.
3. BEGIN TEXT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE:
DEAR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV:
IN MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, I EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION FOR THE RICHNESS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON ISSUES OF MUTUAL IMPORTANCE. I WANT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF MR. SHEVARDNADZE'STRIP TO THE UNITED STATES TO EMPHASIZE TO YOU ONE AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MORE WORK MUST BE DONE. THIS IS THE ISSUE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AS WELL AS THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON THIS SUBJECT. WHILE PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS TO DATE, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE EROSION OF RESTRAINTS IN THE THIRD WORLD ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE, AS WELL AS THE EVER GROWING DANGER OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO MEET THIS THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES.
I AM DETERMINED TO DO ALL I CAN TO ACHIEVE A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON A WORLDWIDE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE THIS GOAL HAVING SPOKEN OF IT PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A BOLD APPROACH AIMED AT ACCELERATING THE WORK UNDERWAY IN GENEVA AND BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. TO THAT END I AM MAKING THE FOLLOWING COMMITMENTS:
-- DESTRUCTION OF MORE THAN 98 PERCENT OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE WITHIN EIGHT YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES.
-- THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE STOCKPILE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN TEN YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, PROVIDED ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES

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PER E.O. 13526
~~2009~~
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

BECOME SIGNATORIES TO THE CONVENTION BY THE EIGHTH YEAR, OR TOTAL ELIMINATION WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE TIME WHEN ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES DO BECOME SIGNATORIES, WHICHEVER IS LATER.

I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO TAKE THE LEAD IN MOVING THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS FORWARD. ACCORDINGLY, IN ADDITION TO THE STEPS ABOVE, I AM PROPOSING THAT WHILE THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA CONTINUE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION REDUCE THEIR RESPECTIVE STOCKPILES TO LESS THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE CURRENT U.S. LEVEL. AND THAT SUITABLE PROVISIONS BE MADE FOR THE INSPECTION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROCESS.

VERIFICATION OF ANY AGREEMENT, EITHER BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DAUNTING CHALLENGE. IT WILL REQUIRE OPENNESS AND ACCEPTANCE OF A REGIME THAT WILL DO JUSTICE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL THE SIGNATORIES.

SECRETARY BAKER HAS DISCUSSED MY PROPOSALS IN DETAIL DURING HIS MEETINGS IN WYOMING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. I INTEND TO ANNOUNCE THESE STEPS BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

NEGOTIATING A MULTILATERAL, WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN IS AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE. YET I BELIEVE THAT, WITH THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION YOU HAVE SHOWN IN THE PAST, OUR EFFORTS CAN SUCCEED.

SINCERELY,

END TEXT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE. EAGLEBURGER

BT

#6804

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6804 <TOR> 890925101027 MSG000244030227

<DIST>
PRT: VANERON
SIT: BENKO PRES_MSGS BLACKWILL RICE DORMINEY RODMAN VAX BRANSCUM
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 280446Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2806-MR
12/2/2016 MM

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
-

<TEXT>BT
~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 345904
NODIS
E.O. 12356:: DECL:OADR
TAGS: UR, US, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
-
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PARA 3 CONTAINS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF AN OCTOBER 18 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. IT WAS DELIVERED BY CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV DURING AN OCTOBER 26 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:
HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY A SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, MAY I CONVEY TO YOU MY GOOD WISHES AND ALSO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY THOUGHTS. MR. EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE INFORMED ME ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH YOU AND THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS HE HAD WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER. WE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE QUITE SATISFIED THAT IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO ENTER A NEW PHASE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND ALSO THAT A LARGER MEASURE OF CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED. IT IS MY HOPE THAT FOLLOWING DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND VIENNA AS WELL AS FURTHER MINISTERIALS YOU AND I SHALL BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OUR NEW ABM-RELATED PROPOSAL OFFERS A CHANCE FOR COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. WE FEEL THAT SOME SOLUTIONS MAY ALSO BE POSSIBLE ON THE ISSUE OF SLCMS AND ALCMS IN SHORT, WE SEEM TO HAVE COME WITHIN REACH OF THE SECOND TREATY IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS BOUND TO BE HIGHLY ACCLAIMED BY THE ENTIRE HUMAN RACE.
SIMILARLY, PROSPECTS NOW LOOK GOOD FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ALSO ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE -- THE TWO AREAS WHERE WE HAVE NOW A BROAD-BASED COINCIDENCE OF APPROACHES. I WISH TO TELL YOU PERSONALLY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE STEPS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE IN THOSE AREAS, WHICH HAVE PROVED QUITE HELPFUL.
IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WORK ON THE PROTOCOLS TO

THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING COMPLETED BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IN THE COURSE OF MY MEETING WITH YOU WE COULD SIGN AND SUBMIT THEM FOR RATIFICATION. THIS WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO ENHANCE UNIVERSAL SECURITY.
WHAT I WISH TO REITERATE MOST FIRMLY IS THAT WE STAND FOR AGREEMENT ON TOTAL CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, ESPECIALLY SINCE VERIFICATION ISSUES NOW APPEAR TO BE MANAGEABLE.
THE STAGE WE HAVE JOINTLY REACHED IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL PROBLEMS IS AN INDICATION OF THE MATURITY AND PRODUCTIVENESS OF THE SOVIET-U.S. DIALOGUE. IN THIS AREA, IN ADDITION TO BROADER UNDERSTANDING, IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MEASURE OF COOPERATION ON A COMPROMISE BASIS.
IT IS A GOOD SIGN THAT SOVIET-U.S. TIES BETWEEN GENERAL PUBLIC AND IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE ARE ON THE RISE, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE INAUGURATION IN MOSCOW A FEW DAYS AGO OF AN IMPRESSIVE EXHIBITION "UNITED STATES-89," WHICH I TOURED LAST WEEK.
I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR THE KIND GREETINGS YOU CONVEYED THROUGH MR EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE, FOR YOUR WISHES OF SUCCESS TO SOVIET PERESTROYKA. OF COURSE, WE ARE KEENLY FOLLOWING THE REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE ONGOING TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THERE IS EFFECTIVE RECOGNITION IN WASHINGTON THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF OUR REFORMS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. IF THAT IS THE CASE, OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAY EXPECT BROAD PROSPECTS TO OPEN BEFORE THEM, WHICH IT WILL BE YOUR AND MY TASK TO MAKE A REALITY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.
CARRYING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU WILL BE MR. YEVGENI PRIMAKOV, HEAD OF THE VISITING SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, WHICH PLANS TO FAMILIARIZE ITSELF WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, SHARE INFORMATION ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN OUR COUNTRY, AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATORS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.
IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE DELEGATION WILL BE ACCORDED A WARM WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES.
WITH PROFOUND RESPECT AND LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR EARLY MEETING.
KREMLIN, MOSCOW
OCTOBER 18, 1989
/SIGNED/MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
END TEXT OF LETTER.
KIMMITT
BT
#5904
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 5904 <TOR> 891028100349 MSG000246881029

<DIST>
PRT: VANERON
SIT: PRES_MSGS VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 282036Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8826
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 7361

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THANK-YOU LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT
UNCLAS STATE 346876
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: THANK-YOU LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
THE PRESIDENT
1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
THANK-YOU LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. A SIGNED ORIGINAL
WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED, BUT THERE IS NO
OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.
3. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE IN THE WAKE OF
THE TRAGIC EARTHQUAKE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA. THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAVE THE SHARED
EXPERIENCE OF GREAT EARTHQUAKES. I KNOW THAT I SPEAK FOR
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN SAYING THAT WE WERE DEEPLY MOVED
BY YOUR MESSAGE AND BY YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE.

THOUGH THE DAMAGE AND LOSS OF LIFE WAS CONSIDERABLE, THE
CLEAN-UP EFFORT IS PROCEEDING WELL. OUR CONCERN NOW IS
TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO PREPARE BETTER FOR FUTURE
EARTHQUAKES. AS YOU KNOW, SEISMOLOGISTS ARE MAKING
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES AND
PATTERNS OF MAJOR DISTURBANCES. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND ASK YOU TO SEND
A TEAM OF SOVIET SEISMOLOGISTS TO JOIN THE U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY'S EFFORT TO ASSESS THE BAY AREA
EARTHQUAKE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS JOINT EFFORT -- DRAWING
UPON DATA FROM THE ARMENIAN AND BAY AREA EARTHQUAKES --
CAN CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
PHENOMENON.
SINCE WE HAVE RECENTLY SHARED THIS TRAGIC EXPERIENCE, LET
US TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE OUR KNOWLEDGE AND
EXPERTISE IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT FURTHER DISASTERS.
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF
SUCH A VISIT.
SINCERELY YOURS,
GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
- MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,
- CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
- OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
- MOSCOW.

Florence

file up here

"Super Secretaire"

Document Originally
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Following Page

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 1, 1989

Bob Gates

Bob,

Here are the notes from Brent's meeting last Saturday with Akhromeyev.

Bob Blackwill

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1028-MR
SCS 3/22/13

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George
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Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09b. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (18 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [2]

Date Closed:	4/3/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91126-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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Document Originally
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SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing this letter to you on my way back from Europe to the United States. My mind is full of the fascinating conversations that I had with people in Hungary and Poland and with the many world leaders gathered in Paris for France's bicentennial.

Let me get quickly to the point of this letter. I would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our shoulders, without the ever-present briefing papers and certainly without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about "who's winning," "what agreements have been reached," or "has our meeting succeeded or failed."

Up until now I have felt that a meeting would have to produce major agreements so as not to disappoint the watching world. Now my thinking is changing.

Perhaps it was my visit to Poland and Hungary or perhaps it is what I heard about your recent visits to France and Germany -- whatever the cause -- I just want to reduce the chances there could be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more personal basis. If you agree that an unstructured meeting would be productive, I would make the following suggestion.

My suggestion is that you decide, on your own, to come to speak at the U.N. early in the General Assembly session -- perhaps around the end of September (the 27th and 28th of September would be perfect for me, but so would other dates). Immediately following your public announcement that you were coming to the United Nations, I would invite you to come to meet with me for an informal, "no agenda" visit. In my view, it would be preferable to avoid the word "summit" which is, at best, overworked and, at worst, a word whose connotation is one of a momentous happening.

I would propose inviting you to visit me for a day or two of private chats.

There are two alternative ways I would suggest to do this. One way would be for you to fly from New York to Washington where I would meet you at Andrews Air Force Base. We could then go by helicopter to Camp David. There, in a relaxed setting with neckties off, we could talk about any and all subjects. The very nature of the invitation would guard against the danger of "overpromise." I would propose no more than a handful of advisers on each side. I would visualize long chats between you and me alone and, also, good discussions with my Secretary of State, NSC Adviser, and Chief of Staff present, along with their counterparts, of course.

Another option would be for you to visit Barbara and me at our seaside house in Maine. Late September can be very nice there. You could fly to Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire, about 40 minutes from New York and helicopter another 15 minutes to our home, for the same kind of talks.

Camp David perhaps would offer the most privacy, but Maine would offer you a glimpse of our Atlantic seacoast. It would also give me a chance to take you for a ride in my speed boat and maybe catch a fish.

Perhaps there is some entirely different way more convenient for you, and I would welcome a suggestion. The General Assembly seems to me to provide the ideal cover needed for a "spontaneous" invitation to an unstructured, informal meeting. I do not intend in any way to put you in an awkward position and I will understand completely if, for whatever reason, you do not feel you can respond positively to my suggestion.

General Brent Scowcroft and Secretary Jim Baker, plus my Chief of Staff John Sununu, are the only ones who know of this letter, which I have personally written. I hope I can demonstrate to you that some things need not "leak."

My respects and sincere regards,

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

sk of Bush

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Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr.President,

I think that the letter you sent me on June 20 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international security.

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union believe--and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this--that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. In a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.

At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.

In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.

One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure. In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we must, of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic arm would result in strengthening strategic stability.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.

You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptual gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of this situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approached more pragmatically.

The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.

I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talks by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.

We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.

The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.

As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision--to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related to the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trade off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointly once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.

A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with the Secretary of State And you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at our upcoming meeting.

The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last round. It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bombers must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important not to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warheads. I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.

Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of th two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.

Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arms, and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.

We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.

I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.

It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.

I wish now to address two more problems that deal with the set of nuclear issues.

The first one concerns our nuclear testing talks. It seems to me that our acceptance, at the latest round of the talks, of using the CORRTEX method to monitor all nuclear tests above the agreed yield threshold, as the US side had insisted, makes it possible to bring the first stage of these talks to the concluding phase. I hope that our US partners will now look in the same unbiased way at the verification procedures that we propose. If during the ministerial meeting the two sides

recorded their fundamental understanding regarding the verification mechanism, instructions could then be given to our respective delegations at the Geneva talks to complete as soon as possible--in any case before the end of the year--work on the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and to prepare them for signing at our meeting. I also think that it is time for us to give general consideration to the guidelines for further restrictions on the yield and number of tests, which we are going to set for our delegations as their goal for the second stage of the talks.

The other problem to which I would like to call your attention has to do with the possibility of starting talks to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Today, as we see it, we have a favorable situation--the United States has actually ceased the production of fresh weapon-grade plutonium while the Soviet Union has adopted a program for phasing out before the year 2000 all the industrial reactors used to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Eduard Shevardnadze will inform the US side about the specific details of the program. I want to point out that we are ready to speed up its implementation in the event of matching reciprocal steps on your part.

In these circumstances our two countries could address in practical terms the problem of a verifiable cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. As a first step we could even now instruct our experts to consider jointly the issues related to the mechanism of mutual verivicati of such a measure. It is our view that the reciprocal cessation of the production of fissionable material not only would help to strengthen predictability in the strategic field, but would also make it possible for both sides to solve--at a much lower cost--a large number of environmental problems involved in the operation of nuclear production complexes.

Another priority issue--and we seem to be of one mind on this-- is the conclusion of a global and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapon We welcome your statement that every effort must be made to achieve such a prohibition. In this, our approaches coincide.

I also wish to note with satisfaction that during the last two rounds of bilateral consultations progress was made toward achieving this goal. I hope that our ministers will be able during their current meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding on a bilateral verification experiment.

We have also decided to take an additional step to accomodate the US position by agreeing to the inclusion of saxitoxin and ricin into the relevant list under the convention.

The multilateral talks on the convention have now entered a crucial phase. At the same time they still seem to lack a sense of purpose. Perhaps this is due to some extent to the fact that there is no agreed date by which the negotiators would seek to complete the preparation of the convention. Why shouldn't our two countries take an ininiative here by issuing a joint appeal to conclude the convention as early as 1990 or 1991? Such a time limit seems to be quite realistic.

Mr.President, there is another issue which calls for the personal efforts of the two of us. I am referring to the reduction of conventional armed forces. Actually, both you and I took these talks into our own hands when we proposed the initiatives which are now paving the way to resolving the problems which for decades have poisoned East-West relations. It is precisely those political decisions taken at the highest level that have made it possible for the Vienna talks to take an unprecedented start and make very good headway.

You took a bold step, Mr. President, by proposing that the talks be completed within six to twelve months, which is an unheard-of challenge. Well, we accept it, even though I will say frankly that it will not be easy to do it.

But if you and I want to give effect to those commitments we must work out a kind of strategy for speeding up the Vienna talks. We could perhaps agree between ourselves and with the other participants from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to convene in the second half of 1990 a summit meeting in order to sign the agreement on conventional arms, to be attended by all the leaders of the European states. I am confident that such a European conference would be unprecedented as regards its results.

To that end we should instruct our foreign ministers to intensify work to find solutions to outstanding issues. Perhaps it will take two or three meetings between our ministers and the ministers from other states concerned which participate in the Vienna talks; meetings not for making speeches but to find solutions to outstanding issues.

For example, why not hold the first such meeting in Vienna early next year to review the principal difficulties holding up the talks?

We have duly appreciated agreement by the United States and other NATO countries to reduce combat aircraft. This is an important step toward accomodating the position of the Warsaw Treaty. But let me say frankly that it fails to address our serious concern regarding air defense aircraft based in the European territory of the Soviet Union and intended only to protect vital facilities against possible air strikes from various directions. They do not have the capability to strike ground targets. Those aircraft are not part of the surprise attack capability. We are prepared to give American experts an opportunity to see for themselves that that is precisely the case. In order to resolve this issue we could agree to set a certain limit for such aircraft, which would not include frontline fighters. Of course, we expect that there should not be any buildup of systems which these aircraft are intended to counter.

In the context of the likely breakthrough at the Vienna talks we believe it is possible even now to begin discussing the question of a gradual removal of the tactical nuclear component from the European military equation. All the more so since we understand that in Brussels the NATO countries gave their agreement in principle to such discussions. I would like to inform you that with due regard for this evolution in NATO's

position, the Soviet Union, as I already said in Strassbourg, is considering the possibility of further major unilateral reductions in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

And now the last point. We welcome your proposal concerning an "open skies" regime which would provide for mutual overflights by unarmed aircraft over the territories of the USSR and the United States and their Warsaw Treaty and NATO allies for the purpose of monitoring their military activities, and we agree to take part in an international conference to discuss issues involved in establishing such a regime.

I think that we are now on the threshold of mutually acceptable agreement. But you and I together will have to cross that threshold. And we can do so if we take into account each other's fundamental concerns.

In closing, Mr.President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

M.Gorbachev

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DIANE EDWARDS

4729

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As we resume negotiations at the Nuclear and Space Talks, I have been giving considerable thought to the challenges before us and would like to share my views with you. It is my hope that we can have frequent and personal exchanges between the two of us on this and other subjects, exchanges that will be as free as possible from ritualistic formulations. We bear enormous -- and mutual -- responsibility to take advantage of the promise of these extraordinary times to improve international security. Direct and substantive communication between us is essential in building the kind of relationship between our countries that I believe we both seek.

One of our most pressing concerns is to reduce the risk of war and the Nuclear and Space Talks are an essential component of efforts to do so. Dedicated Soviet and American negotiators have worked painstakingly over the past few years to forge understandings and agreements on a number of issues. I was supportive of that process as Vice President and remain so today. As Secretary Baker noted when he met with you in May, while we reserve the right to make changes in our position and introduce new ideas, the United States believes that the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement.

It is imperative that we work in these negotiations to remove any incentive to attack first. Vulnerable systems with short time of flight are particularly troubling in this regard. We must also minimize the concentration of warheads on vulnerable systems, since they increase the incentives for attack.

You and I have both directed the modernization of our strategic forces in order to improve their survivability. But arms control gives us an opportunity, working together, to push the evolution of both arsenals toward more stable systems and to introduce predictability into military planning so that we can slow the pace of military competition. We must work to insure that the forces that remain after an agreement are survivable.

I am also concerned about the verification challenge before us. The introduction of mobile land-based systems has improved survivability but, at the same time, made verification extremely difficult. Traditional means of monitoring are insufficient and even with intrusive inspection, confidence in monitoring may not be high. This problem is exacerbated when mobile systems are MIRVed, because undetected missiles carry so many warheads. We need to cooperate more intensively and creatively to address this problem.

Toward this end, I believe that the two sides should try, as a part of our effort in START, to agree on and begin implementing as soon as possible some verification and stability measures drawn from proposals that both sides have advanced in START or in other contexts.

The measures we are proposing do not constitute a comprehensive verification regime and I understand that either side may choose to alter or augment them in the context of a final START agreement on the basis of experience gained. The objective is to reach agreement promptly in as many specific areas as possible so that we can set in place concrete verification measures and gain practical experience that will help the negotiations.

Specifically, the United States will propose:

(1) Immediate establishment of perimeter/portal monitoring of certain ICBM production facilities along the lines described in the U.S. START proposal.

(2) Prompt exchange of data. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on a reciprocal basis would begin to exchange numbers for the agreed categories in the Memorandum of Understanding which are now blank. We can also begin to conduct familiarization visits to learn more about the forces, operations, practices and procedures that would be subject to inspections.

(3) Cessation of ballistic missile telemetry encryption and data denial.

(4) Ballistic missile reentry-vehicle inspection. Each side would demonstrate its reentry-vehicle inspection procedures on one of its missiles chosen by the other side.

(5) Demonstration of the U.S. concept for tagging ballistic missiles and the Soviet concept of registration in order to facilitate technical exchanges on promising approaches.

In addition, I believe that we can benefit by agreeing to two additional measures that, while not a part of the START treaty, would enhance strategic stability.

(1) Following on your suggestion to Secretary Baker, the United States is prepared to address the problem of short-time-of-flight (depressed trajectory) SLBMs.

(2) The United States suggests that the two countries implement the proposal to notify the largest strategic exercise each year that was discussed in an exchange of letters between then-Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Minister of Defense Yazov.

I am confident that if we can reach agreement and implement measures such as these, it would facilitate early agreement on the START treaty.

Finally, let me note that I remain committed to preserving U.S. options for development and deployment of strategic defenses when they are ready. We believe that defenses can enhance mutual security and stability, particularly when introduced at a measured pace and in a cooperative manner. Although I know you have disagreed with this view in the past, I hope that you will rethink your position and that we can continue to discuss the subject between the two of us. We need to narrow the conceptual gap that now divides us on this issue.

The United States will work hard to find creative approaches to address the problems outlined above. An agreement that contributes to a stable environment at the strategic nuclear level will enhance our joint security, that of our allies and of the international system as a whole. Personal communication between us will help bridge our differences.

Sincerely, with respect —

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

From the de
George

clipped pages only

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET 4729

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6/20/89

June 19, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1028-MR
SCS 3/22/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Gorbachev

Purpose

To explore the U.S. START position with Gorbachev and to preview the verification and stability measures that we will table in Geneva.

Background

The letter is intended to serve several purposes. It is a fairly detailed analysis of the requirements for reducing the risk of war and thus establishes communication between you and the General Secretary at a serious, conceptual level. This is particularly important if we intend, during this process, to introduce new wrinkles and departures in our START negotiating position.

The Soviet system can absorb new ideas much better than at the time of the Carter SALT II proposal of March 1977 which the Soviets rejected publicly and violently. But we need to lay the ground work, step by step, for any departure. Gorbachev seems willing to confront the General Staff and demand breakthrough proposals when he is personally convinced of the wisdom of doing so. Through a series of exchanges between you and Gorbachev, we should seek to convince him of the wisdom of a change in emphasis at START from reductions for their own sake to reducing the risk of war.

The letter also lays out several of our concerns with the evolution of the START agreement thus far while trying to allay Soviet fears that we intend to start over. The letter tells Gorbachev that you believe that any agreement must promote the evolution of the arsenals in directions that enhance stability. The letter reiterates your commitment to strategic defenses that enhance deterrence.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Finally, the letter lays out in some detail the verification and stability measures that we will table in Geneva. It tells Gorbachev that these measures are intended to expedite the START process.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Mikhail Gorbachev attached at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev

~~SECRET~~

4729

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6/17/89
1305

June 16, 1989

Brent -- This is our first effort at a more personal tone in the President's letters to Gorbachev

Bob Blackwill

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Eve of the Resumption the START Talks

We have drafted a Presidential letter to Gorbachev for delivery when the START Talks resume. Your memorandum to the President at Tab II tells him that a letter to Gorbachev has several purposes. First, the letter, which is a fairly detailed analysis of the requirements for reducing the risk of war, establishes communication between the President and the General Secretary at a serious, conceptual level. This is particularly important if we intend, during this process, to introduce new wrinkles and departures in our position.

The Soviet system can absorb new ideas much better than at the time of the Carter proposal of March 1977. But we need to lay the ground work, step by step, for any new departure. Gorbachev is seemingly willing to confront the General Staff and demand breakthrough proposals when he is personally convinced of the wisdom of doing so. He is, himself, the key figure and though he has "civilian" advisors around him, the evidence is that he still turns to the General Staff to assess the impact of proposals on Soviet forces. Through a series of Presidential exchanges we are seeking to convince Gorbachev of the wisdom of a change in emphasis at START from reductions for their own sake to reducing the risk of war.

Secondly, the letter lays out several of our concerns with the evolution of the agreement thus far while trying to allay Soviet fears that we intend to start over. The letter tells Gorbachev that the President believes that any agreement must promote the evolution of the arsenals toward survivable systems, thereby enhancing stability. It notes our continuing concern with vulnerable land-based systems and with the verification problems that land-based mobiles pose.

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PER E.O. 13526
~~2012-13~~ 2011-1398-MR
BR 8/21/13

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

Finally, the letter reiterates the President's commitment to strategic defenses that enhance deterrence.

Some of the language in the letter may need revision if we decide to make new proposals.

Concurrences by: CR for Arnie Kanter and John Gordon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President. Review no later than June 19.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Secretary General Gorbachev

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1989

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would appreciate it if you would deliver the attached letter from the President to the General Secretary. The contents, except for the personal note at the end, have been cabled to Moscow. The President considers this a very private communication and has no intention of making it public in any way.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

His Excellency
Yuriy V. Dubinin
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 24, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Secretary of State Baker has reported to me on his meetings in Moscow. I am quite satisfied with the outcome of his visit. I strongly support intensifying our dialogue and cooperation across the full range of issues of mutual interest, including regional issues, bilateral and transnational issues, human rights, and arms control. The resumption of the full array of arms control and arms reduction negotiations is a welcome development.

Mr. Chairman, I wrote you in April to express our condolences over the tragic loss of your Mike-class submarine in the Norwegian Sea and the lives of so many young sailors. In recent weeks we have seen several indications of Soviet interest in obtaining Western assistance in raising the sunken submarine. We have certain capabilities for this kind of mission and, from a purely humanitarian standpoint, I would like to offer our cooperation and assistance should you wish to pursue raising the submarine. I know that you would be sensitive about military technologies associated with the submarine. I respect such sensitivity and arrangements could be made to safeguard your technology.

From our perspective, we have not examined either the cost or the time that would be required to ready our ship for such a mission. However, I can appreciate the concern of the families and the Soviet people for the men lost in the submarine and wish to extend this offer. It is this concern for those young sailors' families that prompts this offer.

Should you have interest in pursuing a cooperative effort to raise the submarine, we would be prepared to begin exploring the feasibility with you.

Sincerely,

Geo Bush

P.S. This is a personal letter I will see that it remains just between us —

Geo Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: PRES MSGS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 241721Z MAY 89

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

NODIS

~~S E C R E T~~ MOSCOW 13686
NODIS
SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
REF: THE WHITE HOUSE 241208Z MAY 89 (~~SECRET~~
- SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY)

NODIS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 1900 ON MAY 24 (DUE TO THE ONGOING PROCESS OF FORMING A NEW LEGISLATURE THIS WEEK, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DELIVER THE LETTER TO GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, SINCE HE WAS INVOLVED ALL DAY IN MEETINGS WITH DEPUTIES).

NODIS

3. SHEVARDNADZE LISTENED CAREFULLY AS THE LETTER WAS READ, PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT'S POSITIVE COMMENTS ON SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, AND TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RECOVER THE MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE THAT SANK LAST APRIL IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE VERY MUCH VALUED THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESPENT'S OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUBMARINE AND RECOVER THE BODIES OF THE SOVIET SAILORS WHO WERE LOST AT SEA,

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2/25/2014 MM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT OF COURSE A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL MATTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. HE OFFERED TO PASS THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, AND SAID THAT AN ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN A FEW DAYS. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL GRATITUDE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS PROPOSAL, AND NOTED THAT THIS, AS WELL AS THE AID GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE ARMENIAN TRAGEDY AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INDICATED JUST HOW MUCH THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD CHANGED FOR THE BETTER.

4. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUB NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SOVIET SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FULLY AND GET BACK WITH A CONSIDERED REPLY.

5. SHEVARDNADZE MADE OTHER COMMENTS ON THIS WEEK'S POLITICAL EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ON THE SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS. MATLOCK

BT

#3686

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QQQQ
-
EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.
-
-
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.
-
BEGIN TEXT
-
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
-
SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME ON HIS MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW. I AM QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT. I
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0374 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
STRONGLY SUPPORT INTENSIFYING OUR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION
ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING
REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, ANDARMS
CONTROL. THE RESUMPTION OF THE FULL ARRAY OF ARMS CONTROL
AND ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT.
-
MR. CHARIMAN, I WROTE YOU IN APRIL TO EXPRESS OUR CONDOLENCES
OVER THE TRAGIC LOSS OF YOUR MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE IN THE
NORWEGIAN SEA AND THE LIVES OF SO MANY YOUNG SAILORS. IN RECENT
WEEKS WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN
OBTAINING WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN RAISING THE SUNKEN SUBMARINE.
WE HAVE CERTAIN CAPABILITIES FOR THIS KIND OF MISSION
AND, FROM A PURELY HUMANITAIRAN STANDPOINT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER
OUR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD YOU WISH TO PURSUE RAISING
THE SUBMARINE. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD BE SENSITIVE ABOUT MILITARY
TECHNOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBMARINE. I RESPECT SUCH
SENSITIVITY AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO SAFEGUARD YOUR
TECHNOLOGY. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE HAVE NOT EXAMINED EITHER
THE COST OR THE TIME THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO READY OUR SHIP
FOR SUCH A MISSION. HOWEVER, I CAN APPRECIATE THE CONCERN OF
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0374 ~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
THE FAMILIES AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE MEN LOST IN THE
SUBMARINE AND WISH TO EXTEND THIS OFFER. IT IS THIS CONCERN FOR
THOSE YOUNG SAILORS' FAMILIES THAT PROMPTS THIS OFFER.
-
SHOULD YOU HAVE INTEREST IN PURSUING A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO
RAISE THE SUBMARINE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN EXPLORING
THE FEASIBILITY WITH YOU.
-
SINCERELY,
-
GEORGE BUSH
-
END TEXT

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

#0000

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#0374

Brent

OK with changes!!

cnB

5-23-89

DRAFT LETTER/18May/#2

FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Secretary of State Baker has reported to me on his meetings in Moscow. I am quite satisfied with the outcome of his visit. I strongly support intensifying our dialogue and cooperation across the full range of issues of mutual interest, including regional issues, bilateral and transnational issues, human rights, and arms control. The resumption of the full array of arms control and arms reduction negotiations is a welcome development.

Mr. Chairman, I wrote you in April to express our condolences over the tragic loss of your Mike-class submarine in the Norwegian Sea and the lives of so many young silors. In recent weeks we have seen several indications of Soviet interest in obtaining Western assistance in raising the sunken submarine. We have certain capabilities for this kind of mission and, from a purely humanitarian standpoint, I would like to offer our cooperation and assistance should you wish to pursue raising the submarine. I know that you would be sensitive about military

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I respect such sensitivity and arrangements could be made to safeguard your technology

technologies associated with the submarine, from our perspective, we have not examined either the cost or the time that would be required to ready our ship for such a mission. However, I can appreciate the concern of the families and the Soviet people for the men lost in the submarine and wish to extend this offer. It is this concern for those families of young sailors that prompts this offer.

Should you have interest in pursuing a cooperative effort to raise the submarine, we would be prepared to begin exploring the feasibility with you.

Sincerely,

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From the de
George

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SCOWCROFT CHRON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
VIA BACK CHANNEL

May 10, 1989

FOR: ROBERT GATES
AmEmbassy Moscow

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
The White House

TO BE DELIVERED EYES ONLY FOR ADDRESSEE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS AND BEFORE DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW.

1. Panama situation is heating up rapidly. Noriega is now putting out the word he has won the election and this afternoon he beat up the opposition candidates. We have continued to work with Gonzalez and Perez, hoping now to get at least some vocal support and conceivably even concerted action. The President is having a Leadership meeting Thursday morning to consult on the measures against Noriega. At the request of Gonzalez we will not execute the package before Thursday afternoon.

2. I am glad to see that the intelligence old boy network is still operating.

3. Will you inform us of arrangements for announcing resumption of START. Currently the President has a sentence in the A&M speech about it. Also, anything else relevant to the speech.

4. The President wants to send Deng Xiaoping a cable outlining your discussions in Moscow. How about drafting something suitable and cabling it to me Thursday evening or Friday morning at the earliest so that we can get it to Deng before Gorbachev arrives in Beijing.

5. By separate cable we will be sending you what I hope is the penultimate draft of the A&M speech.

6. Where are you when I need you? Regards.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5-7-89

FROM THE PRESIDENT GHW

TO:

Jim Baker

hand carried by Bob Gates.

Jim,
Given the fact that gorbachev's latest letter was not reflected in my reply to him, you might want to hand him the handwritten note. I think it would show him we are being promptly responsive.

Have a great trip.

GB

Mr. Gates —

Attached are the signed Presidential letter, handwritten note for Gorbachev, and informal note for Baker.

WHSR
5/7/89

THE PRESIDENT

Sunday
May 7, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have just read your most recent letter.

Secretary Baker will be fully prepared to discuss all the subjects raised in that letter — ~~for~~ example Cuba,



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Namibia etc.

I have a feeling
that contacts between
Jim Baker and Minister Shevernadze
plus continued contact between
you and me will lead to the
progress we both want.

Respectfully, GB Bush

From the de
George
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To The Vice President of the United States
George Bush

Moscow, January 18, 1989

Dear Mr. Bush,

I thank you for the message sent via Mr. Kissinger. I value this message. I value the fact that you sent it at such an early time, even before assuming the office of President. I, like you, attribute great importance to a personal and confidential dialogue with you.

We are ready to begin a corresponding exchange of views which takes into account the necessity of deliberating on the perspectives, character and mechanism of our cooperation in the interests of strengthening and developing our bilateral relations and maximum harmonization of the policies of our two countries in solving international problems.

I think that the context of our entire conversation with Mr. Kissinger, which he will describe, will make clear to you the meaning of what I convey when I say that you can count not only on understanding, but also on cooperation, from our side.

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

Translation 1/24/89
NSC: Rudy Perina

ВИЦЕ-ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ США
ДЖОРДЖУ БУШУ

Москва, 18 января 1989 г.

Уважаемый господин Буш,

Благодарю Вас за послание, переданное через Г.Киссинджера. Я ценю это послание, ценю тот факт, что Вы направили его на столь раннем этапе, еще до вступления в должность президента. Я, как и Вы, придаю большое значение личному и конфиденциальному диалогу с Вами.

Мы готовы начать соответствующий обмен мнениями, учитывая необходимость обдумать перспективы, характер и механизм нашего взаимодействия в интересах укрепления и развития наших двусторонних отношений и максимальной гармонизации политики наших стран в решении международных вопросов.

Думаю, что из контекста всей нашей беседы с Г.Киссинджером, о которой он расскажет, Вам будет ясно, какой смысл я вкладываю, когда говорю, что Вы можете рассчитывать не только на понимание, но и сотрудничество с нашей стороны.

С уважением

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Henry Kissinger

Meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin - January 16, 1989
9:30 - 11:30 hrs.

A

Dobrynin received me in an office in the Kremlin in the suite of the President of the USSR. He welcomed me extremely warmly. He had been extremely pleased by Scowcroft's phone call. Gorbachev would receive me but it would help if Bush's letter could be studied ahead of time. I gave Dobrynin a copy and said I would turn the original over myself.

Dobrynin asked what Washington understood by a political dialogue. I said that the best I could do was to give him substantially the same analysis I had made to the President-elect about conditions in Central Europe. One possible topic would be to explore whether political control and security guarantees could be separated. Dobrynin asked whether we were willing to reduce American troops in Europe. Cautioning him that the Bush administration had not yet formulated precise policies, I expressed the personal opinion that as part of a general political agreement some reductions could be envisaged. The zero option was however totally out of the question.

Dobrynin asked about arms control talks. I pointed out that the new Administration needed time to review its position especially with respect to weapons such as mobiles. It was also interested in conventional arms control.

Dobrynin then turned to Afghanistan. I said that in my personal view we could agree to no solutions that kept the Najibullah government in place in the cities. This is why a cease fire as proposed by Gorbachev at the UN had been rejected. However, the US had no interest in using Afghanistan as a base for hostile acts against the USSR. But in any real political discussion the Soviet Union had to accept the same restraint with respect to Nicaragua. Dobrynin replied that Gorbachev had offered to stop sending arms to Nicaragua if the US ceased supplying arms to Salvador, Guatamala, Costa Rica and Honduras. I said this was an absurd suggestion, as it implied that the Soviet Union had equal political and security interests in Central America.

There was a general discussion of other issues: Ethiopia, economic relations, Europe.

Dobrynin then returned to the problem of a channel. He said Gorbachev was eager to establish a system of truly confidential communication with the President. He thought it important to have an opportunity to "open his heart" and hoped Bush would do the same. The foreign policy of the two countries could then

A

be coordinated or at least harmonized. He analyzed various ideas. He did not think it could work via the ambassadors because it would be difficult to keep the required secrecy. On the Soviet side he would be the contact. He would get back to me after I had spoken to Gorbachev.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Henry A. Kissinger
Alexander Yakovlev
January 16, 1989, 4:00-6:45.

Initial conversation was about Yakovlev's alleged anti-Americanism, which he supposedly acquired while a student at Columbia. Yakovlev denied this, saying that he had learned much at Columbia, especially from the students, who had befriended him, and defended him on occasion, against Ukranian nationalists. He did, however, believe that the average American had stereotypes about the Soviet Union; as an example, he related his experience on a visit to a farm in Iowa. The wife of the farmer was surprised at Yakovlev's fondness for children, because she thought that the Soviets had communal wives and communal children.

By way of introduction, Kissinger recalled that Yakovlev had said to him at a social gathering that if they had been in office at the same time they could have had some interesting conversations. Kissinger noted that he had recently met with the President-elect and his key advisors to discuss Kissinger's trip to the Soviet Union. He said he had two general subjects he wished to raise: foreign policy and perestroika.

He believed that the Administration wanted to make a major effort with the Soviet Union so that they could both look back in four years and say that they had made a significant difference, not just in adjusting numbers of weapons but politically as well. In this connection, he had discussed some ideas with the President-elect which he would repeat here. But Kissinger did not claim that the President-elect necessarily agrees with every last point.

The first question was how to start to give substance to symbolism of the recent improvement of relations. The new Administration will start immediately to study the situation and will be interested to find a way to start a dialogue that will lead to a broad understanding.

Yakovlev responded that personally he thought it would be important to strengthen elements of continuity of policy, even in words; during their luncheon with Gorbachev both Reagan and Bush had said they wanted to maintain good relations, and Gorbachev had replied that it was important to say just that to the world.

Kissinger said that this will certainly happen.

Yakovlev continued: the second point was that Bush had mentioned the ecology and chemical weapons as issues to address

early; now there had been the Paris meeting on chemical weapons, but there could be something more if the Administration had ideas on the ecology. Senator Gore, before the election, had proposed a conference on ecology.

Kissinger said that as the new Administration reviewed policy there were two issues: first there were the strategic issues and arms control. As the Administration had yet to define its defense budget it could not finally decide on issues in START negotiations; for example, what to do about mobile missiles. Until that was decided, it was difficult to decide how to handle the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 in the negotiations. The Soviet Union should not exercise pressure to speed up the process.

The second issue to be reviewed was the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons and arms control. In part this was because in the past conventional arms control had not been stressed enough and had not been studied for concrete ideas. For example, equality of numbers of forces did not necessarily guarantee security; victories had been won with inferior numbers in the past. Moreover, there were other aspects of special importance: the difference between the US and the USSR in the distances that they each withdrew their forces and how quickly they could be returned; how quickly disbanded forces could be remobilized.

Thus this involved the future of Europe. If military dispositions change on both sides, it means that a fluid situation will develop. This could be dangerous if it occurred without discussion of political evolution.

In short, the most important issue was that the two sides had not had a serious discussion of the political relationship. The Soviet Union was settling Afghanistan, but the issue would not disappear; the situation will continue even after Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets had been helpful in settling Angola, but that issue, too, would continue to have a life of its own. And, of course, we were deeply concerned about Nicaragua.

Then there were the other issues, such as ecology, that Yakovlev had mentioned. Kissinger believed that rapid progress was possible on this, but on the other questions did Yakovlev have any ideas how to give them content?

Yakovlev replied that he understood that the new Administration would want to take some time to study issues including the strategic talks, and would want to look around. The Soviet Union would be patient. But still the two sides had to find

ways to point out that the relationship was continuing, so as not to scare world opinion, lest people believe there is a danger that process will stop. To be clear, we agree that we have to go deeper into strategic and, above all, political issues.

But the fourth issue is the economic relationship. The Soviet Union does not need that much technology and frankly the Soviet Union does not have the money to buy it. But he thinks that the question is also a psychological one; the two sides have some distance to go, because of the obstacles that we put in the way in the past.

The old style was to exchange insults; i.e., Jackson-Vanik amendment; it did not have an economic impact on the USSR but did have a psychological impact.

The Soviet leaders now get letters saying that they are engaging in revisionism; people complain that they (the leaders) are going against the principles of socialism. Critics say that we, the Soviet side, stopped anti-American statements, but the Americans have not stopped their anti-Soviet campaign. We are criticised at party meetings, also, that we are "selling out" to the Americans. He, Yakovlev, had been attacked personally as a "Mason" whose name was Epstein (sic). Kissinger must understand this is because he had been accused of ridiculous things in his country.

But the period we have is a serious one. The reason is that new questions are arising and people ask what are we waiting for? The outside world is asking the same. So we must continue to build mutual relations but to consider the effect of politics within our own communities and of political issues between our countries.

Kissinger agreed that the problem was psychological as well as political. For example, he had been critical of the Reagan Administration on occasion because he found it difficult to believe that the personal friendship between a man of Reagan's background and a man of Gorbachev's background as a life-long member of the communist party could become the principal basis for settling our differences. The only reliable basis was national interest; and it would be precarious if put purely on a personal basis. Kissinger said that he did not believe that the Soviets had specific plans for world domination, though one could interpret some policies in that way. It could be argued that Gorbachev had two objectives: first, to take away from the US and the West the image of a common enemy, on the calculation that the alliances would fall apart, and, second, to delegitimize nuclear weapons beginning with the INF treaty. This is creating a new situation in Germany, in that the Germans feel

betrayed; then a nationalism will develop -- in both the East and West side of Germany. (Yakovlev nodded vigorously at this remark.) While the Soviets cannot be blamed for accepting the zero option, to put it on top of the political situation and then to start stressing conventional arms control -- where will it all lead? That is the question: for example, what does it mean when you say you will adopt "defensive" positions after some divisions are withdrawn? Where will the divisions go? We would like clarity on your unilateral acts. Meanwhile, in Germany there is a new trend toward nationalism; for us this will be embarrassing for 5 years, but for the Soviet Union it will be a problem for 50 years. Germany's unfulfilled goals are in the East, not in the West.

All of this could also create a situation in Eastern Europe that would become explosive; thus, the Soviets may see some trend or face some challenge and have to demonstrate that they are still powerful in Eastern Europe. At that point American opinion would react and conclude that the Soviets had always been devils.

Therefore we should begin a political discussion of the evolution in Europe (and elsewhere). We cannot stop history, but we can prevent events from blowing up. An evolution must be possible but it should be understood. We are not interested in securing our position on your back, not interested in creating new problems. But we will defend our vital interests in Afghanistan, for example; we are not seeking a permanent position or to make it a permanent challenge. You have legitimate security interests on your borders; the reverse is true in Central America. That could be the basis for a discussion: i.e., who can do what to whom; it could lead to some formal agreements, or understanding, but some issues cannot be formal.

If this discussion can occur, then when you have arms control it has a political context.

In sum, this is the kind of thinking that exists in the new group in Washington.

In addition, if both of us look around the world we can see new power centers emerging; neither of us can win anything permanent from the other. But we can exhaust ourselves against each other, and only the new centers would benefit. But if we can approach issues together, then when heads of government meet they can have a strategic review, while documents prepared at lower levels can be consumated.

We do not want a situation in which Europe blows up, but neither did the Great Powers before World War I; each contributed to that crisis, because no one knew what the limits

were.

Yakovlev: we are ready for detailed discussions; while our interests may not be the same, we can approach common problems "normally"; and above all we must not let different interests drive us to a military confrontation. As for the geopolitical process, this has started. The Soviets are leaving Afghanistan; we have talked hours and hours with the Cubans in this very room about Angola. And we are having discussions with the Ethiopians. You, the US, could use your influence with your friends to calm down others (meaning Somalia). These discussions can include other areas, including Europe.

Kissinger: this (Ethiopia) could be the subject of a quiet discussion.

Yakovlev: yes, I agree that we need to work on both the political and psychological. I mentioned our past history of relations, marked by suspicions (anecdote of Metternich's death: when Talleyrand was informed, he commented, 'I wonder what the old fox meant by that?') The point is how to change?

I (Yakovlev) have attended the five meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev; I read all of Reagan's statements before he took office and after, and we had concluded that we could never come to terms, but we were mistaken. There is another Reagan, who does not use the language of 5 years ago.

Kissinger: yes, but we have to move from here to political content. In four years we could say that there could be qualitative changes. (In light of perestroika) what could the outside world do about the Soviet situation?

Yakovlev: I still think we should strengthen the general atmosphere, to eliminate the stereotypes; trading helps both, not just communism. What has happened at Vienna (conference on CSCE) is alright.

Kissinger: Let me make a philosophical point. In our country, the US, we have no real tradition of a foreign policy based on national interests. We have thought other countries were either devils or angels. The result has been a great fluctuation. On the other hand, Russia has never lived in equilibrium with its neighbors. Russia was either invaded, or expanded outward to gain security. Thus both of our countries need to find a way to live with each other in equilibrium, without the US seeking to destroy the Soviet Union in its national borders, and without the Soviets seeking absolute security. The Soviets could possibly gain an advantage, and so could the US, but neither side can defeat the other without the

other side noticing. The net result would be both sides would be exhausted and others would benefit.

In short, this relationship should be the subject of a serious dialogue, and then arms control could be solved more quickly. I have discussed these views with our senior people in the next Administration and they are ready for a dialogue in good faith.

Kissinger: Finally, I have one question: what is the message I should carry back?

Yakovlev: I read in your book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and recall parts about the status quo. That is important; we have common interests in maintaining the status quo and to approach the changes life brings seriously and honestly.

Kissinger: I agree, but it is difficult to put it that way in the US.

Yakovlev: When bilateral relations improve, we have expectations and hopes; for example, I think about the possibility of no nuclear weapons. But then there would still be terrorism and local fires, so that is why we have to maintain the status quo.

Kissinger: It is not possible to eliminate nuclear weapons but we could achieve a situation in which the danger of nuclear confrontation was more remote.

The problem is that part of the world is in evolution. Take the situation in Poland. We have no anti-Soviet interest in Poland, but can we separate the political evolution for security interests. In that case, we could recognize what things threaten security and how could they be avoided, while the political evolution continues.

Yakovlev: I agree we could separate the two.

Kissinger: Our people are ready to discuss this seriously.

Yakovlev: But it is necessary not to increase agitation.

Kissinger: In Poland, preventing agitation also means refraining from suppression by the Soviet Union, while maintaining security requirements in the military field.

Yakovlev: If we get rid of all foreign troops there could be new evolution.

Kissinger: More likely that there would be small garrisons of foreign troops, stationary, as a security guarantee.

Yakovlev: Guarantee of security against whom?

Kissinger: You prefer to push our forces out, but that is out of the question. You can reinforce troops quicker than we. All forces from Germany?

You mentioned some mechanism for continuing discussions that could be used with 100 percent confidence.

Yakovlev: Yes, I mentioned this to Gorbachev. If Bush agrees, it is alright.

Kissinger: Our people have not worked out the details but agree to the principle.

II

Kissinger: We admire Gorbachev's courage in tackling these problems of perestroika. We are interested in how they are working, because foreign and domestic are related.

Yakovlev: On perestroika, frankly it is proving much more difficult than we anticipated. We were idealistic; we believed that its support would grow stronger and stronger. But the economy is more imbalanced than we expected. We thought people would welcome democratization and glasnost. But it is not so, many say why change. Recently we have had letters that say what we need is a firm hand. We answer that democracy will mean more power, but that is diffcult to prove.

What we need is a good harvest.

Second, we started with new economic activities in management, cost accounting, and what happened? While increasing value of goods, they disappeared. People bought them immediately. There is no scarcity; goods have all been purchased, even expensive goods such as jewelry.

This of course was aggravated by rumors of price reforms. We could produce more goods, but our approach is to put more into investment. We have put money into machine building, for example. As we increase, and shift more and more to cost-accounting, then taken together we believe that this will produce results.

Kissinger: But there must be 10,000 officials who are

opposed to reforms, or at least are not eager to eliminate their jobs.

Yakovlev: Yes, but politically we want to make the Supreme Soviet an important control body, to check on results, to protect society from errors.

Kissinger: But this will reduce the power of the Central Committee?

Yakovlev: Yes, this will mean a reduction in Central Committee organizations, but in reality they will have more importance because now the minister can no longer say it was the center's fault, and now they will be independent.

As for price reforms, it is impossible to continue with prices based on arbitrary social categories. Prices must reflect the cost of production, but people are opposed to new prices. We have tried to explain that they will get back the extra cost in availability of goods, that they will not lose in the long run, but they do not believe it.

Kissinger: And now they have the Chinese experience as an example of problems.

Yakovlev: Yes. And now many are opposed to price reforms; even Arbatov who was originally for it is now opposed. You can ask him. Now they argue that cost of production must be reduced first so that prices will not rise much.

Our managers will be given more authority, but they do not know what to do with it. Some of our economists are poorly informed. A leading economist told me he knew nothing of the US Federal Reserve system, for example. But we are sending managers abroad for training, including to the US. When we do institute price reform, then they will have to deal in a free market, so they must be ready.

Meeting with Gorbachev - January 17, 1989
12:00-1:20 pm

B

Gorbachev received me in the office in the Kremlin familiar to me from Brezhnev's day. However the huge conference table has been replaced by a normal oval-shaped table seating perhaps eight. The telephone console looking like an organ near the desk has given way to a normal-sized telephone.

In the presence of some television reporters Gorbachev greeted me warmly though he seemed less ebullient than at his first meeting two years ago or even during his visit to the United States. I handed him the Presidential letter which he put aside, having obviously read the copy I had left with Dobrynin the day before.

Gorbachev said that he eagerly welcomed a confidential dialogue with the new Administration. He took the fact that the President-elect had approached him even before the inauguration as a sign of good faith and serious commitment to a dialogue. There were new forces at large in the world. Despite many changes, the United States and the Soviet Union still had the principal responsibility for preserving the peace. The two sides in conflict could only exhaust each other, not make permanent gains from each other.

Gorbachev joked that at Governor's Island Reagan had offered to be the conscience of Bush. I said that Bush needed no outside impetus to seek a stable peace. However, while Reagan had laid the foundation, the new Administration would have together with Gorbachev to put up the structure and furnish it. This could only be done on the basis of reciprocity and concreteness, not a general atmosphere.

Gorbachev said he had taken my point to Dobrynin regarding START. There would be no Soviet pressure. However, he thought the political dialogue could begin earlier - as far as he was concerned as early as March. He was prepared to send Dobrynin to the United States or receive Scowcroft in Moscow. Or an emissary could come if Scowcroft was unavailable. A note should be sent via the Soviet UN Ambassador, preferably from Scowcroft, although in order to preserve the privacy of the channel it would be best if the outside envelope were from me. The Soviets would then announce Dobrynin's visit. On the Soviet side only the fewest people would know of the channel: at this point only Yakovlev, Dobrynin and himself, although he would tell Shevardnadze in his capacity as Politboro member when he returned from Vienna. I told him that on the US side to the best

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George Bush Handwriting

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of my knowledge only the President-elect, Baker, Scowcroft and Sununu were as yet involved. // ??

Gorbachev then reviewed a number of international problems, especially the European situation along the lines of the meeting with Yakovlev (see attached). I summed up my concern about the European situation, especially Germany and Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev replied: "I have thought about what you said to Dobrynin and Yakovlev. My view is that we should both keep an eye on Germany and by that I mean both Germanies. We must not do anything to unsettle Europe into a crisis." As for Eastern Europe his view was as follows: life brings certain changes which no one can stop and that applied as well to Eastern Europe. But both sides should be careful not to threaten each other's security. That was the spirit in which he would approach the dialogue.

He recalled that the President-elect had expressed concerns about the environment on Governor's Island. He was prepared to move ahead on cooperative efforts immediately, though he realized that was not the heart of the President-elect's message. // Let's move soon - no downside

He also stressed the need for better economic cooperation.

He then dictated the following oral message to the President-elect: "I am ready to begin an exchange of views taking into account the need to harmonize our policies on international matters. I greatly appreciate the message especially that a confidential channel has been opened even at this early stage. Please convey to Mr. Bush my very warm regards. Tell him that he can count not only on my understanding of the considerations you have put forward but on my very warm cooperation. He can rely on me."

As I got up to leave Gorbachev grew pensive. He said "I lead a strange country. I am trying to take my people in a direction they do not understand and many do not want to go. When I became General Secretary I thought that by now perestroika would be completed. Instead the economic reform has only just begun. But one thing is sure - whatever happens to perestroika this country will never be the same again." // issues Gov. Isl.

I said if I were a historian I would ask how as a product of the old system he could be so determined to change its premises. He replied wistfully: "It was easy to see what

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George Bush Handwriting

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was wrong. What is harder is to find out what works. But I need a long period of peace."

Conclusion: In my view Gorbachev is treading water with perestroika. He is looking to foreign policy as a way out. He will pay a reasonable price to that end.

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George Bush Handwriting

Dinner with Dobrynin - January 18, 1989
18:30-20:00 hrs.

Dobrynin invited me to dinner at the elegant club for senior officials of the Communist party.

Dobrynin began the conversation by handing me a letter to the President from Gorbachev. In thinking about the conversation Gorbachev had concluded that an oral message was not enough. He therefore asked me to transmit the letter.

As for the channel, Gorbachev was of the view that the political dialogue could start even before the arms control negotiations. I pointed out that the President as well as Baker and Scowcroft would be traveling to Japan during the last part of February. Dobrynin thought the first half of March might be a good time to start the channel. As for procedure, he outlined three options: (1) Scowcroft could come to Moscow; (2) I could return to Moscow; (3) Dobrynin could come to Washington on the pretext of accepting an invitation from Senator Pell in Dobrynin's capacity as a member of the Supreme Soviet.

Clearly Dobrynin preferred the last option. The best way to trigger it would be either a letter from me via the Soviet UN ambassador in a double envelope that Washington was ready to start the political dialogue. Even better would be a letter from Scowcroft to that effect, though in that case the outer envelope should be from me. A third possibility was to send the letter via Kendall who would be visiting the Soviet Union at the end of February. In that case, too, the outer envelope should be from me since much as he liked Kendall he did not want him as political messenger. In each case Dobrynin would then accept the invitation from Pell.

Dobrynin then reviewed once again the substance of the previous discussions to make sure he had understood the points correctly.

He asked specifically whether after Soviet troop withdrawal we would be willing to be helpful in Afghanistan. I replied that it depended on what was meant by helpful. We could not help keep Najibullah in power. I stressed the need for Soviet cooperation on ~~Afghanistan~~ NICARAGUA.

Dobrynin added to the agenda Soviet concern about Japanese rearmament and US support for it. He also repeated Soviet historic distrust of China. "In 30 years they will be a nightmare", he said. I did not comment.

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Coming back to the European concept Dobrynin mused whether perhaps Eastern Europe should form an economic unit to deal with the EEC in the framework I had outlined.

The atmosphere was boisterously cordial.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1989

President Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow

Dear President Gorbachev:

I am taking advantage of Henry Kissinger's travel to Moscow to send you this personal note.

At the outset I want to tell you of my deep appreciation for the attention given my son and grandson during their recent mission to Armenia. Seeing that terrible tragedy firsthand was a deeply moving experience for them both; they came away with a great respect for the strength and dedication of the people who are now seeking to rebuild from the disaster.

May I also underscore the comments I made to you at the time of your visit to the United Nations last year. As I explained at that time, my new national security team and I will need time to reflect on the range of issues -- particularly those relating to arms control -- central to our bilateral relationship, and to formulate our own thoughts on how best to move that relationship forward. Our purpose is to assure a sound and coherent American approach; it is in no way an attempt to delay or reverse the positive progress that has marked the past year or two.

I am very serious about moving our relationship forward for the benefit of both our countries and world peace. I believe it is important to lift our dialogue -- especially between the two of us -- beyond the details of arms control proposals to the issues of the larger political relationship we should want to create.

I am determined to do everything I can to construct and solidify a sound and solid relationship. I am looking forward to maintaining personal contact with you as we deal with the common tasks we have before us.

Sincerely,

George Bush

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1989

President Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow

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November 22, 1989

General --

When I was straightening up your desk, I found the attached note, "VP wants Gorb corres." Is this something that I need to do for you? Please advise.

Florence

VP wants
Gorb corres

~~SECRET~~/NODIS Draft Official Translation

His Excellency Mr. James Baker
U.S. Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have carefully studied your letter on Central America and would like to share with you certain thoughts in connection with the issues you have raised in it. Of course the exchange of opinions that we had in Paris with regard to this problem and your comments on various aspects of the American approach have helped us to gain a better understanding of the U.S. position.

Moreover, taking into consideration all of our latest contacts and discussions concerning the problems of Central America as well as the events occurring in the region itself, I believe that I am justified in saying that the conditions exist for a qualitatively new stage of Soviet-American cooperation in establishing the favorable, external prerequisites for a lasting and just political settlement in Central America. The Latin Americans themselves are consistently pursuing this goal and our own policy is firmly directed toward this end.

I will not conceal that I was pleased to learn of your high opinion of the Soviet approach to Central American affairs as responsible and constructive. As you know, its fundamental principles are set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's May letter to President Bush. We also welcomed further reciprocal identification of areas of coincident interests including during the consultations of experts, which I also regard as useful.

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I wish to emphasize that we attribute great importance to the new U.S. approach towards settlement of Central American problems that you set forth in Moscow and, in particular, your intention to eventually normalize relations with Managua. This is an extremely important political statement and we believe that it offers very encouraging prospects.

However (and I believe that the new quality of our dialogue allows me to be so frank), we do not yet observe corresponding movement in the practice of U.S. policy. Even in your last letter, which on the whole I consider very positive, there are (to put it mildly) strained interpretations, imprecise judgments and statements that actually lead us far afield from the tasks of establishing a lasting and just peace in Central America. However, most important, I did not perceive concrete details or determination to achieve results in the immediate future.

I would not want you to reproach me for unfounded assertions and I, for my own part, will dwell upon certain questions which we consider of utmost importance in working out effective Soviet-American cooperation.

In your letter you put emphasis on the forthcoming elections in Nicaragua. However, first of all, the prospects of a comprehensive peace settlement are by no means based on the domestic situation in that country. Secondly, I disagree completely with your characterization of the motives of the Sandinista government. If one looks dispassionately with facts in hand at the actual implementation of the Guatemala and Salvadoran agreements (the latter of which for some reason you have not mentioned), any unbiased person will note that it is Nicaragua that has taken the lead here and it is Managua that is following the letter and spirit of those agreements in the most scrupulous fashion.

A new graphic example of this is the agreement between the Sandinista government and all political forces on measures guaranteeing the free choice of the Nicaraguan people during the February elections. Yes, Managua has made serious concessions and has even taken certain risks in the name of national reconciliation. Now (and this is acknowledged by many countries), it is difficult to cast aspersions on the sincerity of the Sandinistas. Demanding criteria have been established for holding the elections as well as reliable (one might even say dual) guarantees. Monitoring will be carried out not only by various parties within Nicaragua, but also by various international observers including representatives of such authoritative organizations as the United Nations and the OAS.

However, the issue I have touched upon primarily concerns the competence of the people of Central America themselves. Life has shown that if at least no one interferes with them and if nothing is done to thwart the Central American dialogue, they will be able to reach an agreement. You and I, I believe, should aim for a higher goal: not only not to hinder an internal settlement but to encourage it, to strengthen the constructive spirit of all the participants.

The latest conference of the Presidents of the five Central American countries which, in our opinion, concluded with very significant results, has confirmed once again that the main obstacle to reaching a settlement at the present time is lack of agreement on the disbandment of the contras. Many decisions have been taken, good decisions, but their implementation has been much worse. The Central Americans themselves will in fact now judge on the basis of actions in this regard about the sincerity and interest in a peaceful settlement in the region. To assert something else means, as I have said, to deviate from seeking a solution.

That is why I'm convinced that our joint and parallel steps in facilitating the process of political settlement would be the best manifestation of new thinking in the U.S. and Soviet approach to Central American affairs. I also see a specific area of coinciding views here. I have specifically noted your readiness to facilitate the working out and continuous functioning of the international monitoring regime. I think that the rapid implementation of such a regime will remove many concerns -- both on the part of the U.S. as well as on the part of those countries which, in turn, do not trust U.S. policy.

We note with satisfaction the clear movement forward with regard to El Salvador. There should be no misunderstanding here: the Soviet Union has been and is in favor of a political solution here and is not taking any steps which would impede it. Moreover, I am prepared to take upon myself the responsibility of certifying that Nicaragua and Cuba are also in favor of a political, and not a military solution. But, of course, they clearly are in favor of a just political solution.

Now, with regard to the evaluation of our actions which I can only qualify as biased evaluations. The Soviet Union has taken a very important step: in the interest of creating favorable conditions for a Central American settlement, it has suspended the implementation of its obligations with regard to the supply of weapons to Nicaragua. And why does someone have to purposely confuse the issue and distort it? What do we have here? A throwback to old thinking, or a conscious desire to mask the lack of one's own constructive reaction to this manifestation of unilateral restraint? For clearly it is impossible that, in Washington, they do not know the true situation in the area.

I do not want to end this useful conversation on a critical note, especially since, as I have already written, I share your

thought that the time for a breakthrough on Central America is not only ripe, but that there is a unique "window of opportunity" for it. And here, I repeat, the five-point program you have laid out is, undoubtedly, in principle a positive factor. However, the constructive intentions of the U.S. of which you spoke, are basically directed toward the future, but concrete steps are demanded of the two of us right now. I have already spoken of some of them. There are also others. Specifically, I am still convinced that the beginning of a direct dialogue with Managua will resolve many of the problems -- both for you and for the Nicaraguans. Obviously, this must be an open dialogue between partners ready to achieve an understanding, without pressure, without imposition of one's will, and without preconditions. I know from the Nicaraguans that they are prepared for such a constructive dialogue.

It is clear that our discussion of these important issues must not turn into a monologue and I anxiously await the thoughts you have in reply. In this regard we are very interested in the U.S. intention, of which you speak in your letter, to take "further steps" to demonstrate the fact that the U.S. is dedicated to abiding by all the provisions of the agreements reached by the Central American forces. I assume that we will return to this topic in the course of our following meeting.

Despite all the importance of the problems in Central America, I would nevertheless like to use this opportunity to expand somewhat the framework of our regional dialogue. You wrote in your letter that a breakthrough in questions of a Central American settlement would have far-reaching implications, and would demonstrate "the depth of the transformation which Soviet-American relations have undergone."

Agreeing with this thesis in principle, I, at the same time, believe that it should relate in equal measure to our cooperation in other regions as well where dangerous hotbeds of conflict exists. And here, without doubt, the question of Afghanistan is in the forefront.

To be blunt: I was encouraged by your statement in Paris that the U.S. is disposed with understanding toward our concern just as we are not indifferent to the concern of the U.S. side in connection with the situation in Central America. In actuality we will be able to use to the fullest the potential of Soviet-American regional cooperation only when we reject any "double standards" and attempts to depart from finding a just balance of interests.

Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, our practical policy both in Central America and in Afghanistan can be characterized as considered and responsible. In all situations, including the most complicated and ambiguous ones, we conduct a consistent policy of securing a balance of interests both for direct participants in conflicts as well as for other parties involved in them.

Unfortunately until now it is difficult for me to characterize US policy in an analogous way, especially on the Afghan question. On the contrary, one gets the impression that it is becoming increasingly rigid, one could even say demonstrably rigid. Despite the fact the America is one of the guarantors of the Geneva agreements, it is giving open support to an extremist element of the opposition, and actively helping to turn Pakistan into a staging ground for aggression against a sovereign neighboring country.

Such a policy flagrantly contradicts new Afghan realities (I am able to make a judgment about this boldly, on the basis of the freshest personal impressions from my visit to Afghanistan). A policy of encouraging fanatic fundamentalist forces could hardly serve the interests of the United States either. Moreover, of course, "this sort of reciprocity", if one takes into account the desire for peace and restraint which distinguishes Soviet policy on regional questions, does not fit into the generally encouraging development of the Soviet-American dialogue.

In connection with this I would like to express the hope that the constructive character of our last discussion will be turned into practical deeds and the American side will assess in a new way the situation surrounding Afghanistan and, most important, will introduce long overdue corrections into its policy. I am confident that this will give an even richer content to that "new closeness" between our two countries that President Bush spoke about and about which we, as I understand, agreed to facilitate in the process of our dialogue.

Just like you, I am looking forward to a deepened discussion of the entire U.S.-Soviet agenda for the purpose of moving relations forward; our next meeting in September in the U.S. will afford such an opportunity.

Sincerely,

/s/

Moscow
August 9, 1989

Brent – You may have seen this – or may be familiar with similar type material. If not, however, it is well worth perusing (especially the front end). It is based on observation rather than speculation. Jim Goodby

APNSA Has Seen

MOSCOW IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES

by Vladimir Shlapentokh

Moscow, July 1989

INTRODUCTION

When I visited Moscow in May 1988 for the first time since my emigration nearly a decade years earlier, it was clear that great progress had been made in the country's political atmosphere. The level of fear, the major indicator of Soviet life over the last 70 years, was far lower than it had been at any time during the Brezhnev era. In general, however, the major structures of the Soviet system (e.g., economic, political, cultural, and scientific) remained almost completely intact.

Although I very much enjoyed meeting with my old friends and acquaintances, I was quite disappointed with the intellectual aspects of my trip. That is, my visit aroused very few new ideas regarding the country's development.

By contrast, my second trip, only one year later, proved highly intellectually stimulating. The hiatus between my two trips had proven to be a critical period in recent Soviet history, and I returned to a Moscow embroiled in turmoil and change.

In this document, I will try to convey some observations and impressions from my most recent trip. My primary focus will be on political, economic, and ethnic matters.

IS THE SOVIET UNION ON THE VERGE OF THE CATASTROPHE ENVISIONED BY ITS PEOPLE?

The first session of the Congress of People's Deputies produced results quite antithetical to those anticipated by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Congress not only sharply intensified the continuing conflicts between the Soviet Union's four major political actors--the party reformers headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, the party apparatus, the liberal intelligentsia, and the masses--but it heightened the tensions between various ethnic groups as well.

While visiting Moscow in the aftermath of the Congress, I spoke with numerous people from all walks of life, and I listened to speakers at meetings of both liberals and conservatives. I had no choice but to agree with the message conveyed by all--the current political situation in the country is clearly more explosive than it had been prior to May 25th when the new Soviet parliament began its 13 day marathon.

During my May 1988 trip to Moscow, the Soviet people discussed their future in terms of the survival of both Gorbachev and his liberal program. Now, little more than one year later, Soviet politicians and intellectuals discuss the future in terms of peaceful versus violent courses of events--the possibility of civil war, mass strikes and riots, an internecine ethnic war, or the collapse of the state.

Talk of these possibilities is rampant in Moscow at the meetings of both Stalinists and liberals, and is even splashed

across the pages of Soviet periodicals. Iurii Chernichenko, a committed foe of private farming, finished an article in *Ogoniok* with a direct warning of merciless riots should Moscow fail to solve the country's food problem. Boris Kurashvili, another liberal, predicted the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a multinational state should the Kremlin's national policy falter.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the Congress was its deleterious effect on the relationship between the leader and the masses.

Gorbachev's great miscalculation, which was made by many Western analysts as well, was that the Soviet people would assess the Congress in the same way that Soviet planners evaluated the performance of various enterprises--through comparison "with the level achieved in the previous year." Indeed, with its genuine freedom of speech, with free access to the podium (in some cases even against the will of Gorbachev), and with open critique of Gorbachev (not to mention of other Politburo members), the Congress represented a great step toward democratic order.

In assessing the Congress, however, the Soviet people refused to recognize that the Britons required several centuries to refine their near-perfect parliamentary system. Instead, the Soviets measured the work of the Congress by contemporary world standards, and found these standards grossly violated, particularly by Gorbachev himself. In a survey conducted by Vladimir Iadov, the director of the Sociological Institute, the majority of the Soviet people supported the harsh accusations of anti-democratism directed

at the Congress by Iurii Afanasiev, the leader of a tiny liberal minority. By contrast, only one-third of the respondents endorsed the positions taken by their deputies at the Congress (*Izvestia*, May 31, 1989).

In addition, an even larger percentage of the Soviet people labeled the Congress "a big circus" (the expression often used by ordinary people), and saw no link between its work and their concerns. In the opinions of most people, the Congress (like Glasnost in general) was designed simply to divert their attention from the rapid deterioration of their lifestyle.

Probably even more important than the people's anger at the Congress's anti-democratic nature is the apocalyptic mood currently gripping the Soviet people, who feel that neither the Congress nor democratization will alleviate the problems currently plaguing nearly every aspect of Soviet life.

In May 1988, the prevailing psychological atmosphere was rather positive, despite ongoing economic stagnation. Glasnost, with its new freedom of speech and daring publications, still seemed to millions of Soviet people (especially the intelligentsia) to be adequate compensation for the hardships of everyday life.

The current situation, however, is radically different. Continuing revelations regarding Stalin and his time fail to excite even the liberal intelligentsia, not to mention the masses, who grew indifferent to such reports a year ago. Moreover, further movements in the last year toward the disappearance of fear and the attainment of near-total freedom of speech (in Moscow's Arbat, the

Soviet Hyde Park, speakers spare neither socialism nor Lenin, Gorbachev nor his wife) have failed to impress the Soviet people, who no longer hail Gorbachev for this truly great progress.

The majority of the Soviet people, whose salaries were fixed dozens of years ago, have been devastated by soaring inflation. Even more humiliating for the Soviet people, however, is the declining role of money in their lives. With most stores offering nothing but empty shelves, only connections, barter exchanges, and bribes are useful in obtaining needed goods and services (this phenomenon will be addressed more completely in the next section). For the average Soviet individual, the scope of corruption appears far broader now than during Brezhnev's period of "stagnation," the official label for the Brezhnev era.

My personal observations are in complete accord with the results of a nation-wide, random sample survey directed by Boris Grushin at the Center for Public Opinion Studies. In the survey, conducted six months ago when the situation was better than is currently the case, half of the Soviet population complained about deterioration in the supply of food and other consumer goods.

The Soviet people's melancholia is also fed by recurrent technological disasters, which the people feel result from a combination of technological backwardness, incompetence, and a lack of discipline. Fortunately, the Chernobyl incident, which seemed to usher in this lugubrious era, remains foremost among such events. Other disasters, however, have joined its ranks. The oil pipeline blast in Bashkiria in June, during the session of the

Congress of People's Deputies, was one of several disasters which have occurred in the last two months.

It is no surprise that, even before a series of new catastrophes in early 1989, two-thirds of the respondents in Grushin's survey considered technological disasters a part of their everyday lives.

The Soviet people are also horrified by their country's deteriorating ecological situation. Only seven percent of the respondents in Grushin's survey expressed optimistic views regarding the ecological situation, while almost two-thirds voiced gloomier sentiments.

Still more upsetting to the Soviet people than inflation, the lack of goods, and technological and ecological disasters is the growing tension in the country. Social and political conflicts, which often become violent, have emerged as a part of Soviet life. Confrontations between the police and members of informal organizations, and the strikes and demonstrations of workers, students, and even policemen, significantly contribute to the apocalyptic mood of the Soviet people.

Finally, when the Soviet people are asked to name the gravest threat to Soviet life and Soviet society, their answer is clear: the incessant spread of ethnic conflicts.

Having first appeared in Alma-Ata in December 1986, these conflicts have since spread to many regions of the country, engendering violent clashes with hundreds of victims in Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Uzbekistan, and Kasakhstan. Minorities everywhere,

including Russians living in non-Russian regions, live in a constant state of high anxiety. Gorbachev's recent televised speech on ethnic relations in the Soviet Union, in which he spoke of the possibility of a terrible ethnic disaster, only served to confirm the worst apprehensions of the average citizen.

During my most recent stay in Moscow I attended several political meetings, both of the right and of the left. I was shocked that, wherever I went, civil war and the collapse of the state were debated as very real possibilities. For example, at a large meeting in the Olympic village, Oles Adamovich, a prominent Soviet intellectual and a leader of the liberal opposition at the Congress of People's Deputies, publicly pondered about possible structures to be put into place to prevent mass bloodshed in the event of the collapse of the existing political order.

Also while I was in Moscow, *Pravda* published an article about Rostov, a large southern city, which in recent months has lived in "the expectation of some disaster, an apocalypse". The nervousness in the city has reached such proportions that the majority of parents have forbidden their children to go to school.

When asked by several Moscow intellectuals to identify the most striking aspect of my visit, I chose the increase in the society's general level of anxiety and nervousness, a phenomenon which I had never before observed. The intellectuals with whom I was speaking immediately concurred.

Since my last departure from Moscow, new developments, such as the violent clashes in Abkhasia, which have rendered Black Sea

resorts out of reach for millions of vacationers, and, especially, the national miner's strike, have served to exacerbate the country's apocalyptic mood.

Given their feelings of hopelessness, many Soviet people have grown indifferent to recent political developments, such as the participation of the Supreme Soviet in the selection of the government. The Soviets feel that such developments are irrelevant to their worries and predicaments, and that any changes are simply cosmetic adaptations of the old political order to new circumstances. A significant number of Americans, with their political apathy, will understand the sentiments of the Soviet people.

Although, according to the polls, about two-thirds of the Soviet people endorsed Gorbachev's election as President, they did so without enthusiasm, and primarily because they saw no viable alternative. Gorbachev has lost his aura, his long speeches irritate people, and one no longer hears toasts for Mikhail Sergeievich at Moscow parties, as was the case even one year ago. Moscow liberals, aware of the decline of Gorbachev's prestige, now strive to further his image (Adamovich did so at the Olympic village meeting mentioned above, and Igor Kliamkin followed suit in a recent issue of *Moscow News*), and a growing number of people mention Boris El'tsin as a potential leader truly capable of saving the country.

As a result of his behavior at the Congress, Gorbachev lost a great deal of support, even among the liberal intelligentsia,

which has proven to be his major ally in the years of Perestroika. It is curious that during the July 9 meeting of Soviet and French intellectuals on Soviet TV, all six Soviet participants curtly declined to answer their counterpart's questions regarding Gorbachev's current prestige in the USSR.

Despite the apparent increase in Gorbachev's power following his election as President, the decline of his prestige in the country is an extremely destabilizing factor. Only one year ago, Gorbachev successfully used his authority to prevent the outburst of ethnic unrest in various regions of the country, but he is no longer able to do so. In its coverage of the growing ethnic tension in Moldavia, Soviet TV (July 10) lamented the fact that the unrest occurred despite Gorbachev's special appeal for national reconciliation. More recently, Gorbachev proved unable to use his prestige to defuse the coal miner's strike in July.

Although still recuperating from its defeat in the March 1989 election, the party apparatus dominated the Congress. With Gorbachev's help (similar to that which he gave at the 19th party conference), the party apparatus maintained the upper hand in almost all controversial issues. Consequently, the gap between the party apparatus and the liberal intelligentsia has widened immensely in the wake of the Congress.

The party apparatus launched its counteroffensive at the meetings of the Leningrad regional party committee and the Central Committee in April. Following its success at the Congress, the party apparatus continued its assault at the very aggressive

meeting of the Moscow party committee in June, which stopped just short of demanding the immediate convening of an extraordinary Congress of the party.

In all of these meetings, apparatchiks openly challenged the liberal reformers and demanded the restoration of authoritarian order and Stalinist ideology in the country. "State, motherland, and Communism"--the key words poignantly proclaimed by Afghan veteran S. Chervonopisky at the Congress of People's Deputies during a broadside against Sakharov--became a rallying slogan for Stalinists in the country (*Izvestia*, June 4, 1989).

The apparatchiks have clearly tied their political plans to the worsening of the material situation in the country. According to an ever-increasing consensus, the apparatchiks are doing everything within their power to hasten the deterioration of the Soviet people's lifestyle, up to and including the creation of deficits of basic goods.

The apparatchik's hope is that the growing material concerns of the Soviet people will pit them not only against Gorbachev and his reforms but also against the liberal intelligentsia, which, in its preoccupation with democratization, has paid little attention to the plight of the masses. When I attended the big rally of the liberal intelligentsia in the Olympic village, I was amazed that not only Oles Adamovich and Iurii Koriakin, the main speakers, but the other intellectuals at the podium and in the audience as well, totally ignored the rapidly deteriorating standard of living in the country and remained absorbed by political issues.

The strategy of the intellectuals's opponents--the apparatchiks--is radically different. They focus on and emphasize the current material hardships of the masses, and then place the responsibility for these hardships on Perestroika and its leaders.

Having not yet dared directly express their hatred of the political leadership and the liberal intelligentsia, the apparatchiks have formed their own informal organizations, such as "The Association of Scientific Communism" and the notoriously chauvinistic "Pamiat'".

I attended a meeting of the former organization, which was held under the aegis of the Moscow party committee and was directed against Gorbachev and, especially, Alexander Iakovlev. These two were accused of promoting the new bourgeoisie which, through economic reforms, has grabbed the leading positions in society, while the workers, having been betrayed by the Politburo, suffer harshly from the marketization and decentralization of the economy and from ever-increasing social inequality. The participants at the meeting, who were quite militant and aggressive, demanded the creation of a struggle against the government.

At the present time, it is difficult to measure the potential of this Stalinist association. But, given a natural alliance with chauvinistic forces (from time to time some of the participants of the meeting shouted pure anti-Semitic slogans, equating the new bourgeoisie with "Zionists" and "Masons"), increases in inflation and social differentiation, and increased animosity among the Soviet people (a fact unanimously confirmed by those with whom I

spoke in Moscow), it would be foolish to discount the party apparatus's chances of redirecting the people's attention away from liberal ideas and toward anger aimed at political reformers in the Kremlin, private cooperatives, the intelligentsia, and Jews. All of the elements of this ideological shift were clearly present at the Congress (see the speeches of V. Bakulin, a foreman from Ivanovo, *Izvestia*, June 2; Vasilii Belov, writer, *Izvestia*, June 2; V. Kalish, worker from Zaporozhie, *Izvestia*, June 2; S. Melekhin, worker from N. Tagil, *Izvestia*, May 31; and V. Shcherbakov, the chairman of the Moscow Trade Union, *Izvestia*, June 4).

In Moscow, many People's Deputies, including Boris Vasiliev, Iuri Vlasov, and others, consider Chervonopiski's slogan ("State, motherland, and Communism") reasonable ideological justification for the intervention of the army, a military coup, and martial law, and they regard the merciless massacre in Tbilisi in April 1989 a general rehearsal for the quenching of the democratic movement in the country.

The speech of General I. Rodionov at the Congress, which lacked even one word of regret for his victims, and the stormy ovation of the majority of the Deputies, suggest that there are generals available for the crushing of mass movements (many people singled out General Gromov, former commander of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and current commander of the Kiev military district, to fill the shoes of Cavaignak, the famous French general who quenched the riots of 1848). In addition, it is clear that there

are Deputies who will praise such generals as heroes and saviors of the motherland (*Izvestia*, June 1).

In general, I found the mood of the Soviet people to be in dire straits. Further developments in the Soviet Union in July, following my departure from Moscow, have only intensified the country's apocalyptic mood. The clashes between the Tadzhiks and the Kirgizs, and especially those between the Georgians and the Abkhasians, mark an expansion of the area engulfed in armed conflict. This area now includes the zone on the shore of the Black Sea where millions of Soviet people pass their vacations.

Much more ominous, however, are the strikes of hundreds of thousands of coal miners. Should the miners be joined by workers from other sectors of the economy, particularly those employed by the railroads, they could paralyze the Soviet economy.

It is difficult to imagine how the USSR, even when headed by a politician as shrewd as Gorbachev, can possibly sidestep a period of turmoil and subsequent intervention by the army to support order in the country.

It should be noted that, as recent events revealed, the Soviet population possesses a large number of weapons, and various ethnic minorities throughout the country are actively enlarging their stockpiles. At the same time, the creation of detachments of workers to fight crime also increases the number of people owning lethal weapons.

There are those in Moscow who, with the conspiratorial mindset common to citizens in authoritarian states, believe that recent

major social and ethnic conflicts, as well as some technological disasters, have been organized or triggered by the enemies of Gorbachev, one of the greatest reformers in Russian history. In support of their position they point to the unusually high number of catastrophes which occurred during the work of the Congress.

Similarly, some people in Moscow had feared a military coup during Gorbachev's trip to China on the eve of the Congress--an issue candidly discussed by Rasputin in his speech at the Congress (*Izvestia*, June 7).

The USA and the West must brace themselves for a situation in Russia which may be even more dramatic than that in China, and must elaborate their policies toward various possible domestic events which might occur in the near future. At the same time, the possibility remains that Gorbachev will manage to overcome the major obstacles to his reforms and will be able to stabilize his country. This scenario is, of course, the most desirable for the West, which would hardly benefit should the worst fears of the Soviet people come to pass.

THE ROUBLE ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

Recently, the world has become convinced that Soviet society, under Gorbachev's guidance, has expanded the role of its free market, with money occupying a primary place and with consumers free to pick and choose their goods. During my most recent trip to Moscow, however, I observed a situation far different from that envisioned by outsiders.

Radical changes have occurred within the last year. When I visited Moscow in May 1988, I found the economic situation much as it had been upon my departure nearly a decade ago. By contrast, during my most recent trip I found that soaring inflation rates (currently about ten percent per year, an unprecedented rate for the Soviet economy) have nearly destroyed the country's state market. In addition, the number of rationed goods has risen drastically compared to one year ago. In many regions of the country, this list now includes not only meat and butter, but sugar, soap, detergents, tea, and several other items as well. Although some people's coupon allotment provides them with much more than they need, they rarely fail to fill their quota. Instead, they either hoard their food or sell it on the black market. According to my friends in Moscow, sugar and soap have never been as plentiful as they are now that they have become rationed.

The distribution of industrial goods, mostly of foreign origin, in enterprises and offices has swelled enormously. The state has elaborated a complicated mechanism for such distribution, which includes the use of lotteries to determine who among the workers of a given institution will be entitled to "buy," for example, one of the ten pairs of Italian womens shoes or one of the five jackets made in France that have been allotted to their institution. Winners of these lotteries very rarely refuse items which do not fit them or one of their family members.

The bartering of goods and services among those with access to such commodities (primarily workers in commerce, of course), which places money in a secondary role, and speculation with deficit goods--two phenomena which were strongly condemned during the Brezhnev era--have only increased in importance in recent years. Most Soviets rely on a network of sales people to provide them with under-the-counter basic and non-basic goods.

The mass media regularly publish articles about stocks of various goods hidden from ordinary buyers in almost every store. To combat this development, which has aroused strong anger among the masses, Gorbachev's leadership (again following Brezhnev's line) has created numerous teams of workers to monitor such activities. Unfortunately, rather than providing any benefit to ordinary consumers, Gorbachev's action will most likely result in increased numbers of people involved in corrupt activity.

With increasing numbers of rationed items and the growing role of barter in everyday life, the importance of the rouble has decreased dramatically. Taxi drivers in Moscow provide a typical example of this phenomenon: they go to great lengths to avoid passengers ready to pay the official rate (even with a tip). They can be persuaded only if promised a double fare or, of course, hard currency. People in restaurants and other enterprises behave likewise, refusing to provide services at the official rate.

Of course, the decline in the power of the rouble affects only those with the "small rouble," which is linked to official prices

and the average salary in the state sector (about 200 roubles per month). Similar declines have not affected the "big rouble."

Practically all goods and services are accessible to the minority who possess the "big rouble," i.e., those whose income exceeds the average state salary several fold. For a double or triple rate, one can always get taxi, find a place in a restaurant, buy furniture or a color TV set, and, of course, buy good food at the free market.

While it is true that people continue to find some goods and services in state stores and cafeterias at official prices, the quality of these goods and services leaves much to be desired. Perestroika has legalized networks of private enterprises which offer rich people goods of higher quality (at much higher prices, of course).

Compare, for instance, the prices in state and private cafeterias. For about 2 roubles, one can buy a dinner at a state cafeteria. Unfortunately, one must first wait in line for hours, and then both the dinner and the service will be of extraordinarily poor quality. By comparison, for about 20 roubles, one can relish a fine dinner and excellent service in a cooperative cafe. Unfortunately, the 20 roubles spent on this dinner will cost the average Soviet worker about 10 percent of his or her monthly salary.

The open coexistence of enterprises such as those in the previous example provides one of the most striking elements of Soviet life. When wandering through Moscow, one gets the feeling

one is observing two totally separate economies intertwine and meander through one another.

Of course, this is not a new phenomenon for Soviet society. Privileged stores for the apparatchiks have always been a part of Soviet life. In the past, however, such stores remained closed and hidden from the public, without so much as a sign to announce their existence or whereabouts. More importantly, such stores supplied a much smaller number of goods than now crowd the newly legalized private market. The coexistence of these two markets--one very meager, another very rich--lies at the heart of one of the most serious social issues of Soviet life.

It is no surprise that the hatred felt by the masses toward the private cooperatives easily equals their hostility toward the party bureaucracy. When last in Moscow, I attended a meeting of neo-Stalinists who were in the process of creating a new organization to fight Gorbachev. They clearly saw the social hatred generated by the two groups of stores as a tool with which to pit the masses against Gorbachev's policies.

Perhaps even more significant is the decline of material incentives in the state economy, which still produces 90 percent of the country's GNP. With the negligible value of the "small rouble" and no prospect of earning the "big rouble" through honest work, Soviet laborers are loosing interest in hard work, a pattern which was clearly present in Brezhnev's times.

The extremely low prestige of both the rouble and the state market have created a real mania for the dollar in the country.

The rate of exchange in Moscow of one dollar for twelve roubles (the official rate is one dollar for sixty kopecks) has contributed to a fervent hunt for hard currency among those engaged in commerce and services.

Much more interesting, however, is the increasingly insistent demand for hard currency emanating from the Soviet industrial and agricultural industries. The movement for the dollar has been joined recently by the striking miners in Kuzbass. Among the demands they sent to Gorbachev was the right to sell coal for dollars, without which they have little hope of improving their lives.

Gorbachev's strategists hope that the rapid expansion of various private and semiprivate forms of economic activity will soon begin to compensate for the deleterious effect of the decline of the rouble's prestige. Unfortunately, however, I cannot avoid sharing the deep pessimism of many Soviet people regarding the Soviet state's ability to cope with the economic problems it faces in the near future.

DANGEROUS INCOMPETENCE IN MOSCOW

During my most recent trip to Moscow, I spoke with several Gorbachev admirers about the current state of affairs in the USSR. While these devotees certainly could not deny that the country is going through an extremely difficult period, they argued that, in domestic affairs, Gorbachev has simply experienced a string of bad luck. Examples of this bad luck, they said, include the series of

technological disasters ushered in by Chernobyl, the unprecedented incessant ethnic conflicts, and, of course, the rampant inflation, which, having appeared in 1987, has led to near-total collapse of the market. Were I to talk with them today, they could add the mass miner's strike to their list.

In response to this argument, it must be conceded that, bad luck notwithstanding, Gorbachev can hardly be held personally responsible for all of the domestic tribulations of the last four years. At the same time, however, it is also inappropriate to resort to attributions of bad luck in order to absolve Gorbachev of the mistakes made by his leadership.

One such mistake has been the Kremlin's incredibly flippant and amateurish approach to planning and implementing major projects. Proposals have invariably failed to address even the most immediate consequences of their implementation, and have ignored even the most elementary lessons from the past.

The anti-alcoholism campaign designed in 1986 is an early example of such planning. Although driven by the admittedly noble idea of eliminating alcoholism within a short period of time, the campaign totally ignored the failure of similar campaigns in Russia as well as in other countries.

Incredibly, Gorbachev and the authors of the project were oblivious to the Soviet people's inevitable reaction to any drastic decrease in the state's production of liquor: massive moonshining (a reaction which, by the way, was predicted by illiterate country women within days of the law's passage).

Even more astounding, however, was Kremlin's refusal to acknowledge the impact of the anti-alcohol legislation on state revenues. Despite their limited wits, angry drunkards predicted that the state would be devastated by the loss of the revenue they provided for vodka. And, sure enough, further developments proved the drunkards correct, as the Kremlin strategists failed to make good on their groundless promises to replace the 40 billion roubles in lost liquor sales with additional production of consumer goods.

As is now evident throughout the country, the revenge of the alcoholics has surpassed their wildest dreams: the diversion of money which would have paid for liquor in state stores, along with a few other factors not anticipated by Gorbachev's advisors, has fueled inflation, and has contributed to the massive disarray of the market, which directly endangers the survival of the regime.

Now, two years later, the Gorbachev regime, having recognized both its mistakes and its defeat, has abolished almost all of its anti-alcoholism measures.

The characteristics which marred, and eventually doomed, the anti-alcoholism campaign (e.g., the dilettantism, the ignorance of elementary concepts of economic and social sciences, the absence of any serious data produced by special investigations and calculations) are typical of all of Gorbachev's "grand ideas." The epic of the private cooperative movement provides another good illustration.

As in the case of the anti-alcoholism campaign, the motivation of Gorbachev's team was excellent--to promote individual initiative

and private business. Unfortunately, the authors of the private cooperative movement gave no thought to several seemingly basic factors, such as where the cooperatives would get the resources necessary for their production, the resistance of local authorities to innovation, the number of people ready to join cooperatives, their income and how it would affect employees in the state economy, and how the cooperatives would be taxed.

Given this lack of foresight, it is no surprise that the decree on private cooperatives, like practically all of Gorbachev's laws, became obsolete within a month, and was replaced or changed by new decisions. This process has clearly damaged a commodity vital to the restoration of private business in the country--the people's trust in official economic policies.

Gorbachev's advisers demonstrated particular incompetence in their failure to ensure well-organized competition among private cooperatives. These advisors placed their complete trust in the self-regulatory forces of the nascent Soviet free market, and took no steps to prevent either monopolies or corrupt alliances with local authorities, the two main causes of the extremely high prices which now exist.

Instead of providing an example of success, the private cooperative movement has become an eloquent indicator of the heavy liabilities which haunt Gorbachev's regime. Indeed, private cooperatives currently account for far less than one percent of the Soviet GNP.

In addition, due to their monopolistic nature, cooperatives are able to charge exorbitant prices to the average Soviet consumer and produce extraordinarily high incomes for their members. Because of this negative effect on consumers, private cooperatives have generated tremendous hatred and social envy, both of which contribute significantly to the tension in the country.

Recent polls, such as Grushin's nation-wide poll, suggest that the masses are strongly hostile toward private cooperatives, which are regarded as being the major beneficiary of Perestroika, and private cooperatives now vie with the bureaucracy for the position of most hated institution. During the July riots in Novyi Uzen (in Kasakhstan), Fergana (in Uzbekistan), and Nebit-Dag (in Degestan), private cooperatives joined the local governmental bodies as the prime targets of violence. The suspension of cooperative activity was also high on the list of the demands sent by the miners to Gorbachev in July.

In the last two years, Gorbachev has energetically promoted family farming in agriculture, and some of his lieutenants have demanded the dismantling of the country's big farms, both collective and state. Like the anti-alcoholism and private cooperative campaigns, this program of transformation in the countryside is extremely ill-conceived.

The advocates the family farming program did not conduct a single survey to assess the peasants's attitudes toward any new reforms, nor was any investigation made into the possible consequences of such reform. Thus, a myriad of issues remain

unaddressed, including the number of peasants currently ready to lease land who will abandon their private farms in two to three years, whether it is possible to use modern technology on small farms, and the ways in which privatization will affect relatively efficient collective farms.

How is it that all of Gorbachev's economic, social, and political decrees (such as those regarding non-labor income and state enterprises) have been plagued with serious defects apparent even to non-specialists? Why has Gorbachev's staff proven so inept in the decision-making process? The personality of the General Secretary himself (i.e., over-confident and, like Khrushchev, quick to look for miracles) is a likely contributor to the quality of the decisions made in the Kremlin.

Equally important, however, is the low level of professionalism demonstrated by Gorbachev's advisers, particularly those in economics. Their experience in commanding the economy has left them unprepared for designing programs able to account for the activity of millions of actors, producers, and consumers. In addition, having been recruited during the period of intellectual stagnation, they not only lack necessary knowledge, especially in market economics, but they have little experience as qualified advisers to their boss, who wants to modernize his country. For all of their professional lives, they have learned to predict and then deliver what their boss wants, and they have never been taken to task for a professional fiasco.

The country's general discontent with Gorbachev's advisers was clearly manifested at the Congress of People's Deputies, where delegates demanded that Gorbachev name the authors of various botched decrees. In order to ensure the success of, and popular support for, any future decisions made in the Kremlin, it is clear that a new brand of professional adviser to the top leadership must emerge.

A SIMMERING THREAT TO THE JEWS?

Although the Soviet people are strongly divided in their evaluations of the first session of the Congress of People's Deputies, even the most caustic critics of Gorbachev's enterprise concede that never before in Soviet history have deputies been so free to bring up, before millions of TV viewers, the most sensitive political, social, and economic issues.

Almost 500 delegates, representing left and right, liberals and conservatives, Russian chauvinists and Baltic nationalists, and practically every social and ethnic group in the Soviet population, were given an open forum in which to vent previously suppressed grievances, no matter how minor.

Throughout the 13-day session of the Congress, I carefully watched the Soviet TV in my office in Michigan and read the detailed reports of the Congress's work in Soviet newspapers. At the end of the Congress's session, it occurred to me that, of the thousands of subjects debated at the Congress, one issue was conspicuously absent: the fate of the Soviet Jews.

It happened that my most recent visit to Moscow occurred only a few days after the end of the Congress's session, and I shared my realization about the absence of the Jewish issue at the Congress with my friends, many of whom are Russian Jews. I almost immediately discerned two schools of thought: that of the optimists and that of the pessimists.

Those promoting the first school of thought argued that, with the advent of Glasnost, the Jewish question ceased to be acute and important. Indeed, continued the advocates of this view, Jews were among those to greet Glasnost with enthusiasm, despite the fact that Gorbachev's regime waited two years before doing anything for the Jews (state anti-Semitism, rampant since the late 1930s, finally started to abate in 1987-1988).

For the first time in five decades, the word "Jew" appeared in the Soviet press in a positive context. Jewish cultural life was resurrected from total oblivion, and when I was in Kiev, which is renowned for its brazen anti-Semitism, I actually found a billboard with at least two announcements about Jewish concerts. The Kremlin simultaneously opened the gates for Jewish emigration and permitted the very friendly treatment of former Jewish emigrants.

In this new climate, argued the optimists, it is only natural that the Jewish question lost its centrality and was ignored by the delegates, even by those acclaimed for their struggle against anti-Semitism, such as Andrei Sakharov, Evgenii Evtushenko, and Oles'

Adamovich. These delegates, continued the optimists, were concerned with much more important problems.

By contrast, many people (including ethnic Russians) with whom I met in Moscow in the first few days of my visit resolutely rejected the optimist's position, declaring it self-deluding and even dishonest. Proponents of the pessimistic view held that the Congress, which patiently dealt with many ethnic groups far smaller in number than the 2 million Jews (such as the 26 tiny groups in the Far East which together total less than 180,000), avoided the Jewish issue simply because of its explosive character. According to the pessimists, the inflammatory nature of the Jewish question dissuaded even the most famous liberals from using the podium to discuss, in front of millions of TV viewers, either the current problems of the Jewish people or the anti-Semitism of Stalin's times.

Defenders of yet another pessimistic view suggested that while anti-Semitism from "above" is actually ebbing, that from "below" is on the rise. Although the "Pamiat'" organization, with its inhuman and brutish hatred of Jews, fared poorly in the last election, it has become a serious political force ready to demonstrate its genuine strength should a critical situation arise. Equally significant is the fact that the role of Jews in Russian and Soviet history has become the main divisive issue for the Soviet intellectuals and their periodicals (the chauvinistic *Nash Sovremennik* regularly publishes acrimonious anti-Semitic articles, and the liberal *Ogoniok* regularly denounces them).

It is remarkable, however, that even the brave *Ogoniok* has yet to publish an article about anti-Semitism containing a serious analysis of its roots from "above" as well as those from "below." Despite the merciless critique of Stalin's times, no magazine has published an article about the essential role of anti-Semitism in Stalin's ideology and policy.

Even more important, however, was another argument of the pessimists. The Soviet Union is currently embroiled in increasingly violent ethnic conflicts. These conflicts, which have already claimed hundreds of thousands of victims in one way or another, are fueled not only by old ethnic grievances, but by the deterioration of material life and the decline of the state's authority.

Given the history of the Jewish people, it would be incredible if further exacerbation of ethnic conflicts failed to include Jews as scapegoats for the deprivations of the masses and as pawns in the political struggle. In Kokand, a city close to Fergana, for instance, Jews were among those to incur the wrath of Uzbek youngsters, most of whom were unemployed and living under terrible conditions.

Still, the strongest evidence in favor of the pessimist's position was presented by Grigorii Kanovich, a Jewish writer from Lithuania who represented his republic in the Congress. Kanovich staunchly rejected the optimist's position as self-lulling, and maintained that popular anti-Semitism was indeed on the rise. In addition, he argued that the Jews face a very real physical threat,

since the state has proven unable (or unwilling) to defend the victims of ethnic assaults in both Sumgaiti and Fergana.

Kanovich's assertions were supported by Vitali Ginzburg and Oleg Gazenko, both of whom are members of the Academy of Science as well as People's Deputies. Ginzburg, Gazenko, and Kanovich submitted an appeal to Gorbachev, requesting that he pass a resolution condemning anti-Semitism and create a special committee of the Congress to follow up on the issue. The appeal was signed by more than 200 Deputies, despite the fact that none of them would risk discussing the issue from the podium. Although Kanovich conferred briefly with Gorbachev on three occasions and tried to persuade him to make the appeal known to the Congress, his efforts proved futile. Not only did the appeal remain hidden from the Congress, but it was stricken from the list of petitions submitted to the presidium by the delegates.

This incident confirms that neither Gorbachev nor his opponents from the left want their names associated with the Jewish cause, for fear that their conservative and chauvinistic enemies would immediately declare them Zionists and Masons.

This little known but extremely telling episode at the Congress has strengthened the views of the pessimists, who continue to hold that beneath the surface of Glasnost lies seething anti-Semitic rage ready to explode at the slightest provocation, as occurred in Sumgaiti and Fergana.

During my visit to the USSR, it became clear that most Soviet Jews (and indeed all other minorities, including Russians in

Central Asia and the Baltic republics) are living in a constant state of alert. Soviet Jews share a sense that they must brace themselves for dangerous times, and many of them, especially the youth, look to emigration as the solution.

Jewish organizations in the West, and indeed the entire international community, should very carefully monitor the developments in the Soviet Union, and should remember that the fate of the Soviet Jews depends not only on Gorbachev's good intentions, but on the country's aggressive chauvinistic forces as well. Should Gorbachev's enemies decide to use the increasing ethnic animosity and the country's deteriorating lifestyle to incite the chauvinists, the latter might once again horrify the world with bloody pogroms.

Copy of incoming ltr sent to Perino for transl. 1/23

January 21, 1989

General Scowcroft:

I have received the materials from Dr. Kissinger.

Please indicate what classification you would like placed on these documents.

Confidential _____ Secret _____ Top Secret _____

Senstive _____ Other _____

WARNING: You can't just check other -- you must write in the block!!!!!!

No other copies have been made of this correspondence. Please advise how you wish to handle. Are we going to maintain this file in our office or will it eventually go into the system?

We'll maintain here ✓

We will put into system. I will advise when _____

I am attaching a copy of the the letter that Dr. Kissinger carried to Gorbachev from President-elect Bush dated 1/13/89.

Florence

Brent

Enclosed are 4 documents

A - Memcon with Dobrynin January 16

B - Memcon with G Jan 17

C - Memcon with Dobrynin January

D - Document in Russian

H. KISSINGER

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy