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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91126
Folder ID Number: 91126-001

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	9/89	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in 1990 (3 pp.)	1/13/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in 1990 (1 pp.)	1/9/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	1/17/90	(b)(1)	
04. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	1/5/90	(b)(1)	
05. Demarche	Re: Demarche to Soviet Union Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	
06. Memcon	Re: Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union (2 pp.)	12/3/89	(b)(1)	S
07. Memcon	Re: First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union (6 pp.)	12/2/89	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 - June 1990 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1064
OA/ID Number: 91126-001
Date Closed: 4/3/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08a. Cable	Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock from Brent Scowcroft (3 pp.)	12/8/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jack Matlock Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	12/7/89	(b)(1)	S
08c. Cable	Robert Gates to General Scowcroft Re: [Letter to Chairman Gorbachev from President Bush] (1 pp.)	12/7/89	(b)(1)	S
09. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	
10. Letter	President Bush to Mr. President (4 pp.)	11/22/89	(b)(1)	
11a. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	11/20	(b)(1)	
11b. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12a. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	S
12b. Cable	Re: Reply to Gorbachev Message on Berlin (3 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Letter	Re: Unofficial Translation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
14a. Letter	Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev (2 pp.)	11/7/89	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
14b. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
14c. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Russian] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
14d. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
14e. Letter	Raisa Gorbachev to Barbara Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
14f. Letter	Barbara Bush to Raisa Gorbachev (2 pp.)	11/7/89	(b)(1)	
15a. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation [James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze] (12 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
15b. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation [James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze] (15 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S

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SUMMIT/RAISA (Moscow/Reuter) -- Raisa Gorbachev, watching the Revolution Day parade on Moscow's Red Square Tuesday, said she will go to the Mediterranean for the superpower summit next month if her husband allows.... Asked whether she would accompany [her husband] to his December 2-3 meeting with President Bush..., she replied: "If my husband takes me." She indicated, however, that she did plan to make an official visit to Italy with Gorbachev on November 29-December 1.

IRANIAN ASSETS/STATE DEPT. (UPI) -- The U.S. has agreed to give Iran a portion of that country's assets frozen since the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was overrun by an Iranian mob in 1979, a White House official said Tuesday. The official said an agreement was reached last Friday in The Hague, Netherlands, but he could not say how much was involved.... State Department spokesman Deva Denny said Tuesday the U.S. is "making no deals with anyone about hostages."

ISRAELI ATTACKS/HEZBOLLAH (Jerusalem/AP) -- Israeli air force jets bombed a base of the Shiite Moslem guerrilla group Hezbollah in southeastern Lebanon this morning, the military command announced. "All targets were hit and our planes returned safely to base," the army communique said, saying the targets struck were in Mazraat Ayn Busiwar, 14 miles north of the Israeli border.... An army spokesman, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said several targets were struck in the base.... No reason for the raid was given.

MARCOS PROTESTS (Manila/UPI) -- About 150 supporters of the late Ferdinand Marcos burned a U.S. flag Tuesday during a rally at the American Embassy and demanded the return of the former president's corpse to his homeland. "To the ugly Americans: you kidnapped Marcos alive, bring him back now that he's dead or all Filipinos will curse all Americans," said a placard at the three-hour protest.... The protesters trampled a U.S. flag before setting it ablaze.

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Brent - Did
we get our
Raisa - gram
out? GB
537

From the desk of

George Bush

from Box S-2

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Gorbo cores

President/Gorbachev

Outgoing 1-13-89

Incoming 1-18-89

~~Outgoing 2-8-89 (draft, not sure if sent)~~

✓ Outgoing 5-7-89 (handwritten note)

✓ Outgoing 5-24-89

✓ Outgoing 6-20-89 (Pkg #4729)

✓ Outgoing 7-21-89 SENSITIVE

INCOMING 8-6-89

Incoming 8-25-89

✓ Outgoing 8-30-89

Incoming 9-1-89

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✓ Outgoing 9-8-89

→ Incoming 1-20-89

✓ Outgoing 11-15-89

✓ Outgoing 11-22-89 also 11-22-89

THESE
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Outgoing 11-7-89 BB to Raisa

Incoming 11-13-89 Raisa to BB

Outgoing 11-15-89 BB to Raisa

Outgoing 4-5-90 BB to Raisa

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Incoming 9-1-89 Millie
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Gorbo cores

President/Gorbachev

Outgoing 1-13-89

Incoming 1-18-89

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✓ Outgoing 11-15-89

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Outgoing 11-7-89 BB to Raisa

Incoming 11-13-89 Raisa to BB

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Outgoing 4-5-90 BB to Raisa

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Incoming 9-1-89 Millie
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Gorbachev/President

Outgoing 1-13-89
Incoming 1-18-89
Outgoing 5- 7-89 (handwritten note)
Outgoing 5-24-89
Outgoing 6-20-89 (Pkg #4729)
Outgoing 7-21-89 SENSITIVE
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Outgoing 9- 8-89

2/8/89
Draft outgoing

Incoming 8-25-89

8/25 Incoming
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From the desk of
George Bu

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Document Originally
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9/89
incoming

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I think that the letter you sent me on June 20 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international security.

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union believe--and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this--that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. In a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.

At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.

In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.

One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure. In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we must, of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic arms, would result in strengthening strategic stability.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.

You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptual gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of this situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approached more pragmatically.

The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.

I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talks by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.

We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.

The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.

As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision--to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related to the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trade off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointly once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.

A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with the Secretary of State. And you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at our upcoming meeting.

The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last round. It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bombers must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important not to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warheads. I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.

Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of the two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.

Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arms, and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.

We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.

I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.

It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.

I wish now to address two more problems that deal with the set of nuclear issues.

The first one concerns our nuclear testing talks. It seems to me that our acceptance, at the latest round of the talks, of using the CORTEX method to monitor all nuclear tests above the agreed yield threshold, as the US side had insisted, makes it possible to bring the first stage of these talks to the concluding phase. I hope that our US partners will now look in the same unbiased way at the verification procedures that we propose. If during the ministerial meeting the two sides

recorded their fundamental understanding regarding the verification mechanism, instructions could then be given to our respective delegations at the Geneva talks to complete as soon as possible--in any case before the end of the year--work on the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and to prepare them for signing at our meeting. I also think that it is time for us to give general consideration to the guidelines for further restrictions on the yield and number of tests, which we are going to set for our delegations as their goal for the second stage of the talks.

The other problem to which I would like to call your attention has to do with the possibility of starting talks to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Today, as we see it, we have a favorable situation--the United States has actually ceased the production of fresh weapon-grade plutonium while the Soviet Union has adopted a program for phasing out before the year 2000 all the industrial reactors used to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Eduard Shevardnadze will inform the US side about the specific details of the program. I want to point out that we are ready to speed up its implementation in the event of matching reciprocal steps on your part.

In these circumstances our two countries could address in practical terms the problem of a verifiable cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. As a first step we could even now instruct our experts to consider jointly the issues related to the mechanism of mutual verification of such a measure. It is our view that the reciprocal cessation of the production of fissionable material not only would help to strengthen predictability in the strategic field, but would also make it possible for both sides to solve--at a much lower cost--a large number of environmental problems involved in the operation of nuclear production complexes.

Another priority issue--and we seem to be of one mind on this-- is the conclusion of a global and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We welcome your statement that every effort must be made to achieve such a prohibition. In this, our approaches coincide.

I also wish to note with satisfaction that during the last two rounds of bilateral consultations progress was made toward achieving this goal. I hope that our ministers will be able during their current meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding on a bilateral verification experiment.

We have also decided to take an additional step to accommodate the US position by agreeing to the inclusion of saxitoxin and ricin into the relevant list under the convention.

The multilateral talks on the convention have now entered a crucial phase. At the same time they still seem to lack a sense of purpose. Perhaps this is due to some extent to the fact that there is no agreed date by which the negotiators would seek to complete the preparation of the convention. Why shouldn't our two countries take an initiative here by issuing a joint appeal to conclude the convention as early as 1990 or 1991? Such a time limit seems to be quite realistic.

Mr. President, there is another issue which calls for the personal efforts of the two of us. I am referring to the reduction of conventional armed forces. Actually, both you and I took these talks into our own hands when we proposed the initiatives which are now paving the way to resolving the problems which for decades have poisoned East-West relations. It is precisely those political decisions taken at the highest level that have made it possible for the Vienna talks to take an unprecedented start and make very good headway.

You took a bold step, Mr. President, by proposing that the talks be completed within six to twelve months, which is an unheard-of challenge. Well, we accept it, even though I will say frankly that it will not be easy to do it.

But if you and I want to give effect to those commitments we must work out a kind of strategy for speeding up the Vienna talks. We could perhaps agree between ourselves and with the other participants from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to convene in the second half of 1990 a summit meeting in order to sign the agreement on conventional arms, to be attended by all the leaders of the European states. I am confident that such a European conference would be unprecedented as regards its results.

To that end we should instruct our foreign ministers to intensify work to find solutions to outstanding issues. Perhaps it will take two or three meetings between our ministers and the ministers from other states concerned which participate in the Vienna talks; meetings not for making speeches but to find solutions to outstanding issues.

For example, why not hold the first such meeting in Vienna early next year to review the principal difficulties holding up the talks?

We have duly appreciated agreement by the United States and other NATO countries to reduce combat aircraft. This is an important step toward accommodating the position of the Warsaw Treaty. But let me say frankly that it fails to address our serious concern regarding air defense aircraft based in the European territory of the Soviet Union and intended only to protect vital facilities against possible air strikes from various directions. They do not have the capability to strike ground targets. Those aircraft are not part of the surprise attack capability. We are prepared to give American experts an opportunity to see for themselves that that is precisely the case. In order to resolve this issue we could agree to set a certain limit for such aircraft, which would not include frontline fighters. Of course, we expect that there should not be any buildup of systems which these aircraft are intended to counter.

In the context of the likely breakthrough at the Vienna talks we believe it is possible even now to begin discussing the question of a gradual removal of the tactical nuclear component from the European military equation. All the more so since we understand that in Brussels the NATO countries gave their agreement in principle to such discussions. I would like to inform you that with due regard for this evolution in NATO's

position, the Soviet Union, as I already said in Strassbourg, is considering the possibility of further major unilateral reductions in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

And now the last point. We welcome your proposal concerning an "open skies" regime which would provide for mutual overflights by unarmed aircraft over the territories of the USSR and the United States and their Warsaw Treaty and NATO allies for the purpose of monitoring their military activities, and we agree to take part in an international conference to discuss issues involved in establishing such a regime.

I think that we are now on the threshold of mutually acceptable agreement. But you and I together will have to cross that threshold. And we can do so if we take into account each other's fundamental concerns.

In closing, Mr. President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1990

INFORMATION

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2009-0942-MA
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1990

This is a rare period in which we can seek to achieve a fundamental shift in the strategic balance, particularly in Europe. The future of the Soviet Union remains cloudy, but it is clearly in our interest to do what we can to prolong the tenure of the reformers -- men who have inadvertently set in motion events that have put long-standing U.S. objectives regarding the Soviet Union well within our reach: freedom for Eastern Europe; a significant reduction of the Soviet military threat to the West; and the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in the regions.

The principal challenge that you face in U.S.-Soviet relations this year is to engage Gorbachev effectively at a time when he faces mounting chaos at home; declining influence and authority in Eastern Europe; and uncertainty about the future of Russia's traditional nemesis, Germany. Gorbachev's sense of security stems from still powerful Soviet military forces and the conviction -- bordering on faith -- that sophisticated diplomacy can convince his adversaries not to take advantage of him. But there are observable cracks in Moscow's confidence about the fruits of the new foreign policy -- particularly where Germany is concerned -- and that Soviet insecurity is likely to grow.

1990 promises to be another very difficult year for Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union's ills are worsening. Problems like whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should have a constitutionally guaranteed "leading role" -- precluding fair competition with other parties; whether a command economy can be expected to produce the needed economic turnaround; whether to have private property; whether territory belonging to Azerbaijan should be transferred to Armenia; whether the Baltic states -- and other republics -- should be allowed to secede from the Union and similar issues cannot be resolved through Gorbachev's usual jawboning and equivocation. If they continue to grow worse, they could be his undoing.

Over time, the Soviet population -- while appreciating his role in initiating reform -- has increasingly come to see Gorbachev as ineffective and indecisive. Nationalists from Armenia and

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Azerbaijan to the Baltics regard him as a man without a bottom line and it is Gorbachev, not the nationalists, who has retreated in the face of repeated challenges.

The saving grace for Gorbachev at this time is that he is still regarded by moderate nationalists in the Republics as their best hope for the peaceful achievement of their goal -- total independence. But moderates, to say nothing of extremists, may take Gorbachev's continuing appeasement as weakness, leading them to press even harder (as with the mass demonstrations in Lithuania when Gorbachev visits there.) That in turn will further alarm conservatives, who already see these trends as a threat to the integrity of the Union. Challenges to Gorbachev's power will probably increase markedly in the next year. Within the last two months, Gorbachev has reportedly threatened to resign twice. The first Baltic elections in Lithuania at the end of February and the 28th Party Congress, now scheduled for October 1990, will be crucial tests for him.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The Soviet leadership will be anxious to keep U.S.-Soviet relations moving forward. Gorbachev cannot afford, in the face of mounting failures at home, to have his foreign policy line discredited too. Objectively, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has never had better prospects from our point of view. Your meeting at Malta infused U.S.-Soviet relations with a greater sense of direction -- pointing toward the June Summit. On arms control, human rights and the incipient economic agenda, there is every reason to be optimistic that the progress made in 1989 can be sustained and perhaps Moscow can even be moved to be more sensible on Central America.

But it is, of course, the unraveling of communist power in Eastern Europe that has changed the strategic environment and the face of U.S.-Soviet relations. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has been the most enduring and most fundamental source of American conflict with Moscow. Thus, our central and overriding objective in 1990 should be to facilitate the continued and graduated withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe.

A preeminent challenge, in this regard, is to help the FRG and the Soviet Union to manage their relationship. If there is a single external issue that might cause Moscow to reassess its course in Eastern Europe, might even bring Gorbachev down, it is the German question. With that much at stake for the United States, we will need to be intensively involved in the increasingly complicated diplomatic environment in Europe which will be ever more preoccupied with the future of Germany.

While we can do little to affect internal Soviet politics, we should do what we can to prolong perestroika as long as Gorbachev continues to tolerate the diminution of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. If Moscow maintains its present course, it will be impossible within a few years for the Soviet Union to do anything

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about the changes in Eastern Europe, short of all out invasion. With this in mind, we need to work hard to insure a successful June U.S.-Soviet Summit -- particularly in arms control and the economic sphere -- which may boost Gorbachev's image at home and thus his staying power.

We must grasp while we can the chance for an early CFE agreement which would bring the conventional military balance into line with the new political realities in Eastern Europe. These reductions will also facilitate the orderly withdrawal of Soviet military power from the territory of its former allies. Rapid progress toward an "Open Skies" accord also would institutionalize Soviet openness on an unprecedented scale.

Finally, it is important that you continue to engage Gorbachev personally while emphasizing that it is the process of perestroika, not the man, on which U.S. policy is based.

As 1990 begins, the uncertainties surrounding the future of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev have only multiplied. At present, Gorbachev appears to be playing for time in the hope that, by some miracle, perestroika will succeed in creating a stable and prosperous Soviet Union. We have clearer and more realistic goals: the liberation of Eastern Europe and the consolidation of pluralist rule throughout the region; and a dramatic reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe and the United States.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Lead memo.

10307

January 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *PB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations
in 1990

The memorandum for the President at Tab I examines the challenges in U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly relating to Europe, in light of continuing Soviet internal difficulties.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to President

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

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*Hand delivered
by Amb Duberini
1-19-90
Cordis has orig.
Unofficial translation*

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.

January 17, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of December 8, transmitted through Ambassador Matlock. I wish to say from the outset that I share your assessment of the Malta meeting. I believe we have every reason to say that it has taken Soviet-American relations to a new level of mutual understanding.

The fact that we, while remaining realists in approaching the issues that divide us, have begun to clear the USSR-US relationship of everything that stands in the way of its normal development, opens up great opportunities, in my view, for bilateral cooperation and for building new international relations based on trust, mutual respect, and a balance of interests.

Of course, a number of issues were not discussed in depth at Malta. Therefore, I support your idea that all issues which are the subject of the Soviet-American dialogue be discussed in the coming months between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker.

I took note of your information about the US allies' reaction to the Malta talks. At a meeting in Moscow we informed in detail the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member states on the substance of the Soviet-American talks at Malta. Our allies welcomed the results of those talks and expressed their satisfaction with the thoughtfulness and the reasonable approach to the developments in Western and Eastern Europe.

It is my view that the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to conduct business with respect to Europe, which is going through turbulent and profound changes, on the basis of prudence and great responsibility.

As a separate issue, I would like to touch on the question of Panama. I acquainted myself with the arguments conveyed by your Ambassador in Moscow. I must say that I cannot agree with them, as well as with the statement contained in your message of December 26, 1989, to the effect that the US action in Panama is somehow fully consistent with the principles that we discussed at Malta.

Our position of principle is known to you. We reject the use of force in international relations as an instrument of resolving conflict situations. It is in those terms that this question was discussed during the Malta talks. There, we sought to make this principal idea clear to the US side: no objective can serve as a justification of the use of military force. Universality of the politico-diplomatic procedures must be recognized as absolute. To allow for a multitude of interpretations or authorize exceptions here would mean to emasculate the efforts of the international community (and both our countries are playing a prominent role in them) to affirm the primacy of law.

We in the Soviet leadership have begun to reflect on the possible areas of progress to be made at the forthcoming Soviet-American negotiations in 1990. We believe that a more specific determination in this regard could be made as a result of our foreign ministers' meetings on which you and I agreed earlier.

I would like to invite you, Mr. President, to continue our correspondence not only on urgent problems, but on key conceptual issues in the interests of USSR-US rapprochement and enhancing stability in international relations.

I wish to conclude this letter by expressing the hope that the year 1990 will be productive for our relations.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow
Kremlin

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1-5-90

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the magnificently crafted model of the "Aleksandr Nevsky." It is an ideal gift for me because, as an old navy man, I dearly love the sea.

I am sending along a few pictures which I hope you will enjoy. When I look at them I am reminded of our Malta meeting which, in my view, was a big success.

I am also enclosing a video tape which was prepared for you by a friend of mine who is a U.S. movie producer, Jerry Weintraub. He used some historical footage out of a famous film library. The announcer on this tape, incidentally, is a famous U.S. movie actor, Charlton Heston.

I hope you and Mrs. Gorbacheva have a wonderful New Year. I am convinced that the next year will be one of even greater cooperation and improvement in our relations.


I am determined to follow up on our talk about START and about CFE. The whole world hopes that we can reach agreement on these two treaties.

I also hope we can move ahead in the chemical weapons field. I know you want to ban these weapons and so do I. I still worry about verification, but let's find the way to make real progress in 1990.

I have followed the developments in Europe with keen interest and with a genuine sense of excitement. I note with great interest and admiration the way those who support changes all across Eastern Europe invoke your name in a most favorable way - a well deserved tribute to your own leadership for reform.

Let's vow to stay in close touch during this coming year.

Most sincerely,



His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

P.S. That ship model
will always remind me
of Malta and of our
most constructive
and pleasant meeting



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20 December 1989

Demarche to Soviet Union
Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev

1. Read enclosed Presidential announcement to Gorbachev
2. President asked me personally to brief you on this matter.
3. The President wants you to know that he took this action only after becoming convinced that General Noriega had become increasingly unstable and dangerous and that the American community, which numbers 35,000 people faced increasing violent threats. As you know, a U.S. serviceman was shot to death by PDF forces shortly after General Noriega declared war on the United States and a serviceman's was brutalized and his wife sexually threatened in a separate incident.
4. The United States sees no precedent in this action. Just the opposite. This situation is unique.
5. A democratic election was held May 7th and the results were internationally recognized. The democratic choice was denied through violence and repression.

6. Moreover, General Noriega is an indicted drug trafficker wanted for prosecution in the U.S.
7. In addition, the United States has obligations under the Panama Canal Treaties to safeguard safe passage through the Panama Canal for all nations. Those Treaties have the force of international law.
8. The United States intends to remove its forces as quickly as possible. It also intends to normalize its relations fully with the Endara government. We hope that the Endara government will have peaceful friendly relations with others, including the Soviet Union.
9. We have informed both Managua and Havana that they face absolutely no security threat as a result of this action. We hope you will repeat and reinforce this message.
10. We hope also that Nicaragua does not use this unique action as an excuse to violate its commitment under Esquipulas to go forward with the currently scheduled elections. The United States remains committed to recognize the winner of the election if it is free and fair no matter which party wins. The U.S. also remains fully committed to resolve the conflicts in both Nicaragua and El Salvador under the

Esquipulas Treaties, including the commitments relayed by Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

11. The President hopes that in the spirit of Malta that your government will take no action that will inflame this situation or make it more difficult to resolve this crisis quickly, peacefully, and democratically.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 3, 1989, 11:45 am - 12:45 pm
AND PLACE: Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta

The President: I want to discuss an idea on bibles and a proposal on Billy Graham. (Described the question he is asked about the Baltics). (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I have discussed how we see a [ILLEGIBLE]. Many problems have arisen. We were ready to deal with them through greater autonomy. If separatism would become dominant, that would be dramatic. I must not create a danger to perestroika. The Soviet peoples would not understand. We lived together for fifty years, we are integrated. We have sixty million living out there in nationality areas. Fifty percent of Estonia are Russians, over 50% of Latvians are now Russian, Lithuanian majority in Lithuania. In the Ukraine, 50 million are non-Ukrainian. Kazakhs are only 30% of the population. Our country is that way and separatism brings out strong feelings by people. (S)

There has been a calming down but still there are problems. This is a sensitive issue for us. I hope you understand our position. This would bring out all sorts of terrible fires. If the U.S. has no understanding it would spoil relations with the U.S. more than anything else. (S)

The President: But if you use force -- you don't want to -- that would create a firestorm. You will get that question. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: We want all to get equal treatment. If we removed our MVD troops from Nagorno-Karabakh we would have war. We are committed to a democratic process and we hope you understand. (S)

What happened here is precisely what we wanted. We are very pleased. There are some in both countries who don't like what we are doing. But we are right. Destructive forces should not be allowed to undermine this. Let me [ILLEGIBLE] some. ~~(S)~~

The President What forces? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Sometimes lies are presented in the press, etc., i.e. that Gorbachev sold his friends down the river as a student after drinking ...[ILLEGIBLE] ~~(S)~~

The President: I never heard of this. We have a lot of nuts.
(U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I know you don't believe it. (U)

The President: The visit is exactly what I hoped. I didn't respond to all arms control but we want to move forward. But we must be prudent. We are looking for ways to make further reductions, especially in manpower in CFE. I must consult with NATO. ~~(S)~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
General Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 2, 1989, 12:00 - 1:00 pm
AND PLACE: Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta

Chairman Gorbachev: I have three points. I already referred to Central America especially Cuba. I recall a letter to you after Cuba. My talks in Cuba weren't simple. Castro expressed caution about our policy -- I explained our aims were good. I said as for our internal affairs we are doing what we want. What you do is your business. He asked me, in effect, to help normalize U.S.-Cuban relations. (~~S/SEN~~)

Recently, the Cuban Chief of Staff visited the Soviet Union. He talked to Yazov and said some things, I say this for the first time in the most private way. If Castro found out (~~S/SEN~~)

The President: I understand. It will stay with me. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I think perhaps we would think how to do it. Some contacts. We could participate but that is not necessary. I can say that Castro understands that the world is changing dramatically but he has his own sense of dignity and pride. Even raising this possibility was not easy for him. (~~S/SEN~~)

The President: What is he saying? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: His very words, "Find a way to make the President aware of my interest in normalization." It is on the basis of that remark that I made my comment. (~~S/SEN~~)

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The President: Let's put all our cards on the table about Castro. Our allies can't see why we care about Central America. It just isn't a gut issue for them. For the political left in the U.S., it isn't a gut issue. But for the fledgling democracies in Latin America and the U.S. right it is a gut issue. Castro is like a sea anchor as you move forward and the Western Hemisphere moves. He is against all this -- Eastern Europe and the Western Hemisphere. (S/SEN)

Publicly Latin Americans will not criticize a colleague. But Arias' call was a clear indication that Castro is now totally isolated. There is another major Castro problem -- the emigres (in Florida) who have strong emotions about this last dictator. We have had feelers from Castro but never with an indication of a willingness to change. (S)

Switching to Nicaragua, you said Ortega had nothing to do with [ILLEGIBLE]. I am inclined to agree though I didn't use to think so. But I am convinced that they are exporting revolution. They are sending weapons. I don't care what they have told you, they are supporting the FMLN. I am now convinced there is a new shipment of helos going from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua. I don't question Shevardnadze's word on this. (S/SEN)

Chairman Gorbachev: There were U.S. rockets too. (S)

The President I see a solution as in a verifiable election -- free and open -- and that if Ortega loses he doesn't try to cling to power. If it is a free election, we will abide by the results. (S/SEN)

The only other open cancer is Panama, but there is no feeling that the Soviet Union wants Noriega to succeed. He is a terrible problem for us. I asked the Attorney General if our indictments were strong ones. I am seeking for him to get out. This is quite confidential. He said these are good indictments and given feelings on drugs in the U.S., I can't drop the indictments. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Let me tell you how your steps are perceived in the Soviet Union. People ask are there no barrier to the U.S. action in independent countries? The U.S. passes judgement and executes that judgement. (S)

The President: There is no military operation against Colombia, but if we are asked for help against the scourge of drugs, we will help. (S)

Then I would like to mention the Philippines. (S)

I was surprised at your Philippines reaction. Aquino is democratically elected and asked for our help to prevent the palace from being bombed by the rebels. It never occurred to me that this would cause problems in the Soviet Union, though I probably would have done it anyway. But that notion never occurred to me. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: In the Soviet Union some are saying the Brezhnev doctrine is being replaced by the Bush doctrine. (S)

The President: I want to understand. Here is a democracy saying that it needs help against rebels. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I agree she is democratically elected. It depends on the context. In Eastern Europe there are governments, legitimately elected, that are now being replaced. The question is in Eastern Europe it is prohibited for Soviet troops to intervene. All now is interrelated. Some now are ~~seeing~~ ^{realizing} that we are not performing our duty to our friends. But we have not been asked. (S)

The President: In Eastern Europe, change is peaceful and encouraged by you. In the Philippines, there is a Colonel trying to shoot his way into power. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I agree -- peaceful change is the way. Our position is non-interference. The process of change can be painful but we believe in non-interference. Colonels can be found everywhere to do those jobs. (S)

The President: If we can stick with the notion of peaceful change, better relations will occur between the Soviet Union and the U.S. I would never give advice to a senior office holder like you. I can accept your criticism, but not on this issue, in this circumstance. Aquino is struggling to bring democracy. I would hope your criticism could be muted. I can accept it but I think that your criticism would cut the wrong way. (S)

I appreciate your explanation in the Philippines. One more comment on Latin America. I don't want to sound like a broken record. Let me express U.S. public opinion on you yourself. There is strong support for perestroika and for establishing pluralistic answers in Eastern Europe -- strong support. But I think people see support for Castro -- almost -- speaking frankly -- as an embarrassment. He is against the causes you are advocating. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: That is pluralism (laughs). (U)

The President: I wish we could find a way. You are spending billions into the pipeline and getting nothing for it, and it does interfere with our overall relationship. The way you have handled it is clear. Castro doesn't just do what you say. (S)

Just to end it -- anything we can do to cut support for Cuba and Nicaragua so we are not on opposite sides. Chile is moving in the right direction -- not toward the U.S. but toward democracy and I don't want these others to get in the way of what I want to do with the Soviet Union. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: The most important thing is that we have no plan for Latin America -- no bridges, no bridgeheads. That is not our policy -- you have it from me. {NEXT LINE ILLEGIBLE}

I am moving toward democracy. Of course they are fledgling and the road ahead will be difficult. We are satisfied with that -- as you -- but we will not interfere. ~~(S)~~

With Cuba, yes, we have a long relationship -- responding to the economic blockade. We seek to put it on a more normal basis, especially economic. We are trading with Cuba and that meets our need -- sugar, citrus, nickel -- but it is much more to Cuba's advantage. For example, we sell oil to Cuba on a market clearing basis which we could sell for much more. But Cuba is independent with its own view and we don't want to interfere. ~~(S)~~

I mention Castro's signal because I think it shows Castro sees his interest lies in changing his relations with the U.S. and others. So please give it some thought. If you have something to share with us or something we can pass on. We can note we have had a frank conversation and understand each other better. ~~(S)~~

The President: We have had feelers from him. But if he could do something in human rights. I will think carefully on it. I will let you know so we don't get disconnected on this. ~~(S)~~

Chairman Gorbachev: We could say that to him about human rights. ~~(S)~~

The President: He won't even let the U.N. in to see. ~~(S)~~

Chairman Gorbachev: I haven't finished (laughs). (U)

The President: Neither have I. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: O.K. (U)

The President: O.K. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Let me address Eastern Europe. I have three points. ~~(S)~~

- (1) The direction of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is such as to bring us closer -- that is important. ~~(S)~~
- (2) What I dislike is when some U.S. politicians say unity of Europe should be on the basis of Western values. We have long been accused of exporting ideology. That is what is now being proposed by some -- not you. ~~(S)~~
- (3) Mr. Kohl is in too much of a hurry on the German question. That is not good. I worry that this could be part of his pre-election game and not because of a strategic outlook. There are some differences in view in West Germany, within the coalition, and with the SPD. We should let Kohl know that his approach could damage things. ~~(S)~~

For example, would a united Germany be outside alliances or within NATO? Answer is premature and we shouldn't put it forth -- should let it run its natural course. You and I are not responsible for the division of Germany. Let history decide what should happen. We need an understanding on this. (S)

The President: I think Kohl feels an enormous emotional response to what has happened -- as does Genscher. There is some politics in his three part program and some emotional outpouring. I think he knows his allies -- after they support right of the German people to reunify, have some private reservations about reunification. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Yes I know -- and they have let me know. Unlike they and you -- I am saying there are two states, mandated by history. So let history decide the outcome. Kohl assures me he will abide by understandings made in Bonn. Now he says he wants to talk on the phone and Genscher is coming. I think this is an ? particular prudence. (S)

The President: I agree and we will do nothing to recklessly try to speed up reunification. When you talk to Kohl, I think you will see he agrees. But his rhetoric, you must understand, is emotional and possibly some politics, but mostly emotion. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: It is good that things have [ILLEGIBLE] (U)

The President: The most conservative Americans salute how you have handled this issue. They are now looking back into history. I will be timid -- that is how in a nutshell they describe my refusal to jump up and down at the Wall. This is no time for grandstanding -- a step that looks good but could prove reckless. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: The times we live in are of great responsibility -- great opportunity but great responsibility. (S)

The President: I would like to spend some time on one other point at some time. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I have one other point as well -- later. A point which you carefully avoided. (S)

The President: Yes, I was hoping to avoid it. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I once said something -- You used a word that means "a test" to see if we could solve mutual problems. (S)

The President: Afghanistan is more important to you than to us. I was wrong about what would happen after Soviet troops left. Let's discuss it. (S)

The President: Let me not blind side you. You may not want to discuss it. But I would like to know your views concerning the sensitive area of the Baltics. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS~~

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Chairman Gorbachev: Yes, we will. (U)

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SCOWCROFT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
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FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, EYES ONLY, TO AMBASSADOR
JACK MATLOCK, FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO
THE PRESIDENT.

-
I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO
SIGNED ORIGINAL.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

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DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

-
I JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I AM WITH OUR
PAGE 02 RUEADWW1790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
MEETING IN MALTA. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER WAS DISAPPOINTING, THE
SUBSTANCE, CANDOR AND ATMOSPHERE OF OUR TALKS MORE THAN FULFILLED
MY EXPECTATIONS. AT A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY,
I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE IN NEARLY ALL ASPECTS OF
THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH
WE DISCUSSED FRANKLY, AND WE WILL PURSUE THESE. BECAUSE WE HAD
TO FOREGO ONE OF OUR SESSIONS, THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES I WAS
UNABLE TO RAISE WITH YOU. FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO
DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, CHINA, AND OTHER ASIAN
ISSUES SUCH AS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, A MATTER OF GREAT

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CONCERN TO OUR FRIENDS, THE JAPANESE. I WILL HAVE SECRETARY BAKER PURSUE THESE ISSUES WITH MINISTER SHEVANDNADZE AT THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL.

LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. ALL OF THE ALLIES WERE QUITE PLEASED WITH THE CONTENT AND TONE OF OUR TALKS IN MALTA. THEY WELCOMED ACCELERATING THE PACE OF KEY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE FURTHER AREAS OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY WANT TO REVIEW THE FOUR PRINCIPLES I PRESENTED PAGE 03 RUEADWW1790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF GERMANY. I WILL ASK AMBASSADOR MATLOCK TO PROVIDE THEM TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE.

AGAIN, I BELIEVE THAT OUR MALTA MEETING SETS THE STAGE FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON NEXT JUNE, AND ESTABLISHES A STRONG BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN MANY AREAS AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES.

ON A VERY PERSONAL BASIS I WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU AGAIN. IN MY VIEW, THE PERSONAL "CHEMISTRY" WAS GOOD AND I HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT DURING 1990 AND BEYOND.

PLEASE GIVE MY REGARDS TO MRS. GORBACHEV. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO SEE HER IN MALTA.

SINCERELY,
SIGNED
GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

PAGE 04 RUEADWW1790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

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~~SECRET~~

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December 7, 1989

TO: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO BE DELIVERED EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

I would appreciate it if you would deliver the following message
from the President to Chairman Gorbachev. There will be no
signed original.

BEGIN TEXT:

(Copy attached -- with corrections)

END TEXT.

Warm regards, Brent.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 7/19/12

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VAX, VP
<PREC> IMMEDIATE
<DTG> 071737Z DEC 89

<ORIG>FM AIR FORCE ONE

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: ROBERT GATES

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I AM WITH OUR MEETING IN MALTA. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER WAS DISAPPOINTING, THE SUBSTANCE, CANDOR AND ATMOSPHERE OF OUR TALKS MORE THAN FULFILLED MY EXPECTATIONS. AT A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY, I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE IN NEARLY ALL ASPECTS OF THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH WE DISCUSSED FRANKLY, AND WE WILL PURSUE THESE. BECAUSE WE HAD TO FOREGO ONE OF OUR SESSIONS, THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES I WAS UNABLE TO RAISE WITH YOU. FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, CHINA, AND OTHER ASIAN ISSUES SUCH AS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO OUR FRIENDS, THE JAPANESE. I WILL HAVE SECRETARY BAKER PURSUE THESE ISSUES WITH MINISTER SHEVANDNADZE AT THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL.

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PLEASE GIVE MY REGARDS TO MRS. GORBACHEV. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO SEE HER IN MALTA.

SINCERELY,
SIGNED
GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

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PER E.O. 13526

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George Bu

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Gorbachev (Dobrynin)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1992 NOV 28

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MESSAGE NO _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 1
FROM: ROBERT KIMMITT P 642-1598 700A NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (TRANSLATION)
ECW LETTER DUBYNIN TO KIMMITT ON 11/28

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	BOB GATES VIA WHSITRM		
	Zelikow		
	Kanter		
	Mohrley		
	Blackwill		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~White House Guidelines~~

~~E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006~~

~~By _____ NARA, Date _____~~

S/S Officer: _____

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By *cap* NARA, Date 4/2/09

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I am grateful to you for your letter of September 23, 1989, in which you underscore the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have a special responsibility to play a decisive role in advancing the multilateral process of prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. I would like to tell you at the outset that I fully and sincerely support such an approach.

In order to promptly achieve a universal ban on chemical weapons I propose, just as in the case of Vienna talks, to express ourselves in favor of setting a deadline for finalizing the convention, through a joint appeal to the participants in the Conference on Disarmament, to finalize the text of the convention by 1990-1991 at latest.

It is in the context of the determination stated by our two countries in Wyoming to persist in achieving chemical weapons prohibition and elimination of all its stockpiles that we approach the specific ideas, which you, Mr. President, have put forward in your letter as well as at the UN.

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0839-MR
SCS 4/10/13

TREAT AS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

You've been writing about the readiness of the United States to eliminate over 98% of its CW stockpiles during the period of 8 years after the convention comes into effect, provided that the Soviet Union is to be one of the state signatories to that convention. As regards the Soviet Union participation in the convention, I give you a completely unequivocally positive answer. The Soviet Union has already stated that it is ready to be among the original parties to the convention.

It would be nice, if the United States were to make a similar announcement, and still better if we were to make such announcement jointly, for instance, at our forthcoming meeting in 1990. In turn, that would push other states to take no less a definite stance with regard to participating in the convention.

As to the issue of complete destruction of CW under the future convention, it seems to me that we should adhere to the agreement reached at the multinational negotiations, mostly due to the initiative of the USSR and United States, on their unconditional 100 per cent destruction within the 10 year period after the coming into force of the convention. It is on the principles of complete destruction of CW stockpiles and production facilities in this time-frame that the joint Soviet-US proposals on the order of destruction of such stockpiles and facilities have been drafted and then adopted in Wyoming. The right to retain any stockpiles, however minimal, would signify the perpetuating of a threat of CW use, would provide, as a matter of fact, ground for any state to renounce under various pretexts the complete destruction of chemical weapons.

As to the participation in the convention of all CW capable states, the Soviet Union, like the United States, attaches priority significance to this question.

We believe that it has been resolved to a great extent by the special Soviet-US agreement on the categories of states which should be original parties to the convention, and now it seems to be possible to get down to discussing a specific plan of action with a view to involving as parties to the convention such states that pose a potential threat in terms of CW. Naturally, what is required here is a flexible approach, taking into account diverse conditions existing in each given region of the world.

You have also proposed a radical reduction of the CW stockpiles of the USSR and the United States while the multilateral talks in Geneva are still underway. I think that our two countries, given their special responsibility in the area of CW disarmament, could move even further and without waiting for a convention to be concluded, undertake an entire package of reciprocal and mutually interrelated obligations.

First. To halt completely any CW production. It is a natural and relatively easy first step to take toward the future convention. It would enable to considerably reinforce our political impact on those who are possibly engaged in their own CW production or are planning to do so.

I must frankly say that the recent reports to the effect that the United States intends to continue the CW production even after the coming into force of the convention have given rise to our serious concern. It is with a certain degree of mistrust that we have treated these reports because such US actions would directly contradict the already existing agreements worked out mostly through the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, you made no mention of this approach in your letter either. Any permission to produce

chemical weapons in the framework of the convention would push other states, one way or the other, to initiate its production in order to retain the right to continue it after the coming into force of the convention. It would inevitably lead to a point where the proliferation of chemical weapons would become politically and legally admissible.

Second. To radically reduce and - what is even better to completely destroy the chemical weapons of the USSR and the US. The Soviet Union intends to start destruction of its stockpiles prior to the conclusion of the convention, and we like the idea of the USSR and the US moving along this road on parallel courses. We had to convert our first pilot CW destruction plant built near Chapaevsk, into a training center as requested by the public, and now in order to have an idea of our real possibilities for destroying the stockpiles, we must complete the draft comprehensive program for CW destruction in the USSR to be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Consideration of such a complex and multifaceted issue in the Supreme Soviet as well as implementation of the decisions to be adopted will obviously take some time.

With a view to ensuring the best possible preparation for CW destruction, including solutions to complex ecological question, it might be possible to build on cooperation between our two countries concerning the methods of CW destruction, operating respective facilities, elaboration of suitable verification procedures, etc. and formalize a special bilateral agreement to that effect.

In order to avoid any apprehensions on the part of the participants in the talks to the effect that the reciprocal steps of the USSR and the US are conceived

as a substitute for a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it would be possible to declare that the agreement on reduction and, time permitting, destruction of US and Soviet chemical weapons will come into force at the moment of the signing of the convention itself.

Third. Under no circumstances chemical weapons should be used. Unlike the USSR and the US the overwhelming majority of countries have no reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol enabling the use of CW in retaliation. The mutual renunciation by the USSR and the US of their reservations would make a tangible contribution to the process of strengthening intolerance toward chemical weapons. Establishing an absolute and verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons through effective UN procedures would lessen the incentives for acquiring chemical weapons by states.

Forth. We resolutely believe that the discontinuation of CW production, their destruction and non-use must be verified in the strictest possible manner in the framework of both convention and the range of steps which the USSR and the US could implement prior to its conclusion.

As to our possible joint contribution to the process of multilateral negotiations, I think there is a need for it, now, above all, with a view to finalizing a solution to the entire range of verification problems. In this connection I'd like to propose that our two countries come out with a joint initiative on challenge inspections.

The important contribution that you, Mr. President, made in raising this issue at the negotiations has been now appreciated on its merits in the Soviet Union. Its discussion showed that it may be adequately resolved,

provided all states accept the concept of "continuous" or "open invitation for inspection" which would provide for a possibility to conduct such inspections by the international inspectorate at the request of any party to the convention, at any time, at any point or facility of the other party within the most limited time-frame, without any exceptions and the right to refusal. Our joint initiative on this basis would become a most significant contribution to the successful completion of the negotiations on the convention.

In conclusion I'd like to express my conviction that through joint efforts we will succeed, already in the near future, to attain our common objective - introduction of a complete global ban on CW. I would be interested to know your considerations in reaction concerning this priority question.

With sincere respect.

M. GORBACHEV

November 28, 1989

From the desk of
George B.

Whole
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Following Page

CLOSE HOLD
NO COPIES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOV. 22, 1989

Dear Mr. President,

After talking with Anatoli Dobrinin yesterday it occurred to me that even though we have a "no agenda" meeting you might be interested in some of the topics I would like to cover. What I set out below is not meant in any way to limit our discussions; but here is my list - a non-inclusive list.

- A. Eastern Europe
- B. Regional Differences
Central America, Angola,
Afghanistan, Asia
(Cambodia) + Middle East
- C. The Defense spending
of both our countries -
What effect will
changing times have
on levels of defense spending?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 2 -

D. Your vision and mine
of the World 10 years
from now.

What are the differences when
You say "Common European Home"
+ I say "Europe Whole + Free"?

E. Human Rights

F. Arms Control - philosophy
and objectives - treating
this in a broad, general
sense

Of course, you will have your
own priorities. I would like to
hear from you your expectations
for 'perestroika' - where does it
lead down the road?

I want this meeting to be useful
in advancing our mutual under-
standing and in laying the
ground-work for a good
relationship.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 3 -

Success does not mean deals signed, in my view. It means that you and I are frank enough with each other so that our two great countries will not have tensions that arise because we don't know each other's innermost thinking.

I will be visiting next week to flesh out our side's thinking but there will be no 'December Surprise'.

If however there is some proposal not covered by the list above, I will be prepared to make it.

I am writing this on the eve of our Thanksgiving Day - a day in which all Americans thank God for

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 4 -

our blessings

I will give thanks
for the fact that we
are living in times of enormous
promise. I will give thanks
that our 5 kids and
our 11 grandchildren
might just have a real
chance to grow up in a
more peaceful, less scary
world.

I will give thanks
that you are pressing
forward with glasnost
and perestroika; for, you
see, the fate of my
our family and yours
is dependent on perestroika's
success

I look forward to
seeing you - with Respect
Gy Bunk

From the desk of
George Bu

clipped
pp
only

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Rec'd fm
Baker
11/20

Dear Mr. President,

I think that our agreement to meet in early December was a timely decision. It is viewed that way throughout the world.

We have much to talk about and to discuss, and I am looking forward to a free-flowing and informal conversation, to a meeting without too much protocol.

Our meeting, Mr. President, will be taking place at a time of a new beginning, a clear turning point in the course of world events. A time for us, I think, to take a broad, conceptual view of the role of our two countries in that process and to assess the responsibility which you and I, personally, will have to shoulder.

In this context and, of course, with due regard for the national interests of each of our two countries we shall have to discuss the fundamental aspects of the further development of Soviet-American relations.

What is notable about the current situation is, in my view, the fact, that you and I already can predict the course of the relationship with a great deal of certainty. Surely we can think together about the practical meaning of the new closeness which you, Mr. President, have proclaimed. We can try to formulate an overall concept of Soviet-American relations, which it will be our task to implement in the coming years, at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

Without going into the specific issues of the Soviet-American agenda let me just say that they will probably have to be discussed in one degree or another, most likely with a view to giving an additional impetus at our level to the negotiating process, particularly in Geneva and Vienna.

In the current crucial period some particularly sensitive problems have arisen in the world, which require that big powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States give them special attention and show extraordinary caution and responsibility in assessing and approaching them. We shall probably discuss them too, for it is important not to leave anything unsaid or unclear in that regard.

We will be able, as we agreed, to talk about anything without being constrained by some fixed agenda, with maximum openness and trust and with the hope that our meeting will consolidate the movement "from mutual understanding to mutual action" in the process of Soviet-American dialogue.

See you soon.

Sincerely,

Mikhail Gorbachev

Уважаемый господин президент!

Думаю, что наша договоренность о встрече в начале декабря была своевременным решением. Так она воспринимается и во всем мире.

Нам есть о чем поговорить. Есть, что обсудить — тем более в условиях свободного, неофициального разговора, без протокольных излишеств.

Наша с Вами встреча, господин президент, будет происходить в момент, когда уже явственно обозначилось начало перелома во всем мировом развитии. И пора, видимо, посмотреть в широком, концептуальном плане на роль наших двух государств в этом процессе и определиться с мерой ответственности, которая ложится и лично на нас с Вами.

В этом контексте и, разумеется, с учетом национальных интересов каждой из обеих стран, предстоит обсудить принципиальную сторону дальнейшего развития советско-американских отношений.

Как мне представляется, особенность нынешней ситуации в том, что мы с Вами уже можем с большой долей уверенности прогнозировать эти отношения. Во всяком случае поразмышлять о практическом содержании, "новой близости" США с СССР, которую Вы, господин президент, провозгласили. Попытаться выстроить общую концепцию советско-американских отношений, которую именно нам с Вами придется воплощать в жизнь в предстоящие годы, в канун XXI века.


Не буду сейчас касаться конкретных вопросов советско-американской повестки дня. Они, надо полагать, будут в той или иной степени затрагиваться, причем, скорее всего, в целях дать на нашем с Вами уровне дополнительный импульс переговорным процессам, особенно в Женеве и в Вене.

В нынешнее переломное время в мире возникли проблемы особо деликатного порядка. От таких держав, как СССР и США, они требуют особого внимания и сугубой осторожности и ответственности в оценках и в подходе к ним. Наверное, мы поговорим и о них: тут важно не оставлять недоговоренности или неясности.

Мы можем, как условились, говорить обо всем, не будучи ограничены какой-то фиксированной повесткой дня, в обстановке максимальной откровенности и доверительности и в расчете на то, что эта наша встреча закрепит движение в советско-американском диалоге "от взаимопонимания к взаимодействию".

До скорой встречи.

С уважением



From the desk of
George Bu

clipped
sheets
only

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Following Page

~~SECRET~~

11/15/89

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DRAMATIC EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BERLIN AND THE GDR THAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 10. I WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ARE CORRECT AND PROMISING. THE LIFTING OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR THE POPULATION OF THE GDR REPRESENTS A HISTORIC STEP. I BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOAL OF CREATING A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU AT OUR MEETING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NEXT MONTH.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDABLY HIGH EMOTIONS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, THE EVENTS IN RECENT DAYS IN BERLIN HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL. WE SHARE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER ARE MAINTAINED, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN. IN FACT, THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH OUR GERMAN PARTNERS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THIS REMAINS THE CASE. I SUGGEST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THE INTERESTS OF AVOIDING SURPRISES OR THE EMERGENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1031-MR
SLS 5/20/13

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU VOICED CONCERN THAT THE LEADERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE FRG LEADERSHIP HAS ACTED WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CHANGE IN THE GDR AND THE NEED TO AVOID DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

AS FOR THE APPROACH OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT, LET ME SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE DEPTH AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO LIFT CONTROLS ON THE TRAVEL OF ITS CITIZENS, AND WE WELCOME ITS EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM -- A COURSE WHICH REFLECTS THE WILL OF THE POPULATION OF THE GDR. I HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON SEE LEGISLATION ENACTED THAT CODIFIES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND THAT THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP WILL WORK WITH OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THESE STEPS WILL NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT THEY COULD LEAD AS WELL TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

LET ME ADD THAT I BELIEVE YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING YOUR ALLIES TO EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT THE

CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OWN PLANS TO MODIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ABROAD, AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. I HOPE THAT PRAGUE AND SOFIA WILL BE THE NEXT WARSAW PACT CAPITALS TO FEEL THE INVIGORATING BREEZE OF PERESTROYKA.

THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OF OUR ALLIES ARE UNITED IN THE VIEW THAT PERESTROYKA IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, BUT THAT ITS SUCCESS WILL OPEN THE WAY TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN WEST AND EAST. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR AND IN OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, NOR IS IT OUR WISH TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY ALL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION FROM OUR OWN STATEMENTS, I TRUST THAT YOU DO THE SAME.

SINCERELY,

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

043775
MESSAGE NO. 043775 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 3
FROM ELIZABETH MCKUNE S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW RE REPLY TO GORBACHEV
MESSAGE ON BERLIN

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	G. PHILIP HUGHES	2224	GFWW
NSCS	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	<i>Blackwell/Rice</i>		
	<i>Bittmann</i>		
	HUTCHINGS		

FOR CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS PLEASE CLEAR BY: 33/35 Hurt to bright

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/2/09

S/S Officer

Elizabeth McKune
ELIZABETH MCKUNE

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

11/15/89
1820

Bent -- For your
clearance.

BB Blackall

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	7	SS	8	SS

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EUR:RGHSEITZ

EUR:JFBOBBINS
EUR/CE:PSHOSTAL/AGOODMAN
EUR/EEY:JHOOPEY
S/S:

EUR:CLKAMMAN
S/P:WBURNS
NSC:
S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE

MOSCOW, BONN IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

LONDON, PARIS IMMEDIATE, USBERLIN PRIORITY,
EMBERLIN PRIORITY, USNATO PRIORITY
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PDIP, UR, US, GE, GC

SUBJECT: REPLY TO GORBACHEV MESSAGE ON BERLIN

REF: A) STATE 363047, B) STATE 364359, C) BONN 36036

1. X - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOR MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH
GORBACHEV OR SHEVARDNADZE TO DELIVER PARA 4 TEXT OF
PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE SOVIET LEADER'S NOVEMBER 10
MESSAGE ON BERLIN (REF A). THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

3. FOR BONN: EMBASSY MAY INFORM BONN GROUP COLLEAGUES
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS REPLIED TO GORBACHEV ALONG THE
LINES OF THE CONSENSUS REPORTED IN REF C, BUT SHOULD NOT
DISTRIBUTE THE TEXT. EMBASSY SHOULD INDICATE THAT HE
BELIEVE THIS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL,
AND THAT HE HOPE ALL ALLIES WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE
CLOSELY ON THIS SENSITIVE SUBJECT. YOU SHOULD INQUIRE OF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1031-MR
SCS 5180/13

SECRET

Brent -- for your
clearance.

BB Blackwill

~~SECRET~~

2

THE FRENCH REP WHETHER HE HAS RECEIVED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING PARIS'S RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV MESSAGE TO MITTERRAND.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DRAMATIC EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BERLIN AND THE GDR THAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 10. I WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ARE CORRECT AND PROMISING. THE LIFTING OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR THE POPULATION OF THE GDR REPRESENTS A HISTORIC STEP. I BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOAL OF CREATING A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU AT OUR MEETING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NEXT MONTH.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDABLY HIGH EMOTIONS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, THE EVENTS IN RECENT DAYS IN BERLIN HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL. WE SHARE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER ARE MAINTAINED, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN. IN FACT, THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH OUR GERMAN PARTNERS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THIS REMAINS THE CASE. I SUGGEST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THE INTERESTS OF AVOIDING SURPRISES OR THE EMERGENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU VOICED CONCERN THAT THE LEADERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE FRG LEADERSHIP HAS ACTED WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CHANGE IN THE GDR AND THE NEED TO AVOID DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

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~~SECRET~~

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THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP WILL WORK WITH OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THESE STEPS WILL NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT THEY COULD LEAD AS WELL TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

LET ME ADD THAT I BELIEVE YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING YOUR ALLIES TO EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OWN PLANS TO MODIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ABROAD, AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. I HOPE THAT PRAGUE AND SOFIA WILL BE THE NEXT WARSAW PACT CAPITALS TO FEEL THE INVIGORATING BREEZE OF PERESTROYKA.

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SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

44

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1989

Message delivered by
Soviet Amb Yuriy Dubinin
in meeting with General Scowcroft
on Friday, November 10, 1989.

Per Gen Scowcroft's request,
copy faxed to Bob Gates and
copy given to Blackwill/Rice.

Wilma

*classified
Secret / Sensitive*

From the desk of
George Bu

*Whole
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In view of the rather extreme situation obtaining at this point in connection with the events in the GDR, its capital and West Berlin, and noting a cardinal and, in my view, a correct and promising nature of the decisions being taken by the new GDR leadership, I have just sent a verbal message to Chancellor Kohl of the FRG about whose contents I deem it necessary to inform you as well.

According to the reports that are reaching us, a rally is going to take place today in West Berlin with the participation of officials from the FRG and West Berlin. Concurrently, another rally is scheduled to be held in the GDR capital. Given the present virtual openness and mass flows of people in both directions, there is a possibility that a chaotic situation may emerge with unforeseeable consequences.

I have urged Chancellor Kohl to take the necessary and most urgent measures to prevent a complication and a destabilization of the situation.

Our Ambassador in Berlin has been instructed to immediately contact representatives of the three powers' administration in West Berlin. I hope that you, for your part, will also issue appropriate instructions to your representative so that developments do not take an undesirable turn.

On the whole, I believe it useful to emphasize the depth and seriousness of the changes presently taking place in the GDR. But when statements are made in the FRG designed to stir up emotions, in the spirit of implacable rejection of the post-war realities, that is, the existence of two German states, then such manifestations of political extremism can only be seen as aimed at undermining the current dynamic processes of democratization and renewal of all aspects of the society's life. And, looking ahead, this can bring about a destabilization of the situation not only in Central Europe, but on a larger scale.

I wish to express the hope for the understanding of all this on your part.

From the desk of
George Bu

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THE WHITE HOUSE

November 7, 1989

Dear Raisa:

I have asked General Scowcroft to pass along to you a suggestion that I am very enthusiastic about.

George has decided, and I concur, that the character, location, and the site of the upcoming meeting on board ship makes it inappropriate for me to accompany him to Malta. However, knowing that you will be in Italy with your husband, I wanted to suggest to you that I meet you in Italy.

I have never been to Florence and it occurred to me we could meet in that beautiful city. If Florence doesn't appeal, I would love to meet you in Rome. In either place, we could have good discussions, renew our friendship, and perhaps jointly, in some way, show the concerns that we both feel for some of the world's problems. Your interests in the fine arts and the preservation of historic monuments and mine in expanding literacy could both be accommodated in either location.

THE WHITE HOUSE

2

If for some reason none of this can be worked out, let me assure you I am really looking forward to seeing you in Washington at the "Summit" next year. I have enjoyed our previous meetings.

Most sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Barbara Bush". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Barbara Bush

Mrs. Raisa Maksimovna Gorbachev
The Kremlin
Moscow

11-13-89

Dear Mrs. Bush,

I sincerely appreciate your kind letter transmitted through General Scowcroft and the good feelings expressed in it.

It is with great pleasure that I recall our previous meetings. I really very much wanted to meet with you once again, and to talk about the problems that are of interest to both of us, and I feel those may be quite a few. Therefore, it seemed to me that a joint visit to Malta would give us a good opportunity to do so.

As such, our joint trip to Florence would have been a wonderful idea. At one time, I already had an opportunity to see this magnificent city of the world with its enchanting and wondrous richness of artistic treasures. Unfortunately, however, to go to Florence or some other city in Italy after Mikhail Sergeyevich and I would have already completed our visit to that country would not, I feel, look logical. I think you will agree.

Mrs. Barbara BUSH
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Bush, I shall have full understanding, if you will not be able to accompany the President on his trip to Malta. I do believe that you and I shall not fail to avail ourselves of a future opportunity, whenever it presents itself, to renew our direct contacts and conversations.

In the meantime, I wish you all the very best. I am confident that you and I share the hope for the success of the forthcoming Soviet-US meeting in Malta.

Sincerely,

Raisa GORBACHEVA

Moscow

November 13, 1989

Дорогая госпожа Буш,

Сердечно благодарю за Ваше любезное письмо, переданное через генерала Скоукрофта, и выраженные в нем добрые чувства.

Я с большим удовольствием вспоминаю наши предыдущие встречи. Мне искренне хотелось вновь встретиться с Вами, поговорить о проблемах, которые интересуют и Вас, и меня, — а таковых, чувствую, у нас немало. Поэтому мне казалось, что совместное посещение Мальты предоставило бы нам для этого удобную возможность.

Сама по себе идея нашей с Вами поездки во Флоренцию была бы превосходной. Однажды я уже имела возможность посетить этот великолепнейший город мира, прельщающий удивительным богатством своих художественных сокровищ. Однако, к сожалению, посещение Флоренции или какого-то другого итальянского города уже по завершении нашего с Михаилом Сергеевичем визита в эту страну, думается, выглядело бы нелогичным. Полагаю, Вы согласитесь с этим.

Госпоже Барбаре БУШ
Белый дом
Вашингтон

Дорогая госпожа Буш, я с полным пониманием отнесусь к тому, если Вы не сможете сопровождать президента в поездке на Мальту. Верю, что мы с Вами не преминем воспользоваться последующей возможностью, когда она появится, для того, чтобы возобновить наши непосредственные контакты, беседы.

Тем временем желаю Вам всего самого доброго. Уверена, что мы с Вами одинаково надеемся на успех предстоящей советско-американской встречи на Мальте.

С искренним уважением,

Раиса ГОРБАЧЕВА

Москва

13 ноября 1989 года

Unofficial translation

Dear Mrs. Bush,

I sincerely appreciate your kind letter transmitted through General Scowcroft and the good feelings expressed in it.

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Moscow

November 13, 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 15, 1989

Dear Raisa,

I got your good letter
and I certainly understand.
I will look forward to seeing
you when you and the President
come to the United States next
year.

Please feel free to let me know
what you would like to see when
you are here. All of America
is awaiting your visit with
great anticipation.
Most warmly - Barbara

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to Mrs. Bush

Mrs. Barbara BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Barbara,

It was a pleasure to have received a letter from you,
which E.A. Shevardnadze delivered to me.

I look forward with the same great interest as you do
to our meeting, to personal contacts with you. I am glad
to have an opportunity to visit your country once again,
to see America, to meet with its people.

As far as I know, joint work is now getting under way
to prepare a program for the visit of the USSR President.
My possible plans will depend on this program. I thank you
in advance for attention to them.

With the best of feelings and wishes

(signature)

Moscow

May 2, 1990

Госпоже Барбаре БУШ

БЕЛЫЙ ДОМ

ВАШИНГТОН


Дорогая Барбара,

Мне было приятно получить от Вас письмо, которое передал
Э.А.Шеварднадзе.

Так же, как и Вы, я с большим интересом жду нашей встречи,
личных контактов с Вами. Рада возможности вновь побывать в вашей
стране, видеть Америку, общаться с ее людьми.

Сейчас, насколько я знаю, начинается совместная работа над
программой визита Президента СССР. Исходя из нее будут решаться
возможности моих планов. Я заранее благодарю Вас за внимание
к ним.

С самыми добрыми чувствами и пожеланиями



Москва

" 2 " мая 1990 года

Госпоже БАРБАРЕ БУШ

P Handed to
Shevardnadze
on 4-6-90

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 5 - 1990

Dear Raisa,

We are so pleased that
a date has been set for our
husbands' meeting.

On Friday, June 1st, I have
been invited to give the graduation
speech at Wellesley College, a
fine women's college in our
State of Massachusetts near Boston.
I would love to have you
join us. We could fly up
on a government plane in the

morning and return by early afternoon.
I would hope that you would
speak to the graduating
class for about 5 to 6 minutes
and I would do the same.
It would be a great
opportunity for many young
women to learn about your
great country and your hopes
for the Russian women of
the same age group.

I do hope you will say
yes. Either way I look forward
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Baubaus

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for the Russian women of
the same age group.

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Barbara

**National Security Council
The White House**

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS Close Hold

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1989

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Attached are the one-on-one memcons from the Wyoming Ministerial. The Secretary would appreciate it if you hold them very closely.



Dennis B. Ross

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), July 21, 1997
By 31 NARA, Date 4/3/69

~~SECRET~~/NODIS ATTACHMENT

From the desk of
George Bu

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NSC cover)

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Thursday, September 21, 1989

Time: 6:30pm - 8:30pm

Place: On the Plane to Jackson Hole, Wyoming

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
USSR

Secretary: I am interested in knowing your view and your perspective on what just happened at your plenum. I would really like to get your assessment of what it means and what some of the implications are if that is okay with you.

Shevardnadze: The nationality problems are one of the most sensitive and difficult problems that we face. They need to be understood in their historical setting. Before the October revolution and in the first years after the revolution the people who populated all parts of Russia did not have their own entities. Before the revolution there were no national entities such as the Byelorussia or Azerbaijan. Instead what one saw were provinces sometimes with provincial rights. So one of the slogans or principles that was put forward by Lenin and our party was the principle of self-determination for the people who made up the Russian empire and it was on this principle that we formed the Soviet Union, a union not of provinces but of republics. Initially, the union consisted of the Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Later there was Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and some other republics were formed. In our constitution there was a provision that each republic would be a sovereign state which would delegate some of its rights to the Soviet Union. Such as rights on defense and diplomacy. Under Lenin these were the only two rights that the Union had. Nothing more was delegated to the Union. All those rights remained in the constitution. In practice they were not given. Instead there was great centralization of power. That centralization came not only because of the subjective views of our leaders at the time but because of the difficulty of the conditions in which our country found itself. Centralization was needed if a weak country was to be transformed into a strong one.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
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I think it is important to remember that World War I and the Civil War devastated our country. In addition, the economic and political blockade of our country made it that much more important to emphasize centralization. And one also has to realize that people were illiterate and it was important because of that to try to help raise the very low living and cultural standards that existed in most of their republics. As I said to the President we have no intention of negating our entire history. Despite all of our problems, and the problems that existed in our earlier decades, the Soviet Union was able, during a difficult period, to rebuild its national economy, its industrial base, its agricultural base, and its overall cultural standards. But, as I have said, this transformation took place in conditions of great centralization. Though constitutional rights existed that should have enabled the republics to develop independently the reality was that we developed as a unitary state. This served us well during a very difficult period because I can't imagine us going to war without centralization. And maybe there even was some justification after the war to maintain a highly centralized economy. We did after all have to rebuild. But in the 1960s and 70s it's clear that the actual gap between our constitutional rights and the actual practice in the republics was great and was also harmful. It is not surprising that during this period as the intelligentsia grew in each republic that they would want to have rights of greater self-expression. After all, every nation has its writers, its artists and its intellectuals. At that time we misled ourselves into thinking that the nationality problem had been definitively resolved. That was a mistake and it was wrong to think that way. Every nation is a living entity. It grows, it revolves; and it was a mistake to think the nationality problem could be solved once and for all.

We are now developing a new nationality policy but we should have done this 25 years ago. Now we must consider the need for maximum independence of the republics in all areas starting with the economy. We have decided that the republics should have a completely free hand in managing all sectors of their economies with very few exceptions; for example, energy, the railroads, possibly metal and steel and possibly also civil aviation. It is really unreasonable to try to divide these kinds of economic sectors. Also, some branches of the defense sector must belong to the Center. All the rest of the economic sectors should be transferred to the republics with the republics owning and having responsibility for light industry, machine building, construction, education, services, etc. We are now trying to implement the constitutional principle that our republics are sovereign states. We are in the process of searching for a political solution for the relations between

the republics and the Center. If I were to speak from purely a formal standpoint I might tell you that everything seems okay. After all, each republic has its own parliament, can discuss questions relating to the budget of the republic, and other related issues. Also each republic has the attributes of state power. Unfortunately, these attributes are not translated into reality. The truth is all important problems have to be taken to the Center. Now we are going to reverse this process. All these decisions will be sent back to the republics.

Baker: I take it this is what you meant by telling the President that you haven't firmly determined the method for defining completely economic autonomy and political autonomy under your existing system. But that your aim is to grant the republics extensive and real autonomy.

Shevardnadze: Yes. We aim to create greater independence, self-rule and a real autonomy for the republics. It is very important to have a division of functions between the Center and the republics. For example, take the question of property. What belongs to the union, what belongs to the republics. One idea that we have is that there should be some common national or state property.

Baker: Do you mean there should be central government property and property that is owned by the republics?

Shevardnadze: Yes, indeed. We should have federal or union property that can't be managed only by one republic. We should then have republic properties, in effect, creating a situation where there are both union and republic properties or mixed properties. And by the way this should go down to the municipal level as well. I should note that within the republics there will be property that will belong to the cooperatives. And this must really be seen as private property.

Baker: To what extent do you envision that private property will exist within the system.

Shevardnadze: For the time being we would not envision that there would be private property on a large scale. However, the system of cooperatives implies that private property is going to exist. Members of the cooperative become owners of what they produce including the machines or the equipment that is responsible for production.

Baker: When I saw Boris Yeltsin he suggested that the private sector might be equal to about 15 percent of all property. He did not elaborate on that suggestion or observation. I must say that I didn't believe that that was a

particularly productive course to follow. For economic reform to be successful a way must be found to move to an incentive system that enhances competition, markets, etc. I understand that there is incentive built into the cooperative system and I want to talk to you in more detail about some of these economic issues later on. For now I would like to ask you some additional questions on the nationality issues.

I know that it is a sensitive area for you but I have to tell you that we have a problem vis-a-vis the Baltics. You have heard me say we really want the reform effort to succeed and we will do nothing to complicate that process. I have said it publicly that we do not want to see instability in the Soviet Union. But let me also tell you that it has been US policy for over 40 years not to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union. These Baltic states were independent. Now that policy of 40 years is a difficult one for us to change because after all there remains a very strong public sentiment in our country that identifies with these Baltic states.

We are very conscious of your concern about sovereignty and borders and will do nothing to exacerbate the problem. Nevertheless, as hard as we might try to move our relations forward with you it would be very hard to sustain positive relations if you were to find it necessary to use force in the Baltics. Let me just say to you that a strong reaction by us would be a given. So I am very hopeful that a peaceful way would be found to solve the nationality problem generally and especially in the Baltics. I raise this only so that you will understand the extraordinary pressure on us. I don't raise this to pressure you or to hector you.

Let me add one final point on nationalities. The President and I have both said that your response to the nationality problem to date has been praise-worthy, measured, and responsible. We hope it will continue in that direction. Can I ask one other question on the plenum? How do the political changes that have taken place at the plenum affect the prospects for perestroika?

Shevardnadze: Do you mean the personnel changes?

Baker: Yes.

Shevardnadze: Well, they are not the most important result. The changes are significant but they are not the most important result to emerge from the plenum. The most important result is that we have now produced a platform to propose to all the republics on the nationality question. Now people have

an idea of what we mean by federation. They also have an idea of what we mean by sovereignty within the federation and by the real rights that each republic will have. I can tell you that we had very sharp debates on the issue of language.

Baker: How did you come out on the issue of language?

Shevardnadze: We have made a decision that every republic and its people have a right to have a home language. There will now be an official state language for every republic and that will be the local language. The Russian language will be recognized as the federal language or the language for inter-national communication. In a multinational state like ours, one needs this. It is not unusual to develop in this fashion. India has two national languages. Switzerland has three. So it is not unusual.

Baker: Do you think this satisfies most of the nationality demands?

Shevardnadze: This is a major decision and a very serious decision. The question of language is a central one. In only one republic before was there a constitution that made the local language the official language and that is my native republic of Georgia. In 1978 when the 3rd Soviet constitution proposed removing this provision from the Georgian constitution the population arose and demonstrated and it was decided not to make this change.

As to your concern about the use of violence, let me just say that this is ruled out by us. That would mean an end a perestroika. It would restore what we used to call the dictatorship of the proletariat. We can't reverse our course. We can't go back to the past. In some areas we were compelled to use force but this was only in circumstances where different ethnic groups like the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians were practically engaging in genocide. Here force was required to restore order. In the Baltics, no one intends to use force. As you know, in Georgia force was used and there were tragic consequences. Gorbachev and I were out of the country when that decision was made. That decision was taken by republican authorities. When we came back and saw this we sacked the people responsible. We condemned their decision, and we made it clear that the use of force is inconsistent with our principles. But extremism can produce some unfortunate reactions. Look at a place like Estonia which is a small republic. One-third of the population is Russian speaking. If Estonians insist on something illegal or want to separate from the Soviet Union how will the native Russians react? You know there are separatists in Estonia. They are not the majority but they exist.

Baker: How would a referendum on self-determination in Estonia come out? How, for example, would people vote on whether to stay within the Soviet Union or to choose to leave it?

Shevardnadze: There would probably be differences among ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians on how to answer this question. But I can tell you that I think complete separation wouldn't be practical from Estonia's interests. After all Estonia's economy is interlaced with the rest of the republics. Let me give you an example. There is a huge factory in Riga that produces radio equipment. That factory has an enormous network of suppliers throughout the rest of the country. In fact this factory is an assembly plant and has 25,000 workers. Separation would mean that the entire system is broken up and it would take a long time to build new economic relations. Similarly Estonia has important long time technical and scientific links to the Soviet establishment. And like many republics Estonia has specialized in certain areas. Estonia is mainly responsible for producing meat, milk, and potatoes. These products are exported to other republics. It must import all its other needs. It imports its grains, its energy, its fuel needs, its raw materials and so forth. One could go ahead and try to build another economic net but it would take them 20 years.

Baker: So you think that because it is impractical the vast majority of those in Estonia and elsewhere in the republic would chose to stay in the Soviet Union?

Shevardnadze: I spent my vacation in the south this year and I visited Georgia. And I talked with many of the Georgian separatists. And at one point I said to them okay let's assume you have your complete freedom and you can do what you want. If you chose to leave the Soviet Union what's going to happen in a week's time? Your metal plants would be stopped because you will need your supplies, your machine building would be stopped because of a lack of supplies and spare parts, your light industry would experience the same stoppage, you will need to get bread from elsewhere, sugar from elsewhere. You eat 40,000 kilograms of butter and 38,000 come from outside, the majority of your oil and natural gas come from outside -- you tell me what is going to happen after separation.

Baker: I understand the impracticality of independence for each republic.

Shevardnadze: You know the Swedes, the Finns and the Danish have very close relations with the Baltic republics. And they have very actively advised against the separatism.

They see it as a complication for them. The current leader of the Estonian Communist Party is a good friend of mine. We worked together in the youth organization and I have stayed in close touch with him over the years. You know he and I have a good and frank relationship and I asked him the same question you asked me. Would the Estonians prefer to leave the Soviet Union or stay. He said that they would not prefer to leave.

Baker: Let me raise two points. First, if it's totally impractical and the majority would choose to stay in any given republic, why not solve the problem by having a referendum? If you grant people the right of self-determination and they can vote on what they want to do, and if the majority vote to stay, then the separatists will no longer have a basis on which to push for separation. Second point: Isn't there a difference between the Baltic republics, which were once independent countries, and the others which were never independent?

Shevardnadze: First, on the question of the referendum, this is a constitutional question. This is a question for the national or union constitution and for each republican constitution. In the current constitutions there are no provisions for referendums. The fact is the union constitution doesn't provide any regulation on how the process of self-determination should take place. The Supreme Soviet has established a commission to develop a new union constitution and there are also commissions set up for the republic constitutions. If these constitutions provide for referendums then there is no reason why the referendum shouldn't take place.

You are raising an important issue and it needs to be addressed. But I would also note that the constitutions must answer the question not only of whether republics have the right to secede, but must also deal with other aspects of self-determination as well. After all, secession is only one aspect of self-determination and our objective is to produce real self-determination for our republics. We still have to determine how best to express the right of self-determination. A referendum is one way to do so. Perhaps in the congress of peoples deputies other ways would be discussed.

As for your point on the Baltic Republics, it is true that they joined the Soviet Union in 1939-40 and this was later than the others. But you might note that the Transcaucas republics were independent for three years after the October revolution. There were separate governments in Baku and in Yerevan. These governments in fact were set up under Kerensky. So, there may not be as much a difference here as you think and, indeed if the Baltics were to leave people, in Transcaucas might say why shouldn't we leave also. Frankly, it is okay for this to be a

part of our open debate. We don't fear to debate. Indeed we have a huge stadium in Moscow and a covered sports arena and people are coming there all the time to demonstrate. And these demonstrations are not banned and they are called by formal and informal groups. Indeed Boris Yeltsin gathers people there twice a week. I am confident that as we debate these issues openly people would come to see the real facts and the consequences of their decisions. I mentioned to the President that as we see politicization of the Soviet Union we are going to have a pluralization of opinion.

Baker: I am glad to hear that the questions being debated in the constitution are such that a discussion on a referendum would be permitted. I really believe that would be the best way to draw the poison out of the nationality problem. Once people have had an opportunity to express themselves through referendum they really wouldn't have a basis on which to complain. Perhaps then much of the agitation and unrest would disappear.

Shevardnadze: For the time being, they are not raising or demanding a referendum. But you are right; this possibility must be considered by the constitutional commission. We couldn't foresee everything in the development of our party platform on nationalities and that is why the Congress and Supreme Soviet established these commissions.

Baker: I would like to offer a comment on Eastern Europe. I hope the way we are approaching events in Eastern Europe is not troublesome to you. We do not desire to stir things up or ferment unrest. We are going to handle relations much the way the President did when he went to Poland and Hungary. We are going to try to assist Poland and Hungary in moving their economies towards more of a free market system. We are going to encourage them to develop private sectors. We would like for our relations with regard to Eastern Europe to be based on the principle of "no surprises." In that connection you told me you were going to Nicaragua. I would like to let you know that there is some chance that I may make a trip to Eastern Europe. Would that cause any problem for you in any way?

Shevardnadze: No. We are happy and pleased to see good relations between you and Poland and Hungary. We would like to see an expansion of this good relations and see them extended to other countries in Eastern Europe. In this connection of expanding ties I suggested to the Iranians that they should develop good relations with you.

Baker: We appreciate what you did in Iran after our meeting in Paris.

Shevardnadze: Let me suggest that on Eastern Europe that an unstable Poland would neither be good for you nor for us. By the same token a rupture of all of Poland's links with the Soviet Union would be suicide. Currently they have a 40 billion ruble debt to us. You surely can't solve their problems by yourself. On the outset we have built relations with Poland, and I might just add confidentially to you that we have given in the last few years 6.5 billion ruble alone, with interest rates of only about 4.8 percent.

Baker: Where do I apply?

Shevardnadze: You could ask the Poles what they pay for their oil and gas from us. Frankly, they don't know what world prices mean. So if you rupture all links, it would be suicide just like it would be suicide for the Baltic states. No one could take Poland under its wing, certainly not Germany. Yes, they could work with Poland, but no one could throw the kind of money at Poland that it really needs. Only we've done that. Only we've wasted our money.

Baker: How much does Hungary owe you?

Shevardnadze: Probably 4.5 billion.

Baker: They do a better job with their economy.

Shevardnadze: Well, they live better. But their per capital debt is actually higher than Poland's by a factor of 1.5. Of course their standards in industry and agriculture are much higher.

Baker: I have understood your views on Eastern Europe and their continued interest in the Warsaw Pact is essential. Do you feel as strongly about as remaining a part of CEMA?

Shevardnadze: I have got a reasonable proposal for you. Let's disband both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Let's release your allies and ours. While NATO exists, the Warsaw Pact also exists. As for CEMA it needs reconstruction. If that organization rebuilt itself into a sufficient organization, it will exist. If it continues working the way it does now it will serve neither our allies nor us. We are working to reform it but will have to see how it does. Could I mention a statement Kohl made at the Congress of his party? If you haven't read it might be worth your reading it.

Baker: I haven't read it but I will. What was its general thrust?

Shevardnadze: Well it is very similar to statements made by German leaders in the 1930s and it created a serious concern for us.

Baker: Did it talk about reunification?

Shevardnadze: Not just that although that is a part of it. No, he spoke in terms of ultimatum and he also said that the Soviet Union is on the verge of crumbling, Eastern Europe is on the verge of crumbling; CEMA is on the verge of crumbling; and the task in the West, Kohl said, was to see what it should be doing under such circumstances.

Baker: You know we always speak about self-determination because it goes to the essence of our philosophy. But we don't want to see instability anywhere in Eastern Europe and certainly not in the GDR. Rather, what we would like to see in Eastern Europe is a Europe that is whole and free, where the divisions have been ended, and all of this is accomplished in a peaceful fashion. I think that is the view of the federal republic as well.

Shevardnadze: We also want to see a common European house. But, it's important to respect existing realities.

Baker: As perestroika advances and gets applied to the GDR perhaps one won't see so many people wanting to leave the GDR. As you know, perestroika has been lagging in the GDR.

Shevardnadze: That's true but it is up to every country to decide how it wants to live.

Baker: When you have thousands of people seeking to leave, however, they obviously are saying something about the system and how it is working.

Shevardnadze: Well that is not always true. We in the Soviet Union are going through a period when we are allowing much greater freedom and yet we are having almost a 100,000 people a year leaving. You know from the standpoint of the freedom of expression we have never had people so good and yet people want to leave. As for the GDR, one has to admit that they have a high standard of living. They have a well-developed social infrastructure. Their housing problem is largely solved. They have day care centers. They produce lots of athletic champions.

Baker: So, how do you explain all of those people leaving?

Shevardnadze: Well it could be a division of families, relatives, that could be playing a part. But, let me say, it is not up to us to solve this problem, it is up to them. If I were in their shoes I'd let everybody who wants to go leave. Of course, it is true that if as many one million people leave that would be a serious problem for Eastern Europe, but I would let them go.

Baker: I've talked before about the importance of your having a new pricing system and making the ruble convertible. After studying the situation more carefully, I am convinced that before you can move on price reform or convertibility, action must be taken to soak up the ruble overhang. When we have our discussion on economic issues I am prepared to go into more detail on how to do that. In so doing, I don't mean to imply that we have all the answers. In fact, the value of my suggestions may be worth the price that you have to pay for them, but we have some new ideas that might be helpful to you I am prepared to go through those with you if it is of interest to you.

Shevardnadze: Moving on price reform is very difficult for us.

Baker: I know that but price reform and convertibility are necessary for opening the door for making the Soviet Union an attractive place for outside investment. When I was at Treasury I use to say that our great economic trump card is that we were open to foreign investment. Some fear foreign investment but it means jobs, technology and output. It also means you are using others' capital to create a better economy. We have some ideas on how you might take a number of steps that will make it possible for you to soak up the ruble overhang as a necessary precursor to doing anything on prices. Secondly, I think that if you are going to make headway on prices and convertibility, you have got to institutionalize a system of competitiveness and incentives. Thirdly you are going to need to create a social safety net that helps cushion the political effects of going to a new pricing system.

Shevardnadze: Well, let's have this discussion. There is a question of what's going on with the US economy also. Currently, US companies are investing less in the US than they are investing elsewhere.

Baker: That is not exactly right. There is not as much investment in the US as we would like to see but our investment is increasing each year. Foreign investment is increasing even faster. One major reason for that is that we have lowered the value of the dollar against other major convertible currencies

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in the world. We did that to make ourselves more competitive from a trading standpoint that has reduced our trade deficit. In effect, what we have done is make property and businesses in the US cheaper for those with yen or sterling or marks, etc., to buy. What we have really done is create a good investment opportunity for people from the outside.

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