

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files

OA/ID Number: 91137
Folder ID Number: 91137-004

Folder Title:
China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Douglas H. Paal to Distribution List Re: Query frm Ambassador Lilley (1 pp.)	11/2/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to Doug Paal Re: Begin Text: (2 pp.)	11/2/90	(b)(1)	S
02c. Cable	From White House Re: Message from Douglas Paal to Ambassador Lilley (1 pp.)	11/3/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable	General Scowcroft to Ambassador Lilley Re: Meeting with Henry Kissinger, 9 September (3 pp.)	9/10/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to General Scowcroft Re: Possible Chinese Arms Deal with Iraq (2 pp.)	9/12/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Request	Re: Request for Appointments [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	10/24/90	(b)(6)	
05b. Request	Re: Request for Appointments [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	10/24/90	(b)(6)	
06. Memo	Douglas H. Paal to Distribution List Re: Tea [FOIA exempt information redacted] (1 pp.)	10/5/90	(b)(1); (b)(6)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1137
OA/ID Number: 91137-004
Date Closed: 5/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Memo	POTUS to Brent [Scowcroft] Re: CHINA (ramblings from the Oval) (1 pp.)	9/13/90	(b)(1)	✓
08. Letter	President Bush to Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	
09a. Letter	President Bush to Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	8/30/90	(b)(1)	
09b. Post It Note	Re: Brent (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09c. Draft Letter	President Bush to Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09d. Draft Letter	President Bush to Deng Xiaoping (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09e. Draft Letter	President Bush to Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09f. Draft Letter	President Bush to Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
10a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Lilley from Mr. Doug Paal (1 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	S
10b. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to Doug Paal Re: Begin Text: (2 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	S
11a. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jim Lilley Re: Flight Clearance Request (1 pp.)	6/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11b. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jim Lilley Re: Flight Clearance Request (1 pp.)	6/22/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Cable	Re: Chinese Drop Demand for USG "Restraint" of Fang, Offer Counterproposal for Fang's Statement (8 pp.)	6/20/90	(b)(1)	S
13a. Note	Bob Gates to POTUS Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	6/16/90	(b)(1)	S
13b. Non-Paper	Re: As the Chinese... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
13c. Non-Paper	Re: Schedule of Actions (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	6/13/90	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	Douglas H. Paal to Ambassador Lilley Re: Memorandum of Conversation (7 pp.)	6/18/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Nov-1990 12:00 EDT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Douglas H. Paal
(PAAL)

SUBJECT: Query from Ambassador Lilley

For General Scowcroft:

You should be aware of this cable from Jim Lilley. I believe Jim's recommendation is the right one, and will handle it with Bob Kimmitt (who will be at the Baker-Qian meeting), unless you instruct me otherwise.

Distribution:

FOR: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
FOR: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Karl Jackson	(JACKSON)
CC: William W. Working	(WORKING)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1167-MR
E8 12/29/15

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to Doug Paal Re: Begin Text: (2 pp.)	11/2/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Cable	From White House Re: Message from Douglas Paal to Ambassador Lilley (1 pp.)	11/3/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By EJ On 4/28/22

Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1173-MR (501.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/29/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

1.4(c)

<DTG> 030030Z NOV 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ^{1.4(c)} BEIJING

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM DOUGLAS PAAL TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY FOR HIS EYES ONLY.

BEGIN TEXT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHE. SECRETARY BAKER AND BOB KIMMITT WILL BE INFORMED AND PRIMED TO RESPOND, AS YOU RECOMMENDED, WITH THE BAREBONES OF THE STORY IF QIAN RAISES IT.

THE THINKING HERE IS THAT IF SADDAM SEEKS TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US AND THE CHINESE, IT WILL SIMPLY NOT BE CREDIBLE WITH BEIJING. WITH OVER 200,000 U.S. PERSONNEL OPPOSITE IRAQ, WHY WOULD WE, AS A MATTER OF POLICY, PLAY A STUPID GAME WITH IRAQI INTELLIGENCE?


AS YOU NOTED, THE STORY WILL LIKELY GET OUT EVENTUALLY. WHEN THE CHINESE SEE THAT WE HAVE DISCIPLINED OUR OFFICER, OR HEAR IT FROM SEC. BAKER, THEY SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT THIS WAS AN ISOLATED EPISODE.

END TEXT.

DECL OADR

#0110

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0110 <TOR> 901102192712 MSG000278882832



DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2009-1167 MR

28 12/29/15

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY[△]IN SIT SUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 100905Z SEP 90

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 100905Z SEP 90 PRIVACY CHANNELS
FM AMBASSADOR LILLEY, BEIJING 028
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT IMMEDIATE.

BEGIN TEXT

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH HENRY KISSINGER, 9 SEPTEMBER

1. I MET WITH HAK FOR A BRIEF PERIOD THE AFTERNOON OF 9 SEPTEMBER TO DEBRIEF HIM ON HIS MEETINGS WITH CHINESE LEADERS LI PENG, JIANG ZEMIN, AND YANG SHANGKUN ON 8 AND 9 SEPTEMBER. HAK GAVE ME AN OVERALL RUNDOWN ON HIS TALKS, BUT DID NOT SPECIFY IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES THE STATEMENTS BY SPECIFIC CHINESE LEADERS. HENCE, A FURTHER DEBRIEF IS NECESSARY, PARTICULARLY IF HAK MADE ANY APPROACH TO THE CHINESE ON KOREA.

2. THE CHINESE MADE THESE POINTS TO HAK:

-- THE CHINESE HAD CONCEDED A GREAT DEAL TO THE U.S. ALREADY. THIS INCLUDED THE RELEASE OF FANG LIZHI, THREE AMNESTIES FOR DISSIDENTS, SUPPORT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ, COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. ON CAMBODIA, LIFTING MARTIAL LAW AND IMPROVING ACCESS TO TIBET. IT WAS NOW TIME FOR THE U.S. TO MOVE. THE CHINESE HAD CARRIED OUT THEIR PART OF THE PACKAGE DEAL.

-- JIANG ZEMIN SAID THE U.S. SHOULD LIFT SANCTIONS NOW. THIS WAS SAID WITH A TONE OF RESENTMENT. JIANG'S COMMENT WAS ECHOED BY BOTH LI PENG AND YANG SHANGKUN. JIANG STRESSED THAT DENG HAD ORIGINALLY RAISED THE PACKAGE DEAL WITH HAK, AND THE CHINESE HAD MET THEIR PART OF THAT DEAL. JIANG ZEMIN SAID THE CHINESE WERE PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE U.S. WAS LEADING THE CHARGE ON RESTRICTING WORLD BANK LOANS. JIANG

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2009-1167MR
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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

EMPHASIZED THERE WOULD BE NO MORE GIVE ON THE CHINESE SIDE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. THE CHINESE ALSO WANTED THE RESTORATION OF HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES. THEY DID NOT SPECIFICALLY RAISE JIANG'S VISIT, BUT THEY SAID IT WAS TIME FOR RESUMPTION OF THESE EXCHANGES. THE CHINESE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT BUSH'S PREDICAMENT WITH CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION. THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS THEY HAD, AT OUR INSISTENCE, GONE ALONG ON THE IRAQI SANCTIONS.

4. FOR HIS PART, HAK SAID HE HAD SPENT MUCH OF HIS TIME EXPLAINING OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY TO THE CHINESE. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF SANCTIONS DID NOT WORK, THEN WHAT? MILITARY ACTION HAD TO BE A LOGICAL EXTENSION. HAK SAID THE CHINESE SHOULD STOP MAKING SUCH AN ISSUE OF BIG POWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF. THE CHINESE RESPONDED IN THEIR STANDARD WAY THAT THEY WERE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE, BUT UNDERSTOOD OUR DEFENSIVE COMMITMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA. BIG POWERS SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THESE INTERNAL ARAB MATTERS. HAK SAID IT CAME THROUGH CLEARLY TO HIM THAT THE CHINESE WERE MOST CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BRING IN THE SOVIETS MILITARILY AS A RESULT

OF THE SUMMIT MEETING IN HELSINKI ON 9 SEPTEMBER. HAK STRESSED THIS WAS A GREAT CHINESE FEAR. HAK WENT ON THAT HE TOLD THE CHINESE THAT THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE RANG FALSE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THEIR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST VIETNAM IN 1979. HE WENT ON THAT IF SOME FOREIGN POWER SEIZED MANCHURIA, WOULD THE CHINESE NOT SEE THE USE OF FORCE AS A NECESSARY RESPONSE? HAK SAID THAT PRESIDENT YANG SHANGKUN SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND HIS POINTS.

5. HAK FINALLY INFORMED THE CHINESE THAT HE WOULD BE TERMINATING HIS CHINA VENTURES PROJECT. HE SAID HE SIMPLY COULD NOT MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY INVOLVING CHINA WHEN HE HAD A PRIVATE COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN CHINA

6. ON A PERSONAL NOTE, LI PENG STRUCK HAK AS VERY CONFIDENT, FRIENDLY, AND WARM. HE SAID LI PENG IMMEDIATELY MENTIONED JIANG ZEMIN AS THE CORE LEADER IN CHINA. LI PENG WAS

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THE ONE LEADER WHO MOST STRESSED THE MFN ISSUE IN THE
CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.

7. I AM USING THIS CHANNEL BECAUSE MUCH OF WHAT WAS SAID
WAS LINKED TO THE "PACKAGE DEAL," ACCORDING TO HAK. PLEASE
SHARE THIS WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS AT STATE.

END TEXT

DECL OADR

#1069

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to General Scowcroft Re: Possible Chinese Arms Deal with Iraq (2 pp.)	9/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By ER On 4/28/22

Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1173-MR (503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/29/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
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 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 120527Z SEP 90

FM ^{1.4(c)} BEIJING

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 120527Z SEP 90 PRIVACY CHANNELS
WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM AMBASSADOR JAMES LILLEY

1. ~~SECRET~~ 120526Z SEP 90 PRIVACY CHANNELS
FM AMBASSADOR LILLEY, BEIJING 029
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT IMMEDIATE.

BEGIN TEXT

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE CHINESE ARMS DEAL WITH IRAQ

1. ^{1.4(c)} HE PENGFEI, OF THE PLA, WAS RECENTLY IN PYONGYANG NEGOTIATING A THREE-CORNERED DEAL. OSTENSIBLY CHINA WOULD SHIP ARMS TO NORTH KOREA WHICH, IN ITS TURN, WOULD SELL THEM TO IRAQ. MOST OTHER EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT CHINA HAS TAKEN A GENERALLY RESPONSIBLE AND COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE IN ARMS SALES TO IRAQ. THIS CONTRADICTORY REPORTING IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH PAST CHINESE PRACTICES. CHINESE ARMS MERCHANTS, LARGELY ON THEIR OWN, HAVE TRIED TO STRIKE DEALS ON ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST--AND IN SOME INSTANCES THEY HAVE BEEN OVERRULED BY THEIR HIGHER-UPS SUCH AS YANG SHANGKUN AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR. I BELIEVE OUR TIMELY INTERVENTIONS HAVE INFLUENCED CHINESE POLICY MAKERS TO MAKE THE RIGHT MOVES.

2. EARLIER--IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR--I WROTE TO YOU VIA THIS CHANNEL OF MY DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF HE PENGFEI. HE WAS THEN SELLING HUGE AMOUNTS OF ARMS TO US FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WHILE BEING IN THE MIDDLE OF INCOMPATIBLE CHINESE ARMS DEALINGS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE BEEN REASONABLY CONSISTENT. HIS PURPOSE IS TO MAKE MONEY FOR CHINA WITHOUT SUITABLE REGARD FOR OTHER

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1167-MR

28 12/29/15

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

POLITICAL FACTORS. HE KNOWS WE TOOK HIM ON THE F-8 AVIONICS DEAL AND HAS EXPRESSED SOME RESENTMENT. HE ALSO HAS REFUSED TO MEET WITH OUR DAO. PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE F-8 DEAL.

3.

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

IF THE INFO IS SUBSTANTIAL, STATE IS CONSIDERING A DEMARCHE TO THE CHINESE. I WANTED TO BRING THIS TO YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION BECAUSE OF ITS POSSIBLE IMPACT ON OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

END TEXT

DECL OADR

#0058

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Request	Re: Request for Appointments [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	10/24/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

*Florence
Yost*

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on October 24, 19 90

for THE PRESIDENT of WHITE HOUSE:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Tea with President and Mrs. Bush

HUNG, Huang

DOB: 7/19/61

SSN:

C

ZHANG, Hanzhi
(PRC citizen)

DOB: 6/11/35

Bush Library Photocopy

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Requested by Douglas H. Paal

Room No. Private Residence

Room No. 493 Telephone 5746

Time of Meeting 5:00 p.m.

Date of request October 22, 1990

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed:	5/8/2009	OA/ID Number:	91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

Florence
Gentle

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on October 24, 19 90
for DOUGLAS H. PAAL of NSC:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

HUNG, Huang

DOB: 7/19/61

SSN:

C

ZHANG, Hanzhi
(PRC citizen)

DOB: 6/11/35

Bush Library Photocopy

MEETING LOCATION

Building OEOB

Requested by Douglas Paal

Room No. 493

Room No. 493 Telephone 5746

Time of Meeting 4:30 p.m.

Date of request October 22, 1990

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1990

Wed
10/24
5:00
1 pm
==

Florence:

Patty Presock called as a result of General Scowcroft mentioning "a tea" to her asking for names/details.

I couldn't find anything in your "hold folder", meeting folders, calendar etc etc. so I went back to Doug Paal who provided attached and said that I should share it with Patty.

Copy attached for FYI.

Wilma

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	Douglas H. Paal to Distribution List Re: Tea [FOIA exempt information redacted] (1 pp.)	10/5/90	(b)(1); (b)(6)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
By ES on 4/28/22

Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1173-MR (504)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/29/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

05-Oct-1990 09:30 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)

FROM: Douglas H. Paal
(PAAL)

SUBJECT: Tea

The Chinese invited for tea are Mme Zhang Hanzhi (widow of former Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and friend of the President and Mrs. Bush during their time in Beijing) and

(b) (6)

who will not be in the US for the tea).

(b) (6)

The two understand that this will be an unpublicized meeting. Chinese officials are not and should not be made aware of this social contact.

FYI: Mme. Zhang is in the US on private vacation and official business. She will travel on an official agricultural delegation for a portion of her stay, and will call at IMF/World Bank while in Washington. Mme. Zhang is still a very outgoing, ironic woman with a great deal of inside knowledge on the leadership situation in China. She is also a frequent source for the Australian Embassy there and Washington Post and New York Times correspondents. s

Patty:

Invitation has been extended for 5:00 pm, Tuesday, October 23 -- as strictly a "social invitation" with President and Mrs. Bush.

Doug Paal would like to attend if possible -- he knows that it is "social" but it would be helpful if he could attend.

Wilma

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1167-MR
28 12/29/15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Staff has cy.

DATE: 9-13-90

FROM THE PRESIDENT

as

To: Brent

SUBJECT CHINA (ramblings from the Oval)

GIVEN HAK'S DEBRIEF OT LILLY
SHOULD WE THINK OF WHAT NEXT
STEPS IF ANY WE SHOULD TAKE.

WOULD IT BE HELPFUL, GIVEN
U.N. SOLIDARITY (if it holds)
TO HAVE HIGHER LEVEL VISIT

COULD WE REVIEW MATTERS WITH
AMBASSADOR OR IS THAT JUST
A WASTE OF TIME.

MAYBE A DISCUSSION WITH EXPERTS ON
WHAT NEXT WITH CHINA.....

IF CHINA REALLY FEELS THE NEXT
MOVE IS UP TO US WE NEED TO
DISPEL THAT NOTION....

MFN COULD FALL APART IF IRAQ
SUPPORT ERODES (FAR FETCHED BUT
POSSIBLE E.G. CHINA LEAVING US ON
FOOD SANCTIONS ETC.)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2630-MR
SCS 4/17/13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 30, 1990

Your Excellency:

I am writing to you, my old friend, to reemphasize the high importance I attach to the U.S.-China relationship. Our relations remain fundamental to peace and stability, not only in Asia, but in the entire world. This remains an objective fact, despite the tremendous difficulties and changes currently before us.

The United States will make no attempts to marginalize or downgrade this important strategic relationship. The recent U.S. policy adjustment on Cambodia is not a departure from our shared goal of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict there. Rather, it was an adjustment in approach necessary to overcome growing Congressional opposition to U.S. assistance to the Cambodian resistance. I regret that premature press leaks prevented appropriate consultations in advance with your government and that the leaks obscured the important progress toward our common objective made in the Perm Five discussions in Paris. I am gratified by the Perm Five Agreement this week on an interim administration for Cambodia and hope that the Cambodian factions can be induced to accept it in good faith.

I would also like to express my appreciation for the principled position taken by your government regarding the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. I believe a useful message is conveyed to all countries when our two governments can stand together in support of the fundamental principles of international conduct.

You and I, I believe, have tried our best to begin the process of restoring our relations to a more positive course. Both sides have taken steps, including some very big ones. Your difficult but

wise decision to permit the departure of the Fang Lizhi family was helpful, and I express my appreciation. In my judgment, this is likely to be a crucial factor in the most-favored-nation debate. Nevertheless, more remains to be done to implement the package solution. I have indicated desirable further steps in my previous letters and in discussions between our governments.

For now, I want to emphasize the priority I attach to the next U.S. step: winning a continuation of China's most-favored-nation status. That is, of course, a crucial next step. I am compelled to say, however, that more needs to be done on the Chinese side before I can guarantee a general improvement in our relations. Any such steps your side can take will move toward accomplishment of the package solution which is so much in our mutual interest. I am writing you this letter from our vacation spot on the Maine Coast. I am hopeful that you had some time for rest and recreation at your own special seaside place -- Beidaihe.

Please accept my warm, personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Beidaihe, China

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1990

NOTE FOR FILE:

Per General Scowcroft's instructions following telcon with Larry Eagleburger, State -- original of Deng letter hand-delivered in an EYES ONLY for Larry Eagleburger sealed envelope by WH Driver (Sgt Bedder) and handed directly to Sondra Almond (secy to LSE) at 5:30 pm.

No other distribution made; no copies retained by President's office. General Scowcroft took directly to the President for signature; handcarried back to ofc.

Wilma

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 30, 1990

Your Excellency:

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
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Please accept my warm, personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Beidaihe, China

From the desk of

George Bush

Brent

From the desk of

George Bush

Dear title Deng

Is this
Cambodian
stuff still
operation - ↓

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Excellency:
Dear Friend:

I am writing to you, my old friend, to reemphasize the high importance I attach to the U.S.-China relationship. Our relations remain fundamental to peace and stability, not only in Asia, but in the entire world. This remains an objective fact, despite the tremendous difficulties and changes currently before us.

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being made in the Perm Five discussions in Paris. I am
gratified and I am gratified by the Perm Five agreement
I would also like to express my appreciation for the principled position taken by your government regarding the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. I believe a useful message is conveyed to all countries when our two governments can stand together in support of the fundamental principles of international conduct.

You and I, I believe, have tried our best to begin the process of restoring our relations to a more positive course. Both sides have taken steps, including some very big ones. Your difficult but wise decision to permit the departure of the Fang Lizhi family was helpful, and I express my appreciation. In my judgment,

this week on an interim administration for Cambodia and that the Cambodian factions can be induced to accept it in good faith.

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Please accept my warm, personal regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Beidaihe, China

Dear Chairman Deng:

I am writing to you, my old friend, to reemphasize the high importance I attach to the U.S.-China relationship. Our relations remain fundamental to peace and stability, not only in Asia, but in the entire world. This remains an objective fact, despite the tremendous difficulties and changes currently before us.

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I would also like to express my appreciation for the principled position taken by your government regarding the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait. I believe a useful message is conveyed to all countries when our two governments can stand together in support of the fundamental principles of international conduct. When Congress

reconvenes, I plan to cite China's cooperative stance at the UN as a reason for us to have improved relations.

You and I, I believe, have tried our best to begin the process of restoring our relations to a more positive course. Both sides have taken steps, including some very big ones. Your difficult but wise decision to permit the departure of the Fang Lizhi family was helpful, and I express my appreciation. In my judgment, this is likely to be a crucial factor in our Congressional most-favored-nation debate. Nevertheless, more remains to be done to implement the package solution. As you know, I have indicated desirable further steps in my previous letters and in discussions between our governments.

For now, I want to emphasize the priority I attach to the next U.S. step: winning a continuation of China's most-favored-nation status. That is, of course, a crucial next step. I am compelled to say, however, that more needs to be done on the Chinese side before I can guarantee ^{a general improvement in our} ~~improved relations. will be possible.~~ Any such steps your side can take will move toward accomplishment of the package solution which is so much in our mutual interest.

I am writing you this letter from our vacation spot on the Maine Coast. I am hopeful that you had some time for rest and recreation at your own special seaside place - - Beiduh (Check spelling).

Please accept my warm, personal regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Beijing

Check spelling
of Teng's
Beidaihe, seaside
China vacation
place

Love and
care
Jus

Document Originally
Attached to
Previous Page

*Draft
Dism*

Dear Chairman Deng:

I am writing to you, my old friend, to reemphasize the high importance I attach to the U.S.-China relationship. Our relations remain fundamental to peace and stability, not only in Asia, but in the entire world. This remains an objective fact, despite the tremendous difficulties and changes currently before us.

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toward our common objective made in the Perm Five discussions in Paris.

Through Sec. Baker
I am instructing the State Department to be readily available for further talks with the Chinese side on this important question

I would also like to express my appreciation for the principled position taken by your government regarding the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait. I believe a useful message is conveyed to all countries when our two governments can stand together in support of the fundamental principles of international conduct.

when Congress reconvenes
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~~status. I believe I should do nothing that would excite the~~
step. I am compelled to say, however, that
~~political environment in the United States and make this more~~
more needs to be done on the Chinese
~~difficult. I am sure you will understand this strategy. Any~~
side before I can guarantee improved
~~such steps your side can take in the meantime will move us that much~~
relations will be possible
~~farther toward accomplishment of the package solution which is so~~
 much in our mutual interest.

??

I am writing you this letter from our vacation spot on the
 Please accept my warm, personal regards. *Maine Coast.* I am

Sincerely,

His Excellency
 Deng Xiaoping
 Beijing

hopeful that you had
some rest time, ^{for rest - recreation} at your
own special seaside
place - Bethesda f.??

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 16, 1990

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL 

Here is the redraft of the President's letter to Deng Xiaoping. I have made some additional minor editing.

Attachments
Azure Green and
Double-Spaced Draft

✓✓

- ✓ 1) Moskovich deal ✓
- 2) ✓ invite leaders on trip
- ✓ 3) UN money

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chairman Deng:

I am writing to you, my old friend, to reemphasize the high importance I attach to the U.S.-China relationship. Our relations remain fundamental to peace and stability, not only in Asia, but in the entire world. This remains an objective fact, despite the tremendous difficulties and changes currently before us.

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Please accept my warm, personal regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Beijing

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Lilley from Mr. Doug Paal (1 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By ES On 4/28/22

Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1173-MR (508)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/29/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
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- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT SDO SITTMANN
SIT: FILE PAAL PRIVACY OUT SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 241233Z JUN 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ^{1.4(c)} BEIJING

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY FROM
MR. DOUG PAAL.

REFERENCE BEIJING 021

BEGIN TEXT:

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN OVER THE CHANGE OF AIRFIELDS AND
KNOW THAT IT IS A PROBLEM, HOWEVER, THE REQUIRED APPROACH PLATES
ARE MOST LIKELY STORED ON THE SPECIAL PROJECT AIRCRAFT AND ARE NOT
READILY AVAILABLE.

NO WAY HAS BEEN FOUND AT THIS END TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM IN
THE TIME WE HAVE REMAINING.

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0180

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1167-MR
Eg 12/29/15

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to Doug Paal Re: Begin Text: (2 pp.)	6/24/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By EF On 4/28/22

Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1173-MR (508.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/29/2015

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
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN
SIT: FILE JACKSON PAAL PRIVACY IN SIT SUM

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 240424Z JUN 90

FM EMBASSY BEIJING

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 240424Z JUNE 90 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FM AMBASSADOR LILLEY, BEIJING 021

TO THE WHITE HOUSE. FOR EYES ONLY DOUG PAAL NIACT

IMMEDIATE

BEGIN TEXT

1. STATE HAS TOLD US YOKOTA AIR BASE DOES NOT HAVE APPROACH PLATES FOR NAN YUAN SO HAS ASKED US TO MOVE 25 JUNE FLIGHT BACK TO OLD CAPITAL AIRPORT, BEIJING. THIS STRIKES ME AS QUESTIONABLE ON TWO GROUNDS.

A US AIR FORCE C-135 FLYING INTO OLD CAPITAL AIRPORT IN BROAD DAYLIGHT WILL PROBABLY START RUMORS FLYING ALL OVER THIS TOWN. I HAD CONVINCED THE CHINESE TO MOVE THE FLIGHT TO NAN YUAN FOR THIS REASON.

US AIR FORCE PLANES HAVE BEEN FLYING INTO NAN YUAN SINCE 1971 - THE LATEST PEACE PEARL FLIGHT WAS JANUARY 1989 FROM YOKOTA. AS YOU KNOW THE SPECIAL PROJECT HAS FLIGHTS FROM YOKOTA TO NAN YUAN ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS AND THESE ARE CURRENT. WE HAVE NAN YUAN APPROACH PLATES HERE FROM JANUARY 1989 FLIGHT AND ARE IN PROCESS OF UPDATING THEM AT THIS MOMENT WITH THE CHINESE.

2. I SUGGEST YOU GET IN CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED]

1.4(c)

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HE COULD HELP YOU SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. WE HAVE TOLD TO EXPECT YOUR CALL BUT HAVE NOT TOLD HIM ANY BACKGROUND YET. ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] MAY PHONE YOU IF HE DOES NOT HEAR FROM YOU.

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2009-1167-NR
EJ 12/29/15

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

3. I SUGGEST YOU TELL ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] WE COULD WORK IT DIRECTLY WITH ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] FROM HERE. WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE NEED TO KNOW AND WOULD BE QUICKER AND MORE DIRECT. PLEASE APPROVE THIS APPROACH IMMEDIATELY IN THIS CHANNEL.

4. ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED]
^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] AND WE ARE TAKING MOST OF THE NAVIGATION DATA FROM THESE TO CREATE A FLIGHT PLAN FOR THE USAF AIRCRAFT. WE WILL SUBMIT THIS TENTATIVE PLAN TO THE CHINESE TODAY. HOWEVER. WE WILL NEED TO HAVE YAKOTA CONFIRM AND FINALIZE THE PLAN AND TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WE WILL NEED AUTHORIZATION TO PASS THE APPROACH PLATES TO THE CREW.

5. KENT WIEDEMAN KNOWS WE DO NOT FAVOR THE C-135 BEING SWITCHED BACK TO OLD CAPITOL AIRPORT.

END TEXT

DECL OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11a. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Jim Lilley Re: Flight Clearance Request (1 pp.)	6/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1990 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By ES On 4/28/22

Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1173-MR (509)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/29/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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PAGE 01

PRT: GATES PAAL COMM ^{(b)(6)} SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY OUT SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 230022Z JUN 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ^{1.4(c)} /BEIJING

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JIM LILLEY
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT

SUBJECT: FLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUEST

PER AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, FOLLOWING ARE THE FLIGHT DATA:

C-135 (B MODEL);

TAIL NUMBER 24126;

CALL SIGN: SAM 126

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0177

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6/22 8:00 pm

dictated by
Doug Paal - to go
out immediately

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June 22, 1990

VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

TO: AMBASSADOR JIM LILLEY, BEIJING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Flight Clearance Request

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

Per Ambassador's request, following are the flight data:

C-135 (B model);

tail number 24126;

call sign: SAM 126.

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Declassify on: OADR

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2009-11/07-MR
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NODIS ROUTING
The attached State Department message is provided on a strict need - to - know basis. Discussion of this message and its contents should be limited to the below named individuals.
State Cable Number: Beijing 19318
Scowcroft
Gates
Sittmann
O'Leary (File)

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INFO SS-02 /002 A2 JJJ

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0958

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NODIS/MARKET FROM AMBASSADOR JIM LILLEY

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CH

SUBJECT: CHINESE DROP DEMAND FOR USG "RESTRAINT" OF

- FANG, OFFER COUNTERPROPOSAL FOR FANG'S

- STATEMENT

REF: BEIJING 19115

1. ~~SECRET~~/NODIS/MARKET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LIU HUAQIU INVITED ME TO THE DIAOYUTAI COMPOUND AT 6:00 P.M. JUNE 20 TO HEAR THE FORMAL CHINESE REACTION TO MY PRESENTATION AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING. THE SESSION, WHICH LASTED 15 MINUTES, PRODUCED A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE CHINESE PROPOSAL: IT DROPPED YESTERDAY'S DEMANDS FOR USG ASSURANCES ON RESTRAINT OF FANG AND LI SHUXIAN, AND IT PROPOSED CHANGES IN FANG'S DRAFT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF "ECONOMY OF WORDS" RATHER THAN FURTHER ADDITIONS OR AMENDMENTS. THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS EXTREMELY GOOD, AND LIU HAD LAID ON A DINNER AT DIAOYUTAI AFTERWARDS FOR THE TWO SIDES (PARTICIPANTS WERE THE SAME AS IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS, SAVE THAT THE CHINESE INTERPRETER WAS SWITCHED -- A

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TOKEN, PRESUMABLY, OF VFM'S UNHAPPINESS AT HIS PERFORMANCE YESTERDAY AND OF THE SIGNAL IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO THE DAY'S MEETING).

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3. LIU CAME RIGHT TO THE POINT: HE HAD REPORTED THE CONTENT OF YESTERDAY'S SESSIONS TO HIS SUPERIORS, AND WAS PREPARED TO SHARE THE CHINESE REACTION. LIU OFFERED A REVISED TEXT OF FANG'S STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS:

/

1. I OPPOSE THE FOUR CARDINAL PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION, BECAUSE THEIR PURPOSE IS TO UPHOLD A POLITICAL SYSTEM OF "CLASS STRUGGLE." I TAKE NOTE THAT (DELETION OF -- THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HOLDS THAT) THE ABOVE POLITICAL STAND IS OPPOSED TO THE CONSTITUTION.

2. IN ORDER TO (DELETION OF -- CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE WITH SOME 20 UNIVERSITIES IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE, AND ALSO) VISIT RELATIVES AND FRIENDS ABROAD AND TO OBTAIN NECESSARY MEDICAL TREATMENT, I APPLY TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND TRAVEL ABROAD. I HOPE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE THIS HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION.

3. THE PURPOSE IN GOING ABROAD IS FOCUSED ON SCHOLARLY EXCHANGE AND RESEARCH. I WILL APPRECIATE AND WELCOME ALL ACTIVITIES WHICH ACCORD WITH THE PROGRESSIVE INTERESTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY, AND I WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY ACTIVITIES HAVING THE MOTIVE OF OPPOSING CHINA (DELETE'S PROGRESSIVE INTERESTS).

END TEXT OF CHINESE COUNTERPROPOSAL.

4. LIU OBSERVED THAT, SO FAR AS THE CHINESE SIDE WAS CONCERNED, FANG COULD EITHER ACCEPT, AND SIGN, THE

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TEXT PROPOSED YESTERDAY (WHICH WE HAD NOT PROVIDED HIM,
AND WHICH WAS CONSPICUOUSLY LESS PALATABLE THAN THIS ONE)
OR THE TEXT AS AMENDED ABOVE. BOTH FANG AND LI MUST SIGN.

5. WITH REGARD TO U.S. ASSURANCES, LIU SPECIFIED THAT:

-- THE USG SHOULD PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT AFTER FANG LIZHI
AND LI SHUXIAN LEAVE CHINA, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,
U.S. OFFICIALS, AND U.S.-CONTROLLED AGENCIES (WHICH
LIU HAS PREVIOUSLY SPECIFIED MUST EXPLICITLY INCLUDE
VOA) WILL NOT USE FANG AND LI TO CARRY OUT ANTI-CHINESE
ACTIVITIES. IN THIS REGARD, LIU RECALLED THAT SUCH A
REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE 12/9/89 BY FOREIGN MINISTER
QIAN QICHEN TO GEN SCOWCROFT, AND THAT WE HAD REPLIED ON
DECEMBER 22, 1989 THAT THIS SHOULD PRESENT NO
DIFFICULTY.

-- THE US SIDE SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF (ZHUYIDAO) THE
STATEMENT BY FANG LIZHI AND LI SHUXIAN THAT THEY WILL ONLY
ENGAGE IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND SCHOLARLY EXCHANGE, AND
WILL NOT INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN ACTIVITIES OPPOSING CHINA.

-- NOTING THAT I HAD SPECIFIED THAT FANG AND LI WOULD GO
TO A THIRD COUNTRY, LIU EXPRESSED THE "STRONG HOPE"
THAT THIS PERIOD IN A THIRD COUNTRY BE FOR MORE THAN
A HALF YEAR.

(COMMENT: FANG AND LI HAVE PREVIOUSLY TOLD US THAT THEY
WOULD GO ALONG WITH THIS TYPE OF ARRANGEMENT.
FURTHERMORE, THEY HAVE EXPRESSED TO US RECENTLY THEIR
STRONG PREFERENCE TO GO, IF NOT TO THE U.S., THEN TO

CAMBRIDGE TO ACCEPT AN OFFER MADE THROUGH ROYAL
ASTROPHYSICAL SOCIETY AUSPICES. THEY HAVE ALSO SAID

PREVIOUSLY THAT, SHOULD THEY GO ULTIMATELY TO CAMBRIDGE,
THEY WOULD SEEK TO ASSUAGE BRITISH CONCERNS BY GIVING

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A PRIVATE UNDERTAKING "TO REMAIN SILENT" FOR AT LEAST
SIX MONTHS. END COMMENT.

-- NOTING THAT I HAD MENTIONED IN OUR 1/15/90 MEETING
THAT FANG AND LI WOULD MAKE AN ASSURANCE NOT TO
PARTICIPATE IN FEDERATION FOR A DEMOCRATIC CHINA
(FDC) ACTIVITIES ONCE HE LEAVES THE COUNTRY, VFM LIU
ASKED THAT FANG AND LI NOW REAFFIRM THAT ORAL
COMMITMENT. HERE AGAIN LIU UNDERScoreD THAT THE ORAL
COMMITMENT MUST COME FROM BOTH FANG AND LI, AND HE
REITERATED THAT THE STATEMENT MUST BE SIGNED BY BOTH
FANG AND LI.

6. SUBSEQUENTLY, AT THE END OF A CORDIAL DINNER WHICH
DEALT NOT AT ALL WITH THE FANG FAMILY ISSUE, LIU
ADDED A QUERY: "WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE, DO YOU SUPPOSE,
FOR YOUR SIDE TO GIVE A WRITTEN COMMITMENT (CHENG-NUO)?"
HE DID NOT PRESS THE POINT, NOR DID HE MAKE CLEAR HIS
PRECISE MEANING, BUT I ASSUME THAT HIS REFERENCE WAS
TO A WRITTEN U.S. STATEMENT REGARDING FUTURE
NON-UTILIZATION OF FANG AND LI BY THE USG. I WILL
SEEK TO CLARIFY THIS AT OUR NEXT SESSION.

7. LIU CONCLUDED HIS BRIEF PRESENTATION AT THE FORMAL
SESSION WITH AN UNDERSTATED APPEAL FOR OUR COOPERATION
IN BRINGING THIS MATTER TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
HE ASSERTED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE HAD SHOWN SINCERITY
IN ADDRESSING THE QUESTION, HAVING IN MIND THE
OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

8. IN REPLY, I ASSURED LIU THAT WE WOULD ACT SWIFTLY ON
HIS POINTS, REPORTING THEM TO WASHINGTON FOR GUIDANCE
AND MAKING THEM KNOWN TO FANG AND LI. I TOLD HIM THAT
I CONSIDERED THE CHINESE APPROACH TO HAVE BEEN VERY
CONSTRUCTIVE, AND THAT I SAW THAT WE HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE
PROGRESS IN THE PAST 24 HOURS. WITH THAT, I PLEDGED

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TO WORK WITH HIM TOWARD A QUICK SOLUTION.

9. REITERATING THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING QUICKLY, I REMINDED LIU THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT, FOR FANG AND LI AS WELL AS FOR US, TO MOVE AHEAD ALSO ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEPARTURE OF FANG ZHE. LIU SAID THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD "CONSIDER THIS," BUT, AFTER BRIEF REFLECTION, AMENDED HIS COMMENT TO "POSITIVELY CONSIDER THIS."

10. BEFORE BREAKING FOR THE DINNER, I ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE CHINESE RESPONSIVENESS TO OUR CONCERNS ABOUT SHIPMENT OF CHEMICAL PRECURSORS.

11. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS: THE CHINESE REACTION IS ONE THAT MOVES VERY CLOSE TO WHAT WE WILL REQUIRE. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THEY HAVE ACCEPTED OUR REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT WE CANNOT LEGALLY, PRACTICALLY OR POLITICALLY OFFER OR PLEDGE TO PLACE RESTRAINTS UPON FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF FANG AND LI. THAT DEMAND HAS VANISHED ALTOGETHER.

12. WHAT THE CHINESE NOW ASK OF US STRIKES ME AS FEASIBLE. WE CAN REAFFIRM OUR ORAL UNDERTAKING NOT TO UTILIZE FANG AND LI FOR ANTI-CHINESE PURPOSES. BUT WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY LIU'S "AFTERTHOUGHT" REGARDING PUTTING THIS IN WRITING.

13. FANG HIMSELF HAS VOCIFEROUSLY REJECTED PAST LANGUAGE SPECIFYING THAT HIS VIEWS AND ACTIONS

WERE/ARE "OPPOSED TO THE CONSTITUTION." HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THIS, AND BELIEVES RATHER THAT THE FOUR CARDINAL PRINCIPLES ARE NOT ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF SPECIFIES THAT ANY CHINESE CITIZEN MAY EXPRESS HIS INDEPENDENT POINT OF VIEW. NONETHELESS, I WILL PRESENT

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THE NEW PROPOSED LANGUAGE TO HIM, GET HIS REACTIONS,
AND REPORT THOSE REACTIONS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS
MESSAGE (DRAFTED IN ADVANCE FOR THE SAKE OF TIMELINESS).

14. THE OTHER KEY DELETION REPRESENTS AN AREA THAT
HAS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED A MORAL DILEMMA FOR FANG: THE
POINT THREE DELETION OF "PROGRESSIVE INTERESTS."
NEVERTHELESS, SINCE THE CHINESE SIDE NO LONGER INSISTS

ON THE LANGUAGE "OPPOSING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT,"
THIS PHRASING MAY PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO FANG, WHO CAN
ARGUE THAT HE WILL NEVER OPPOSE "CHINA."

15. SHOULD FANG ACCEPT, IN TOTO OR WITH SMALL REVISIONS,
THE LATEST DRAFT, AND SHOULD WASHINGTON ACCEPT THE
LATEST PACKAGE INCLUDING REQUIREMENTS PLACED UPON THE
U.S. SIDE, THEN I SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE SWIFTLY TO
CONSIDERATION OF OTHER SUBJECTS:

-- DEPARTURE MODALITIES FOR THE FANG FAMILY, INCLUDING
THE SON FANG ZHE;

-- CONTENT OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS, IF ANY, BY THE TWO
SIDES;

-- DISCUSSION OF THE DESTINATION. IN THIS REGARD,
ASSUMING THAT FANG CONTINUES TO NUMBER CAMBRIDGE FIRST

AMONG HIS PREFERENCES, WE WILL NEED SWIFTLY TO CONTACT
THE BRITISH TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS.

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16. REACTION BY FANG AND LI:

THE FIRST-BLUSH REACTION BY FANG AND LI WAS ALONG LINES
WE HAD ANTICIPATED: CONCERN ABOUT "TAKING NOTE THAT
THESE POLITICAL VIEWS ARE IN OPPOSITION TO THE
CONSTITUTION"; A RELUCTANCE BY LI TO STATE THAT SHE

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ALSO OPPOSED THE FOUR CARDINAL PRINCIPLES (ETC), SINCE SHE HAS NEVER HELD SUCH; AND A CLARIFYING -- AND EVEN STRENGTHENING -- LAST CLAUSE TO THE EFFECT THAT FANG AND LI WOULD "REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE" IN ALL ACTIVITIES WHOSE MOTIVE LIES IN OPPOSING CHINA." BEYOND THAT, THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR PREFERENCE WAS CAMBRIDGE; THAT THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE TO REMAIN SILENT FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS (THOUGH WE DO NOT YET HAVE FROM THEM A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE PARAMETERS OF SUCH "SILENCE"); AND THAT THEY WERE INALTERABLY OPPOSED TO THE FDC, AND WOULD THEREFORE PROVIDE THE ORAL COMMITMENT NOT TO AFFILIATE WITH OR LEND SUPPORT TO THIS ORGANIZATION.

17. WE HAVE ASKED DR FANG AND LI TO GIVE THIS FURTHER THOUGHT THIS EVENING AND TOMORROW MORNING, AND TO LET US KNOW ANY OTHER REACTIONS AND IDEAS THEY MIGHT HAVE. WE HAVE INDICATED THAT WE WILL SEE THEM AGAIN TOMORROW, FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF WASHINGTON'S REACTIONS.

18. I REQUEST YOUR REACTION TO THE FOREGOING, AND YOUR GUIDANCE FOR MY NEXT MEETING WITH LIU. LILLEY

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→ China File

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Attachment

June 16, 1990

Mr. President:

Attached is a proposed message that Brent would deliver to the Chinese Ambassador tomorrow morning, with your approval. The message is in two parts: a general statement and a description of specific actions.

At Brent's suggestion, I am providing this to you simultaneously with sending copies to Brent, Larry Eagleburger and Bob Kimmitt. We will revise the message today to take into account your changes, as well as those of Brent, Larry and Kimmitt.

Bob

Bob Gates

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Attachment

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As the Chinese side knows, the President received a message from Mr. Deng Xiaoping through President Mubarak of Egypt. The President has acknowledged the importance of what Mr. Deng said about US-China relations. The President appreciated the positive tone of Mr. Deng's stated desire to improve those relations, as well as the generous personal comments by Mr. Deng about the President.

The President very much shares Mr. Deng's desire to restore US-China relations to their previous state to the extent possible. The US side has all along made major efforts to protect vital elements of the US-China relationship, such as the President's decisions to extend MFN treatment for China, veto the Pelosi Bill, and waive Congressional sanctions on satellites, and other politically courageous steps well known to you.

The US side continues to believe that at the upcoming meeting of the G-7 in Houston, in the absence of significant new developments, the leaders of the industrialized nations will have no choice but to address and confirm again the common position adopted last year with respect to China. In view of that upcoming meeting and the impending vote on MFN in the US Congress, we would welcome and respond positively to major efforts by the Chinese side to put behind us issues that have impeded improvements in our relations.

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As the US side indicated last December, we are willing, in principle, to accept each of the four elements in the package presented by Deng Xiaoping and Foreign Minister Qian last November and December. General Scowcroft and Secretary Eagleburger have repeatedly stressed in the time since then that what is needed to sustain genuine progress in US-China relations is a process of improvement, going well beyond a few specific steps by both sides.

With this in mind, and given that time is short, the US side wishes to propose actions that should be taken by both sides as expeditiously as possible to fulfill our respective requirements. The US also wishes to point out that in many specific cases, circumstances have evolved since January, 1990, and we will need to address our requirements in light of those changes.

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SCHEDULE OF ACTIONS

The case of Fang Lizhi and Li Shuxian. Ambassador Lilley has been instructed to reopen talks with his counterpart immediately in an effort to resolve the case of the Fang Lizhi family. We believe their departure from our Embassy under agreed terms will have an effect on the deliberations in the Congress over whether or not to overturn President Bush's courageous decision to extend MFN status for China. The degree to which it will have an effect will depend greatly on the manner with which the Chinese government publicly treats this issue. The more lenient China appears to be, and the more actions it takes beyond the case of the Fang Lizhi family, the more effective these actions will be with the Congress and the American people.

As the Chinese side should know, US law constrains US support for lending by international financial institutions under conditions such as now prevail in US-China relations. The issue of lending to China will be discussed at the G-7 meeting in Houston in July as well. Our Congress has been closely monitoring World Bank lending in particular, and will expect positive developments in areas which China considers entirely its internal affairs before agreeing to a resumption of lending beyond that for Basic Human Needs. Indeed, members of Congress are now considering proposing

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further restrictive legislation on lending to China. The US side believes that China should see the time immediately before the Houston meeting as an opportune moment to take actions that will affect the entire course of the next year's lending. Resolution of the Fang family case will also be helpful in this regard, but other actions will be required to remove restraints imposed on us by Congress.

Obviously, readjustment or removal of the G-7 consensus statement on policy toward lending to China will be favorably affected by China's own actions with respect to relaxing its political environment and punishing those involved in the events of last year. The position of the US will correspond to the progress achieved by China in areas of concern to the US before the G-7 meeting. This in turn can be expected to have an effect on those lending nations whose bilateral assistance programs have remained in line with US policy.

Jamming of VOA. Cessation of the jamming of VOA broadcasts to China would remove an obstacle in US-China relations. The US side believes that an end to jamming should be clean and simple. It would be counterproductive to our mutual efforts at normalizing relations if the jamming continues. It would be similarly counterproductive if the jamming were ceased, but other

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measures to accomplish the same effect were taken by the Chinese side.

Relatedly, there is the issue of harassment of foreign reporters pursuing their legitimate function in gathering and reporting news in China. It is difficult to imagine that positive steps the Chinese government may take in the near future will be portrayed appropriately overseas by the media if they believe they are being harassed.

Amnesty. Over the months, the US has welcomed the release of "detainees" involved in the events surrounding June 3-4, 1989. The US side wishes those releases had been accompanied by a greater public expression of forgiveness and tolerance on the part of the Chinese government toward those who engaged solely in non-violent activities. That would have magnified the impact of the releases on the American Congress and people. As time passes, our experience has taught us, interest throughout the world will grow in the fates of those involved peacefully in the June events whose cases have not been publicly resolved.

This puts great weight behind the need for a comprehensive public accounting of the names of those released, still detained,

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convicted or killed in connection with the events. The absence of such an accounting amplifies the effect on the public of rumors and misunderstandings and makes more difficult our task in improving relations. The situation with respect to the detainees has a direct bearing on the US side's ability to encourage international financial lending beyond the category of Basic Human Needs. It also has an indirect bearing on our ability to lift the suspension of deliveries of military equipment and services.

Candor requires that we also note that in the aftermath of improvements in our relations -- which I believe we both hope to achieve in the near future -- due legal process and leniency in the handling of any detainees and others who may still be held by your authorities will be a matter of great sensitivity. Additionally, interest has grown in the US in the fates of those whom many believe have been imprisoned for their religious beliefs. These include Roman Catholic bishops and priests, who should be released as soon as possible.

Chinese students. The US side has noted General Secretary Jiang's letter to students in California and expects that this is a harbinger of further Chinese efforts to reassure Chinese students abroad that they need have no fear of returning to their

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homeland. As you know, the issue of harassment of Chinese students within the US has been raised frequently and will be the subject of a special Congressional hearing next week. We expect Chinese representatives to refrain from any activity in the US that could be construed as threatening Chinese students as to the consequences of their peaceful actions in our country. Relevant legislation exists on this subject, and if intimidation or harassment were proved to occur, the Administration would be forced by law to suspend licenses for all munitions list items, including dual-use categories such as inertial navigation systems for civil aircraft. Obviously, this issue is directly relevant to our ability to lift the suspension of deliveries of military articles and services.

Chinese restrictions on officially sponsored graduate study abroad raise an issue directly relevant to MFN status. At every Congressional hearing, questions have been asked about the relationship between the new restrictions and the emigration requirements of the Jackson-Vanik legislation governing MFN. The US side holds that elimination or relaxation of the restrictions will ease the pressure in Congress to deny China MFN status. Such positive Chinese action would also have the benefit of responding to concerns expressed publicly by Chinese students and intellectuals in the US of our mutual efforts to promote US-China



relations.

High level visits. Resumption of the previous level of visits between the US and China will be an important step in normalizing relations. Rapid and substantial movement on the issues of concern before the Houston G-7 meeting will greatly improve the atmosphere for the impending visit of a delegation of mayors from many of China's most important cities, including Shanghai's mayor Zhu Rongji. The US side understands that the mayors may be able to begin to outline possible areas of economic cooperation, including the Pudong project, in anticipation of fulfillment of the economic portion of the package outlined by Mr. Deng. We are prepared to welcome this delegation warmly, but their official reception in the US will necessarily depend on the steps taken beforehand.

The US side envisions a subsequent process of increasingly higher level exchanges, depending on the pace of other improvements in the issue areas of concern to us. As you know, the US side has previously agreed in principle to extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the United States at an appropriate time as the culmination of the process of normalization.

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Other issues. In addition to US concerns directly relevant to the package formula above, there are other issues that decidedly affect the atmosphere of US-China relations and China's standing in the world at any time. These include the proliferation of missiles and chemical weapons, particularly to highly unstable parts of the world. China could greatly improve the atmosphere of US-China relations by taking firm, visible action to assure the world that you the other major powers in refusing to tolerate such proliferation. A ready means to that end would be to adhere to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, as the Soviet Union recently decided to do; this would not require China's formally joining the pact.

Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge is another area receiving prominent attention. The US side hopes that the Chinese side will redouble its efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

In sum, in order to make the greatest possible progress toward resumption of normal relations, the US side believes that the Chinese side should resolve the case of the Fang Lizhi family through mutual efforts, cease jamming VOA, release people imprisoned for their peaceful protest activities, prevent harassment of Chinese students abroad and revise exit regulations for graduate study abroad, take measures to prevent missile and

chemical weapon proliferation, and redouble efforts for a settlement in Cambodia. To the extent that China will take such steps, the US side will be in a position to carry out the fight for China's MFN status, modify the G-7 posture with respect to lending to China, exchange high-level visitors, resume deliveries of military articles and services, promote economic cooperation and invite the General Secretary to the United States. The US response will necessarily be commensurate with Chinese actions, due to legislative and political constraints on the US side. If China makes a maximum effort, it will be matched by a maximum effort on the US side.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/NODIS/MARKET

June 13, 1990

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Meeting with Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen, June 13, 1990, 5:14 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. EDT, West Wing

Participants:

Ambassador Zhu Qizhen
Counselor Liu Xiaoming, Notetaker
Brent Scowcroft
Douglas Paal, Notetaker

Ambassador Zhu: I am here on instructions from Beijing. On May 13, Deng Xiaoping, through President Mubarak, passed an oral message to President Bush. Subsequent to that, President Bush sent a verbal message to Deng Xiaoping through an unofficial channel.

The U.S. and China have no fundamental conflicts, nor do the two countries have border issues. Over the past decade, they have enjoyed good relations.

What happened last year during late spring and early summer in Beijing is China's internal affair. However, the events gave rise to an aberration in our relations. It is our view that our two sides should continue to make efforts to change this abnormal situation.

Last November, when Dr. Kissinger visited China, Deng Xiaoping proposed a package formula. China has all along adhered to this formula and never changed its position. The Chinese side has since made great efforts and taken a number of positive steps for the restoration of U.S.-China relations.

I have been instructed by the top leaders of China to have a meeting with you to learn the response of the American side to the message from Deng Xiaoping.

As I understand, President Bush indicated that it is important that solutions to some problems be achieved prior to the G-7 summit. If that is the case, time is very pressing. If we can have an early response we can move forward quickly.

General Scowcroft: I appreciate the message. I will inform the President. We will need a little time to get back. But we will.

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The President has made, I think, a major gesture with his decision to go forward with MFN. We welcome this message. We will look carefully at what will be most helpful in terms of the G-7 meeting in early July.

Ambassador Zhu: Thankyou very much. I will be away only one day, to visit the Saudi Arabian exhibition in Los Angeles. I will be back Friday evening. I will be in Washington on Saturday and will be available anytime.

What we are thinking is, if the two sides can reach an understanding on what to do next (sic). We can discuss how and where to discuss those which are on your mind and on our mind.

General Scowcroft: I am sure you have some ideas. We will see.

Ambassador Zhu: I hope to have your response. That's why I am here.

General Scowcroft: I think you know us well enough to know what it will be. We will give you a thoughtful, considered response.

Ambassador Zhu: Is there anything else you want to say?

General Scowcroft: I will just underscore that the President's decision on MFN was very difficult. He has received a lot of criticism. I think his action was just an indication of his willingness to reach out and try to restore the relationship to the situation last year. I hope you take it as a sign of his good will.

----- END OF CONVERSATION -----

(Before and after the meeting, Ambassador Zhu stressed to Doug Paal the sensitivity of this meeting. Only Zhu and Liu are witting within the Embassy here. His behavior suggested much greater optimism than we have seen in him since last December. He pointed out that a major purpose of this meeting is to establish the bona fides of the message received from the President in the "informal channel." If the President officially conveys political backing for a new effort to improve relations, he suggested, then the two sides can proceed to deal with the details of the sensitive problems we discussed earlier. He seemed to be indicating Fang Lizhi's case.)

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15. Cable	Douglas H. Paal to Ambassador Lilley Re: Memorandum of Conversation (7 pp.)	6/18/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed: 5/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91137-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



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SECTION 01 OF 03

FM: DOUGLAS H. PAAL

TO: EMBASSY BEIJING. IMMEDIATE EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY

BEGIN TEXT:

JIM, I WANT YOU TO HAVE THE RECORD OF A NON-CONVERSATION I HAD WITH ZHU QIZHEN ON SATURDAY. PLEASE HOLD IT CLOSELY. I GAVE COPIES TO LARRY EAGLEBURGER AND BOB KIMMITT. REGARDS, DOUG.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ZHU QIZHEN, PRC (S)

PARTICIPANTS: ZHU QIZHEN, PRC AMBASSADOR
DOUGLAS PAAL, NSC

DATE, TIME JUNE 16, 1990, 2:30 - 4:40 P.M. EDT

PLACE: PRC EMBASSY RESIDENCE

I INITIATED THE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ZHU TO HAVE A "NON-CONVERSATION" ON THE SITUATION IN US-CHINA RELATIONS IN VIEW OF BEIJING'S LATEST MOVES. ZHU WARMLY WELCOMED THE IDEA AND INVITED ME TO HIS RESIDENCE. (S)

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BOTH OF US OPENED THE MEETING BY REMARKING ON HOW SENSITIVE OUR DEALINGS WILL BE IN THE COMING DAYS. THIS MAY BE THE LAST CHANCE FOR A LONG TIME TO BEGIN TO RESTORE THE RELATIONSHIP TO WHAT IT WAS. I NOTED THAT A MISSTEP AT THIS TIME, WHEN MFN AND WORLD BANK ISSUES ARE PENDING, COULD PROVE DISASTROUS. WE NEED TO COMMUNICATE CLEARLY WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT OUR CONCERNS AND LIMITATIONS. (S)

I SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO MY DUTY TO TRY TO FOSTER BETTER US-CHINA RELATIONS. I HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE PRESIDENT FROM FURTHER POLITICAL EXPOSURE OVER CHINA POLICY. ANY PERCEPTION IN CONGRESS OR AMONG THE PEOPLE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS MAKING UNILATERAL GESTURES TO CHINA AGAIN WILL BE POLITICALLY SUICIDAL. (S)

IN VIEW OF THIS SENSITIVITY, EVEN ONE LEAK OF THE FACT THAT WE ARE TALKING AGAIN COULD PROVE EXTREMELY DAMAGING NOT ONLY TO THIS INITIATIVE, BUT ALSO TO THE CHANCES FOR MFN AND PROGRESS ON LENDING AT THE G-7 MEETING IN HOUSTON. FOR THAT REASON, ON OUR SIDE WE ARE KEEPING THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AWARE OF THIS DIALOGUE TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. I EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WILL BE SIMILARLY LIMITED. ZHU AGREED WITH ALL OF THIS. (S)

I OBSERVED TO ZHU THAT THE INDIRECT CHARACTER OF CHINA'S APPROACH AND THE EVIDENT EFFORTS AT FACE-SAVING MIGHT LEAD TO THE

INTERPRETATION THAT THE RECENT CHINESE EFFORTS ARE THE PRODUCT OF ONE FACTION IN THE LEADERSHIP CONCERNED THAT OTHER FACTIONS BE KEPT IN THE DARK ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING. I WONDERED WHETHER HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL ON GENERAL SCOWCROFT ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF A CONSENSUS IN THE LEADERSHIP. ZHU REPLIED THAT IN FACT THE CHINESE APPROACH WAS SUPPORTED BY DENG XIAOPING, AND THAT JIANG ZEMIN IS CARRYING OUT DENG'S INSTRUCTIONS. (IN MAY, CHEN YUN'S SON TOLD ME THAT DENG INSTRUCTED LI PENG, ON JANUARY 3, TO HANDLE US-CHINA RELATIONS.) (S)

LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, ZHU SAID THAT SOME LEADERS ARE MORE MISTRUSTFUL OF THE US THAN OTHERS. WHEN CHINA REFERS TO THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FEELINGS OF 1.1 BILLION PEOPLE. IT IS REALLY REFERRING TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MISTRUSTFUL LEADERS WILL EXPLOIT POPULAR REACTION. FOR EXAMPLE TO THE RELEASE OF FANG LIZHI, TO WORSEN US-CHINA RELATIONS. HE SAID SOME OF THESE LEADERS FEEL STRONGLY THAT FANG SHOULD STAY IN THE US EMBASSY. (S)

I EXPLAINED TO ZHU THAT WE ARE MULLING OVER HOW TO RESPOND TO HIS DEMARCHE MOST EFFECTIVELY. I FEAR THAT WE MIGHT INADVERTENTLY STRIKE A SENSITIVE NERVE IN THE FORM OF OUR MESSAGE. AFTER LAYING OUT SEVERAL OPTIONS, ZHU RESPONDED THAT THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS TO INCLUDE REFERENCES TO A DESIRE FOR STRONG US-CHINA RELATIONS AND TO THE PACKAGE SOLUTION. BEYOND THAT, THE MORE EXPLICIT WE CAN BE ABOUT OUR IDEAS, THE BETTER. ZHU LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE WILL BE GLAD FOR ANYTHING POSITIVE IN OUR RESPONSE. (S)

I THEN TRIED TO EXPLORE TO WHAT EXTENT THE CHINESE LEADERS MIGHT BE PLACING TOO MUCH STOCK IN RESOLVING THE CASE OF FANG LIZHI, THAT THEY MAY BELIEVE HIS RELEASE WILL TURN AROUND ALL OTHER TROUBLED ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. ON THIS, ZHU HAD LITTLE TO OFFER. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE TRY TO GET THE POINT ACROSS BY EXPLICITLY STATING IN OUR MESSAGE THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE STEPS IN RESPONSE TO FANG'S RELEASE UNTIL AFTER THE MFN VOTE AND HOUSTON MEETING. (S)

ON FANG LIZHI'S RELEASE, AFTER BOTH OF US SAID THAT THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY IN BEIJING, I ASKED WHETHER THE CHINESE SIDE REALLY EXPECTS THE WHITE HOUSE TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ASSURING THAT THE US WOULD RESTRAIN FANG'S ACTIVITIES. ZHU SAID THIS WAS AN "IDEA." THE BASIC TWO POINTS CHINA NEEDS TO SATISFY, HE SAID, ARE: AN ADMISSION BY FANG THAT HE UNDERTOOK ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRC AND AN ASSURANCE OF SOME "CONTROL" OVER FANG'S ACTIVITIES, SO THAT HE WILL NOT BE USED AGAINST CHINA. THE LATTER POINT, ZHU SAID, INVOLVES THE FEELINGS OF 1.1 BILLION PEOPLE. ZHU NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR LILLEY SEEMED TO HAVE IDEAS ON THESE POINTS THAT COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER. I SAID THAT WE WOULD EXPEDITE OUR RESPONSES. (S)

I ASKED IF THE CHINESE ARE OPERATING AGAINST A DEADLINE. ZHU

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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RESPONDED THAT THEY ARE NOT, BUT THAT THEY DO WANT TO MOVE AS SWIFTLY AS POSSIBLE. (I SUSPECT THERE IS A DEADLINE SOMEWHERE IN THEIR SYSTEM.) (S)

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SECTION 02 OF 03

I THEN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE ISSUE OF WORLD BANK LENDING, EXPLAINING BRIEFLY HOW OUR LEGISLATION TIES OUR LENDING POLICY TO THE SITUATION WITHIN CHINA AND NOT TO DEVELOPMENTS IN US-CHINA

BILATERAL RELATIONS. CHINA CANNOT EXPECT THAT RELEASE OF THE FANGS AND CESSATION OF THE JAMMING OF VOA WILL LEAD TO A CHANGE IN LENDING. ZHU THEN EMBARKED ON A REMINISCENCE OF HOW ANGRY SOME CHINESE LEADERS WERE IN JANUARY, WHEN THEY LEARNED THE US WOULD NOT REOPEN CHINA'S FULL LINE OF CREDIT AT THE BANK. THE CHINESE FELT THEIR LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND RELEASE OF DETAINEES WERE MAJOR GESTURES -- TAKEN AFTER INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE -- THAT DESERVED A COMMENSURATE RESPONSE. WHEN THEY LEARNED FROM BANK STAFF AND SOME OF THE G-7 REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE US STILL RESISTED LENDING TO CHINA, THEY WERE FURIOUS. (S)

ZHU REMAINED CALM AS I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE LEADERS MAY HEAR THE SAME SORTS OF REPORTS AFTER THE NEXT G-7 MEETING. IT MAY SIMPLY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE US TO CHANGE ITS LENDING POLICY IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS WITHIN CHINA. WITH MFN VOTES ON THE HORIZON, THE US WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT LOANS TO CHINA WITHOUT RISKING A FIRESTORM OF CRITICISM AND, WORST OF ALL, DEFEAT OF MFN. (S)

ZHU RESPONDED THAT THE US SHOULD TRY TO INFORM CHINA IN ADVANCE OF ITS TACTICS SO THAT THOSE FAVORING BETTER RELATIONS WILL BE PREFERRED TO DEAL WITH CRITICAL REPORTS OF US STATEMENTS. WE THEN TENTATIVELY EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CONSENSUS ON LENDING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO CHINA MAY CHANGE SOMEWHAT, WITH THE US CONTINUING TO OPPOSE LOANS IN ITS OWN WORLD BANK VOTES. SOME BILATERAL LENDING BY OTHER G-7 MEMBERS MAY INCREASE IN RESPONSE TO CHINESE EFFORTS TO PLEASE THE US. SUCH AS ON FANG AND VOA, BUT THIS WILL REMAIN A SENSITIVE AREA. ZHU ADDED THAT CHINA IS NOT LOOKING FOR ALL THE MONEY TO BE RESTORED. JUST SOME INCREMENT TO SUGGEST THAT THE HATED SANCTIONS ARE BEING REMOVED. HE CLEARLY TOOK THE IMPLICIT POINT THAT WITH MAJOR CHINESE STEPS, THE US MIGHT NUDGE OTHERS, ESPECIALLY JAPAN, TO RESUME LENDING. (S)

ON VOA JAMMING, ZHU SAID THAT THERE IS SOME CONSIDERATION IN CHINA OF ASKING THE US TO RESTRAIN VOA FROM PROVOCATIVE BROADCASTING FOR ONE MONTH, AT THE END OF WHICH THE JAMMING WOULD STOP. I TOLD ZHU THAT THIS WAS LIKELY TO BE A NON-STARTER. WHILE WE CAN CONTROL EDITORIALS, AND WE DO NOT CONSIDER THEM PROVOCATIVE, WE WOULD INVITE INTENSE CRITICISM IF WE ARE VIEWED AS MUZZLING VOA. IT CANNOT BE DONE. I SUGGESTED INSTEAD THAT CHINA CONSIDER DOING AS THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS DO. THAT IS, CHINA SHOULD BRING TO VOA, THROUGH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES, SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE BROADCASTING. VOA WILL TREAT THE CHINESE COMPLAINTS VERY SERIOUSLY. ZHU LISTENED, BUT WAS UNRESPONSIVE. (S)

I TURNED TO THE PROBLEMS OF JOURNALISTS IN CHINA-MUCH OF OUR TROUBLES ROSE IN THE WAKE OF HIGHLY NEGATIVE MEDIA REPORTING OF CHINA'S LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND RELEASE OF DETAINEES. I ASKED HOW CHINA EXPECTED THE JOURNALISTS TO REPORT FAVORABLY ON FANG LIZHI'S RELEASE WHEN THEY ARE SUBJECT TO VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT FROM THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES. I WAS SHOCKED THAT CHINA'S MFA BALDLY DENIED VIOLENCE THAT WAS PLAINLY VISIBLE ON OUR TELEVISION SCREENS. I SUGGESTED THAT THE MFA ISSUE A STATEMENT OF REGRET, THAT THIS WAS WELL WITHIN THE MFA'S COMPETENCE. I URGED THAT THE JOURNALISTS BE ACTIVELY COURTED, GIVEN TRAVEL OPPORTUNITIES, AND OTHERWISE MADE TO FEEL MORE INCLINED TO REPORT OBJECTIVELY. ZHU SEEMED TO TAKE THIS ON BOARD, AND PERHAPS EVEN PLANS TO DO SOMETHING, BUT HE DID NOT SAY SO. (S)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FINALLY. I OBSERVED THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING EXCLUSIVELY OF WHAT THE US MIGHT DO IN RESPONSE TO RELEASE OF FANG. MY FEELING IS THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL INSTANTLY SEE FANG'S RELEASE AS A TOKEN OF APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S COURAGEOUS DECISION ON MFN. OBSERVERS WILL EXPECT EVEN FURTHER CHINESE UNILATERAL ACTIONS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE THE LATITUDE TO APPEAR TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE CHINESE GESTURES. PEOPLE HERE FEEL THEIR PRESIDENT WAS INSULTED BY CHINA AFTER THE PELOSI FIGHT, AND THAT CHINA'S PERFORMANCE STILL COMES UP SHORT IN BILATERAL TERMS, LET ALONE IN HUMAN RIGHTS TERMS. TO THIS, ZHU CALMLY SAID THAT WE SHOULD EXPLICITLY STATE THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE STEPS EVENTUALLY TO BE RESPONSIVE, BUT CANNOT DO SO BEFORE THE MFN VOTE AND A DECENT INTERVAL AFTER THAT. (S)

ZHU THEN STRESSED THAT THE US SHOULD PROPOSE CONCRETE STEPS. RESUMING HIGHER LEVEL VISITS SEEMS DOABLE. I SAID THAT THE UPCOMING VISIT OF SHANGHAI MAYOR ZHU RONGJI MIGHT BE A GOOD PLACE TO START. (S)

ZHU EMPHASIZED THAT BEIJING MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RELAX THE INTERNAL SITUATION UNTIL AFTER THE ASIAN GAMES IN SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER. MORE PEOPLE WILL ATTEND THE GAMES THAN THE CHINESE PREVIOUSLY ANTICIPATED. THIS WILL INCREASE THE EMPHASIS ON SECURITY AND SOME BAD PUBLICITY MAY RESULT. ZHU THEN SUGGESTED WE MAY WANT TO STATE TO THE CHINESE LEADERS THAT ANY STEPS WE TAKE TO FULFILL THE PACKAGE FORMULA WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE GAMES. (S)

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FINAL SECTION OF 03

ZHU OFFERED TO EXPLAIN HOW THE CURRENT CHINESE INITIATIVE CAME ABOUT, PROBABLY SENSING CORRECTLY THAT IT PUZZLED ME. HE SAID THAT DENG HAD DECIDED TO GET RID OF THE ISSUE OF FANG LIZHI, AND THE INSTRUCTION CAME DOWN TO ZHU THAT HE SHOULD CALL ON GENERAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SCOWCROFT. ZHU CABLED BEIJING TO ASK ON WHAT PRETEXT HE SHOULD REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT. HE WAS TOLD TO SEEK A REPLY TO THE MESSAGE DENG HAD GIVEN PRESIDENT MUBARAK ON MAY 13. ZHU COMPLAINED THAT IT WOULD SEEM STRANGE TO ASK OUR RESPONSE AFTER A FULL MONTH'S DELAY. HE THEN SUGGESTED HE BE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE APPROACH HE DID, INVENTING THE "INFORMAL CHANNEL" TO WHICH HE REFERRED IN HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL SCOWCROFT. HE THEN RECEIVED OFFICIAL APPROVAL TO DO SO.

(S)

ZHU CLOSED THE SESSION BY ASKING PRECISELY WHO IN OUR GOVERNMENT IS WITTING OF THE CURRENT ACTIVITY WITH CHINA; HE WANTS TO AVOID MISSTEPS BY SPEAKING TO SOMEONE OUT OF THE LOOP. HE SAID HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THAT WE OPENED A CHANNEL FOR FRANK, UNRECORDED CONVERSATION. HE HOPES WE WILL USE IT AGAIN IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. HE SAID THAT ONCE HE ENTERS THE WHITE HOUSE OR STATE DEPARTMENT, HE CANNOT SPEAK WITHOUT GUIDANCE. (S)

END OF TEXT.

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