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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries:	China Files

OA/ID Number:	91136
Folder ID Number:	91136-008

Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [8]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Notes	Re: Jiang Memcon (1 pp.)	12/89	(b) (1)	
02a. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Lilley Re: Begin Text: (1 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Draft Cable	White House to American Embassy Beijing Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to Scowcroft and Secretary Baker Re: Begin Text: (2 pp.)	12/19/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Draft	Re: Draft Reply to Chinese Non-Paper of December 18 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b) (1)	
05. List	Re: The package... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Draft Cable	White House to American Embassy Beijing Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador James R. Lilley (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b) (1)	S
07. Cable	Re: Chinese Officials and Local Contacts Upbeat on Results of Visit by National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger (4 pp.)	12/15/89	(b) (1)	C

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [8]

Pinksheet Number: cap1133
OA/ID Number: 91136-008
Date Closed: 5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08a. Note	Doug Paal to General [Scowcroft] Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	12/13	(b)(1)	S
08b. Non-Paper	Re: The U.S. side... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08c. Non-Paper	Re: Schedule of Action (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08d. Non-Paper	Re: The U.S. side... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08e. Non-Paper	Re: Schedule of Action (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08f. Non-Paper	Re: The U.S. side... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08g. Non-Paper	Re: Schedule of Action (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08h. Non-Paper	Re: The U.S. side... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08i. Non-Paper	Re: Schedule of Action (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09. Memcon	Re: Deputy Secretary's Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to the United States (3 pp.)	12/12/89	(b)(1)	S
10. Memcon	Re: Working Luncheon Between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (5 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
11a. Handwritten Note	Brent [Scowcroft] to Dick Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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11b. Non-Paper	Re: The U.S. side... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
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11d. List	Re: The package... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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An Open Letter to President George Bush from Chinese
Students in the United States

May 20, 1989

Mr. George Herbert Walker Bush
President of the United States of America
Kennebunkport, Maine

Dear Mr. President:

As we are writing this open letter to you, a violent and bloody crackdown on the pro-democracy movement is in progress in Beijing. Blood is flowing in the very streets that you visited three months ago. The Chinese government headed by Mr. Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Li Peng has massed assault troops and police forces, some of which have been, since yesterday, conducting a systematic and brutal campaign of repression. Additional troops are being sent to Beijing. A massacre of peaceful demonstrators is imminent. Right now millions of Beijing residents have temporarily blocked the advance of army units and managed to prevent the government's order from being executed. In addition, since last night the Chinese government has imposed a news blackout against Western, primarily American, television news organizations which had been reporting the gripping story of a heroic people struggling to free itself from a deteriorating dictatorship.

Many signs indicate that the Chinese government is about to employ much greater violence against non-violent and orderly demonstrators. First, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, formerly the Secretary General of the Communist Party who was a moderating influence within the top Chinese leadership, has resigned. His resignation yesterday was accompanied by an immediate escalation of tension and violence in Beijing, with the arrival of troops now armed with assault rifles. Second, the Chinese government's news blackout also indicates that it is going to hide, from the eyes of the people of the world, the increasing atrocities it is committing or about to commit. Finally, by violently suppressing peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators in China, the government under Deng has violated all the accepted codes of conduct in the civilized world. It has violated the relevant clauses of the United Nations' Human Rights Charter, to which the People's Republic of China is an official signatory. It has abrogated the television transmission contracts its representatives signed with American and other Western news organizations. It has openly

challenged the civilized world, and particularly Western democracies.

The current Deng-Li regime in China has lost its legitimacy and the support of the Chinese society. Its foundation is eroding fast. It no longer has any credibility with its own people. Even the Communist Party has been torn apart, with the defection from the regime by many party members and government officials, including Mr. Zhao. The rift between the Chinese society and the Deng regime, and the rift within the regime are widening. If a significant portion of the military withdraws their support for the regime and turns against it, an all-out civil war will break out. If most of the military refuses to carry out repressive orders, the regime will collapse quickly. The situation in China indicates that both possibilities are increasing.

Most importantly, all the major social groups in China, including students, government officials, workers, professionals and urban residents, have fundamentally rejected the current Deng-Li regime. They shall make efforts to resist, in various ways, the new campaign of repression by the Deng-Li regime. The combination of these factors will further de-stabilize the already volatile situation in China; in the long-run, the Deng-Li regime will inevitably collapse, perhaps as soon as the aging Deng is struck by natural infirmities.

This raises the issue of the position of the United States government on the deteriorating situation in China. As one of the greatest democracies in the world, it is the duty of the United States to support the democratic movement in China today. The U.S. government's reticence about or weak response to the Chinese government's violent suppression of the democratic movement will be construed, both by the people of the world and particularly the Chinese people, as condoning the atrocities of the Deng-Li regime, the survival of which now is an open question. On the other hand, the public withdrawal of American support from this disintegrating regime is both in the interests of the United States and in keeping with the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The practical effect of the American official condemnation of the Deng-Li regime will demonstrate to the people of the world, and especially the Chinese people, that an evil regime has no allies or friends in the democratic world. As Chinese nationals now living in this free land, we strongly believe that this is also the will of the American people.

Human rights and democracy are universal values that know no artificial boundaries of states. It is part of the obligations of the governments of the free world to condemn -- and punish -- a foreign government which is beating, murdering and enslaving its own people.

We strongly urge you, Mr. President, and the other leaders of the free world to take prompt actions to ensure that the government-sponsored violence against peaceful demonstrators be ceased immediately, that the freedom-loving people of China receive all the moral and material support from the free peoples and their governments in other parts of the world, and that the violent dictatorship under Deng be roundly condemned throughout the civilized world.

Respectfully,

The Chinese Students Studying in the United States

Principal organizers of this open letter (signatures are being collected across the United States)

Harvard University

Gong Xiaoxia (617) 666-9055
Pei Minxin (617) 628-0853
Qian Yingyi (617) 498-3391
Xu Chenggang (617) 498-6312
Ye Yang (617) 497-6881
Zhang Longxi (617) 864-3248

MIT

Feng Xudong (617) 625-1992
Yang Qingyun 253-1887
Wang Jing 625-1992

Boston University

Lu Kuanghui (617) 498-6312
Cai Jinyong
Lin Suo 625-9455

Jiang Wenxin
Dec 89

- Crown tells me Bush in diff position.
- Referred to Chow En-hai - try to find common ground while dealing w/ minor diff.
- 3 kingdoms - unity + separation.
- Asia-Pac will drop rapidly in coming years
 - China will drop into big market providing opportunity for coop.
- Discussed Guanghai communiques
 - Some of my classmates have high positions in Taiwan.
- US / PRC diff systems should not be a bar to coop.

Even

- Reform & open to outside & avoiding bourgeois liberalism.
 - We opposed to negative aspects
 - Prostitution, etc.

xx

**

- EE - Diff w/ China
 - Mentioned Deng comment on Perestroika

Japan

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT QUESTIONS

- 1) Now that you've taken the first step toward restoring relations with China, what do you hope to see from them? What is your reaction to the beating of student demonstrators yesterday?
- 2) Why did you go along with the Chinese request to keep the Scowcroft/Eagleburger mission secret?
- 3) What have been your biggest disappointments in the area of foreign affairs in your first year in office?
- 4) You said it would be inappropriate for you to go to Berlin at this time, why then, was it appropriate for your Secretary of State to do so?
- 5) Did you influence the Salvadorans to release Jennifer Casolo; and, do you think she was guilty? Will you send her back if they reopen the case?
- 6) Won't your planned trip to Cartagena require the Colombians to devote extraordinary police and military attention to your safety which otherwise could be devoted to the drug war?

- 7) Several former, high-level Defense officials have testified that the DoD budget can be cut in half in the next decade due to the diminished Soviet threat. Do you envision this size cut?
- 8) What are your priorities or main goals for the '90s?
- 9) How do you see the abortion issue affecting next year's elections?
- 10) If the FY'90 budget comes down to a real crunch, what programs will be put before others; and, will you consider using the sequester again?
- 11) What do you hope will be the tone of your administration in 1990?
- 12) Do you still expect to be able to maintain your conciliatory approach to Congress and keep bipartisanship alive?
- 13) What are your greatest accomplishments and failures in your first year in office?

- 1) Does Scowcroft's visit indicate a change in U.S. policy toward China?
- 2) Why did you take the first step when you said the Chinese would have to?
- 3) What do you expect from the Chinese? Doesn't this mean the U.S. protest is meaningless?
- 4) What does this say about your Human Rights policy?
- 5) Are the four power talks on Berlin an attempt by the Soviets to block German Reunification?
- 6) What is your reaction to the Soviet request for, and Arias' support of, a joint U.S.-Soviet effort regarding the peace process in Central America?

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DECEMBER 12, 1989

J.R.L. STERNE, Editorial Page Editor

REG MURPHY, Publisher

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

JAMES I. HOUCK, Managing Editor

Mission to Beijing

President Bush was right to send two ranking emissaries to brief Chinese Communist leaders on his Malta summit with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. China has one-fifth the world's population, nuclear bombs and a national interest in the U.S.-Soviet relationship that translates into a right to be informed. Keeping China isolated would only undercut efforts by the two leaders to lessen world tensions. As Mr. Bush told a group of editorial-page editors yesterday, "I do not want to isolate the Chinese people." He seeks to reopen lines of communication rather than keeping them shut, as Democrats stridently urge, in retaliation for last summer's crackdown on Chinese demonstrators.

This imperative overrides President Bush's suspension of high-level contacts last June in response to the regime's butchery of peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. It is more important than the congressional sniping at the mission. China was no democracy when President Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger opened the Sino-American dialogue. Its human rights practice improved afterward, leading to the false optimism of last May. China still will need a human rights improvement to end sanctions imposed last June, to rekindle ceremonial summitry or to restart the flow of U.S. investment. But it takes diplomatic contact, such as the mission of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, to keep reiterating that to its leaders.

The U.S. needs to talk to China to dissuade it from selling sophisticated missiles to the likes of Libya and Syria; to bring Cambodia to true independence without the reimposition of the ghastly horrors of the China-backed Khmer Rouge; to protect the Americans resident in China; to bring freedom in exile for dissident scientist Fang Lizhi and his wife, now sheltering in the U.S. embassy. And lastly, it was reported that Deng Xiaoping, through an interpreter, expressed satisfaction with President Carter for sending Messrs. Scowcroft and Eagleburger. Mr. Deng is 85, nominally retired but the leader still, and clearly slipping in his personal faculties. His imminent departure and the consequent uncertainty shrouding the gerontocracy are reasons enough to keep in touch.

Democrats complain that the U.S. should not kowtow, and so it should not. The homage to the Middle Kingdom, inherited from emperors with self-delusions of ruling the world, must be replaced by symmetrical exchanges of visits. The presidential veto of a bill to grant automatic extensions of visas to Chinese students was an unnecessary and unwise solicitude to Beijing. But none of that is involved in the perfectly sensible mission to Beijing. Not to have undertaken this task would have been dereliction.

27/12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

General Scowcroft,

This is a private memo from two scholars - Glaser and Barrett. It reports a conversation with Zhang Deguang - the sharpest officer in the Chinese Embassy here.

I think you'll find it worth reading.

VR,

Doug Paul

Bonnie Glaser/Banning Garrett
Memcon
Zhang Deguang
Political Counsellor
Chinese Embassy
December 19, 1989

Sino-American Relations

The visit to China by General Scowcroft is viewed as a major gesture to China by the United States. Some Chinese scholars may view the visit as vindicating their prediction that the U.S. would come crawling back to China if Beijing is patient enough to wait, but I don't think that the leadership sees it this way. Deng does not hold the view that the U.S. needs China more than China needs the U.S. He sees U.S.-Chinese relations as extremely important to both countries as well as to world peace.

Deng is a strategic thinker. He sees the U.S. as the most important country to China and has attached great importance to improving and developing the Sino-American relationship. The visit demonstrates that Deng still plays the most important role in foreign policy decisionmaking. It was critical that U.S.-Chinese relations be restored while Deng is still alive and continues have great influence. Jiang Zemin is not yet powerful enough. He lacks a broad base of support.

I disagree with those who view the sanctions as hurting the handliners and strengthening the moderates in China. In my view, the sanctions have only strengthened the position of the handliners. Scowcroft's visit will strengthen the position of Deng and the moderates.

I think that President Bush was "courageous" to send Scowcroft to China since he certainly must have anticipated the storm of criticism that such a step would likely evoke from Congress and the American public. The visit will likely mark an historical turning point in Sino-American relations. China will respond positively to the Scowcroft visit to push Sino-U.S. relations forward. We should help President Bush. Deng told Nixon when he visited that if the U.S. takes the first step, China would respond. Now the U.S. has taken that step, China is compelled to take positive steps. I think that the Fulbright program will be reinstated, student exchanges will be resumed and Fang Lizhi and his wife will be released to a third country. It is also possible that martial law will be lifted. Deng said during Scowcroft's visit that China should do something to make the Chinese people happy in the new year. I don't know what he meant by this, but my speculation is that martial law might be lifted on January 1.

Chinese propaganda attacks on the U.S. in the media have already subsided considerably. I think that these attacks were a response to the U.S. sanctions. The stress on ideology and class struggle in foreign policy was also a reaction to the West and will likely diminish now, assuming that U.S.-Chinese relations get back on track and the sanctions are eventually lifted. The calls by some Chinese leaders for greater self-reliance were not viewed as the optimal situation for China--they were intended to send the message that China could endure international isolation if necessary, but this was never considered to be the preferred option, not even by the hardliners.

The statement made by Li Peng last summer calling for a distinction between China's relations with countries which have similar ideologies, values and social systems, and relations with countries which have different ideologies, values and social systems was never repeated by any other Chinese leader. This view was not shared by Deng and did not accurately represent Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy.

Do you think that these steps will be sufficient to satisfy congress? How will congress view the release of Fang Lizhi? [In response to the suggestion that China cease jamming VOA:] I have been told that most of southern China can still hear VOA broadcasts in Chinese, and of course, China is not jamming the English language broadcasts. I don't think that such importance should be attached to the jamming of VOA.

The U.S.--and especially congress--should not expect too much from China in a short period of time. Only certain steps can be taken at the present time. The situation in China cannot be transformed overnight. The internal repression will be eased only gradually. Concerning the demand by some Americans that China acknowledge that the June events were a tragedy, I don't think that this will happen. I personally don't understand why the Chinese government refuses to acknowledge this since any loss of life can be termed a tragedy.

Have you heard whether China will curtail or cut off sending students to the U.S. in response to Bush's decision to take administrative measures to allow students from China to remain in the U.S. instead of compelling them to return for two years? I have heard contradictory information. Some people say that China will not send more students, while others say that the policy has not changed. Perhaps the Scowcroft visit will affect this decision.

A conference was recently held in China to discuss ways of improving working conditions for student returnees to China. I think this is a positive development. It would be a great loss for China if 40,000 students in the U.S. did not return. In my view, most students here have nothing to fear if they return home. The vast majority will not be persecuted. Only the small handful of activists and organizers of anti-China groups would be punished.

In the Chinese embassy, personnel at the level of political counsellor and above knew about Scowcroft's July visit to China.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

The outcome of the Malta summit was not surprising to me. Prior to the summit I had many meetings with Soviet experts and read articles on the issues to be discussed and the likely results of the summit.

Bush and Gorbachev shared many common interests at the summit. Most importantly, they expressed a shared interest in maintaining stability in Eastern Europe and in supporting a gradual continuation of reform in East European countries. They also held common views on German reunification.

I think there are good prospects for greater U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the future. There is now a debate in China about whether we are entering a new post-cold war era in U.S.-Soviet relations in which cooperation will be the dominant factor in the superpower relationship. The majority may still view the U.S.-Soviet rivalry as the more important factor, however. The latter view rejects the theory that the cold war is over and holds that there are inherent contradictions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that will not be easily eliminated. From Deng Xiaoping's statements during General Scowcroft's visit, it is apparent that he does not accept the view that the cold war is over and a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations is emerging. Perhaps Chinese leaders do not wish to accept this view because such a development would not serve Chinese interests--it would diminish China's status in the triangle. But even Deng is not conclusive and has adopted a wait-and-see attitude. So the debate is still continuing on this question.

Prior to the Malta summit, the White House spokesman Fitzwater said that China was on a list of "regional conflicts" to be discussed along with Central America. I don't think that China was discussed between Bush and Gorbachev, but during Baker's meeting with Shevardnadze in Wyoming China was likely touched on.

I had lunch today with Condoleezza Rice (NSC expert on the Soviet Union) and Douglas Paal. I asked her what her assessment was of the progress of reform in the Soviet Union, the survivability of Gorbachev in the next 1-2 years, the possibility of a multi-party system emerging in the Soviet Union and prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. I concluded from the discussion that President Bush does not want to hasten reforms in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. The U.S. wants to see stability maintained and supports slow-paced progress. In addition, the U.S. hopes that Gorbachev will remain in power.

Sino-Soviet Relations

[In response to a question about a Kyodo report that Jiang Zemin's planned visit to Moscow in 1990 has been postponed:]

Now that the U.S. and China have begun to restore relations, there is no urgent need for China to send Jiang to Moscow. Moreover, there are differences in Chinese and Soviet viewpoints on reform and developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. China "blames" Gorbachev for accelerating the pace of change in Eastern Europe. This will affect Sino-Soviet relations. It will slow political contacts and exchanges between our two countries. China is not anxious to send many students to the Soviet Union now. In fact, it is likely that U.S.-Soviet student exchanges will soon exceed Sino-Soviet student exchanges. Bush and Gorbachev agreed at Malta to exchange 1,000 students.

The first round of talks between diplomatic and military experts on demilitarization of the border made some achievements. The two sides agreed on principles to guide the reductions. For example, it was agreed that force reductions should be made on the basis of equal security. This means that reductions will not necessarily be equal on both sides--the country that has more weapons/troops will have to cut its weapons/troops more. The result should be equal security not equal numbers. The first round did not discuss numbers of troops or categories and types of weapons, but this may be discussed in future rounds. The next round will be held in February. I don't know if an agreement will be produced that resembles U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements which obligate both sides to adhere to certain limits. I think, however, that any agreement will deal with specifics, not just generalities. Verification measures will have to be adopted and I wonder how China will feel about having Soviet inspectors at Chinese facilities.

The progress in the talks aimed at demilitarizing the border will be affected by the progress in U.S.-Soviet global arms control, especially START and CFE, and in the progress in easing the U.S.-Soviet military competition in Asia. [Zhang agreed with the following:] China does not want to be left out of the process of disarmament, nor does it want to be seen as out in front of the United States.

In the last round of border talks progress was made on only a very small area. In fact, no substantial progress is being made in these talks. There has been no movement on the impasse over Heixiazhi island. No treaty is likely to be reached in the near future.

Soviet Union: Internal Situation

Gorbachev fears the possibility of inflation and economic chaos in the Soviet Union. He doesn't want to make the same mistakes that China made, so he will move slowly to implement reform. I disagree with the view put forward by many American scholars on the Soviet Union that Soviet economic reforms have suffered a setback with the announcement of the 13th Five Year Plan. It is true that Moscow will continue to rely primarily on central planning, but I think that the current plan is intended to create a stronger basis for moving ahead with price reform. Progress in economic reform will continue, but only at a slow pace. This is Gorbachev's preference.

Eventually, Gorbachev may agree to a multi-party system in the Soviet Union. He has not rejected such a possibility, but he does not want it to occur too soon nor too quickly.

Implications of East European and Soviet Reforms for China

China does not see the reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as posing a grave threat to China. There are major differences between the situation in China and in many East European countries. In the Soviet Union there is glasnost and perestroika, but no food on the table nor consumer goods on the shelves. In Poland the economic situation is terrible and there is no evidence that a more open political system will improve the economy. East Germany and Czechoslovakia are considered to be relatively prosperous, but there is doubt as to whether the political changes there can further improve the economic situation. So there is no certainty that any model is appropriate to China's situation and can ensure continued economic progress. Most Chinese people view the situation in Eastern Europe as chaotic and do not wish to see similar chaos in China.

Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union

The improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and in overall East-West ties has weakened Japan's global position. I think that the Japanese may play a Soviet card to shore up its global influence. They may invite Gorbachev to visit Japan and step up investment in Siberia.

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

22/12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

General —

I'd like to send this msg
to Jim Lilley. Larry Eagleburger
knows the info; I'm not
sure about Baker.

This may die quietly as an
option, but if it catches on,
it can be handled
subsequently in State channels.

Dory Paul

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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to Scowcroft and Secretary Baker Re: Begin Text: (2 pp.)	12/19/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [8]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By ES on 1/16/14

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #: 2009-1165-MR (502)	MR Case #:
AR Disposition: Released in Part	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 2/14/2013	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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<DIST>

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY_IN SIT SUM

<DIST>

SIT: PRIVACY_IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEKOHR <DTG> 190649Z DEC 89

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

<TO>TO THE WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 190650Z DEC 89 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FM AMBASSADOR LILLEY, BEIJING 008

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

ADVISOR LTG SCOWCROFT AND EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY BAKER
BEGIN TEXT

I'M FLAGGING THREE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA NOT BECAUSE I WANT TO BE SOME SECOND-RATE CASSANDRA, BUT BECAUSE I'M FRANKLY WORRIED. I FLAG THESE PROBLEMS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF YOUR SUCCESSFUL TRIP. YOU TOOK HEAT BACK THERE, BUT IT HAS SURELY IMPROVED THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP HERE.

(b)(1)

THE SECOND PROBLEM IS OUR MILITARY SALES PROGRAM. I DETECTED THE MOST HOSTILITY AT HOME AGAINST RESUMING OUR MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE CHINESE, IN CONGRESS, IN DOD, AND AMONG WELL-INFORMED CHINA BUFFS WHO NORMALLY SUPPORT US. THE ISSUE MAY COME TO A HEAD IN LATE FEBRUARY 1990 WHEN WE MEET WITH THE CHINESE AND ASSESS THEM COSTS FOR SUSPENSION (INITIATED BY US) OF THE MILITARY PROGRAMS. THE EXTRA COSTS WILL BE IN THE MILLIONS AND THEY HAVE SERVED NOTICE FREQUENTLY AND FORCEFULLY THAT THEY WON'T PAY THESE COSTS, AND THEY WANT DELIVERIES RESUMED ON ITEMS THEY HAVE ALREADY PAID FOR, SUCH AS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
8010-2781-MR
ES 01/14/13



TORPEDOES, ARTILLERY RADARS. WE HAVE POSTPONED THE ISSUE THUS FAR BY VAGUE ASSURANCES, BUT THIS PROBABLY CANNOT LAST. A CHINESE PAYMENT WAS DUE ON 15 DECEMBER. WE HOPE THEY MAKE IT. IF OUR MILITARY DELIVERIES DON'T TAKE PLACE AND WE ASSESS THE CHINESE COSTS FOR THE SUSPENSION, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A SHOWDOWN. IF IT GOES AGAINST THE CHINESE AND THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP DESTRUCTS, THEN YANG SHANGKUN AND POSSIBLY DENG MAY HAVE TO TURN AGAINST US. WE THEREFORE MUST BEGIN TO FOCUS ON A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM NOW AT A POLICY LEVEL. LOWER LEVELS WERE FLOUNDERING WHEN I WAS HOME EARLIER THIS MONTH.

THE THIRD PROBLEM IS BROADER. WE ARE GOING UP AGAINST SOME TOUGH COOKIES, CHINESE LEADERS WHO ARE HANGING ON TO POWER BY WIDE-SREAD SUPPRESSION, INDOCTRINATION, ISOLATION OF THEIR PEOPLE, AND BY THREAT OF ARMED FORCE (SPELLED PLA). (b)(1)

(b)(1)

WE HAVE TO TAKE ON THIS REGIME ON DEMOCRACY AND ON THE UNIVERSAL RIGHTS OF HUMAN BEINGS, WHICH INCLUDES THE CHINESE PEOPLE. OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT SHOULD REINFORCE THIS, BUT WILL CERTAINLY ANGER THE REGIME HERE. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO THE SELLING OF OUR CHINA POLICY THAT IN SOME AREAS WE OPPOSE THEM VIGOROUSLY, AS IT IS WIDELY KNOWN THAT THEIR SUPPRESSION IS BRUTAL AND PERVASIVE. WE HAVE TO GET A CAREFUL MIX WHERE THEY WORK WITH US TO IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE AND THEIR PERFORMANCE SO THAT WE CAN REINSTITUTE SOME OF OUR MORE CONTROVERSIAL PROGRAMS, I.E. MILITARY DELIVERIES. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

THE CHINESE DILEMMA IS--THE MORE THEY OPEN UP, THE MORE THEIR HOLD ON POWER WEAKENS. SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPE DEVELOPMENTS ARE WELL KNOWN AMONG THE LEADERSHIP HERE. WE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BUILD ANY KIND OF STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH A CHINA THAT PERSISTS IN ITS CURRENT POLICIES. BUT WE MUST KEEP TRYING TO GAIN AN IMPROVED MIX. I WILL BE MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR.

#0190

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0190 <TOR> 891219023409 MSG000251346849

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

NOTICE TO THE PRESS

December 18, 1989

CNN reported today that General Brent Scowcroft visited China in July 1989 on behalf of President Bush. General Scowcroft did undertake a mission to China for President Bush in July to personally underscore the United States' shock and concern about the violence in Tiananmen Square, and to impress upon the Chinese Government the seriousness with which this incident was viewed in the United States.

The President felt this face-to-face mission, like the one recently completed by General Scowcroft, was necessary to show the sense of purpose and direction of the United States Government.

#

Draft reply to
Chinese non-paper
of Dec 18.
D Paul

The US side appreciates the generally positive message received from the Chinese side on December 18. Having established our respective positions, the US side sees no need to repeat at this time the proposed schedule of action. The US side believes the Chinese side knows well what needs to be done to achieve our shared objectives.

The US side is pleased that the Chinese side is willing to consult on the US-China Friendship Volunteer program under the Peace Corps. The US side hopes that the Chinese side will strive to create conditions for lifting martial law as soon as possible and that credible, visible efforts can be made that will demonstrate that the Chinese side takes the most lenient possible approach to those involved in the incidents around June 4.

The US side notes that the Chinese side has referred to "slanted anti-China reporting" by VOA. While the US in no way accepts that it is the policy of VOA to present slanted reporting, mechanisms exist for addressing issues that the Chinese side may wish to clarify. Should the Chinese side wish to do so, the US side will give due consideration and take corrective action if warranted.

The US side wishes to emphasize once again the importance of speedy action. January 1 is an important date in our system, and actions by then will have a greater beneficial impact than those taken later.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. List	Re: The package... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [8]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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~~SECRET~~

Sent
12/15

FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING

~~SECRET~~ _____ PRIVACY CHANNELS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY, AMEMBASSY BEIJING
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

BEGIN TEXT

JIM, THE PRESIDENT WOULD APPRECIATE ^{YOUR} ~~ANY~~ THOUGHTS, OBSERVATIONS ^{AND} ~~OR~~
now that a week has gone by
INSIGHTS ~~(YOU MAY HAVE HAD)~~ SINCE OUR TRIP TO BEIJING LAST WEEKEND.
He would appreciate being grateful for ~~REFLECTIONS ON~~

this
~~PLEASE SEND A WRAP-UP OF YOUR IDEAS AND THE WEEK'S EVENTS~~
~~SOONEST~~, THROUGH ~~THE~~ PRIVACY CHANNEL. I WILL SHARE IT WITH
SECRETARY BAKER. THANKS AND WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT

*the situation and your
reflections on it,*

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1165-MR
mm 2/11/2016

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: GATES GRIMES HUGHES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN

SIT: FILE JACKSON MOORER PAAL SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 150945Z DEC 89

FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6530
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1327
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3465
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0763
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 1263
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 8023
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 6412
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 34920
CINCPAC FOR FPA KILLION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (SCOWCROFT, BRENT), CH, US

SUBJECT: CHINESE OFFICIALS AND LOCAL CONTACTS UPBEAT

-- ON RESULTS OF VISIT BY NATIONAL SECURITY

-- ADVISOR SCOWCROFT AND DEPUTY SECRETARY

-- EAGLEBURGER

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

/

2. IN MEETINGS THIS WEEK WITH OFFICIAL AND
NON-OFFICIAL CHINESE CONTACTS, EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE
HEARD OVERWHELMINGLY POSITIVE REACTIONS TO LAST
WEEKEND'S VISIT BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT
AND DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AT THE MFA, OTHER MINISTRIES, THINK TANKS, AND EVEN
LOCAL MERCHANTS HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
VISIT FOR BEGINNING THE RESTORATION OF SINO-U.S.
RELATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1165-MR

mm 2/11/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

/

3. REACTIONS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS: INDICATIVE OF THE POSITIVE FEELING BY CHINESE OFFICIALS WERE COMMENTS MADE BY MIDDLE-LEVEL OFFICIALS DECEMBER 13 AND 14 AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DURING SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS ON SUBJECTS OTHER THAN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. ALL LAUDED THE TRIP AS A "VERY COURAGEOUS" FIRST STEP BY THE PRESIDENT, AND SOUGHT TO ASSURE EMBOFFS THAT THERE WOULD BE A RESPONSE BY THE CHINESE SIDE. IN A MEETING THIS WEEK, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CUSTOMS OPENED TALKS WITH ECON MINCOUNS BY SAYING, "NOW THAT RELATIONS ARE BACK ON TRACK. . . " AN OFFICIAL OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION TOLD ECONOFF ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, THAT "ALL OF US HERE HAVE BEEN WATCHING THE TELEVISION OVER THE WEEKEND AND ARE VERY EXCITED ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT. "

/

4. THINK TANK EXPERTS PRAISE VISIT: SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SPECIALISTS AT THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (CASS) EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP PLEASURE ABOUT THE VISIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. THEY SAID THE U.S. HAD CLEARLY MADE THE FIRST MOVE, AND NOW CHINA MUST MAKE AN

APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. THE CASS ANALYSTS ACKNOWLEDGED THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR PRESIDENT BUSH RESULTING FROM NEGATIVE REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES. THE SOVIET ANALYST SAID THAT RECENT EDITIONS OF "REFERENCE MATERIALS," CIRCULATED ONLY TO HIGHER-LEVEL PARTY OFFICIALS, HAVE CONTAINED MANY ARTICLES FROM U.S. MEDIA CRITICAL OF THE SCOWCROFT VISIT.

/

5. MORE THINK TANK REACTION: ASKED HOW THE CHINESE "MAN IN THE STREET" VIEWS THE VISIT, THEY SAID THAT, WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS, CHINESE WHO CARE ABOUT THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE RELATIONS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

MOVE BACK TOWARDS NORMALIZATION. THE ANALYSTS WENT ON TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH MANY CHINESE MAY BE UNHAPPY WITH THE JUNE 3-4 CRACKDOWN, ITS AFTERMATH, AND THE CURRENT REGIME'S POLICIES, THERE EXISTS A DEEP TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THEY SAID, MANY CHINESE PEOPLE RECOGNIZE THAT IMPROVED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS MEAN MORE INTELLECTUAL EXCHANGES AND ECONOMIC-COMMERCIAL TIES. WITH NORMALIZED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, THE OPEN DOOR AND REFORM POLICIES WOULD RECEIVE DESPERATELY NEEDED SUPPORT FROM ABROAD. THE ANALYSTS SAID THEY BELIEVE MOST CHINESE KNOW THAT CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. CAN ONLY RESULT IN FURTHER REFORMS AT HOME AND A BETTER ECONOMIC SITUATION FOR EVERYONE, NOTWITHSTANDING ATTEMPTS FROM WITHIN TO BLOCK REFORMS.

/

6. PRIVATE REACTION : MERCHANTS ON A BUSY DOWNTOWN THOROUGHFARE COMMENTED POSITIVELY ON THE VISIT DURING A CHAT WITH EMBOFFS EARLY THIS WEEK. ONE SAID, "RELATIONS BETWEEN US ARE GOOD NOW, RIGHT?"

/

7. A COMMENT FROM THE PROVINCES: CHEN LINGZHANG, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE SICHUAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE IN CHENGDU TOLD SCIENCE MINCOUNS ON DECEMBER 9 THAT HE WAS "VERY GLAD" TO HEAR OF THE VISIT, WHICH IS AN "AUSPICIOUS STEP" IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE

BT

#4920

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 34920

CINCPAC FOR FPA KILLION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (SCOWCROFT, BRENT), CH, US

SUBJECT: CHINESE OFFICIALS AND LOCAL CONTACTS UPBEAT UNITED STATES.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

/

8. EMBASSY OPERATIONS: SOME EMBASSY OPERATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN EFFECTED POSITIVELY BY THE VISIT. THE ECONOMIC SECTION REPORTS THAT PREVIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING APPOINTMENTS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICES HAVE EASED THIS WEEK. MOREOVER, THE SECTION'S TOP INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM (IVP) CANDIDATE, WHO EARLIER INFORMED US HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO TRAVEL THIS YEAR, TOLD ECON MINCOUNS ON DECEMBER 13 HE WOULD NOW BE ABLE TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. AS PROPOSED.

LILLEY

BT

#4920

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<DIST>SIT: PAAL MOORER
<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 891214095158

<TEXT>FBIS 085
UNCLAS 1B

(WHSR: PLEASE PASS TO DOUG PAAL, NSC)

PRC: SPOKESMAN TERMS SCOWCROFT VISIT 'CONSTRUCTIVE'

HK1412103689 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 1032 GMT 14 DEC 89

["FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ON CHINA TOUR OF SPECIAL ENVOY OF U.S. PRESIDENT"--XINHUA HEADLINE]

[TEXT] BEIJING, DECEMBER 14 (XINHUA)--THE RECENT VISIT TO CHINA BY THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS BRENT SCOWCROFT HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL, A CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SAID HERE TODAY.

THIS VISIT, SPOKESMAN JIN GUIHUA SAID, HAS HELPED INCREASE THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CHINA AND THE U.S. AND IS CONDUCIVE TO OVERCOMING THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND TO THE GRADUAL RESTORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BILATERAL TIES.

JIN MADE THE REMARKS AT A WEEKLY NEWS BRIEFING HERE THIS AFTERNOON IN RESPONSE TO REPORTERS' QUESTIONS ON SCOWCROFT'S VISIT TO CHINA.

HE SAID BOTH SIDES ARE SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS ACHIEVED DURING THE VISIT.

JIN SAID CHINA WELCOMES SCOWCROFT'S VISIT TO CHINA. UNDER THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS UNDERGOING THE MOST PROFOUND CHANGES SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THE CONSTANT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS BOTH NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL.

DURING THE VISIT, JIN CONTINUED, SCOWCROFT BRIEFED THE CHINESE LEADERS ON THE RECENT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AND THEY HAD EXTENSIVE AND INDEPTH EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND ON THE ISSUES IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

JIN NOTED THAT THE RESULTS OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SHOW THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. HOWEVER, HE SAID, BOTH AGREED THAT CHINA AND THE U.S. HAVE MAJOR COMMON INTERESTS IN A WIDE RANGE OF AREAS.

THE IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY, HE SAID.

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS THAT GOOD SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY, HE SAID. SO LONG AS THE TWO SIDES WORK TOGETHER AND OBSERVE STRICTLY THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUEES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND SO LONG AS THEY MAKE MORE PRACTICAL EFFORTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR RELATIONS, IT WILL ENTIRELY POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR MUTUAL INTERESTS WHILE RETAINING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND OVERCOME THE EXISTING DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO NORMAL AND EVEN FURTHER DEVELOPED THIS WAY, JIN CONCLUDED.

14 DEC 1453Z AMS

<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 891214060432

<TEXT>UNCLAS 1A

PRC: SCOWCROFT VISIT DESCRIBED AS 'CONSTRUCTIVE, USEFUL'

OW1412105189 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 1030 GMT 14 DEC 89

[TEXT] BEIJING, DECEMBER 14 (XINHUA) -- THE RECENT VISIT TO CHINA BY THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS BRENT SCOWCROFT HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL, A CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SAID HERE TODAY.

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JIN SAID CHINA WELCOMES SCOWCROFT'S VISIT TO CHINA. UNDER THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS UNDERGOING THE MOST PROFOUND CHANGES SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THE CONSTANT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS BOTH NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL.

DURING THE VISIT, JIN CONTINUED, SCOWCROFT BRIEFED THE CHINESE LEADERS ON THE RECENT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AND THEY HAD EXTENSIVE AND IN-DEPTH EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND ON THE ISSUES IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

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14 DEC 1103Z AJF

NNNN

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<TEXT>FBIS UNNUMBERED
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(WHSR: PLS PASS TO DOUG PAAL, NSC)

PRC: RADIO BEIJING NOTES BUSH'S REMARKS ON TIES WITH PRC

OW1312144389 BEIJING IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICA 0300 GMT 13 DEC
89

[TEXT] U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH SAID HE IS LOOKING FOR
WAYS TO FIND A COMMON GROUND WITH CHINA IN A HOPE OF IMPROVING
RELATIONS. RADIO BEIJING'S CORRESPONDENT IN WASHINGTON CHEN DONONG
REPORTS:

PRESIDENT BUSH SAID HE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION IN SENDING A HIGH-
LEVEL MISSION TO CHINA IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT CHINA FROM REMAINING
TOTALLY ISOLATED.

IN A SPEECH TO NEWSPAPERS' EDITORIAL WRITERS AT THE WHITE HOUSE
ON MONDAY, PRESIDENT BUSH SAID HE WANTS TO SEEK A COMMON GROUND WITH
CHINA AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE COULD IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP.
HE SAID HE REALIZED THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS RELATIONSHIP, BUT HE DOES
NOT WANT TO MAKE IT ANY WORSE. HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK IT WOULD
IMPROVE.

OFFICIAL OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SAID: THE SCOWCROFT-
EAGLEBURGER MISSION WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO MOVE THE TWO COUNTRIES
TOWARD MORE NORMALIZED RELATIONS.

THE SOURCES SAID: PRESIDENT BUSH WAS DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD WITH
THE EFFORT EVEN THOUGH SOME SENIOR ADVISERS HAD FEARED A BACKLASH AT
HOME. THEY SAID FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON AND FORMER SECRETARY
OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER SERVED AS IMPORTANT CHANNELS LEADING UP TO
BUSH'S OVERTURE. THEY ALSO SAID PROFESSOR T.D. LEE OF COLOMBIA
UNIVERSITY ALSO PLAYED A ROLE IN HIS REPORT TO BUSH THAT CHINA'S
LEADERSHIP WANTED TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

14 DEC 1518Z AMS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13 December

General:

Here are draft non-papers to present to the Chinese ambassador, preferably tomorrow. You may want to discuss them with Secretary E' burger today before taking them to the Preside

One paper includes what we would do and expect the Chinese to do if Fang is released. The other does not go into detail on Fang.

Please avoid issuing the Presidential waiver on the satellites until next week. We can use it in the conversation with Zhu tomorrow for added leverage. Same for the Exim waiver.


Doug Paal

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PER E.O. 13526

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Fang

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As discussed in preliminary form during the visit to China of National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, the U.S. side is willing, in principle, to accept each of the four elements proposed in the package presented by Deng Xiaoping and Foreign Minister Qian, with some qualifications detailed below.

First, as discussed in Beijing, the U.S. side believes it is important that the details involved in the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family and their safe departure for a third country be discussed between Ambassador Lilley and your representative in Beijing to satisfy the mutual interests of all concerned. To the extent possible, the issue of the Fang family should be kept separate and distinct from other measures intended to lead eventually to normalization of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. side believes it has received Chinese agreement to these two points.

Second, other aspects of relations between the U.S. and China should be discussed through your ambassador and U.S. representatives in Washington.

Third, the U.S. side agrees in principle to make serious efforts to reach agreement on cooperative ventures and would welcome proposals from the Chinese side on the ventures.

Fourth, the U.S. side agrees in principle to extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the United States at an appropriate time next year as the culmination of the process of normalization of relations.

Fifth, the U.S. side wishes to present its proposal for a schedule of actions by both sides that would facilitate normalization of relations.

SCHEDULE OF ACTION

The US side has already agreed to measures regarding the Peace Pearl project, vetoed the Pelosi Bill and sent special Presidential emissaries to China for a public visit. The US side notes that the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman has spoken on missile sales to the Middle East and that anti-US propaganda has [stopped appearing] [abated] in the Chinese media.

With a view to further step-by-step progress toward a normalization of relations the US side proposes the following sequence of actions for consideration by the government of the PRC:

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The US side expects the Chinese side to cease its jamming of VOA and to grant visas for resident VOA correspondents in China. The US believes that these steps will mark a step forward in our relations recognizable by a broad portion of the US and Chinese people.

The US side will be prepared to consider modification of the Department of State's travel "warning" in connection with a resumption of Fulbright and student exchanges, and implementation of the Peace Corps pilot project.

The US side believes that amnesty before January 1, 1990, for those Chinese involved in the activities surrounding the events of June 3-4 in China, would permit the US side to include that significant development in its Human Rights Report to Congress for 1989 due in late January. The US side expects the Congress to draw heavily on the Human Rights Report, a factual compilation of data required by law on this subject, in considering any legislation relevant to the PRC. Moreover, following such an improvement in the atmosphere, the US side would not continue to discourage lending by international financial institutions to the PRC.

The US side believes that the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family during or before the Christmas season would be a major step toward improving the atmosphere between the two countries. In the short term, such a step would permit the US to take a positive attitude toward FMS talks in February. It would also permit the US side not only no longer to discourage, but also to begin to encourage consideration of lending to China by

international financial institutions, although US votes in those financial institutions will continue to be governed by US law.

The US side would also be willing to meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister early in the New Year, with a view to determining a date for the visit of the General Secretary and to identifying prospective joint ventures. The US would also be willing to resume military sales and high level contacts after successful negotiation of the February FMS talks. The US would be similarly prepared to sign a Science and Technology Agreement, subject to the successful completion of the negotiations of the agreement.

The US side has noted the remarks of a Chinese leader to the effect that martial law will not be lifted before January 27, 1990. The US side believes that martial law should be lifted in Beijing and Tibet. If martial law can be lifted on or before January 27, 1990, the US side will be in a position to cancel any travel advisory to China. If it were lifted before January 1, 1990, that significant development could also be included in the 1989 Human Rights Report.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

December 12, 1989

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary's Meeting with the Chinese
Ambassador to the United States

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger met today for thirty minutes with the Chinese Ambassador to follow-up on discussions held this past weekend in Beijing. Also present at the meeting were Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon; Kenneth Juster, Senior Adviser to the Deputy Secretary (notetaker); and a notetaker for the Chinese. The conversation proceeded as follows:

EAGLEBURGER: I wanted to talk a bit about our trip and what we plan to do. I assume you have already gotten reports from Beijing. I also want to pass on to you a message from President Bush.

As we indicated when General Scowcroft and I were in Beijing, there is every intention on the part of the Bush Administration to find ways to reestablish a more normal relationship with China. In that regard, your Foreign Minister gave us a "package" for settling our differences. I told him that, although I could not give him an official response at the time, I doubted that the package provided to us would work.

We will provide you with a counter-proposal. I am not prepared to provide any detailed comment on your package, except to say that it requires too much from us up front. We will aim to give you our counter-proposal on Friday. It will have been reviewed by the President. It will contain two different approaches - one that involves the release of Fang Lizhi, and one that avoids that issue as being too difficult to resolve. Indeed, the future of our relationship cannot be made to depend on one man. There are substantive issues that we need to deal with, and Fang Lizhi cannot hold up such issues.

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In preparing our package, I want to emphasize that it will be done with the utmost of discretion. Although we call it a "package," I do not want to imply that our public actions and your public actions should make it look like a package.

In our judgment, it makes no sense for either of us to continue to talk about who needs to move first. Let us deal with the substantive issues instead. Nonetheless, we do feel that we have already moved substantially, including the visit this past weekend by General Scowcroft and myself, which, as you know, has been almost universally attacked here. Indeed, the President is paying a substantial political price for the trip. We have taken other steps to move forward as well, including the transactions involving Boeing. But the bridge of who goes first has already been crossed.

We were grateful for the quick comment out of Beijing on the missile issue. The President felt that he had to say something in public about that because of all of the publicity generated by our trip.

Finally, I want to let you know that the President called me this morning. He stated that everyone should understand that this (relations with China) is a fight that he is prepared to make because it is the "right" thing to do. He then said that I should tell the Chinese Ambassador how very important it is that we see some steps and some progress from the Chinese with regard to the issue of human rights. He did not give me any specifics. However, in light of the public reaction to the trip by General Scowcroft and myself, and the fact that Congress returns on approximately January 23, we have only until then to do as much as we can to put the President in a position to defeat efforts in Congress to impose sanctions on the Chinese. The President needs some assistance from the Chinese in terms of progress on human rights issues in order to allow him to carry through on his policy. Of course, we understand that your government cannot take actions in a vacuum.

We will have our suggestions to you by the end of the week and will be ready to work with you over the Christmas holiday to move forward as quickly as possible.

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CHINESE AMBASSADOR: Thank you very much, Mr. Eagleburger. The Chinese side feels that the talks were very constructive, positive, and useful. It is time for the two sides to move forward to put our relations on a normal track. I will await your counter-proposal, as I know we do not have much time. You know our position and our willingness to see normalization. I am ready to work with you and move forward.

EAGLEBURGER: It is easier for us to do the discussions and negotiations in Washington rather than Beijing. We would like to do it that way if that is okay with you.

CHINESE AMBASSADOR: That is fine. We can discuss it here, except for details on Fang Lizhi, which will be discussed in Beijing.

EAGLEBURGER: On Fang Lizhi, that is very much an issue of the details as to how to arrange his release, and those discussions will take place in Beijing.

CHINESE AMBASSADOR: Yes, but I understand that the resolution of that issue depends on our discussion on other issues as well.

End of meeting.

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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Good afternoon. I want to open my remarks with a few comments on the importance of strategic relations between the United States and China. As you know, this weekend my National Security Adviser, General Brent Scowcroft, traveled to China to explore the possibilities of dialogue with Chinese leaders. Some have characterized this trip as amounting to a normalization of relations. That is not the case. Our human rights concerns are as strong today as they were when we expressed our outrage over the situation in Tiananmen Square. It still remains for the Chinese to address themselves to the problems inherent in that episode.

But we cannot allow a country of approximately one billion people to be isolated from the world. To keep China isolated serves neither stability nor reform. It is in the interest of the United States and all countries of the world, to know the position of China on the changes taking place in other countries.

I said last June, and I repeat today, that the United States should not take actions which hurt the Chinese people. That is a yardstick I continue to use in measuring progress as we move toward constructive dialogue. I am hopeful that China is ready to "do more practical work" to improve our relations. Those are the words used by Premier Li Peng this morning. It remains to be seen if changes will occur, but I believe it is time to foster those opportunities.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Luncheon Between Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen and National Security Advisor
Scowcroft

DATE & TIME: Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 12:15 pm

PLACE: Diaoyutai State Guesthouse - Villa No. 9
Beijing, PRC

PARTICIPANTS:

US Side: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Chase Undermeyer, Assistant to the President
Douglas S. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker

PRC Side: Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian
Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs
Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: If the press asks, how should I
characterize the meetings?

General Scowcroft: I would say that the visit was positive in
the sense that all sides understand that each side has domestic
problems that have to be worked out and we need to work to take
reciprocal gestures in order to restore the relationship and that
our general view of the world in a broad sense and of recent
developments is parallel. The need to react to a changing world
is understood.

Ambassador Lilley: I would suggest that you might want to say
that because of changing situations, relationship might not be the
same but it is still very important. ^{the}

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General Scowcroft: I guess I would say there were three elements to visit: (1) realization of continuing need to evaluate ^{the} strategic relationship; (2) telling you the results of the Malta meeting and (3) discussion of how we can deal with the bilateral relationship. ✓

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: There are differences but we agreed to work toward improvement of the relationship.

General Scowcroft: We would be interested in your view of the visit.

Foreign Minister Qian: In spite of our differences both sides agree that we have common interest. So this visit has served to enhance and deepen the common desire to return our relations to normal. Both sides agree that Sino-U.S. relations are of vital importance to world stability. So I think we share similar view of that issue.

General Scowcroft: We do indeed. Now all we have to do is overcome the differences.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Mr. Untermyer, what did you accomplish while we were working?

Mr. Untermyer: ^T Improved the Chinese economy by spending money. ✓

^{Bank}
Foreign Minister Qian: I consider it is very important in the world that we resume discussion on sending loans to China. I do recall that Secretary of State Baker said the American side would take some measures. In a technical sense both the World Bank and IMF have indicated their operations are free of political consideration. I think it is difficult for their operation to be completely immune to political considerations. It is almost the same as saying the weather should not affect U.S.-Soviet relations, but, in fact, the weather in the Port of Malta did affect the relations because they had to cancel a meeting. ✓

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: It proves there is a power higher than the President of the United States and Chairman Gorbachev. While I might think that, I am not trying to impose it on you.

Foreign Minister Qian: Gorbachev said then those warships served no purpose and they should be destroyed.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Let's not go too far.

General Scowcroft: He's reluctant to destroy his warships. Any time the Russians want to destroy their warships, ^{own} ~~it's~~ ^{it's} alright with us

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Ambassador Lilley: In terms of the World Bank they have just conducted a mission here. They have done research and I have read their report on their visit here. Although political situations do affect the situation, like in terms of the weather, I think they are concerned that there may be, although you said otherwise, some concrete evidence that you are going the other way. It is important that it not become politicized. Of great concern is we are not jumping to any conclusions but we have to work with preliminary indicators in cases like this. And this affects the decision on World Bank and we have been examining it already. ✓

Foreign Minister Qian: China's reforms will continue. No doubt about it, but it must be a gradual process under the prevailing economic conditions. The biggest challenge is such a large population. So right now we have to try to bring down the inflation rate and stabilize. Although the rating of China has been lowered somewhat on the Japanese market, China will have no trouble in repaying. The total foreign debt of China is the same as that of Poland. Yet we have a much larger (ban) export than Poland. So I think the U.S. will face much less of a problem when they come to invest in China than they do in Poland. ?

Ambassador Lilley: The U.S. has more money invested in China than any other country in the world. One of the reasons we suggested a brief meeting after lunch is that, while we do not have an answer to your package, it is important to have some preliminary discussion as to needs and how we see it developing so we lose no time in how we deal with things. ✓

Foreign Minister Qian: That is to say, after the lunch we will have a short visit. ✓

Ambassador Lilley: Mr. Qian is one of the foremost experts on Soviets. ✓

General Scowcroft: Yes. You have listened to us for 24 hours. What is your appraisal of what has been happening?

Foreign Minister Qian: Gorbachev would like to maintain a balance in everything. There is balance between East and West and balance between United States and Soviet Union. So he just concentrates on this balance but he cannot continue balancing everything, for example in economic affairs. He can't try just to strike a balance; for example, balance between economic and political affairs. How can he achieve a balance if he cannot turn a profit? So I really share your view that Gorbachev does not know economy very much. Ambassador Lilley mentioned the fact that the Soviets want to make the ruble convertible. This is an objective but to be realized it will be very remote. Gorbachev ✓

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can say a lot of things that are really difficult to be achieved. So I think the Soviets are faced with two major problems: the ethnic issue and the economic issue. These two problems will result in prolonged turmoil in the Soviet Union. I have not seen Gorbachev taking any measures.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Don't you believe that he began political reform only when he decided he needed it to make the economic reform work -- that it was not an original plan of his.

Foreign Minister Qian: Maybe so at the beginning. Because last year and the year before last I had opportunities to meet with Mr. Gorbachev and at that time he explained to me that because he ran into obstacles in perestroika he wanted to make political reform.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: That is the reason for glasnost.

Foreign Minister Qian: But of late he seems to have gradually developed more of a pattern for political reforms. Many use political reforms as a means of removing those who hold opposing views. Then the Eastern European countries are adopting the same attitude on a much larger scale. In the Soviet Union they are used to seeing a hundred members of the Committee resign. Now you have in Eastern Europe the entire membership resigning.

Ambassador Lilley: Some problems are being resolved while differences remain. Another problem to resolve is the reduction of troops along the border.

Foreign Minister Qian: Troops along the border within a certain scope. So in this regard we are starting first by talking about general principles. We will have to make it clear that we will have to avoid deployment along the border so as to avoid border clashes. We have not decided as yet as to the scope of such areas to be demilitarized, whether it should be 100km on each side or 200. The talks are next month.

Ambassador Lilley: We have mutual means of verifying that, don't we?

Foreign Minister Qian: We agreed on principles. Gorbachev has called on the Chinese side to provide consumer necessities. First of all we can provide consumer goods and they will pay back in raw materials. They also want loans. We were quite taken aback when they first raised this. We have agreed to extend some money to them.

Ambassador Lilley: Also technology transfer. You are teaching them how to grow soy beans.

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Foreign Minister Qian: Their farmers are very unmotivated. After sowing the seeds in the ground then they prepare to sharpen their sickles. We have sent some vegetable farmers to the Soviet Union because the Soviets don't know how to grow vegetables. They call potatoes vegetables. They have no other vegetables.

Ambassador Lilley: Any more on Soviet side re Vietnam?

Foreign Minister Qian: Results are not very good. They seem to be more interested in Cambodia than in Eastern Europe and I don't know why. Just as they are more interested in Nicaragua, Central America and Cuba than in Eastern Europe. So I presume that maybe they want to keep some trouble spots around China and around the United States. And Eastern Europe is next to them. I have the impression that Eastern Europe is a great burden on the Soviets. Generally speaking, every year it has to provide 70 million tons of petroleum plus natural gas equivalent to 30 million tons, totalling 100 million tons of petroleum. No other Eastern European country has so much natural resources. So this is a great burden on the Soviets. I wonder whether Western Europe is now ready to take on this burden. I should say that Western Europe does not have natural energy nor does it have abundant natural resources.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: The Minister has raised a very important point in terms of where they can go in the future. Much of their finances is in clearing arrangements, not hard currency. That is not easily accessible to them somewhere else. The Soviets have a leverage that the West can forget. It is a burden but a leverage with Eastern Europe. It is not something we could fill in tomorrow morning if the Soviets should cut.

Foreign Minister Qian: How is Secretary Baker?

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: He is fine. I talked with him this morning. He leaves sometime today for Berlin and then he has the Group of 24 meeting to talk about aid to Poland and Hungary.

Foreign Minister Qian: Money?

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: No money; just promise.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick -

This is the
practical outcome
of my Chinese trip.
It remains to be
seen whether they
will actually go
through with it.

Please keep to
yourself for now &
return the papers
after you have read
Brent

The U.S. side has closely examined the package proposal as detailed by Foreign Minister Qian and wishes to present a response.

As discussed in preliminary form during the visit to China of National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, the U.S. side is willing, in principle, to accept each of the four elements proposed in the package presented by Deng Xiaoping and Foreign Minister Qian, with some qualifications detailed below.

First, as discussed in Beijing, the U.S. side believes it is important that the details involved in the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family and their safe departure for a third country be discussed between Ambassador Lilley and your representative in Beijing to satisfy the mutual interests of all concerned. To the extent possible, the issue of the Fang family should be kept separate and distinct from other measures intended to lead eventually to normalization of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. side believes it has received Chinese agreement to these two points.

Second, other aspects of relations between the U.S. and China should be discussed through your ambassador and U.S. representatives in Washington.

Third, the U.S. side agrees in principle to make serious efforts to reach agreement on cooperative ventures and would welcome proposals from the Chinese side on the ventures.

Fourth, the U.S. side agrees in principle to extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the United States at an appropriate time next year as the culmination of the process of normalization of relations.

Fifth, the U.S. side wishes to present its proposal for a schedule of actions by both sides that would facilitate normalization of relations.

SCHEDULE OF ACTION

The US side has already taken a major step by sending special Presidential emissaries to China for a public visit, and also agreed to measures regarding the Peace Pearl project and vetoed the Pelosi Bill. The US side notes that the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman has spoken on missile sales to the Middle East, that anti-US propaganda has abated in the Chinese media, that the PRC has accredited a VOA correspondent, and that the PRC has indicated a desire to discuss the Fulbright Program with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

The US wishes to inform the Chinese side that the President has decided to issue waivers for the licensing of the Aussat and Asiasat satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets and for Exim Bank lending for China. The Department of State, moreover, will soon modify its travel warning for China.

With a view to further step-by-step progress toward a normalization of relations the US side proposes the following sequence of actions for consideration by the government of the PRC:

The Chinese side would cease its jamming of VOA, resume Fulbright and student exchanges, and implement the Peace Corps pilot project. The US believes that these steps will mark a step forward in our relations recognizable by a broad portion of the US and Chinese people.

The US side believes that amnesty before January 1, 1990, for those Chinese involved in the activities surrounding the events of June 3-4 in China, would permit the US side to include that significant development in its Human Rights Report to Congress for 1989 due in late January. The US side expects the Congress to draw heavily on the Human Rights Report, a factual compilation of data required by law on this subject, in considering any legislation relevant to the PRC. Moreover, following such an improvement in the atmosphere, the US side would not continue to discourage lending by international financial institutions to the PRC.

The US side believes that the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family during or before the Christmas season would be a major step toward improving the atmosphere between the two countries. In the short term, such a step would permit the US to take a positive attitude toward FMS talks in February. It would also permit the US side to begin encouraging consideration of lending to China by international financial institutions, although US votes in those financial institutions will continue to be governed by US law.

At an appropriate time, the US side would also be willing to meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister with a view to determining a date for the visit of the General Secretary and to identifying prospective joint ventures. The US would be similarly prepared to sign a Science and Technology Agreement, subject to the successful completion of the negotiations of the agreement.

The US side has noted the remarks of a Chinese leader to the effect that martial law will not be lifted before January 27, 1990. The US side believes that martial law should be lifted in Beijing and Tibet. If martial law is lifted on or before January 27, 1990, the US side will be in a position to cancel any travel advisory to China. If it were lifted before January 1, 1990, that significant development could also be included in the 1989 Human Rights Report. The US would also be willing to resume military sales and contacts and high level exchanges after successful negotiation of the February FMS talks.

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