

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files

OA/ID Number: 91136
Folder ID Number: 91136-007

Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	11/6/89	(b)(1)	
02. Memo	President Richard Nixon to President George Bush Re: My China Trip (14 pp.)	11/5/89	(b)(1)	
03a. Speech	Re: Toast by Former President Nixon at a Banquet Hosted by the President of the People's Republic of China (3 pp.)	11/1/89	(b)(1)	
03b. Non-Paper	Re: Copy of Untitled Non-Paper Given to Jiang Zemin (3 pp.)	10/31/89	(b)(1)	✓
03c. Memo	Mike Oksenberg to Karl Jackson Re: Deng Xiaoping Presentation to President Nixon about Fang Lizhi (3 pp.)	11/3/89	(b)(1)	TS
03d. Speech	Re: Toast by Former President Nixon at a Banquet Hosted by the Premier of the People's Republic of China (4 pp.)	10/30/89	(b)(1)	
04a. Letter	President Bush to Ambassador James R. Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1), (b)(6)	
04b. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Pinksheet Number: cap1132
OA/ID Number: 91136-007
Date Closed: 5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04c. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	S
04d. Letter	President Bush to Ambassador James R. Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1) , (b)(6)	
05a. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	S
05b. Letter	President Bush to Ambassador James R. Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1) , (b)(6)	
06. Handwritten Notes	Re: Deng Letter (2 pp.)	6/21/89	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Pinksheet Number: cap1132
OA/ID Number: 91136-007
Date Closed: 5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

*Handed over
to Chinese
Amb.
11/8/89*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Greetings to my friend.

Last night at the White House, former President Nixon debriefed me and some of my top associates on his visit to China. He appreciated the manner in which he was received there. My personal view is that his visit to China was helpful.

I scheduled this meeting immediately upon his return from China, hoping that this will signal to you, to the people here at home, and to the rest of the world that I want to find a way to work out the major difficulties that have darkened our relationship. I will be carefully considering everything Mr. Nixon told me.

Now, for a different subject. Soon I will be meeting President Gorbachev at a non-Summit meeting, in other words at a meeting without a set agenda. Though our relations with the Soviet Union are more free of tensions than at times past, enormous problems still remain. At a time of rapidly moving events in many areas of the world, this meeting is designed, not to reach major decisions, but to reduce the chances of misunderstandings on issues of significance. I want to assure you that nothing will take place at this meeting that will be detrimental to China's interests.

In my view the geo-political reasons that prompted Richard Nixon to come to China in the first place are still valid. I see many areas of importance today where China and the U.S. have similar interests.


With these considerations in mind I would propose sending a personal emissary to China after the December 2-3 meetings with President Gorbachev. That emissary would be prepared to fill you in on the details of the meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. If that is agreeable in principle we can decide later who the emissary should be and who might receive him. If, prior to the US-Soviet meeting you have any concerns or thoughts to convey to me, I would welcome hearing from you.

On the broader subject that is a constant concern to me, how to normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find some answers. With respect, I hope China will try to do the same. In this regard, I think the discussions that you had with President Nixon and with the physicist, Dr. Tsung-Dao Lee, were extremely helpful.

On October 26, it was a pleasure to receive your able new Ambassador a few days after he arrived and before formal presentations of credentials. By receiving him in this manner, I wanted you to know that I remain personally involved in emphasizing the importance I ascribe to our relationship and in trying to resolve our differences.

Respectfully,

Most sincerely,



His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Chairman, Central Military Committee
People's Republic of China
Beijing

RICHARD NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

MEMORANDUM

TO: President George Bush

FROM: Richard Nixon

DATE: November 5, 1989

RE: My China Trip

My extensive and blunt discussion with China's leaders yield several major findings. These findings prompt several policy recommendations:

- 1) To try to deter Congress from passing the sanctions bill;
- 2) To have someone in the administration give a speech on China that expresses indignation over the June 2-4 tragedy and subsequent crackdown while establishing the rationale for seeking improved relations;
- 3) To devote priority to resolving the Fang Lizhi matter;
- 4) To indicate that as soon as that is resolved, high level contacts will be renewed, with Nicholas Brady the first person to go;
- 5) His trip should elicit Chinese restoration of Fulbright and measures to ease constraint of foreign businessmen;
- 6) A successful Brady trip would aim at restored American support for new World Bank loans with Chinese affirmation of the economic reform process and signs of abating repression of intellectuals.

Under the best of circumstances, this sequence would take many months to accomplish and would occur against continued monitoring of its arms sales policy, much tough but quiet dialogue in Beijing about human rights concerns, and on-going efforts to find a solution to the Kampuchean situation that both sides could support. While this sequence of steps is reasonable, and attainable, we must be prepared for the risk and the possibility of failure.

Let me turn to my major findings:

Deng is losing his effectiveness. Deng is physically vigorous but has lost some of his acuity. His hearing problem is severe and his analytical capabilities have weakened. China no longer has an effective preeminent leader, as its system demands. Deng no longer is in disciplined control of himself. For example, I wanted him to acknowledge that mutual efforts would be required to restore relations. As he formulated his response, his emotions gained control, and his face reddened as he gained a head of steam. His response was to reject my plea for mutual efforts. Instead, he said that he had taken no measure to harm Sino-American relations; the erosion was due to American actions: economic sanction, cessation of high level contacts, and so on. Therefore, the United States should bear all the burden for restoring the relationship. Deng concluded. However, as he delivered his response, his reply veered off in a more negative manner than he clearly had intended, and he overshot his mark. He then became calm. I then tried to elicit from him a more helpful formulation. This time,

in more reasoned forms, he strongly affirmed that mutual efforts are needed. He did not let me complete a presentation; he interrupted repeatedly. Yet, I did not feel that he was rude. Rather, at a minimum, he has lost his sensitivity to the translation process, while at a maximum he simply has less interest in absorbing ideas. Hard of hearing, he is no longer a good listener. In the past, his intellectual curiosity was one of his strengths. That is now diminished. Yet he remains forceful, self-confident, witting, and engaged. I asked if Jiang Zemin was as intelligent as he; he replied, "He is no less able." But he is clearly unable to absorb much information orally, and he never was a big reader. The bottom line is that his interventions in the policy process are undoubtedly somewhat capricious and unsteady; he is subject to manipulation. But if he gives a specific command and takes an interest in a single topic, such as his engagement now in resolving the Fang Lizhi matter, he is still a commanding and feared figure.

Several competing power centers exist: one around Premier Li Peng, another around General Secretary Jiang, another around President Yang Shangkun. Even the lesser figures I met -- the very attractive and dynamic new Politburo standing committee member Li Ruihuan, the Shanghai leader Zhu Rongji, and the Education Commissioner Li Tieying -- seemed to speak as independent power centers. They do not speak in similar fashion about many of the key issues of the day. Of them, Li Peng clearly exhibits the greatest lust for power and the greatest

commitment to doctrinaire socialism. Yang Shangkun has backbone and may seek to be the power broker after Deng. Jiang Zemin is affable and pragmatic but does not seem to be a visionary thug, requisite qualities to be China's preeminent leader. The system lacks the cohesiveness, coherence, and unified structure of authority we've come to expect of China under Deng. China is headed for a period of protracted uncertainty until Deng dies and the successors establish a new pecking order. While Li Peng's chances are greater than our conventional wisdom has it, the most likely outcome is that a dark horse will win the sweepstakes. Yang at 82 is too old, though he is vigorous, while Jiang strikes me as a light weight. The struggle may last up to two years, if similar succession periods in China and the Soviet Union are any guide. I should mention that Li Ruihuan is particularly impressive; he is clearly an inspiring leader. All the Chinese were on the edge of their seats, clearly awed by him.

The Chinese leaders are sinking back into intellectual isolation. Their thinking no longer is being challenged by a steady stream of foreign visitors. As a result, consumed by domestic concerns, the top leaders seem almost oblivious to the inadequacies of their thinking about their weak strategic situation. Two examples suffice. First, they assert that martial law must remain in force and that a handful of counter revolutionaries nearly toppled the Chinese government -- a confession of extraordinary weakness and vulnerability -- but they also claim the domestic situation is

stable and the state is strong. I pointed out the contradictions in their views and observed that their own rhetoric is a cause for Western businessmen's hesitancy to invest in China. They did not understand the point. Second, all the leaders express skepticism over Gorbachev's long term intent and admit no major power shares as many common interests with them as the United States does. Yet, when I asked whether it really was in China's security interest that both they and we now enjoyed improving relations with the Soviet Union while our own bilateral relations were eroding, they had no effective response. In short, the top leaders are not being intellectually challenged, and the cessation of foreign leaders' visits reduces the opportunities of the more cosmopolitan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to shape the leaders' thinking through the briefings that occur on the eve of a foreign visit.

As a result, the leaders are reverting to old ways of viewing the world. Our economic sanctions, our refusal to talk to Chinese officials, and the american moral indignations from a nation with its own inadequacies remind the old revolutionaries of days goneby, when our nation bullied and scorned China and the outside world exploited that nation. This prompts rigidity of thought, an emphasis on dignity and principle, and an unwillingness to absorb ideas.

I am convinced all the leaders believe that they were amply justified in cracking down on the demonstrators and that the disorder was threatening to spread to other cities. My own rhetoric of condemnation, as the American press

reported, was very hard. In no small measure, my posture was aimed at establishing my credibility in the United States, and given the headlines upon my return, I think I succeeded. But unquestionably, my rhetoric prompted my hosts to escalate their own attacks on the United States and resolutely to defend their own deeds. I pointedly insisted on referring to events in China as tragedy. On my first night, I asked the Foreign Minister why the leaders did not describe the June 2-4 events as a tragedy. I explained that the current stance makes them appear to the world as calloused and uncaring individuals. But I have since learned that "tragedy" as a concept, when rendered in Chinese, has different connotations than "tragedy" connotes in English. In Chinese culture, life is a morality play, and a tragedy inevitably involves a villain, while in the West, a tragedy can entail a situation in which all the players lose and responsibility for the outcome is diffuse. If the leaders admit a tragedy occurred, in their culture they would be acknowledging that they acted immorally. Let me be clear. I seek neither to justify their rhetoric, nor mute our own. But linguistic analysis may illuminate in part their sense of insult arising from our terminology.

Among some of the leaders -- especially Jiang Zemin and the dynamic, younger, and new Politburo Standing Committee member Li Ruihuan -- there is remorse and an understanding that what happened was unfortunate, sad, and regrettable. I think several leaders are slowly working toward use of words that reveal their dismay over what happened. To the extent

possible and consistent with our values, our rhetoric should aim to facilitate a more humane Chinese expression of their regret. (At the same time, we should know some of the leaders--Li and Yang in particular--probably relished the whiff of gunpowder; they would be placed on the defensive by having to employ a language of regret.)

Our own strategic situation in East Asia is passive. As you enter a period of negotiations with Gorbachev, your hand should be as strong as possible. A weakening relationship with China detracts from the total pressure you can have against him. By depriving you of flexibility to improve relations with China between now and December, the domestic critics of your China policy are objectively weakening you. Under ideal circumstances, you should be meeting Gorbachev while your relations with Beijing are on the upswing. And the Chinese have some incentive to help you in this regard. Otherwise, they will confront the danger of a superpower meeting in which neither side is particularly sensitive to Chinese concerns.

Further, we are unlikely to elicit the cooperation that we seek from China in Kampuchea when our bilateral relations are in disrepair. As you know, Deng and Yang are proud Long March veterans, and their natural stubbornness precludes openly associating with us on the transitory regional issues in which our interests converge when we are publicly humiliating them.

The Chinese are disappointed with the short-term gains they have secured from rapprochement with the Soviet Union. My sense is that Gorbachev's domestic problems, his concentration on Eastern Europe problems and Western Europe opportunities, and his ultimate East Asia strategy of improving relations with Japan, as well as his own disdain for the way the Chinese leaders handled their Beijing problems, have prompted him to step back somewhat from his Chinese initiative. In any case, I was struck by the persistent anti-Gorbachev theme to which I was exposed. To my surprise, the harshest comments came from Li Peng. To be sure, he and his colleagues may have been playing upon my own well known inclinations. But Li Peng, who is no actor, was convincing in his rather emotional and vehement condemnation of Gorbachev as a vacillating politician who, in effect, is risking the cause of socialism. The Chinese believe it is still too early to tell whether Gorbachev's new thinking is a tactical ploy or a fundamental change in strategy. Interestingly, Li told me that in his first meeting with Gorbachev at Chernenko's funeral in 1985, Gorbachev suggested that the USSR and China should cooperate against the United States. Li noted both that he rejected the offer at the time and that the Soviet offer is no longer on the table, a retract on that clearly vexes him.

While we must guard against the possibility the Chinese are being manipulative and duplicitous, the Chinese affirm in private at least that one of the underlying strategic purposes of our relationship is still very much in place: our common interest in countering Soviet

expansionist proclivities. We should continue deliberately to use this common interest as one of the bonds or glues to our relationship. If Gorbachev were to reverse course or lose power to a Ligachev-type conservative while Sino-American relations were strained, the two communist giants would have an interest in drawing significantly closer together. Or, should Gorbachev's reforms prevail and were the Beijing reformers to return to power, under present circumstances, you might not be able to enter the bidding. You could not respond swiftly due the rigidities imposed by lack of contact and possibly by congressional legislation. The Beijing reformers might perceive they have more in common with reformist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

As to our bilateral relations, some Chinese leaders clearly hope to return to the extensive relations we had before June 2-4. They particularly seek a roll back of the sanctions and a full return of American businessmen, tourists, and scientists. And these Chinese leaders somehow hope the Fang Lizhi matter can be settled. To such Chinese--and I include Deng Xiaoping among them--the US side must initiate the process of reconciliation; they cannot appear to yield to American pressure. As Deng said, "i have no room to yield." I am also convinced, however, that some leaders welcome the suspect Li Peng is among them. These conservative leaders are not enamored with Deng's economic reforms and are opposed to political reform. (Li policies.) The conservatives understand that the openness to the outside, economic reform, and political reform really constitute an integrated package of reform policies. They believe that the

package ultimately will cost China their vision of what socialism entails. And they also believe--probably with some reason--that the package of policies will subject China to social stress of the sort visible in the streets of Beijing last spring. They would rather risk China's rapid modernization than risk its unity and stability. Let's face it. Americans were involved in stimulating and exacerbating the student movement through the involvement of our media, our scholars in Beijing, and our tolerance of Chinese students in the US, although I suspect our involvement was marginal rather than central. But no matter its extent, the American connection has become part of the political debate in China.

The Chinese conservatives see our presence as destabilizing; the reformers see it as essential to the modernization proces. Not until the succession struggle is over will this debate be resolved in one direction or the other. We have some but not decisive leverage in affecting the outcome of the debate. Our present posture, however, precludes us from exercising the limited influence that we do possess. And this inadvertently benefits the conservatives.

The American long-term strategic interest in the outcome of this debate should not be underestimated. What is at stake over the long run is the nature of America's involvement in East Asia. Essentially, we have historically faced three options in this region: 1) to be constructively engaged on the mainland of Asia, which means to participate in the modernization of China including of its military; 2) to base

ourselves on the rim of Asia: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and to seek to isolate and contain the forces on the China mainland; 3) to retreat to Guam and Hawaii. If the conservatives were to prevail and China were to turn inward, its relations with us would become more acrimonious and adversarial than positive and beneficial. Perforce we would then have to return to the rim strategy of the 1950's and 1960's. And you remember how costly and ultimately untenable that strategy was.

One of two things would happen if the Chinese conservatives were to prevail in the post-Deng era and we then reverted to a rim strategy in the Western Pacific. Either an isolated China would lash out and would experience severe difficulties at home; or to escape its isolation, the leaders would develop close relations with and resume its modernization effort in cooperation with the USSR and/or Japan but not us. An isolated China would be dangerous, unable or unwilling to contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

We understand the danger of a Sino-Soviet approachment; that is obvious. But a Sino-Japanese partnership without our involvement would, in its way, pose a serious challenge. History teaches us the dangers that arise when our China policy and Japan's China policy diverge; the inevitable result is heightened US-Japanese tensions. So much for a bit of gaming and speculation about alternative East Asian scenarios.

In the current emotion of the moment, our nation seems to be forgetting an important point: A modernizing, unified, and effectively governed China that has good relations with us and that balances Japanese and Soviet strength in the region is by far the preferred solution for advancing American security interests in East Asia. At time when we are appropriately occupied with the historic challenges and opportunities in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet union, let us not neglect the situation in Asia, where inattention on our part now could inadvertently create a major security problem for the next generation. And as I said in my October 30 toast at Li Peng's banquet, China plays an indispensable role in the maintenance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Peace cannot maintained in Korea, the Taiwan issue cannot be resolved peacefully, the people of Hong Kong can not enjoy a future as an autonomous, capitalist, and democratic entity, and tranquility cannot at last be found in Indochina unless China is constructively and responsibly engaged in regional affairs.

Recommendations: This leads to my recommendations on bilateral relations. I attach at Tab A a list of initiatives the Chinese might consider. I gave it to Jiang Zemin after mentioning my intent to do so to Deng Xiaoping.

I return convinced that the congressional legislation is a very bad idea. It will elicit a negative response, could risk the Fang initiative (but which cannot be disclosed on the

Hill), and freezes you in. I suggest quiet lobbying against it.

A major speech on China policy, with some tough rhetoric it in, could buy public support for more moderate policies and would remind the nation or our enduring interests in China. I tried to strike this balance on the trip, and it worked fairly well. It is always possible to explain the to the Chinese what you are doing, perhaps in private correspondence to Dent Xiaoping.

I believe the cessation of official contact above the Bureau of Chef level hurts us more than them. It contributes to their isolation. We can express our revulsion for the crackdown directly to them. But our presence has its effect. And as my foray into the streets of Biejing shows, our presence is desired by the Chinese people. Why should we abandon the citizens of the country when they yearn for our presence? And why should we permit the Soviets to have more contact with the leader of China than we do?

Priority must be given to settling the Fang case. If it can be resolved, I recommend next sending Nicholas brady to discuss partial restoration economic relations. The quid pro quo for restoration of new World Bank loans should be clearer affirmations than we've received thus far of welcome of foreign business in China and of commitment to economic reform

Resumption of the negotiations of the Science and Technology agreement should be linked to

restoration of the Fulbright program. This buys
plaudits from the academics.

The PRC Embassy here should be encouraged to
open an off-the-record dialogue with the human
rights people--Asia Watch and Amnesty
International. China specialist at State or NSC
should work behind the scenes to nurture this
link. The purpose here is in no small measure
to quiet somewhat one of the potentially most
vociferous critics of the policy I have
recommended -- critics with considerable
influence on the Hill.

The big question, of course, is why these small
steps should be taken. Why risk criticism when
we do not know if the Chinese will answer the
phone? My belief is that, with Jim Lilly's good
urging in Beijing, they will respond. But above
all, I believe our presence in China and our
restoration of momentum would help you
strategically and perhaps help the reformers in
their battle with the doctrinaire socialists.

Toast by Former President Nixon at a Banquet Hosted by
the President of the Peoples Republic of China

November 1, 1989

Mr. President:

We meet at a critical time in the relations between our two countries. Americans will long remember the tragedy that recently occurred in this city and its continuing aftermath. And this memory will inevitably color American opinion and behavior toward China.

Lenin wrote that facts are stubborn things. The fact is that many in the United States, including many friends of China, believe the crackdown was excessive and unjustified. The events of April through June damaged the respect and confidence which most Americans previously had for the leaders of China.

On the other hand, as I have learned this week, many Chinese leaders deeply believe that the American reaction represents an intrusion in their internal affairs. The American response has included economic sanctions, cessation of high-level official contacts, and moral condemnation from a nation with inadequacies of its own. These measures have revived bitter personal memories among China's leaders. They recall bygone days, when their nation was bullied and exploited by outside powers. As a result, some Chinese now exhibit a distrust of the United States that is reminiscent of the period before 1972.

China's leaders now appear to claim that how they rule their country internally is no one else's business. Most Americans deeply believe, however, that international standards exist to guide the conduct of leaders anywhere. The age-old clash of ideas that now divides our nations is clear: The assertion of sovereignty of the state versus the universal rights of man.

But let us leave the philosophical realm. When ideology intrudes excessively into public affairs, disaster is sure to follow. I journeyed to China to explore a number of issues:

-- Our common strategic concern about Soviet adventurism was a major factor that brought us together. Today, when the conventional wisdom is that the Soviet threat has diminished -- some even proclaim that the Cold War is over -- what is the glue that can keep us together?

-- In view of its domestic problems, is China willing and able to play a major and constructive role in the maintenance

of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region?

-- Are martial law and political repression permanent features of life in China?

-- Is the door that China opened to the outside world to be closed, or can we continue and increase the exchange of people and ideas which has so enriched the lives of the people of both our countries?

-- Can the courageous and bold economic reforms that Chairman Deng Xiaoping initiated in 1979 be revitalized and continued, or will China revert to the stagnant situation that existed before?

-- In rooting out corruption and inflation, will China also root out the delicate new growth of individual enterprise that has doubled the per capita income of the Chinese people between 1979 and 1989?

My twenty hours of frank and wide-ranging discussions with China's leaders do not permit conclusive answers to these questions. But they do yield two unmistakable conclusions.

First, mutual efforts are required to restore momentum to our relations. At present, the Chinese side says the United States must take the first step. Many Americans say China must take the first step. If those attitudes had prevailed in 1971 and 1972, the Shanghai Communique would not exist. Neither normalization in 1979 nor resolution of our differences in 1982 and 1983 would have been possible. The only way to move forward is to journey together.

Second, the death of innocent people on June 2 through June 4 was a great tragedy. But another tragedy would be the death of a relationship and of policies that have served so well. We must not permit our real enemies -- misunderstanding, fruitless resentment, endless recrimination -- to close the door we opened with such high hopes 17 years ago.

American concern over the tragedy of June 2 through June 4 has as much to do with our compassion for the people of China as it does with our opposition to some policies of their government. What both sides must recognize is that this bond between our peoples is a precious thing. If we are concerned about the events of last June, it is because we want a better life for the people of China. If we worry that Chairman Deng's visionary reforms may stall, it is because we want a better life

for the people of China. If in my discussions with your leaders I have at times seemed to be alarmed at the deteriorating of Sino-American relations, it is because I want a better life for the people of China, and I know that there is much our two peoples can still do for each other.

Despite the differences that divide us today, I am more confident about the future of Sino-American relations that I was in 1972. That is because we are no longer joined together only by our fears, as was the case 17 years ago, but by our hopes -- our hope for economic progress for both our peoples, our hope to reduce the danger of war, our hope for a cleaner, safer world.

When I first came to China in 1972, a deep and abiding friendship began between our two countries that continues today. Some naive observers, of course, insisted on turning our rapprochement into a romance. In fact, we became friends because we had mutual interests. We did not look for mutual interests because we were friends. Friendship neither brought us together nor will keep us together. But without the friendship between our two peoples, no enduring relationship between our two governments would be possible.

Enemies do not have falling-outs. Enemies do not fear they are being misunderstood. Only friends do. In the years to come, I am confident that China and the United States will reach new heights together. They will find new ways to cooperate in building a better world and better lives for their people. As the bitterness of the last few months recedes, and as our common interests draw us together, our relationship will emerge stronger than ever.

Our relations will never be smooth and untroubled. We are both too proud, too different, and too great for that. China and the United States took a great risk by putting aside their differences and starting together down a common road. But think about it: Nothing great is ever accomplished without great risks. We must never be satisfied with success; we should never be discouraged by failure. As two great nations moving toward an uncertain future, we will have both successes and failures in our relations. But our relations will endure, because they must endure. It is destiny for two nations as great as ours to work together, both for ourselves and for the world.

May I therefore propose a toast

- to the continued growth of good Sino-American relations;
- to my host, the President of the Peoples Republic of China;
- And to the health of all our Chinese and American friends here this evening.

Here is a series of questions I would pose for the Chinese government to consider. This list is entirely my own idea of possible measures that could help restore momentum to the Sino-American relationship. They are offered on the assumption that China wishes to continue its openness and restore momentum to Sino-American relations.

I also recognize that there are many measures the United States could take. I will propose a similar list to Bush. These are not listed in any particular order of importance.

I fully understand and respect the points Chairman Deng raised this morning. Consider these observations from a friendly personage. To use a Chinese saying, I am throwing out rocks to get back jade:

-- Can martial law be lifted in Beijing? Or at least can the military presence and its legal basis be made less intrusive? This would signal a return to normal.

-- Would the Chinese government be willing to reiterate the validity of the 1985 23-point document concerning foreign business activities in China? A number of businessmen believe this would be helpful, as several of those items now appear to be against government policy.

-- Could the Chinese government consider a formal proclamation of amnesty for certain categories of demonstrators from the student and faculty ranks?

-- In your propaganda against bourgeois liberalism and Westernization, could you perhaps make it a bit clearer that foreigners are still welcome in China? When Americans see their culture and beliefs attacked with such vehemence in China, they naturally conclude that perhaps it is dangerous to come here or that their presence could bring harm to people who associate with them.

-- Is there any way the Chinese government might encourage Chinese corporations to hasten negotiations with American firms? I am aware of several discussions that have languished in recent months. It would be helpful to pick some that could highlight the government's determination to move ahead in some areas not affected by retrenchment.

-- Could the level of military guards against the US Embassy be reduced? The presence of AK-47s in particular is quite offensive and possibly dangerous. It also signals to businessmen and tourists that the Chinese government views the United States with hostility.

-- May I suggest that you follow closely the publications of various human rights organizations in Washington? They have a certain amount of influence in Congress. You may wish to consider whether there are any constructive

ways of responding to some of their assertions and recommendations. Asia Watch and Amnesty International are two such organizations.

-- Tibet and forced abortions are two other issues that are agitating the Congress. Working through your Embassy in Washington and through appropriate public education organizations (such as the National Committee on US-China Relations), perhaps American understanding of these issues could be enhanced.

-- How should the Chinese government respond to the Nobel Prize being given to the Dalai Lama? Does a negative Chinese reaction simply cast the Chinese in a bad light? Does this not draw more attention to the matter? Doesn't this play into the hands of his supporters? He has been careful recently to cease seeking independence, I understand.

-- Must the leaders continue to say the events of June 2-4 were not a tragedy? When hundreds die and thousands are injured, most people around the world believe a tragedy has occurred, no matter what the reason. The Chinese position strikes many people as saying it does not value human life, and this seems cruel. Some indication that the incident is seen as regrettable or unfortunate would have considerable effect, I think.

-- Is there any way to restore the Fulbright program and begin negotiations between the Education Commission and USIA for next year's program? Considerable lead time is necessary to bring about next year's program.

-- Can the Chinese government give additional thought to how to relieve the anxieties of Chinese students in the United States about their return to China? Several US agencies would possibly be prepared to discuss this issue with you.

-- Reassurances to the American scholarly community that Chinese scholars are not suffering from political persecution would remove suspension of valuable exchanges in the sciences. Both the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences would respond to overtures and are prepared to explore ways of restoring momentum. The issues are whether Chinese scientists are still able to participate in international meetings and whether their research still is sufficiently unfettered to meet international standards of scholarship.

-- Does China gain great benefit from jamming VOA? In our era, can the dissemination of ideas and information really be halted in this way?

-- Would it be useful for our journalists to have greater access to Chinese leaders for occasional in-depth, background interviews? One reason for the quality of reporting is the relatively little access that journalists have to Chinese officials.

-- Are there ways to help restore the confidence of the residents of Hong Kong in their future?

Most of these are small measures. Most of them involve public relations rather than change on substance. Movement on even a few of them would begin

to change China's tarnished image in world affairs.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Memo	Mike Oksenberg to Karl Jackson Re: Deng Xiaoping Presentation to President Nixon about Fang Lizhi (3 pp.)	11/3/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Toast by Former President Nixon at a Banquet Hosted by
the Premier of the Peoples Republic of China

October 30, 1989

Mr. Premier:

We meet at a delicate moment in Sino-American relations. The tragedy that occurred in Beijing from June 2 to June 4 and the subsequent developments in your country and mine have cast a shadow over our relations.

My purpose in journeying to China is not to reexamine exactly what transpired in this city this past spring. The facts are clear enough. The cultural, political, and ideological differences between us, Mr. Premier -- you a Chinese communist who believes in Leninist rule, I an American conservative who believes in capitalism and democracy -- are too great to permit a common understanding of this tragedy. Let us recognize that our differences over recent events are huge and unbridgeable. But let us not become mired in endless and fruitless recriminations over the seeming impasse that has now developed between our two countries.

Both of our nations must now deal realistically with the aftermath. Both of our nations inhabit the same planet. Both of our nations possess nuclear weapons. Neither of our nations poses a military threat to the other. Neither of us wishes to return to the hostility and bitterness that characterized our relations for over 20 years, at such high cost to our peoples. Our separate national welfares demand that we continue to cooperate in many areas.

So let us return to the formula that has served us so well since my first journey to China in 1972, acknowledging our profound differences while realistically identifying and pursuing our common interests. This approach has been followed in bipartisan fashion by four successive Administrations, including those of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush.

What is the strategic basis for Sino-American relations in the 1990s? Why should our nations attach priority to our relationship? What practical steps can be taken by both sides to restore momentum to our relations?

To deal with these issues intelligently, we must first understand the new world in which we live. That world is going through a period of enormous change. International relations differ substantially from 1972, when Soviet expansionist activities were the primary factor which led to the Sino-American rapproach-

ment. Note the changes since then:

- o Some observers believe the Soviet Union is in the midst of profound change and no longer poses a significant threat to world peace.

- o Eastern European countries are asserting their independence and resuming their historic ties with Western Europe.

- o Western Europe is moving rapidly to the creation of an integrated economy, which will enhance its influence in the world.

- o Japan has become a global economic superpower and as a result is gaining increased political influence and a slowly growing military capacity.

- o China has enjoyed an extraordinary decade of economic growth by unleashing the remarkable entrepreneurial talents of its people. These days we primarily hear about the dramatic reforms in the Soviet Union. To keep things in perspective, we should bear in mind that in the ten years of the reforms Deng Xiaoping initiated in 1979, the per capita income of China has doubled. In the five years of Gorbachev's reforms, the per capita income of the Soviet Union has gone down. Events of recent months have raised doubts among some foreign observers about China's future, but a humanely governed China that is responsive to the yearnings of its people will continue its rapid ascent in world affairs.

- o Although suffering from government and trade deficits and facing numerous social problems, the United States is enjoying unprecedented prosperity and has rebuilt its defenses. Our people have gained renewed confidence in their future.

- o Throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia, small and weak governments confront problems that they lack the capacity to solve.

- o In East and Southeast Asia, the four dragons of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have developed economies of global consequence and reach.

- o A truly international economy is emerging that transcends the capacity of individual governments to manage.

- o The telecommunications and computer transformations make it impossible for governments to halt the dissemination of ideas and information at their borders.

- o Problems that transcend national boundaries, such as

global warming, environmental degradation, population increase, communicable diseases, production of narcotics, and illegal migration of peoples demand increasing attention.

When we reflect in this fashion upon today's world and adopt a long-term, strategic perspective, the importance of Sino-American relations comes into focus. The basis of our relationship is clear. The reasons we must overcome our current difficulties are obvious. We still have common concerns that make cooperation between China and the United States an indispensable element in ensuring the welfare of our two peoples and serving the cause of peace and prosperity in the world.

o First, peace and security still depend upon nations having sufficient might to deter would-be aggressors. The United States and China continue to share an interest in maintaining a stable global balance of power.

o Second, the United States shares in China's interest to participate fully in the international economy.

o Third, the United States and China must cooperate in addressing the problems of interdependence. Our scientists, social scientists, and scholars in the humanities must be unfettered in their search for solutions to these problems.

o Fourth, it is neither in China's nor America's interest for your nation of over one billion people to return to its isolation. The certain result would be an angry and impoverished nation.

o And finally, China has an indispensable role to play in the maintenance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Peace cannot be maintained in Korea, the Taiwan issue cannot be resolved peacefully, the people of Hong Kong cannot enjoy a future as an autonomous, capitalist, and democratic entity, and tranquility cannot be found at last in Indochina unless China is constructively and responsibly engaged in regional affairs.

The choice is clear. Shall China turn away from greatness and consign itself to the backwater of oppression and stagnation? Or does it continue to venture forth on the open seas on a journey which may at times be rough but which leads to progress and peace and justice for its people?

The United States must decide whether it wishes to persist in the arduous journey begun 17 years ago. Does it wish to be involved in the development of a nation whose values and traditions differ from ours? Or does it wish to disengage itself from a

quarter of mankind who are destined to be one of the superpowers of the 21st century?

The challenges before us are enormous, but the opportunities are also great. For together, we can help create an era of unprecedented peace and prosperity for our peoples. Let us therefore rise above the acrimony of the moment and resume the progress and cooperation that are worthy of two great peoples.

May I therefore propose a toast

- o to the continued development of Sino-American relations;
- o to the Premier of the Peoples Republic of China; and
- o to the health of all our Chinese and American friends here tonight.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1989

Jim:

Enclosed is the original of the President's letter about the Nixon trip previously sent to you via privacy cable.

Also enclosed is a copy of the transcript of Marlin Fitzwater's handling of the press questions on the trip.


Brent

Brent Scowcroft

FROM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Honorable James R. Lilley
American Ambassador
Beijing

VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Letter	President Bush to Ambassador James R. Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1) , (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/26/14

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1164-MR (503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1989

Dear Jim:

I talked to President Nixon on October 21st. Doug Paul will brief him on Monday, October 23, 1989. He plans to check in with you. I asked him to contact (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I told President Nixon we would handle the press inquiries in accord with his suggestions below. For your information only I am sending the parts of his October 17th letter to me that relate to his coming visit.

"I plan to be in Beijing from October 25 to the 31st. I will be travelling alone, with only Mike Endicott, my private security aide accompanying me; as you know I gave up Secret Service five years ago. I will be representing no clients, and will be paying my own expenses. I have informed the Chinese that I will be doing no sightseeing and no shopping and have ruled out purely social events. I will be having meetings with the major Chinese leaders and have asked them not to plan public luncheons or dinners with the usual tipping of glasses, etc. I will, of course, be strongly supporting the Administration's policies and shall make the point that your refusal to go along with excessive sanctions is courageous and costly politically. Therefore, they should avoid actions which might be embarrassing to you and to other friends of China. When I return, I will give you my private assessment of the leaders and their positions in writing.


While I will not be going as a representative of the Administration, I would appreciate it if the press office, if queried, would avoid

statements that might be interpreted by our "friends" in the media as attempts to disassociate the Administration from my trip. It would be very helpful in my meetings with the Chinese if the press spokesman could say something like the following: We understand that President Nixon is making his sixth visit to China to meet with its top leaders. While he is travelling as a private citizen, President Bush looks forward to hearing the President's assessment of the situation in China when he returns."

After his visit both Jim Baker and I would appreciate a personal update on US-China relations.

Warm regards, and love to Sally.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

The Honorable James R. Lilley
American Ambassador
Beijing

Q Back to the earthquake for a second. You talk about \$2.5 billion as the federal share. Does the administration have guidelines for what is the federal share in categories, and what in categories does the state share?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't have any categories and I don't know how much the state -- Governor Deukmejian has had some estimates, but I don't have any information on them.

Q Well, it seems that --

MR. FITZWATER: There are no guidelines that says one has to have so much and one another, no.

Q But are there are things about what state officials are proposing that you oppose the use of federal funds for?

MR. FITZWATER: Not familiar with any, no.

Q Back to Costa Rica. Is there any experts' group working there -- this six-item agenda with drugs, deforestation and so forth. Is Mr. Bush --

MR. FITZWATER: Any what --

Q Experts?

MR. FITZWATER: Expert groups? I don't believe there are. I don't believe there are.

Q Has President Nixon talked to President Bush and General Scowcroft about an upcoming trip to China? And do you expect him to brief the President when he returns?

MR. FITZWATER: We understand that --

Q Question?

MR. FITZWATER: He asked if we have had any discussions with President Nixon concerning his trip. We understand that former President Nixon is making his sixth visit to China to meet with its top leaders. While the former President is traveling as a private citizen, President Bush looks forward to hearing his assessment of the situation in China when he returns.

Q Face to face, would you expect?

MR. FITZWATER: We'll have to wait and see. Can't say.

Q When is this trip?

Q Play golf.

MR. FITZWATER: I don't have details on the trip. I don't know when he's leaving.

Q Marlin, what about the first half of the question? Has he discussed it with Nixon and so forth?

MR. FITZWATER: Not with the President, but I think we were aware of the trip through Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor. I don't know how he -- whether he talked to President Nixon or a member of his staff.

Q Marlin, the group "No Greater Love" is holding a memorial service for victims of terrorism. In that context, some are wondering what the administration's progress on determining responsibility for Flight 103 is, and why no retaliation has been taken against PFLP and others who have been identified by intelligence agencies as responsible?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know all the ramifications of

Q He again demanded today that the assets be unfrozen before Iran could be helpful. What's the status of that?

MR. FITZWATER: Our position has not changed, that we do not link the Iranian assets to the hostages, and we do not make deals for hostages.

Q Same subject. He also says that he wants more help finding some of the Iranians held in Lebanon. Is the United States doing anything to facilitate that?

MR. FITZWATER: We have given them all the information we have, and they have the best of our knowledge about that subject already.

Q And if you come across new information, will you share that?

MR. FITZWATER: Certainly.

Q Has he given them any information that we can be apprised of?

MR. FITZWATER: We've -- nothing new. I mean, we've given them all the information we had. We've generally not discussed it, although most of you who want to check your morgues will find plenty of characterizations of that information.

Q Did we do that directly, or through third-party --

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know that.

Q Do you think it's appropriate for Nixon to be going to China now? Do you think things have cooled off enough? I mean, he cancelled, or postponed his visit once.

MR. FITZWATER: He's a private citizen. He's free to do whatever he wants.

Q Did you enjoy Friday without us, Marlin?

Q What happened to you?

MR. FITZWATER: Friday was a very productive day. Very productive. I was very generous in giving up my seat to the Time Magazine correspondent.

Q You chose the easy place to stay behind.

MR. FITZWATER: And I worked long and hard to stay up with your activities, but --

Q Twenty four hours a day, seven days a week.

MR. FITZWATER: -- unfortunately I had to do it for 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Q Looking back over his visit and the news the next day that a survivor had actually been found in the interstate, has the President said anything more about his feelings about the devastation and hope for any other survivors?

MR. FITZWATER: Only he expressed his joy at the fact that they found another survivor over the weekend. He certainly was gratified by the construction workers and so forth who gave him credit for lifting their spirits and giving them an impetus to go on with the search. Beyond that, the President's concerns are that they continue to try to rescue all the bodies that they can and, in case there is someone else alive, that every effort has been made to get them out.

Q What does the President think of the criticism of

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/26/14

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1164-MR (503.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

(b)(1)

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 231851Z OCT 89

FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

(b)(1)

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY, FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

BEGIN TEXT:

OCTOBER 23, 1989

FOR: AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY
BEIJING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY

1. JIM. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
YOU (ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
INSTRUCTIONS, THE ONLY OTHER COPY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO SECRETARY OF
STATE JIM BAKER FOR HIS EYES ONLY.

(COPY ATTACHED TEXT.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2782-MR
SCS 10/24/13

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 23, 1989

DEAR JIM:

I TALKED TO PRESIDENT NIXON ON OCTOBER 21ST. DOUG PAAL WILL BRIEF HIM ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1989. HE PLANS TO CHECK IN WITH YOU. I ASKED HIM TO CONTACT (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I TOLD PRESIDENT NIXON WE WOULD HANDLE THE PRESS INQUIRIES IN ACCORD WITH HIS SUGGESTIONS BELOW. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY I AM SENDING THE PARTS OF HIS OCTOBER 17TH LETTER TO ME THAT RELATE TO HIS COMING VISIT.

"I PLAN TO BE IN BEIJING FROM OCTOBER 25 TO THE 31ST. I WILL BE TRAVELLING ALONE, WITH ONLY MIKE ENDICOTT, MY PRIVATE SECURITY AIDE ACCOMPANYING ME; AS YOU KNOW I GAVE UP SECRET SERVICE FIVE YEARS AGO. I WILL BE REPRESENTING NO CLIENTS, AND WILL BE PAYING MY OWN EXPENSES. I HAVE INFORMED THE CHINESE THAT I WILL BE DOING NO SIGHTSEEING AND NO SHOPPING AND HAVE RULED OUT PURELY SOCIAL EVENTS. I WILL BE HAVING MEETINGS WITH THE MAJOR CHINESE

LEADERS AND HAVE ASKED THEM NOT TO PLAN PUBLIC LUNCHEONS OR DINNERS WITH THE USUAL TIPPING OF GLASSES, ETC. I WILL, OF COURSE, BE STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES AND SHALL MAKE THE POINT THAT YOUR REFUSAL TO GO ALONG WITH EXCESSIVE SANCTIONS IS COURAGEOUS AND COSTLY POLITICALLY. THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO YOU AND TO OTHER FRIENDS OF CHINA. WHEN I RETURN, I WILL GIVE YOU MY PRIVATE ASSESSMENT OF THE LEADERS AND THEIR POSITIONS IN WRITING.

WHILE I WILL NOT BE GOING AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE PRESS OFFICE, IF QUERIED, WOULD AVOID STATEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED BY OUR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

"FRIENDS" IN THE MEDIA AS ATTEMPTS TO DISASSOCIATE THE ADMINISTRATION FROM MY TRIP. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN MY MEETINGS WITH THE CHINESE IF THE PRESS SPOKESMAN COULD SAY SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING: WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IS MAKING HIS SIXTH VISIT TO CHINA TO MEET WITH ITS TOP LEADERS. WHILE HE IS TRAVELLING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN. PRESIDENT BUSH LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING THE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN CHINA WHEN HE RETURNS."

AFTER HIS VISIT BOTH JIM BAKER AND I WOULD APPRECIATE A PERSONAL UPDATE ON US-CHINA RELATIONS.

WARM REGARDS, AND LOVE TO SALLY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LILLEY
AMERICAN ANBASSADOR
BEIJING

2. WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

END TEXT

DECLAS: OADR

#0266

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/26/14

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1164-MR (503.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 23, 1989

(b)(1)



FOR: Ambassador James R. Lilley
Beijing

FROM: Brent Scowcroft
The White House

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY

1. Jim, following is the text of a letter from the President to you (original being pouched). In accordance with the President's instructions, the only other copy has been given to Secretary of State Jim Baker for his eyes only.

(Copy attached text.)

2. Warm regards, Brent.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2782-MR
SCS 10/24/13

Per POTUS -

please

cable

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: October 23, 1989

FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Copy only to JAB III only.

Thanks.

GB

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Letter	President Bush to Ambassador James R. Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1) , (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Document Declassified
 (Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/26/14

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1164-MR (503.03)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1989

Dear Jim:

I talked to President Nixon on October 21st. Doug Paul will brief him on Monday, October 23, 1989. He plans to check in with you. I asked him to contact (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I told President Nixon we would handle the press inquiries in accord with his suggestions below. For your information only I am sending the parts of his October 17th letter to me that relate to his coming visit.

"I plan to be in Beijing from October 25 to the 31st. I will be travelling alone, with only Mike Endicott, my private security aide accompanying me; as you know I gave up Secret Service five years ago. I will be representing no clients, and will be paying my own expenses. I have informed the Chinese that I will be doing no sightseeing and no shopping and have ruled out purely social events. I will be having meetings with the major Chinese leaders and have asked them not to plan public luncheons or dinners with the usual tipping of glasses, etc. I will, of course, be strongly supporting the Administration's policies and shall make the point that your refusal to go along with excessive sanctions is courageous and costly politically. Therefore, they should avoid actions which might be embarrassing to you and to other friends of China. When I return, I will give you my private assessment of the leaders and their positions in writing.


While I will not be going as a representative of the Administration, I would appreciate it if the press office, if queried, would avoid

statements that might be interpreted by our "friends" in the media as attempts to disassociate the Administration from my trip. It would be very helpful in my meetings with the Chinese if the press spokesman could say something like the following: We understand that President Nixon is making his sixth visit to China to meet with its top leaders. While he is travelling as a private citizen, President Bush looks forward to hearing the President's assessment of the situation in China when he returns."

After his visit both Jim Baker and I would appreciate a personal update on US-China relations.

Warm regards, and love to Sally.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "G." and the last name "Bush" clearly distinguishable.

The Honorable James R. Lilley
American Ambassador
Beijing

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/26/14

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1164-MR (504)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 23, 1989

(b)(1)

FOR: Ambassador James R. Lilley
Beijing

FROM: Brent Scowcroft
The White House

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY

1. Jim, following is the text of a letter from the President to you (original being pouched). In accordance with the President's instructions, the only other copy has been given to Secretary of State Jim Baker for his eyes only.

(Copy attached text.)

2. Warm regards, Brent.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2782-MR
SCS 10/24/13



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: October 23, 1989

FROM THE PRESIDENT

To: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT *by*

Copy only to JAB III only.

Thanks.

GB

*Per POTUS -
please
callback*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Letter	President Bush to Ambassador James R. Lilley [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1) , (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [7]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/26/14

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1164-MR (504.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1989

Dear Jim:

I talked to President Nixon on October 21st. Doug Paul will brief him on Monday, October 23, 1989. He plans to check in with you. I asked him to contact (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I told President Nixon we would handle the press inquiries in accord with his suggestions below. For your information only I am sending the parts of his October 17th letter to me that relate to his coming visit.

"I plan to be in Beijing from October 25 to the 31st. I will be travelling alone, with only Mike Endicott, my private security aide accompanying me; as you know I gave up Secret Service five years ago. I will be representing no clients, and will be paying my own expenses. I have informed the Chinese that I will be doing no sightseeing and no shopping and have ruled out purely social events. I will be having meetings with the major Chinese leaders and have asked them not to plan public luncheons or dinners with the usual tipping of glasses, etc. I will, of course, be strongly supporting the Administration's policies and shall make the point that your refusal to go along with excessive sanctions is courageous and costly politically. Therefore, they should avoid actions which might be embarrassing to you and to other friends of China. When I return, I will give you my private assessment of the leaders and their positions in writing.


While I will not be going as a representative of the Administration, I would appreciate it if the press office, if queried, would avoid

statements that might be interpreted by our "friends" in the media as attempts to disassociate the Administration from my trip. It would be very helpful in my meetings with the Chinese if the press spokesman could say something like the following: We understand that President Nixon is making his sixth visit to China to meet with its top leaders. While he is travelling as a private citizen, President Bush looks forward to hearing the President's assessment of the situation in China when he returns."

After his visit both Jim Baker and I would appreciate a personal update on US-China relations.

Warm regards, and love to Sally.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "G." and the last name "Bush" clearly distinguishable.

The Honorable James R. Lilley
American Ambassador
Beijing

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON

June 21, 1989

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft,

President Nixon instructed me to send you this advance copy of his article about the situation in China, which will appear on Sunday in the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times and on Monday in a variety of other papers here and abroad.

With respect,

Sincerely,



John H. Taylor

ARTICLE FOR LA TIMES SYNDICATE (release: 6/25/89)

by Richard Nixon

The worldwide revulsion against the brutal repression of demonstrators for democracy in China is unquestionably justified. It is critically important, however, that we not let our revulsion lead us to adopt policies of reprisal that would isolate the Chinese government. They would not be in the interests of the Chinese people. They would not be in the interests of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese in China and all over the world who have demonstrated for political reform. And they would not be in the interests of the United States.

In view of the cruelty and stupidity that led the Chinese government to resort to repression, lashing back with punitive policies would be politically popular and emotionally satisfying for the great majority of the American people. But while such policies might make us feel better, they would dash the Chinese people's chances for further economic progress and eventual political reform. If in our anger we drive China back into the shadows of the Soviet Union and the oppressive economic system Deng Xiaoping has tried to reform, those who fell in Tiananmen Square will truly have died in vain.

To see where we should go in our policy toward China, we should first look back and see where we have been.

When I went to China in 1972, I was criticized by the far right and praised by the far left, both for the wrong reasons. The far right believed I had betrayed my anti-communist principles. The far left rejoiced because they thought I had outgrown them. In fact, my decision had nothing to do with my attitude toward communism.

The first reason I went to China was the Soviet threat. Both the Soviet Union and China had communist governments. Both were supporting our enemies in North Vietnam. But there was a crucial difference. The Soviet Union, as a nuclear superpower, was a potential threat to the United States. China was not. It had broken away from the Soviets and was in the position to play a more constructive international role. It made both moral and strategic sense for the United States to have relations with any nation that did not threaten our fundamental interests.

Today, a strong, stable China is as vital as ever to the security interests of the United States and to peace in the Pacific. A weak, fractured China would leave the Soviet Union as the dominant military power in Asia and Japan as the dominant economic power. Whatever happens in the

future, it is imperative that Sino-American relations remain strong so the United States can help maintain the balance among China, Japan, and the Soviet Union.

President Bush will be pressured to take harsher action by a strange coalition of China-bashers. Those on the far right who oppose any relations with China will demand economic and diplomatic sanctions. So will the human rights lobby, which calls for punishing every regime that does not live up to our standards regardless of our interests or those of the millions living under those regimes whom sanctions would hurt the most. The Bush Administration should continue to ignore these extremist voices and stay the prudent course it has already set.

Many who criticized the President's measured response to the Beijing crackdown were strangely silent about the deafening silence from Mikhail Gorbachev. He may have refrained from condemning the Chinese leaders because he fears that he too will continue to be faced with pro-democracy and anti-Moscow regional movements, such as the one in Georgia this spring where hundreds were massacred by troops using poison gas. In stark contrast to the massive coverage of the tragedy in Tiananmen Square, American television cameras and reporters were not present for that massacre, which is one reason Gorbachev's popularity rating in the West remains high while Deng's is plunging. But the Soviet leader cannot push his luck by condemning Deng for taking steps that he has taken already and may have to take again.

Gorbachev also knows a freeze between Washington and Beijing will hasten the thaw between Moscow and Beijing. Nearly forgotten in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square is an equally important event that occurred in Beijing just days before: the normalization of relations between Moscow and Beijing. Hardline Communist leaders in Beijing, some of whom were suspicious of the Americans to begin with, are probably saying today that if the United States adopts further sanctions, in effect closing the door to China that we opened in 1972, the Kremlin gates now stand open again.

China's leaders want to continue to have economic progress, and they know the best way to encourage them is through continued access to Western technology and investment. They neither like nor trust the Russians, and the Russians have little to offer them compared to the West. But political factors can override economic realities. The Chinese got along without the West for a quarter-century, and they could do so again. If we force them back into their angry isolation from the West, we risk prompting a potentially disastrous entente between the two great communist powers that would be in nobody's interests but

Gorbachev's.

The second reason I went to China had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Even if there had been no Soviet threat, it was essential that we have relations with a government that was a member of the nuclear club. And today, how can we launch a worldwide attack on the environmental crisis without the cooperation of a government ruling over one-fourth of all people on earth?

Despite the fundamental national self-interest behind our rapprochement with China, many Americans have gone overboard and turned it into a romance. China has a limitless capacity to fascinate. But it is not Disneyland. It is, as it has been since 1949, a communist dictatorship held together by brute force. No one who knows China should be surprised when its leaders turn to violence to pursue their political goals. They have done far worse before Tiananmen Square. One overly excited journalist wrote last week that the crackdown transformed "the Woodstock-like encampment of young students...into the bloodiest killing ground in Communist China's history." He apparently was not aware that many times more people died -- hundreds of thousands, and some Chinese claim millions -- in Mao's Cultural Revolution. Twenty million died in the wake of the brutal forced collectivization known as the Great Leap Forward. Attacks on unarmed civilians are never justified. But in condemning them, we should not pretend that we did not know that China's leaders were capable of using violence for political purposes.

Since Tiananmen Square, some pundits have said it is ironic that the same Deng Xiaopeng who beguiled millions, including an army of journalists, during his state visit to the United States in 1979 is the same man who ordered the crackdown. What is more ironic is that many of the same pundits were willing to believe that the dedicated communist who had fought and bled his way through the Long March and the bloody Chinese civil war was just a cuddly teddy bear with a cute smile. Those who insist on romanticizing relations between nations will always be disappointed when the realities of national interest and survival inevitably intrude.

But while we should be realistic about China, its leaders, and the strategic reasons our relationship must continue, we should not lose sight of the benefits the Chinese people have derived from that relationship, particularly the economic progress that has come along with it. If we can restore a close relationship with China, the greatest beneficiaries will be the people of China themselves.

Some of the Beijing demonstrators carried banners reading, "In the Soviet Union they have Gorbachev -- who do

we have?" They have leaders who have made life better for hundreds of millions of Chinese. In the ten years since Deng instituted his economic reforms and an intensive campaign to attract Western investment, the income of the average Chinese has doubled. In the five years since Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, despite the rave reviews he has received for his political reforms, the income of the average Russian has stagnated or even gone down.

In 1972 there were no Chinese students from the PRC studying in the United States. Since that time, 62,500 have done so. In that same period only a few hundred Russian students have studied here. Gorbachev's glasnost, or "openness," notwithstanding, television and press coverage of the events in Tiananmen Square has been far greater than that of comparable events in the Soviet Union.

On June 2nd, two days before the crackdown, a Chinese student who is studying in New York City mailed a letter to my office. He wrote, "Please tell President Nixon that we young people from China really appreciate what he has done to open up China to the outside world. Just look at the Statue of Liberty that the Chinese students carried when demonstrating on the streets for democracy. It would be impossible without his courageous visit to China."

As I watched the aftermath of that night's events, I took little comfort from his message. China's new fascination with the West and the dramatic economic reforms Deng adopted were both welcome developments. But they also entailed great dangers. By giving their people a better life economically and permitting their brightest young people to study in the United States and other Western countries, China's leaders ran the risk that the people's rising expectations would eventually lead to demands for political reforms that would challenge the authority of the Communist Party. The further tragedy is that the suppression of the pro-democracy challenge has dealt a massive setback to his economic policies.

A fundamental goal of our China policy should be to influence its leaders to get the economic reforms back on track and also to go forward with peaceful political reforms. Our influence will be squandered if we make pious pronouncements in public about what the Chinese leaders should or should not do. It would be far better to urge them through private channels to show restraint in dealing with pro-democracy activists and eventually to find a way to better accommodate dissent within the system.

In 1972 I met with a group of congressmen and Senators who opposed our new relationship with the Soviet Union because of its policies against Jewish immigration. I said, "The walls of the Kremlin are very thick. It is difficult

to be heard even when you are inside the walls. It is impossible to be heard when you are outside." When we opened lines of communication to the Kremlin and made our views known privately, the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union increased from 600 the year before I came to office in 1969 to 37,000 in 1973.

We face a similar dilemma in China today. The Great Wall of China is very thick. We may not always be heard when we are inside. If we withdraw back outside the Wall again, we will not be heard at all, and the Chinese people's dreams of more democracy and a better life will almost certainly die.

END

Deng Letter

6/21/89

- Write w/ heavy heart
 - Genuine friend
 - Passion for a relationship
- Great respect for what D. has done for China
- Last visit, Deng lecture
 - Encouragement, good relations w/ west, keep China moving forward.
- Asks help in preserving a relationship
 - Not injecting himself in China's affairs
 - Respectful of dif. in 2 societies
- Reverence for China culture
 - US culture is freedom
- Demonstrations
 - Went beautifully at first
 - Carry love & people.
- The crackdown forced us to act as we did in resp. to our principles.
 - Resisted econ sanctions.
- Fang
 - We didn't invite him in but couldn't refuse him.
 - Can't put him out w/o assurances
 - Want to solve in a way satis. to both
- Would a private embassy help?
 - No copies of this letter
- Unauthorized story - on special project

- Clammy to students would bring world
acclaim

- Don't let a relationship suffer more.
- Statements on peaceful resolution
would be welcome
- Matter is too important to be left
to our bureaucrats.

Beijing: The Army Moves In

It China Protests; as Students Fight

anger as he watched the body of student being carted away, his head blown away by bullets.

"Maybe we'll fail today," he said. "Maybe we'll fail tomorrow. But someday we'll succeed. It's a historical inevitability."

On Saturday the police had used tear gas and beat dozens of demonstrators near the Communist Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai, while soldiers and workers hurled bricks at each other behind the Great Hall of the People. Dozens of people were wounded, but exact numbers could not be confirmed.

It appeared to be the first use of tear gas ever in the Chinese capital, and the violence seemed to radicalize the crowds that filled Tiananmen Square and Changan Avenue in the center of the city. The clashes also appeared to contribute to the public bitterness against the Government of Prime Minister Li.

The violence on both sides seemed to mark a milestone in the democracy movement, and the streets in the center of the city were a kaleidoscope of scenes rarely if ever seen in the Chinese capital: furious crowds smashed and overturned army vehicles in front of Zhongnanhai, and then stoned the Great Hall of the People; grim-faced young soldiers clutching submachine guns tried to push their way through thick crowds of demonstrators near the Beijing train station; and the police charged a crowd near Zhongnanhai and used truncheons to beat men and women disabled by tear gas.


A Changing View of the Army

"In 1949, we welcomed the army into Beijing," said an old man on the Jiaomenwai bridge, referring to the crowds who hailed the arrival of Communist troops at the end of the Communist revolution. Then he waved toward a line of 50 army trucks that were blocked in a sea of more than 10,000 angry men and women, and added, "Now we're fighting to keep them out."

Most Chinese seemed convinced that the tanks and troops had been ordered into the city to crush the pro-democracy demonstrations once and for all. The immediate result of the first clashes was to revitalize the pro-democracy movement, which had been losing momentum over the last 10 days, and to erase the sense that life in the capital was returning to normal. But the use of tanks and guns came later, and it was not clear if they would succeed in extinguishing the movement or would lead to such measures as a general strike.

The tension was exacerbated by an extraordinary announcement on television Saturday night, ordering citizens to "stay at home to protect your lives." In particular, the announcement ordered people to stay off the streets and away from Tiananmen Square.

"The situation in Beijing at present is very serious," the Government warned in another urgent notice read on television. "A handful of ruffians



Demonstrators in Beijing scuffling with a soldier who was marching toward Tiananmen Square yesterday.



Students atop an armored vehicle they disabled in Tiananmen Square

are wantonly making rumors to instigate the masses to openly insult, denounce, beat and kidnap soldiers in the People's Liberation Army, to seize arms, surround and block Zhongnanhai, attack the Great Hall of the People, and attempt to gather together various forces. More serious riots can occur at

any time."

There were some reports that the Communist Party's ruling Politburo had met Friday and given the Beijing municipality the authority to clear the square and end the protests. The People's Daily and the television news on Saturday took a hard line against the

unrest, and the evening news warned that "armed police and troops have the right to use all means to dispose of troublemakers who act willfully to defy the law."

The clashes and enormous outpouring of support for the students were an unexpected turnaround for the democracy movement. Just a few days ago, the number of students occupying Tiananmen Square had dropped to a few thousand, and students seemed to be having difficulty mobilizing large numbers of citizens to take to the streets. The Government's strategy, of waiting for the students to become bored and go home, seemed to be leading to the possibility of a resolution to the difficulty.

Cyclists Killed

Then a police van crashed into four bicyclists late Friday night, generating new outrage against the Government. One cyclist was killed instantly, and two died in the hospital Saturday, while the fourth seemed less seriously hurt.

Rumors were less meticulous about detail, and word spread early Saturday morning through the capital that four people had been killed by the police. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets to protest, and immediately found themselves confronting more than 2,000 unarmed troops who were marching toward Tiananmen Square.

The troops retreated, but that confrontation seemed to set the tone for the massive demonstrations later Saturday and early today.

PRESIDENT ASSAILS SHOOTINGS IN CHINA

Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups

By ROBERT PEAR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — President Bush said today that he deeply deplored the shooting of protesters by Chinese troops.

The President said it was "clear that the Chinese Government has chosen to use force against Chinese citizens who were making a peaceful statement in favor of democracy."

"I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent loss of life," said Mr. Bush, who was spending the weekend in Kennebunkport, Me. "We have been urging and continue to urge non-violence, restraint and dialogue. Tragically, another course has been chosen. Again, I urge a return to non-violent means for dealing with the current situation."

Baker Is Cautious

Secretary of State Baker, appearing on the CNN television program "Newsmaker Saturday," declined to say whether the Bush Administration would seek to penalize China by such steps as cutting off sales of American arms to Beijing.

Appearing on the CNN television program "Newsmaker Saturday," Mr. Baker said that the Chinese Government and the thousands of protesters seeking greater democracy had displayed "a significant amount of restraint" over the last few weeks.

But today, he said, "it would appear that there may be some violence being used here on both sides," not only by Chinese soldiers, but also by students throwing firebombs.

Comments Called Stronger

Mr. Baker said that his comments today were "considerably stronger than what we've said heretofore." But they did not go as far as many members of Congress and human rights groups say the Administration should have gone in expressing concern.

Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed alarm at China's effort to suppress the student protests.

"The Chinese Communist leaders apparently are not willing to cease their historic repression of human rights," Mr. Helms said from his home in Raleigh. "I will be working with my colleagues to insure that, as a first response against this brutality, all U.S. military cooperation and sharing of technology with the Communist Government must be terminated."

In a letter to President Bush this week, Freedom House, a human rights organization founded in 1941, said the United States should condemn China for "any significant violations of political rights and civil liberties."

Kampelman's Argument

The chairman of Freedom House, Max M. Kampelman, said that such violations would justify an immediate review of the full range of economic and military cooperation between Washington and Beijing.

Secretary Baker said today, "The army of China calls itself the army of the people, and we think it would be unfortunate indeed if the army of the people were used to suppress the people."

Mr. Baker declined to say if the United States should impose sanctions against China. He said that the shooting of demonstrators by troops today was "the first really significant use of force" since the student protests began seven weeks ago.

"Before we get into hypothetical situations, let's see how this most recent and extremely deplorable development unfolds," Mr. Baker said. "Let's see what happens over the course of the next few days before we start hypothesizing about what we

The Beijing Spring: From Heady Defiance to Repression

Demonstrations by students and workers demanding greater democracy and an end to Government corruption went on for more than six weeks in Beijing's central Tiananmen Square before the authorities resorted to armed force to suppress them. Here are the high points of the sustained protest, which has come to be regarded as a turning point for China:

April 18 Several thousand students march through the capital in predawn hours, chanting democratic slogans, singing revolutionary songs and mourning the ousted Communist Party leader, Hu Yaobang, who died April 15.

April 22 Defying a ban on public protests, more than 100,000 gather in Tiananmen Square to press demands for more democracy. Tens of thousands of university students begin camping all night in the square, foiling Government plans to close off the area.

May 13 About 2,000 students begin a hunger strike at Tiananmen Square.

May 14 An unannounced Politburo meeting reportedly endorses the moderate line of the Communist Party leader, Zhao Ziyang, including more discussions with the students and limited steps toward greater democracy.

May 15 Mikhail S. Gorbachev arrives in Beijing to seal the reconciliation of the two Communist nations. Hunger strikers camped out in the square refuse to end their vigil, forcing the authorities to move their welcoming ceremony for the Soviet leader to the airport.

May 19 Prime Minister Li Peng warns that chaos in Beijing is spreading all over the country. The Government capitulates on a key study. The Government capitulates on a key study. The Government capitulates on a key study.

of thousands of people rush out of their homes blocking troops from reaching demonstrators in the central square. Later in the day, about one million Chinese take to the streets to defy martial law.

Reports circulate that Zhao Ziyang has been stripped of all power, retaining only his title of General Secretary of the party.

May 25 Mr. Li declares that his Government is in control and sends a letter to troops encircling Beijing, expressing the hope that "the troops will overcome the difficulties confronting them" and "successfully impose martial law."


May 27 Some student leaders call for an end to their occupation of Tiananmen Square, but say they will continue to hold large-scale demonstrations to press for greater democracy and the resignation of Prime Minister Li.

June 2 Unarmed troops try to march on the



Reuters

Protestors in Beijing scuffling with a soldier who was marching toward Tiananmen Square yesterday.



Associated Press

Protestors atop an armored vehicle they disabled in Tiananmen Square

only making rumors to instill any time." There were some reports that the

unrest, and the evening news warned that "armed police and troops have the right to use all means to dispose of troublemakers who act willfully to defy the law."

The clashes and enormous outpouring of support for the students were an unexpected turnaround for the democracy movement. Just a few days ago, the number of students occupying Tiananmen Square had dropped to a few thousand, and students seemed to be having difficulty mobilizing large numbers of citizens to take to the streets. The Government's strategy, of waiting for the students to become bored and go home, seemed to be leading to the possibility of a resolution to the difficulty.

Cyclists Killed

Then a police van crashed into four bicyclists late Friday night, generating new outrage against the Government. One cyclist was killed instantly, and two died in the hospital Saturday, while the fourth seemed less seriously hurt.

Rumors were less meticulous about detail, and word spread early Saturday morning through the capital that four people had been killed by the police. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets to protest, and immediately found themselves confronting more than 2,000 unarmed troops who were

PRESIDENT ASSAILS SHOOTINGS IN CHINA

Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — President Bush said today that he deeply deplored the shooting of protesters by Chinese troops.

The President said it was "clear that the Chinese Government has chosen to use force against Chinese citizens who were making a peaceful statement in favor of democracy."

"I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent loss of life," said Mr. Bush, who was spending the weekend in Kennebunkport, Me. "We have been urging and continue to urge non-violence, restraint and dialogue. Tragically, another course has been chosen. Again, I urge a return to non-violent means for dealing with the current situation."

Baker Is Careful

Secretary of State Baker, appearing on the CNN television program "Newsmaker Saturday," declined to say whether the Bush Administration would seek to penalize China by such steps as cutting off sales of American arms to Beijing.

Appearing on the CNN television program "Newsmaker Saturday," Mr. Baker said that the Chinese Government and the thousands of protesters seeking greater democracy had displayed "a significant amount of restraint" over the last few weeks.

But today, he said, "it would appear that there may be some violence being used here on both sides," not only by Chinese soldiers, but also by students throwing firebombs.

Comments Called Stronger

Mr. Baker said that his comments today were "considerably stronger than what we've said heretofore." But they did not go as far as many members of Congress and human rights groups say the Administration should have gone in expressing concern.

Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed alarm at China's effort to suppress the student protests.

"The Chinese Communist leaders apparently are not willing to cease their historic repression of human rights," Mr. Helms said from his home in Raleigh. "I will be working with my colleagues to insure that, as a first response against this brutality, all U.S.

anytime. There were some reports that the Communist Party's ruling Politburo had met Friday and given the Beijing municipality the authority to clear the square and end the protests. The People's Daily and the television news on Saturday took a hard line against the

found themselves confronting more than 2,000 unarmed troops who were marching toward Tiananmen Square.

The troops retreated, but that confrontation seemed to set the tone for the massive demonstrations later Saturday and early today.

colleagues to insure that, as a response against this brutality, all U.S. military cooperation and sharing of technology with the Communist Government must be terminated."

In a letter to President Bush this week, Freedom House, a human rights organization founded in 1941, said the United States should condemn China for "any significant violations of political rights and civil liberties."

Kampelman's Argument

The chairman of Freedom House, Max M. Kampelman, said that such violations would justify an immediate review of the full range of economic and military cooperation between Washington and Beijing.

Secretary Baker said today, "The army of China calls itself the army of the people, and we think it would be unfortunate indeed if the army of the people were used to suppress the people."

Mr. Baker declined to say if the United States should impose sanctions against China. He said that the shooting of demonstrators by troops today was "the first really significant use of force" since the student protests began seven weeks ago.

"Before we get into hypothetical situations, let's see how this most recent and extremely deplorable development unfolds," Mr. Baker said. "Let's see what happens over the course of the next few days before we start hypothesizing about what we might or might not do in the future."

Mr. Baker said that the State Department had ordered employees of the American Embassy in Beijing to avoid Tiananmen Square, the site of the demonstrations where soldiers opened fire today. In addition, he said, the department has issued a notice urging Americans to avoid travel to China at this time.

A Heady Defiance to Repression

at 2,000 students begin a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square.

An announced Politburo meeting reverses the moderate line of the party leader, Zhao Ziyang, including concessions with the students and limited greater democracy.

Mail S. Gorbachev arrives in Beijing for reconciliation of the two Communist leaders. Hunger strikers camped out in the square to end their vigil, forcing the government to move their welcoming ceremony to the airport.

The Minister Li Peng warns that the situation is spreading all over the country. The government capitulates on a key study by arranging a nationally televised meeting between Mr. Li and leaders of the student movement. "You have good intentions, but our country to become better than you have raised will eventually be destroyed."

Troops are called into the capital and imposed in parts of the city as the government attempts crack down. "We must take resolute measures to end the chaos," Prime Minister Li says. Tens

of thousands of people rush out of their homes blocking troops from reaching demonstrators in the central square. Later in the day, about one million Chinese take to the streets to defy martial law.

Reports circulate that Zhao Ziyang has been stripped of all power, retaining only his title of General Secretary of the party.

May 25 Mr. Li declares that his Government is in control and sends a letter to troops encircling Beijing, expressing the hope that "the troops will overcome the difficulties confronting them" and "successfully impose martial law."

May 27 Some student leaders call for an end to their occupation of Tiananmen Square, but say they will continue to hold large-scale demonstrations to press for greater democracy and the resignation of Prime Minister Li.

June 2 Unarmed troops try to march on the square but are driven back by thousands of citizens.

June 3 A violent confrontation begins as troops again march on square, beating dozens of protesters before retreating.

June 4 Troops and tanks return to the square, opening fire on throngs and destroying barricades.

ars

bullets, against

pen be- said Lu nt engi- at first ck, and


t to the sands of orth in- ass and der-like parently

use of a res with children a bed," and neck. "They their was be-

unist

Crackdown in Beijing

Events began Saturday afternoon; times shown are local times.



The New York Times/June 4, 1989

green helmets, sweating in their heavy green uniforms under the pelt- ing sun.

Some citizens gathered in small huddles around people they thought

how far the Government would go.

"They are simply ruffians and band- its," said a young well-dressed woman who had gotten caught in the cross-fire of bricks and stones as she

comfort her. "We are shocked," he said. "We thought that this kind of thing only happened during the reign of the corrupt Government of the Kuomintang. Yet this happened in our People's Republic. The troops